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78–817 2013

HEARING ON IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 8, 2012 

Serial No. 112–OS12/SS15 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 

ii 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman 

WALLY HERGER, California 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

PETER J. ROSKAM, Illinois 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

RICK BERG, North Dakota 

DIANE BLACK, Tennessee 

TOM REED, New York 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JENNIFER SAFAVIAN, Staff Director 

JANICE MAYS, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana, Chairman 

DIANE BLACK, Tennessee 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

TOM REED, New York 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas, Chairman 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

RICK BERG, North Dakota 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

iii 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of May 8, 2012 announcing the hearing ................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration ................................................................................................................. 9 

Testimony ................................................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr., Inspector General, Social Security 

Administration ..................................................................................................... 27 

Testimony ................................................................................................................. 28 

Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service ............................................................................................. 34 

Testimony ................................................................................................................. 37 

Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Service ............ 48 

Testimony ................................................................................................................. 50 

David F. Black, General Counsel, Social Security Administration ..................... 70 

Testimony ................................................................................................................. 72 

(1) 

HEARING ON IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX 

FRAUD 

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

1100, Longworth House Office Building, the Honorable Charles 

Boustany [chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight] presiding. 

[The advisory of the hearing follows:] 

2 

HEARING ADVISORY 

Chairmen Boustany and Johnson Announce 

Hearing on Identity Theft and Tax Fraud 

Tuesday, May 08, 2012 

House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Charles Boustany, 

Jr., MD (R-LA) and Social Security Subcommittee Chairman Sam Johnson (R-TX) 

today announced that the Subcommittees on Oversight and Social Security will hold 

a hearing on tax fraud involving identity theft. The hearing will take place on 

Tuesday, May 8, 2012, in 1100 Longworth House Office Building, beginning 

at 10:00 A.M. 

In view of the limited time available to hear from witnesses, oral testimony at 

this hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However, any individual or organization not scheduled for an oral appearance may submit a written statement for 

consideration by the Committee and for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing. A list of invited witnesses will follow. 

BACKGROUND: 

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) recently reported 

that criminals are stealing identities at an alarming rate to receive fraudulent tax 

refunds. For Processing Year 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported detecting approximately 940,000 tax returns potentially filed by identity thieves and 

prevented issuing $6.5 billion in fraudulent tax refunds. Yet, TIGTA found that 

fraudulent refunds acquired through identity theft are significantly greater than the 

amounts detected. Recent media reports indicate criminals are engaging in previously unheard of levels of identity-theft related tax fraud, including a Tampa, 

Florida ring that allegedly swindled taxpayers out of $130 million by using off-theshelf tax preparation software and prepaid debit cards to fraudulently obtain tax refunds. 

One source of information for identity thieves is the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) compilation of death records, which it uses to administer benefits. Since 

1980, the SSA has made available for purchase by the public a file containing the 

Social Security numbers (SSNs), names, dates of birth and death, and zip code of 

those who have died. According to the Inspector General of SSA, this data file, 

known as the Death Master File (DMF), contains the personal information of 85 

million Social Security number holders who have died since 1936, as well as the information from about 1.3 million new deaths that are added each year. 

The DMF is useful to many organizations for fraud prevention and benefit administration. It has been purchased by other government agencies, financial institutions, life insurance companies, credit reporting organizations, data aggregators, 

medical researchers, genealogists and others; and purchasers are free to re-disclose 

the data they obtain. At the same time, criminals are able to exploit the availability 

of death information to submit fraudulent tax returns that include the decedent’s 

SSN, including the SSNs of deceased dependent children. Only after the parents of 

the dead child have had their legitimate return rejected by the IRS do they and the 

agency discover the theft. 

According to the 2011 Annual Report to Congress by the National Taxpayer Advocate, the federal government facilitates tax-related identity theft by publicly releasing significant personal information of deceased individuals. The National Taxpayer 

Advocate has recommended legislative action to restrict access to the DMF. The 

Taxpayer Advocate has also reported a 97 percent increase in taxpayer identitytheft complaints in fiscal year (FY) 2011, on top of a 23 percent increase in FY 2010. 

In November 2011, SSA restricted the release of certain state records in the publicly-available file, resulting in the removal of 4.2 million death records from the 

DMF, and since that time has also removed zip code information from the DMF. 

3 

In addition, the Administration is developing legislation to limit the availability of 

death information. 

In announcing the hearing, Chairman Boustany said, ‘‘Improper payments of tax refunds have cost taxpayers over $100 billion in recent years. This 

hearing will explore a major source of the problem - identity thieves who 

steal Social Security numbers to engage in tax fraud. We need to make sure 

that we have a complete accounting of the size of the problem, understand 

why it is getting worse, and explore what can be done to combat tax fraud 

so we can catch and put more identity thieves in jail.’’ 

In announcing the hearing, Chairman Johnson said, ‘‘Worrying about a lost 

loved one’s stolen identity is a burden no grieving family should bear. 

That’s why I, along with a number of my colleagues, introduced H.R. 3475, 

the ‘Keeping IDs Safe Act of 2011,’ to protect the Social Security number 

and other personal information of those who have died. With the bipartisan 

support of my colleagues and the Administration we will take steps to stop 

these heartless identity thieves and protect American taxpayers.’’ 

FOCUS OF THE HEARING: 

The Subcommittees will examine how identity theft contributes to tax fraud, and 

whether the IRS and the SSA are doing enough to protect SSNs and prevent and 

detect false returns filed by identity thieves. 

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page of the Committee 

website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, 

http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘Hearings.’’ Select the hearing for which you 

would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, ‘‘Click here to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, submit all requested information. ATTACH your submission as a Word document, in compliance 

with the formatting requirements listed below, by the close of business on Tuesday, May 22, 2012. Finally, please note that due to the change in House mail policy, the U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package deliveries to all House Office 

Buildings. For questions, or if you encounter technical problems, please call (202) 

225-1721 or (202) 225-3625. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing 

record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, 

but we reserve the right to format it according to our guidelines. Any submission 

provided to the Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for 

the printed record, and any written comments in response to a request for written 

comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission or supplementary item not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will 

be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in Word format and MUST 

NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised 

that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. 

2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. 

Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material 

not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use 

by the Committee. 

3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. A supplemental sheet must accompany each submission listing the 

name, company, address, telephone, and fax numbers of each witness. 

The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-1721 or 202-226- 

4 

3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World 

Wide Web at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/

f 

. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. The subcommittees will come to order. I 

would like to welcome everyone to today’s joint Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Subcommittee on Social Security hearing on identity 

theft and tax fraud. I am very pleased to join Chairman Johnson 

again as our subcommittees focus on fraud, waste and abuse and 

how the Federal Government might better protect taxpayer dollars. 

The subject of today’s hearing is not a new one, but evidence suggests it is a problem reaching unprecedented levels. Identity theft 

allows criminals to file false tax returns and claim thousands of 

dollars in refundable tax credits. 

In a recent case in Florida, identity thieves alleged obtained $30 

million in fraudulent refunds and nearly obtained $100 million 

more before being caught. They spent the money on expensive cars, 

homes, living lavishly under the impression that they could steal 

from taxpayers with impunity. Recent news stories have also told 

of identity thieves so brazen that they hold seminars on how to 

steal identities and to commit tax fraud. 

In another case scam artists uploaded music video on YouTube 

showing cars they were able to purchase with stolen taxpayer dollars and instructing others on how they could do the same. 

Confronted with emboldened identity thieves and tax cheats, the 

American taxpayers expect the Federal Government to better protect identities, detect fraudulent tax returns, punish those engaged 

in these crimes and assist taxpayers who are victimized. Today we 

will explore how well the Federal Government is living up to this 

responsibility and how we can improve these efforts. 

This morning’s hearing will seek to answer four questions. First, 

how does identity theft related tax fraud occur? Identity thieves 

often rely on public sources of sensitive information to engage in 

tax fraud, and the subcommittees look forward to hearing from the 

witnesses on how this information might be limited or better protected in a way that protects taxpayer identities. 

Second, how big is the problem? While the IRS has estimated 

identity theft related tax fraud costs taxpayers more than $6 billion 

annually, we will hear testimony this morning that the true figure 

may be nearly double previous estimates. 

Third, what tools are needed to better deter, detect and punish 

this crime? Fruitful discussions of fraud, waste and abuse should 

include not just details of the problem, but also talk of potential solutions, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on that. 

And finally, this morning’s hearing will focus on victimized taxpayers and what their experience is when they learn they have 

been victims of identity theft and how the government might better 

assist them in recovering from the crime and better protect their 

identities. 

5 

I want to thank our witnesses and I look forward to this morning’s discussion. Before yielding to the ranking member, Mr. Lewis, 

I ask unanimous consent that all members written statements be 

included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Lewis, I now yield to you, sir. 

Mr. LEWIS. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, you and Chairman Johnson, for holding this hearing. I am pleased to have the 

Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration 

before us today. These agencies are both entrusted with personal 

information and they should play an important role in preventing 

identity theft. 

Tax fraud and identity theft are growing problems for the tax administration. They harm the Federal Treasury, American citizens 

and their families. I commend the Internal Revenue Service for 

identifying and preventing over $14 billion in fraudulent tax refunds last year. 

I also thank the agency for its assistance to almost 500,000 taxpayers who have been victims of identity theft. Despite this 

progress we need to do more, and we must do more, to help victims 

and stop the loss of billions of taxpayer dollars. 

I continue to have serious concerns about the effects of recent 

budget cuts on taxpayers and the agency’s ability to serve them. In 

this area of budget cuts, hiring freezes and staff reduction, I am 

also concerned that the IRS cannot fully combat identity theft and 

tax fraud. This year the IRS expects to spend over $330 million 

combating fraudulent tax refunds when its budget was cut by over 

$300 million. 

In a most recent report to Congress, the National Taxpayer Advocate states that the most serious problem facing taxpayers is 

that the IRS is not adequately funded to serve taxpayers and collect taxes. We will see today that the IRS is not properly funded 

to handle the growing identity theft problem. We need to provide 

the IRS with more tools to combat identity theft today. 

I look forward to learning more about the recommendation to expand the agency’s to access the National Directory of New Hires. 

The recommendation was initially proposed by the Bush administration in 2006. It has been in the Administration’s budget proposal every year since then. It appears to be a common sense solution that will be a step in the right direction. 

Now the gentleman from Washington, Representative 

McDermott, and I have introduced a bill to expand the agency’s access to this database. I ask my colleagues on both sides to join us 

on this bill. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to thank the witnesses for 

appearing before us today. I look forward to your testimony, and 

thank you again very much for being here. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the ranking member of the 

Oversight Subcommittee, and now we turn to Chairman Johnson, 

chairman of the Social Security Subcommittee, for his opening 

statement. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman 

Boustany, I want to thank you for holding the hearing regarding 

identity theft and its role in the growing crime of tax fraud. Earlier 

6 

this year the Subcommittee on Social Security held a hearing on 

Social Security death records, including the so-called Death Master 

File, a publicly available listing of the personal information of those 

who have died, including their Social Security numbers. We 

learned that the Death Master File serves as a readily available 

source of information identity thieves need in order to file fraudulent tax returns. 

We heard the heartbreaking story of the Agin family whose 4- 

year-old daughter Alexis had her identity stolen shortly after she 

passed away. Only when their tax return was rejected by the IRS 

did the Agins learn that an identity thief had already filed a claim, 

claiming their child as a dependent. No grieving family should bear 

this additional burden. Yet when the Agins reached out to the community of grieving cancer parents, within the first hour they heard 

from 14 families who had lost a child whose Social Security Number was also stolen. Alexis’ father, Jonathan Agin is in the audience today. He has joined us and I thank him for his tireless efforts 

to stop identity thieves from accessing the Death Master File. 

Thank you for being with us, sir. 

So why does the Federal Government make public the Social Security numbers and other personal information of those who have 

died? Turns out unless Congress changes the law, it is required. 

Social Security collects death information so it can stop benefits to 

those who have died and start benefits for their survivors. But a 

1980 Freedom of Information Act court mandated settlement required Social Security to also make the information about deceased 

Social Security number holders available to the public. In response 

Social Security created the Death Master File. With 84 million listed individuals and 1-1/2 million new individuals added each year, 

many groups now purchase the Death Master File from the Commerce Department, including government agencies, credit reporting 

agencies, financial institutions, law enforcement organizations, and 

medical and genealogical researchers. 

But the decades old practice of publishing personal death information that anyone can buy needs to end, and now. In the age of 

Internet identity thieves can all too easily get their hands on a Social Security Number and reap instant awards that no one, including the person whose number it is, knows what has happened until 

after the fact usually. 

ID Analytics, a fraud prevention firm, recently released a study 

comparing death information from the Death Master File to applications for credit products and cell phone services. The study found 

that the identities of nearly 2.5 million deceased Americans are 

used by fraudsters to commit identity theft each year. 

Identity theft is also a growing problem on the tax front. The 

Treasury Inspector General reports that IRS stopped 6.5 billion in 

false refunds in 2011, but much more went undetected. 

Taxpayers who are victims of tax identity theft have to endure 

a long process of proving their real identities, submitting paper returns and waiting months to get their rightful refund. That is just 

wrong. 

To help stop this crime I, along with a number of my colleagues, 

introduced H.R. 3475, Keeping IDs Safe Act of 2011. Our bill ends 

7 

the publication of the Death Master File, denying criminals easy 

access to the personal information of those who have died. 

Make no mistake, we will stop these identity thieves and in so 

doing protect the American taxpayers and prevent other families 

from having to go through what the Agins did. 

I want to thank all our witnesses for coming today and I look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Chairman Johnson. Now we 

will turn to the ranking member of the Committee on Social Security, Mr. Becerra. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. The Internal Revenue Service does a lot with a little, processing 140 million 

tax returns in the span of just a few months while combating fraud 

and enforcing our tax laws. Congress needs to do its part too by 

providing adequate resources and enacting legislation that strikes 

the right balance between efficiently processing returns and preventing fraud. 

We are all concerned about tax fraud. Tax fraud increases the 

burden on honest taxpayers, it undermines compliance with our 

voluntary tax system, and it harms the U.S. Treasury. When tax 

fraud takes the form of identity theft, it hurts individual taxpayers 

more directly, as Mr. Jonathan Agin, who testified recently at our 

subcommittee hearing, and he is the father of a deceased child who 

was a victim of tax fraud, as he so eloquently testified when he appeared before us in this subcommittee. 

Mr. Chairman, the IRS needs both tools and resources to combat 

fraud. It needs not only to work together with Congress because it 

is not always easy to keep a step ahead of the fraudsters, but it 

also, we are going to learn today, needs to do something about having the right amount of funding to get things done. We are going 

to learn today about some of the more creative ways that individuals actually do perpetrate tax fraud. 

Unfortunately, budget cuts mean the IRS is struggling just to 

keep up with its core work. This year IRS’s operating budget is 

$305 million less than it was in 2011, and it has 5,000 fewer employees who can process returns, assist taxpayers and combat 

fraud. 

As a result, the IRS can barely answer the phone calls it receives 

from taxpayers. In fact this spring the large majority of callers to 

the special IRS phone line dedicated to assisting taxpayers with 

identity theft did not get through. For the most recent week measured, 75 percent of callers were unable to get through, and those 

that did get through waited 1 hour and 21 minutes on hold before 

the IRS employee could assist them. 

The National Taxpayer Advocate has identified IRS’s underfunding as the ‘‘number one most serious problem’’ in her annual 

report to Congress, concluding that the IRS ‘‘is not adequately 

funded to serve taxpayers and collect taxes.’’ 

Combating fraud requires a balancing act. The IRS must balance 

the time it takes to conduct antifraud checks with a statutory requirement it has to process returns and issue refunds quickly for 

law abiding taxpayers. Each year under current procedures it takes 

months for the IRS to receive and process the nearly 250 million 

W-2 reports and 1.5 billion other third party reports that are subVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:29 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 078817 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\78817.XXX 78817
8 

mitted. This is on an annual basis. At the same time, the IRS aims 

to issue refunds within 7 to 10 days of receiving the return. As a 

result the agency does not wait to issue refunds until it is able to 

cross-check those returns against those other reports. 

I think we need to figure out a way to do a better job in the future, but there is no easy answer now on the horizon. 

Similarly, the question of the Death Master File also requires 

striking the right balance. The Social Security Subcommittee has 

received testimony over the years about the value of SSA’s compilation of the death records it receives into the DMF. The DMF is 

helpful in administering benefits and combating fraud at both government agencies and in the private sector. At the same time we 

know that the widespread availability of the SSA’s death information means it can also be used by identity fraudsters. We are going 

to learn more about the challenges of combating identity fraud in 

the tax world today. 

I commend SSA for utilizing its limited statutory authority to restrict death information. SSA recently removed zip code information from the DMF to make it harder for fraudsters to use, and 

promptly it received a Freedom of Information Act—a FOIA request—to reinstate it. SSA has also recently removed certain State 

death records which it were determined were not subject to a FOIA 

request from the publicly released DMF, resulting in the removal 

of over 4 million records from the file. However, SSA’s longstanding 

legal opinion is that the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information 

Act do not allow SSA to keep its death records from the public. As 

a result, at our last hearing on the DMF and identity fraud SSA 

testified that the Administration was evaluating legislative options 

to restrict release of the DMF. I understand they have made significant progress and I look forward to receiving the legislative proposal. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with the administration 

and with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we try to move 

forward with a solution to this problem, and with that I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the ranking member for his 

opening statement and now I would like to welcome our panel. We 

have a distinguished panel with us today. This morning we will 

hear from the Honorable Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. Welcome, Mr. George. We will also 

hear from the Honorable Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr., Inspector General for the Social Security Administration. And thirdly, Mr. Steven 

Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement for the 

Internal Revenue Service. Welcome, sir. Nina Olson, the National 

Taxpayer Advocate. Ms. Olson, welcome. And Mr. David Black, the 

General Counsel for the Social Security Administration. 

Welcome to all of you. We thank you for being here today. You 

each will have 5 minutes, as is customary, to deliver your oral 

statements, keeping in mind that your full written statements will 

be included in the record. 

Inspector General George, you may begin. 

9 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RUSSELL GEORGE, 

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. GEORGE. Thank you, Chairman Boustany, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Lewis, Ranking Member Becerra, and Members of the Subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to address the subject of identity theft and its impact on taxpayers and 

tax administration. 

Since I last testified on this subject in November of 2011, TIGTA 

is in the process of completing an assessment of the IRS’s efforts 

to spot and prevent identity theft. While the final report will not 

be released until June, I will discuss some of our most cogent findings as well as those of a recently issued report on the assistance 

the IRS provides to victims of tax fraud related identity theft. 

TIGTA has reported previously a substantial number of individuals continue to submit tax returns reporting false income and/or 

withholding for the sole purpose of receiving a fraudulent tax refund. The IRS recently reported that of the more than 2 million tax 

returns that it identified as fraudulent approximately 900,000 tax 

returns with $6.5 billion in associated fraudulent tax refunds involved identity theft. However, the IRS does not know how many 

identity thieves are filing fraudulent tax returns or the amount of 

revenue being lost. 

TIGTA evaluated the IRS’s efforts to identify and prevent fraudulent tax returns resulting from identity theft. As part of our assessment we identified and quantified potential refund losses. Our 

analysis found that although the IRS detects and prevents a large 

number of fraudulent refunds based on false income documents, 

there is much more fraud that it does not detect. We identified approximately 1.5 million additional undetected tax returns with potentially fraudulent tax refunds totaling in excess of $5 billion. If 

this is not addressed, we estimate the IRS could issue approximately $26 billion in fraudulent tax refunds resulting from identity 

theft over the next 5 years. 

As we previously reported, access to third party income and withholding information at the time tax returns are processed is the 

single most important tool the IRS could have to identify and prevent this type of tax fraud. Another important tool that could help 

the IRS prevent this type of fraud is the National Directory of New 

Hires. Again, as was pointed out earlier by Mr. Lewis, legislation 

would be needed to expand the IRS’s authority to access the directory’s wage information for use in identifying tax fraud. 

In those cases involving identity theft the fraudulent tax return 

is often filed before the legitimate taxpayer files his or her tax return. For tax year 2010 we identified more than 48,000 Social Security numbers that were used multiple times as a primary taxpayer identification number. When the identity thief files the 

fraudulent tax return the IRS does not yet know that the individual’s identity will be used more than once. As a result the tax return is processed and the fraudulent refund is issued. Once the legitimate taxpayer files his or her tax return the duplicate tax return is identified and the refund is held until the IRS can confirm 

the taxpayer’s identity. These instances result in the greatest burden to the legitimate taxpayer. 

10 

We recently completed an audit that evaluated the assistance the 

IRS provides to victims of identity theft. We found that the IRS is 

not effectively providing assistance to these victims. Moreover, 

processes are not adequate to communicate identity theft procedures to taxpayers, resulting in increased burden for victims. Of 

concern is the length of time taxpayers must work with the IRS to 

resolve identity theft cases which, as Mr. Becerra pointed out, 

could take more than a year to resolve. Resources have not been 

sufficient to work identity theft cases dealing with refund fraud 

and continue to be of concern. IRS employees who work the majority of cases also respond to taxpayer calls. As a result the average 

wait time for a taxpayer was approximately 1 hour. 

In conclusion, we at TIGTA continue to be very concerned about 

the scope of this problem and will provide continuing audit coverage of IRS’s actions taken to stem tax fraud related identity theft 

and to provide prompt resolution to taxpayers who are victimized. 

In addition, we will continue to conduct criminal investigations of 

identity theft violations involving IRS employees, tax return preparers and individuals impersonating the IRS. 

I hope my discussion of our work assists you with your oversight 

of the issue involving the IRS. Chairman Boustany, Chairman 

Johnson, Ranking Member Lewis, Ranking Member Becerra, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address 

this important topic. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. George follows:] 

11 


Insert offset folio 01 here 78817.001

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON OVERSIGHT 

AND SOCIAL SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

"Identity Theft and Tax Fraud" 

Testimony of 

The Honorable J. Russell George 

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

May 8, 2012 

Washington, D.C. 
12 


Insert offset folio 02 here 78817.002

TESTIMONY OF 

THE HONORABLE J. RUSSELL GEORGE 

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN[STRATION 

before the 

COMM[TTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMM[TTEES ON OVERS[GHT 

AND SOCIAL SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT[VES 

"[dentity Theft and Tax Fraud" 

May 8,2012 

Chairman Boustany, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Lewis, Ranking 

Member Becerra, and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the 

invitation to speak before you today on the subject of identity theft and its impact 

on taxpayers and tax administration. Since [ last testified on this subject in 

November 2011,1 we have completed our assessment of the [RS's efforts to 

identify and prevent identity theft and plan to issue our final report in June of this 

year. We have also recently issued a report on the assistance that the [RS 

provides to victims of tax fraud-related identity theft. My comments today will 

focus on this recently completed work. 

As we have reported previously, a substantial number of individuals 

continue to submit tax returns reporting false income and/or withholding for the 

sole purpose of receiving a fraudulent tax refund. Many of these claims involve 

identity theft. For Processing Year 2011,2 the [RS reported that of the 2.2 million 

tax returns that it identified as fraudulent, approximately 940,000 tax returns with 

$6.5 billion in associated fraudulent tax refunds involved identity theft. 

The IRS acknowledges that it does not have complete statistics on identity 

theft. [n Calendar Year 2011, the IRS identified over 1.1 million incidents of 

identity theft that affected the Nation's tax system. This figure includes incidents 

in which taxpayers contacted the IRS alleging that they were victims of identity 

1 Identity Theft and Tax Fraud, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 

Reform, Subctm. on Government Organization, Efficiency and Financial Management, 112th 

Congo (Nov. 15,2011) (statement of J. Russell George). 

2 A Processing Year is the year that the tax return is processed. 
13 


Insert offset folio 03 here 78817.003

theft (110,750 incidents3

) as well as instances where the IRS identified identity 

theft (1,014,884 incidents4

). Many of the taxpayers that the IRS identified were 

not aware they were victims of identity theft because they either did not file tax 

returns or did not have filing requirements. 

Detection and Prevention of Identity Theft 

At the beginning of the 2012 Filing Season, the IRS announced the results 

of a nationwide sweep cracking down on suspected identity theft perpetrators as 

part of a stepped-up effort against refund fraud and identity theft. This effort is 

part of the IRS's identity theft strategy to prevent, detect, and resolve identity 

theft cases. In addition to this crackdown by its law-enforcement division, the 

IRS has stepped up its internal reviews to spot false tax returns before tax 

refunds are issued. These efforts include designing new identity theft screening 

filters that the IRS believes will improve its ability to identify false tax returns 

before they are processed and before any fraudulent tax refunds are issued. 

Tax returns identified by these new filters are held during processing until 

the IRS can verify the taxpayers' identity. IRS employees attempt to contact 

these individuals and request information to verify that the individual filing the tax 

return is the legitimate taxpayer. Once a taxpayer's identity has been confirmed, 

the tax return is released for processing and the tax refund is issued. If the IRS 

cannot confirm the filer's identity, it halts processing of the tax return to prevent 

the issuance of a fraudulent tax refund. As of April 19, 2012, the IRS reports that 

it has stopped the issuance of $1.3 billion in potentially fraudulent tax refunds as 

a result of the new identity theft filters. 

The IRS also continues to expand its efforts to prevent the payment of 

fraudulent tax refunds claimed using deceased individuals' names and Social 

Security Numbers (SSNs). The IRS began a pilot program in Processing Year 

2011 which locked taxpayers' accounts where the IRS Master File and Social 

Security Administration data showed a date of death. The IRS places a unique 

identity theft indicator on deceased individuals' tax accounts to lock their tax 

account. This will systemically void tax returns filed on a deceased taxpayer's 

account. As of March 1,2012, it had locked 90,570 tax accounts and prevented 

approximately $1.8 million in fraudulent tax refunds claimed using deceased 

individuals' identities since the lock was established. 

3 Taxpayers can be affected by more than one incident of identity theft. These incidences 

affected 87,322 taxpayers. 

4 These incidences affected 553.730 taxpayers. 

2 
14 


Insert offset folio 04 here 78817.004

Recognizing that victims of identity theft can be affected in multiple tax 

years, the IRS also places an identity theft indicator on each tax account for 

which it has determined an identity theft has occurred. All tax returns filed using 

the identity of a confirmed victim are flagged during tax return processing and 

sent for additional screening before any tax refund is issued. This screening is 

designed to detect tax returns filed by identity thieves who attempt to re-use a 

victim's identity in subsequent years and to prevent the issuance of fraudulent tax 

refunds. 

To further assist victims in the filing of their tax returns, the IRS, in Fiscal 

Year 2011, began issuing Identity Protection Personal Identification Numbers 

(IPPIN) to these individuals. The IPPIN will indicate that the taxpayer has 

previously provided the IRS with information that validates their identity and that 

the IRS is satisfied that the taxpayer is the valid holder of the SSN. Tax returns 

that are filed on accounts with an IPPIN correctly input at the time of filing will be 

processed as the valid tax return using standard processing procedures. A new 

IPPIN will be issued each subsequent year before the start of the new filing 

season for as long as the taxpayer remains at risk for identity theft. For the 2012 

Filing Season, the IRS sent 252,000 individuals an IPPIN. 

However, the IRS does not know how many identity thieves are filing 

fraudulent tax returns or the amount of revenue being lost. TIGTA evaluated the 

IRS's efforts to identify and prevent fraudulent tax returns resulting frorn identity 

theft.5 As part of our assessment, we identified and quantified potential refund 

losses resulting from identity theft. 

Using characteristics of tax returns that the IRS has identified and 

confirmed as fraudulent filings involving identity theft, we analyzed Tax Year 

2010 tax returns to identify additional tax returns that rnet the characteristics of 

these confirmed cases. Our analysis found that, although the IRS detects and 

prevents a large number of fraudulent refunds based on false income 

documents, there is rnuch fraud that it does not detect. We identified 

approximately 1.5 million additional undetected tax returns with potentially 

fraudulent tax refunds totaling in excess of $5.2 billion. If not addressed, we 

estimate the IRS could issue approxirnately $26 billion in fraudulent tax refunds 

resulting from identity theft over the next five years. 

5 TIGTA, Audit No. 201140044, Efforts to Identify and Prevent Fraudulent Tax Returns Resulting 

From Identity Theft (planned report issuance in June 2012). 

3 
15 


Insert offset folio 05 here 78817.005

The primary characteristic of these cases is that the identity thief reports 

false income and withholding to generate a fraudulent tax refund. Without the 

falsely reported income, many of the deductions and/or credits used to inflate the 

fraudulent tax refund could not be claimed on the tax return. The individuals 

whose identities were stolen may not even be aware that their identities were 

used to file a fraudulent tax return. These individuals are typically those who are 

not required to file a tax return. Individuals are generally not aware that they are 

the victims of this type of identity theft unless they file a tax return, which causes 

the return to be rejected as a duplicate filing. 

Access to third-party income and withholding information at the time tax 

returns are processed is the single most important tool the IRS could have to 

identify and prevent this type of identity theft tax fraud. In lieu of this, another 

important tool that could help the IRS prevent this type of fraud is the National 

Directory of New Hires.6 Legislation would be needed to expand the IRS's 

authority to access the National Directory of New Hires wage information for use 

in identifying tax fraud. Currently, the IRS's use of this data is limited by law to 

just those tax returns with a claim for the Earned Income Tax Credit. 

The IRS included a request for expanded access to the National Directory 

of New Hires in its annual budget submissions for Fiscal Years 2010,2011, and 

2012. The request was made as part of the IRS's efforts to strengthen tax 

administration. However, expanded access has not been provided for by law. 

The IRS has again requested expanded access to the National Directory of New 

Hires in its FY 2013 budget submission. 

In a report that we recently issued to the IRS, we included a 

recommendation to develop a process that uses information from the National 

Directory of New Hires (if expanded access is provided in the law) along with 

third-party income and withholding information that the IRS maintains for the prior 

year's tax filings to better identify individuals who report false income. The IRS 

could use this information to confirm that the individual had no reported income 

or withholding in the prior tax year and did not obtain new employment in the 

current tax year. The IRS could then freeze the tax refund and attempt to verify 

the reported income and withholding. 

6 A Department of Health and Human Services national database of wage and employment 

information submitted by Federal agencies and State workforce agencies. 

4 
16 


Insert offset folio 06 here 78817.006

Even with improved identification of these returns, the next step of 

verifying whether the returns are fraudulent will require resources. The IRS has 

faced budget cuts, a hiring freeze, and staffing reductions during the same time it 

has encountered a significant surge in identity theft refund fraud. Without the 

necessary resources, it is unlikely that the IRS will be able to work the entire 

inventory of potentially fraudulent tax refunds it identifies. The IRS will only 

select those tax returns that it can verify based on its resources. 

Using IRS estimates, it would cost approximately $31.8 million to screen 

and verify approximately 1.5 million tax returns that we identified as not having 

third-party information to support the income and withholding reported on the tax 

return. The net cost of not providing the necessary resources is substantial given 

that the potential revenue loss to the Federal Government of these identity theft 

refund fraud cases is $5.2 billion annually. 

The validation process that we have proposed has some limitations. It will 

not identify instances of identity theft in which the legitimate taxpayer is employed 

and has a filing requirement but has not yet filed an income tax return. The IRS 

needs further tools to identify those individuals who are improperly filing using the 

identity of a taxpayer with a tax return filing requirement. 

In those cases involving identity theft, the fraudulent tax return is often 

filed before the legitimate taxpayer files his or her tax return. For Tax Year 2010, 

we identified 48,357 SSNs that were used multiple times as a primary Taxpayer 

Identification Numberl When the identity thief files the fraudulent tax return, the 

IRS does not yet know that the individual's identity will be used more than once. 

As a result, the tax return is processed and the fraudulent refund is issued. 

These instances result in the greatest burden to the legitimate taxpayer. Once 

the legitimate taxpayer files his or her tax return, the duplicate tax return is 

identified and the refund is held until the IRS can confirm the taxpayer's identity. 

In Tax Year 2010, we estimate that $70.6 million in potentially fraudulent tax 

refunds were paid to identity thieves who filed tax returns before the legitimate 

taxpayers filed theirs. 8 This is in addition to the $5.2 billion in potentially 

fraudulent refunds noted previously related to taxpayers who do not appear to 

have a filing requirement. 

7 This estimate includes only those tax returns filed on tax accounts that contain an Identity Theft 

Indicator input on or before December 31,2011. It does not include potentially fraudulent tax 

returns filed on tax accounts that do not contain an Identity Theft Indicator. 

8 This estimate is based only on the duplicate use of the primary SSN. 

5 
17 


Insert offset folio 07 here 78817.007

Although the IRS is working toward finding ways to determine which tax 

return is legitimate, it could do more to prevent identity thieves from electronically 

filing (e-file) tax returns. Before a tax return can be submitted electronically, the 

taxpayer must verify his or her identity with either the prior year's tax return SelfSelect Personal Identification Number (PIN) or Adjusted Gross Income. 

However, if the taxpayer does not remember the prior year's Self-Select 

PIN or Adjusted Gross Income, he or she can go to IRS.gov, the IRS's public 

Internet website, and obtain an Electronic Filing PIN by providing his or her 

name, SSN, date of birth, and the address and filing status on the prior year's tax 

return. The IRS then matches this information with the data on the prior year's 

tax return filed by the taxpayer. 

Authenticating taxpayers is a challenge, not only in processing tax returns, 

but also whenever taxpayers call or write to the IRS requesting help with their tax 

account. The IRS has not adopted common industry practices for authentication, 

such as security challenge questions (e.g., mother's maiden name, name of first 

pet). 

Direct Deposit and the Use of Debit Cards 

Direct deposit, which now includes debit cards, is often used by identity 

thieves to obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Approximately $4.5 billion of the 

$5.2 billion in potentially fraudulent tax refunds we identified were issued by 

direct deposit. 

In September 2008, we reported9 that the IRS was not in compliance with direct 

deposit regulations that require tax refunds to be deposited into an account only 

in the name of the individual listed on the tax return. 10 We recommended that the 

IRS limit the number of tax refunds being sent to the same account. While such 

a limitation does not ensure that all direct deposits are in the name of the 

taxpayer, it does help limit the potential for fraud. The IRS was concerned about 

limiting the number of direct deposits to a single account because of situations in 

which an account is in the name of multiple individuals. In addition, the IRS 

places responsibility for compliance with Federal direct deposit regulations on the 

taxpayer. The IRS stated that it is the taxpayer's responsibility to ensure that 

their tax refunds are only directly deposited into their accounts. However, in our 

9 TIGTA, Ref. No. 2008-40-182, Processes Are Not Sufficient to Minimize Fraud and Ensure the 

Accuracy of Tax Refund Direct Deposits (Sept. 2008). 

10 31 C.F.R. Part 210 (2011). 

6 
18 


Insert offset folio 08 here 78817.008

opinion, the IRS is responsible for ensuring that direct deposits are made to an 

account in the name of the recipient. Representatives from the Financial 

Management Service also indicated that the IRS is responsible for enforcing the 

Code of Federal Regulations requirement. 

To date, little has been done to ensure that tax refunds are directly 

deposited only into the taxpayer's account. Some bank accounts are obviously 

being used for the refunds of many different taxpayers. For example, we found 

that 4,157 of the potentially fraudulent tax refunds we identified totaling 

$6.7 million were deposited into one of 10 bank accounts. Each of these 10 bank 

accounts had direct deposits of more than 300 tax refunds. 

The use of debit cards to receive tax refunds further increases the risk of 

tax fraud. Identity thieves are using debit cards to fraudulently obtain direct 

deposits of fraudulent tax refunds. For example, authorities confiscated over 

5,000 debit cards during the investigation of a Tampa, Florida identity theft 

scheme. Individuals can obtain a debit card online or from a bank, a third-party 

provider, or a local retailer. This complicates the IRS's efforts to identify the 

holder of the debit card as well as the bank account and the tax account 

associated with the debit card. In addition, the debit card issuer is the only entity 

that can ensure the individual requesting the debit card and receiving the tax 

refund is the taxpayer. 

The IRS has a process in place in which it works with banks to obtain 

information on questionable tax refunds. In December 2011, one bank 

associated with the confiscated debit cards from the Tampa scheme provided the 

IRS with a listing of 60,000 bank accounts, including debit card accounts, that it 

had identified nationwide with questionable tax refunds. The bank intercepted 

and prevented questionable tax refunds totaling $164 million from being 

deposited into these accounts. 

IRS management has indicated that it is working to establish processes to 

recover potentially fraudulent tax refunds intercepted by banks. However, more 

action is needed to prevent tax refunds from being erroneously deposited into 

bank accounts. We are currently working with the IRS and the Department of the 

Treasury to determine ways in which the IRS could strengthen direct deposit 

controls. At a minimum, we believe the IRS should implement our previous 

recommendations to limit the number of direct deposits to a single bank or debit 

card account, and coordinate with financial institutions to develop a process to 

7 
19 


Insert offset folio 09 here 78817.009

ensure that tax refunds issued via direct deposit are issued only to accounts that 

are in the taxpayer's name. 

We believe the Department of the Treasury will need improved policies 

and regulations to ensure that debit cards can be identified based on the direct 

deposit account information on tax returns and vice versa. Furthermore, 

because of the potential for fraud that can be perpetrated by an anonymous user 

of these debit cards, the Department of the Treasury should take steps to ensure 

that financial institutions and/or debit card administration companies authenticate 

the identity of individuals purchasing or obtaining debit cards before Government 

funds can be deposited on those cards. Direct deposits should not be made to 

debit cards issued by financial institutions and debit card administration 

companies that do not take sufficient steps to authenticate individuals' identities. 

IRS Assistance to Victims of Identity Theft 

We recently completed an audit that evaluated the assistance that the IRS 

provides to victims of identity theft. 11 We found that the IRS is not effectively 

providing assistance to these victims. Moreover, processes are not adequate to 

communicate identity theft procedures to taxpayers, resulting in increased 

burden for victims of identity theft. Of continuing concern is the length of time 

taxpayers must work with the IRS to resolve identity theft cases. 

Identity theft cases can take more than one year to resolve. While we 

cannot provide specific case examples due to privacy and disclosure laws, the 

following timeline illustrates a typical path for an identity theft refund fraud case 

that is not complex: 

February The identity thief files a fraudulent tax return and obtains a tax refund. Subsequently, 

the legitimate taxpayer (taxpayer) attempts to electronically file his tax return, for 

which he is due a tax refund. He receives an IRS rejection notice stating that his 

SSN cannot be used more than once on the tax return or on another tax return. 

The taxpayer calls the IRS toll-free telephone line and explains the situation to the 

assistor. The assistor, after authenticating the taxpayer's identity, researches his tax 

account and determines that a tax return has already been filed using his name and 

SSN. The assistor advises the taxpayer to file a paper tax return, attaching an 

Identity Theft Affidavit (Form 14039) or a police report and a valid government-issued 

document such as a copy of a Social Security card, passport, or driver's license to 

the tax return and mailing it to the IRS. 

11 TIGTA, Ref. No. 2012-40-050, Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service (May 2012). 

8 
20 


Insert offset folio 10 here 78817.010

The IRS receives the paper tax return in one of its processing sites and a technician 

enters the data into the IRS computer system. The paper tax return with all 

attachments is sent to the Files Unit. It is rejected. A technician determines it is a 

duplicate tax return and inputs the appropriate transaction code. The duplicate return 

case is received in the Duplicate function, where an assistor identifies this as a 

possible identity theft case. The assistor requests the paper tax return. The case is 

set aside in a queue to be worked after April 15, when the filing season has ended. 

April The taxpayer calls the IRS toll-free line again and asks when he will receive his tax 

refund. The assistor researches the taxpayer's account, determines a duplicate tax 

return has been filed, and advises the taxpayer that there will be processing delays 

and that he rnay receive correspondence requesting additional information. The 

assistor also advises the taxpayer to visit the IRS website at IRS.gov for additional 

information and links related to identity theft. 

July The taxpayer's tax return is worked in the Duplicate function and determined to be an 

identity theft case. The duplicate tax return is transferred to another unit to an 

assistor whose responsibilities also include answering IRS toll-free telephone calls. 

The case is scanned into a management information system and queued. 

September The assistor begins working the case, orders copies of original tax returns, and sends 

letters to the identity thief and the taxpayer to attempt to determine who the legitimate 

taxpayer is. The taxpayer responds, confirming that he did not file the first tax return 

the IRS received. 

October The taxpayer calls the Identity Protection Specialized Unit and asks when he should 

expect his tax refund. The customer service representative researches the case and 

advises him his case is being worked. This representative sends a referral to the 

assistor working the case. 

November The assistor determines who the legitimate taxpayer is, requests adjustments to the 

taxpayer's account, and sends a letter to the identity thief providing him or her with a 

temporary tax identity number and a letter to the taxpayer advising him he has been 

a victim of identity theft and his account has been flagged. 

December The taxpayer receives the letter from the IRS and calls the Identity Protection 

Specialized Unit to inquire when he will receive his tax refund. The assistor advises 

him that it has been scheduled. 

January The adjustments post to the taxpayer's account and the refund is released. The 

taxpayer receives another letter advising him he has been a victim of identity theft 

and his account has been flagged. A new tax account for the person who committed 

the identity theft is also established. 12 

The above illustration provides a "best case" resolution of an identity theft 

case given the IRS's current processes, However, most cases are more 

complex and can present considerable challenges throughout the resolution 

process, For instance, it can be difficult to determine who the legitimate taxpayer 

is or if the case is actually a case of identity theft. Taxpayers sometimes 

transpose digits in SSNs, but do not respond to the IRS when it requests 

information to resolve the case, As a result, the IRS may not be able to 

12 Even though a tax return is fraudulent, the IRS retains a record of the tax return by creating a 

tax account under a tax identification number that the IRS creates, and posting the tax return. 

9 
21 


Insert offset folio 11 here 78817.011

determine who the legitimate taxpayer is. With other cases we have reviewed, 

taxpayers claimed to be victims of identity theft after the IRS had questioned 

deductions or credits or proposed examination adjustments. In certain instances, 

the Social Security Administration had issued two taxpayers the same SSN. 

As a result of an assessment of its Identity Theft Program completed in 

October 2011, the IRS is currently planning improvements to its program. The 

IRS is reorganizing to have an Identity Theft Program Specialized Group within 

each of the business units and/or functions where dedicated employees work the 

identity theft portion of the case. It will also begin collecting IRS-wide identity 

theft data to assist in tracking and reporting the effect identity theft has on tax 

administration. Nevertheless, these improvements may not be sufficient to 

significantly reduce the burden identity theft has placed on tax administration 

and on taxpayers whose identities have been stolen. 

Identity theft cases have not been prioritized during the standard tax return 

filing process. The IRS plans to update tax return processing procedures to 

include a special processing code that recognizes the presence of identity theft 

documentation on a paper-filed tax return. This will allow certain identity theft 

victims' tax returns identified during processing to be forwarded and assigned to 

an assistor, rather than continuing through the standard duplicate tax return 

procedures. This will reduce the time a taxpayer must wait to have his or her 

identity theft case resolved by three to five months. However, the IRS does not 

plan to put this change into place until June 2012. 

Taxpayers could also be further burdened if the address on the tax return 

filed by the identity thief is used by the IRS instead of the address of the 

legitimate taxpayer. Many taxpayers do not notify the IRS when they move, but 

just use their new/current address when they file their tax returns. When the IRS 

processes a tax return with an address different from the one it has on file, it 

systemically updates the taxpayer's account with the new address. It does not 

notify the taxpayer that his or her account has been changed with the new 

address. 

While the IRS is in the process of resolving the identity theft case, the 

identity thief's address is still the address on the taxpayer's record. Any IRS 

correspondence or notices unrelated to the identity theft case will be sent to the 

most recent address on record. The legitimate taxpayer (the identity theft victim) 

will be unaware the IRS is trying to contact him or her. 

10 
22 


Insert offset folio 12 here 78817.012

This situation can also create disclosure issues. For example, if the 

legitimate taxpayer's prior year tax return has been selected for an examination, 

the examination notice will be sent to the address of record-the address the 

identity thief used on the fraudulent tax return. The identity theft victim is now at 

risk at having his or her personal and tax information disclosed to an 

unauthorized third party (whoever resides at that address). In response to our 

report, the IRS stated that in January 2012, it expanded its identity theft indicator 

codes that annotate when there is a claim of identity theft. The IRS developed 

tracking indicators to mark taxpayer accounts when the identity theft incident is 

initially alleged or suspected. It will explore leveraging this new indicator to 

suspend certain correspondence. 

Resources have not been sufficient to work identity theft cases dealing 

with refund fraud and continue to be of a concern. IRS employees who work 

the majority of identity theft cases also respond to taxpayers' calls to the IRS's 

various toll-free telephone lines. Demanding telephone schedules and a large 

identity-theft inventory make it difficult for assistors to prioritize identity theft 

cases. The IRS has dedicated 400 additional employees to the Accounts 

Management function to work identity theft cases. However, because of limited 

resources and the high taxpayer demand for telephone assistance, the IRS 

plans to continue to have assistors who work identity theft cases also work the 

telephones on Mondays (and any Tuesday following a Monday holiday). 

Assistors are trained to communicate with taxpayers and know the tax 

laws and related IRS operational procedures. However, identity theft cases 

can be complex and can present considerable challenges throughout the 

resolution process. Assistors are not examiners and are not trained to conduct 

examinations, which requires skills and tools beyond those of the assistors. 

Additionally, the management information system that telephone assistors 

use to control and work cases can add to taxpayer burden. For instance, one 

victim may have multiple cases opened and multiple assistors working his or her 

identity theft issue. Victims become further frustrated when they are asked 

numerous times to prove their identities, even though they have previously 

followed IRS instructions and sent in Identity Theft Affidavits and copies of 

identification with their tax returns. 

Victims also receive duplicate letters at different times, wasting IRS 

resources and possibly confusing the victims. None of the letters advise the 

victims when to expect their refunds, which could still be months away. 

11 
23 


Insert offset folio 13 here 78817.013

Identity theft case histories are so limited that it is extremely difficult to 

determine what action has been taken on a case; for example, if research was 

completed to determine which individual is the legitimate taxpayer. Case 

histories do not note whether the assistor researched addresses, filing or 

employment histories, etc., for the individuals associated with the cases. This 

increases the need to spend extra time on these cases. 

When our auditors reviewed a sample of cases, they could not determine 

if some of the cases had been resolved or why those cases were still open. In 

most cases, auditors had to reconstruct the cases to determine if all actions had 

been appropriately taken to resolve them. 

The IRS acknowledges that it does not know the exact number of identity 

theft incidents or the number of taxpayers affected by identity theft. It also has 

not been able to quantify the amount of improper payments resulting from identity 

theft. The IRS reports cases only for accounts with identity theft indicators. It 

has procedures in place to input identity theft indicators on certain taxpayer 

accounts, depending on how the taxpayer's identity theft case was identified and 

if it affects Federal tax administration. However, these procedures are 

inconsistent and complex. Potential identity theft cases in process do not have 

indicators and are not counted. 

Identity theft data are captured on 22 different systems throughout the 

IRS. These systems are not integrated and data must be manually compiled, 

hindering the IRS's capability of producing accurate and reliable identity theft 

reports. As a result, not all identity theft cases are counted. In addition, not all 

cases counted are actually identity theft cases. As of June 2011, the IRS 

estimated the number of unmarked accounts that should have identity theft 

indicators in the range of 240,000 to 280,000. 

Finally, in November 2011 , the IRS established a Taxpayer Protection Unit 

to manage work arising from the identity theft indicators and filters used to 

identify tax returns affected by identity theft-both to stop the identity thief's tax 

return from being processed and to ensure the legitimate taxpayer's tax return is 

processed. Currently, employees have only been detailed to the unit. The IRS 

will determine the needs of the unit after assessing the 2012 Filing Season. 

During this filing season, taxpayers found it difficult to reach employees in 

this unit. The unit received more than 86,000 calls during the 2012 Filing 

12 
24 


Insert offset folio 14 here 78817.014

Season, but has only been able to answer about 21 ,000. The average wait time 

for taxpayers was almost one hour. The Taxpayer Protection Unit will be a 

significant component in the IRS's attempt to stop fraudulent refunds and provide 

assistance to victims of identity theft. TIGTA is currently conducting an audit of 

this unit and, during the 2013 Filing Season, we will be conducting a follow-up 

audit to assess the IRS's actions to improve the quality of assistance provided to 

identity theft victims. 

Criminal Investigations of Identity Theft 

When the crime of identity theft occurs within our jurisdiction, TIGTA's 

Office of Investigations (01) investigates it as it impacts the economy, efficiency, 

and effectiveness in the administration of the Internal Revenue Code. Identity 

theft directly and destructively impacts law-abiding citizens. When individuals 

steal identities and file fraudulent tax returns to obtain fraudulent refunds before 

the legitimate taxpayers file, the crime is simple tax fraud and it falls within the 

jurisdiction and programmatic responsibility of the IRS. However, there are other 

variations of IRS-related identity theft that, although not widely covered by the 

media, falls within TIGTA's jurisdiction and has a significant impact on taxpayers. 

TIGTA focuses its limited investigative resources on the following areas as 

they pertain to IRS-related identity theft: 

• IRS employees who are involved in committing identity theft either as 

the source of the identity information or through active participation in a 

scheme; 

• Tax preparers who improperly steal and disclose client information for 

the purpose of committing identity theft; and 

• Individuals who impersonate the IRS in furtherance of committing 

identity theft. 

TIGTA has conducted investigations of IRS employees who use their 

access to taxpayer information as a means for stealing identities for the purpose 

of committing identity theft. Noted below is an example of identity theft by an IRS 

employee: 

On April 14,2011, Monica Hernandez was indicted for making a false 

income tax return when she was a part-time data entry clerk for the IRS. During 

13 
25 


Insert offset folio 15 here 78817.015

the course of her employment with the IRS, Hernandez stole and/or 

misappropriated information of other taxpayers listed on various IRS forms. 

Hernandez used falsified and forged IRS forms with the victim's information to 

obtain large tax refunds from the IRS totaling $175,144. 

IRS employees are entrusted with the sensitive personal and financial 

information of taxpayers. Using this information to perpetrate a criminal scheme 

for personal gain negatively impacts our Nation's voluntary tax system and 

generates widespread distrust of the IRS. TIGTA's 01 pursues identity theft 

violations and conducts criminal investigations of IRS employees involved in 

these crimes. 

Tax preparers who improperly steal and disclose any taxpayer's Federal 

tax information as part of an identity theft scheme cause serious harm to 

taxpayers. The following case highlights an instance when a tax preparer stole 

and improperly disclosed the identity of her clients in order to commit identity 

theft: 

Kathleen Lance was a public accountant and president of her company. 

In this capacity, Lance obtained and used the identification of six of her clients to 

change the direct deposit account information on clients' tax returns before she 

electronically submitted their returns to the IRS. Lance thereby diverted funds 

from the clients' bank accounts and redirected the deposits to her personal and 

business bank accounts. Lance also assumed and disclosed the identity of 

those six clients and fraudulently opened credit card accounts in her name. On 

May 24, 2010, she was sentenced to serve 64-months imprisonment and threeyears supervised probation for wire fraud, theft of Government funds, use of 

unauthorized access devices, and aggravated identity theft. 

Impersonation of the IRS as part of an identity theft scheme takes many 

forms. Often, the IRS is impersonated by individuals who seek to trick 

unsuspecting taxpayers into revealing their personal information. The details of 

each scheme tend to vary, but the common thread is the use of the IRS name to 

lure recipients into accessing links or providing sensitive information. 

• Victims are told that they are either due a refund or that a tax payment 

was rejected and the taxpayer needs to click on a link which either opens 

an attached form or takes them to a website where they enter their 

Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Federal tax information, and credit 

card information; or 

14 
26 

f 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Inspector General George. 

Inspector General O’Carroll, you may proceed. 


Insert offset folio 16 here 78817.016
27 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK P. O’CARROLL, JR., 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. O’CARROL. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Chairman 

Boustany, Ranking Member Becerra, Ranking Member Lewis, and 

members of the both subcommittees. Thank you for the invitation 

to testify today. 

As today’s Death Master File, or DMF, makes the personal information of deceased people and sometimes the living available to 

the public, this creates a significant risk of SSN misuse and identity theft. I would like to share an OIG case in which available 

death data was used to obtain personal information and then commit fraud. 

In a recent national investigation my office identified about 60 

retirement benefit applications that were submitted in the names 

of deceased people. The claims were filed with the name, the Social 

Security number, and the date of birth of these individuals. The 

suspects found this information on a genealogy Web site that published the DMF. Our agents and other law enforcement identified 

the suspects, executed search warrants, and made arrests. However, the main suspect in the case took his own life before he could 

be arrested. His two accomplices, both relatives, were indicted and 

pleaded guilty. A judge sentenced them to prison and ordered them 

to be deported. One also was ordered to repay more than $145,000 

to the SSA. 

It is not only the personal information of deceased individuals 

that is at risk. In two recent reports our auditors identified thousands of living individuals who were mistakenly included in the 

DMF. These errors can have serious consequences for the affected 

individuals. Each month SSA erroneously includes about 1,000 living individuals in the Death Master File. That personal information could be used to obtain loans or credit, to apply for government benefits or to assume a new identity. 

My office has recommended limiting the DMF to only the information required by law and ensuring the file’s accuracy. Such steps 

would minimize these errors and reduce SSN misuse in all forms, 

including tax fraud. 

We investigated a Colorado man who hired people to search a 

genealogy Web site for the names and SSNs of deceased individuals. After confirming this information against other data sources 

the man fabricated employment records and filed fraudulent tax returns. A judge sentenced the man to 4 years in jail for SSN misuse 

and making false claims. He was ordered to repay more than 

$282,000 to the IRS. 

Limiting the content or discontinuing the availability of the DMF 

is a legislative and policy decision for Congress and the SSA. In 

November 2011, Chairman Johnson introduced the Keeping IDs 

Safe Act. This bill would end the sale of the DMF to the public. 

Whether through legislative action or policy changes, my office 

strongly supports any effort to limit public access to SSA’s death 

records. Pending such changes, we advocate limiting the information made available to the extent permitted by law, and we recommend a risk based approach to the distribution of the DMF. 

SSA’s key uses in government and finance make it a valuable 

commodity for criminals. SSN misuse and identity theft remains 

28 

significant threats and failure to take action creates unnecessary 

public risk. My office also urges citizens to guard their personal information. We encourage people to keep their Social Security cards 

in a safe place, shred personal documents, and be judicious in giving out an SSN in business transactions. We will going to continue 

to work with your subcommittees and SSA in these and future efforts to protect personal information and reduce tax fraud. 

Thank you again for the invitation to testify, and I will be happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statementt of Mr. O’Carroll follows:] 


Insert offset folio 17 here 78817.017
29 


Insert offset folio 18 here 78817.018

Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Chairman Boustany, Ranking Member Becerra, Ranking 

Member Lewis, and members of both Subcommittees. It is a pleasure to appear before you, and I 

thank you for the invitation to testify today. I have appeared before Congress many times to 

discuss issues critical to the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the services the Agency 

provides to American citizens; earlier this year I testified before the Subcommittee on Social 

Security at separate hearings on SSA's Disability Insurance program and the Death Master File 

(DMF). 

Today, we are discussing the Social Security number (SSN) and ways to improve SSN protection 

and guard against misuse, identity theft, and tax fraud. Your Subcommittees have previously 

worked with SSA and the Office ofthe Inspector General (OIG) to address these issues, but with 

SSN use widespread throughout government programs and financial transactions, and 

technology constantly evolving, the threat of SSN misuse and identity theft persists. My office is 

well aware of the central role that the SSN plays in American society, and part of our mission is 

to maintain its integrity along with other personally identifiable infonnation (PII) within SSA 

records. To provide some context, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, SSA assigned about 5.4 million 

original SSNs, issued 10.9 million replacement cards, and processed more than 1.4 billion SSN 

verifications. The Agency also received about $660 billion in employment taxes related to 

earnings. Protecting the SSN and properly posting employees' wages is paramount to ensuring 

the integrity of our personal information. 

Despite our efforts as well as those of SSA and the IRS to protect this critical information, we all 

remain targets for identity thieves. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that as many 

as 9 million Americans have their identities stolen each year. The number of identity theftrelated incidents on tax returns reached about 248,000 in 2010, about five times more than in 

2008, according to the Government Accountability Office. We in the OIG understand the 

concern your Subcommittees have for citizens and their families with regard to identity theft, and 

we investigate as many SSN misuse cases as our resources allow each year. As we pursue these 

criminal investigations, we have also conducted numerous audits and made recommendations to 

SSA and to the Congress to improve the SSN's security. 

SSN Misuse Investigations 

OIG's primary mission is to protect SSA programs and operations, and the majority of our 

investigations are related to SSA program fraud. However, our organization receives thousands 

of allegations of SSN misuse each year; in FY 2011, about 14 percent of all fraud referrals 

received involved SSN misuse. It is our experience that investigations into SSN misuse will 

often reveal some fonn of identity theft. At times, they can also involve Social Security benefit 

fraud and tax fraud that can lead to the recovery of significant government funds. 

I would like to share with your Subcommittees some of our most recent cases involving SSN 

misuse for the purpose of tax fraud: 

~ The OIG, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Treasury Inspector General 

for Tax Administration, and other agencies conducted a joint investigation of several 

individuals who misused the names and SSNs of approximately 300 residents of Puerto 

I 
30 


Insert offset folio 19 here 78817.019

Rico so they could file fraudulent tax returns. This scheme caused the IRS to issue more 

than $2 million in fraudulent tax refunds. A judge sentenced three individuals to between 

3 months and 30 months in prison, and ordered them to pay restitution of nearly $230,000 

to the IRS. 

~ My office investigated a California woman who used fraudulent SSNs to file Federal 

income tax returns. The woman applied for and obtained more than 20 Social Security 

cards, falsely claiming she gave birth to that many children at a Los Angeles hospital in 

2002. The woman then prepared and filed fraudulent tax returns, claiming multiple 

dependent deductions for family members and friends. She recently pleaded guilty to 

theft, fraudulent use of SSNs, and preparing false tax returns. A judge sentenced her to 18 

months' incarceration and ordered her to pay restitution of more than $302,000 to the 

IRS. 

~ The OIG, IRS cm, and other agencies investigated two New Jersey men who misused 

the names and SSNs of victims who used a health-service provider in the area. The men 

used the victims' personal information to file false tax returns, improperly claiming about 

$507,000 in refunds from the IRS. The men pleaded guilty in 2011, and ajudge 

sentenced them to 60 months and 120 months in prison and ordered them to pay 

restitution of more than $207,000 and about $300,000 to the IRS, respectively. 

As we pursue investigations similar to these, our agents also participate on about 45 SSN misuse 

task forces throughout the country, which cover mortgage fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and 

document and benefit fraud, as well as identity theft. 

SSA's Death Master File 

SSA has made significant efforts to improve SSN integrity and encourage individuals to protect 

PII. However, the SSNs of deceased individuals are also vulnerable to misuse. As such, the 

public release of the DMF raises concerns related to SSN misuse and identity theft, as seen in 

recent news media reports and evidenced by ongoing legislative efforts. SSA has, on the 

Numident-the Agency's master database of SSN holders-a record of reported deaths. Because 

of a Consent Judgment in a 1978 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit-Perholtz vs. 

Ross-SSA was required as of 1980 to provide death records that included the SSN, the last 

name, and the date of death of deceased number holders; the result was the creation of the DMF, 

an extract ofNumident data. SSA later expanded the DMF to include individuals' first and 

middle name, date of birth, residential state and zip code. 

In November 2011, SSA made changes to the DMF. First, the Agency ceased providing the 

decedent's residential state and Zip code. In addition, SSA removed about 4.2 million State 

records from the DMF, based on a provision in the Social Security Act prohibiting SSA from 

disclosing death records the Agency receives through its contacts with the States, except in 

limited circumstances. 

Today, each DMF record usually includes the following: SSN, full name, date of birth, and date 

of death. Therefore, even with SSA's recent changes, the DMF still contains more information 

2 
31 


Insert offset folio 20 here 78817.020

than required by the Consent Judgment in Perholtz. The file contains about 86 million records, 

and it adds about 1.1 million records each year. 

SSA provides the DMF to the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information 

Service (NTIS), a clearinghouse for scientific and technical infonnation, which, in tum, sells the 

DMF to public and private industries-government, financial, investigative, credit reporting, and 

medical customers. Those customers use the data to verify death and prevent fraud, among other 

uses. SSA also currently distributes all death information it maintains, including State death 

records, under agreements with eight government agencies, including the IRS and the Centers for 

Medicare & Medicaid Services. SSA provides this death information to the IRS weekly. SSA 

also provides IRS a weekly file that includes the names and SSNs of newborns, as well as their 

parents' names and SSNs. 

Criminal Use of Public Death Records 

The DMF has important and productive uses. For example, medical researchers and hospitals 

track fonner patients for their studies; investigative firms use the data to verify deaths related to 

investigations; and pension funds, insurance companies, and government entities need to know if 

they are sending payments to deceased individuals. In addition, the financial community and 

Federal, State, and local governments can identify and prevent identity theft by running financial 

and credit applications against the DMF. However, the form in which the DMF is currently 

distributed provides opportunity for individuals to misuse SSNs and commit identity theft. 

These OIG investigations show how individuals can use available death data to obtain SSNs and 

commit fraud: 

:» In August 20 I 0, we began investigating about 60 fraudulent retirement benefit claims 

that used the name, SSN, and date of birth of individuals who died decades ago. We 

determined that the PH used to file the fraudulent claims was available to the public 

through a genealogical website. The OIG and other law enforcement agencies identified 

suspects in the case and executed search and arrest warrants; however, the main suspect 

took his own life before he was taken into custody. His two accomplices, both relatives of 

his, were indicted and pled guilty to the charges. A judge sentenced the two individuals to 

20 months' and 25 months' incarceration followed by deportation from the U.S., and one 

was ordered to pay restitution of more than $145,000 to SSA. 

:» An OlG investigation of a Colorado man revealed that he employed individuals so he 

could obtain names and SSNs of long-deceased individuals from a genealogical website. 

The man then fabricated employment records and instructed others to use the obtained 

names and SSNs and false employment information to create fraudulent tax returns, 

which were submitted to the IRS online. To determine deceased individuals' SSNs, the 

man said he compared data available from the public Internet site with a certain State's 

death data. A judge sentenced the man to 46 months in prison for SSN misuse, making 

false claims, and wirc fraud; and ordered him to pay morc than $282,000 in restitution to 

the IRS. 
32 


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According to news media reports, in December 2011, this genealogical website said it 

would no longer display the Social Security information for anyone who has died in the 

last 10 years; the sitc also said it would placc its Social Security Dcath Index bchind a 

pay wall and only allow access to the index to family history researchers. 

The Congress has recognized the seriousness of this issue, as current bills for consideration 

address access to the DMF. In November 2011, Chairman Johnson and several members of the 

Subcommittee on Social Security introduced the Keeping IDs Safe Act, which would end the sale 

of the DMF. The bill would help protect the death data of all number holders. My office also 

supports an exemption to the bill that would allow government and Federal law enforcement 

agencies-like the OIO-to access the DMF to combat fraud. 

Reviews and Recommendations 

The 010 recognizes that limiting or discontinuing the DMF's availability is ultimately a 

legislative and policy decision for the Congress and SSA to make. Even so, my offIce has long 

taken the position that to the extent possible, SSA should limit public access to the DMF that 

required by law, and take all possible steps to ensure its accuracy. We have made several 

recommendations to this effect. 

Our March 2011 report, Follow-up: Personally Identifiable Information Made Available fa the 

Public via the Death Master File, examined whether SSA took corrective actions to address 

recommendations we made in a June 2008 report on the DMF. In the June 2008 repOlt, we 

determined that, from January 2004 through April 2007, SSA's publication of the DMF resulted 

in the potential exposure of PI! for more than 20,000 living individuals erroneously listed as 

deceased on the DMF. In some cases, these individuals' PH was still available for free viewing 

on the Internet--on ancestry sites like genealogy.com and familysearch.org-at the time of our 

report. 

[n the March 2011 report, we found SSA did not take actions on two of our recommendations. 

SSA did not implement a delay in the release of DMF updates, as the Agency indicated that 

public and private organizations rely on the DMF to combat fraud and identity theft. According 

to SSA, those organizations must have immediate and up-to-date information to be effective. The 

Agency also did not attempt to limit the amount of information included on the DMF, and it did 

not explore alternatives to the inclusion of an individual's full SSN, citing the Perholtz consent 

judgment and potential litigation under FOlA. SSA added that a deceased individual does not 

have a privacy interest, according to FOIA. 

Our follow-up audit work indicated that between January 2008 and April 20 I 0, SSA published at 

least 35,000 living numberholders' PI! in the DMF. According to SSA, there are about 1,000 

cases each month in which a living individual is mistakenly included in the DMF. SSA said that 

when the Agency becomes aware it has posted a death report in error, SSA moves quickly to 

correct the situation, and the Agency has not found evidence of past data misuse. However, we 

remain concerned about these errors, because erroneous death entries can lead to benefit 

tennination and cause severe financial hardship and distress to affected individuals. We also 

have concerns that DMF update files, some with the SSNs of living individuals, are a potential 

4 
33 


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source of information that would be useful in perpetrating SSN misuse and identity theft. DMF 

updates can reveal to potential criminals the PI! of individuals who are still alive. 

Legislative Efforts 

We support the prior bipartisan legislative efforts of these Subcommittees to limit the use, 

access, and display of the SSN in public and private sectors, and to increase penalties against 

those who misuse SSNs. Most recently, the Subcommittee on Social Security introduced the 

Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2009. This legislation 

included new criminal penalties for the misuse of SSNs; criminal penalties for SSA employees 

who knowingly and fraudulently issue Social Security cards or SSNs; and enhanced penalties in 

cases of telTorism, drug trafficking crimes, or prior offenses. 

The legislation would also expand the types of activities that are subject to civil monetary 

penalties (CMPs) and assessments under Section 1129 of the Social Security Act. Currently, an 

individual who misuscs an SSN is not subjcct to a CMP, cxccpt in cascs rclatcd to the receipt of 

Social Security benefits or Supplemental Security Income. The legislation would authorize the 

imposition of CMPs and assessments for activities such as providing false information to obtain 

an SSN, using an SSN fraudulently obtained, or counterfeiting an SSN. 

The expanded use of the SSN in today's society has made it a valuable commodity for criminals. 

In addition to being a lynchpin for identity theft crimes, it also helps an individual assimilate into 

our society, and in some instances, to avoid detection. The importance of SSN integrity to 

prevent identity theft and ensure homeland security is universally recognized. Providing 

enhanced, structured penalties is appropriate to reflect the vital importance of the SSN. 

Citizens' Accountability 

While government agencies such as SSA have controls in place to protect the SSN and other 

personal information, individuals must also take basic preventive steps to protect their own 

information from improper use. We urge everyone to keep Social Security cards in a secure 

place, shred personal documents, and be aware of phishing schemes, because no reputable 

financial institution or company will ask for personal infonnation like an SSN via the phone or 

the Internet. It is also important to protect personal computers with a firewall and updated antivirus protection. 

Additionally, we should all be judicious in giving out an SSN in business transactions, because 

while it is required for some financial transactions, an SSN is not necessary for everyday 

transactions, like applying for a gym membership. We can monitor our financial transactions and 

regularly check our credit reports from the three major credit bureaus. Concerned citizens may 

also contact SSA at 1-800-772-1213 if they suspect someone is using their SSN work purposes; 

SSA will review work earnings to ensure its records are COlTec!. Anyone who suspects identity 

theft should report it to the FTC at 1-877-438-4338; and may need to contact the IRS to address 

potential tax issues. By knowing how to protect ourselves, and actually taking these important 

steps, we make life much more difficult for identity thieves. 

5 
34 

f 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. O’Carroll. 

Mr. Miller, you made proceed. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN T. MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 

FOR SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT, INTERNAL 

REVENU.S.RVICE 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Chairman Boustany, Ranking Member Becerra, Ranking Member Lewis, MemVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:29 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 078817 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\78817.XXX 78817

Insert offset folio 23 here 78817.023
35 

bers of the Subcommittee. My name is Steve Miller and I am the 

Deputy Commissioner at the IRS. 

Over the past few years the IRS has seen a significant increase 

in refund schemes, particularly those involving identity theft. Identity theft and the harm it inflicts on innocent taxpayers is a problem that we take very seriously. We are confronted with the same 

challenges that face every major financial institution in preventing 

and detecting identity theft. We cannot stop all identity theft. However, we are better than we were and we will get better still. 

There is a delicate balance here. We cannot manually inspect 100 

million refund returns to ensure all are correct. We must balance 

the need to make payments in a timely manner with the need to 

ensure that claims are proper and taxpayer rights are protected. 

Let me begin by describing our efforts at upfront prevention. In 

2011, the IRS identified and prevented the issuance of more than 

14 billion in fraudulent refunds. A great deal of that was identity 

theft. We estimate that at a minimum 1.3 million returns were 

identity theft of the 2.2 million total returns that we stopped last 

year. This year we will stop even more. 

We have improved upfront screening filters to spot false returns 

before a refund is issued. As of mid-April we have stopped more 

than 2.6 million returns we suspect of being fraudulent. At this 

time we estimate that the returns we have worked a minimum of 

750,000 are identity theft, and we are just underway in working 

through those cases. Until we complete our review of the returns 

we have stopped we don’t have a precise tally of how much is identity theft or the total dollars that are involved. However, we suspect that the bulk of them are inventory, which is now 2.6 million 

and continues to grow, will be identity theft. 

More specific to this filing season we have also done the following. Despite substantial cuts in our budget we added hundreds 

of staff in this area and will add hundreds more. In fact we estimate that we are going to spend over $330 million on refund work 

this year, in the refund fraud area. Most of that is going to be specific to identity theft. We issued special identification numbers, socalled PINs, to expedite filing for those taxpayers whose identities 

have been stolen. There are 250,000 PINs that have been issued to 

date. There have been over 170,000 failed attempts to use an SSN 

associated with those PINs. 

We have also accelerated the matching of information returns to 

help stop fraud. We are taking a number of actions to prevent identity thieves from stealing Social Security numbers of deceased taxpayers. For example, when we receive a final return filed on behalf 

of a deceased taxpayer we are putting a special marker on those 

accounts since those individuals have no future filing requirement. 

And we are working with the Administration and the Social Security Administration on modifications to the practice of making the 

Death Master File public. 

There are new procedures to allow us to match returns on lists 

of taxpayer information that law enforcement officials believe may 

have been stolen, and we have improved collaboration with software developers and others to determine how we can better partner to prevent identity theft. 

36 

In addition, our Criminal Investigation Division continues to increase its work on identity theft. In 2012 we will spend more than 

400,000 hours of investigative work in this area. In my written testimony you will see details of this work, including a description of 

a week long sweep in January that led to more than 900 charges 

across 23 States. 

In addition, earlier this month we began a process for local law 

enforcement to obtain tax return data that is vital to their local enforcement needs. That is our work on prevention. 

We are also taking a number of actions to help victims of identity 

theft. We have implemented new procedures and, as mentioned, we 

have added staff to resolve cases faster and better respond to calls, 

and of course the PINs I spoke of earlier will assist identity theft 

victims in filing future returns. We have also trained 35,000 of our 

employees to recognize and help when they see identity theft situations. 

Let me conclude. Our work is critical. We can’t be lax in stopping 

fraud and our treatment of those who have had their identity stolen. I can’t tell you that we will beat this problem this year, but 

I can say that our work in 2012 represents real progress but not 

the end of our efforts. 

I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

37 


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WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF 

STEVEN T. MILLER 

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

ON IDENTITY THEFT 

MAY 8,2012 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Chairmen Johnson and Boustany, Ranking Members Becerra and Lewis, and Members 

of the Subcommittees on Social Security and Oversight, my name is Steven Miller and I 

am Deputy Commissioner at the Internal Revenue Service. I appreciate the opportunity 

to testify on the irnportant issue of identity theft and provide you with an update on 

actions that the IRS is taking in this area. 

Over the past few years, the IRS has seen a significant increase in refund fraud 

schemes in general and schemes involving identity theft in particular. Identity theft and 

the harm that it inflicts on innocent taxpayers is a problem that we take very seriously. 

The IRS has a comprehensive identity theft strategy comprised of a two-pronged effort, 

focusing both on fraud prevention and victim assistance. 

Identity theft is the use of another person's identifying information stolen from a wide 

variety of places and through a wide variety of means. With respect to the IRS, identity 

theft manifests itself in several ways. First, it is used to defraud the government of 

funds through the filing of fraudulent refund claims. Second, in many instances it 

victimizes an innocent taxpayer by impeding his or her ability to get a refund from us. 

Fraudulent filings may also cause us to initiate an adverse enforcement action against 

the innocent taxpayer. There are also many instances where the identity stolen is not of 

an active filer so there is less immediate impact on the real taxpayer. In these 

instances, the identity may belong to a deceased individual or an individual without a 

filing requirement. In this category, the IRS is faced with fraud, but there is less 

immediacy in the need to assist the correct taxpayer because there is no return filed or 

other IRS activity underway with respect to that individual. 

At the start let me say quite plainly that the IRS is confronted with the same challenges 

as every major financial institution in preventing and detecting identity theft. The IRS 

cannot stop all identity theft. However, we have improved and we are committed to 

continuing to improve our programs. We can and will continue to work to prevent the 

issuance of fraudulent refunds and we can and will continue to work with innocent 

taxpayers to clear their accounts and/or get them their money faster in a courteous and 

professional manner. 
38 


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While I will describe for you some of the details of new programs and systems that the 

IRS has created to address this challenge, I would start by saying that we have put a 

significant amount of time into redoubling our training efforts for our IRS workforce so 

that they can better understand what identity theft victims are going through. Although 

these thieves steal the information from sources outside the tax system, the IRS is 

sometimes the first to inform the individual that identity theft has occurred. 

The IRS has also taken actions to be better prepared in both fraud prevention and 

victim assistance. On the prevention side, this means implementing new processes for 

handling retums, new filters to detect fraud, new initiatives to partner with stakeholders 

and a continued commitment to investigate the criminals who perpetrate these crimes. 

As for victim assistance, the IRS is working to speed up case resolution, provide more 

training for our employees who assist victims of identity theft, and step up outreach to 

and education of taxpayers so they can prevent and resolve tax-related identity theft 

issues quickly. 

The improvements that the IRS is making would not be possible without the additional 

resources that we have directed toward these programs. We have substantially 

increased our resources devoted to both prevention and assistance. Even in a declining 

budget environment, we are hiring and training additional staff to address the growing 

challenge of identity theft. 

Fighting identity theft will be an ongoing battle for the IRS and one where we cannot 

afford to let up. The identity theft landscape is constantly changing, as identity thieves 

continue to create new ways of stealing personal information and using it for their gain. 

We at the IRS must continually review our processes and policies to ensure that we are 

doing everything possible to minimize the incidence of identity theft and to help those 

who find themselves victimized by it. 

And yet there is a delicate balance here. We cannot manually inspect 100 million 

refunds to ensure all are correct - nor is there any justification for doing so. That is 

neither practical nor in keeping with Congressional intent. The IRS has a dual mission 

when it comes to refunds, particularly when they are generated in whole or in part by tax 

credits. Refundable and other tax credits are provided to achieve important policy 

goals, such as relieving poverty or boosting the economy. The IRS must deliver refunds 

in the intended time frame, while ensuring that appropriate controls are in place to 

minimize errors and fraud. We must balance the need to make payments in a timely 

manner with the need to ensure that claims are proper and taxpayer rights are 

protected. 

So it is indeed a difficult challenge to strike the right balance. The IRS' approach to 

tackling identity theft must be multi-faceted. We are improving processes to prevent 

fraudulent filings from being processed as well as identifying promoters and other 

schemes. We are also taking actions to improve handling of identity theft cases and to 

better serve taxpayers whose identity has been stolen for tax purposes. All of this is 

2 
39 


Insert offset folio 26 here 78817.026

being done within a very difficult budget environment. The Administration's FY 2013 

budget request includes important funding for additional enforcement initiatives focused 

specifically on addressing refund fraud, including identity theft. Let me walk through our 

work to prevent the fraud up front and how we hope to improve our service to the 

victims of identity theft. 

PREVENTING FRAUD FROM IDENTITY THEFT 

Tax filings can be affected by identity theft in various ways. For example, an identity 

thief steals a legitimate taxpayer's personal information in order to file a fake tax return 

and attempt to obtain a fraudulent refund. There are also instances where the identity 

stolen is of an individual who is deceased or has no filing requirement. 

Overall, IRS identified and prevented the issuance of over $14 billion in fraudulent 

refunds in 2011. Identity theft is a subset of this overall refund fraud. From 2008 

through March 2012, the IRS identified more than 490,000 taxpayers who have been 

affected by identity theft. These are taxpayers who have filing requirements and who 

are or may be impacted by the theft. With respect to these taxpayers, in calendar year 

2011, the [RS protected $1.4 billion in refunds from being erroneously sent to identity 

thieves. This does not include identity theft of those without a filing requirement (though 

that value is included in the above $14 bil[ion). The [RS is comrnitted to improving its 

approaches to blocking these fraudulent refund claims. To that end, we strive to process 

returns in such a way that potentially false returns are screened out at the earliest 

possible stage. 

Catching the Refund at the Door -- Enhanced Return Processing 

Identity theft is a key focus of an IRS program launched in 2011. Under this program, 

the following improvements have been made: 

• Various new identity theft screening filters are in place to improve our ability to 

spot false returns before they are processed and before a refund is issued. For 

example, new filters were designed and launched that flag returns if certain 

changes in taxpayer circumstances are detected. [t must be noted that effective 

filters are difficult to develop given the number of changes that many taxpayers 

experience in a year. For example, annually 10 million of us move and 46 million 

of us change jobs. Thus, changes in taxpayer circumstances do not necessarily 

indicate identity theft. Nonethe[ess, as of mid-April 2012, we have stopped over 

325,000 questionable returns with $1.75 billion in claimed refunds from filters 

specifically targeting refund fraud. 

• Moreover, this filing season, we have expanded our work on severa [ fraud filters 

which catch not only identity but other fraud. [n this area we have already 

stopped more returns this filing season than we stopped all last calendar year. 

Until we work these cases we will not have a solid answer as to how much of this 

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40 


Insert offset folio 27 here 78817.027

work is fraud, but not identity fraud, though we suspect a great deal may fall into 

the latter category. 

• We have implemented new procedures for handling returns that we suspect were 

filed by identity thieves. Once a return has been flagged, we will correspond with 

the sender before continuing to process the return. 

• We are issuing special identification numbers (Identity Protection Personal 

Identification Numbers or IP PINs) to taxpayers whose identities are known to 

have been stolen, to facilitate the filing of their returns and prevent others from 

utilizing their identities. The use of IP PINs is more fully described below, but we 

issued over 250,000 for the 2012 filing season. 

• We have accelerated the availability of information returns in order to identify 

mismatches earlier, further enhancing our ability to spot fraudulent tax returns 

before they are processed. 

• We are leveraging mechanisms to stop the growing trend of fraudulent tax 

returns being filed under deceased taxpayers' identities. First, we have coded 

accounts of decedent taxpayers whose SSNs were previously misused 

by identity thieves to prevent future abuse. Second, we are identifying returns of 

recently deceased taxpayers to determine if it is the taxpayer's final return, and 

then marking accounts of deceased taxpayers who have no future filing 

requirement. Of this season's filings, 91,000 returns have been stopped for this 

review. Third, we are working with the Social Security Administration in order to 

more timely utilize the information SSA makes available to us. And we are 

working with SSA on a potential legislative change to the practice of routine 

release of the Death Master File. 

• We have also developed procedures for handling lists of taxpayers' personal 

information that law enforcement officials discover in the course of investigating 

identity theft schemes or other criminal activity. This is extremely valuable data 

that can be used to flag taxpayer accounts and help us block returns filed by 

identity thieves who have used the personal information of these taxpayers. Our 

Criminal Investigation (CI) division will utilize this data to ensure linkages are 

identified between criminal schemes and will also ensure that the information is 

shared appropriately to affect victim account adjustment and protection activity. 

• We expanded the use of our list of prisoners to better utilize the list to stop 

problematic returns. We have stopped 190,000 questionable returns this filing 

season. For the fiscal year, we have prevented over $1 billion in refunds, almost 

double the value of refunds stopped over the same period last year. We 

received additional help under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement 

Implementation Act passed last year that requires federal and state prisons to 

provide information on the current prison population. We are engaging with 

prison officials to determine the best way to move forward with this new authority. 

4 
41 


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Unfortunately, the news is not all good. The authority allowing us to share return 

information with prisons expired at the end of 2011. The FY 2013 Budget 

proposal would reinstate the provision authorizing the IRS to disclose return 

information with respect to individuals incarcerated in Federal or State prisons 

whom the IRS determines may have filed or facilitated the filing of a false return. 

• We are also collaborating with software developers, banks, and other industries 

to determine how we can better partner to prevent theft. 

Stopping It Before It Starts -- Criminal Investigation Work 

The investigative work done by our Criminal Investigation (CI) division is another major 

component in our effort to combat tax-related identity theft. CI investigates and detects 

tax fraud and other financial fraud, including fraud related to identity theft, and 

coordinates with other IRS divisions to ensure that false refunds involving identity theft 

are addressed quickly and that the IRS accounts of identity theft victims are marked to 

help prevent any future problems. CI recommends prosecution of refund fraud cases, 

including cases involving identity theft, to the Department of Justice. 

CI works closely with the other IRS divisions to improve processes and procedures 

related to identity theft refund fraud prevention. For example, CI provides regular 

updates to the IRS' Wage and Investment division regarding emerging scheme trends 

so that processes and filters can be enhanced to prevent refund loss. These 

collaborative efforts have been instrumental in helping the IRS stop more refund fraud. 

In response to this growing threat to tax administration, CI established the Identity Theft 

Clearinghouse (ITC), a specialized unit that became operational in January, to work on 

identity theft leads. The ITC receives all refund fraud related identity theft leads from 

IRS-CI field offices. The lTC's primary responsibility is to develop and refer identity theft 

schemes to the field offices, facilitate discussions between field offices with multijurisdictional issues, and to provide support of on-going criminal investigations involving 

identity theft. 

CI investigations of tax fraud related to identity theft have increased significantly over 

the past two fiscal years and the trend is continuing in FY 2012. In FY 2011, 276 

investigations were initiated, compared with 224 in FY 2010 and 187 in FY 2009. CI 

recommended 218 cases for prosecution in 2011, compared with 147 the previous year 

and 91 in 2009. Indictments in identity-theft related cases totaled 165 in 2011, with 80 

individuals' sentenced and average time to be served at 44 months. This compares with 

94 indictments, 45 individuals sentenced and a 41-month average sentence in 2010. 

Already in FY 2012, CI has initiated 336 cases and recommended 224 cases for 

prosecution. Indictments in identity theft cases total 218, with 61 individuals'sentenced 

and average time to be served at 45 months. The direct investigative time spent on 

identity theft in FY 2011 was 225,000 hours and CI is on pace to double this in FY 2012. 

5 
42 


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The IRS conducted a coordinated identity theft enforcement sweep during the week of 

January 23. It was an outstanding success. Working with the Justice Department's Tax 

Division and local U.S. Attorneys' offices, the nationwide effort targeted 105 people in 

23 states. The coast-to-coast effort that took place included indictments, arrests and the 

execution of search warrants involving the potential theft of thousands of identities. In 

all, 939 criminal charges are included in the 69 indictments and information related to 

identity theft. 

In addition, in that same week IRS auditors and investigators conducted extensive 

compliance visits to money service businesses in nine locations across the country. The 

approximately 150 visits occurred to help ensure that these check-cashing facilities 

aren't facilitating refund fraud and identity theft. 

These efforts send an unmistakable message to anyone considering participating in a 

refund fraud scheme that we are aggressively pursuing cases across the nation with the 

Justice Department, and people wil[ be going to jail. 

Identity theft has been designated as a priority in 2012. We also wil[ be piloting 

dedicated cross-functional teams with other parts of the IRS that will allow us to create a 

greater footprint in one or more geographic locales. 

Loca[ law enforcement and other federal agencies play a critical role in combating 

identity theft. Thus, an important part of our effort to stop identity thieves involves 

partnering with law enforcement agencies. We collaborate on these issues and this 

effort will only increase going forward. [t should be noted that the existing rules for 

protecting taxpayer privacy often make it difficult for us to provide easy access to 

information that may be useful for loca[ law enforcement. Despite these difficulties, in 

April 2012 we implemented a new law enforcement assistance pilot program designed 

to aid law enforcement in obtaining tax return data vital to their local efforts in 

investigating and prosecuting specific cases of identity theft. The [RS will carefully 

assess the results and performance of the pilot program before deciding on how to 

proceed. 

We will continue to search for other innovative ways to partner with local law 

enforcement. Furthermore, C[ special agents throughout the country participate in at 

[east 35 task forces and working groups with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

that target tax related identity theft crimes. C[ personnel also coordinate with these 

agencies in an effort to ensure that victims are aware of the steps they need to take to 

resolve their affected tax accounts. We will continue to develop new partnerships with 

law enforcement agencies ... 

Some of the recent successes involving identity theft include the following cases in 

which sentences were handed down since December 2011: 

• An A[abama woman was sentenced to 61 months in prison and ordered to pay 

$494,424 in restitution after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the 

6 
43 


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United States by filing false claims, wire fraud and aggravated identity theft using 

stolen identities. This individual stored tens of thousands of stolen means of 

identification (names and social security numbers) at her house, which came 

from numerous sources, including private companies, health clinics, and prisons. 

• A Delaware woman was sentenced to 120 months in prison and ordered to pay 

approximately $1.5 million in restitution after being convicted for conspiracy to 

commit mail and wire fraud. This individual conspired with others to obtain tax 

refunds by submitting fraudulent tax returns using the identifying information of 

prison inmates, including the inmates' social security numbers and variations of 

their names. The false returns were either filed electronically or mailed to the 

Internal Revenue Service requesting that the refunds be either electronically 

deposited or mailed to bank accounts or addresses controlled by the individuals 

and the other conspirators. 

• An Alabama woman was sentenced to 75 months in prison and ordered to pay 

$720,067 in restitution and forfeit $593,949 after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy 

involving false claims, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. This individual 

conspired with workers of tax return businesses to file fraudulent tax returns and 

purchased identifying information for children and other dependents to use as the 

basis for tax deductions, the earned income credit, the child dependent care 

credit and other credits on tax returns for people who were not related to the 

dependents. 

• An Arizona man was sentenced to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised 

release, and ordered to pay approximately $387,000 in restitution after he 

pleaded guilty to conspiracy involving false claims, wire fraud and aggravated 

identity theft. This individual used stolen identities of disabled individuals to claim 

more than $1 million in bogus tax refunds. 

• An Alabama woman was sentenced to 184 months in prison and ordered to pay 

more than $1.1 million in restitution on charges of filing false claims, wire fraud 

and aggravated identity theft. This individual, the owner of a tax preparation 

business, used her business to run a scheme to steal tax refunds by filing false 

tax returns with stolen identities. Those tax returns claimed refunds that were 

directed to bank accounts and debit cards that she controlled. 

• A Tennessee woman was sentenced to 108 months in prison, three years of 

supervised release, and ordered to pay $110,000 in restitution. This individual 

and an accomplice obtained names, Social Security numbers and other 

identifying information of various individuals, both alive and deceased, from the 

Social Security Death Master File and from an underground website. They 

prepared false W-2s, claiming false wages and withholding amounts, and used 

these forms to file income tax returns with the IRS to get refunds that were 

deposited into bank accounts they controlled. 

7 
44 


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• An Alabama woman was sentenced to 94 months in prison and ordered to pay 

$276,000 in restitution on charges of identity theft, wire fraud, aggravated identity 

theft and conspiracy to make false claims for tax refunds. This individual obtained 

the names and Social Security numbers of student loan borrowers from the 

databases at her former employer and conspired to use the stolen identifying 

information to file false tax returns. She also fraudulently obtained refund 

anticipation loans from a bank on the basis of the fraudulently filed returns. 

• A Florida woman was sentenced to 108 months in prison and ordered to pay 

$673,000 in restitution on charges of tax fraud and mail fraud. This individual 

obtained identifying information from others, including Social Security numbers, 

and used this information to prepare and electronically file dozens of false 

income tax returns. In some instances, the individuals whose identities were 

being used were deceased. 

ASSISTING TAXPAYERS VICTIMIZED BY IDENTITY THEFT 

Along with prevention, the other key component of the IRS' efforts to combat identity 

theft involves providing assistance to taxpayers whose personal information has been 

stolen and used by a perpetrator in the tax filing process. This situation is complicated 

by the fact that identity theft victims' data has already been compromised outside the 

filing process by the time we detect and stop perpetrators from using their information. 

We have taken a number of actions, including those described below to restore the 

account of the innocent taxpayer. We have had difficulty keeping pace with the number 

of cases, but we are determined to bring to bear new resources and streamline existing 

processes. Thus, we have committed additional resources, even in this tough budget 

climate, trained our people, developed an IP PIN program, and expanded our external 

outreach. 

Improving our work on Identity Theft Cases 

As noted above, since 2008 the IRS has identified more than 490,000 taxpayers who 

were victims of identity theft. We realize the importance of resolving these cases quickly 

and efficiently so that identity theft victims who are owed their refunds can receive them 

as soon as possible and so that we do not take adverse enforcement actions against 

such individuals. 

We are implementing new procedures designed to resolve cases faster and minimize 

the disruption to innocent taxpayers. For example, every division within the IRS is 

making identity theft cases a higher priority in their work. As indicated above, new 

procedures and additional staff are being put in place to work cases faster where a 

refund has been stopped. We increased staffing last year and this year, and have plans 

to dedicate additional resources following the filing season. By the end of the fiscal 

year, staffing dedicated to identity theft will be almost 2,500 employees. 

8 
45 


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Along with taking steps toward faster resolution of identity theft cases, we are 

continuously improving the way we track and report on the status of all identity theft 

cases. We believe these improvements will reduce the time to work identity theft cases 

in coming filing seasons so that honest taxpayers will receive their refunds sooner. 

Additionally, better tracking and reporting means that we can spot - and correct - any 

flaws in the system more quickly. 

Identity Protection PIN Program 

In addition to helping identity theft victims clear up problems with their IRS accounts, the 

IRS works proactively to help ensure that these taxpayers do not encounter delays in 

processing their future returns. In 2011, we launched a pilot program for Identity 

Protection Personal Identification Numbers (IP PIN). The IP PIN is a unique identifier 

that establishes that a particular taxpayer is the rightful filer of the return. Under this 

pilot, we issued IP PINs to over 50,000 taxpayers who were identity theft victims. 

The pilot program showed us that this is a very promising innovation that can 

dramatically reduce the number of taxpayers caught up in delays. Therefore, we have 

expanded the program for the new filing season, and have issued IP PINs to 

approximately 250,000 taxpayers who have suffered identity theft in the past. 

Employee Training 

The IRS runs one of the largest phone centers in the world, and is dedicated to 

providing quality service with a high degree of accuracy to every taxpayer who contacts 

us. Having said that, we realize that taxpayers who call the IRS with identity theft 

problems present unique challenges to our telephone representatives and we need to 

ensure taxpayers receive quality, courteous service. 

As a result, last year we conducted a thorough review of the training we provide our 

employees to make sure that they have the tools and sensitivity they need to respond in 

an appropriate manner to those who have been victimized by identity theft. 

Out of this review, we have done two things: 

• First, we updated the training course for our telephone assistors in order to 

ensure that our assistors maintain the proper level of sensitivity when dealing 

with identity theft victims and understand the serious financial problems that 

identity theft poses for these taxpayers. We conducted this training at the 

beginning of the 2012 filing season. 

• Second, we broadened the scope of our training to cover those IRS employees 

who are not telephone assistors but who nonetheless interact with taxpayers or 

work identity theft cases. We developed a new course for these employees, 

which includes not only sensitivity training but also ensures that employees who 

9 
46 


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process identity theft cases have the proper tools and techniques to do so. This 

course was provided to all employees who might come into contact with an 

identity theft victim. In all, 35,000 IRS employees received this training. 

Taxpayer Outreach and Education 

The IRS continues to undertake outreach initiatives to provide taxpayers, return 

preparers and other stakeholders with the information they need to prevent tax-related 

identity theft and, when identity theft does occur, to resolve issues as quickly and 

efficiently as possible. Recent actions in this area include the following: 

• We overhauled the identity protection training provided to tax practitioners at last 

year's Tax Forums. These yearly events, held in several cities around the 

country, typically draw more than 16,000 practitioners. In addition, our Small 

Business/Self Employed division met with practitioners to discuss the IP PIN 

program, the expansion of the program, and the modified procedures, forms and 

notices associated with the program. 

• We continue to update the identity theft information provided on the IRS.gov 

website. This includes emerging trends in identity theft along with fraud schemes, 

phishing sites and prevention strategies. We also added a direct link to our 

Identity Theft page, to make it easier for taxpayers who visit IRS.gov to find it. 

• The IRS continues a far-reaching communications effort through traditional and 

social media in both English and Spanish. This effort, started last year, has 

intensified this filing season. In addition to consumer protection information on 

IRS.gov, we have done a number of news releases and tax tips to help taxpayers 

and highlight our continuing enforcement efforts. We have also produced new 

identity theft awareness videos for the IRS YouTube channel in English, Spanish 

and American Sign Language and relayed information out through IRS Twitter 

feeds and podcasts. In addition, the IRS also made identity theft the top item in 

this year's "Dirty Dozen" annual list of taxpayer scams. We plan to 

continue this sweeping communication effort through the rest of the filing season 

and beyond. 

CONCLUSION 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership in this area and thank you again for the 

opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee and update you on the steps that the 

IRS is taking to prevent identity theft and to assist taxpayers who have been victims of 

this crime. This work is a key challenge for the IRS. Our work here for filing season 

2012 is a solid start but not the end of our efforts. I cannot tell you that we will beat this 

problem in one year. I can tell you that we have committed our talents and resources to 

prevent the issuance of fraudulent refunds and have developed processes to minimize 

the pain felt by those who have been victimized. We are committed to continuing to 

10 
47 

f 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

Ms. Olson, you may proceed. 


Insert offset folio 34 here 78817.034
48 

STATEMENT OF NINA E. OLSON, NATIONAL TAXPAYER 

ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 

Ms. OLSON. Chairmen Boustany and Johnson, Ranking Members Lewis and Becerra, and Members of the Subcommittees, thank 

you for inviting me to testify today about tax related identity theft. 

Since 2004, I have written extensively about the impact of identity theft on taxpayers and tax administration, and I have worked 

closely with the IRS to improve its efforts to assist taxpayers who 

become identity theft victims. The IRS has adopted many of my office’s recommendations and made significant progress in this area 

in recent years. Notwithstanding these efforts, however, identity 

theft continues to pose significant challenges for the IRS. 

I will highlight five points that I think deserve particular emphasis. First, I am concerned that the Federal Government continues 

to facilitate tax related identity theft by making the Death Master 

File, a list of recently deceased individuals that includes their full 

name, SSN, data of birth, date of death and the county, State, zip 

code, maybe, maybe not, of the last address on record. There is 

some uncertainty about whether the Social Security Administration 

has the legal authority to restrict public access to DMF records in 

light of the Freedom of Information Act. For that reason I strongly 

support legislation to restrict public access to the DMF. However, 

I believe the SSA has at least a reasonable basis for seeking to 

limit public access to the DMF under present case law under FOIA 

and if legislation is not enacted soon, I encourage the SSA to act 

on its own because everyday we delay taxpayers are harmed. 

Second, I am aware that some State and local law enforcement 

agencies would like to access the taxpayer return information to 

help them combat identity theft. I have significant concerns about 

loosening taxpayer privacy protections and believe this is an area 

where we need to tread carefully. But as I describe in my written 

statement, the IRS is piloting a procedure that would enable taxpayers to consent to the release of their returns in appropriate circumstances. In my view, giving taxpayers a choice strikes the appropriate balance. 

Third, I am pleased that this filing season the IRS has established a dedicated taxpayer protection unit to answer phone calls 

from legitimate taxpayers who have been caught up in our identity 

theft filters. However, for the week ending April 28th the level of 

service on this phone line was 24 percent, meaning that only 1 out 

of every 4 calls was answered and those callers that did get 

through had to wait on hold an average of 1 hour and 21 minutes. 

More support for this unit is clearly required. 

Fourth, although my office has extensive knowledge about what 

victims of tax related identity theft experience as a result of handling tens of thousands of such cases, the IRS has been developing 

new initiatives in this area without seeking our input until late in 

the process. As a result the victims’ perspective in several instances has not been given adequate weight in my opinion. For example, the IRS is moving away from using a single traffic cop to 

resolve identity theft cases, which may make the process more complicated for taxpayers to navigate and end up with cases falling 

into black holes. 

49 

The IRS has also been very slow to develop procedures to assist 

victims of preparer fraud. Congress put the Office of the Taxpayer 

Advocate inside the IRS precisely to ensure that the taxpayer perspective is considered and when we are not adequately consulted 

the result is often that the IRS does what is best for the IRS rather 

than what is best for the taxpayer. 

Fifth, I note that even as the IRS is being urged to do much more 

to combat identity theft, taxpayers are clamoring for the IRS to 

process returns and issue refunds more quickly. While there is still 

room for the IRS to make improvements in both areas, these two 

goals are fundamentally at odds. If our overriding goal is to process 

tax returns and deliver refunds as quickly as possible for the vast 

majority of persons who file legitimate returns, it is inevitable that 

some identity thieves will get away with refund fraud and some 

honest taxpayers will be harmed. 

On the other hand, if we place a greater value on protecting taxpayers against identity theft and the Treasury against fraudulent 

refund claims, the IRS will need more time to review returns and 

the roughly 110 taxpayers who receive refunds will have to wait 

longer to get them, perhaps considerably longer. Alternatively, the 

IRS will require a considerably larger staff to enable it to review 

questionable returns more quickly. There really is no way around 

these tradeoffs. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and would be happy 

to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Olson follows:] 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Ms. Olson. 

Mr. Black, you may proceed. 

50 


Insert offset folio 35 here 78817.035

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 

NINA E. OLSON 

NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 

HEARING ON 

IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON OVERSIGHT 

AND SOCIAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 8,2012 
51 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. The IRS and TAS Continue to See Unprecedented Levels of Identity Theft 

Casework ............................................................................................................... 5 

II. The Social Security Administration (SSA) Should Restrict Access to the Death 

Master File ............................................................................................................. 7 

III. Creating New Exceptions to Taxpayer Privacy Protections Poses Risks and 

Should Be Approached Carefully, If at All. .......................................................... 10 

IV. There Is a Continuing Need for the IRS's Identity Protection Specialized Unit to 

Playa Centralized Role in Managing Identity Theft Cases ................................. 12 

V. The Taxpayer Protection Unit Needs Significantly More Staffing to Increase Its 

Level of Service ................................................................................................... 13 

VI. The IRS Should Clarify the Purpose and Impact of Identity Theft Indicators ...... 15 

VII. When Analyzing the Impact of Identity Theft, a Broad Perspective Is Necessary . 

.................... .................. .................. ................................. ................................ 16 

VIII. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 18 
52 


Insert offset folio 37 here 78817.037

Chairman Boustany, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Lewis, Ranking Member 

Becerra, and distinguished Members of the respective subcommittees: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today about the subject of tax-related identity theft.' 

I have written extensively about the impact of identity theft on taxpayers and tax 

administration and have addressed identity theft in two other congressional hearings 

this spring2 While the IRS has made significant progress in this area in recent years, I 

believe the IRS can do more. Identity theft is not a problem the IRS can fully solve, but I 

have significant concerns about certain aspects of the IRS's approach. 

I first raised concerns about the IRS's processing of identity theft cases in 2004 and 

included identity theft as a Most Serious Problem in my 2005 Annual Report to 

Congress, even before the IRS acknowledged identity theft as a problem worthy of a 

dedicated program office3 The Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is unique in that we 

work identity theft cases from beginning to end, and many TAS employees have 

developed expertise in this issue over the years. To its credit, the IRS has adopted 

many of my office's recommendations to help victims of identity theft. Indeed, a number 

of former TAS employees have moved to the IRS's Office of Privacy, Governmental 

1 The views expressed herein are solely those of the National Taxpayer Advocate. The National 

Taxpayer Advocate is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and reports to the Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue. However, the National Taxpayer Advocate presents an independent taxpayer 

perspective that does not necessarily reflect the position of the IRS, the Treasury Department, or the 

Office of Management and Budget. Congressional testimony requested from the National Taxpayer 

Advocate is not submitted to the IRS, the Treasury Department. or the Office of Management and Budget 

for prior approval. However, we have provided courtesy copies of this statement to both the IRS and the 

Treasury Department in advance of this hearing. 

2 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 48-73 (Most Serious Problem: TaxRelated Identity Theft Continues to Impose Significant Burdens on Taxpayers and the IRS); National 

Taxpayer Advocate 2009 Annual Report to Congress 307-317 (Status Update: IRS's Identity Theft 

Procedures Require Fine-Tuning); National Taxpayer Advocate 2008 Annual Report to Congress 79-94 

(Most Serious Problem: IRS Process Improvements to Assist Victims of Identity Theft); National Taxpayer 

Advocate 2007 Annual Report to Congress 96-115 (Most Serious Problem: Identity Theft Procedures); 

National Taxpayer Advocate 2005 Annual Report to Congress 180-191 (Most Serious Problem: Identity 

Theft); National Taxpayer Advocate 2004 Annual Report to Congress 133-136 (Most Serious Problem: 

Inconsistence Campus Procedures); Hearing on Tax Compliance and Tax-Fraud Prevention Before the 

H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcomm. on Government Organization, Efficiency, 

and Financial Management, 112'h Congo (Apr. 19, 2012) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer 

Advocate); Tax Fraud by Identity Theft Part 2: Status, Progress, and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before 

the S. Comm. on Finance, Subcomm. on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Growth, 112'h Congo 

(Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate); The Spread of Tax Fraud by 

Identity Theft: A Threat to Taxpayers, a Drain on the Public Treasury, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Finance, Subcomm. on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Growth, 112th Congo (May 25, 2011) 

(statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate); Filing Season Update: Current IRS Issues, 

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111 th Congo (Apr. 15, 2010) (statement of Nina E. Olson, 

National Taxpayer Advocate); Identity Theft: Who's Got Your Number, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Finance, 110th Congo (Apr. 10,2008) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate). 

3 National Taxpayer Advocate 2005 Annual Report to Congress 180-191 (Most Serious Problem: Identity 

Theft); National Taxpayer Advocate 2004 Annual Report to Congress 133-136 (Most Serious Problem: 

Inconsistence Campus Procedures). 
53 


Insert offset folio 38 here 78817.038

- 2-

Liaison, and Disclosure (PGLD), the organization in charge of coordinating identity theft 

efforts servicewide. 

Today, I am concerned that the IRS is proceeding with certain efforts to assist identity theft 

victims without seeking my office's involvement. TAS has an important perspective to offer 

in that we are the "voice of the taxpayer" within the IRS, yet we are not being given the 

opportunity to weigh in at the early stages when the IRS develops new procedures in this 

area. 

For example, the IRS recently decided to adopt a specialized approach to assisting identity 

theft victims. As I understand it, each affected IRS function will create its own specialized 

unit whose employees will work solely on identity theft cases and will be trained to resolve 

related account problems. These specialized, embedded employees will adjust the 

taxpayers' accounts themselves, rather than sending them to the servicewide Accounts 

Management (AM) unit. Because TAS will continue to receive and resolve identity theft 

cases that meet our case criteria, TAS employees will work closely with these units. 

In general, I support the concept of a specialized unit approach, but "the devil is in the 

details." Thus, I would like my staff to have an opportunity to review the procedures 

being developed by the various functions. Our review would serve two purposes: (1) to 

ensure that the rights of identity theft victims are adequately protected and (2) to allow 

the Taxpayer Advocate Service to update its internal procedures so that our requests 

for help in resolving identity theft cases reach the appropriate contacts throughout the 

IRS. When we asked to be a part of the review process, we were initially told that it was 

not our role to comment on procedures being created by other functions. Only when we 

recently raised this issue with the Director of PGLD were we permitted to participate in 

the review process. Just in the past week or so, my staff was given access to the 

procedures developed by the specialized units. Including TAS at such a late stage 

severely limits the opportunity for the IRS to adequately consider our suggestions. In 

the meantime, my office continues to receive identity theft cases at a record pace, and 

our case advocates are uncertain about where to send their identity theft-related 

Operations Assistance Requests (OARs)4 In fact, I hear reports from my offices that 

the IRS functions are improperly rejecting our OARs. With all this confusion, taxpayers 

are being harmed. This is simply unacceptable. 

The IRS's track record in assisting victims of return preparer fraud does not bode well 

for victims of identity theft. 

I am concerned at the moment about the IRS's ability to develop procedures to promptly 

assist taxpayers who are victimized by identity theft, in part because of how the IRS has 

handled a related issue involving fraud by tax return preparers. The IRS has struggled 

4 An OAR (Form 12412) is used by TAS case advocates to request assistance from the IRS when TAS 

does not have the statutory or delegated authority to take the required action(s) on a taxpayer's case. 

See Internal Revenue Manual (lRM) 13.1.19.1, TAS OAR Process (Feb. 1, 2011). 
54 


Insert offset folio 39 here 78817.039

- 3-

to unwind the harm done to victims - even when it had plenty of time to develop 

procedures. 

More specifically, TAS has received a significant number of cases involving preparer 

refund fraud. These preparers alter taxpayers' returns by inflating income, deductions, 

credits, or withholding without their clients' knowledge or consent, and pocket the 

difference between the revised refund amount and the amount expected by the 

taxpayer. The IRS ultimately discovers that the taxpayer's return is incorrect and 

attempts to recover the excess refund from the taxpayer through levies, liens, and other 

enforcement actions. In one egregious instance involving several returns prepared by 

the same tax return preparer - and despite the IRS's concurrence that the returns it 

processed were not the returns signed by the taxpayers - our Local Taxpayer Advocate 

could not persuade the IRS Accounts Management function (AM) to adjust the 

taxpayers' accounts to remove the fabricated income or credits. 

In these cases, the Local Taxpayer Advocate issued Taxpayer Assistance Orders 

(TAOs)5 to AM in December 2010. After AM refused to comply, I elevated these TAOs 

to the Commissioner of the Wage and Investment (W&I) division in July 2011. After 

receiving no response, I further elevated the TAOs in August 2011 to the Deputy 

Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, who agreed that the IRS needed to 

correct the victims' accounts. It was not until the end of March 2012 that the IRS finally 

made the adjustments. 

Because this was a systemic issue that required guidance to W&I employees, I issued a 

Proposed Taxpayer Advocate Directive (TAD) to the Commissioner of W&I on June 13, 

2011.6 This Proposed TAD directed W&I to establish procedures for adjusting the 

taxpayer accounts in instances where a tax return preparer alters the return without the 

taxpayer's knowledge or consent in order to obtain a fraudulent refund. The Proposed 

TAD pointed out that the IRS has been aware of the issue of unscrupulous tax return 

preparers altering returns in this manner for at least eight years. In particular, in March 

of 2003, the Refund Crimes section of the IRS's Criminal Investigation (CI) division had 

identified a scheme in which a particular tax return preparer had altered several 

hundred of his clients' returns without their knowledge in order to increase the total 

amount of each refund, and he then diverted the excess refund into his bank account. 

CI sought advice from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, which issued an opinion 

5 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 7811 authorizes the National Taxpayer Advocate to issue a Taxpayer 

Assistance Order upon a determination that a taxpayer is suffering or about to suffer a significant 

hardship as a result of the manner in which the internal revenue laws are being administered by the 

Secretary. See IRC § 7811. 

6 Pursuant to Delegation Order No. 13-3, the National Taxpayer Advocate has the authority to issue a 

TAD to mandate administrative or procedural changes to improve the operation of a functional process or 

to grant relief to groups of taxpayers (or all taxpayers) when implementation will protect the rights of 

taxpayers, prevent undue burden, ensure equitable treatment, or provide an essential service to 

taxpayers. IRM 1.2.50.4, Delegation Order 13-3 (formerly 00-250, Rev. 1), Authority to Issue Taxpayer 

Advocate Directives (Jan. 17,2001). See also IRM 13.2.1.6, Taxpayer Advocate Directives (July 16, 

2009). 
55 


Insert offset folio 40 here 78817.040

- 4-

concluding that a return altered by a tax return preparer after the taxpayer has verified 

the accuracy of the return is a nullity (i.e., not a valid return)-' Counsel also advised that 

the taxpayer's account should be corrected by having the taxpayer file an accurate 

return and then adjusting the account to reflect the correct information reported on that 

return H The Office of Chief Counsel issued an additional opinion in 2008, concluding 

that the IRS can and should adjust each taxpayer's account to remove any entries 

attributable to the invalid return filed by the preparer.9 And in 2011, shortly after I issued 

the Proposed TAD, Counsel reaffirmed the conclusion that such altered returns were 

not valid. 'o 

After receiving an unsatisfactory response to concerns raised about this matter in the 

Proposed TAD and my 2011 Annual Report to Congress," I issued a TAD to the W&I 

Commissioner and the Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) division Commissioner 

on January 12, 2012.'2 While both have acknowledged their intent to comply with the 

substance of the TAD, they appealed the TAD solely in an effort to extend the time 

allowed to comply with the actions, notwithstanding that they already had over eight 

years to develop procedures to assist these victims of fraud. 

It has been almost a year and a half since TAS first raised this issue with Accounts 

Management. In this time, I have issued a Proposed TAD and a TAD directing the IRS 

to develop procedures, and have discussed this concern in my 2011 Annual Report to 

Congress. I and my employees have issued Taxpayer Assistance Orders in specific 

cases. I find it entirely unacceptable that the IRS needs more time to develop guidance 

for its employees about a type of return preparer fraud that it has known about for more 

than eight years, is growing, is closely related to identity theft, and is potentially very 

harmful to the impacted taxpayers. The taxpayers are the victims here, and the IRS 

should act with all due haste to correct their accounts and eliminate the risk of unlawful 

collection. 

Because of experiences like this, I believe it is critical that TAS be included in predecisional meetings at which changes in IRS identity theft procedures are discussed in 

order to ensure that the victims' perspective is adequately considered. 

In my testimony today, I will make the following points with respect to identity theft: 

7 See IRS Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum, Horse's Tax Service, PMTA 2011-13 (May 12, 2003). 

8 1d. 

g IRS Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum, Refunds Improperly Directed to a Preparer, POSTN-145098-

08 (Dec. 17, 2008). 

10 IRS Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum, Tax Return Preparer's Alteration of a Return, PMTA 2011-

20 (June 27, 2011). 

11 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 59-60. 

12 See Taxpayer Advocate Directive 2012-1 (Establish procedures for adjusting the taxpayer's account in 

instances where a tax return preparer altered the return without the taxpayer's knowledge or consent, and 

the preparerobtained a fraudulent refund) (Jan. 12,2012). 
56 


Insert offset folio 41 here 78817.041

- 5-

1. The IRS and TAS continue to see unprecedented levels of identity theft 

casework. 

2. The Social Security Administration should restrict access to the Death Master 

File. 

3. Creating new exceptions to taxpayer privacy protections poses risks and should 

be approached carefully, if at all. 

4. There is a continuing need for the IRS's identity protection specialized unit to 

playa centralized role in managing identity theft cases. 

5. The Taxpayer Protection Unit needs significantly more staffing to increase its 

level of service. 

6. The IRS should clarify the purpose and impact of identity theft indicators. 

7. When analyzing the impact of identity theft, a broad perspective is necessary. 

I. The IRS and TAS Continue to See Unprecedented Levels of Identity Theft 

Casework. 

Tax-related identity theft is a serious problem - for its victims, for the IRS and, when 

Treasury funds are improperly paid to the perpetrators, for all taxpayers. In general, 

tax-related identity theft occurs when an individual intentionally uses the Social Security 

number (SSN) of another person to file a false tax return with the intention of obtaining 

an unauthorized refund. '3 Identity theft wreaks havoc on our tax system in many ways. 

Victims not only must deal with the aftermath of an emotionally draining crime, but may 

also have to deal with the IRS for years to untangle the resulting tax account problems. 

Identity theft also impacts the public fisc, as Treasury funds are diverted to payout 

improper tax refunds claimed by opportunistic perpetrators. In addition, identity theft 

takes a significant toll on the IRS, tying up limited resources that the IRS could 

otherwise shift to taxpayer service or compliance initiatives. 

13 This type of tax-related identity theft is referred to as "refund-related" identity theft. In "employmentrelated" identity theft, an individual files a tax return using his or her own taxpayer identifying number, but 

uses another individual's SSN in order to obtain employment, and consequently, the wages are reported 

to the IRS under the SSN. The IRS has procedures in place to minimize the tax administration impact to 

the victim in these employment-related identity theft situations. Accordingly, I will focus on refund-related 

identity theft in this testimony. 
57 


Insert offset folio 42 here 78817.042

- 6-

Today, identity theft can be an organized, large-scale operation. Indeed, the most 

recent IRS data show more than 450,000 identity theft cases servicewide.'4 The 

Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU), the centralized IRS organization established 

in 2008 that assists identity theft victims, is experiencing unprecedented levels of case 

receipts. 's As this chart shows, IPSU receipts increased substantially over the two 

previous years. 

Chart 1: IPSU Paper Inventory Receipts, FY 2009 to FY 2012 by Planning Period'6 

160,000 .IPSU Receipts 

140.000 1 

120,000 i 

I 

I 100.000 i 

I 

80,000 I 

i 

11111_ I 

60,000 I 

I 

I 40,000 

1 __ 1 20,000 

0 

"'~ "'N "'''' "'~ "'N "'''' "'~ "'N "'''' "'~ 

CLCL 

1~ CLCL 1~ 1~ CLCL CLCL 1~ CLCL I~ CLCL 1~ CLCL 1~ CLCL 1~ CLCL 1~ CLCL I~ FY 2009 FY 2010 FY2011 FY 

2012 

The Taxpayer Advocate Service has experienced a similar surge in cases, as TAS 

identity theft receipts rose 97 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2011 over FY 2010. The 

upward trend has continued in the current fiscal year. In the first two quarters of 

FY 2012, TAS received 9,988 identity theft cases, a 43 percent increase over the same 

period in FY 2011.17 The growth in casework reflects the both the increase in identity 

theft incidents and the IRS's inability to address the victims' tax issues promptly. 

14 Data provided by the IRS Office of Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure (e-mail dated 

Apr. 17,2012). 

15 With the IRS moving to a specialized approach to identity theft victim assistance, it is unclear what role 

the IPSU will play in the future. The National Taxpayer Advocate believes it is important for the IPSU to 

continue to serve as the "traffic cop" and serving as the single point of contact with the identity theft 

victim, as discussed later in this testimony. 

16 Data obtained from IRS Identity Protection Specialized Unit (Mar. 13,2012). The IPSU tracks cases by 

"planning period." Planning Period 1 covers Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, Planning Period 2 covers Jan. 1 to 

June 30, and Planning Period 3 covers July 1 to Sept. 30. 

17 There were 6,999 stolen identity (Primary Issue Code 425) cases in TAS during the same period in 

FY 2011 Data provided by TAS Technical Analysis and Guidance (Apr. 16,2012). 
58 


Insert offset folio 43 here 78817.043

- 7 -

II. The Social Security Administration (SSA) Should Restrict Access to the 

Death Master File. 

I am concerned that the federal government continues to facilitate tax-related identity 

theft by making public the Death Master File (DMF), a list of recently deceased 

individuals that includes their full name, Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, 

date of death, and the county, state, and ZIP code of the last address on record. 18 The 

SSA characterizes release of this information as "legally mandated,,,19 but the extent to 

which courts currently would require dissemination of death data under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA)2o has not been tested. To eliminate uncertainty, I have 

recommended that Congress pass legislation to clarify that public access to the DMF 

can and should be limited.21 

The public availability of the DMF facilitates tax-related identity theft in a variety of ways. 

For example, a parent generally is entitled to claim a deceased minor child as a 

dependent on the tax return that covers the child's year of death. If an identity thief 

obtains information about the child from the DMF and uses it to claim the dependent on 

a fraudulent return before the legitimate taxpayer files, the IRS will stop the second 

(legitimate taxpayer's) return and freeze the refund. The legitimate taxpayer then may 

face an extended delay in obtaining the refund, potentially causing an economic 

hardship, and will bear the emotionally laden burden of persuading the IRS that the 

deceased child was really his or hers. As a practical matter, legislation could relieve 

survivors of this burden by simply delaying release of the information for several years. 

In light of the practical difficulties of passing legislation, however, I also urge the Social 

Security Administration to reevaluate whether it has the legal authority to place limits on 

the disclosure of DMF information administratively. In 1980, the SSA created the DMF, 

now issued weekly, after an individual filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Columbia seeking certain data fields pursuant to FOIA and the court entered a 

consent judgment in the case pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties.22 While 

the 1980 consent judgment may have seemed reasonable at the time, the factual and 

legal landscape has changed considerably over the past three decades. 

18 See Office of the Inspector General, SSA, Personally Identifiable Information Made Available to the 

General Public via the Death Master File, A-06-08-18042 (June 2008). 

19 Social Security and Death Information 1, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm. on 

Soc. Security (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security) (Feb. 2, 2012). 

20 FOIA generally provides that any person has a right to obtain access to certain federal agency records. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 

21 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 519-23 (Legislative 

Recommendation: Restrict Access to the Death Master File). 

22 See Perholtz v. Ross. Civil Action Nos. 78-2385, 78-2386 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1980). 
59 


Insert offset folio 44 here 78817.044

-8-

From a factual standpoint, DMF information was sought in 1980 as a way to prevent 

fraud by enabling pension funds to identify when a beneficiary died so they could stop 

the payment of benefits. Today, DMF information is used to commit tax fraud, so there 

is a factual reason for keeping the information out of the public domain. 

From a legal standpoint, judicial interpretations of FOIA and its privacy exceptions have 

evolved in several important respects, including the recognition of privacy rights for 

decedents and their surviving relatives. 

In general, agencies receiving FOIA requests for personal information must balance 

(1) the public interest served by release of the requested information against (2) the 

privacy interests of individuals to whom the information pertains23 

In 1989, the Supreme Court reiterated that the public's FOIA interest lies in learning 

"what their government is up 10.,,24 The Court continued: 

Official information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory 

duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not 

fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in 

various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's 

own conduct. 25 

Following the Supreme Court's reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 

rejected a request for a list of names and addresses of retired or disabled federal 

employees, concluding that the release of the information could "subject the listed 

annuitants 'to an unwanted barrage of mailings and personal solicitations,'" and that 

such a "fusillade" was more than a de minimis assault on privacy.26 

The courts have increasingly found that privacy rights do not belong only to living 

persons. In 2001, the D.C. Circuit stated that: 

the death of the subject of personal information does diminish to some extent the 

23 See, e.g., Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994); 

Department of Justice v. Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). This 

balancing applies to information described in FOIA Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) ("personnel and 

medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy"), which would encompass files like the DMF. See Department of State v. Washington 

Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599-603 (1982); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Administration, 449 

F.3d 141, 152 (D.C. CiL 2006). 

24 Department of Justice v. Reporter's Committee for Freedom ofthe Press, 489 U.S. at 773 (quotation 

omitted). 

25 Id. See also National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) 

(quotation omitted) ("FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to know 'what the Government is up 

to"'). 

26 National Association of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990). 
60 


Insert offset folio 45 here 78817.045

- 9-

privacy interest in that information, though it by no means extinguishes that 

interest; one's own and one's relations' interests in privacy ordinarily extend 

beyond one's death27 

The courts have reiterated that decedents and their surviving relatives possess privacy 

rights in numerous cases. 28 In the decided cases, the privacy interest at issue generally 

has consisted exclusively of emotional trauma. Where there is tax-related identity theft, 

the privacy interest is much stronger because there is a financial as well as an 

emotional impact. For example, a parent who has lost a child to Sudden Infant Death 

Syndrome and then discovers an identity thief has used the DMF to claim his child as a 

dependent must not only devote time trying to prove to the IRS that he was the 

legitimate parent, but he must also deal with the financial burden of having his tax return 

(and refund) frozen. 

Consider two legitimate uses of DMF information. One is by pension funds that use the 

information to terminate benefits as of the date of a beneficiary's death. The other is by 

genealogists who use DMF information to help them build a family tree. While both 

uses are reasonable, neither fits within the core purpose of FOIA of alerting the citizenry 

about "what their government is up to." The D.C. Circuit has held that where disclosure 

does not serve the core purpose of FOIA, no public interest exists, and any personal 

privacy interest, however modest, is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of 

nondisclosure.29 Even if a court were to decide that the DMF does serve a core FOIA 

purpose, it would balance the public and privacy interests and could easily conclude 

that the privacy interests predominate. 

Thus, if legislation is not forthcoming, I hope the SSA will reconsider its legal analysis 

and decide to take steps to restrict access to the DMF.30 

27 Schrecker v. Department of Justice, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), reiterated 

on appeal following remand, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

28 See, e.g., National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170 ("FOIA recognizes 

surviving family members' right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's death-scene 

images."); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Park Service, 194 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting 

that the D.C. Circuit "has squarely rejected the proposition that FOIA's protection of personal privacy ends 

upon the death of the individual depicted"); Campbell v. Department of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) ("The court must also account for the fact that certain reputational interests and family-related 

privacy expectations survive death."); New York Times v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 

920 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (concluding that NASA was not required to release audio 

tapes of the final minutes aboard the Challenger space shuttle). 

29 National Association of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

30 The SSA may be able to restrict access to the DMF without even asking the court to modify its consent 

judgment in Perholtz v. Ross, Civil Action Nos. 78-2385. 78-2386 (DD.C. Apr. 11. 1980). By its terms, 

the consent judgment applies only to requests for updated information submitted by Mr. Perholtz himself, 

is limited to one request per year, and covers only a decedent's "social security number, surname and (as 

available) date of death_" Our understanding is that Mr. Perholtz has not submitted requests for updated 

information in recent years. that the SSA is now making DMF information available weekly, and that the 

SSA is making public considerably more information than the three data fields described. 
61 


Insert offset folio 46 here 78817.046

- 10-

III. Creating New Exceptions to Taxpayer Privacy Protections Poses Risks and 

Should Be Approached Carefully, If at All. 

In my most recent Annual Report to Congress, I recommended that Congress enact a 

comprehensive Taxpayer Bill of Rights, and I suggested that the right to confidentiality 

is one of those core taxpayer rights. Taxpayers have the right to expect that any 

information they provide to the IRS will not be used or disclosed by the IRS unless 

authorized by the taxpayer or other provision of law31 

The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains significant protections for the confidentiality 

of returns and return information. IRC § 6103 generally provides that returns and return 

information shall be confidential and then delineates a number of exceptions to this 

general rule. "Return information" is defined broadly and includes a taxpayer's identity; 

the nature, source, or amount of income; payments; receipts; deductions; exemptions; 

credits; and similar items.32 For example, information furnished on a Form W-2 

constitutes return information. 

Section 61 03(i)(2) authorizes the disclosure of return information (other than "taxpayer 

return information,,33) in response to requests from federal law enforcement agencies for 

use in criminal investigations. The head of the federal agency (or the inspector general 

of that agency)34 must request the information in writing and can only disclose it to 

officers and employees of that agency who are personally/directly engaged in: (1) the 

preparation of a judicial or administrative proceeding regarding enforcement of a nontax 

federal criminal statute, (2) an investigation which may result in such a proceeding, or 

(3) a grand jury proceeding relating to enforcement of a nontax federal criminal statute 

to which the United States or such agency is or may be a party35 Section 61 03(i)(3)(A) 

authorizes the IRS to disclose return information (other than "taxpayer return 

information,,36), if the information may constitute evidence of a violation of a nontax 

federal criminal law, to apprise the head of the appropriate federal agency charged with 

responsibility for enforcing that law. 

31 National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 505. 

32 IRC § 6103(b)(2). 

33 "Taxpayer return information" is defined as return information "which is filed with. or furnished to. the 

Secretary by or on behalf of the taxpayer to whom such return information relates." IRC § 6103(b)(3). 

34 If the request is being made by the Department of Justice, multiple specifically named high level 

officials can make the written request for the information. See IRC § 6103(i)(2)(A). 

35 See IRC § 61 03(i)(2)(A)(i)·(iii). 

36 See IRC § 6103(b)(3). The information disclosed can include the taxpayer's identity only if there is 

information other than taxpayer return information that may constitute evidence of a taxpayer's violation of 

a nontax federal criminal law. IRC § 6103(i)(3)(A)(ii). "Return information" that is not "taxpayer return 

information" may include a taxpayer's identity, amount of income, deductions, etc., that is not filed with (or 

furnished to) the IRS by the taxpayer to whom the return information relates. IRC § 6103(b)(2) & (3). In 

the typical "bad return" case, the thief's identity, if discovered, will almost always come from other than 

taxpayer return information. 
62 


Insert offset folio 47 here 78817.047

- 11 -

There is no corresponding exception in IRC § 6103 that allows for the release of identity 

theft information to state or local agencies. 37 However, IRC § 6103(c) provides that a 

taxpayer may consent to disclosure of returns and return information to any person 

designated by the taxpayer. Under this exception, the IRS has developed a pilot that 

would facilitate a consent-based sharing of identity theft information with state and local 

law enforcement agencies. 

It is my understanding that some have called for the expansion of exceptions to IRC 

§ 6103, ostensibly to help state and local law enforcement combat identity theft. I have 

significant concerns about loosening taxpayer privacy protections and I do not believe 

that such an expansion of this statute is appropriate at this time. I believe the current 

framework of IRC § 6103 includes sufficient exceptions to allow the IRS to share 

information about identity thieves. 

The IRS Office of Chief Counsel has advised that under IRC § 6103(i)(3)(A), the IRS 

may share the "bad return" and other return inforrnation of an identity thief with other 

federal law enforcement agencies investigating the identity theft. In addition, the Office 

of Chief Counsel has advised that because a "bad return" filed by an identity thief may 

be considered return information of the victim, an identity theft victim can consent to the 

disclosure of the "bad return" filed by the alleged identity thief to state and local law 

enforcement agencies in connection with state and local law enforcement investigations 

related to the identity theft. 

In light of this advice, the IRS has developed a pilot in which tax data related to the "bad 

return" may be shared with state and local law enforcement agencies based on the 

victirn's written consent. I believe this approach strikes an appropriate balance -

protecting taxpayer return information while simultaneously giving state and local law 

enforcernent authorities more information to help them investigate and combat identity 

theft. However, I am concerned that once the information is in the hands of state and 

local law enforcernent, there is no prohibition in the tax code against redisclosure. 

Therefore, I suggest that Congress consider rnodifying IRC § 6103(c) to explicitly limit 

the use of tax return information to the purpose agreed upon by the taxpayer (i.e., to 

allow state or local law enforcernent to use the information solell to enforce state or 

local laws) and to prohibit the redisclosure of such information3 

37 Note, however, that certain disclosures to state law enforcement are permissible. See IRC 

§ 6103(i)(3)(B)(i) (disclosure of return information, including taxpayer return information, can be made to 

the extent necessary to advise appropriate officers or employees of any state law enforcement agency of 

the imminent danger of death or physical injury to any individual; disclosure cannot be made to local law 

enforcement agencies). While identity theft may cause emotional and economic injury, the typical identity 

theft situation does not pose an imminent danger of death or physical injury. 

38 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 505. 
63 


Insert offset folio 48 here 78817.048

- 12 -

IV. There Is a Continuing Need for the IRS's Identity Protection Specialized 

Unit to Playa Centralized Role in Managing Identity Theft Cases. 

Commissioner Shulman, in his written response to Senator Baucus's follow-up questions 

stemming from an April 2008 hearing, described the specialized unit (IPSU) as providing "a 

central point of contact for the resolution of tax issues caused by identity theft." His 

response further stated, "This unit will provide end-to-end case resolution. Victims will be 

able to communicate with one customer service representative to have their questions 

answered and issues resolved quickly and efficiently.,,39 While this description fits the 

model for which my office advocated, it does not accurately reflect how the IPSU works in 

practice. 

The IPSU does not "work" an identity theft case from beginning to end. Instead, it 

coordinates with up to 27 other functions within the IRS to obtain relief for the victim40 That 

is, the IPSU is designed to act as the "traffic cop" for identity theft cases, ensuring that 

cases move along smoothly and timely, and are not stuck in one function or another. In 

some cases (such as when the victim faces no immediate tax impact), the IPSU simply 

routes the case to other IRS organizations and "monitors" the account every 60 days41 In 

other cases, the unit uses Identity Theft Assistance Requests (ITARs) to ask other IRS 

functions to take specific actions42 

While the procedures call for the receiving functions to give ITARs priority treatment, there 

are no "teeth" to ensure that this happens43 Unlike TAS, which can issue a Taxpayer 

Assistance Order if an operating division (00) does not comply with its request for 

assistance in a timely manner, the IPSU procedures do not specify any consequences for 

functions that are unresponsive to a case referral or an ITAR. Moreover, TAS has 

negotiated agreements with the ODs that clearly define when and how the ODs will 

respond to a TAS request for action. I have urged the IPSU to enter into similar 

agreements with other IRS ODs and functions that set forth the timeframes for taking the 

requested actions and to develop tracking procedures to report to heads of office when 

functions regularly fail to meet these timeframes. 

39 Identity Theft: Who's Got Your Number, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 11 Oth Congo 

(Apr. 10,2008) (response of IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman to questions from Chairman Max 

Baucus), available at http://finance.senate.gov Ihearings/hearing/download!?id =f989b 16e-5da3-452d9675-b75d796fe2b4. 

40 IRS, Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee, Identity Theft Program Enhancements, Challenges 

and Next Steps 14 (Oct. 19,2011). 

41 IRM 21.9.2.4.3(7) (Oct. 1, 2011). 

421RM 21.9.2.10.1 (Oct. 1, 2011). 

43 IRM 21.9.2.1(4) (Oct. 1,2011) provides: 

All cases involving identity theft will receive priority treatment. This includes ... Form 14027-A 

Identity Theft Case Monitoring, and Form 14027-B, Identity Theft Case Referral .... ldentity Theft 

Assistance Request (ITAR) referrals are also included. 

IRM 21.9.2.10.1(1) (Oct. 1,2011) provides that "Cases assigned as ITAR will be treated similar to 

Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) process including time frames." 
64 


Insert offset folio 49 here 78817.049

- 13 -

Although the IRS has now shifted gears and plans to take a specialized approach to 

assisting identity theft victims, I firmly believe there remains a need for a centralized body 

such as the IPSU to serve as the "traffic cop." Identity theft cases are often complex, 

requiring adjustments by multiple IRS functions, and without a coordinator, there is a high 

risk that these cases will get "stuck" or fall through the cracks. The IPSU should continue 

to playa central role in this process by conducting a global account review and then 

tracking each identity theft case from start to finish, from one specialized function to 

another. 

V. The Taxpayer Protection Unit Needs Significantly More Staffing to Increase 

Its Level of Service. 

For the 2012 filing season, the IRS designed and implemented several identity theft 

filters intended to weed out suspicious returns. Through data mining, programmers can 

detect trends based on a variety of factors and develop customized filters to isolate 

suspicious claims for refunds. 

When the IRS proposed these filters, I was consulted and I said I could support them on 

the condition that the IRS also expeditiously address legitimate returns that happen to have 

the characteristics of a fabricated return. Significantly, the IRS must be able to answer 

phone calls from legitimate taxpayers who are caught up in the filters. I was assured there 

would be a mechanism for filtered tax returns to be retrieved and quickly processed, and a 

dedicated unit would be sufficiently staffed to take taxpayers' calls. 

The IRS now notifies affected taxpayers by letter that it had a problem processing the 

return and instructs them to call the new Taxpayer Protection Unit (TPU) to provide more 

information.44 Unfortunately, this unit is woefully understaffed to handle the volume of calls 

from taxpayers trying to figure out why their returns are not being processed. For the week 

ending March 10, the level of service on this unit's phone line was 11.7 percent, meaning 

that only about one out of every nine calls was answered45 And callers who did get 

through had to wait on hold an average of an hour and six minutes!46 

44 The Taxpayer Protection Unit should not be confused with the Identity Protection Specialized Unit, 

which assists victims of identity theft. The number to the TPU phone line is provided to taxpayers who 

receive a letter as a result of the identity theft filters implemented in the 2012 filing season. Victims of 

identity theft are still instructed to call the toll-free line operated by IPSU. 

4s IRS, Joint Operations Center Executive Level Summary Report (Mar. 13,2012). Level of service (LOS) 

measures the relative success rate of taxpayers that call for toll-free services seeking assistance from 

customer service representatives (CSRs). LOS is calculated by dividing the number of calls answered by 

the total number of callers attempting to reach the CSR queue. See IRS Performance Measures 2009 

Data Dictionary (Aug. 4, 2009). 

46 The average speed of answer was 3,991 seconds. IRS, Joint Operations Center Executive Level 

Summary Report (Mar. 10, 2012). 
65 


Insert offset folio 50 here 78817.050

- 14-

In the following weeks, the IRS provided additional staffing for the TPU, yet the level of 

service for this line has not risen to an acceptable [eveL For the week ending April 28, the 

TPU achieved a 24,0 percent level of service, with the average wait time increasing to one 

hour and 21 minutes47 This performance is simply unacceptable. The TPU c1ear[y 

requires more support. [note, however, that in a zero-sum budget environment, providing 

more resources for this unit means another [RS unit wil[ have less. The table below shows 

the level of service and average wait time for this "Taxpayer Protection" toll-free line for the 

past two months. 

Chart 2: Taxpayer Protection Unit Toll-Free Line Data 

90 

70 

60~~~~~~--~,--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~ __ ~ 

50~--------------~,~~----------~'----------------~ 

40+-------------~~~~-----------~~~----------~ 

30~----------~~------,c-------c~----~~----------~ 

20~------~~-----------------M'----------~~--~--~ 

10~~~~------------------------------~ 

O~----_,------,_----_.------._----_.------._----_.~ 

3/10/2012 3/17/2012 3/24/2012 3/31/2012 4/712012 4/14/2012 4/21/2012 4/28/2012 

___ Level of Ser.ice (%) . Average Speed of Answer (minutes) 

It seems not only that the [RS misjudged the number of customer service representatives 

needed to staff this line, but also that the identity theft filters have picked up more returns 

than anticipated. With such a low level of service, it is impossible to assign legitimacy to 

any estimate the IRS has of the filters' accuracy. If less than a quarter of the taxpayers 

calling the number listed in the notice get through to the TPU, how can the [RS ascertain 

the success of the identity theft filters? 

The [RS leadership has assured me this problem has been identified and resolved, and 

additional resources have been allocated to TPU staffing. Yet the actual LOS data cast 

doubt on these assurances. According[y, my staff and [ will monitor the situation and 

continue to have conversations with the [RS concerning how we can better serve the 

honest taxpayers caught up in the identity theft filters. From this point on, [ will be less 

47 The average speed of answer was 4,868 seconds for this period. IRS, Joint Operations Center 

Executive Level Summary Report (Apr. 28, 2012). 
66 


Insert offset folio 51 here 78817.051

- 15 -

willing to lend my support to additional filters until I see actual staffing plans and 

commitments, beyond mere verbal assurances, that the IRS will address the needs of 

legitimate taxpayers ensnared by the filters. 

The IRS often receives lists of compromised identities from its Criminal Investigation 

function, law enforcement agencies, and other third parties. Information that can identity a 

taxpayer comes in various forms, such as a series of debit cards, Treasury checks, or 

personally identifiable information retrieved from an alleged identity thiefs laptop. The TPU 

will be responsible for the review, verification, and resolution of potential identity theft cases 

referred to the IRS. This process includes checking and verifying returns, determining 

refund status, and taking appropriate action based on verification results. By identifying 

and preventing these schemes, the TPU should help protect taxpayers against identity 

theft-related fraud and enhance I RS revenue protection capabilities. 

I am pleased that there is now a process in place to work these referrals, but I am 

concerned they will be worked by the same TPU ernployees who are now inundated with 

identity theft filter calls. With the current level of service on the phones at 24 percent, can 

we realistically expect that this unit will be able to devote rnuch attention to referral lists? 

VI. The IRS Should Clarify the Purpose and Impact of Identity Theft Indicators. 

The IRS is making efforts to improve its tracking and reporting of identity theft cases 48 

Each function that works a case is required to input an identity theft marker on the 

purported victim's account. This initial indicator simply marks the account as belonging to a 

potential identity theft victim. For any filing or refund protections to be activated, a second 

identity theft marker must be placed on the account after the theft has been verified. 

With the backlog of identity theft cases, it often takes months to determine which filer is the 

rightful owner of the SSN where there have been duplicate filings. By this tirne, the next 

filing season may already be underway. When the identity theft victim files the following 

year's tax return, he or she may assurne, rnistakenly, that the IRS has taken steps to 

protect the account from would-be identity thieves when, in reality, the IRS has simply 

flagged the account as a potential identity theft account. 

I have asked that additional training be provided to remind IRS employees (including TAS 

employees) that the initial identity theft marker provides no protection to the victim's 

account and is used solely for tracking purposes. It is imperative that we quickly resolve 

the account problem and apply the subsequent identity theft marker, both to protect 

revenue and to protect the legitirnate taxpayer. 

48 The National Taxpayer Advocate first recommended that the IRS develop an electronic indicator to 

mark the accounts of identity theft victims in 2005, an idea the IRS ignored in its response. See National 

Taxpayer Advocate 2005 Annual Report to Congress 185,191. It was not until 2008 that the IRS 

developed such an indicator. See National Taxpayer Advocate 2007 Annual Report to Congress 110 ("'In 

collaboration with the TAS and representatives from IRS business and operating divisions, the IRS has 

developed a process for using a universal identity theft indicator that will be placed on a taxpayer's 

account, beginning in 2008, when the taxpayer self-identifies as an identity theft victim."). 
67 


Insert offset folio 52 here 78817.052

- 16-

In addition to applying an identity theft marker to a victim's account, the IRS should also 

notify victims in writing that their personal information has been misused. I made this 

recommendation in my 2007 Annual Report to Congress49 While such a letter would not 

directly stop identity theft, it would alert innocent taxpayers that their personal information 

has been compromised and allow them an opportunity to take measures to protect 

themselves from further harm. Only recently has the IRS developed such a letter, and my 

understanding is that over 16,000 letters have gone out thus far in the 2012 filing seasonso 

However, not every function appears to be issuing these notification letterss1 The fact that 

it took over four years to develop such a simple and helpful letter suggests the IRS has not 

placed adequate emphasis on victim assistance. The fact that not all appropriate functions 

currently issue these letters reveals the need for a stronger identity theft program office that 

does not rely on individual functions to develop their own procedures without sufficient 

oversight. 

VII. When Analyzing the Impact of Identity Theft, a Broad Perspective Is 

Necessary. 

I want to take a moment to provide much-needed perspective on the IRS's overall 

mission and the challenges and trade-offs that addressing tax-related identity theft 

presents. As the nation's tax collection agency, the IRS is responsible for processing 

over 145 million individual income tax returns annually, including more than 109 million 

requests for refunds. 52 In 2011, the average refund amount was approximately $2,913, 

representing a significant lump-sum payment for those taxpayers with incomes below 

the median adjusted gross income of $31 ,494 for individual taxpayers. 53 

During the filing season and throughout the year, the IRS must protect the public fisc 

from illegitimate refund claims while expeditiously processing legitimate returns and 

paying out legitimate refunds. The dual tasks of fraud prevention and timely return 

processing present challenges even in simple tax systems, and ours is far from simple. 

The recent trend of running explicit economic stimulus or disbursement programs 

through the tax code that require the IRS to make large payments to taxpayers, 

combined with a reduction in IRS funding, has made the IRS's job much harder. 

49 National Taxpayer Advocate 2007 Annual Report to Congress 112. 

50 Data obtained from the Notice Gatekeeper intranet site (May 3, 2012). 

51 For example, there is no guidance in the IRM for the Automated Underreporter function to issue 

Letter 431 Oc to taxpayers whose SSNs have been misused. 

52 In calendar year 2011, the IRS processed 145,320,000 individual tax returns, with 109,337,000 

requests for refunds. IRS, Filing Season Statistics - Dec. 31, 2011, at 

http://www.irs.govinewsroomiarticlelO .. id=252176.00.html(last visited Mar. 12,2012). 

53 IRS, Filing Season Statistics - Dec. 31, 2011, at 

http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/articlelO .. id=252176.00.html(last visited Mar. 12,2012); Compliance Data 

Warehouse, Individual Returns Transaction File for CY 2011. 
68 


Insert offset folio 53 here 78817.053

- 17-

To better protect the public fisc from a surge of new refund schemes, the IRS has 

expanded its use of sophisticated fraud detection models based on data mining. In 

FY 2011, the IRS's Electronic Fraud Detection System (EFDS) selected over one million 

questionable returns for screening, a 72 percent increase from the previous year.54 

While it is important for the IRS to address the one million questionable returns, we 

should not lose sight of the fact that the IRS also has a duty to the other 144 million 

individual taxpayers in this country. Taxpayers have become accustomed to filing their 

returns shortly after they receive their Forms W-2 or Forms 1099 (reporting wages and 

interest, respectively, and available to taxpayers by January 31). Approximately 77 

percent of U.S. taxpayers file electronically, meaning the IRS can process most refund 

requests within a week or two of filing.55 With the introduction of e-filing, combined with 

the increasing number of refundable credits run through the tax code, our tax system 

has shifted, for better or worse, to one of instant gratification. 

The benefit of enjoying such a tax system is somewhat offset by the increased ability of 

perpetrators to defraud the government. While the IRS seeks to implement automated 

filters to screen out as many suspicious refund claims as possible, it is unrealistic to 

expect the IRS to detect and deny all such claims. Because the fraud detection 

algorithms are constantly evolving in response to new patterns, there will always be a 

lag in the filters. 

If we wanted to be absolutely certain that no improper refunds are paid out to identity 

thieves or other individuals filing bogus returns, we could keep the April 15 filing 

deadline, but push the date on which the IRS will issue refunds a few months into the 

summer, after the return filing due date, as some other tax systems do. Such a shift 

would allow the IRS sufficient time to review every suspicious return. More importantly, 

the IRS would have at its disposal nearly the full arsenal of information reporting 

databases - including complete data on wages and withholding, interest income, 

dividends, and capital gains - and could better detect and resolve discrepancies and 

questionable returns before refunds are issued. 

However, this would be an extreme shift and it would take considerable effort to change 

a culture in which taxpayers have become accustomed to receiving their refunds within 

a week or two of electronically filing their returns. Delaying the delivery of a $3,000 

refund to a family that is relying on these funds to meet basic living expenses may inflict 

severe financial hardships. Many taxpayers have grown accustomed to the existing 

cycle and make financial decisions based on the assumption they will receive their 

refunds in February or March. 

There would be other costs associated with such a drastic shift as well. Third-party 

lenders may welcome the opportunity to provide bridge loans to taxpayers who feel they 

54 The volume of returns selected to be screened rose from 611,845 in CY 2010 to 1,054,704 in CY 2011 

(through Oct. 15, 2011), a 72 percent increase. See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to 

Congress 28. 

55 IRS, IRS e-fi/e Launches Today; Most Taxpayers Can File Immediately, IR-2012-7 (Jan. 17,2012). 
69 


Insert offset folio 54 here 78817.054

- 18-

cannot wait six months for a refund. Because experience has shown that such lenders 

will be tempted to charge predatory interest rates, we would need to be prepared to 

further regulate this industry. 

Alternatively, if we prefer not to delay the processing of refunds for six months but still 

insist on greater fraud detection than the IRS can now manage, then Congress should 

authorize significantly more funding for the IRS so it can expeditiously work cases 

where returns and associated refunds have been flagged but may be legitimate. In 

rny 2011 Annual Report, I noted that while questionable returns selected by EFDS 

increased by 72 percent, the staffing of the IRS unit conducting the manual wage and 

withholding verification grew by less than nine percent. 56 It is unrealistic to expect the 

IRS to keep up with its increasing workload without either allocating a corresponding 

increase in resources or extending the timeframe for the necessary wage and 

withholding verification. Absent one of these steps, honest taxpayers will continue to be 

harmed and overall taxpayer service and compliance will suffer as the IRS directs 

resources from other IRS activities to combat fraud and identity theft. 

Recently, the IRS started exploring the feasibility of using an e-authentication system. 

The White House is promoting the development of an "Identity Ecosystem" - essentially 

a marketplace of trusted credential providers that individuals could choose to use in 

order to better authenticate and protect themselves online. 57 The IRS is in discussions 

with the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) to see how this 

e-authentication system can both make it more difficult for individuals to commit identity 

theft and offer increased convenience to taxpayers 58 The IRS will conduct a costbenefit analysis of participation in this NSTIC program. 

VIII. Conclusion 

Identity theft poses significant challenges for the IRS. Opportunistic thieves will always 

try to game the system. From their perspective, the potential rewards of committing taxrelated identity theft may be worth the risk. We can do more both to reduce the rewards 

(by continuing to implement targeted filters) and to increase the risk (by actively 

pursuing criminal penalties against those who are caught). In making the tax system 

less attractive to such criminal activity, we cannot impose significant burden on 

56 The Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AMTAP) staff increased from 336 in 

FY 2010 to 366 in FY 2011, a gain of nearly nine percent. See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual 

Report to Congress 29. 

57 See The White House, National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace: Enhancing Online 

Choice, Efficiency, Security, and Privacy (Apr. 2011), available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defauIUfileslrss_viewer/NSTICstrategL041511.pdf; The White House 

Blog, The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/201 0106/25/nationa I-strategy-trusted-identities-cyberspace (last visited 

May 3, 2012). 

58 For more information about the NSTIC program, see http://www.nist.gov/nstic. 
70 

f 

STATEMENT OF DAVID F. BLACK, GENERAL COUNSEL, SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BLACK. Chairman Johnson, Chairman Boustany, Ranking 

Members Becerra and Lewis, and Members of the Subcommittees 

on Social Security and Oversight, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify about identity theft. 

With the exception of an 8-month deployment to Afghanistan between 2010 and 2011, I have served as the General Counsel of the 

Social Security Administration since November 2007. I also serve 

as the senior agency official for privacy. 

The agency maintains sensitive and personal information on almost every American and takes seriously its responsibility to protect it. I can attest to the agency’s tireless efforts to protect the personal information the public has entrusted to it. 

Let me begin by reiterating Commissioner Astrue’s recent testimony before the Social Security Subcommittee that the Administration is committed to strike any balance between transparency 

that helps prevent fraud and protecting individuals from identity 

theft, which is consistent with the framework for Chairman Johnson’s bill, H.R. 3475. 

Since Commissioner Astrue’s testimony we have submitted to the 

subcommittee specifications for a bill that expresses the Administration’s current thinking on how best to strike that difficult balance. We continue to stand ready to work with you, other agencies 

and interested organizations to advance a bill that promotes our 

common goals. 

We at Social Security do not generate death data. Rather, we collect it from a variety of sources so we can run our programs. We 

use death data to stop benefits and to determine eligibility for survivors benefits. 

Individuals and entities became aware that we were gathering 

this high value information. In 1978, Ronald Perholtz filed a lawsuit against us under the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, to 

gain access to the death information in our file. In 1980, the parties entered into a court-approved consent decree that required the 


Insert offset folio 55 here 78817.055
71 

agency to release to Mr. Perholtz the data requested in his lawsuit. 

The Department of Justice advised us that Congress had not provided an exemption to the FOIA or the Privacy Act that would justify withholding the data covered by the court-approved consent decree. 

In 1983, Congress added subsection (r) to Section 205 of the Social Security Act. This subsection requires us to collect death information from States to update our program records, provides the 

circumstances under which certain agencies may receive such information from us, and, notably, exempts the death information we 

receive from States from FOIA and the Privacy Act. 

However, Congress did not act to exempt from FOIA our release 

of death information we receive from other sources. In order for us 

to manage the demand for FOIA requests and for death information and because we had no legal basis to withhold the information, 

we created a file that we could make available to the public. That 

file is commonly known as the Death Master File. 

Since 1992 we have provided that file to the Department of Commerce’s National Technical Information Service, or NTIS, to distribute because NTIS functions as a national clearinghouse for a 

wide array of government data. NTIS reimburses us for the file 

under a contractual arrangement. NTIS recovers its dissemination 

costs by making the Death Master File available to 630 entities, including banks, hospitals, universities, insurance companies, and 

genealogical services. 

In addition, NTIS makes the file available for online searching 

by many organizations with similar requirements, but who do not 

wish to load the raw data on their internal systems. The financial 

services community in particular expressed a desire for this ability 

when the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security and 

the Financial Services Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held a joint hearing on the Death Master File in November 

of 2001. 

Our practice involving the Death Master File remains legally 

sound based on FOIA case law, the Department of Justice FOIA 

guidance, and OMB’s Privacy Act guidance. Any attempt to limit 

disclosure of death information under current law would undoubtedly spawn additional litigation. More importantly, we see no new 

judicial interpretation of FOIA or the Privacy Act that would allow 

to us withhold data on deceased individuals. Accordingly, the administration is seeking congressional action to exempt this information from the FOIA to protect countless Americans from the 

threat of identity theft through abuse of the Death Master File. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:] 

72 


Insert offset folio 56 here 78817.056

HEARI'IG BEFORE 

THE COMMITTEE 0'1 WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

SUBCOMMITTEE 0'1 SOCIAL SECURITY 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESEYf A T1VES 

MAY S, 2012 

STATEMDIT 

OF 

DAVID F. BLACK 

GENERAL COU'ISEL 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
73 


Insert offset folio 57 here 78817.057

Chairman Johnson, Chairman Boustany, Ranking Members Becerra and Lewis, and 

Members of the Subcommittees on Social Security and Oversight, thank you for this 

opportunity to testify about the Death Master file. 

With the exception of an 8-month deployment to Afghanistan between 20 I 0 and 

2011, I have served as the General Counsel of the Social Security Administration since 

November 2007. I also serve as the Senior Agency Official for Privacy. The agency 

maintains sensitive and personal information on almost every American and takes 

seriously its responsibility to protect it. I can attest to the agency's tireless efforts to 

protect the personal information the public has entrusted to it. 

Let me begin by reiterating Commissioner Astrue's recent testimony before the Social 

Security Subcommittee that the Administration is committed to striking a balance 

between transparency that helps prevent fraud and protecting individuals from identity 

theft, which is consistent with the framework for Chairman Johnson's bill, H.R. 3475. 

Since Commissioner Astrue's testimony, we have submitted to the Subcommittee 

specifications for a bill that expresses the Administration's current thinking on how best 

to strike that difficult balance. We continue to stand ready to work with you, other 

agencies, and interested organizations to advance a bill that promotes our common goals. 

We at Social Security do not generate death data; rather, we collect it from a variety 

of sources so that we can run our programs. We use death data to stop benefits and to 

determine eligibility for survivors' benefits. 

Individuals and entities became aware that we were gathering this high-value 

information. In 1978, Ronald Perholtz filed a lawsuit against us under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOTA) to gain access to the death information in our files. Tn 1980, the 

parties entered into a court-approved consent decree that required the agency to release to 

Mr. Perholtz the data requested in his lawsuit. The Department of Justice advised us that 

Congress had not provided an exemption to the FOIA or the Privacy Act that would 

justify withholding the data covered by the court-approved consent decree. 

In 1983, Congress added subsection (r) to section 205 of the Social Security Act. 

This subsection requires us to collect death information from States to update our 

program records, provides the circumstances under which certain agencies may receive 

such information from us, and, notably, exempts the death information we receive from 

States from FOIA and the Privacy Act. However, Congress did not act to exempt from 

FOIA our release of death information that we receive from other sources. 

-1-
74 

f 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Black. 

Inspector General George, your testimony referenced identity 

theft related tax fraud that might go undetected, and we heard 

some figures, IRS reports $6.5 billion in identity theft tax fraud for 

fiscal year 2011. You had a different figure that you laid out in 

your testimony. Can you just describe again the total amount of 

fraud in 2011? 

Mr. GEORGE. Yes. The figure that the IRS identified we do not 

contest. We have had the benefit of being able to look at the issue 

subsequent to the IRS’s release of their figure. A perennial probVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:29 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 078817 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\78817.XXX 78817

Insert offset folio 58 here 78817.058
75 

lem, Mr. Chairman, that the IRS confronts in their worthwhile effort to expedite refunds to the taxpayers they do not have either 

the benefit of or, whatever term I would defer to Mr. Miller to describe, the time to wait until all third party reporting information 

has been received by them, meaning W-2, 1099 and the like. And 

so when we looked at this number we were able to benefit from the 

fact that we saw the W-2s and the 1099s and that an additional 

$5.2 billion was on top of the number that the IRS reported. So it 

is almost double the problem that they initially reported, sir. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. Miller, do you want to comment on 

that? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, I would actually. We don’t disagree with the 

number that General George and the Inspector General are utilizing. I would point out that we probably do disagree with the 

large number over a 5-year period because what—and we received 

the report last week—what we see is actually a good story, not a 

bad story. It is true that money got out in 2010, which is the year 

they were looking at. The Inspector General utilized four scenarios 

to try to look through the data. The Schedule C work that they 

suggested we are now doing. The work on Social Security income 

we now have fixes in place for that. Interest income, which was a 

third of their rules that they were utilizing, we have what they are 

suggesting being done there as well. So I will say yes, it is true in 

2010. The fourth piece was the W-2s are missing, and I think that 

is correct. What we have done is moved up by as much as a couple 

of months when we can look at those W-2s, but it continues to be 

less than optimal not to have all the data that we need to look at 

as a return is in front of us in determining whether it is fraudulent 

or not. But I think what we would see is a much lower number 

today because of the efforts that we have done than with 2010. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. So are you suggesting that the Inspector 

General’s number was based on a snapshot before you implemented 

certain things that will have an impact on that 5-year figure? 

Mr. MILLER. Absolutely. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Okay. 

Inspector General George. 

Mr. GEORGE. I have no information to contradict what he 

states. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Okay. The subcommittee is not only interested in the size of the fraud but also in how we might prevent 

it from occurring and continuing to occur. And I would like each 

of you to comment on what Congress needs to do legislatively. We 

are all aware of Chairman Johnson’s bill. I think there seems to 

be broad agreement that it is a good bill that needs to move forward. But what more do we need to consider to assist your agencies to combat this growing problem? 

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, the new hire directory would be an 

immensely helpful tool for the IRS for a variety of reasons, but 

some of it is the fact that it would give the IRS a tool to determine 

whether or not someone who is claiming deductions or income for 

which they would seek a refund if they didn’t have a job in the previous year or the year prior to that, you know, it raises alarm bells 

that the IRS can use internally to determine whether or not the information that they are supplying seeking the refund is valid, susVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:29 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 078817 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\78817.XXX 78817
76 

pect, what have you. And this again, as was pointed out by Mr. 

Lewis, is something that has been sought for by both the various 

administrations and various Secretaries of the Treasury. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. So if I could add to that, I think the new hire database would be a great add, a new tool in our tool box in this area, 

not a panacea, none of these are panaceas to be honest with you. 

But we could use all the help we can get and that would be a good 

one. Another one actually is the Death Master File which is the 

subject of discussion today. We need, the IRS needs maybe 2 years 

without having a decedent’s Social Security number in the public 

domain because a decedent has a filing requirement, the executor 

must file on behalf of the decedent for the year of his or her death. 

So we need a little bit of time, we can’t just lock the account when 

we understand someone has passed. We have to allow that person 

to file with us. 

I will go back to obviously the big one for us is the budget. We 

could use any help that you can give us in terms of bridging some 

of the gaps we are seeing right now on the budget. 

Lastly, I will mention there is a little known provision in Section 

6103, the tax privacy rules, that has expired, and that allows us 

to share information with prisons. And that allows the prisons to 

utilize that information in disciplinary hearings on people who are 

prisoners who are cheating, and we have 1990,000 returns from 

prisoners that we believe are fraudulent. That would help as well. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Despite IRS’s creation of a centralized 

identity protection unit, the Taxpayer Advocate reports at least 28 

different units within IRS are charged with helping ID theft victims and sit on a somewhat bureaucratic maze. Taxpayers sometimes work more than a year to resolve their identity issues, according to TIGTA. I would like you each to comment on how this 

affects taxpayers and what changes could be made to streamline 

that process and better serve the victims of these crimes. 

Mr. GEORGE. As you can imagine, if you call American Express 

or any credit card company and you are relating a problem to them 

and every time you are requested to give the same information you 

gave the first time you called and to explain the problem over and 

over again, how frustrating that can be. While Mr. Miller pointed 

out that the IRS is providing additional resources towards this, we 

noted in our research, Mr. Chairman, that during the height of the 

tax filing season, people who are normally assigned to address 

identity theft problems were actually taken away from that responsibility and reassigned to answer tax questions that any citizen 

who rightfully has a question and calls the 1–800 number expects 

to receive. And so the identity theft issue is actually set aside for 

a while and then assigned to someone who may not have any information at all regarding that particular case. And so again the taxpayer has to start anew. And we think they could readily institute 

policies where you have a single individual assigned to a case and 

almost as many police departments do with detectives and the like. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. Miller, has that been considered? 

Mr. MILLER. It is in some fashion, but let me rephrase sort of 

the question. We have, the vast majority of the identity theft work 

we are doing with victims is when the person files and they are 

77 

blocked from going through because somebody has stolen their 

identity and it has gone through first. That work resides—and it 

is anywhere between 150,000 or more of those cases—resides with 

a unit specifically working on those cases. I don’t think we have 

pulled people off, we may have, but I am unaware of that. What 

I can say is with the number of cases that we had, we were understaffed. And so there is no question about that in terms of working 

through these cases. They are difficult cases. They can take anywhere between 40 days and what the Inspector General has mentioned on average right now they are taking 280 days, and that is 

about 250 days too long in probably all of our view. That is a question of staffing. We started the year working those cases with 200 

people. Now the filing season is over, we will have 1,200 people 

working those cases. 

What I am trying to do is make sure that by the end of this calendar year nobody who has been a previous victim has the chance 

of being a victim again. We want to work that inventory during the 

summer. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you. And one final question, are 

there any practices in the private sector that we at the Federal 

level might adopt that would both limit tax fraud or better assist 

victims? Briefly if you could comment on that. 

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, yes. The short answer is there is 

something called shared secrets. If you call again a credit card company in addition to asking for your name and your card number, 

they will ask many times your mother’s maiden name or date of 

birth. The IRS simply doesn’t do that and that is something that 

they can easily do. But just to go back to your earlier point, sir, 

something that is somewhat perverse in that the victim of identity 

theft reaches the point where the refund was sent to someone else’s 

account, the thief’s account, bad guy’s account, information that is 

later sent by the IRS to try to resolve the information is sent to 

the same address as that which the thief provided. And so there 

is still even more of a chance of the unwilling or I don’t think intentional divulgence of privacy information, personally identifiable 

information. So the IRS, there are certain commonsensical actions 

that I think are needed that I don’t think would cost a lot of money 

but the IRS simply hasn’t done. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Just a couple points. One, I believe statutorily we 

have to at least start with the address the record that we have, 

and if it is the wrong address unfortunately that is the address we 

probably will have to send it to. We do follow up and we work these 

cases. It is one the barriers we have. 

In terms of shared secrets I think it is a wonderful idea and we 

are working on it. I don’t think it is cheap, quite frankly. We don’t 

have a database sitting there waiting to be utilized for this. Part 

of our authentication process I hope to roll out before the next filing season, but it is not a small list to be honest with you. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you. I now yield to Mr. Lewis the 

ranking member of the Oversight Subcommittee. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank each witness for being willing to testify and being here today. Thank you 

so much. 

78 

Inspector General George, your written testimony states that the 

IRS has faced budget cuts, a hiring freeze, and staff reductions 

during the same time it has encountered a large surge in identity 

theft refund fraud. Is identity theft something that the IRS is fully 

able to combat given its resources and budget constraints? 

Mr. GEORGE. Notwithstanding and again obviously, sir, you understand the role that I play. 

Mr. LEWIS. I understand your role very well. 

Mr. GEORGE. Where they can make improvements. Notwithstanding all of my statements, I would have to give the IRS credit 

in this area. They are doing a better job in terms of assisting people who are victims of identity theft and in terms of improving 

processes, but they obviously could do a better job and there is no 

question that if they had additional resources they could do more 

and do it better. 

Mr. LEWIS. But do you have any suggestions or recommendations of what amount of additional resources would be helpful to 

the IRS? 

Mr. GEORGE. That I don’t have at this time, sir. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Miller, in your original testimony you stated 

that in some cases identity theft, the identity that is stolen may 

belong to a deceased individual. Why doesn’t the IRS immediately 

turn off Social Security numbers of deceased individuals? 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lewis, we can’t do that. As I 

mentioned, a person who died in 2011 will have to have their executor file a tax return in their name, and so if I passed on the 

1st of January, for example, all the way through the extension date 

of October 15th of the next year, there is a possibility that that decedent will have to use their Social Security number to file their 

return. We have filters in place to try to make sure that those returns coming in are not fraudulent, but it is impossible for us really to lock that account down until that final return has been filed. 

We are marking them as best we can at this point, but we can’t 

just block that social until they no longer have a filing requirement 

with us. 

Ms. OLSON. If I might add, sir, if you are a surviving spouse, 

under the law you are able to file married filing jointly with your 

deceased spouse for the year of death, and I believe 2 years after 

the year of death, if you do not remarry. So that is really three, 

you know, the year of death, plus two more years that in certain 

instances, you would need the Social Security number to be live. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Ms. Olson. Mr. Miller, you further stated in your written testimony that the IRS has a significant increase in refund fraud involving identity theft. Given your budget 

cut, how do you address identity theft and keep up with your current workload? I understand that the telephone service is suffering 

with identity theft victims waiting over 1 hour to speak with someone. What else is suffering? 

Mr. MILLER. So it is a zero-sum game. We have a dollar to 

spend on various things, and we have gone from, our estimate 

would be maybe $190 million in 2011 to $330 million this year on 

these issues. So obviously, service is stretched; enforcement is 

stretched. We are making sure we fund what we need to fund to 

79 

have a fair and equitable, balanced program of service and enforcement. But there is no doubt that we are stretched. 

And I would speak a moment on the line that everyone refers to. 

Nothing to be proud of for us, obviously. It is not a defensible position to have that low ability to answer the phone. We have taken 

steps to address it. We are right now in the 70s, because we have 

put another 100 folks on that line, but it took a while to do that. 

We had to wait for the filing season, to be honest with you, before 

we pulled people off and put them on that line. And that is the 

line, by the way, we should be clear, that is not the line that if I 

am the subject of identity theft, I pick up and the phone and call 

the service. That line, seven out of ten people are getting through 

and we are doing much better on. This is the line where we sent 

something to the person saying, your return is being held up, we 

have some questions. That is the line that we frankly were 

swamped on, and have now taken appropriate steps, late but appropriate steps to try to get past that backlog. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Now, Miss Olson in your testimony you 

stated that a broad perspective is needed on the IRS’s overall mission, and the challenges and tradeoffs that a tax-related identity 

theft present. Please explain. Can you explain to us further? Can 

you inform and educate Members of the Committee? 

Ms. OLSON. We were trying to raise a really broad policy issue, 

which is the conflict between the fact that we have 80 percent of 

our individual taxpayers getting refunds and they want them 

quickly, and then the need of the IRS to basically screen returns, 

and rout out identity theft or other refund fraud and make sure we 

are protecting the government fisc, and those two issues are inherently in conflict. And part of my raising this was to say we should 

perhaps consider, and this a very big issue, doing what many other 

countries do in their filing season, which is that they actually delay 

the date of issuance of refunds until after the return filing season 

is over. So you know that, you know if the return filing season is 

going to end on April 15th, and refunds are going to be issued on 

June 1st, or June 15th, then the IRS would have the time to do 

the matching with the information return documents, and things 

like that, and that you would be much more likely to have the legitimate refunds going out. 

That is a very big issue, but I think that is about the only way 

that you are really going to resolve these competing tensions, the 

need for refunds, and then the need to protect revenue. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the ranking member. 

Chairman JOHNSON. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get to 

any of my questions I would like to briefly speak about a tax fraud 

issue I have been working on for over 2 years. 

Mr. Miller, the other week NBC Indianapolis, Station WTHR ran 

a report entitled: ‘‘Tax Loopholes Cost Billions.’’ According to the 

report, the IRS is handing out refundable child tax credits to illegal 

immigrants who are claiming children who don’t even live in the 

United States. 

Without objection, I would like to submit that report for the 

record. 

80 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Without objection. 

[The report follows, The Honorable Sam Johnson #1:] 


Insert offset folio 59 here 78817.059

NBCWTHR 13 

Tax loophole costs billions 

Posted: Apr 26,20129:55 PM EDT Updated: Ju/ 05,201210:03 AM EDT 

By Bob Segall 

Millions of illegal immigrants are getting a bigger tax refund than you. Eyewitness 

News shows a massive tax loophole that provides billions of dollars in tax credits 

to undocumented workers and, in many cases, people who have never stepped 

foot in the United States. And you are paying for it! 

INDIANAPOLIS - Inside his central Indiana office, a longtime tax consultant sits at his 

desk, shaking his head in disbelief. 

"There is not a doubt in my mind there's huge fraud taking place here," he said, slowly 

flipping through the pages of a tax return. 

The tax preparer does not want you to know his name for fear of reprisal, but he does 

want you to know about a nationwide problem with a huge price tag. 

He came to 13 Investigates to blow the whistle. 

"We're talking about a multi-billion dollar fraud scheme here that's taking place and no 

one is talking about it," he said. 

The scheme involves illegal immigrants -- illegal immigrants who are filing tax returns. 

How it works 

The Internal Revenue Service says everyone who is employed in the United States -

even those who are working here illegally - must report income and pay taxes. Of 

course, undocumented workers are not supposed to have a social security number. So 

for them to pay taxes, the IRS created what's called an ITIN, an individual taxpayer 

identification number. A 9-digit ITIN number issued by the IRS provides both resident 

and nonresident aliens with a unique identification number that allows them to file tax 

returns. 

While that may have seemed like a good idea, it's now backfiring in a big way. 

Each spring, at tax preparation offices all across the nation, many illegal immigrants are 

now eagerly filing tax returns to take advantage of a tax loophole, using their ITIN 

numbers to get huge refunds from the IRS. 

The loophole is called the Additional Child Tax Credit. It's a fully-refundable credit of up 

to $1000 per child, and it's meant to help working families who have children living at 

home. 
81 


Insert offset folio 60 here 78817.060

But 13 Investigates has found many undocumented workers are claiming the tax credit 

for kids who live in Mexico - lots of kids in Mexico. 

"We've seen sometimes 10 or 12 dependents, most times nieces and nephews, on 

these tax forms," the whistleblower told Eyewitness News. "The more you put on there, 

the more you get back." 

The whistleblower has thousands of examples, and he brought some of them to 13 

Investigates. While identifying information such as names and addresses on the tax 

retums was redacted, it was still clear that the tax filers had received large tax refunds 

after claiming additional child tax credits for many dependents. 

"Here's a return right here: we've got a $10,3000 refund for nine nieces and nephews," 

he said, pointing to the words "niece" and "nephew" listed on the tax forms nine 

separate times. 

"We're getting an $11,000 refund on this tax return. There's seven nieces and 

nephews," he said, pointing to another set of documents. "I can bring out stacks and 

stacks. It's just so easy it's ridiculous." 

20 kids = $30,000 

WTHR spoke to several undocumented workers who confirmed it is easy. 

They all agreed to talk with WTHR investigative reporter Bob Segall and a translator as 

long as WTHR agreed not to reveal their identity. 

One of the workers, who was interviewed at his home in southern Indiana, admitted his 

address was used this year to file tax returns by four other undocumented workers who 

don't even live there. Those four workers claimed 20 children live inside the one 

residence and, as a result, the IRS sent the illegal immigrants tax refunds totaling 

$29,608. 

13 Investigates saw only one little girl who lives at that address (a small mobile home). 

We wondered about the 20 kids claimed as tax deductions? 

"They don't live here," said the undocumented worker. "The other kids are in their 

country of origin, which is Mexico." 

He later explained none of the 20 children have ever visited the United States - let 

alone lived here. 

So why should undocumented workers receive tax credits for children living in a foreign 

country, which is a violation of IRS tax rules? 
82 


Insert offset folio 61 here 78817.061

"If the opportunity is there and they can give it to me, why not take advantage of it?" the 

worker said. 

Other undocumented workers in Indiana told 13 Investigates the same thing. Their 

families are collecting tax refunds for children who do not live in this country. Several of 

the workers told WTHR they were told it was legal for them to claim the tax credit for a 

child who does not live in the United States. 

IRS was repeatedly warned 

"The magnitude of the problem has grown exponentially," said Russell George, the 

United States Department of Treasury's Inspector General for Tax Administration 

(TIGTA). 

And he says the IRS has known about the problem for years. 

George has repeatedly warned the IRS that additional child tax credits are being 

abused by undocumented workers. In 2009, his office released an audit report that 

showed ITIN tax filers received about $1 billion in additional child tax credits. Last year, 

the inspector general released a n_~",,-r~p~rt showing the problem now costs American 

tax payers more than $4.2 billion. 

"Keep in mind, we're talking $4 billion per year," he said. "It's very troubling." 

What George finds even more troubling is the IRS has not taken action despite multiple 

warnings from the inspector general. 

"Millions of people are seeking this tax credit who, we believe, are not entitled to it," said 

the inspector general. "We have made recommendations to [IRS] as to how they could 

address this, and they have not taken sufficient action in our view to solve the problem." 

Other information obtained from the TIGTA audits include: 

· Claims for additional child tax credits by ITIN filers have skyrocketed during the past 

decade, from $161 million in 2001 to $4.2 billion in tax year 2010. 

· Undocumented workers filed 3.02 million tax returns in 2010. 72% of those returns 

(2.18 million) claimed the additional child tax credit. 

· In 2010, the IRS owed undocumented workers more in claimed additional child tax 

credits than it collected from those workers in taxes. 

Agency responds - sort of 

What does the IRS have to say about all this? 
83 


Insert offset folio 62 here 78817.062

The agency sent WTHR a statement, defending its policy of paying tax credits to illegal 

immigrants. 

'The law has been clear for over a decade that eligibility for these credits does not 

depend on work authorization status or the type of taxpayer identification number used. 

Any suggestion that the IRS shouldn't be paying out these credits under current law to 

ITIN holders is simply incorrect. The IRS administers the law impartially and applies it 

as it is written," the statement said. 

George disagrees with that position and believes the IRS should be doing more to 

prevent undocumented workers from getting billions in US tax dollars. 

"The IRS is not doing something as simple as requesting sufficient documentation from 

people seeking this credit," he said. "Once the money goes out the door, it's nearly 

impossible for the IRS to get it back." 

Over the past month, WTHR has tried to ask the IRS more questions about its efforts to 

prevent abuse involving additional child tax credits. 

Despite repeated phone calls, e-mails and a visit to IRS headquarters in Washington, 

the agency said none of its 100,000 employees had time to meet with 13 Investigates 

for an interview. An IRS spokeswoman said all staff were too busy because of the tax 

filing deadline in mid-April. 

Apparently, the IRS doesn't have time to respond to some tax preparers, either. 

Last year, our whistleblower noticed dozens of undocumented workers had used phony 

documents and false income to claim tax credits. He reported all of it to the IRS. 

"These were fraudulent, 100% fraudulent tax returns, but I got no response; absolutely 

none. We never heard a thing," he said. "To me, it's clear the IRS is letting this happen." 

The IRS tells WTHR it can do nothing to change the current system unless it gets 

permission from Congress. In other words, according to the IRS, closing the loophole 

would require lawmakers to pass a new law specifically excluding illegal immigrants 

from claiming additional child tax credits. 

The big questions now: Is Congress willing to do that? 

Full statement to WTHR from the Internal Revenue Service 

The law has been clear for over a decade that eligibility for these credits does not 

depend on work authorization status or the type of taxpayer identification number used. 

Any suggestion that the IRS shouldn't be paying out these credits under current law to 

ITIN holders is simply incorrect. The IRS administers the law impartially and applies it 

as it is written. If the law were changed, the IRS would change its programs accordingly. 
84 

f 

Chairman JOHNSON. It is outrageous that by all accounts the 

IRS is simply turning a blind eye to this type of fraud which is 

costing the American taxpayer billions. Now the IRS has said it 

doesn’t have the authority to require Social Security numbers for 

this refundable tax credit. However, as you well know, one of the 

requirements for the child tax credit is for the child to actually live 

in America. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the IRS is enforcing this simple requirement, and I feel that is unacceptable. 

As you well know, I have got a common-sense measure to stop 

the IRS from giving out refundable child tax credits to illegal immigrants by requiring tax filers to provide their Social Security number. It is my hope that we will finally pass this into law. Until we 

do so, I fully expect and call on the IRS to do all it can to stop this, 

multi-million dollar fraud. I think the taxpayer deserves no less, 

and I think you agree with me. 

Mr. O’Carroll, criminals seem to always be one step ahead of us, 

particularly when the government makes it easy for them. Can you 

tell us more about the case in Puerto Rico and why obtaining Social 

Security numbers of those from Puerto Rico are so valuable? 

Mr. O’CARROL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As you are saying, it is a 

commodity out there, the misuse of the SSNs, and SSN information, and what happened in Puerto Rico is that there was a theft 

of a lot of birth certificates and other identifying documents that 

went on to the black market and were sold and then were used for 

people to basically adopt identity and adopt identities of children 

from also school records that were taken from there, and both were 

being then used for identity theft and fraud. And we have been, 

again, very keeping, I guess the law enforcement community is informed of this and trying to keep as much information out there 

to keep it from becoming too widespread. And we think that probably through the sharing of information it has been contained. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Given your experience, are there other 

ways, in addition to ending the public availability of the Death 

Master File, that you could recommend for fighting tax-related 

fraud resulting from identity theft? 


Insert offset folio 63 here 78817.063
85 

Mr. O’CARROL. Yes, I can. As I had said in my oral testimony, 

most of it is common sense on the part of individuals, not to be, 

you know, be phished into giving information out to people that 

you don’t know, to safeguard your Social Security number. Don’t 

carry it with you. Shred any personal information that has your 

identifiers on it so that it is not going to be, you know, picked up 

by something doing the dumpster diving and trying to get your personal information. So we try at every opportunity that we can 

when we talk to people at our hotline is to give that information 

out, is that it is a valuable commodity and to safeguard your Social 

Security number whenever you can. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. Ms. Olson, I know in your annual report to Congress you supported legislation to limit public access to the Death Master File, and you also suggested Social Security might have legal authority to limit access to the Death Master 

File, but when Social Security tried to simply remove the zip code 

from the file, the agency was besieged by inquiries and lawyers. 

Protecting personal information by limiting access is Congress’ responsibility. 

Isn’t eliminating the publication of the Death Master File as we 

propose the best way to make sure none of the information about 

the deceased is made public? 

Ms. OLSON. Sir, I support having a legislative solution to this. 

I think that that is the cleanest and least controversial approach, 

but my concern is, as I said in my oral testimony, every single day 

that we do not have that legislation taxpayers are being harmed. 

And my reading of the case law since the 1980s, although there 

may be litigation over the Social Security withholding this information, my reading of the United States Supreme Court case law is 

that there are exemptions that would cover Social Security withholding that information, and Social Security would prevail. So 

that is my point, is that we could take administrative steps as we 

are trying to get the more perfect solution, which is legislation. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma’am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. Becerra, you are recognized. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your testimony. Let me first submit for the record a couple of matters, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit a letter from April the 

17th, 2012, by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 

opposing, as they say, our strong opposition to unfair proposals 

that would alter the child tax credit to exclude children of hardworking immigrant families, and a January 30th, 2012, New York 

Times editorial which also opposed the unfair proposal to target 

hard-working immigrant families on the child tax credit and it is 

titled: ‘‘A Harder Squeeze on the Poor,’’ for the record. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Without objection. 

[The letters follow, The Honorable Xavier Becerra #1, The Honorable Xavier Becerra #2:] 

86 


Insert offset folio 64 here 78817.064

New York Times 

A Harder Squeeze on the Poor 

Editorial 

Published: January 30, 2012 

House Republicans have hit upon a noxious scheme to help pay for an extension of the payroll 

tax cut: a tax increase on millions of poor working families. A bill passed by the House and now 

in conference seeks to deny cash refunds under the child tax credit to those who file tax returns 

using "individual taxpayer identification numbers" issued by the Internal Revenue Service. Only 

those using Social Security numbers would be eligible. 

The refundable portion of the child tax credit is a life-saver for the working poor. Families that 

would be cut off by this policy change make an average of$21,000 per year, according to the 

Treasury Department. They would lose an average of $1 ,800. About 80 percent of those families 

are Hispanic. The taxpayer identification numbers are used frequently, though not exclusively, 

by unauthorized immigrants to pay the taxes because they are not eligible for Social Security 

numbers. The I.R.S. accepts their tax payments and allows families to claim the child tax credit 

regardless of immigration status. This policy is an effective antipoverty tool that protects 

children, most of whom are American-born citizens. 

The Republicans who have flatly rejected tax increases on the rich have settled instead on 

limiting this refund, which kept about 1.3 million children from falling into poverty in 2009. 

Leaving aside the cruelty of squeezing the poorest workers for a greater portion of their wages to 

make a point about illegal immigration, the bill punishes not just the undocumented, but the 

communities they live in, because a poor family's hard-earned wages get spent: on things like 

groceries, child care, utilities, gas and rent. This would be the bottom line of the House bill: a 

Congress that has failed for years to fix the immigration system, using its failure to harm 

children and hurting those at the bottom of the ladder to avoid the slightest pressure on 

millionaires. The Senate would be mad to go along with it. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01 .. 31/oQinion/a-harder.squceze-on-the-poor.html? J= 1 
87 

f 

Mr. BECERRA. Miss Olson, you are the Taxpayer Advocate. 

Let’s make sure we are clear. That doesn’t mean you are the IRS’s 

advocate before Congress. It means you are the advocate for the 

millions of Americans who file voluntarily their tax returns to pay 

their taxes. 

Ms. OLSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BECERRA. So you are the eyes and ears for Americans who 

can’t afford to be in D.C. to talk to Congress every day. 

Ms. OLSON. Right. 

Mr. BECERRA. Okay. You have said that the number one most 

serious problem facing the IRS is underfunding, or as you put it, 

the IRS quote does not adequately—‘‘is not adequately funded to 

serve taxpayers and collect taxes.’’ You have said that today. You 

have said it before. 

$300 million less in funding this year for the IRS than in last 

year’s budget. IRS is dealing with workloads that are increasing 


Insert offset folio 65 here 78817.065
88 

with 5,000 fewer employees than it had before, so to combat fraud, 

take care of taxpayers’ filings, fewer employees. Does anyone disagree with what Miss Olson has said that the IRS is not adequately funded to serve taxpayers and collect taxes? And I would 

actually ask the two IGs, Inspectors General, do you, either of you 

disagree with Miss Olson’s statement that the IRS is not adequately funded? And I am not going to get into the whole thing, 

but I am just wondering, do you think they have got enough money 

or they don’t? 

Mr. GEORGE. As was stated by Mr. Miller—— 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. George, I am going to run out of time real 

quickly. I can get into it more, but I am just wondering, do you concur or not with Miss Olson? 

Mr. GEORGE. No. I have not conducted an assessment as to the 

adequacy of IRS funding. 

Mr. BECERRA. So you can’t pass judgment, that is fair. Okay, 

Mr. O’Carroll. 

Mr. O’CARROL. I am focusing more on Social Security’s funding 

than IRS, so I am not going to weigh in there. 

Mr. BECERRA. Maybe we should ask the IGs to examine whether or not the IRS is adequately funded. Mr. Miller, you said that 

no doubt we are stretched. You just said that a few minutes ago, 

and so I think you would concur with Miss Olson that your budget 

is strained and you are trying to do as much as you can with what 

you have when you are answering only one out of every four phone 

calls from folks who are calling about identity theft, and those who 

do get their phone call answered are waiting more than an hour 

on hold. I suspect you are distressed having to deal with that type 

of outcome. 

Mr. MILLER. We are. That is a disappointment to us as well as 

to the taxpayer. 

Mr. BECERRA. Okay now, so let me ask this. I think Mr. George, it was in your testimony that you said that with $32 million in additional funding to do some of this work on identity theft, 

we probably could collect some of the, or avoid paying out the $5.5 

billion in refunds that were sent out based on fraudulent returns 

that involved identity theft. Is that correct? 

Mr. GEORGE. That is, yes, that is my testimony, sir. 

Mr. BECERRA. So for a tenth of the money that the IRS didn’t 

get of the $300 million, they could actually get us back $5.5 billion? 

Mr. GEORGE. Yeah, the return on investment, you know, is 

something that in many of the activities that the IRS engages in 

would benefit them in terms of getting more of taxpayer dollars 

back to the Treasury. There is no question about that, sir. 

Mr. BECERRA. Is there a more clear definition of being penny 

wise and pound foolish than to cut the IRS millions of dollars and 

cost the taxpayers at the end of the day billions of dollars? 

Mr. GEORGE. There is no question that if the IRS received additional resources, it could do more. 

Mr. BECERRA. I appreciate that. Let me ask Miss Olson and 

Mr. Black to engage in a bit of a colloquy with me in the time I 

have remaining. Okay, Miss Olson, you said you think IRS has the 

ability to restrict some of the Death Master File information from 

getting out there without having to resort to Congress for a change 

89 

in statute. Mr. Black, you say you don’t believe that authority exists and you have to abide by the existing laws. And you also mentioned—I don’t think you mentioned, but it seems like you would 

need to be defended if you were sued because you tried to restrict, 

as Miss Olson said, some of that information. The Department of 

Justice ultimately would have to take on your case and defend you 

in court if you were to restrict access to that information because 

someone, a consumer, a business, decided to sue you because all of 

a sudden you were restricting access to that Death Master File. 

Can I ask a question? Why not talk to each other? Why not ask 

Justice to sit in a room with you all instead of asking us to perhaps 

write a new law; can we find out if Justice first would defend you 

in court and say, yeah, I think there is a case here. If they say no, 

we wouldn’t defend you, then I think it is clear, Miss Olson, that 

we need to have a new statute. But at the end of the day, every 

day that we don’t restrict access, someone is using information to 

commit fraud, and it seems to me that it is almost—I hate to say 

this—but it almost would be worth testing how far we can take the 

existing laws on privacy to see if you can start restricting—give legitimate stakeholders, there are a lot of insurance companies, a lot 

of others—and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman—a lot of 

others who need to have access to the Death Master File so fraud 

isn’t committed against them. I know an insurance company would 

say, wait a minute, if we can’t have access to this information, 

fraud will be committed against consumers by people using it, 

without us having the correct information. So I think we have to 

be careful, but giving legitimate stakeholders access to the information. Let’s test the limit so that we can avoid this and if ultimately 

we find that the statutes aren’t sufficient to restrict access to private information, then Congress will be better guided. But would 

you be willing to reach out to Justice and perhaps report back to 

Congress on what conversations between IRS, Taxpayer Advocate, 

SSA, and the Department of Justice would turn up? 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Briefly. 

Mr. BECERRA. Yes. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BLACK. It is difficult for attorneys to be brief, but yes, we 

would be happy to discuss this with Justice, but as both the chairman and yourself have pointed out, there is both positive and negative uses of the Death Master File. 

Mr. BECERRA. Okay. 

Mr. BLACK. We would prefer the legislative approach that 

strikes that balance between the two, and we would prefer to leave 

a decision like that made up to Congress as opposed to the courts 

determining what that proper balance is. I think the better approach is that Congress working with the Administration determines what that balance is about the appropriate access to the 

Death Master File versus the improper access to the Death Master 

File. 

Mr. BECERRA. And I probably should have added Mr. Miller 

since he is with the IRS as well, and I hope that Mr. Miller would 

be willing to work with Ms. Olson on that as well. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. The gentleman’s time is expired. Ms. 

Jenkins. 

90 

Ms. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing and thank the panel for being here. And Mr. Miller, 

or in Mr. George’s testimony, he states that their office has recommended that the IRS limit the number of tax refunds being sent 

to the same account, however, that IRS has not yet acted. And according to Mr. George, his office found 10 bank accounts that had 

direct deposits of more than 300 tax refunds, which begs the question, you know, why hasn’t it been fixed. So is it not possible for 

the computer system to flag an account after a threshold number 

of returns has been sent? 

Mr. MILLER. So I believe it is possible. It does make sense to 

look at that. There—I will start by saying it is not exactly the IRS 

that would be doing this, but FMS, but it is part of Treasury, so 

it can be done. The issue is a little more complex than just doing 

that, however, because there are numerous accounts that will receive multiple refunds, including tribes, for example, return preparers, so we would have to find a way to figure out who is whom 

in that area as we move forward. We did go down this road once 

before to a bit of a muddle, but we are going to look at it again, 

absolutely. 

Ms. JENKINS. Okay, thank you, and could maybe one or more 

of you just comment or explain the interaction between the Department of Justice, local law enforcement, and your agencies when 

identity theft-related tax fraud occurs and kind of walk us through 

a typical investigation and prosecution of how law enforcement 

interacts with one another when this occurs? 

Mr. O’CARROL. Ms. Jenkins, I will take this at least to start. 

We work very closely, or our office and our investigators work very 

closely with the Department of Justice and we are on 45 national 

task forces that are out there trying to, you know, on identity theft, 

bankruptcy, and through that we try to assist, you know, local law 

enforcement with the information on it. We are able to share a lot 

of our information with them. They share their information back. 

One of the things we have a little bit of a limitation on is anything 

in relation to IRS data we don’t share and we can’t share with law 

enforcement, but we share all of the information that we have from 

Social Security on it. We are very proactive with it. We try to work 

with U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and get the word out there that there 

is punishment for identity theft. 

Mr. MILLER. So if I could add on to that, we also work really 

very hard in this area. I mentioned that 400,000 hours of our 

criminal investigators’ time is spent on identity theft. We have, as 

the Inspector General mentioned, we have numerous task forces 

that we are on. We have some issues. We have some issues with 

local law enforcement because 6103 works in a fashion that allows 

us to share taxpayer data with State enforcement officials if the 

State enforcement official is working on State tax. If it is a tax 

charge that they are working on, and so in States like Florida, for 

example, where there is no State income tax, there is a gap in what 

we can do. What we have tried to do, and local law enforcement 

has been very vocal and annoyed with us, 6103 makes it difficult. 

We have just started a path forward that I think will help, and 

that is where you have been a victim and want to help local law 

enforcement we will go to you. We will say, do you mind if we 

91 

share? Do you waive your right to 6103 privacy on behalf of the 

local law enforcement official? So far, very early to be able to tell 

whether that is going to work or not, but our attempt there is to 

help local law enforcement, but it is a difficult path. 

Ms. OLSON. I was going to say, if I might add, another thing 

that local law enforcement and the IRS are doing now including 

the—and also the Department of Justice, is where someone has 

identified a scheme and the IRS is not yet involved in it, and they 

get lists of people’s numbers that have been compromised, the IRS 

now has a place for those lists to go to and, you know, the taxpayer 

accounts get an identity theft marker because we know that they 

are possibly compromised even if they haven’t been actually yet 

with us. Again, that takes more resources, more people to enter 

those markers, and that is sort of on the bottom of the pile. But 

at least there is that protective device that is going on now. 

Ms. JENKINS. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. Stark, you may inquire. 

Mr. STARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both chairmen for holding this hearing, and thank the witnesses for being with us today. 

Just my very first question would be directed towards Mr. Miller, 

and you could just send us a note. I would like to know during that 

hour and 20 minutes that I might have to wait what music you 

play, and do you pay your ASCAP fees on that? That would be 

helpful to know what days to call. 

On a more serious note, directed towards Mr. Black and Mr. 

O’Carroll. Something that we have talked about before, but 19 

States are stealing basically about $6,000 bucks a year per foster 

care child. What happens, those of us who have children who receive Social Security payments, my own case, my young three children, because of my age and that I am on Social Security. Many 

States unhappily, including our own State of California, take that 

money from foster care children and dump it into the State general 

fund, and they don’t fill out the annual form that you require me 

to fill out saying what did I do with that money? Did I save it for 

the child? Where is it now? How much is saved? Did I spend it? 

What did I spend it on? 

You are not requiring the States to do that. And consequently, 

we have, as I say, I think it is about 19 States now that are taking 

the money that should be set aside. These kids when they turn 18 

might very well have 15- or 20,000 bucks which they could buy a 

car, go to college, do a lot of things, and the State is just using it 

to pave potholes and pay the Governor’s salary. That is unfair. And 

I would like to ask Mr. Black, what are you going to do to see that 

the States obey the law and fill out the form and return it to you 

so that you can see that those foster children, whose money that 

is, receive it when they mature out of foster care? 

Mr. BLACK. Congressman Stark, unfortunately I spent all of my 

preparation time getting into the ins and outs of the Death Master 

File, but when I return I will sit down with our policy folks, the 

Office of General Counsel will look at that issue and submit a response for the record. 

[The information follows, David F. Black] 

92 

f 

Mr. STARK. Because it is the law, and it takes enforcement. And 

Mr. O’Carroll, you are also familiar with this. 

Mr. O’CARROL. Yes, I am because I met with you one time. We 

talked about it. And to be truthful on it, we haven’t done our audit 

work on it. As a result of your bringing it up to me, it is on our 

list for our work plan for next year. 

Mr. STARK. It started with Mr. DeLay and myself. I mean, this 

is an issue, as I say, for the poorest of the poor, the kids who need 

it most. And as I say, I am sorry the States are doing this, but I 

want to see that they get what they deserve and receive the funds 

they should. So I can fill in any of my colleagues on the details of 

their own State, but this is something which I guess we have oversight on, and I would like to see that these children somehow get 

that money saved or the State does. Now, they may need mental 

health care, which would be a logical thing for this money to be 

spent on that, special hospitalizations, special treatments. Any of 

those things are valid ways to spend it, but I am afraid the States 

who assume the locus parenti for these kids don’t do it. And I hope 

that I can encourage both of you to look into this more and see that 

these children get the savings and the funds they deserve. 

I am sorry to digress, Mr. Chairman, but it is an important issue 

for young kids. Thank you very much. I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the gentleman. Miss Black. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Miller, I have a question for you. In Mr. George’s testimony, he says 

that the office has recommended that the IRS limit the number of 

tax refunds that are sent to the same account. However, the IRS 

has not acted on that, and according to Mr. George and his office, 

they found that 10 bank accounts had direct deposits of more than 

300 tax refunds. 


Insert offset folio 66 here 78817.066
93 

Do you have any idea about how you can fix this, or do you have 

plans for fixing this so that you might be able to make that determination and helping to make sure that that one account doesn’t 

get that kind of refund? 

Mr. MILLER. Well, Congresswoman, I have previously touched 

on this, but it is something we are working on, and it is something 

we will look at. We have tried to do that once in the past with 

mixed results. What I have mentioned is that there are absolutely 

valid reasons why a single account can be the recipient of many refunds. At the short end of it, it can be a family account for several 

people, all the way up through the fact that certain Indian tribes 

maintain an account for the unbanked within their tribal membership, and also return preparers. So we would have to find a way 

to know that that account was an account that was going to be able 

to receive many refunds, and we are going to work on that. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. I think with the exception of, as you 

say, maybe an Indian account, I think 300 tax returns for even a 

family would seem to be quite excessive. I mean, that would have 

to be a mighty large family to get 300 tax refunds. 

Mr. MILLER. Agreed, but the return preparers are another 

issue. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. GEORGE. Miss Black, if I may just, in addition, because I 

didn’t address this during my oral testimony. In addition to the 

issue that you just raised, we are finding a growing problem with 

the use of prepaid debit cards, and having Federal refunds, not 

only in the realm of the IRS, but Social Security, and other governmental benefits going to these prepaid cards which people can literally buy at stores and bodegas and the like, and finding growing 

examples of fraud associated with that, with very little oversight 

being conducted by anyone on this area. And so again, I have to 

continue my response by saying tax policy is an issue that the Secretary of the Treasury has given solely to the Office of Tax Policy, 

so I am not in a position to give you any policy advice on this but 

I did want to make this committee aware of a growing problem in 

an area that is, you know, something that is beneficial, not everyone has a bank account, but at the same time it is being used inappropriately. 

Ms. OLSON. If I might comment on that, please. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Sure. 

Ms. OLSON. My office has recommended in the past that just as 

you have a Social Security debit card to load benefits for the 

unbanked onto that, that the government should have a Federally 

funded, you know, card for people to get their refunds on, those 

unbanked individuals. And that card would only be available if 

they went into a financial institution and produced evidence of 

identity and things like that; rather than clicking a button on a 

software package, you know, software package that sent you a card 

without any identification information, and it just came to you in 

the mail. And I think that might be one way to reach the balance 

between trying to get the unbanked into the banking system, but 

also protecting us against identity theft in some way. We can learn 

from Social Security on that. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Mr. George? 

94 

Mr. GEORGE. Yes, Mrs. Black. There is no question that the 

IRS and Treasury should be working with financial institutions to 

develop policies. This is an issue that is of importance, as Ms. 

Olson just noted, and it is something that is resolvable. It is something that we think can be addressed, but just simply isn’t being 

done so. 

Mr. MILLER. And if I could just add on a little bit. We are working with financial institutions. I do not want to give the subcommittee the view that the debit card companies and that the financial institutions are not working with us. They absolutely are 

and they have been very helpful. We are not as far as we need to 

be yet, but they are working with us. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. And Mr. Miller, is there any idea 

about when, I mean, I hear you say you are working on this, but 

obviously time is of the essence, because there is so much of this 

going on. Do you have any idea about when you might be able to 

come up with some resolution that would help us, because we are 

obviously at tax season and I can just imagine how much is happening right now. 

Mr. MILLER. Well, it has happened already, Congresswoman, so 

we have a little bit of time but not that much time to prepare for 

the next filing season. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Yeah. 

Mr. MILLER. But as I have mentioned I think to the subcommittees, there is no panacea here, and really should not—absent some 

ability of the community to act in a fashion that doesn’t allow a Social Security number to be stolen, the service will always be working in small places to do things to stop this. There is no one single 

thing that we can do to stop identity theft. 

Mr. GEORGE. But if I may just close on this. The exact problem 

that you noted regarding 300 refunds going to a single account, you 

are having— while I don’t have an exact number, but we do know 

that many additional tax refunds are going to a single debit card, 

so it is really, it is a mirror image of the problem. 

Mrs. BLACK of Tennessee. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. George, let me put on the record 

that over a year ago, a letter to, I think it was Secretary Geithner, 

expressing major concerns about the debit card issue and the potential for fraud, and the responses have been very, very slow on 

that and we are still pushing to get further information on the potential problems with the use of these debit cards. 

Mr. GEORGE. I was unaware of that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. We will get a copy of the letter to you. 

Mr. GEORGE. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Thank you. Mr. Paulsen, you are recognized. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairmen. I want to thank you 

and the ranking members for holding our hearing today. And the 

topic of identity theft is certainly very important and we need to 

be doing all that we can to combat the problem. I remember last 

week in Minnesota, actually I held an identity theft seminar with 

the Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force for seniors, and I will 

tell you the object was to give them insight on how to better protect 

95 

themselves, and it was a packed house. The line was overflowing 

out the hallway. In fact, they were so interested in getting information that they hung around for an extra hour, so we ran over time. 

And I think one way we can help protect, certainly seniors, is to 

remove that Social Security number from that Medicare ID card. 

And I am cosponsor of Chairman Johnson’s legislation. I thank him 

for bringing that forward and working on that issue. 

But I do want to turn for a moment, if I could, to fraud and ID 

theft in the area of tax returns, in particular, and Miss Olson, in 

your 2011 report to Congress, you gave that outline on an issue regarding tax fraud where the tax preparer fraudulently alters a 

completed tax return and then retains the illicit benefit without the 

knowledge of the taxpayer even. And you recommended an increase 

in the penalty to give greater incentive to go after these fraudulent 

preparers, and so today actually, along with Mr. McDermott and 

both the chairmen and the ranking member of the Oversight Subcommittee, we are introducing legislation, the Fighting Tax Fraud 

Act, which essentially doubles the current penalties, giving greater 

incentive for prosecutions against this type of theft. 

So Commissioner, I want to thank you and your office for your 

diligence and being a great resource to not only myself but my staff 

throughout the drafting process, and I am just wondering if you 

could talk a little bit more about what you saw that encouraged 

you to add this as one of your top 10 recommendations, essentially. 

Ms. OLSON. Well, the IRS is seeing many more of these schemes 

coming in involving return preparers that are filing tax returns, 

after the taxpayer has approved the return and they actually have 

a copy of what they think is going to be filed, the preparer alters 

the return in some way and then uses the split refund procedure 

to get the difference in the additional refund deposited into their 

account. The taxpayer doesn’t find out about this until much later. 

They get the refund that they are expecting and it is only until the 

IRS comes out trying to collect this erroneous refund from the taxpayer that they find out that the return has been altered. And 

what we learned was really to go after the preparer you have some 

very-low dollar civil penalties that are really about negligence, and 

then you have a very expensive route, which is to try to build a 

case to get to the Department of Justice to bring a prosecution and 

get restitution for the dollars that are lost to the public fisc, and 

what we tried to propose was some sort of civil penalty that would 

really serve as restitution, where you could build the case that the 

preparer had, in fact, committed this act. It was fraudulent. It was 

willful and fraudulent and then the preparer would be 100 percent 

liable for the amount that was erroneously taken out. So it fills a 

gap in our ability to recover what the public fisc is out, and it also 

heightens the risk to the preparer in engaging in this activity. 

Mr. PAULSEN. And so in these cases, as you mentioned, the taxpayer doesn’t really know that he or she has been defrauded at all 

until they get the notice from the IRS letting them know that their 

returns were faulty, and this means that they are unaware that 

anything took place, actually for quite some time. So part of the 

problem in cases like this is that the return is going to two separate bank accounts, essentially? 

96 

Ms. OLSON. It can go to two bank accounts, or as, you know, 

Commissioner Miller was saying, it can go to the preparer, the preparer could set up a bank account, and then distribute, have the 

return go to that bank account and then send to the taxpayer the 

amount that they are expecting. But either way, the taxpayer won’t 

know that this is happening. 

Mr. PAULSEN. And other than doubling penalties to enhance 

the crackdown, or for enforcement of this, do you have any other 

ideas or suggestions on helping raising the flags earlier in the process to identify where the problems are? Do you have any idea what 

the prevalence of this type of a fraud activity might be out there? 

Ms. OLSON. It is very hard to know about this, but just recently 

the State of Illinois brought some actions against a large return 

preparation firm that also operates in many other States where 

they had identified some alleged fraud, and in fact, they contacted 

my office, and we all worked together with the IRS, myself, and the 

Illinois AG to develop a message for taxpayers who might be impacted by this. 

And I think to your point about a town hall, we would be more 

than happy to provide some information to all of the Members of 

Congress so they could go out in their town halls and alert taxpayers to this risk. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Smith, you 

are recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Chairmen Johnson and Boustany, for 

holding this hearing and thank you to our witnesses. I do have a 

news article from my district that I would like to ask for unanimous consent to submit for the record. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Without objection. 

[The news article follows, The Honorable Adrian Smith] 

97 


Insert offset folio 67 here 78817.067

''I'm not dead!" Student fights to prove he's alive 

by Josh Egbert 

Story Created: Apr 30, 2012 at 5:57 PM COT 

Story Updated: May 1, 2012 at 9:42 AM COT 

A local high school senior is set to graduate and is preparing for college. But at a 

time when most teenagers are having fun and looking forward to the future, his 

plans are on hold. 

A simple trip to the bank revealed a couple alerts on Corbin Russell's credit score 

and those alerts have his future in jeopardy. 

Life was good for Corbin Russell. The Harvard High School senior will graduate in 

just a few days and this fall go to college. But those college plans may be derailed. 

"I had been dead for the past couple of years," said Corbin. 

A simple trip to the bank to get a car loan had turned Corbin's world upside down. 

"I was shocked. I really couldn't believe it because I had been getting a bunch of tax 

returns back from when I was working," Corbin said. 

His social security number came back flagged. 

"After they ran a credit check score, it came back with a couple alerts," said Corbin. 

Corbin's social security number had been used in a death benefit claim for a man in 

South Carolina who died in January of 2010. 

"Without my social security number credit being correct, right now they have it red 

flagged. Without it being correct I can't get a loan because I'm deceased," said 

Corbin. 

"How could anybody have death benefits on a senior in high school?" said Corbin's 

mother Monica Russell. 

Now the problem has gone beyond just that car loan. 

College scholarship applications have been rejected because ofthe flagged credit 

report. And he can't get student loans without a valid Social Security number. 

"My social security number - if someone just took a couple minutes of their time and 

said, hey, look, this social security number doesn't match with this person, we need 

to fix this, everything could be fixed," said Corbin. 

But that could take some time. 
98 

f 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. O’Carroll, on the piece I submitted, 

and I assumed that you—— 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt the gentleman, but could the gentleman identify the article, so we—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am getting there. Thank you. It has to do with a 

student whose Social Security number was utilized by someone 

fraudulently. 

Mr. BECERRA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. SMITH. The Article I submitted has to do with a young man 

from my district, Corbin Russell, actually. He found when he went 

to apply for some student loans that he was denied because someone else had used his Social Security number to file a death claim 

in South Carolina over 2 years ago. And so now Social Security 

says that everything is fine with them, but with other agencies it 

is not yet. And so there is a lot of time that may need to pass before it is clarified or rectified. And so I was wondering why isn’t 


Insert offset folio 68 here 78817.068
99 

there the automatic red flag on a tax return when the name and 

Social Security number do not match? 

Mr. O’CARROLL. I will take the first crack at it. In terms of, I 

am well aware of that, with the identity theft that was taken by 

your constituent, and again, we are concerned on SSA’s information 

on it, when they get the—in this case we realized that it was falsely reported as death on it. SSA changed the record on it and from 

our standpoint, with SSA, I think we rectified his problem, which 

again now leads over to the tax issues, which I will—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well, would SSA further take any action with other 

agencies, credit bureaus, and so forth, to correct that? 

Mr. O’CARROLL. I guess no, is the short answer on it, is that 

what SSA will do is, we will—and I will from, I guess advice to the 

individuals, they will give it to them. They will tell them how they 

can go about it. They will give them the record from SSA that can 

be used to be taken to other locations, but SSA isn’t proactive in 

terms of going out to the credit bureaus and the financial institutions and even other government agencies on sharing any of the 

identity theft. It is probably a good concept in the future of sharing 

that type of identity theft, but we are not involved in it now. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, anyone else wishing to comment? 

Mr. MILLER. Only to say that we do a name check with the Social as it comes into us on the return. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Mr. Miller, you have mentioned that the multiple refunds are mailed to tax preparers. Could you outline a scenario where that would be commonplace? 

Mr. MILLER. I think we are talking direct deposits, which would 

not be a mailing at all actually. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, but transmitting multiple deposits to one entity? 

Mr. MILLER. So there are split refund accounts. My understanding is, and I can get back to the subcommittees on this, but, 

yeah, there are return preparers who have an account that receives 

sometimes the refunds of the clientele. 

Ms. OLSON. Sir, if I might. There is—preparers are barred from 

negotiating a check or a deposit for the taxpayer. There are serious 

penalties about that, but where taxpayers are unbanked, there may 

be an account set up where the refund can be direct deposited into 

it on behalf of the taxpayer, and then—and my understanding is, 

it is actually an account, or a subaccount for that taxpayer in particular, but it may be a larger account number and that might be 

where the problem is. But again, there are preparers, as I described earlier, who are actually violating the law, using the account, their account to receive the taxpayer’s funds and then distribute it out. 

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. Smith, if I may, my office investigates many 

allegations such as what Miss Olson just outlined, where tax preparers have directed refunds from legitimate clients for their own 

benefit, in effect stealing money from their clients. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Also, Ms. Olson, in your earlier testimony, you talked about perhaps holding refunds until the end of 

the filing season. Is the filing season basically January through the 

middle of April, or how would you define filing season? 

100 

Ms. OLSON. Yes, January through April 15th, and I realize this 

is a radical suggestion, but I am trying to point the contrast, you 

know, the tension out between our dual responsibilities here. So, 

and it is basically the model that is followed by most large tax administrations that give out refunds in the world. They allow themselves time to do these reviews, you know, even waiting to see 

what kind of duplicate returns we get in. So the first to file isn’t 

always the one that gets the refund. And then we freeze all the 

later ones. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for 

the record my letter to the editor to the New York Times editorial 

earlier submitted for the record, in response. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Without objection. 

[The letter to the editor follows, The Honorable Sam Johnson #2] 

f 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. Mr. Reed, you are recognized. 

Mr. REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to the witnesses. Essentially, to everyone or anyone who would like 

to respond, in preparing for the hearing today, I was reading about 

the ability for the IRS to lock accounts on deceased tax filers. And 

I can appreciate that ability, because of the reports of millions of 

dollars worth of checks going to deceased folks and the issues that 


Insert offset folio 69 here 78817.069
101 

it represents in regards to waste, fraud, and abuse. And I was just 

wondering, is it working from any of your points of view, and would 

a more ambitious approach using tools such as that one help? Can 

anyone offer any—— 

Mr. MILLER. So if I could start on that, Congressman. We do 

lock accounts of the deceased. As I have mentioned, there is a 

whole group of folks who have died within the last couple of years 

or even 3 years that still a filing requirement, so we can’t really 

lock their account. We can run them through our filters. 

Mr. REED. But isn’t that a filing number off the estate? Doesn’t 

the estate have to get the taxpayer identification number rather 

than the Social Security number? 

Mr. MILLER. Right now they will be filing as an estate entity, 

and they will be filing as the last year of the decedent. 

Mr. REED. Okay, please continue. I am sorry. 

Mr. MILLER. And so locking accounts, marking accounts is what 

we are doing, running them through, running them through the filters, and we have caught like 90,000 questionable returns in the 

traps, is something we are pursuing now, and we will get better at 

it, but that is really where we are at this point. I think locking of 

accounts and getting smarter about filters is our best approach 

going forward. 

Mr. REED. So just so I am clear, when you lock that account, 

that is reported to the Treasury, so that if there is a refund due 

or anything like that, I know it is a little outside of the purview 

of the committee today, but does the Treasury still issue refunds 

when that account is locked? 

Mr. MILLER. No. The locking of the account means that basically that return is going to come in and it is not going to be able 

to be filed with us. 

Mr. REED. Okay. So now if there is an erroneous reporting on 

that filing, on that locked out account, what are the steps that you 

take specifically to make sure that that gets corrected, and what 

is the time frame upon which that correction occurs? 

Mr. MILLER. Sir, I don’t know about the time frame. The approach would be, a person would call in and say you are not letting 

me file. I need to file. Generally what would happen at that point 

is we would ask them to file on paper and we would take a look 

at that return. And that will take a while, but that is the approach 

that we are taking at this point. 

Mr. REED. Because I believe Mr. George had mentioned that it 

can take IRS more than 1 year to resolve an identity theft case, 

right? So that is not what we are talking about here. 

Mr. MILLER. Could be, but, and if it is, it will take a while for 

us to work through that case. These coming in through paper are 

worked, I think, a lot faster especially if there is no first return 

that has come in. 

Mr. REED. Okay, so just looking forward, what could you offer 

to us, or what would be your best recommendation as to how to 

better enhance your ability to solve this issue or what would be the 

kind of the prioritization of additional tools that you could use in 

order to address the concerns? 

Mr. MILLER. So is this for decedents or for identity theft in general? 

102 

Mr. REED. Let’s do both if we could, decedents. I have got plenty 

of time. 

Mr. MILLER. I will roll through the list. 

Mr. REED. See, oh, there is the buzzer now. See look it, now we 

wasted some more time. 

Mr. MILLER. So obviously, we have talked about our budget, 

which is stretched pretty tight right now. 

Mr. REED. And I hear that one, I should—whenever I ask that 

question of any panel from the—I always hear resources, and need 

for money and people. Beyond that, because we have no money, 

and obviously, if you have no money you can’t hire any people, so 

. . . Mr. MILLER. Well, if we have no money and we can’t hire people 

then we aren’t going to be able to do the IT things that I need either, Congressman, and that is going to be a very difficult place for 

the Internal Revenue Service to be. 

Mr. REED. Okay, so with the staff that you have, what authority, what tools could you be given to make your job more efficient 

so you could do it within the resources that you do have? 

Mr. MILLER. We have obviously talked about the Death Master 

File here, and we have talked a little bit about the new hires database. Both of those would be incremental improvements to what we 

do. There is also some expired statutory language around sharing 

with prisons taxpayer information so that we can do a better job 

of letting those prisons do disciplinary action with respect to prisoners. Those are sort of the things that we would be looking for, 

and to be honest, simplification would be a good thing for us and 

for taxpayers as well here. 

Mr. REED. Simplification of the actual—— 

Mr. MILLER. Of the Code. 

Mr. REED. Excellent. Any other suggestions anyone had on either on death or identity theft cases? Mr. George, how about you? 

Mr. GEORGE. I would just note, and because this hasn’t been 

discussed today, a lot of victims of identity theft don’t know they 

are victims because they don’t have filing requirements. And so 

that is something where I don’t know whether it is the IRS or 

whether it is Congress needs to take a closer look at in terms of 

informing people who do not have a requirement to file a tax return, that they may need to check their credit records, or whether 

the IRS has a way of alerting them to something that they should 

be aware of, but that is an issue that needs to be looked at. 

Mr. REED. That is a great point. I appreciate you bringing that 

up, because eventually, hopefully, they will have to file because— 

in that position, and times will get better for them and then they 

can head off a lot of problems that they otherwise would have to 

deal with at that point in time. 

I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate it and 

I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Marchant, 

you are recognized. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently I had a 

phone call from a constituent that asked me to come over to his office. I went over there and sat down with him and he showed me 

next door where there was a storefront that, literally, there were 

103 

people streaming into this storefront on a constant basis for the entire hour that I was there, in the middle of the day. 

And I asked him what his concern was, and he said, you know, 

this goes on for day after day, after day, after day, and in this case 

it was primarily Hispanic families. And he said, we share a common block of mailboxes. And he said, I, from time to time I will 

go to the mailbox to open my box up, and inadvertently the postal 

worker will have put some of the mail from this place next door 

into my mailbox. And then I look through it to see which is my 

mail and which is not my mail. And he says that there are dozens 

and dozens of IRS checks that are made out to various different 

people. And I have listened to the testimony today, and I don’t 

know that I was able to decipher what this particular problem was 

but they were all using this same address of this tax preparer in 

this case. He asked me to look into it. Frankly, I did not know 

where to start in looking into it. I did not know where, what governmental agency to start with. The first was the IRS, but then 

after listening today to the panel, can you suggest to me what a 

Congressman should do when a constituent cares this much about 

how the system is being played and what action I might take, and 

then describe to me what possible fraud is going on in this case? 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. So if I could start, Congressman. So I would recommend that you do contact us. The postal inspector as well has 

lines that do this, and we work very well with the postal inspector. 

You know, in any given case I have no idea whether it is fraudulent or not because it may be that that is their mailing stop. That 

is where they are receiving their refund and they come back and 

grab it. It also is possible, obviously, that it is a drop for fraudulent 

returns that are being procured. So we wouldn’t know in any given 

case. It certainly would raise our antenna, as it did yours, and we 

would look at it. So I would recommend coming to us. The postal 

inspector works with us very closely looking for exactly this sort of 

pattern and stopping a whole lot of these things. 

I will mention one other thing since we are talking about mail, 

and we have talked about debit cards and the problems on debit 

cards, but there is one thing I do want to make sure everyone is 

aware of. That debit card, when it goes out, when you order it online or however you are ordering it, it doesn’t go out with money 

on it. So if we stop that refund, it never has money on it. That 

money goes into an account with sub-accounts, as the Taxpayer Advocate mentioned, but it may be when you see these rows of cards 

that they are devoid of money on them. So that is another thing 

I will mention. 

Mr. MARCHANT. You mentioned earlier that a person can use 

pretty much any mailing address for his address for his return? 

Mr. MILLER. Generally not. I will have to come back. That is 

a specificity I don’t have at my fingertips, so I will have to come 

back on that. 

[The information follows, Steven T. Miller] 

104 

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Mr. MARCHANT. But a preparer could designate that the person’s mailing address be the preparer’s mailing address? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. Marchant, I would just point out that because 

there is some overlapping responsibilities here, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, which was once the inspection service within the IRS, we have primary oversight of an IRS 

employee who is accused of committing some type of tax or other 

criminal wrongdoing, a preparer who steals their client’s information or someone who is using the IRS’s symbol. It could be anyone, 

but if they mimic the IRS eagle and attempt to defraud a person 

or an entity, that is primarily our jurisdiction. 

Whereas, the Criminal Investigations Division, which is within 

the IRS itself, truly has the primary responsibility to investigate in 

a matter such as the example you gave along with the Postal Service, which would also have the postal inspector who would also 

have some responsibility. And then there are instances where the 

overlap to would be an IRS employee who sells the information 

about a taxpayer to a bad person and that bad person then engages 

in the tax fraud. So that is where there would be some overlapping 

jurisdiction among other examples. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you very much. Yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Berg, you 

are recognized. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the panel for 

being here. I want to also recognize Mr. Black, who also is from 

North Dakota. There are so few of us, we have got to stick together 

when we get together. He is actually from Rugby, which is the geoVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:29 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 078817 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\78817.XXX 78817

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105 

graphical center of North America. So sometimes people are not 

sure where North Dakota is. It is the geographical center of North 

America. 

You know, as we look at this issue, as I think about it, obviously, 

there is not unlimited money, not unlimited people, and so it is 

kind of a tradeoff, it’s a tradeoff between how do we get these 

things processed and get them out quickly versus how much time 

do we take verifying Social Security numbers, verifying addresses, 

and verifying those types of issues. 

So I kind of have a question for the whole panel individually, but 

really as you look at that balance, that tradeoff between getting the 

returns out quickly versus being more thorough and more investigative, my question is, are we at that right balance or do you 

think it should be shifted one way or the other? 

Mr. GEORGE. Let me start by quickly saying, as you are aware, 

sir, the IRS recently released its most recent figure on what is 

called the tax gap, the amount of money owed, not paid on time 

by the taxpayer in full, without the IRS having to take some compliance action. That is estimated at $400 billion per year, and I 

submit to you that that is a low ball estimate because it doesn’t 

include other aspects, meaning international dollars involved, tax 

dollars involved and the like. So while we are talking billions here, 

and in my mind that is still a heck of a lot of money, much more 

needs to be done, much more can be done. As we discussed during 

the course of this hearing, some require legislative fixes, others are 

just, we believe, procedural/policy decisions, changes that the IRS 

can make. Some need to be done in conjunction with other agencies, as was pointed out by one of the members earlier. It is so disconcerting, so frustrating for someone to have their identity stolen 

and not be able to get a student loan, and yet the IRS is not in 

a position to help resolve that aspect of the problem. 

So there needs to be more, you know, mutual interaction between 

Federal agencies, and again, using common sense as we have discussed during the course of this hearing. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you. 

Mr. O’CARROLL. Mr. Berg, just—probably the one thing I always like to always remind when we are talking here about the 

benefits as opposed to the returns, on the benefits side, we are always saying that stewardship and using risk-based approaches to 

make sure that the right person is getting the benefit for it; that 

their information isn’t being taken and their benefits are being diverted to the wrong, you know, through fraud or whatever. So we 

always say that the biggest issue with the Social Security is that 

balance between service and stewardship. And our biggest one is 

that you always have to focus on the stewardship, no matter what 

the budgets are or anything else, is just to make sure that due diligence is out there so that the right people are getting the right 

benefits. 

Mr. MILLER. Congressman, in terms of the balance, I don’t 

know whether it is the right balance at this point. That is exactly, 

we are on the cusp of having that discussion, and we should have 

that discussion. I will say a couple of things a we think about that 

discussion. 

106 

If you think that we have 2.6 million fraudulent returns to date, 

that is against a very large number of returns, you know, the 90 

plus million refund returns, so far. And so we have to think about 

that. And we also have to think about the fact that some people 

really do, I mean, when their refunds are late, these people are relying on them for some, at the lower end of our income spectrum, 

these people are—it is the largest payment they receive in a year. 

And to change their expectations around that is not—is no small 

thing. And those are things we are going to have to think about 

and talk about, and I would welcome you all to be a part of that 

discussion, obviously. 

Ms. OLSON. I agree with what Mr. Miller said. I think that it 

is a very delicate decision, and that is really why I was raising it. 

I think that the IRS in the filing season can do better talking to 

taxpayers and explaining to them the risk of identity theft, and explaining to them through releases and conversations the steps that 

we are taking and why there might be delays. And I think if we 

educate taxpayers better, we can tamp down a little bit that 

hysteria, that clutching in the throat, you know, about if their refund gets caught up in there. 

I think the IRS is taking a lot of steps that are very positive in 

this, and I think some of the work that they are doing trying to 

get the W-2 information earlier in the process in a form where they 

can process returns going, you know, that as they come in, against 

this information, also helps us protect things without creating too 

much more of a delay. So I think there is some things that they 

are doing in the right direction before we have gotten the balance 

that we need. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you. 

Mr. BLACK. I will take the balance of your time and thank you 

for recognizing me as a native from the great State of North Dakota. As the IG from SSA recognizes, the Social Security Administration also struggles with this balance of getting the right benefit 

to the right person at the right time, and we have tried to balance 

that approach with better use of technology to do that work, as 

well as a better use of technology to match data with other agencies so that we can prevent things like fraud from happening up 

front. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BOUSTANY. I want to thank all the witnesses for 

coming here today and providing your testimony. This has been a 

very helpful hearing for us. I want to remind each of you that 

members may have additional questions that they will submit or 

may submit and that those questions and your answers will be 

made part of the official record. And with that, this hearing is now 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

107 

Member Submissions For The Record 

The Honorable Sam Johnson #1 


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NBCWTHR 13 

Tax loophole costs billions 

Posted: Apr 26,20129:55 PM EDT Updated: Ju/ 05,201210:03 AM EDT 

By Bob Segall 

Millions of illegal immigrants are getting a bigger tax refund than you. Eyewitness 

News shows a massive tax loophole that provides billions of dollars in tax credits 

to undocumented workers and, in many cases, people who have never stepped 

foot in the United States. And you are paying for it! 

INDIANAPOLIS - Inside his central Indiana office, a longtime tax consultant sits at his 

desk, shaking his head in disbelief. 

"There is not a doubt in my mind there's huge fraud taking place here," he said, slowly 

flipping through the pages of a tax return. 

The tax preparer does not want you to know his name for fear of reprisal, but he does 

want you to know about a nationwide problem with a huge price tag. 

He came to 13 Investigates to blow the whistle. 

"We're talking about a multi-billion dollar fraud scheme here that's taking place and no 

one is talking about it," he said. 

The scheme involves illegal immigrants -- illegal immigrants who are filing tax returns. 

How it works 

The Internal Revenue Service says everyone who is employed in the United States -

even those who are working here illegally - must report income and pay taxes. Of 

course, undocumented workers are not supposed to have a social security number. So 

for them to pay taxes, the IRS created what's called an ITIN, an individual taxpayer 

identification number. A 9-digit ITIN number issued by the IRS provides both resident 

and nonresident aliens with a unique identification number that allows them to file tax 

returns. 

While that may have seemed like a good idea, it's now backfiring in a big way. 

Each spring, at tax preparation offices all across the nation, many illegal immigrants are 

now eagerly filing tax returns to take advantage of a tax loophole, using their ITIN 

numbers to get huge refunds from the IRS. 

The loophole is called the Additional Child Tax Credit. It's a fully-refundable credit of up 

to $1000 per child, and it's meant to help working families who have children living at 

home. 
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But 13 Investigates has found many undocumented workers are claiming the tax credit 

for kids who live in Mexico - lots of kids in Mexico. 

"We've seen sometimes 10 or 12 dependents, most times nieces and nephews, on 

these tax forms," the whistleblower told Eyewitness News. "The more you put on there, 

the more you get back." 

The whistleblower has thousands of examples, and he brought some of them to 13 

Investigates. While identifying information such as names and addresses on the tax 

retums was redacted, it was still clear that the tax filers had received large tax refunds 

after claiming additional child tax credits for many dependents. 

"Here's a return right here: we've got a $10,3000 refund for nine nieces and nephews," 

he said, pointing to the words "niece" and "nephew" listed on the tax forms nine 

separate times. 

"We're getting an $11,000 refund on this tax return. There's seven nieces and 

nephews," he said, pointing to another set of documents. "I can bring out stacks and 

stacks. It's just so easy it's ridiculous." 

20 kids = $30,000 

WTHR spoke to several undocumented workers who confirmed it is easy. 

They all agreed to talk with WTHR investigative reporter Bob Segall and a translator as 

long as WTHR agreed not to reveal their identity. 

One of the workers, who was interviewed at his home in southern Indiana, admitted his 

address was used this year to file tax returns by four other undocumented workers who 

don't even live there. Those four workers claimed 20 children live inside the one 

residence and, as a result, the IRS sent the illegal immigrants tax refunds totaling 

$29,608. 

13 Investigates saw only one little girl who lives at that address (a small mobile home). 

We wondered about the 20 kids claimed as tax deductions? 

"They don't live here," said the undocumented worker. "The other kids are in their 

country of origin, which is Mexico." 

He later explained none of the 20 children have ever visited the United States - let 

alone lived here. 

So why should undocumented workers receive tax credits for children living in a foreign 

country, which is a violation of IRS tax rules? 
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"If the opportunity is there and they can give it to me, why not take advantage of it?" the 

worker said. 

Other undocumented workers in Indiana told 13 Investigates the same thing. Their 

families are collecting tax refunds for children who do not live in this country. Several of 

the workers told WTHR they were told it was legal for them to claim the tax credit for a 

child who does not live in the United States. 

IRS was repeatedly warned 

"The magnitude of the problem has grown exponentially," said Russell George, the 

United States Department of Treasury's Inspector General for Tax Administration 

(TIGTA). 

And he says the IRS has known about the problem for years. 

George has repeatedly warned the IRS that additional child tax credits are being 

abused by undocumented workers. In 2009, his office released an audit report that 

showed ITIN tax filers received about $1 billion in additional child tax credits. Last year, 

the inspector general released a n_~",,-r~p~rt showing the problem now costs American 

tax payers more than $4.2 billion. 

"Keep in mind, we're talking $4 billion per year," he said. "It's very troubling." 

What George finds even more troubling is the IRS has not taken action despite multiple 

warnings from the inspector general. 

"Millions of people are seeking this tax credit who, we believe, are not entitled to it," said 

the inspector general. "We have made recommendations to [IRS] as to how they could 

address this, and they have not taken sufficient action in our view to solve the problem." 

Other information obtained from the TIGTA audits include: 

· Claims for additional child tax credits by ITIN filers have skyrocketed during the past 

decade, from $161 million in 2001 to $4.2 billion in tax year 2010. 

· Undocumented workers filed 3.02 million tax returns in 2010. 72% of those returns 

(2.18 million) claimed the additional child tax credit. 

· In 2010, the IRS owed undocumented workers more in claimed additional child tax 

credits than it collected from those workers in taxes. 

Agency responds - sort of 

What does the IRS have to say about all this? 
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The agency sent WTHR a statement, defending its policy of paying tax credits to illegal 

immigrants. 

'The law has been clear for over a decade that eligibility for these credits does not 

depend on work authorization status or the type of taxpayer identification number used. 

Any suggestion that the IRS shouldn't be paying out these credits under current law to 

ITIN holders is simply incorrect. The IRS administers the law impartially and applies it 

as it is written," the statement said. 

George disagrees with that position and believes the IRS should be doing more to 

prevent undocumented workers from getting billions in US tax dollars. 

"The IRS is not doing something as simple as requesting sufficient documentation from 

people seeking this credit," he said. "Once the money goes out the door, it's nearly 

impossible for the IRS to get it back." 

Over the past month, WTHR has tried to ask the IRS more questions about its efforts to 

prevent abuse involving additional child tax credits. 

Despite repeated phone calls, e-mails and a visit to IRS headquarters in Washington, 

the agency said none of its 100,000 employees had time to meet with 13 Investigates 

for an interview. An IRS spokeswoman said all staff were too busy because of the tax 

filing deadline in mid-April. 

Apparently, the IRS doesn't have time to respond to some tax preparers, either. 

Last year, our whistleblower noticed dozens of undocumented workers had used phony 

documents and false income to claim tax credits. He reported all of it to the IRS. 

"These were fraudulent, 100% fraudulent tax returns, but I got no response; absolutely 

none. We never heard a thing," he said. "To me, it's clear the IRS is letting this happen." 

The IRS tells WTHR it can do nothing to change the current system unless it gets 

permission from Congress. In other words, according to the IRS, closing the loophole 

would require lawmakers to pass a new law specifically excluding illegal immigrants 

from claiming additional child tax credits. 

The big questions now: Is Congress willing to do that? 

Full statement to WTHR from the Internal Revenue Service 

The law has been clear for over a decade that eligibility for these credits does not 

depend on work authorization status or the type of taxpayer identification number used. 

Any suggestion that the IRS shouldn't be paying out these credits under current law to 

ITIN holders is simply incorrect. The IRS administers the law impartially and applies it 

as it is written. If the law were changed, the IRS would change its programs accordingly. 
111 

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The Honorable Sam Johnson #2 

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112 

The Honorable Adrian Smith 


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''I'm not dead!" Student fights to prove he's alive 

by Josh Egbert 

Story Created: Apr 30, 2012 at 5:57 PM COT 

Story Updated: May 1, 2012 at 9:42 AM COT 

A local high school senior is set to graduate and is preparing for college. But at a 

time when most teenagers are having fun and looking forward to the future, his 

plans are on hold. 

A simple trip to the bank revealed a couple alerts on Corbin Russell's credit score 

and those alerts have his future in jeopardy. 

Life was good for Corbin Russell. The Harvard High School senior will graduate in 

just a few days and this fall go to college. But those college plans may be derailed. 

"I had been dead for the past couple of years," said Corbin. 

A simple trip to the bank to get a car loan had turned Corbin's world upside down. 

"I was shocked. I really couldn't believe it because I had been getting a bunch of tax 

returns back from when I was working," Corbin said. 

His social security number came back flagged. 

"After they ran a credit check score, it came back with a couple alerts," said Corbin. 

Corbin's social security number had been used in a death benefit claim for a man in 

South Carolina who died in January of 2010. 

"Without my social security number credit being correct, right now they have it red 

flagged. Without it being correct I can't get a loan because I'm deceased," said 

Corbin. 

"How could anybody have death benefits on a senior in high school?" said Corbin's 

mother Monica Russell. 

Now the problem has gone beyond just that car loan. 

College scholarship applications have been rejected because ofthe flagged credit 

report. And he can't get student loans without a valid Social Security number. 

"My social security number - if someone just took a couple minutes of their time and 

said, hey, look, this social security number doesn't match with this person, we need 

to fix this, everything could be fixed," said Corbin. 

But that could take some time. 
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114 

The Honorable Xavier Becerra #1 

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115 

The Honorable Xavier Becerra #2 

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116 

Witness Inserts For The Record 

Steven T. Miller 

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David F. Black 

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117 

Questions For The Record 

The Honorable J. Russell George 


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118 


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access to third-party income and withholding documents at the time tax returns 

were filed. Employers and other businesses are not required to file income and 

withholding documents until the end of February (end of March, if filed 

electronically), which is well after individuals start filing their tax returns. 

As an alternative to the income and withholding documents, the IRS could benefit 

from expanded access to the Department of Health and Human Services' National 

Directory of New Hires (NDNH). Such access would enable the IRS to verify 

income for many individuals at the time tax returns are filed and before tax refunds 

are paid. The IRS has included a request for expanded access to the NDNH in its 

past annual budget submissions, including those for Fiscal Years 2010,2011, and 

2012. The request was made as part of the IRS's efforts to strengthen tax 

administration. However, expanded access has not been provided for in the law. 

The IRS has again included a request for expanded access to the NDNH as part 

of its Fiscal Year 2013 budget submission. 

2. Your testimony indicates that identity theft is growing and will be with us for 

the foreseeable future. Has this year been the largest year ever for attempts 

at tax fraud through identity theft? Do you see this trend continuing in the 

years ahead? 

Yes, based on IRS statistics, it appears to be the largest year for attempts at 

tax fraud through identity theft. Since Calendar Year 2009, when the IRS 

began tracking identity theft incidents, the number of incidents of identity theft 

that the IRS identified has grown frorn about 366,000 in Calendar Year 2009 

to over 1 million in Calendar Year 2011. Unfortunately, it does appear that 

the trend will continue for the foreseeable future. 

Additionally, using characteristics from tax returns the IRS identified and 

confirmed as filed by identity thieves, we identified approximately 1.5 million 

additional undetected Tax Year 2010 tax returns with potentially fraudulent 

tax refunds totaling in excess of $5.2 billion. Combined with the identity theft 

the IRS was able to detect, this indicates individuals used stolen identities to 

file approximately 2.4 million false tax returns and claimed $11.7 billion in 

potentially fraudulent tax refunds in Tax Year 2010. 

3. Your report indicates the only way to deal with this crime is to act offensively 

to thwart the criminal from the start. Once it gets to the IRS, chances are the 

criminal is going to be rewarded with a refund. Do you have any other 

suggestions for stopping ID theft related tax fraud, particularly like those 

thefts that occurred in Florida and Puerto Rico? 

To effectively combat identity theft, several aspects need to be addressed: realtime access to income and withholding documents at the time tax returns are 

2 
119 


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filed, improving the IRS's ability to detect the fraudulent claims for refund prior to 

issuing tax refunds, continued collaborative law enforcement intervention that 

targets those cases that send the strongest deterrent message, and ensuring that 

the victim taxpayer's IRS tax accounts are timely resolved and corrected. 

The IRS should also work with financial institutions to improve authentication 

controls for the direct deposits of tax refunds, including deposits to debit cards. In 

addition, the IRS needs to limit the number of tax refunds that can be deposited to 

one bank account or debit card and implement Treasury regulations requiring 

Federal tax deposits to be made only to accounts in the taxpayer's name. 

The IRS implemented a number of initiatives during the 2012 Filing Season to 

improve the detection and prevention of fraudulent tax refunds from identity theft. 

These include new identity theft screening filters. The IRS also expanded the use 

of deceased taxpayer account locks and Identity Protection Personal 

Identification Numbers (IP PINs) to deter identity theft and prevent victims of 

identity theft from being victimized again. The IRS stated that it worked with the 

Social Security Administration to obtain records of Social Security benefits paid 

and the associated withholding earlier than in the past and is now using this 

information to verify tax returns as they are filed. The IRS has also initiated 

efforts to improve its ability to recover questionable tax refunds held by financial 

institutions. We have not yet audited these new initiatives, but plan to do so in 

the next fiscal year. 

4. Your report sates it can take the IRS more than one year to resolve an 

identity theft case. Is that a best-case scenario or is there a range? 

The time it takes to resolve identity theft cases is calculated using a range and is 

dependent on various factors, including the actual time an IRS assistor has to work 

a case to the time it takes the taxpayer to respond to IRS requests for information. 

The IRS does not have standards for how long it should take to work identity theft 

cases. Each function and office that works identity theft cases sets its own 

standards. 

The IRS calculated that it took an average of 234 days to resolve identity theft 

cases involving duplicate tax returns in Calendar Year 2011. However, the system 

the IRS used to track and manage the majority of identity theft cases was 

implemented as an inventory control system, not to track and work the complex 

identity theft taxpayer correspondence cases. The IRS calculated the time from 

when it received the correspondences to the time when the case is closed. 

However, one taxpayer's case may be opened and closed multiple times as it 

changes case category codes (category codes denote the source of the case). 

This will skew the results. 

Our review of a judgmental sample of 17 unique taxpayer cases classified as 

identity theft and originating in five functions showed: 

3 
120 


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Case resolution averaged 414 days; cases were open from three to 917 

days. Time was calculated from the date a taxpayer's case(s) was first 

opened until the last day when the case(s) closed. 1 This does not include 

the additional time after a case is closed for the taxpayers to receive any 

applicable tax refunds. 

Inactivity on cases averaged 86 days; inactivity ranged from 0 to 431 days. 

Concerning these 17 taxpayers, the IRS opened 58 different cases and 

assigned multiple assistors to work each case. The case histories did not 

state why the cases were reassigned. However, it appears that the cases 

were reassigned to manage inventory, i.e., reassigned to an assistor who 

had fewer cases in his or her inventory. Additionally, when the IRS received 

new documentation from the taxpayer or another IRS office, a new case 

was opened rather than the documentation correctly linked to the existing 

case. We made numerous recommendations, which should help the 

processes. 

5. What can the IRS do to better assist victims and reduce the time to resolve 

their cases? What has the IRS done to address the problems identified by 

TIGTA and the Taxpayer Advocate? 

In our May 2012 audit report,' we reported that communications between identity 

theft victims and the IRS were limited and confusing, and victims were asked 

multiple times to substantiate their identity. We recommended that the IRS 

conduct an analysis of the letters sent to taxpayers regarding identity theft and 

ensure that taxpayers are notified when the IRS has received their identifying 

documents. 

Most identity theft cases involving individual duplicate tax returns are worked by 

the IRS's Accounts Management function. IRS employees who work in the 

Accounts Management function are assistors, who also spend hours working the 

telephones responding to taxpayer requests as well as working paper cases. 

However, Accounts Management function assistors are not examiners and are not 

trained to conduct examinations. We recommended that the IRS create a 

specialized unit in the Accounts Management function to exclusively work identity 

theft cases. 

In August 2011, the IRS issued the Identity Theft Program Future State Report,3 

which provides its vision for the future state of the Identity Theft Program. It plans 

to reorganize to have an Identity Theft Program Specialized Group within each of 

the business units and/or functions, strengthen roles and responsibilities of the 

office responsible for the Identity Theft Program, and begin collecting IRS-wide 

1 Some taxpayers had multiple cases open involving more than one tax year. 

2 TIGTA, Ref. No 2011-40-050, Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen Do Not Receive 

Quality Customer Service (May 2012). 

3 IRS, IRS Identity Theft Program Future State Report (Aug. 2011). 

4 
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identity theft data to assist in tracking and reporting the effect of identity theft on tax 

administration. The IRS has begun revising guidelines and providing training for 

employees who interact with identity theft victims and work identity theft cases. In 

Fiscal Year 2012. the IRS plans to begin collecting IRS-wide identity theft data to 

be used to oversee the Identity Theft Program and issue a report to stakeholders. 

The IRS also took a number of steps in the 2012 Filing Season to detect identity 

theft tax refund fraud before it occurs. These efforts included designing new 

identity theft screening filters that the IRS indicates will improve its ability to identify 

false tax returns before those tax returns are processed and prior to issuance of a 

fraudulent tax refund. As of April 19. 2012, the IRS had stopped the issuance of 

approximately $1.3 billion in potentially fraudulent tax refunds as a result of the 

new identity theft filters. 

In addition, the IRS expanded efforts to place identity theft indicators on taxpayer 

accounts to track and manage identity theft incidents. For example, at the initiation 

of the 2012 Filing Season, the IRS and the U.S. Department of Justice announced 

the results of a massive nationwide crack down on suspected identity theft 

perpetrators as part of stepped-up efforts to combat tax refund fraud. This national 

effort is part of a comprehensive identity theft strategy by the IRS that is focused 

on preventing, detecting, and resolving identity theft cases as quickly as possible. 

The IRS expanded its efforts to prevent the payment of fraudulent tax refunds 

claimed using deceased individuals' names and Social Security Numbers. Similar 

to last filing season, the IRS placed a unique identity theft indicator on deceased 

individuals' tax accounts. The indicator alerts the IRS when a tax return is filed 

using the deceased individual's Social Security Number. According to the IRS, as 

of March 31, 2012, the IRS placed a deceased lock on more than 164,000 tax 

accounts and has prevented approximately $1.8 million in fraudulent tax refunds 

claimed using deceased individuals' identities since the lock was established. 

Once identity thieves successfully use an identity to obtain a fraudulent tax refund, 

they often attempt to reuse the identity in subsequent years to continue to file 

fraudulent tax returns. To prevent recurring identity theft, the IRS places an 

identity theft indicator on each tax account for which it has determined an identity 

theft has occurred. All tax returns filed using the identity of a confirmed victim of 

identity theft are flagged during tax return processing and sent for additional 

screening before any tax refund is issued. This screening is designed to detect tax 

returns filed by identity thieves who attempt to reuse a victim's identity in 

subsequent years and to prevent the issuance of fraudulent tax refunds. 

Finally, the IRS is issuing the IP PIN to selected victims of identity theft. The 

IP PIN tells the IRS that the tax return was filed by the legitimate taxpayer and 

bypasses additional screening for identity theft, thus reducing delays in issuing the 

tax refund. The IRS issued an IP PIN to 251,568 individuals for the 2012 Filing 

Season and plans to issue an IP PIN to all taxpayers with identity theft indicators 

on their accounts for the 2013 Filing Season. 
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6. Are the victims notified? 

The IRS notifies some victims of identity theft. The IRS has processes in place to 

detect multiple filings of tax returns using the same Social Security Number. When 

the IRS detects a tax return that uses a Social Security Number that has already 

been used to file a tax return. it notifies the taxpayer that the Social Security 

Number has already been used. The IRS then begins research to determine which 

tax return is the valid filing. However, the IRS does not tell the taxpayer that he or 

she may be the victim of identity theft. 

Instead, when the taxpayer's tax return is rejected, the taxpayer is asked to 

complete Form 14039, Identity Theft Affidavit, and mail it with a paper tax return to 

the IRS. Once the IRS receives the paper tax return, a technician enters the data 

into the IRS's computer system, and forwards the tax return and affidavit to 

assistors who determine if it is an identity theft case and attempt to resolve it. 

However, many identities that are used for tax refund fraud involve those 

individuals who do not have a tax return filing requirement. Since these individuals 

do not file a tax return, the IRS may only receive the false tax return filed by the 

identity thief and may not realize that the legitimate taxpayer's identity has been 

stolen. In these situations, the legitimate taxpayers may never know that they have 

been victims of tax-refund-fraud identity theft. 

7. Should State and local law enforcement have access to taxpayer information, 

such as refund data, in pursuing identity theft cases? Why or why not? 

An identity theft victim may consent to the disclosure of the false return filed by the 

alleged identity thief to State and local law enforcement agencies. As mentioned 

above, the IRS is currently piloting an approach in Florida of providing to local law 

enforcement, with the victim's consent, information from the return that was filed by 

the suspected identity thief. 

Whether State and local law enforcement should have expanded access to 

information without the consent of the identity theft victim. or access to other 

investigative information currently protected by the confidentiality provisions of the 

Internal Revenue Code, is a question of tax policy and, pursuant to Treasury Order 

111-01, should be posed to the Department of the Treasury's Office of Tax Policy. 
123 


Insert offset folio 77 here 78817.077

8. Can you comment on the content of the returns that are resulting in 

fraudulent refunds through identity theft? Are these individuals claiming that 

they paid more taxes than were due, or are they generally claiming 

refundable tax credits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and Additional 

Child Tax Credit? 

The common characteristic of the approximately 1.5 million confirmed identity theft 

cases and the additional tax returns TIGTA identified is that false income and 

sufficient withholding were reported on the tax return to generate a refund. Without 

the false income, many of the deductions and/or credits used to inflate the 

fraudulent tax refund could not be claimed on the tax return. 

The top credit claimed was the Making Work Pay Credit (73 percent of the identity 

theft cases). Most of the returns involving tax fraud refund identity theft identified 

for Tax Year 2010 received this credit. After the Making Work Pay Credit, 36 

percent claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 20 percent claimed the 

Additional Child Tax Credit. A small percentage (less than 1 percent) claimed the 

First-Time Homebuyer's Credit. 

Direct deposit, which now includes debit cards: is often used by identity thieves to 

obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Of the 1.5 million confirmed identity theft tax returns, 

1.2 million (82 percent) used direct deposit to obtain potentially fraudulent tax 

refunds totaling approximately $4.5 billion, according to an upcoming TIGTA audit 

report. 

9. Law enforcement and Federal prosecutors make decisions on what cases to 

pursue based on competing priorities and varying levels of fraud. People 

hear of the $130 million cases being pursued, but how much of this problem 

exists at lower levels - $5,000 in fraud or $20,000 in fraud - and are these 

cases vigorously pursued? Do prosecutors only get interested when fraud 

reaches the incredible levels we read about in newspapers? 

The Department of Justice has established general criteria for Federal 

prosecutions. The criteria are largely based upon the Department of Justice 

annual prosecution priorities along with each United States Attorney's Office's 

available resources. 

The substantial growth in this form of crime has quickly outstripped available 

resources. Based on such limitations, the role of Federal law enforcement is to 

select those cases that will have a broad impact on the criminal activity and that 

will send a strong deterrent message. The Department of Justice is also 

challenged with ensuring that they bring significant prosecutions throughout their 

spectrum of prosecution priorities and consistent with their available resources. 

4 These include prepaid debit cards as well as reloadable cards. 

7 
124 


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In addition, there do not appear to be any significant proposed increases in future 

budget years for additional investigative or attorney resources to address the 

challenges of the increasing identity theft criminal activity, 

Questions from Congressman Tom Reed: 

10.1 have submitted an article from a Florida newspaper for the record that 

reports that most fraudulent IRS refunds are made on prepaid debit cards, 

am concerned that the government is moving to the debit card payments 

system, not only for tax refunds, but all government payments before 

adequate measures to prevent fraud are in place, Are you aware of any 

analysis or studies that were available to Treasury or completed by Treasury 

outlining the hazards versus the benefits of debit card and electronic 

payments rather than paper checks? 

We contacted the Department of the Treasury for its response to this question, Its 

response is as follows: 

There are documented instances of fraudulent enrollments resulting 

from various identify theft scams where the perpetrator obtains 

sufficient information about the legitimate beneficiary, Similar fraud 

has occurred with other prepaid card providers and affiliated financial 

institutions, 

As widely reported in the media, fraudsters use various techniques 

including lottery scams to obtain banking and other personal 

information needed to make unauthorized changes to direct deposit 

enrollments, Identify theft can also occur when a paper check is stolen 

from a recipient's mailbox. 

Statistics show that electronic payments remain substantially safer 

than paper checks and are part of the reason why the Treasury 

Department has been promoting Direct Deposit for over 30 years and 

is currently moving to an all-electronic environment. In FY 2011, 

Treasury issued approximately 106 million Social Security and 

Supplemental Security Income checks. Ofthose checks, 440,000 or 

.0042% were reported lost or stolen and had to be replaced. As a 

comparison, that same year, Treasury issued over 661 million Social 

Security and Supplemental Security Income direct deposit payments, 

including many to prepaid cards. For example. the 4,007 fraud cases 

reported for Treasury's Direct Express program represent a tiny 

fraction of all direct deposit payments and the over 18 million Direct 

Express deposits made last year. Additionally, this past year, 

$70 million worth of Treasury-issued checks were fraudulently 

endorsed VS. the approximate $1.8 million reported with the Direct 

Express fraud cases (of which $900,000 has already been recovered). 

The reported fraud cases associated with the electronic payments 

8 
125 


Insert offset folio 79 here 78817.079

represent a tiny fraction when compared to those associated with the 

significantfy lower volume of checks:' 

11. What plans did Treasury have ready to address the crime of identity theft 

when they promulgated their regulation? 

We contacted the Department of the Treasury for its response to this question. Its 

response is as follows: 

Treasury is working closely with Comerica Bank (Treasury's financial 

agent for Direct Express) and SSA on efforts related to fraud detection, 

the monitoring of phishing scams, and other mitigating actions to 

reduce the occurrence of fraudulent enrollments. This includes 

suspending website enrollment functionality, flagging suspicious 

accounts, implementing more stringent processes for authenticating 

individuals enrolling and changing addresses and shifting enrollments 

to alternate channels with more stringent authentication. 6 

12.ln your testimony, you recommend Treasury establish policies ensuring that 

only those institutions that can authenticate the identities of the card users 

be permitted in the debit card program for purposes of tax refunds. Can you 

expand on your suggestion? Should that same policy be used for payment 

of government benefits? Do you have other suggestions for protecting 

payment of benefits from identity theft? 

We believe a policy which addresses both authenticating the identity of the card 

user and ensuring that the tax refund is deposited to an account only in the name 

of the individual is needed. Such a policy would help ensure that the Federal 

Government can identify and verify that the correct taxpayer will receive the tax 

refund. A broader policy for all government benefits would have the same effect; 

however, it is beyond the scope of our authority to make such a recommendation 

for all government benefits. 

In a September 2008 report, we found that the IRS was not in compliance with 

direct deposit regulations that require tax refunds to be deposited to an account 

only in the name of the individual listed on the tax return? The IRS still has not 

developed sufficient processes to ensure tax refunds are deposited to an account 

in the name of the filer. We recommended that the Department of the Treasury 

coordinate with responsible Federal agencies and banking institutions to develop a 

process to ensure that tax refunds issued via direct deposit to either a bank 

5 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Access, Financial Education, and Consumer 

Protection. 

6 lbid. 

7 TIGTA, Ref. No. 2008-40-182, Processes Are Not Sufficient to Minimize Fraud and Ensure the 

Accuracy of Tax Refund Direct Deposits (Sept. 2008). 

9 
126 

f 


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127 

The Honorable Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr. 


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SOCIAl! SECURITY 

Office of th" Inspector Gt'lwral 

The Honorable Charles Boustany 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight 

Committee on Ways and Means 

U.S. House of Representatives 

B-317 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington. D.C. 20515 

Attention: Kim Hildred 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

June 26, 2012 

This is in response to your June 15, 2012 correspondence asking questions for the record, further 

to my testimony on May 8, 2012 before the Subcommittees on Oversight and Social Security at a 

hearing on identity theft and tax fraud. I appreciate the opportunity to provide additional 

information regarding these critical issues. Below are responses to your specific questions. 

1. The Social Security Administration has made the annual Social Security Statement 

available online, whereby a user must answer a series of questions to prove their 

identities. Are there any lessons the Internal Revenue Service could take from this, as it 

and other government agencies move to update their authentication techniques? 

In May 2012, the Social Security Administration (SSA) implemented Electronic Access (EA) for 

its online statement, but has yet to expand EA to other Internet applications. Auther.tication 

through EA occurs completely online, eliminating the mailing of Password Request Codes for its 

PINlPassword applications. Although we have not audited SSA's EA protocols, we believe IRS 

can learn from SSA's experience--especially with respect to the lessons learned from the delays 

SSA experienced in attempting to make EA operational. We do know that the EA protocol uses 

multiple factors to authenticate users, which we believe is more effective than a single-factor 

authentication mechanism. such as a uscrnamc and password. 

In the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2012. wc plan to initiate two audits related to SSA's EA and 

associated authentication. In the first review, Security qfthe Social Security Administration's 

Public Facing Web Applications, we will assess SSA's process to establish eAuthcntication 

requirements for its public-facing web applications. Specifically, we will determine whether 

SSA's public-facing web application eAuthentication reasonably protects the confidentiality, 

availability, and integrity of the sensitive information used in the applications. Our contractor, 

Grant Thornton. LLP, will assess SSA's risk that an intruder could gain entry to the Agency's 

SOCIAL SECURITY Af)MI~JSTRATION BALTIMORE YlD 2!D5·0()O! 
128 


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Page 2-·-The Honorable Charles Boustany 

Internet-accessible web application(s). To meet our objectives. the contractor will perform Web 

Application Penetration tests of SSA's sensitive and crilical web applications. that will 

identify vulnerabilities within the information systems, 

determine opportunities that could be used to compromise the system or data. 

identify risks that could be reduced, and 

propose recommendations that could reduce opportunities to compromise the system 

based on weaknesses identified. 

These tests will also assess the controls and security configurations in place to prevent a nonauthorized individual from undermining the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of the 

sensitive information maintained at SSA. 

Our second planned review, The Social Security Administration's Public-jacing Web Application 

Testing Process, will assess whether (1) SSA's testing process for its public-facing web 

applications complies with Fedcral standards and best practices; and (2) implementation of or 

changes to public-facing web applications followed SSA's system-development life-cycle testing 

process. We willllse any findings from our first review to identify where in the testing process 

the security weaknesses could have been prevented. Once these reviews are completed, we will 

have more definitive information on the effectiveness of the EA protocols. 

2. Should State and local law enforcement have access to taxpayer information, such as 

refund date, in pursuing identity theft cases? Why or why not? 

In cases involving Social Security number (SSN) misuse and identity theft, taxpayer information 

can be invaluable to law enforcement. Specifically, information rcgarding current and former 

cmployers, as well as past earnings reported under an SSN, might provide crucial investigative 

leads and evidence to support criminal charges of identity theft; to substantiate legitimate 

earnings versus illegal proceeds or concealment of work activity; or to assist law enforcement in 

locating a subject. fugitive, witness, or even a missing person. 

The law enforcement community relies on assistance at all levels of govemment to conduct joint 

investigations of mutual interest and overlapping jurisdiction. Although currently we are able to 

share certain information contained within our case files with other law enforcement agencies 

during the course of joint investigations, we are prohibited from sharing "tax return" 

information. as the Internal Revenue Code strictly limits such disclosure. Pursuant to 26 U.S.c. § 

6103, the OrG may disclose tax return information from its files only to the Department of 

Justice and if the disclosure is for the purpose of administering the Social Security Act. As such, 

the sharing of even basic tax return information, such as an individual's name, SSN, and 

employer, with our State/locallaw enforcement partners and prosecutors is restricted. We would 

support any exemption from these restrictions for law enforcement purposes. 

3, Have you investigated any cases in which the Death Master File or a genealogical 

website was used to commit identity theft? In the last fiscal year, how many cases of 

Social Security number misuse cases did your office open? 

Yes. In 2007, we participated in a joint investigation with IRS-Criminal Investigation regarding 

a fraudulent ta,,, filing scheme. The investigation revealed that a Colorado man employed 

individuals so he could obtain names and SS~s of long-deceased individuals from a genealogical 
129 


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Page 3-The Honorable Charles Boustany 

website. The man then fabricated employment records and instructed others to use the obtained 

names, SSNs, and false employment information to create fraudulent tax returns, which were 

submitted to the IRS online. To determine deceased individuals' SSNs, the man said he 

compared data available from the public Internet site with a certain State's death data. The man 

was eventually convicted and sentenced to 46 months in prison for SSN misuse, making false 

claims, and wire fraud. He must also make restitution of over $282.000 to the IRS. 

Also. in August 2010, we began investigating about 60 fraudulent retirement benefit claims that 

used the name, SSN, and date of birth of individuals who died decades ago. We determined that 

the personally identifiable information (PII) used to file the fraudulent claims was available to 

the public through a genealogical website. The 010 and other law enforcement agencies 

identified suspects in the case and executed search and arrest warrants; however, the main 

suspect took his own life before he was taken into custody. His two accomplices, both relatives 

of his, were indicted and pled guilty to the charges. The two individuals received 20 months' and 

25 months' in prison, respectively, and one was ordered to pay restitution of more than $145.000 

to SSA. In addition, they will be deported from the United States at the end of their sentences. 

In Fiscal Year 2011, the 010 opencd 286 cases involving SSN misuse, which accounted for 

approximately 3.9 percent of all cases opened during that period. We prioritize SSN misuse 

allegations that invol ve 

• links to terrorist activities or other threats to national security, 

• benefit fraud or other links to Social Security programs, 

• Social Security employee misconduct, or 

• counterfeiting or selling of Social Security cards. 

4. I have submitted au article from a Florida newspaper for the record that reports that 

most fraudulent IRS refunds are made on prepaid debit cards. I am concerned that the 

government is moving to the debit card payment system, not only for tax refunds, but 

all government payments before adequate measures to prevent fraud are in place. Have 

you uncovered cases regarding debit card and other eleetronic payment systems where 

Social Security benefit payments are diverted to criminals? If so, are these also crimes 

of identity theft and how does that theft oceur? How pervasive is this fraud? 

We are currently investigating fraud involving the unauthorized diversion of Social Security 

benefits through the direct deposit process. Many of these scams involve the use of the Direct 

Express Debit MasterCard Program or some other type of reloadable pre-paid debit card 

account(s), as a means to redirect an individual's benefits without his or her knowledge and 

facilitate the movement of money. 

There appear to be variations in how the fraud is being perpetrated against Social Security 

beneficiaries. These victims' PI! may be compromised through some method of social 

engineering, or information may be acquired from those businesses or entities with access to PI!, 

such as financial services. health care-providers, etc. 

Our investigations confirm that this appears to be a "cottage industry" scam. The majority of our 

victims are elderly beneficiaries. and they are geographically dispersed throughout the country. 

We estimate there are thousands of victims. consisting of individuals who have either had their 
130 

f 


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131 

Steven T. Miller 


Insert offset folio 85 here 78817.085

Ways and Means Subcommittees on Oversight and Social Security 

QFRs 

Hearing on Identity Theft and Tax Fraud 

May 8, 2012 

1. How can the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the U.S. Treasury Inspector 

General for Tax Administration, and other law enforcement work to catch 

criminals sooner? Are there additional tools that you need which would require 

legislative action? 

The IRS has taken aggressive measures to improve its filters and 

processes in an effort to prevent identity theft tax fraud on the front end of 

the tax filing process. In January 2012, the IRS's Criminal Investigation 

(CI) established a specialized unit to work almost exclusively on identity 

theft leads. This unit, known as the Identity Theft Clearinghouse (ITC), is 

comprised of two working groups within the North Atlantic Scheme 

Development Center (SOC). The ITC receives all refund fraud related 

identity theft leads from IRS-CI field offices. The lTC's primary 

responsibility is to develop and refer identity theft schemes to the field 

offices, facilitate discussions between field offices with multi-jurisdictional 

issues, and to work with the other SDCs to provide support for on-going 

IRS criminal investigations involving identity theft. 

One way in which CI has proactively reached out to other law enforcement 

agencies is via a law enforcement alert bulletin that was developed and 

distributed to all CI field offices to share with their law enforcement 

partners. This bulletin helps law enforcement officers identify signs of 

identity theft related refund fraud and provides a local CI field office point 

of contact to assist. CI field offices have frequent contact with other 

federal law enforcement as well as state and local law enforcement in an 

effort to identify and address new trends in tax crimes. Additionally, 

Criminal Investigation continues to work closely in many states around the 

nation with multi-agency task forces designed to identify and disrupt 

identity theft related crime. These task forces pool resources to more 

quickly address identity theft allegations and allow for a more 

concentrated focus on combating identity theft related crimes. 

The IRS also initiated a pilot program in the state of Florida to assist state 

and local law enforcement in identity theft investigative efforts. Through 

this pilot, identity theft victims can authorize the release of tax information 

on their accounts to Florida law enforcement authorities. Such information 

has allowed the participating agencies to obtain tax return information 

submitted by fraudsters to assist in their investigations of identity theft 

crimes. 
132 


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Increasingly, the proceeds of identity theft and tax fraud, including tax 

refunds obtained by identity theft or fraud, are delivered onto prepaid 

devices, such as a prepaid card. The prepaid card industry, through the 

Prepaid Association Fraud Forum, is currently working with the IRS and 

Treasury/FMS to create a special "DO" rejection code for the prepaid card 

industry that suggests possible tax fraud that the IRS and Treasury/FMS 

can then tag as a high risk return. 

Additionally, on July 29, 2011, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

(FinCEN) issued final regulations for the prepaid access industry under 

the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) that will assist in the early detection of this 

type of fraud. These regulations require the prepaid access industry to 

implement a comprehensive anti-money laundering framework which 

includes the filing of suspicious activity reports, collection and retention of 

customer and transactional information, and customer identification. 

Through the application of the BSA regulations, the prepaid providers and 

sellers will be in a better position to identify and report on cases of identity 

theft and tax fraud. This will provide the IRS and law enforcement with 

additional leads. Furthermore, the increased communication between 

IRS, other law enforcement agencies and the prepaid access industry 

should help in developing typologies and patterns so that industry and law 

enforcement can proactively recognize, prevent, and report on identity 

theft and tax fraud. 

Two additional tools requiring legislative action would further assist us in 

combating identity theft. First, expanded access to information in the 

National Directory of New Hires which contains wage and unemployment 

insurance data, would improve the IRS's ability to identify fraudulent 

returns claiming fraudulent refunds, including, but not limited to, fraudulent 

refunds claimed by identity thieves. Second, reinstatement of the 

provisions under section 61 03(k)(1 0) of the Internal Revenue Code 

authorizing the IRS to disclose return information with respect to 

individuals incarcerated in Federal or State prisons whom the IRS 

determined may have filed or facilitated the filing of a false return would 

allow the IRS to combat tax fraud from identity theft committed by 

prisoners. This authorization expired on December 31,2011. Both of 

these tools are included in the tax proposals of the Administrations' FY 

2013 Budget. Additionally, the President's FY2013 Budget proposes an 

amendment to the BCA to permit program integrity cap adjustments in 

support of additional IRS investments. The Budget request includes a total 

program integrity cap adjustment of $691 ,028,000 in additional 

appropriation for tax enforcement and compliance activities. These new 

initiatives are projected to generate more than $1.48 billion in additional 

enforcement revenue annually once the resources are fully mature. 
133 


Insert offset folio 87 here 78817.087

2. Should state and local law enforcement have access to taxpayer information, 

such as refund data, in pursuing identity theft cases? Why or why not? 

As noted in the response to the previous question, the IRS has 

commenced a pilot program in the state of Florida that provides a means 

for state and local law enforcement to access just such data. This pilot 

program is still underway. The results will be analyzed in the coming 

months. As part of this analysis, the IRS will review whether the tax return 

information is beneficial to state and local law enforcement. The IRS will 

also analyze what additional resources would be required to sustain 

and/or expand the program. 

3. Law enforcement and federal prosecutors make decisions on what cases to 

pursue based on competing priorities and varying levels of fraud. People hear of 

the $130 million cases being pursued, but how much of this problem exists at 

lower levels- $5,000 in fraud or $20,000 in fraud- and are these cases vigorously 

pursued? Do prosecutors only get interested when fraud reaches the incredible 

levels we read about in newspapers? 

While each case needs to be evaluated on its own merits, it is clear that 

not every instance of identity theft involving tax fraud can be addressed by 

a criminal prosecution. Resource constraints within IRS Criminal 

Investigation, competing prosecutorial priorities of the United States 

Attorney's Offices, as well as overall capacity issues in the Federal court 

system make it impossible to address every instance of identity theft 

related refund fraud criminally. 

Generally speaking, it is the more egregious cases that receive priority. 

While egregiousness can be measured in part on dollar amount, the 

number and type of victims, and the actual tax loss sustained by the fraud 

scheme are also considered among other factors. In all instances, 

sufficient evidence must still be developed before a case can be 

successfully prosecuted. 

The IRS believes that continued improvement to tax fraud filters and 

processes, combined with criminal investigation and prosecution at the 

state, local, and Federal levels, is the best way to reduce tax fraud from 

identity theft going forward. 

4. You reported to the Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on Fiscal 

Responsibility and Economic Growth hearing that as of March 9, 2012, IRS had 

stopped 215,000 questionable retums with $1.15 billion in claimed refunds from 

filters specifically targeting refund fraud. Can you tell us how much money has 

gone out the door due to fraud this year, or last year? 
134 

f 


Insert offset folio 88 here 78817.088
135 

Nina E. Olson 


Insert offset folio 89 here 78817.089

: I-II' (it, II r (If j Iii IA;':'f'-\{i R ;\i'\'l)~'Alr I \1'[ ~!\,]! \ ,Nnri'! NDf;.. 'II' I'i' ;\1'.\ (lnll R I r{\ 

\..};11l: ,\,'."f);~LI'()I{I~ ,)1)\( II.': !\l\..~(]~,;rn.,," [IIKdtl\,I! lill ~i\JIU~~,! T.'\~, AY'i~,\j)\'('C.\lf 

YOUR VOIOE AT THE IRS 

July 16, 2012 

The Honorable Charles Boustany 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight 

The Honorable Sam Johnson 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security 

Committee on Ways and Means 

U. S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chairman Boustany and Chairman Johnson: 

I am writing in response to your letter dated June 15, 2012, which requested that 

I answer two questions for the record submitted in connection with the 

subcommittees' May 8,2012, hearing on identity theft and tax fraud. The 

questions, and my responses, follow. 

Question 1 

How can the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for 

Tax Administration, and other law enforcement work to catch criminals sooner? 

Are there additional tools that you recommend which would require legislative 

action? 

Response 1 

For identity thieves, tax return fraud may be viewed as a low-risk, high-reward 

venture. Identity theft has become a large-scale operation, with "boiler room" 

operations involving the theft of massive lists of Social Security numbers. 

Apparently, there are networks of criminals who not only share stolen personal 

information but even present seminars about how to use this information to file 

bogus returns.' Such brazen behavior suggests that identity thieves are not 

sufficiently concerned with the possibility of criminal prosecution. 

1 See, e.g., Tampa Bay Times, "49 Accused of Tax Fraud and Identity Theft," (Sept. 2, 2011), 

available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafetylcrime/4jJ-accused-of-tax-fraud-andidentity-thefU1189406; Tampa Bay Online, "Police: Tampa Street Criminals Steal Millions Filing 

Fraudulent Tax Returns," at http://www2.tbo.com/news/politics/2011/sep/01/11/police-tampastreet-criminals-steal-millions-filin-ar-254724/. 
136 


Insert offset folio 90 here 78817.090

2 

The IRS's Criminal Investigation division (CI) initiated 276 fraud cases related to 

identity theft in FY 2011, with 81 convictions - up from 224 investigations and 40 

convictions in FY 2010. 2 With hundreds of thousands of tax-related identity theft 

incidents reported each year, the figure of 81 convictions is a drop in the bucket. 

To respond more nimbly to identity theft situations, CI now has a designated 

liaison for identity theft in each of its major offices, but more action is required. 

In addition to possible criminal prosecution, I believe identity thieves should be 

subject to significant civil penalties. Currently, the IRS does not have the 

authority to assess civil penalties against perpetrators for the amounts by which 

they have defrauded the government. I believe that civil monetary penalties 

would (1) be easier for the IRS to pursue than criminal prosecution, (2) have an 

increased deterrent effect on potential identity thieves, and (3) hit perpetrators 

where it matters - in their pocketbooks. I therefore recommend that Congress 

consider legislation to authorize the IRS to impose such civil penalties. 

In April of this year, Representative Wasserman Shultz introduced a bill that 

would encourage the Attorney General to use all existing resources to bring 

perpetrators of identity theft to justice.3 While I agree that existing resources 

should be devoted to prosecuting identity thieves, I believe a significant increase 

in such resources (i.e., funding) will be necessary to have a meaningful impact 

on identity theft prosecutions. I have not heard the IRS Criminal Investigation 

function claim that it needs greater authority to prosecute identity thieves, so I 

have no reason to believe that additional statutory tools are necessary at this 

time (except for additional funding). However, my office will remain actively 

engaged on this issue and may make additional recommendations in the future. 

Question 2 

Should State and local law enforcement have access to taxpayer information, 

such as refund data, in pursuing identity theft cases? Why or why not? 

Response 2 

Taxpayers have the right to expect that any information they provide to the IRS 

will not be used or disclosed by the IRS unless authorized by the taxpayer or by 

other provisions of law. The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains significant 

protections for the confidentiality of returns and return information. IRC § 6103 

generally provides that returns and return information shall be confidential and 

then delineates a number of exceptions to this general rule. There is no 

exception for the release of identity theft information to state or local agencies.4 

2 Data obtained from the IRS Criminal Investigation division's research function (Mar. 13,2012). 

3 See H.R. 4362, Stopping Tax Offenders and Prosecuting Identity Theft Act of 2012. 

4 Note, however, that certain disclosures to state law enforcement are permissible. See IRC 

§ 6103(i)(3)(8)(i) (disclosure of return information, including taxpayer return information, can be 

made to the extent necessary to advise appropriate officers or employees of any state law 

enforcement agency of the imminent danger of death or physical injury to any individual; 
137 

f 


Insert offset folio 91 here 78817.091

3 

However, IRC § 6103(c) provides that a taxpayer may consent to disclosure of 

returns and return information to any person designated by the taxpayer. 

It is my understanding that some have called for the expansion of exceptions to 

IRC § 6103, ostensibly to help state and local law enforcement combat identity 

theft. I have significant concerns about loosening taxpayer privacy protections, 

and I do not believe that such an expansion of the statute is appropriate at this 

time. I believe the current framework of IRC § 6103 includes sufficient 

exceptions to allow the IRS to share information about identity thieves. 

The IRS Office of Chief Counsel has advised that the IRS may share the "bad 

return" and other return information of an identity thief with other federal law 

enforcement agencies investigating identity theft. 5 In light of this advice, the IRS 

has implemented a pilot program in the State of Florida to facilitate a consentbased sharing of identity theft information with state and local law enforcement 

agencies. 6 

I believe this approach strikes an appropriate balance - protecting taxpayer 

return information while simultaneously giving state and local law enforcement 

authorities more information to help them investigate and combat identity theft. 

However, I am concerned that once the information is in the hands of state and 

local law enforcement, there is no prohibition 

in the tax code against redisclosure. 

Therefore, I suggest that Congress consider modifying IRC § 61 03(c) to explicitly 

limit the use of tax return information to the purpose agreed upon by the taxpayer 

(Le., to allow state or local law enforcement to use the information solely to 

enforce state or local laws) and to prohibit the redisclosure of such information.? 

I hope you find these responses useful. If you have further questions, please 

feel free to contact my office at (202) 622-6100. 

Sincerely, 

\ 

Nina E. Olson 

National Taxpayer Advocate 

disclosure cannot be made to local law enforcement agencies). While identity theft may cause 

emotional and economic injury, the typical identity theft situation does not pose an imminent 

danger of death or physical injury. 

5 IRS Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum, Disclosure Issues Related to Identity Theft, PMTA 

2012-05 (Jan. 18,2012). 

6 See http://www.irs.gov/privacy/article/0.id=256965.00.html(last visited June 8, 2012). 

7 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 505. 
138 

Public Submissions For The Record 

IAJGS 


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International Association of 

Jewish Genealogical Societies (IAJGS) 

6052 Hackers Lane Agoura Hills, CA 91301 

818·889·6616 tel 818·889·0189 fax 

www.iajgs.org 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES C(HIMITTEE WAYS & 

MEANS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON OVERSIGHT AND SOCIAL SECURITY, MAY 8, 2012 JOINT 

HEARI'IG O'ilDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD 

l. INTRODUCTION: 

The U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Subcommittees on Oversight and Social Security held a 

joint hearing on 8 May 2012, on Identity Theft and Tax Fraud including the accuracy and uses of the Social 

Security Administration's Death Master File. The genealogical community was not extended an invitation to 

testify at the hearing, however, public comments were solicited. This statement is accordingly submitted. 

II. IA.JGS BACKGROUND & CONTACT IlWORMATION: 

The International Association of lewish Genealogical Societies is the umbrella organization of 70 genealogical 

societies and lewish historical societies worldwide whose approximately 10,000 members are actively 

researching their Jewish roots. We want to ensure that our members will be allowed continued and maximum 

access to these records. The lAJGS and its predecessor organization were formed in 1988 to provide a 

common voice for issues of significance to its members and to advance our genealogical avocation. One of our 

primary objectives is 10 promote public access to genealogically relevant records. In 2012, we are holding our 

32nd consecutive annual International Conference on Jewish Genealogy (www.iajgs.org). 

IAJGS is a voting member of the Records Preservation and Access Committee (RPAC) that is ajoint 

committee whose other voting members include The National Genealogical Society (NGS) and the Federation 

of Genealogical Societies (FGS). The Association of Professional Genealogists (APG), the Board for 

Certification ofGeneaiogists (BCG), and the American Society of Genealogists (ASG) also serve as 

pariicipating members. RPAC also includes participation from several orthe commercial providers of 

genealogical information. 

Contact Information: 

IAJGS official mailing address is: 

IAJGS 

PO Box 3624 

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-0556 

However, for purposes of this statement please use the following contact information: 

Jan Meisels Allen, 

Vice President, lAJGS 

6052 Hackers Lane Agoura Hills. CA 91301 (818) 889-6616 tel (818) 991-8400 fax (call before submitting a 

fax) 

e-mail: vicerrc"idcnt(a~ iajgs.org 

Dtreoon-al·hllge 

Anne Feder Lee, Honolulu. HI. USA, ''''nne(c~iajgs llrg 
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IAJGS Statement for the Record -May 8. 20121learing Re: Identity Theil and Tax Fraud --Death Master File/SSDl 

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Previous Hearings 

The Social Security Subcommittee held a hearing on the issue on 2 February 2012, and the Senate Finance 

Committee Fiscal Responsibility & Economic Growth Subcommittee also held a hearing on 20 March 2012. 

IAJGS submitted Statements forthe Record for the 2 February 2012 and 20 March 2012 hearings. These 

previous Statements are incorporated by reference into this statement. 

Introduction 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the IAJGS concerns regarding the Subcommittees' proposed reduction 

or elimination of public access to the commercial version of the Death Master File (DMF), the Social Security 

Death Index (SSOI). For the purposes of this statement, we will be addressing access to the SSOI rather than the 

DMF, as the SSDI is the version that genealogists are permitted to access. 

It is ironic that a system that is used to prevent identity theft (by permitting employers, financial organizations, 

insurance companies, pension funds, and others the ability to check names against those deceased as reported on 

the Death Master File), [lH!I2J0vV. \v.J)libg~[Q~hLcts/s~~gmlf!~12,,,J, is nm\' being determined 

inappropriately-as an instrument of identity theft. 

We support the Subcommittees' intent to protect the residents of the United States from improper usage of their 

personal information, and to protect them from identity theft. We support, the provisions in S1534, H 3215 and 

HR 3482 which propose strong criminal penalties for those \vho willfully misuse or disclose another's personal 

tax identity number (Social Security Number) resulting in a personal gain. Only strong criminal penalties \vill 

hopefully, deter those who are misusing another's Social Security Number (SSN) for their own gain. 

Violations occur due to computer breaches from government and private enterprises and government and 

private enterprise personnel misusing or stealing Social Security numbers. A recent study (2012) by ID 

Analytics estimates of 100 million applications examined to the entire annual volume of applications submitted 

for credit products and services in the U.S., that nearly 6.8 million applications have at least a partial match to 

the DMF. Many of these-roughly 2.4 million-are simply SSN typos. Approximately 1.6 million applications 

are instances of a fraudster using a fabricated SSN that unintentionally matches the SSN of a deceased 

person I. A 2009 study stated "in the last five years, approximately 500 million records containing personal 

identifying information of United States residents stored in government and corporate databases was [sic] either 

lost or stolen" j. Many computer breaches have been well documented in the press.::!. In addition, there have 

been newspaper accounts of Social Security numbers found in dumpsters and other places.3 where they can be 

easily found and used by "fraudsters". 

Genealogists Are Not the Cause of Identity Theft 

Genealogists rely on the Death Master File/Social Security Death Index for legitimate reasons. Their access to 

the SSDl is not the cause of identity theft. Thieves are the cause of identity theft. Preventing genealogists access 

to the SSDl will not prevent the aforementioned type of illegal use ofSSNs. Financial institutions and 

government agencies have been hacked into numerous times and that has been documented l. 1, but was not 

mentioned during the hearing. Nor was there mention of returning to using non-computerized data to avoid the 

inevitable hacking that occurs daily in the 21 st century. If we accept the continued use of computerized data, and 

the continued likelihood of hacking occurring to any given database at any time, then we must also accept that, 

occasionally, misuse of data will occur. This is why it is imperative that the IRS take more aggressive action to 

prevent fraudsters from using fraudulently obtained SSNs on fraudulently filed tax returns. It is not reasonable, 

constitutional, or in the nation's interests, to remove public documents from public access. For a real solution to 

this problem, sec below "IRS Needs to be More Proactive." 

In Mr. J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration statement before the joint 

subcommittees' hearing, he commented:" The IRS began a pilot program in Processing Year 2011 which 

locked taxpayers' accounts where the IRS Master File and Social Security Administration data showed a date of 

death. The IRS places a unique identity theft indicator on deceased individuals' tax accounts to lock their tax 

account." While it is gratifying that, the IRS is finally using Social Security Administration information to 

prevent tax identity fraud--it is unfortunate that the IRS was not using the DMF information all along to prevent 

fraudulent filings of deceased individuals. 
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IAJGS Statement for the Record May 8, 2012 llcaring Re: Identity Theft and Tax Fraud --Death Master File/SSDI 

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What was even more striking in Mr. George's statement was that the tax identity fraud of living individuals was 

the overwhelming cause of identity theft and tax fraud, including the billions of dollars of falsely used debit 

cards and not depositing refunds directly into the taxpayers' bank accounts, These fraudulent practices by the 

living are not part of the DMF- and therefore, the focus of closing the commercial version, the Social Security 

Death Index, appears as if it will have no impact at all on the overw helming problem of identity thell and tax 

fraud. Therefore, we ask, why are the Subcommittees focused on the SSDI when closing that off will have 

virtually no bearing on the overwhelming problem. 

Detective Sol Augeri noted, in his oral statement during the March 20th hearing before the Senate Finance 

Committee Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Growth, that once the genealogical websites 

withdrew the SSDI from public access, identity theft did not abate. Rather, Detective Augeri said the access to 

Social Security Numbers to be used in identity theft moved to institutions: hospitals, nursing homes, physician 

offices and other institutions. In his written statement, Detective Augeri said" ... they turned to individuals who 

[sic] worked in Assisted Living Facilities who would obtain necessary information on patients. Lists of names 

are now being sold by those having access to personal information in businesses, medical offices, and 

schools." This documents that removal of the ssm from public access does not necessarily reduce the problem 

of fraudulent use of a Social Security number. Indeed, we heard at the March 20th hearing that identity theft 

continues to grow, in spite of genealogy and family history sites' removal of the SSDI from public access. For 

example, medical identity theft, whereby medical employees have been found to steal patient's identification 

has become a growing business.4 If Congress limits public access to SSDI, it \vill no longer be available as a 

reference check to many who use it as an identity theft deterrent, there well may be an increase in identity 

theft. 

Loss of Critical Data in Death Master File If States Prevent Inclusion in the Commercial Version 

Many organizations-state and local government, financial, insurance and other businesses~rely on the SSDI 

for fraud prevention. Recently, the New York City Employee Retirement System started a new system 

comparing the SSDl with their pension data bank. This was initiated due to a number of recent fraudulent 

pension filings'. As states assert their rights to retain control over the sale of their data in the SSDJ, the recent 

notification from over 30 states that state data can no longer be included in the SSDI is of compelling concern. 

The elimination of data from the ssm raises the concern about the resulting loss of a meaningful fraud 

deterrent used by various organizations including state and local government as well as financial, insurance, 

medical and other businesses. How do the Subcommittees plan to "replace" this effective fraud deterrent? 

Interest in Family History/Genealogy 

Millions of Americans are interested in their family history. The Harris Interactive Poll taken in August 20 II 

found that four in five Americans have an interest in learning about their family history. The Poll also reported 

73% of Americans believe it is important to pass along their family's lineage to the next generation. 6 

Genealogists doing U.S. research located both in and outside the United States rely on the Social Security 

Death Index. 

Certification for Certain Genealogists With Need For Immediate Access to the Death Master File/Social 

Security Death Index 

While IAJGS advocates all genealogists should have immediate access to the ssm, we would support the two 

year delay in access as proposed in S 1534, HR 3215 and HR 3482-and ifneeessary the third year that National 

Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson advocated during her oral testimony during the May 8'h and Mareh 20'h 

hearings. This support is based on amending the bill to include that certain genealogists arc to be eligible for 

certification for immediate access under the bills' provisions. These genealogists include: 

Forensic genealogists. These are genealogists who work, for example by contract on specific cases 

with the Department of Defense in identifying next of kin of deceased military personnel from prior 

conflicts and working with local, county, and state coroners to help find the next of kin of deceased in 

order for the deceased to have a proper burial; 

Heir researchers who are working under contract with law firms to prove or disprove that someone is 

eligible as part oCa deceased's estate or Native American tribal funds; 
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Those researching individual genetically inherited diseases to help current and future generations 

obtain necessary medical testing to determine if they currently need prophylactic treatments. We are 

aware that medical researchers may already be eligible for certification, but many work with aggregate 

data and the individual needs to know about their own medical genetically inherited history. 

While some organizations currently are certified for immediate access, individual genealogists working within 

the above three categories are not covered and certification for immediate access needs to be specifically 

addressed in the legislation. The Records Access and Preservation Committee, which is described on page one 

ofth1s statement, is w1lhng to work with the Subcommittees in detennin1ng who would qualify. 

Sec below for morc dctai I. 

Family Medical History 

Genealogists use Social Security Numbers (SSNs) to appropriately identifY records of people when tracing 

family medical history, especially if the person has a common name: Sara Cohen, Tom Jones, Jose Martinez, 

Mary Smith, etc. During the March 20th hearing before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Fiscal 

Responsibility, it was mentioned that perhaps genealogists could make do with the last four digits of the Social 

Security Number. Unfortunately, this was proven not to be true in the February 2nd House Subcommittee on 

Social Security hearing. Mr. Pratt, representing the Consumer Data Tndustry Association (CDTA), mentioned 

CDIA had conducted a study and found some people with common names, i.e. Smith, also had the same last 

four digits on their Social Security number, validating why the complete Social Security number is necessary. 

Genealogy assists researchers in tracing family medical problems that are passed on from generation to 

generation. Information included in birth, marriage, and death records is critical to reconstructing families and 

tracing genetically inherited attributes in current family members. The SSN is essential to make certain that 

one is researching the correct person. Increasing numbers of physicians are requesting that their patients 

provide a "medical family tree" in order to more quickly identify conditions common within the family 7 

Infonnation on three generations is the suggested minimum. The US Surgeon General includes preparing a 

family medical history as part of the American Family Health Initiative '. 

There are many genetically inherited diseases, but for the purposes of this statement, we will mention the 

BRCAI and BRCA2 genes' mutations and breast and ovarian cancer. The following information is from the 

National Cancer Institute 9. 

"A woman's risk of developing breast and/or ovarian cancer is greatly increased if she 

inherits a deleterious (harmful) BRCAI or BRCA2 mutation. Men with these mutations also 

have an increased risk of breast cancer. Both men and women who have harmful BRCAI or 

BRCA2 mutations may be at increased risk of other cancers. 

The likelihood that a breast and/or ovarian cancer is associated with a harmful mutation in 

BRCA lor BRCA2 is highest in families with a history of multiple cases of breast cancer, cases 

of both breast and ovarian cancer, one or more family members with two primary cancers 

(original tumors that develop at different sites in the body), or an Ashkenazi (Central and 

Eastern European) Jewish background. 

Regardless, women who have a relative with a harmful BRCA 1 or BRCA2 mutation and 

women who appear to be at increased risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer because of their 

family history [emphasis added] should consider genetic counseling to learn more about their 

potential risks and about BRCAI and BRCA2 genetic tests. 

The likelihood of a harmful mutation in SReA 1 or BRCA2 is increased with certain 

familial patterns of cancer [emphasis added]. These patterns include the following for 

women of Ashkenazi Jewish descent: 

Any first-degree relative diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer; and 

Two second-degree relatives on the same side of the family diagnosed with 

breast or ovarian cancer." 

This form of breast cancer is something not unique to Ashkenazi Jews. Studies have demonstrated that this 

has also been found in the Hispanic communities of New Mexico and Colorado--who did not know they 
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IAJGS Statement for the Record -May 8, 2012 Hearing Re: Identity Theft and Tax Fraud --Death Master File/SSDI 

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were descended from Sephardic Jews who had hidden their Jewish identity to survive the Inquisition in the 

15th century. This is described in Jon Entine"s Abraham's Children: Race, Identity and the DNA o(the 

Chosen People, by the Smithsonian in their article, The Secret Jews olSan Luis Valley, and The Wandering 

Gene and the Indian Princess: Race, Religion, and DNA 10 

People who have had members of their families diagnosed with breast cancer need to know whether past 

family members may have also died from this disease, in order to detennine if it is inherited. Both current and 

future generations need to have this information in order to make decisions about whether to prophylactically 

remove both breasts and ovaries (which can mean the difference between early detection and treatment versus 

possible early death). This is something both men and women need to be able to research--as either can be 

carrying the gene mutation. The SSDI is a critical tool in assuring researchers that the records they have 

located on possible ancestors are indeed the correct persons. especially when they have a common name. 

Wc usc this as only one examplc of inherit cd diseases that requirc the ability to research ancestry using a SSNregardless of ethnieity. 

Working with Coroners to Identify Deceased's Next of Kin 

People are going to their graves with no family to claim them. Medical examiners and coroners' ofticesfrequently overstretched with burgeoning caseloads-need help in finding next of kin of the deceased. The 

deeeaseds' identities arc known; it is their next of kin that are unknown in these cases. Over 400 genealogists 

are now offering their volunteer services to help locate the next of kin for unclaimed persons. The identities of 

these people are known, but the government agencies are not always able to find the families, so they are 

literally unclaimed. It is a national problem with which coroners must cope. See unclaimedperson-;.org 

Working with the Military 

There are literally tens ofthollsands of United States Veterans' remains left unclaimed throughout the Nation. 

Sometimes decades pass while these remains are waiting to be identified as Veterans and given a proper 

military burial. Genealogists work with the military to locate relatives of soldiers who arc still unaccounted for 

from past conflicts. By finding relatives, the military can identify soldiers using DNA, and notify the next of 

kin so the family can make burial decisions. While using DNA, the genealogists also need SSNs to help assure 

they are finding the correct person's family!!. 

Genealogy as a Profession 

While there are millions of people who actively study and research their family history as an avocation, there 

arc many others who cam their livelihoods as professional genealogists. Professional genealogists usc the SSDI 

to (I) help track heirs to estates, (2) find title to real property, (3) find witnesses to wills that need to be proved, 

(4) work on the repatriation projects [see Working with the Military], (5) track-works of art-including stolen 

art-and repatriation of looted art work during the Nazi era of World War II, and (6) assist in determining the 

status of Native American tribes and tribal members to prove-or disprove-that they are entitled to share in 

Tribal casino revenues. 

IRS Needs to Be More Proactive 

While we are heartened that the IRS has begun a fraud identification program in 20 II with varions new 

identity theft screening filters -- this is not enough. They need to do more to work with the identity theft victims 

and even more to prevent identity theft-which includes more flagging of returns of not only the deceased, but 

of others covered under the same tax return: spouses and dependents. This "simple" notation in the file can 

titrther prevent tax retlmds being generated by the fraudulent tiler. It is a positive outcome that the IRS has 

undertaken various preventive activities. Hmvever, much more is required to address the growing blight of 

identity theft and actions need to be undertaken now. 

If the IRS were to routinely run Social Security numbers included in tax returns against the Death Master File, 

they might avoid giving refunds to deceased individuals. This is a data match between t\\/O government 

computer programs-something that should be routinely undertaken. The difference between data security and 

data stewardship is excellently described in Kenneth Ryesky's statement to the Subcommittee relative to the 
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lAJGS Statement for the Record -May 8, 2012 Hearing Re: Identity Theft and Tax Fraud --Death Master File/SSDI 

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March 20'" and May 8th hearings. Ryesky testified that, along with failure of the IRS for data stewardship, "The 

social security numbers (SSNs) \-vere not verified, even though the means to verify the numbers should have 

been readily available to the IRS ... data security practices alone do 110t constiulte sound stewardship of taxpayer 

personal data.". 1:~ 

"Operation Rainmaker" (also known as Operation TurboTax), was a tax fraud operation in the Tampa Bay area 

as discussed by Tampa Police Department Lieutenant Augeri during the Senate Finance Subcommittee hearing. 

Law enforcement interviews specified that the IRS, while cooperating with other law enforcement officers. is 

not authorized to share information with local law enforcement departments, hampering efforts to protect their 

citizens. Tfthe federal government is serious about addressing identity theft that uses a person's Social Security 

number, then the IRS needs to be given legislative authority to share information with local, county, and state 

law enforcement organiLations. Perhaps as a minimum, the subcommittees through legislation can adopt the 

suggcstion by National Taxpaycr Advocatc Olson in her written and oral statemcnts for both thc May 8'" and 

March 20'" hearings, that the identity theft victim be able to receive the "bad return". Currently, this is a pilot 

projcct whcre infomlation filcd by the alleged idcntity thicf, cnabling the victim to thcn providc the information 

to local law enforcement or provide a release for the IRS to share the information directly with local law 

enforcement. It was also stated that filing tax refunds for under $10,000 will not get any attention. As 

"Operation Rainmaker" found the average tax, fraud was about $9,500, below the S I 0,000 threshold n This is 

another practice that the Congress needs to review, as the criminals who are perpetrating this fraud know they 

will bc undetccted! 

It became apparent through Mr. McClung in his testimony at the Senate Finance Subcommittee's 25 May 20 II 

Hearing," together with the testimony ofMr. Agin at the House Ways & Means Subcommittee's 2 February 

2012 Hearing, 15 that the IRS assumes the first person filing is the "legitimate" filer and by inference, the 

second filer is the fraudulent party. The IRS needs to amend their practice to require some verification to 

determine which is a valid filing, when the filing involves a deceased child. 

Unfortunately, since the IRS advocated electronic filing of tax returns, one unexpected consequence is the 

remarkable increase in tax identity theft. 

Support For Efforts to Cease Identity Theft 

If income tax returns were electronically compared to the Master Death F iIe, matching cases could be 

flagged for special processing, and the person attempting to create a tax fraud could be stopped before 

the fraud occurs. 

A parent's social security number should be required when filing a tax return for any minor. It is an 

extremely rare occurrence that a minor child would not be listed as a dependent on the parent or 

guardian's tax filing. If the minor dies, the IRS could have a procedure to flag any tilings without the 

parent's social security number, again preventing the fraud. Draft legislative language developed by the 

Records Preservation and Access Committee 16 (see Attachment A) would facilitate just this prevention 

of identity theft perpetrated on children. The National Taxpayer Advocate's Report to Congress/or 

2011 specifically highlights the benefits of the IRS Issued Identity Protection PINs 17 and suggests that 

taxpayers should be allowed to turn off their ability to file tax returns electronically. Any family that 

sufTers a death could elect to turn off the electronic filing ability. 

Criminal penalty statutes for those who fraudulently use Social Security Numbers, including, but not 

restricted to, those who misuse their positions (e.g., hospital, medical institution and office personnel, 

financial and credit card organizations personnel, prison corrections officer, college or university 

registrar ctc.) 

For the reasons stated above: 

Genealogists are NOT the cause of identity thef1; 

Genealogists have legitimate. professional and life saving reasons to have immediate access to the 

SSD1; and 
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Proactive measures are needed to prevent identity theft: and vigorously pursue and punish the TRUE 

identity thieves, and 

"Fraudsters" are focusing on stealing the Social Security Numbers of live people not the dead-- when 

fraudulent tax filings are being rendered to the IRS; and 

SSDI is a deterrent to fraud and removing access to this database will cause more harm than good. 

IAJGS respectfully and vehemently encourages the Subcommittees to continue public access to the commercial 

version of the Death Master File, known as the Social Security Death Index, to be available to the public. Ifany 

time period for withholding this from the public is required, then it should not be greater than two or three years 

including the year of death with certain genealogists being eligible for certification for immediate access to the 

Death Master File. 

On behalf of the International Association of Jewish Genealogical Societies, we appreciate the opportunity to 

submit our comments, and for the occasion to bring to the Subcommittees' attention the many services the 

genealogy community performs for local, state, and federal government offices. We look forward to working 

·with the Subcommittees and statfto find an accommodation that provides genealogists with immediate and 

reasonable access to the SSDI. 

Respectfully submitted, 

c/ 

Jan Meisels Allen 

IAJGS Vice President 

Chairperson, IAJGS Public Records Access Monitoring Committee 

Endnotes 

I http://\T,,'W\V .idanalytics.col1lr'news-and-events/news-releases/20 12/4-23-20 12.php 

http:,'/www . iden titytheft. inf oibreaches09 .aspx 

http://\\\vw,boston.com,'busincs~/articlcs!2()08/03!1 8/uroccr hannaford hit by computer brcach/ 

http://W\V\Y.l1ctimes.cominews/locallarticie _ 3b98ce3S~ tD48-597e-9a76-4 7321 d J 14326.htrnl 

http://WWw.qclimes.cominews/\ocaj/articlc_ 06dJ8e24-146a-l I df .. 91 c6- 001 cc4c03286.html 

http://w\\·\v.\\ashinglonpos1.com/po I itics.itri cure-11l i \ i l3ry-hen.:: ficin rks-bc i ng-i n formed-o C-sto ien-per~onaldata2Q II / 1112.l/gJ QAcR~lIlN_stOl"y-.hll11l 

Ilt tp: i/slInda yhernld. co m/news/heraldnew s/ display. \ "ar .243 222 5.0.0. php 

Understanding Identity Theft: Offenders' accounts of their lives and crimes. Criminal Justice Review. Copes, 

H., and Vicraitis, L.M. (2009) 34(3),329-349. 

hJtp:((wy.:\v. ks;t t.cOJ11,: Il_Cv,ls./Pcr~ona l .. docum~n ts-f(~Un9- 111-trgsh -c"!Il,: -/ 4 ~845 2/82_82,13 2/-< 59y 7 ox/ -/ ind~x_. htl111; 
145 


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IAJGS Statement lor the Record -May 8. 2012 Hearing Re: Identity Theil and Tax Fraod --Death Master File/SSDl 

Page X 

http://ww\\.phiprivi1cy.net/?p=5405 

http://v.rww .abc 15 .com/dpp/news/region_ northern _ az/payson/state-agency-Ie{lyes-arizonans-sensitivedt.)cuments-in-dumrster 

hHP:/I\V\\ w.databreache~.net/?p=-16205 

http://\vww.vestar. com/news/20 12 ,Imar/ 3 O/lost Hdata-may-have-exposed- 800000-peop le-in! 

http://consumcrist . com/20 J 0/03 lid -thcft -ri n g -used -hospital-records-1'01'-300k -shopp ing -spree, html; 

http::iarticles.sun-sentinel.com/20l 0-11-11 !heallhil1-hk-ho1y-cross-id2010 111 O_I_identity-theft-ring-patient-llles-emergency-room 

http://w\\'\\.mim11ihcrald.com/2011/ 12/07/2536 1901miami-va-hospital-employeecharged.html; 

5 http://\\,w\\'.dnainfo.col1l/nc\v-york/20 120509/nt:\\ -york -city/iamily-of-dead-city-w orkers-stole-ncarly-400k2S;·Jl~jQ!l_-=-c1'-li.h:!:flLQ.!1=-?_~ 

(, http://corporate.ancestry . com/press/preqs-rei eases/20 12/0 1 /ancestry. COlTI-partners-\vi th -histori cal-society -(I fpcnn~y 1 \. an ia-to-bring-the-states- rich-history -online/ 

This SllrVe}' vvas conducted online within the United States by Harris Interactive via its QuickQuery omnihus 

product on behalf of Ancestry. com from August 5-9, 2011 among 2,950 adults ages 18 and older 

Mayo Clinic stalI: "Medical History: Compiling your medical family tree." 

http://v.;ww.mayoclinic.com/health/medical-hlstoryiI lQO 1 707; 

8 D.!!Rs://familyhistoIY.l1l1S.gov/fhb-weblhOl}).e.actiol1 

!1J!2://YV\\ \v.ca~1f~~gQv/caJ~lJQQics/fact~heet/~L~~.!..l?~\£'C\ 

10 Abraham's Children: Race, Identity, and the DNA of the Chosen People. Jon Entine, Grand Central 

Publishing, New York, N.Y. 2007. 

!lttp://\\v.·\\··~mi1p'so!l~nlJ~·cor!)bi;_~n.~~.:J!.<!1l,!!:.e/sartlLLis-\·a~hll)tl 

The Wandering Gene and the Indian Princess: Race, Religion, and DNA. Jeff Wheelwright. 

WW Norton & Co. New York, NY, 2012. 

II http://www .a;'lillRrgireiatiOl)ships!genealogyiinfo-06-20 ll/g~n('alogy-tips.html 

PJ!P://~_}\~~_J\l!DjJi~[QxfQ[gQ!.t~Db~1Q~s.orgKl~}l~JRgj§.!Jgm 

12 Kenneth H. Ryesky, Esq .. Statement for the Record, United States Senate Committee on Finance, 

Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility & Economic Growth, Tax Fraud by Identity Then, Part 2: Status, 

Progress, and Potential Solutions March 20, 2012. 

Kenneth H.Ryesky, Esq. Statement for the Record, United States House of Representatives, Committee on 

Ways and Means, Subcommittees on Oversight and Social Security, Joint Hearing on Identity Theft and Tax 

Fraud May 8, 2012 

13 http://www.\.outubc.com/watch?v=gpgTF071)MBk 

14 Statement ofTen), D. McClung. Jr., Hearing on the Spread of Tax Fraud by Identity Theft: A Threat 

to Taxpayers, A Drain on the Public Treasury, United States Senate Committee on Finance, 

Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Growth (25 May 2011). 

h~E(um_cc.scpatc~ov/iJl!Q!.!~d.!~QfLTcst!m_QI1L~.fQ.Qt~5L~Q~!I~j)_~~~lJmg~f. 

IS Statement of Jonathan Eric Agin, Esq .. Hearing on the Accuracy and Uses of the Social Security 

Administration's Death Master File, House Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social 

Security (2 February 2012), http://waysandmeans.house.gov !UploadedFi les/ Agin __ Testirnony202ss.pdL 

16 The Records Preservation and Access Committee is a joint committee, which today includes The National 

Genealogical Society (NGS), the Federation of Genealogical Societies (FGS) and the International 

Association ofJcwish Genealogical Societies (JAJGS) as voting members. The Association of Professional 

Genealogists (APG), the Board for Cel1ifieation of Genealogists (BCG), the American Society of 

Genealogists (ASG), ProQuest and Ancestry. com also serve as participating members. 

17 http://Vvv'I\v.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdJlp2104.pdr 
146 


Insert offset folio 100 here 78817.100

lAJGS Statement [or the Record -May 8, 2012 Hearing Re: Identity Theft and Tax Fraud --Death Master File/SSDl 

Page 9 

Attachment A 

To address the tax issues surrounding the misuse of Social Security Numbers, the following language captures the 

concept that if a child undcr thc age of 18 has their social security number associated with that of their parents or 

Icgal guardian, and if that information is afforded to thc Intcrnal Revenue Service, then administrative procedures 

may be put in place that would flag claims where the social security number of the deceased child did not match the 

social security numbers of its parents and appropriate action may be taken by the IRS, as follows: 

Existing law requires the Social Security Administration to release the data contained in the Death Master File and 

arrange it for publication according to Pcrholtz v. Ross, C.A. Nos. 7R-23R5, 7R-23R6 D.D.C. Since that time, the data 

contained in the Death Master File has been widely used to prevent identity theft for fraudulent purposes through the 

wide dissemination of the information that the person identified with a uniquely identifying Social Security number 

is deceased. 

This bill would require the Social Security Administration to add additional information to the Death Master File to 

be shared with the Internal Revenue Service for the purpose of prohibiting the criminal act of claiming unrelated 

deceased dependents. 

SECTION I. (I) The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration shall arrange and 

pcrmancntly prcscrve thc social sccurity numbcrs of dcpendcnt childrcn with the associated 

3 social security numbers of their legal parents or guardians for all applications registered. 

4 (2) The Commissioner of Social Security may release the indices and data files described in 

5 paragraph (I) to the Intemal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service having obtained 

6 the index pursuant to this paragraph may not release any portion of its contcnts to any othcr 

7 party or govemment agencies. 

8 (3) The Internal Revenue Service or other government agency may not sell or release Social 

9 Security indices prepared and maintained by the Social Security Administration except as 

10 authorized by law. 

II (4) In addition to the indices prepared pursuant to paragraph (I), the Commissioner of 

12 Social Security shall prcpare separate non-comprehensive electronic indices of all deceased 

13 individuals with Social Security numbers that shall be made available for public inspection. 

14 (5) For purposes of this bill, the following definitions apply: 

15 (a) "Data files" means computerized data compiled from Social Security Applications 

16 registered \vith the Social Security Administration. 

17 (b) "Person" means any individual, finn, corporation, partnership, limited liability 

I R company, joint vcnturc, or association. 

19 (c) "Personal identifying information" means first name, middle name, last name, 

20 mother's maiden name, and father's surname, and a social security number that is 

21 contained in the file. 

22 (d) '"Financial institution" means any commercial bank, trust company, savings and 

23 loan company, insurance company, or person engaged in the business oflending money. 

24 (e) "Commercial or non-profit company" means any company or not-for-profit organiza25 tion engaged in sharing information about deceased individuals for the pursuit of heir 

26 searches, genetic research, blood quantum research, genealogy or family history research, 

27 or other legal uses of the information as authorized by law. 

28 (6) The Social Security Death Master File as presently constituted will be made available 

29 tor a reasonable fee to t1nancial institutions, commercial companies, non-pro lit organizations 

30 and educational institutions as authorized by law. 

31 (7) Any person who, in violation of this section, uses, sells, shares, or discloses any infonna32 lion provided pursuant to this section, or who uses information provided pursuant to this 

33 section in a manner other than as authorized pursuant to this section, may be subject to the 

34 assessment ofa civil penalty by the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $ __ . The 
147 

f 


Insert offset folio 101 here 78817.101
148 

Kenneth Ryesky 


Insert offset folio 102 here 78817.102

Kenneth H. Ryesky [D Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 1 

KENNETH H. RYESKY, ESQ., STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, UNITED STATES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE WAYS & MEANS, 

SUBCOMMITTEES ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND ON OVERSIGHT, JOINT 

HEARING ON IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD: 

I. INTRODUCTION: 

The House Ways & Means Committee, Subcommittees on Social Security and on Oversight, 

held a Hearing on 8 May 2012, regarding the usc of identity theft by tax fraudsters. Public 

comments were solicited. This Commentary is accordingly submitted. 

II. COMMENTATOR'S BACKGROUND & CONTACT INFORMATION: 

Background: The Commentator, Kenneth H. Ryesky, Esq., is a member of the Bars of 

New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and is an Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of 

Accounting and Information Systems, Queens College of the City University of New York, 

where he teaches Business Law courses and Taxation courses. Prior to entering into the private 

practice ofIaw, Mr. Ryesky served as an Attorney with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), 

Manhattan District. In addition to his law degree, Mr. Ryesky holds BBA and MBA degrees in 

Management, and a MLS degree. He has authored several scholarly articles and commentaries 

on taxation, including one made part of the printed record of a previous hearing before the full 

Senate Finance Committee 1 and also cited in a report by Her Majesty's Treasury's Office of Tax 

Simplification. 2 

As explained in greater detail in commentaries to previous related Hearings, the 

Commentator has a personal and sometime professional interest in genealogy. 

Contact Information: Kenneth H. Ryesky, Esq., Department of Accounting & 

Information Systems, 215 Powdermakcr Hall, Queens College CUNY, 65-30 Kissena Boulevard, 

Flushing, NY 11367. Telephone 718/997-5070; E-mail: khresq@sprintmail.com. 

Disclaimer: Notwithstanding various consultations between the Commentator and other 

interested individuals and organizations, this Commentary reflects the Commentator's personal 

views, is not written or submitted on behalf of any other person or entity, and does not 

necessarily represent the official position of any person, entity, organization or institution with 

which the Commentator is or has been associated, employed or retained. 

1 Tax: Fundamentals in Advance o{Reform, lIearing before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 

IIOth Congress, 2nd Session, April 15,2008, S. Hrg. 110-1037, pp. 113 - ISO 

<http:// linance.senate,go,,:librarYI hearingsldownlond!'~id~read52be-a 791-41 05-96da-OO [ 0264cd7 ed>. 

2 Her Majesty's Treasury, Office of Tax Simplification. Review o{Tax Relief'. Interim Report, pp 9 - 10 

(December 2010) <hltj1:!l\\\\w ,.hl1Hrcaslirv .goY.uklcllQlS review ta,,-~lic.fL inj<?ril1l.l<:[lol1Jl-'lt>. 
149 


Insert offset folio 103 here 78817.103

Kenneth H. Ryesky ID Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 2 

III. COMMENTARY ON THE ISSUES: 

A. Previous Hearings: 

The instant proceeding of 8 May 2012 is not written on a blank slate. The Social Security 

Subcommittee already held a hearing on the issue on 2 February 2012, and the Fiscal 

Responsibility & Economic Growth Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee also held 

hearings on 25 May 20 II and on 20 March 2012. 

The Commentator submitted Statements for the Record for the 2 February 2012 .1 and 20 

March 2012 4 Hearings. These previous Statements are incorporated by reference into this 

instant Statement. 

B. Of Mice and SSNs: 

The Subcommittees would do well to take to heart the Talmudic dictum to not blame the 

mouse, but to blame the hole. 5 If indeed the Social Security Death Master File (DMF) 6 is the 

"mouse," then cutting off all public access to it will not close the "mousehole." Enterprising 

fraudsters have a plethora of other available sources for Social Security Numbers (SSNs) with 

which to commit tax fraud through identity theft. 

SSNs have been inadvertently posted on website,7 SSNs are to be found in trash cans 

and dumpsters,S including those of such entities as hospitals, 9 law firms, 10 schools, II banking 

3 Posted on the internet at <http://v..:ww .fgs.org,~rpac/\Vr-C0l1tcnytlploads/20 12/02lwm-ssdmf-comments2~1lJ2clf>, also available at 2012 TNT 25·32. 

4 Posted on the intenlet at <http://ww\\,.fgs.org/rpac/\vp-contc:nt!uploads/2012i04/senfincomm-raxfraud20 120320-corrected2.pdf>, also available at 2012 TNT 56-30. 

5 TALMUD, GITTIN 45a. 

In using the mouse and mousehole metaphor, the Commentator does not in any way intend to 

insult or denigrate rodents by equating them to the depraved reprobates who, inter alia, expropriate the 

identities of deceased children in order to defraud the public treasury. 

6 The DMF is available and utilized in another incarnation known as the Social Security Death Index 

(SSOI), and is often referrcd to as such. 

See, e.g. Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

L.g. Mike Salinero and Peter Bernard, Personal Data Found in Trash Bins, TAMPA TRIBUNE, 18 

October 2009, p. 9; Lukas 1. Alpert and Matthew Nestel, WTC Identity Crisis - Ground Zero Workers' 

Personal Info Exposed, N.Y. POST, 22 Apri12008, p. 8; Cathy Zollo, An Identity Trove Intact in the 

Trash, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 23 October 2007, p. A I. 
150 


Insert offset folio 104 here 78817.104

Kenneth H. Ryesky 10 Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 3 

and finance institutions, 12 and casinos. 13 SSNs can be found amongst the images stored on the 

archival hard drives of copy machines, 14 and can, inadvertently or otherwise, be posted on 

bulletin boards in union halls. 15 

Paper records in transit can, in the event of a crash or other misadventure, be spilled, 

strewn and dispersed along the highway; 16 indeed, even the IRS's own couriers are susceptible 

to such traffic mishaps. 17 

Nor have the local law enforcement authorities always fully appreciated the significance 

of personal data in the wrong hands. " 

9 E.g. Patients' Records Tossed into Dump, RECORD [Stockton, CAl, 16 June 2011. 

10 E.g. Mary Mitchell, Lax Document Disposal Leaves Privacy in Shreds, Chicago Sun-Times, 29 July 

2010, p. 12. 

II See, e.g. Elizabeth Lazarowitz, PS Workers' Info Dumped/or Alita See, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 25 

September 2009, p. 62 .. 

12 E.g. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, PRESS RELEASE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MADIGAN SUES PAYDAY 

LOAN STORE AFTER CUSTOMERS' PERSONAL INFORMATION ENDS UP IN THE TRASH (15 Octobcr 20(0), 

available on the internet at 

<hllp:!!www.illinoisattorneygcneral.gov/prcssroom/2010_10/20 101 OI5.hunl>. 

13 See, e.g. United States v. Greer, 640 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2011, cert. denied _ U.S. 

834,181 L. Ed. 2d 540 (20ll). 

,132 S. Ct. 

14 E.g. Jennifer Saranow Schultz, Identity Theft and Copiers, N.Y. TIMES, 22 May 20l0, p. 5. 

15 See, e.g. Fisher v. Communication Workers of America, 716 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 20(1), appeal 

dism'd721 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. 2012). 

16 E.g. Will Jayson Marin, Privacy Concerns Raised about Paperwork Spilled in Marin Highway 101 

Mishap, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,S May 2011. 

17 IRS, PROBLEM ALERT: IRS REPORTS SOME TAX PAYMENTS FROM 13 STATES LOST (September 23, 

2005), available at 2005 TNT 185-56 (26 September 2005), formerly posted on Internet at 

<http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O .• id~98129.00.html> (accessed December 12, 2(05), (reporting 

that, in aftermath of traffic accident, approximately 30,000 tax payments sent to the IRS "were ejected 

into the San Francisco Bay and are not recoverable"). 

The apparent disappearance of the document from the IRS's \vchsitc is not inconsistent with the 

IRS's cultural norm which places low priority on the proper preservation of its own historical records and 

documents. See SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED POWER 38 - 47 (HarperBusiness, N.Y., (997). 

IX See, e.g. Paul Walsh, Stolen Data On 3.3 Million Loans is Found; Despite Publicity About the The/i, 

the Stolen Data Sat in a Minneapolis Police Evidence Room/or Three Weeks, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 

TRIBUNE, 17 April 2010, p. 1 B. 
151 


Insert offset folio 105 here 78817.105

Kenneth H. Ryesky 10 Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 4 

And if the inadvertent release ofSSNs poses a threat to individuals' identity security, then 

the intentional misappropriation ofSSNs by fraud-minded individuals who abuse their trusts is 

all the more nefarious. This has already occurred in numerous incidents and settings, including 

but not limited to misdeeds by employees of hospitals and health care facilities, 19 real estate 

brokers, 20 Banks and mortgage lenders, 21 debt collection agencies and skip tracers, 22 tax return 

preparers, 23 military installations, 24 and government agencies 25 (including the IRS and state 

taxation authorities 26). Enterprising identity thieves have been known to recruit individuals 

19 See, e.g. United States v. Brown, 399 Fed. Appx. 949 (5th Cir. 2010): United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 

537 (6th Cir. 2006); Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Community Health Systems, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 138968 (S.D. Fla. 2011), reconsideration denied 2012 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 54901 (S.D. Fla. 2012); 

see also FBI, New Orleans Division, Press Release, Pair Pleads Guilty to Stealing Patient Information to 

be Usedfor Personal Gain (5 January 2012), available on the Internet at 

<11 ttp://W\VW . fbi. gov/ ne\vor! eans:press-re I eases/20 1 2/pa i roo p 1eads-gu i 1 ty-to-stea 1 i n g-pati ent .. inform ationto-be-used .. ror -persona I-ga i n>. 

20 See, e.g. United United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1177 

(2000). 

21 See, e.g. FBI, Los Angeles Division, Press Release, Former Employee of Countrywide Home Loans 

Ordered to Pay $1.2 Million in Restitlltionfor Data Breach Involving Informationfbr Millions of 

Individuals (28 September 2011), available on the Internet at <http://www.fbi.~ov/losangl',l~r,,-~ 

releases/20 ll/former-employee-o f-country\\' ide-home-loans-ordered-to-pay-l.2-miliion-in-restitutionfor-dal a-breach-111\ olvi!ill.:il1lQ!Jnation-lQI:!I!iUions-o[:indiv iduals>. 

22 See, e.g. United States v. Cummings, 395 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2005). 

23 See, e.g. United States v. Peck, 62 Fed. Appx. 561 (6th Cir. 2003). 

24 See, e.g. United States v. Perkins, 287 Fed. Appx. 342 (5th Cir. La. 2008). 

25 See. e.g. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); N.Y. City Dept. of 

Investigation, Release #26-2007, A Former City Employee Arrested by DOl in Tax Scam is Sentenced to 

Three Years of Probation in Federal COllrt (23 April 2007), available on the Internet at 

<http://www.nYc:..gQ\.lhtmJ/doi/dO\vnls.aclsiPsJ.f/pr".-6..i1lI!S.ht 042120QLl2'.1.t>. 

26 See, e.g. Testimony of J. Russell George, instant Hearing, pp. 13 - 14 (8 May 2012), available at 2012 

TNT 90-56; see also New York State Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, Former State Tax 

Department Employee Sentencedfor Using Position to Steal Taxpayer Identities (25 January 2010), 

available on the internet at <http://wv\.\v.ag.ny .gov/prcss-relcase.fnew-york-state-attorney-gcneralandrc\v-m-cuomo-formcr-state-lax-dcpartmcnt-cmploycc>. 
152 


Insert offset folio 106 here 78817.106

Kenneth H. Ryesky 10 Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 5 

employed in one or more of the aforementioned industries (and/or other lines of work which give 

them access to SSNs of employees, customers or clients) to commit fraud on a wholesale basis. 27 

In his Statement submitted for the Record of the 20 March 2012 Hearing of the Senate 

Finance Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility & Economic Growth, 28 the Commentator 

discusses the distinction between data security and the more inclusive concept of data 

stewardship. 

Deficient data stewardship practices by the New York City Human Resources 

Administration (HRA) left that agency wide open for fraud. As noted by the court in sentencing 

some of the perpetuators of that fraud: 

At the most basic level, HRA did not run simple computer checks with the 

federal Social Security Administration to determine if the social security numbers 

being used by the defendants had been issued. I-IRA also failed to forward prompt 

warnings to the local centers where a problem was brought to its attention. Many 

HRA workers were so poorly supervised that they did not understand the nature 

of the warnings they did receive. Information on computers indicating that many 

families shared the same apartment prompted no action. HRA also neglected to 

use the Department of Health's database of birth certificates to vet applicants. 

While not criminally liable, those responsible for such lackadaisical 

administration must be considered key participants in this series of frauds. 29 

New York City'S HRA interacts with approximately 3 million individuals (out of New 

York City'S population of8.2 million)?' The deleterious effects caused by HRA's poor data 

stewardship practices can only be dwarfed exponentially by analogous data stewardship 

deficiencies on the part of the IRS, an agency which interacts with almost every business and 

household in America. The IRS itself must be considered a key participant in the identity thefts it 

has allowed to be perpetuated upon the public by, inter alia, its failure to correctly match and 

verify the SSNs of the purported dependents claimed by identity thieves. 

The "mousehole" must be plugged by improving the IRS's data stewardship procedures 

and processes. The IRS's unvigilant practices in failing to verify the SSNs and other personal 

27 See, e.g. United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of Florida, Press Release, Last Three of 

Twelve Defendants Sentenced in Massive Bank Fraud and Identity Theft Ring (30 September 2011), 

available on the interne! at <htJp://W\\ w.jll~tjce.goV'itlsao!i1s!Pt~cssRclcase~/ll 093Q-04.hlml>. 

28 Posted on the internet at <http://ww\v.fgs.org/rpac/wp-contelll/uplCladsi20 12/04/senlincolTIm-taxfraud20120320-correclcd2.pdl>, also available al2012 TNT 56-30. 

29 United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 

3D See N.Y.C. Human Resources Administration I Dept. of Social Services, About HRAIDSS, available 

on the Internet at <http://,,·./ww,nyc.gov/html/hra/html/aboutiaboutJ1ra_dss,shtml>. 
153 


Insert offset folio 107 here 78817.107

Kenneth H. Ryesky ID Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 6 

data need to be targeted; deep-freezing the DMF will not stop identity theft tax fraud practices 

such as those recounted by the witnesses at the various Hearings. 

Of particular concern is IRS Deputy Commissioner Miller's testimony at this instant 

Hearing, wherein he states (hat the IRS is: 

[L leveraging mechanisms to stop the growing trend of It'audulent tax returns 

being filed under deceased taxpayers' identities. First, we have coded accounts of 

decedent taxpayers whose SSNs were previously misused by identity thieves to 

prevent future abuse. Second, we are identifying returns of recently deceased 

taxpayers to determine if it is the taxpayer's final return, and then marking accounts 

of deceased taxpayers who have no future filing requirement. Of this season's filings, 

91,000 returns have been stopped for this review. Third, we are working with the 

Social Security Administration in order to more timely utilize the information SSA 

makes available to us. And we are working with SSA on a potential legislative 

change to the practice of routine release of the Death Master File. 31 

Conspicuous by its absence is any reference to flagging the SSNs of deceased dependents 

o/taxpayers. 32 Flagging the SSNs of taxpayers without also flagging the SSNs of decedents 

who might be the taxpayers' spouses or dependents would certainly not have prevented identity 

theft fraud such as that described by Mr. Agin at the 2 February 2012 Hearing 33 and by Mr. 

McClung at the 25 May 2011 Hearing 34 (and also referenced by Ms. Olson at this instant 

Hearing,35 and indeed, by Chairman Johnson in his Opening Remarks to this Hearing 36). Surely 

the IRS has been aware of the practice since at least 2004! 3 J 

31 Testimony of Steven T. Miller, instant Hearing, p. 4 (8 May 2012). available at 2012 TNT 90-57. 

32 This includes deceased children under the age of one year who would not have been claimed as 

dependents on their parents' prior tax returns. 

33 Statement of Jonathan Eric Agin, Esq., Hearing on the Accuracy and Uses of the Social Security 

Administration's Death Master File, House Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social 

Security (2 February 2012). 

<http:lhvaysandmcHns.housc.govIUp]oq.d_cdFi Ics/t\gin_ Tcstimony202ss. pd [>. 

34 Statement of Terry D. McClung, Jr., Hearing on the Spread of Tax Fraud by Identity Theft: A Threat 

to Taxpayers, A Drain on the Public Treasury, United States Senate Committee on Finance, 

Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic Growth (25 May 2011). 

<http://finance.senate.go\/ imo/media/doc/T estimony%20of'l;'20T erry %20McCl ung.pd C>. 

35 Testimony of Nina E. Olson, instant Hearing, p. 7 (8 May 2012), aFailable at 2012 TNT 90-58. 

36 Chairman Sam Johnson, Opening Remarks, instant Hearing (8 May 2012). 

37 See, e.g. United States Attorney's Office, Press Release, 31 March 2004, available on the internet at 

<http://\\\VV\' Juslice.gov/tax i usaopress,i2004ltxci\ 04PS\?dore.himl>. 
154 


Insert offset folio 108 here 78817.108

Kenneth H. Ryesky ID Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 7 

In light of the IRS's prior known dysfunctions in tracking and processing the SSNs of 

individuals associated with taxpayers (as distinct from the taxpayer herself/himself),38 Mr. 

Miller's statements can provide but sparse comfort to Messrs. McClung and Agin and their 

families, and to those apparently numerous families similarly situated. The IRS needs to 

establish the connection between the deceased dependent individual and the taxpayer who can 

rightfully claim the deceased individual as a dependent. And if indeed the IRS is in fact pursuing 

such measures but Mr. Miller's testimony did not clearly convey that fact, then Mr. Miller needs 

to clarify this to the Subcommittees and to the American public. 

"Credible studies indicate that dates of birth are not the sin qua non of identity theft. The 

most common form of identity theft arises from credit card theft or check fraud, and the least 

common form arises from stolen social security numbers or other personal information." 

[emphasis supplied]. 39 If misappropriated SSNs are the least common form of identity theft, 

then why is it that such identity thefts are so disproportionately common in connection with tax 

fraud upon the IRS? 

Do not blame the DMF, but look to the IRS's deficient data stewardship practices. Do 

not blame the mouse, but blame the hole! 

C. The Supply and Demand of SSNs for Tax Fraud Purposes: 

The proposals to block public access to the DMF are not at all encouraging when viewed 

through the prism of the economic supply and demand principles. SSNs are valuable 

commodities for which there is a demand. 40 Prison inmates have sold their own SSNs, 41 and 

indeed, deceased infilllts' parents have been known to sell their own departed children's SSNs for 

38 See, e.R. United States. v. Nielsen, I F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827 (1998); 

Wallin v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Shafer, 1996 U.S. Dist. 

LEX1S 56165 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Grimland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993-367; In re Washington, 172 

B.R. 415, 418 - 419 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994). 

39 Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney Gcneral, 354 S.W.3d 336, 355 - 356 (Tcx. 2010) 

(citing Herb Weisbaum, Identity Theft Problem: The Facts Behind the Fear, MSNBC (Oct. 21, 2010, 

7:42 AM) < http://\nvvv'.msnbc.111_sn.cQm/id/397633 86/ns/b~ISil1ess··conS_U!11el __ I1Cws/>. 

40 In addition to commanding a monetary price, SSNs can be stolen and/or bartered. See, e.g. Fay ton v. 

Goord, 17 A.D.3d 753, 792 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App.Diy., 3d Dep't 2005). 

41 See. e.g N.Y. State Dept. of Taxation & Finance, News Release, Seven Charged For Preparing False 

Tax Returns (22 March 20 II), available on the Internet at 

<hUp:l/w\V\\ .tax.n)' .go\'/pn:ss/rel/20 I !/swecppreparers03221 l.htm>. 
155 


Insert offset folio 109 here 78817.109

Kenneth H. Ryesky 10 Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 8 

cash 42 (though, given the dependency exemption to the personal Income Tax, 43 parents most 

likely to consummate such a sale have a significant likelihood of being illegal aliens or other 

nonparticipants in the voluntary compliancc with the income tax laws). 

If the DMF were no longer accessible, the many of the fraudsters who depend upon it as a 

supply source for SSNs would look to other sources, including those previously mentioned in 

this Commentary, and would be quite willing to pay a higher price for them as a component of 

the cost of doing business. This would mean, for example, that the errant employees who 

misappropriate their employers' databases would be operating in a market in which their 

nefarious services might command a higher price than in an environment such as the one which 

recently prevailed, where the DMF is freely accessible. 

While some embargoes and restrictions on the DMF may well be appropriate, the 

potentially corruptive effects of the resulting supply and demand curves upon the business and 

commercial environment ought not be ignored. One must also take into account recent 

healthcare legislation which serves to increase the demand for healthcare, add additional 

bureaucracy to facilitate healthcare and its financing, and thereby create more data and databases 

which would be subject to expropriation by unscrupulous employees. 

D. Moving towards Solutions: 

America has gotten itself into a situation in which an individual's SSN is so key to his or 

her daily activities and existence in society that the misuse of a SSN wreaks havoc in a broad 

spectrum of life. That the data security standards legislated for health care information 44 were 

never applied to many ifnot most realms outside the healthcare field only complicates the 

situation. Therefore, protections and safeguards need to be in place in order to prevent identity 

theft, and to limit the damages caused when identity theft does occur. The IRS must do its part 

in its own house in such regard, and, as reflected in Ranking Member Lewis's remarks, 45 will 

need the cooperation and assistance of other branches and departments of the government in 

order to do so. 

42 See. e.g. FBI, Jacksonville Division, Press Release, "Duval County Man Pleads Guilty to Federal 

Charges of Aggravated Identity Theft and False Representation of a Social Security Number" (22 

February 20 I I), available on the Internet at <http://www.lbi.gov/Jacksollville/pressreleases/20 11/ja022211.htln>. 

43 T.R.C. §§ 151 _ 153. 

44 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Pub. L. 104-191, Title II. 

45 Ranking Member John Lewis, Opening Statement, instant Hearing (8 May 2012), available at 2012 

TNT 90-40. 
156 


Insert offset folio 110 here 78817.110

Kenneth H. Ryesky ID Theft & Tax Fraud: 2012 Page 9 

Notwithstanding the differing (and often diametrically opposite) viewpoints of various 

constituencies, two ma((ers are now indisputable: 

(1) There are no simple or ideal solutions; and 

(2) Doing nothing is not an option for the Congress. 

There is no perfect solution, and any solutions concocted will inevitably displease one or 

lllore constituencies and cause cOlnplications in other areas. 

The Commentator has no reason to question the integrity or goodwill of any of the 

witnesses at the instant Hearing or at any of the abovcmcntioncd relatcd prcvious hearings; if 

anything, such attributes havc been wcll provcn and cstablished. Nor docs the Commentator 

have any quarrel with the qualifications or propriety of the line-up of witnesses; the constricting 

limitations inherent in the scope and diversity of the invited witness line-ups are easily remedied 

by the Subcommittees and their staffs inviting public submission of comments and according 

such comments serious regard. 

Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the Hearings might collectively function as a 

lynch mob against the public's (including the genealogical community's) interest in accessing the 

data in the DMF. There is concern that the targeting of the DMF is, perhaps, a convenient 

exercise in blame assignment so as to avoid the vexing issues inherent in crafting real solutions. 

As detailed above, the IRS's lax data stewardship practices facilitate the use of the information in 

the DMF to defraud the public fisc, and closing down the DMF to the public will not stop such 

depredations. 

Ranking Member Becerra's Opening Statement states that "the question of the Death 

Master File -- the DMF -- also requires striking the right balance." 46 Mr. Black's testimony 

similarly speaks of "striking a balance between transparency that helps prevent fraud and 

protecting individuals from identity theft." 47 Striking a fair and appropriate balance needs to be 

the guiding principle in addressing the systemic problem. 

Ms. Olson's dual-sided approach in (1) embargoing the release of info in thc DMF for a 

period; and (2) delaying the sending of refund checks to taxpayers has much merit. Though, as 

acknowledged by Ms. Olson, her approach is not without downside, it can significantly stanch 

the raid on the public treasury, increase the likelihood of detection and prosecution, reduce the 

instances of legal and emotional distress inflicted upon the families of deceased identity theft 

victims, and boost the public confidence so critical to America's system of voluntary tax 

compliance. 

46 Ranking Member Xavier Becerra, Opening Statement, instant Hearing (8 May 2012), available at 

2012 TNT 90-37. 

47 Testimony of David F. Black, instant Hearing, p. 4 (8 May 2012), available at 2012 TNT 90-59. 
157 

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NGS 


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NATIONAL GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY 

3108 Columbia Pike, Suite 300 

Arlington, VA 22204-4304 

703- 525-0050 800- 473-0060 

Fax 703-525-0052 

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS 

AND MEANS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON OVERSIGHT AND SOCIAL SECURITY, MAY 8, 2012, 

ON IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FILED BY THE 

NATIONAL GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY 

I. INTRODUCTION 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittees on Oversight 

and Social Security held a Hearing on 8 May 2012 on Identity Theft and Tax Fraud. Public 

comments were solicited. We appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement on behalf of 

the National Genealogical Society. 

II. BACKGROUND ON THE NATIONAL GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY AND CONTACT 

INFORMATION: 

The National Genealogical Society (NGS) is a non-profit Virginia corporation, founded in 1903 

and has approximately 9,100 individual members and 600 organizational subscribers which 

include regional, state, and local societies. Although our membership includes many 

professional genealogists, most of our members are people actively researching their own 

families. All officers and directors serve as volunteers and receive no compensation for 

performing their duties. 

The mission of the National Genealogical Society is to serve and grow the genealogical 

community by providing education and training, fostering increased quality and standards, and 

promoting access to and preservation of genealogical records. 

The genealogical community works together through The Records Preservation and Access 

Committee (RPAC), a joint committee which today includes The National Genealogical Society 

(NGS), the Federation of Genealogical Societies (FGS), and the International Association of 

Jewish Genealogical Societies (IAJGS) as voting members. The Association of Professional 

Genealogists (APG), the Board for Certification of Genealogists (BCG), and the American 

Society of Genealogists (ASG) also serve as participating members. RPAC also includes 

participation from a few of the commercial providers of genealogical information. RPAC meets 

monthly to advise the genealogical community on ensuring proper access to vital records, and 

on supporting strong records preservation policies and practices. 

Contact information: Janet A. Alpert, National Genealogical Society, 3108 Columbia Pike, Suite 

300, Arlington, Virginia, 22204-4304, telephone 703-525-0050, fax 703-525-0052, and email 

janalpert@aoI.com. Janet A. Alpert is a member of the National Genealogical Society board of 

directors, immediate past president, and served two terms as president from 1 October 2006 

through 30 September 2010. She previously served one term as secretary from 2004 through 

2006. Ms. Alpert has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science from the University of 

California, Santa Barbara, California, and a Masters in Business Administration from the 

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University of Connecticut. She retired in 2004 from a thirty-five year career in the title insurance 

industry, and now resides in Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. Ms. Alpert is an amateur 

genealogist who has been researching her family for over thirty years. 

III. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 

The Social Security Administration's Death Master File (DMF) is a publicly available resource of 

great value to both family history researchers and professional genealogists. Genealogists use 

a commercial version of the product called the Social Security Death Index (SSDI). The SSDI 

has been available to the public since the Consent Judgment, Perholtz v. Ross, No. Civ. 78-

2385, Dist. D. C. (April 3, 1980). 

Genealogy is different than the other social sciences where researchers draw their conclusions 

from a broad overview of the available records. Genealogists study specific individuals-their 

ancestors. Therefore if a genealogist does not have access to the records about the ancestor 

they are researching, their work may come to an abrupt halt. 

I am writing on behalf of the National Genealogical Society, its members, and organizational 

subscribers about why family history researchers and professional genealogists need access to 

the Social Security Death Index (SSDI). 

1. Many genealogists begin researching their family because there is a part of their family 

they never knew. The estrangement may have occurred because of adoption, divorce, 

abandonment, death, or other reasons. Regardless of the cause, learning about an 

unknown branch of the family helps the healing process. The SSDI has been an 

essential tool for genealogists looking for relatives who were born in the 19th and 20th 

centuries and is one of the few nationwide resources to connect their living memory to 

the historical set of records that allow people to begin their genealogical research. 

From the earliest settlements in America, we have been people on the move, generally 

migrating west in search of cheaper land and better opportunities. Since Vital Records 

are kept by state, without the SSDI, no national index will be available to determine 

where people might have moved. Information contained in the SSDI includes the state 

where the social security number was initially issued and the social security number, 

which helps genealogists determine if this is the actual person they are researching. 

After finding the person in the SSDI, the researcher often writes to the Social Security 

Administration, OEO FOIA Workgroup, PO Box 33022, Baltimore, Maryland 21290-3022 

for a copy of the original Social Security application form, called the SS-5. The SS-5 

contains valuable information for family history researchers including full name at birth 

including maiden name, date and place of birth, current address, and full name of father 

and mother. The SS-5 is necessary if you are researching someone with a common 

name, to make sure you identify the correct parents. The researcher pays a fee of $27 

for a copy of the SS-5, and a fee of $29.00 if we do not have the Social Security number. 

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2. Another use of the SSDI is to find the date of death and death location of the person you 

are researching so you can look for an obituary. Many recent obituaries are available 

online, but many older obituaries are on microfilm and obtained by writing the local 

library for a copy. Librarians cannot do an extensive search, but can usually find an 

obituary if they have the death date. An obituary normally identifies living and deceased 

relatives, the married names of daughters, and the current cities of residence which is 

essential information. 

3. A third use of the SSDI is to find siblings and cousins when a family carries a disease 

which can be inherited. In these instances time is of the essence. The first step is to find 

the aunts or uncles, or great aunts or uncles in the SSDI, and then follow the procedure 

in (III. 2.) above to locate an obituary. Finding and notifying distant cousins can mean the 

difference between early detection and treatment versus possible death. 

Each year since 2004, the Surgeon General (see http://www.surgeongeneral.gov) has 

declared Thanksgiving to be "National Family History Day." When families are together 

over the holidays or at other gatherings, the Surgeon General encourages families to 

discuss and write down the health problems that appear to run in their family and to 

share the information with their family doctor. The Health and Human Services website 

http://www.hhs.gov/familyhistory/ provides a "My Family Health Portrait" tool for families 

to record their health history information. 

Diseases residing in estranged branches of the family as described in paragraph 111.1. 

above are sometimes the silent killers. Parents of adopted children are given the health 

history of the biological parents. However, since the biological parents are often under 

the age of thirty-years old, sometimes there are few health risks disclosed. If you could 

ask those same parents about their health history fifty years later, after their parents 

have died, the answer would be more complete. Therefore it is important for people who 

are adopted to first identify and then reach out to their biological parents and siblings 

after they reach adulthood. 

4. Professional genealogists need access to the SSDI to continue their livelihood. You can 

learn more about the Association of Professional Genealogists (APG) which has over 

2,000 members in the United States at http://www.apgen.org/aboutiindex.html. In 

addition to helping clients discover their family history, many professional genealogists 

have important specialties. 

a. Some professional genealogists work in the field of forensic genealogy. Working 

with the military they help find the families of servicemen lost in previous military 

conflicts to assist in the repatriation of the remains. 

b. Others work with county coroners to identify the relatives of unclaimed persons. 

c. Some genealogy clients include attorneys who need to find missing heirs to settle 

estate cases. 

d. Genealogists who are researching a genetically inherited disease in their family 

where time is of the essence in locating extended family members why who may 

have inherited a gene and need to be tested and treated as quickly as possible. 

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e. Other genealogists specialize in finding the living biological parents or siblings of 

someone who was adopted. 

IV. SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE TO REDUCE TAX FRAUD FROM IDENTITY THEFT 

Genealogists are also opposed to identity theft and support efforts to stop it. We support many 

of the recommendations made at the hearing by J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector for Tax 

Administration. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has recently initiated a number of screening 

procedures to prevent tax fraud and more can be achieved with implementation of the following: 

1. Legislation is needed to provide the IRS with broader access to the National 

Directory of New Hires wage information which is explained on page 4 of Mr. 

George's testimony. 

2. The IRS has been hamstrung by budget cuts and subsequent reductions of staff. 

The House of Representatives needs to provide the I RS with more funds to screen 

and verify approximately 1.5 million income tax returns which do not have third-party 

information to support the reported income. On page 5 of his testimony, Mr. George 

estimates an additional $31.8 million for such screening and verifying could help 

reduce the estimated $5.2 billion annual loss to the Federal Government from tax 

fraud. 

3. The IRS needs to adopt common industry practices for authentication such as 

security challenge questions as proposed by Mr. George on page 6 of his testimony. 

4. Treasury, IRS, and the banking industry need to develop procedures so direct 

deposit income tax refunds are made only to accounts in the tax payer's name as 

described by Mr. George on pages 6-8 of his testimony. 

5. The National Taxpayer Advocate's report for 2011 specifically highlights the benefits 

of the IRS Issued Identity Protection PINs and suggests that taxpayers should be 

allowed to turn off their ability to file tax returns electronically. Tax fraud committed 

on deceased individuals can be prevented if an executor has the ability to turn off 

electronic filing. 

6. The SSNs of parents should be required when filing a tax return for any minor. If the 

minor dies, the IRS could have a procedure to flag any filings without the parents' 

social security numbers, again preventing attempts at fraud. 

V. TAX FRAUD REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION 

The hearing on 8 May 2012 revealed many causes of tax fraud which require a more 

comprehensive solution than closing public access to the Death Master File (DMF). The Death 

Master File is a major deterrent to fraud which is used by many industries including small 

business owners, financial institutions, and life insurance companies. Why risk even greater 

chance of fraud by changing a system that works for the purposes for which it was designed. 

Why create additional administrative procedures that burden small businesses and local 

merchants by requiring them to qualify and sign up for access to the Death Master File. 

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