Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics 

having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of 

special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of 

conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

VENEZUELA AS AN EXPORTER OF

4TH GENERATION WARFARE INSTABILITY

Max G. Manwaring

December 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be 

downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of 

this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies 

last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications 

may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission 

and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-556-9
iii

FOREWORD

The Latinobarometric Polls underline the fact that 

even though most Latin American countries’ Gross 

Domestic Products (GDP) have been improving since 

2001, there are deep flaws in the political-economicsocial systems throughout the region. Popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic and 

political inequalities, general distrust of most national 

institutions, and a specific lack of confidence in the 

police, the legislatures, and the political parties. There 

are also rising popular expectations regarding currently nonexistent rights. Consequently, Latin America, as it did in 1960-90, appears to be a revolutionary, 

insurgent, criminal, and populist dream. Thus, the 

Americas appear to be particularly susceptible to state 

(and their proxies) and nonstate actors that promise 

the security, stability, and prosperity national governments have generally failed to provide. Accordingly, 

Venezuela and President Hugo Chavez have become 

exporters of asymmetric, unconventional, and undeclared war. If left ignored and unchecked, these wars 

compel radical, unwanted, and epochal political-economic-social system change. 

Even though prudent governments must prepare 

for high-risk, low-probability, conventional interstate 

war, there is a high probability that the President of 

the United States, the Congress, and leaders of other 

powers around the world will continue to require 

civil-military participation in unconventional conflicts 

well into the future. Additionally, the spillover effects 

of intranational and transnational nonstate actor destabilization efforts and the resultant internal violence 

place demands on the global community—if not to 

solve the underlying problems or control the violence, 
iv

then at least to harbor the living victims. This does not 

mean that the United States must be involved all over 

the world all the time. It does mean, however, that the 

United States must rethink and renew its concept of security. In much the same way that George F. Kennan’s 

containment theory of engagement was conceived in 

1947, philosophical underpinnings must be devised 

for a new theory of engagement to deal with more 

diverse threats from unpredictable directions, and by 

more diverse state and nonstate actors modeled on 

Chavez’s concept of 4th Generation War between the 

weak and the strong. The logic of this situation demonstrates that the conscious choices that individual 

nation-states and the international community make 

about how to deal with this type of unconventional 

threat will define the processes of national, regional, 

and global security and well-being for now and the 

future. It is past time for the United States to begin 

the process of developing an acceptable response to 

Chavez’s “new” security reality.

This monograph comes at a time when there are 

well over 100 ongoing small, unconventional, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars in which hegemonic 

states and their proxies and violent nonstate actors 

are helping their own organizations or political patrons bring about radical change and acquire putative 

power. Accordingly, the author of this monograph, 

Dr. Max Manwaring, examines a cogent case that illustrates how would-be revolutionaries all around the 

world might seek to realize their dreams. They would 

include populists and neo-populists; the New Left, 

New Socialists, and 21st Century Socialists; criminal 

nonstate actors, agitators, gangs, and popular militias; 

and other “modern mercenaries.” The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part 
v

of its continuing effort to inform the security debate, 

and to help strategic leaders better understand the realities of modern asymmetric war.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. 

Army War College (USAWC), has held the General 

Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the USAWC, 

and is a retired U.S. Army colonel. He has served in 

various civilian and military positions, including the 

U.S. Southern Command, the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Dickinson College, and Memphis University. 

Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles, chapters, and books dealing with Latin 

American security affairs, political-military affairs, 

and insurgency and counterinsurgency. His most recent book is The Complexity of Modern Irregular War,

Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, forthcoming. His most recent article is “Security, Stability, 

and Sovereignty Challenges of Politicized Gangs and 

Insurgents in the Americas,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, December 2011, pp. 860-889. His most recent SSI 

monograph is The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary 

Security Dilemma, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2011. Dr. 

Manwaring is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in political science 

from the University of Illinois.

ix

SUMMARY

Almost no one seems to understand the MarxistLeninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political 

thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general 

vision of his “Bolivarian Revolution.” The abbreviated 

concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. 

dominated) political and economic systems in the 

Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the 

Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion 

of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely 

separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any 

bourgeois opposition, Chavez’s revolutionary vision 

will not be achieved through a conventional military 

war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will only be created by a gradual, systematic, 

compulsory application of agitation and propaganda 

(i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion 

in favor of a “revolution” and against the bourgeois 

system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that 

the North American (U.S.) “Empire” and its bourgeois 

political friends in Latin America are not doing what 

is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian 

philosophy and leadership will. 

In these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public opinion that is the main target 

of the revolutionary effort. Chavez’s vision comes 

at a time when, despite general economic progress, 

there are deep flaws in the democratic political systems throughout the Western Hemisphere. Relative 
x

popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities; distrust; and lack of confidence 

in the police, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along 

with a popular consciousness of currently nonexistent 

rights. Latin America, now—as in the 1960s, 1970s, 

and 1980s—appears to be a revolutionary’s dream. 

Thus, it appears that Hugo Chavez is prepared to help 

friends, partners, and allies to destabilize, to facilitate 

the processes of state failure, and to “destroy in order 

to build” in true revolutionary fashion. Moreover, according to Chavez, it does not matter whether or not he 

will be able to continue to direct that effort. He states 

straightforwardly that “. . . independent of my personal destiny, this revolution . . . has gotten its start, and 

nothing and no one can stop it.” Consequently, this 

monograph will address four cogent issues operating 

within the context of President Chavez’s grand strategic political-psychological destabilization effort. They 

are: 1) Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Vision; 2) Key Components of the Chavez Strategic-Level Asymmetric 

(4th Generation War) War Model; 3) The Paramilitary 

Operational Model for Compelling Radical Change 

in the Western Hemisphere; and, 4) Implications and 

Recommendations.

The kind of warfare outlined implicitly and explicitly above represents a triple threat to the authority, 

legitimacy, and stability of targeted governments: 1) it 

undermines the ability to perform legitimizing security and well-being functions; 2) it replaces traditional 

nation-state authority (sovereignty) with alternative 

governance; and, 3) it conducts low-cost actions calculated to move a state into the state failure process. The 

logic of this situation demonstrates that the conscious 

choices that individual nation-states and the interna-
xi

tional community make about how to deal with these 

kinds of threats will define the processes of national, regional, and global security and well-being now and for 

the future. Accordingly, we must adapt our approach 

to security and organize our institutions to address 

the concept of contemporary asymmetric, unconventional, undeclared intrastate war (i.e., 4th Generation 

War). We must also adapt our approach to the overwhelming reality that just as the world has evolved 

from an industrial society to an information-based 

society, so has warfare. The reality of this evolution 

demonstrates the need for a new paradigm of conflict 

based on the fact that information—not firepower—is 

the currency upon which war is now conducted. The 

new primary center of gravity is public opinion and 

political leadership. The “new” instruments of power 

are intelligence, public diplomacy, media, time, and 

flexibility. The one thing that remains the same is that 

one level or another of compulsion still defines war. 

Hugo Chavez and his selected leadership understand that contemporary asymmetric war is not a kind 

of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more 

comfortable conventional military attrition warfare 

paradigms. It is a great deal more. This takes us back 

to where we began. Chavez and his supporters understand the importance of dreams about the survival 

and a better life for much of any given population. 

These are the bases of power—all else is illusion. This 

may not be a traditional national security problem for 

the United States and other targeted countries, and it 

may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional 

conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality 

of compulsion.

1

VENEZUELA AS AN EXPORTER OF

4TH GENERATION WARFARE INSTABILITY

The past several years have marked the beginning 

of a different security era than that to which we are 

accustomed. Accordingly, this era requires a new orientation. Whether we like it or not, whether we want 

it or not, and whether we are prepared for it or not, the 

United States and the West are engaged in a number 

of unconventional, undeclared, and undefined asymmetric wars. If left ignored and unchecked, these wars 

compel radical, unwanted, and epochal political-economic-social change. Even if that compulsion is generally indirect, ambiguous, conducted over long periods 

of time, and not perceived to be as lethal as land conventional maneuver war, that does not alter the cruel 

reality of the compulsion.1

Since his election as the President of Venezuela in 

1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to 

encourage his Venezuelan, Latin American, Russian, 

and Iranian partners to support an undeclared asymmetric war paradigm designed to put an end to U.S. 

political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere and to transform the whole of Latin America 

into a single Bolivarian (Socialist) state. Chavez’s 

model centers on a three-front asymmetric war that 

is: 1) psychological-political; 2) uses combinations of 

asymmetric ways and means to achieve its ends; and, 

3) is deliberately protracted. In addition to Asymmetric War, Chavez calls this type of conflict 4th Generation War (4GW).2

 Whether or not Chavez can deliver on his threefront 21st-century transition program is really not all 

that important. This is not because this is the rhetoric 

of a “nut case,” a “clown,” or even a “dead man” im-
2

mersed in “political theater.” This is, importantly, the 

rhetoric of an astute warrior who understands asymmetric war and who is performing the traditional and 

universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and operational plan for a successful revolutionary conflict. Most importantly, Hugo Chavez’s 

Bolivarian dream has stirred the imaginations of 

many Latin American and other interested observers 

around the world. He has provided a seductive Leninist blueprint for a utopian future. Anyone can take 

it, adapt it for his own use, and use it anywhere in 

the world to bring about radical political, economic, 

and social change. Thus, it appears that Chavez is 

prepared to help friends, partners, and allies to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of state failure, and 

to “destroy in order to build” in true revolutionary 

fashion.3

 Moreover, according to Chavez, it does not 

matter whether or not he will be able to continue to 

direct that effort. He states straightforwardly that 

“. . . independent of my personal destiny, this revolution . . . has gotten its start, and nothing and no one 

can stop it.”4

To help strategic leaders—and anyone else who 

has the responsibility for dealing with, analyzing, 

planning, implementing, and/or reporting on contemporary security threats--understand this phenomenon, this monograph will address four cogent issues 

relevant to the context of President Chavez’s grand 

strategic political-psychological destabilization effort. 

They are: 1) Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Vision; 2) Key 

Components of the Chavez Strategic-Level Asymmetric Warfare Model; 3) The Paramilitary Operational 

Model for Compelling Radical Change in the Western 

Hemisphere; and, 4) Implications and Recommendations. Lastly, this would be a good point from which 
3

military and civilian leaders might start thinking about 

all the asymmetric wars that the United States and its 

allies face now and will continue to face in the future.

HUGO CHAVEZ’S BOLIVARIAN VISION AND 

HOW TO ACHIEVE IT

Almost no one seems to understand the MarxistLeninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political 

thought. It becomes evident, however, in his general 

vision of the Bolivarian Revolution. The abbreviated 

concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S.-

dominated) political and economic systems in the 

Americas, to take power, and to create a socialistic, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout 

the Americas.5

 Despite the fact that the possible use of 

military force is never completely separated from the 

Leninist concept of destroying bourgeois opposition, 

Chavez’s revolutionary vision will not be achieved 

through a conventional military war of maneuver and 

attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to 

Vladimir Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will be 

created only by a gradual and systematic application 

of agitation and propaganda. That long-term effort is 

aimed at exporting instability and generating public 

opinion in favor of the “revolution” and against the 

bourgeois system.6 Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the 

concept that the North American “Empire” and its 

bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not 

doing what is right for the people and that the socialist 

Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will.

In these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public opinion that is the main target of 
4

the revolutionary effort. Chavez’s vision comes at a 

time when, despite general economic progress, there 

are deep flaws in the democratic political systems 

throughout the Western Hemisphere. The relative 

popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities, distrust and lack of confidence 

in the police, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along 

with a popular consciousness of nonexistent rights.7

The apparent waning of U.S. power has opened the 

possibility of a new global geopolitical order. At the 

same time, the worldwide financial crisis and the rise 

of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 

have shaken the conventional wisdom that capitalism 

and liberal democracy are superior to the alternatives.8

Latin America now—as in the 1960s and 1970s—appears to be a revolutionary’s dream. 

Five Enabling Concepts.

Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian strategic-level dream 

depends on five enabling concepts. It begins with the 

premise that traditional post-World War II socialist 

and Marxist-Leninist political-economic models made 

mistakes, but the theory remains valid. The idea is 

that representative democracy and the U.S.-dominated capitalism of the new global era are total failures. 

Representative democracy and capitalism serve only 

elites—not the common people. These failures must 

now be replaced by “participatory democracy,” “direct democracy,” or what some detractors have called 

“radical” or “neo-populism.” In these terms, Chavez 

is: 1) re-elaborating a Rousseauan concept of “direct” 

or “totalitarian”democracy; and, 2) promoting a socialist economic system as two parts of a five-part over-
5

arching political-economic model for Latin America.9

The other three parts of the model include: 3) a new 

security scheme for Venezuala; 4) social programs to 

strengthen “direct democracy” and its internal power 

base; and, 5) maximum communications support to 

the regime. That overall system of power is intended to ensure internal peace and societal harmony in 

Venezuela that will—in time—provide the foundations for a Hemisphere-wide regional power bloc, and 

socioeconomic and politicalintegration. 10

Direct Democracy and the Socialist Economic System.

The current concept of Venezuelan democracy has its 

roots firmly in the French Revolution and subsequent 

perversions of the Rousseauan notion of “total” (totalitarian) democracy. In this scenario, the individual 

surrenders his rights and personal interests to the 

state in return for the enforcement of social harmony 

and the General Will. Prior to the French Revolution, 

kings ruled by “Divine Right” and were sovereign. 

With the revolution, however, sovereignty was shifted from the king to the nation-state. Thus, the state 

enjoys absolute power (de facto sovereignty)—through 

the enforcement of Rousseau’s General Will—as an essential right. 11

 The main tenets of direct democracy in contemporary Venezuela dictate that: 1) the new authority in the 

state must be a maximum leader who communicates 

directly with the people, interprets their needs, and 

emphasizes “social expenditure” to guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people; 2) elections, 

Congress, and the courts will provide formal democracy and international legitimacy (de jure sovereignty), 

but will have no real role in governance or the economy; 3) the state will control or own the major means of 

national economic production and distribution; and, 
6

4) the national and regional political-economic integration function will be performed by the supreme 

leader by means of his regional financial, material, informational, and political-military support of radical 

populist and 21st-century social movements.12

The Security Scheme. Lacking the conventional 

power to challenge the United States or most of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, President Chavez and 

his followers know that asymmetric conflict is a logical 

means of expression and self-assertion. It is a concept 

as old as war itself, a methodology of the weak against 

the strong. The primary characteristic of asymmetric 

conflict is the use of disparity between contending 

parties to gain advantage. Strategic asymmetry has 

been defined as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s 

own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, 

attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action 

and movement. It can have both psychological as well 

as physical dimensions.”13 Chavez’s concept of asymmetric war makes explicit the need to generate a mix 

of unconventional methods that authoritatively integrates a nation-state’s political, economic, social-moral, informational, and military instruments of power. 

This type of conflict is not won by seizing specific 

territory militarily or destroying specific industrial 

or nuclear capabilities. It is won by altering the political-psychological-economic-social factors that are 

most relevant in a targeted culture. But, like all others, this kind of conflict is intended to resist, oppose, 

gain control of, or overthrow an existing government 

or symbol of power—and bring about radical political change. All this requires a complete unity of effort 

by the state, using the multidimensional instruments 

of national and international (alliances and partnerships) power that it has at its disposal.14
7

Thus, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides political and institutional autonomy for the 

armed forces, under the absolute control of the President and commander in chief. President Chavez has 

also created an independent national police force, outside the traditional control of the armed forces, which 

is directly responsible to the President. At the same 

time, efforts have gone forward to establish a one 

million-person military reserve and two additional 

paramilitary organizations—the Frente Bolivariano de 

Liberacion (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms). 

The armed forces and the police perform traditional 

national defense and internal security missions within 

the context of preparing for what President Chavez 

has called a “4th Generation Asymmetric War of All 

the People.”15 The military reserve and the paramilitary (militia) organizations are charged to: 1) protect 

the country from a U.S. or Colombian invasion with 

an Iraqi-style insurgency; 2) act internally as armed, 

anti-opposition militias; and, 3) act internationally as 

armed anti-bourgeois militias.16 The institutional separation of the various security organizations ensures 

that no one security institution can control the others, 

but the centralization of those institutions under the 

control of the President ensures his absolute control 

of security and “social harmony” in Venezuela—and 

elsewhere.17

Social Programs and Communications. To strengthen 

his personal position and internal power base, President Chavez is spending large amounts of money on 

an amorphous Plan Bolivar 2000 for the building and 

renovation of schools, clinics, day nurseries, roads, and 

housing for the poor. Additionally, the President is 

developing education and literacy outreach programs, 
8

agrarian reform programs, and workers’ cooperatives. 

At the same time, he has established MERCAL, a state 

company that provides subsidized foodstuffs to the 

poor. Chavez has also imported 16,000 Cuban doctors 

to help take care of the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclass. Clearly, these social programs offer 

tangible benefits to the mass of voting Venezuelans 

who were generally ignored or neglected by previous 

governments.18

The intent of the communications and informational efforts is to generate strong and favorable public opinion. Thus, Bolivarianismo requires maximum 

media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop mass consensus, and 

generate electoral successes. Ample evidence exists 

that Chavez-controlled media are using emotional 

arguments to gain attention, to exploit real and imagined fears of the population, to create outside enemies 

as scapegoats for internal failures, and to inculcate 

the notion that opposition to the regime equates to 

betrayal of the country. President Chavez’s personal 

involvement in the communications effort is also clear 

and strong. Statements, speeches, and interviews are 

being broadcast throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean 

Basin, and large parts of Central and South America every day on the state-owned Television del Sur. 

Additionally, Iranian TV (Hispan TV) is now broadcasting in Spanish 24 hours a day throughout all of 

Latin America.19

Conclusions. 

All these programs together provide the President of Venezuela—whoever he might be—with the 

architecture to generate a unity of effort among the 
9

various political-psychological-socioeconomic-informational-military instruments of state power. That 

unifying structure, rather than traditional governmental hierarchy, allows the President a vastly more 

effective and efficient means through which to pursue 

his political-strategic Bolivarian objectives. At a minimum, Hugo Chavez has created the elements that can 

make Venezuela a regional power. He or his successor can easily export direct democracy, oil money, 

socialist propaganda, and military assets to friendly 

governments, radical groups, and insurgents all over 

the Hemisphere. In these terms, Chavez is also developing the capability to destabilize and force a radical 

restructuring of specific bourgeois political-economic 

systems over large parts of the Americas.20 But, instability is only a symptom, not the threat. Instability is 

the starting point from which to understand the second-, third-, and fourth-level effects that shape the 

Latin American security environment now and for the 

future. Instability also defines the ultimate security 

threat for now and the future—that is, the threat that 

no one likes to talk about—the export of economic and 

political instability to foment the state failure process.

KEY COMPONENTS OF THE CHAVEZ 

STRATEGIC-LEVEL ASYMMETRIC 

WARFARE MODEL

This type of conflict is primarily psychologicalpolitical and aimed at human terrain rather than geographical territory. As a consequence, the new primary 

center of gravity (the hub of all power and movement) 

is not military. It is public opinion and leadership.21

This kind of conflict is based on perceptions, beliefs, 

expectations, and dreams. The key components of 
10

Chavez’s strategic-level asymmetric warfare model 

can be understood within the context of a deliberate 

three-front grand strategic conflict that: 1) is primarily 

psychological-political; 2) uses combinations of military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, and direct 

and indirect ways and means to accomplish its ends; 

and, 3) is deliberately protracted (temporal).22

Psychological-Political War.

The term “propaganda” connotes the dissemination or promotion of ideas, doctrine, and practices to 

further one’s cause or damage the opposition’s cause. 

Most commonly, the term is used pejoratively to imply deception or distortion of the truth. Lenin and 

Chavez use the term in both senses. Because it is as 

important to protect one’s own centers of gravity as 

it is to attack the enemy’s, the intent is to indirectly 

and directly alter the political-psychological factors 

that are most relevant to one’s own and targeted cultures. That is, to spread “a proper understanding of 

the present social and economic system . . . [and] an 

understanding of the historical task of international 

Social-Democracy” (21st-Century Socialism).23 Inseparably connected with propaganda is agitation. Agitation means that small groups of individuals foment 

and take part in the various coercive manifestations 

of the revolution and “all the conflicts between workers and the capitalists.”24 Moreover, there is no issue 

in the political field that does not serve as a subject 

for political agitation.” As a consequence, according 

to Lenin, small propaganda-agitator organizations 

(“agi-props”) must be organized, trained, and utilized 

to support the political-psychological struggle and to 

act as the “midwives” of new social orders.25 Together, 
11

propaganda and agitation will generate political-psychological-economic-social-military support for the 

whole revolutionary organization and for its immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives.26

The primary and specific effort, however, that ultimately breaks up and defeats an adversary’s politicaleconomic-social system and compels radical change 

is the multidimensional erosion of people’s morale 

and political will.27 The better one protagonist is at 

that persuasive-coercive (agi-prop) effort, the more 

effective that protagonist will be relative to the opposition.28 Accordingly, as noted above, the center of 

gravity is an adversary’s public opinion and political 

decisionmaking leadership.29 The basic reality of this 

new center of gravity is that information and the media (propaganda), not military firepower or technology, is the primary currency upon which “modern 

war amongst the people” is run.30 This political-psychological effort also defines victory or defeat. In these 

terms, public opinion and political leadership provide 

the architecture from which to develop a viable ends, 

ways, and means strategy that can win a prolonged 

multidimensional political-psychological war. 

Combinations. 

The two Chinese colonels who authored Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, are 

adamant. They unequivocally argue that regardless of 

whether a war took place 2,500 years ago or last year, 

the data indicate that all victories or failures display 

one common denominator—the winner is the national 

power, international alliance (power bloc), or nonstate 

political actor that is best organized and has implemented a combination of multidimensional efforts.31
12

The purpose of combinations is to organize a system 

of offensive and defensive power that is a great force 

multiplier and facilitator within the global security 

arena. This system gives new and greater meaning 

to the idea of a nation-state or other political actor 

using all available instruments of power to protect, 

maintain, and achieve perceived political and security 

interests.32

The dominating characteristic of a war of this kind 

is political-military, economic-commercial, or culturalmoral. Within the context of these combinations, there 

is a difference between the dominant sphere and the 

whole, although a dynamic relationship exists between 

a dominant type of general war and the supporting elements that make up the whole. As an example, Qiao 

and Wang state that conventional military war must 

be strongly supported by media (propaganda/information/moral) warfare and a combination of other 

types of war that might include but are not limited 

to psychological war, financial war, trade war, cyber 

war, diplomatic war, proxy war, narco-criminal war, 

and guerrilla war.33 More specific examples of national 

power combinations include the following:

• Conventional military war/cyber war/media 

war (e.g., Georgia, 2008);

• Surrogate or proxy war/intelligence war/

media war (e.g., Lebanon, 2006);

• Narco-criminal war/financial war/psychological/media war (e.g., Mexico, to date);

• Guerrilla war/psychological-media war/narco-criminal war (e.g., Colombia and Peru, to 

date); and,

• Diplomatic war/media war/conventional war 

(e.g., Algeria, 1954-62).
13

Any one of the above combinations can be combined with others to form new methods and combinations of conflict. There are no means that cannot 

be combined with others. The only limitation is the 

imagination of the planner and decisionmaker. As a 

consequence, politically effective contemporary warfare requires the services of civilian warriors—as 

well as professional soldiers and policemen—who 

can conduct persuasion-coercion-propaganda war, 

insurgency war, media war, financial war, trade war, 

psychological war, network (virus) war, cyber war, 

chemical-biological-radiological war, etc. Professional 

soldiers no longer have a monopoly on power. Accordingly, civilian warriors must be included in the 

strategic architecture for contemporary warfare.34

Time as an Instrument of Statecraft. 

Hugo Chavez and his disciples understand that 

war is no longer limited to using military violence 

to compel desired radical political-economic-social 

change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear 

on a given situation must be used. A 4GW leader will 

tailor his actions to his adversaries’ vulnerabilities, 

and to their psychological precepts.35 In these terms, 

both Lenin and Mao taught that time (the long-term) 

becomes one of the main instruments of contemporary 

power. Prolonged war includes no place for compromise or other options short of achieving the ultimate 

political objective (radical political change). Lenin 

was straightforward: “Concessions are a new kind of 

war.”36 Thus, time is one more instrument of statecraft.

Moreover, because the “new” asymmetric conflict is generally political-psychological, protagonists 

must understand that it takes time to change peoples’ 
14

minds and behavior and prepare them for phased, 

progressive moves toward short-and mid-term as 

well as long-term objectives. As examples, Mao and 

his Chinese communists fought for 28 years (1921-49); 

the Vietnamese communists fought for 30 years (1945-

75); the Nicaraguan Sandinistas fought for 18 years 

(1961-79); and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso organization has claimed that it is prepared to fight 75 years 

(1962-?) to achieve its revolutionary objective.37 As a 

consequence, in 2005, Chavez claimed that he was 

planning for a protracted 40-year struggle in which 

he or other Bolivarian leadership must: 1) propagate 

Latin American nationalism; 2) educate, organize, and 

prepare several thousand professionals for organizational duties, combat, and governance who are prepared to lead the masses through a revolution and into 

the proverbial halls of power; and, 3) create a popular 

front not just of a few hundred “true believers,” but a 

large number of Christians, Socialists, trade unionists, 

intellectuals, students, peasants, the “debourgeoised” 

middle classes, and friendly nations that will “march 

together to defeat sepoyan (lackey-like) militarism 

and U.S. imperialism.”38 Contrary to the teachings of 

some impatient revolutionaries who still adhere to the 

teachings of Che Guevara, no shortcut will work.39

Conclusions.

Hugo Chavez and his selected leadership understand that contemporary asymmetric war is not a 

kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the 

more comfortable conventional military attrition and 

maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more. 

Again, such war may be military or nonmilitary, lethal 

or nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state or 
15

a coalition of states’ (alliance) array of instruments of 

power. As such, it may be a zero-sum game in which 

only one winner emerges; or, in the worst-case scenario, no winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the 

“battlefield” is extended to everyone, everything, and 

everywhere—over time.40

Some important things in contemporary war have 

changed, but some have stayed the same. In 2005, we 

summarized the concept of modern asymmetric warfare by taking a page from a Harry Potter adventure. 

We called it “Wizard’s Chess.” As a metaphorical 

example, we further characterized Hugo Chavez as 

a “Master” of this deadly game. The analogy is still 

instructive and sobering:

In that game, protagonists move pieces silently and 

subtly all over the game board. Under the players’ studied direction, each piece represents a different type of 

direct and indirect power and might simultaneously 

conduct its lethal and non-lethal attacks from differing directions. Each piece shows no mercy against its 

foe and is prepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow 

another piece the opportunity to destroy or control an 

opponent—or to checkmate the king. Over the longterm, however, this game is not a test of expertise in 

creating instability, conducting violence, or achieving 

some sort of moral satisfaction. Ultimately, it is an exercise in survival. A player’s failure in Wizard’s Chess 

is death, and is not an option.41

The reality of this kind of “game” is grand strategic and epochal in scale, and ultimately witnesses 

the transition from one dominant political form to 

another. Politicized militias, hegemonic nonstate entities, and surrogates for traditional nation-states will 

likely move from war with some rules and conventions to new warmaking entities and into completely 
16

unrestricted warfare. Failing and failed states will 

possibly evolve into new and undesirable state forms 

such as rogue states, criminal states, draconian states 

(military dictatorships), neo-populist states (civilian 

dictatorships), or new “People’s Republics.” Failing 

or failed states may also dissolve and become parts of 

other states, or may be configured into entirely new 

entities.42 In short, revolution is not an event; it is a 

process. 

This takes us back to where we began. Hugo 

Chavez understands the sophistication and complexity of combinations of national instruments of power 

and alliances, and war as a whole. He also understands 

the value of facilitating the processes of state failure 

to achieve his objectives of establishing 21st-Century 

Socialism and Latin American grandeza (greatness). 

Chavez and his supporters understand the importance of dreams about survival and a better life for 

much of any given population. These are the bases of 

power—all else is illusion.

THE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONAL MODEL

Paramilitary operations to enable the three-front 

asymmetric war focus on: 1) six phases of varying 

levels of agi-prop activities; 2) the destabilization of 

the bourgeois enemy until his resolve is gone and the 

targeted country has reached failing or failed-state 

status; and, 3) generating a force multiplier by building alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. Abraham 

Guillen, one of Chavez’s intellectual mentors, argued 

that these “political-[psychological]-moral factors are 

more decisive for victory than heavy armament and 

ironclad units.”43
17

Six Phases that Elaborate “New” Roles of the 

Bolivarian Popular Militias. 

General Gustavo Reyes Rangel Briceno articulated 

the six operational military/paramilitary phases of the 

program for the “liberation” of Latin America at his 

Change of Office Speech as Minister of Defense for the 

National Reserve and National Mobilization to take 

the higher post of Minister of [National] Defense. This 

speech, made on July 18, 2007, provided a 4GW asymmetric model to assist thinking about, planning, and 

implementing the Bolivarian dream. Accordingly, the 

general’s speech might well have been written by Lenin, Abraham Guillen, or a younger Leninist mentor, 

Jorge Verstrynge.44 Another aspect of the speech was 

quite clear. It was NOT written by a military officer 

steeped in the tradition of 3rd Generation Maneuver 

and Attrition War. It was NOT written by someone 

who was preparing his students or staff for an impossible war on the European or North American plains 

against hypothetical red-colored enemies who look, 

strangely, like Russian Combined Arms Armies. It 

was NOT written by someone whose purpose was to 

prepare his students or staff to fight the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. General Briceno’s speech, with its 

“new” phases, reflected “new” battlefields, “new” enemies, “new” forms of attack and defense, and “new” 

threats that are relevant to modern asymmetric wars 

of national resistance (strategic defense). Lastly, General Briceno’s Change of Office Speech was written by 

an officer who was NOT looking for anything tangible. 

He was seeking the realization of a dream—the liberation of Latin America from the U.S. political-economic 

hegemon—a Marxian reward of history.45
18

Phase One: Destabilization of targeted societies 

through the exploitation of a combination of four types 

of war working within the context of the general war 

of resistance: 1) temporal (prolonged) war; 2) creating 

chaos and instability (governance war); 3) economic 

(finance and trade) war; and, 4) media (information/

propaganda) war. 

Phase Two: Create a popular (political) front out 

of the debourgeoised middle classes and other likeminded individuals to compete with and weaken 

a targeted government. The intent is to politically 

and psychologically support the four wars noted in 

Phase One.

Phase Three: Foment regional conflicts. This would 

involve covert, gradual, and preparatory politicalpsychological-military activities (“seeding operations”) in developing and nurturing popular support 

for the war of resistance. The fomentation of regional 

conflicts over time would also involve the establishment and defense of “liberated zones” (quasi-states) 

within the state.

Phase Four: Plan and implement overt and direct 

intimidation activities, including popular actions 

(such as demonstrations, strikes, civic violence, personal violence, maiming, and murder) against feudal, 

capitalistic, militaristic opponents in particular and 

against yanqui imperialism in general. The intent is to 

debilitate targeted states and weaken bourgeois military command and control facilities.

Phase Five: Increase covert and overt politicalpsychological-economic-military actions directed at 

developing local popular militias to fight in their own 

zones, provincial or district militias to fight in their 

particular areas, and a larger military organization to 

fight in all parts of the targeted country with the cooperation of local and district militias.
19

Phase Six: Directly, but gradually, confront a demoralized enemy military force and bring about its 

desired collapse—or militarily invade a failing or 

failed state. The objective in either case would be to 

impose (compel) appropriate 21st-century socialist 

governance.46

Additionally, until the last moment in the third 

and decisive phase of the Latin American liberation 

process—when a targeted government is about to collapse—every action is preparatory work and not expected to provoke great concern from the enemy or its 

bourgeois allies. Only at the point of enemy collapse 

and the radical imposition of New Socialist governance will the people begin to enjoy the benefits of 

love, happiness, peace, and well-being.47

If this dream were to come true, Hugo Chavez or a 

successor would witness the metamorphosis of 15 or 

20 Latin American republics into one great American 

nation. Experience demonstrates, however, that most 

political dreams very seldom come true (think of the 

40+ years of Socialism in Eastern Europe, 1945-89). Ultimately, the international community must pay the 

direct and indirect social, economic, and political costs 

of state failure. As a consequence, the current threat 

environment in the Western Hemisphere is not a traditional security problem, but it is no less dangerous.48

Operationalizing a “New” Paramilitary Mission—

Facilitating the Processes of State Failure.

Like revolution, state failure is a process, not an 

outcome. Contemporary 4GW asymmetric destabilization threats to personal and collective security 

and well-being are not necessarily direct attacks on 

a government. They are, however, proven means for 
20

weakening governing regimes. These indirect threats 

reflect a logical progression from the problems of institutional and state weaknesses to the partial collapse 

of the state, and, finally, to state failure. The process 

is brought on by poor, irresponsible, and/or insensitive governance and leads to one other fundamental 

reason states fail. That is, state failure can be a process 

exacerbated either by nonstate groups or nation-states 

(e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal organizations 

and their enforcer gangs, and/or civil or military or 

paramilitary organizations operating directly on behalf of a nation-state or indirectly as a proxy (surrogate). The general intent is to depose an established 

government or exercise illicit control over a targeted 

country. Destabilizing actions perpetrated by nonstate groups (including proxies) or state authorities 

weaken government and its institutions, and regimes 

become progressively less capable of performing the 

fundamental security and well-being tasks of responsible governance.49

More specifically, the state failure process tends to 

move from personal violence to increased collective 

violence and social disorder to kidnappings, bank 

robberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption, criminal anarchy, and internal and external population displacements. In turn, the momentum of this process of 

violence tends to evolve into more widespread social 

violence, serious degradation of the economy, and 

diminished governmental capability to provide personal and collective security and guarantee the rule 

of law to all citizens. Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, an irregular political actor or nonstate group can quietly and subtly 

co-opt politicians, bureaucrats, and security person-
21

nel to gain political control of a given piece of the national territory. The individual or nonstate group that 

takes control of a series of networked pieces of such 

“ungoverned territory” can then become a dominant 

political actor (e.g., warlord) and control a quasi-state 

within a state.50

Somewhere near the end of the destabilization 

process, the state will be able to control less and less 

of its national territory and fewer and fewer of the 

people in it. The diminishment of responsible governance and citizen security generates greater poverty, 

violence, and instability—and a downward spiral in 

terms of socioeconomic development and well-being. 

It is a zero-sum game in which state, nonstate, or individual actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal 

organizations, corrupt public officials, and hegemonic 

states) are the winners, and the rest of a targeted society are losers. Unless and until a society perceives that 

its government deals with issues of personal security, 

well-being, and socioeconomic development fairly and 

effectively, the potential for internal or external forces 

to destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable. 

Regimes that ignore this lesson often find themselves 

in a “crisis of governance.” They face increasing social 

violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, and 

overthrow. This process has been known to lead to 

the violent imposition of a radical political-economicsocial restructuring of the state and its governance 

in accordance with the values—good, bad, or nonexistent—of the best organized and most-disciplined 

group left standing.
22

Another “New” Force Multiplier—Alliances, 

Partnerships, and Coalitions. 

These are agreements among states or nonstate actors to: 1) coordinate behavior in the event of political-economic-social-military emergencies; 2) increase 

empirical power in the international security arena; 3) 

counterbalance threats posed by potential aggressors 

in the anarchical global security environment; and, 

4) support coercive diplomacy. Thus, alliances, partnerships, and coalitions have operated in the security 

arena for thousands of years, and really are not “new” 

instruments of statecraft. Their primary rule and purpose, forever, has been and is to protect, maintain, 

and/or enhance one’s own interests.51

These tenets define a part of Hugo Chavez’s “New 

Strategic Map for the Exportation of the Bolivarian 

Revolution.” That part of his “map” is entitled “Stimulating the New Multipolar System.” The rationale for 

this is that “the United States will continue to increase 

its interventionist, aggressive, genocidal, and savage policies regarding the Americas. Thus, we must 

prepare ourselves to deal with and overcome these 

hegemonic issues. We must work hard, very hard, to 

prevail over the United States and extend the revolution to the rest of the Latin American region.”52 Accordingly, Chavez has brought together an unlikely 

assortment of state and nonstate actors, and criminalterrorist organizations for these purposes. They are: 

1) the Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuala, which 

includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, 

possibly, Argentina; 2) Iran and Russia; and, 3) at the 

very least, this alliance offers material and political 

support to the insurgent and drug trafficking Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Ira-
23

nian surrogate and terrorist Hezbollah operations in 

the Western Hemisphere, and other violent nonstate 

actors such as African and Mexican Transnational 

Criminal Organizations (TCOs). Thus, this group of 

partners (allies) comprises a hybrid of state, nonstate, 

and criminal-terrorist franchises that appear to be 

expanding as this monograph is being written. The one 

thing this diverse group of parties has in common is 

a hatred for the West in general and the United States 

in particular.53

Alliance Enablers for the Exportation of Instability.

The operationalization of Chavez’s “New Strategic 

Map for the Exportation of the Bolivarian Revolution” 

appears to be based on three mutually supporting alliance activities: 1) Combating International Isolation; 

2) Increasing Economic Activism; and, 3) Increasing 

Paramilitary and Conventional Military Presence in 

the Hemisphere. Chavez and his disciples expect these 

4GW alliance activities to lead to the destabilization of 

their bourgeois enemies. The “new” Socialist reasoning is quite realistic. “Adopting alliances is vital for 

the integration of Latin America because it is impossible for the United States [or anyone else] to use its 

vast conventional military force against them.”54

Combating International Isolation. Alliances provide 

Venezuela with powerful friends both outside and inside the Western Hemisphere. The major allies have 

been noted above. Unofficial extra-hemispheric actors, in addition to Iran and Russia, would probably 

include China, Chinese Triads, African gangs and cartels, the Spanish Basque separatist organization (ETA), 

the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and various Islamic 

groups sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
24

States to include al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.55 A 

new element in the current configuration of forces in 

Latin America is that criminalizing states frequently 

use TCOs (cartels) as a form of statecraft. They bring 

these elements into areas of weak or no state sovereignty, and the TCOs and their enforcer gangs provide alternative (criminal) governance systems (quasistates). Strategically, this alters the structure of global 

order and makes a lie of de facto or de jure sovereignty. 

This threat is operationalized by the illicit movement 

of goods (e.g., drugs, money, weapons systems, and 

human beings), and the billions of dollars that these 

illicit activities generate. The influence and corruption 

that this money buys is rotting fragile (failing) states.56

Such a relationship between state and nonstate actors provides numerous short- to mid-term benefits to 

both parties. As one example, the FARC (Colombia’s 

major insurgent and drug-trafficking organization) 

gains access to Venezuelan territory and routes for 

exporting cocaine to Africa, Europe, and the United 

States. The FARC uses the same territory and routes 

to import weapons systems, communications equipment, training, and money. In this way, the Venezuelan government exerts indirect military pressure and 

related destabilization efforts on its most dangerous 

neighbor—Colombia. Additionally, the Venezuelan 

government enhances its international revolutionary credentials in the radical axis composed of leftist 

populists and Islamic fundamentalists. It is also able 

to profit from this illicit trade at a time when oil revenues are relatively low and the national budget is 

under significant stress. Given the enormous revenue 

stream that illicit Venezuelan-Colombian TCO trade 

represents, it is not likely that this alliance will go 

away soon.57
25

Clearly, the Venezuelan state and its criminalinsurgent-terrorist partners will continue to leverage 

their relationships to mutual benefit. But a cautionary note is required here. Over the long term, TCOs 

and criminal-insurgent networks have proven to be 

resilient and highly adaptable. This gives these kinds 

of actors an asymmetric advantage over partner state 

actors, which are inherently more bureaucratic, slow 

moving, and less adaptable than nonstate groups. At 

the same time, governments have also consistently 

underestimated the capabilities of more efficient 

nonhierarchical organizations. Those organizational 

advantages can generate a possible national security 

and sovereignty threat to the Venezuelan state in that 

national security and sovereignty are being impinged 

every day, and the illicit commercial motives of TCOs 

and other nonstate actors have been known to become 

a subtle and ominous political agenda. In short, the 

common putative objective of these hybrid horizontally organized nonstate groups is to control people, 

territory, and government to ensure their own freedom of movement and action within a given national 

territory (i.e., effective sovereignty).58

Increasing Economic Activity. At base, increasing 

economic activity is a continuation from the more fundamental alliance activity we call Combating International Isolation. Economic cooperation, as a result, has 

emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between 

Iran and the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and serves 

at least three clear purposes. 

 First, it allows Iran to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by the United States, the European 

Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) through 

access to the Venezuelan financial system. As a consequence, Iran’s partnership with Venezuela effectively 
26

provides an ancillary avenue from which it can access 

the international financial system, despite Western 

pressures. Second, this financial access facilitates the 

funding and support of radical populist and socialist parties and violent nonstate actors throughout the 

Hemisphere. Third, Iran has increased its economic 

investment in several areas (e.g., industry, mining, 

transportation, energy, and technical assistance). 

Many of Iran’s contracts with various countries in Latin America have not yet come to fruition. The exception, however, is Venezuela, where substantial Iranian 

investments have been made. As a matter of fact, Iranian economic investment in Venezuela has expanded 

from virtually nothing in 2007 to a not insignificant 

$40 billion today.59

Even though much of the promised Iranian economic investment in the Hemisphere has not materialized, that country is in the process of creating an 

extensive regional network of diplomatic, economic, 

industrial, and commercial activities. Thus, probably 

the most dangerous threat to the United States from 

Venezuela results from its facilitation and encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere 

by Iran and its principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah has established a major regional presence 

throughout the Americas and is involved in a range of 

illicit activities, from drug trafficking, to money laundering, to training Venezuelan and other paramilitary 

forces.60

In this connection, coercive state and violent nonstate actors are serious impediments to growth, and 

major instruments for corrupting, distorting, and 

damaging stability in Latin America. The TCO-enforcer gang-insurgent-state nexus represents a triple 

threat to the authority and sovereignty of a host gov-
27

ernment as well as an enemy regime. First, murder, 

kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and impunity 

undermine the ability of the state to perform its legitimizing security and public service functions. Second, 

by coercive imposition of power over bureaucrats and 

elected officials of the state, TCOs and their allies compromise the exercise of legitimate state authority and 

real democracy. Third, and closely related, by taking 

control of portions of a given national territory and 

performing at least some of the tasks of effective sovereign governance, the TCO phenomenon transforms 

itself de facto into states within the state, and criminal 

leaders govern as they wish. Thus, the hybrid TCOstate phenomenon contributes significantly to the erosion of democracy and to the evolutionary state failure 

process.61

Military-Paramilitary Presence in the Latin American Region. Military-Paramilitary presence builds on 

the previous two closely related elements of Hugo 

Chavez’s “New Strategic Map for the Exportation of 

the Bolivarian Revolution” These actions facilitate serious regional instability through significant military 

equipment and arms purchases and training. They 

support extremists and various “liberation movements” in the Hemisphere and “generate economic 

production, influence, and angst.”62 In a world where 

public opinion is crucial, economic production, influence, and angst keep bourgeois enemies off balance 

and are great facilitators of long-term success (i.e., destabilization).

Military, paramilitary, and intelligence information is always among the murkiest areas of concern 

in global security politics. But even if complete and 

accurate information is not available, these issues cannot be prudently ignored. After all, governments do 
28

not invest long-term resources in pursuit of ephemeral or insubstantial aims. In that connection, Venezuela has submitted two reports to the UN Register of 

Conventional Arms (UNROCA), one in 1997 and the 

other in 2002. Both were nil. At the same time, even 

though Venezuela ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Transparency Convention in 2005, 

it has never submitted a report. This was because of 

military secrecy laws; the 1999 Constitution gives 

the President of the Republic the right to classify and 

control disclosure of matters directly relating to the 

planning and execution of operations concerning national security. Additionally, in 2009, the National Assembly approved a law to maintain the confidentiality 

of military agreements between Venezuela and other 

states.63 As a consequence, Venezuela has provided no 

information on weapons transfers from Russia either 

to UNROCA or the OAS. However, in 2012, Russia reported to the UNROCA that it had delivered 24 combat aircraft, 44 attack helicopters, and 2,272 missiles 

and missile launchers to Venezuela.64

Jane’s Intelligence Weekly and Jane’s International Defense Review report a good deal more. They state that 

Venezuela and Russia have signed agreements for 

arms and training over the period from 2004 to 2010 

that amount to $11 billion. During that time, Venezuela received 24 Su-30MKV multirole fighters, 92 T-72 

tanks, 57 transport and assault Mi-17/26/-35 helicopters, 25 CATIC K-8WB lead-in fighter trainers, four 

Damen Stan Lander 5612 transport ships, and two Stan 

Patrol 2602 coastal patrol craft. Other programs, coming to $4 billion, provide additional patrol vessels, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and BMP-3 infantry 

fighting vehicles. Additionally, Russia is supplying 24 

BM-21 122 mm and 12 Smerch 300 mm multiple rocket 
29

launchers, 48 Sanyi 120 mm self-propelled mortars, 48 

MSTA-S 152 mm self-propelled howitzers, and BukM2E mobile air defense systems. Lastly, more arms, 

long-range mobile radars, air defense systems, and 

electronic warfare centers are expected to be delivered 

in 2012.65

Accordingly, it is being reported that Russia is 

trying to regain the influential position it enjoyed in 

the 1970s and early-1980s in Latin America. At the 

same time, Russia is repaying Venezuela for its diplomatic recognition of the independence of Georgia’s 

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.66

Whether or not these assertions can be proved is not 

as important as the fact that the reports of Venezuelan acquisition of these arms and weapons systems 

are destabilizing the military balance and causing a 

great deal of “angst” in Colombia, Guyana, and a few 

other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 

regions.67

Russia, however, is not the only Venezuelan ally 

that maintains a military or paramilitary presence 

in Latin America. In addition to supporting Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and the Colombian FARC, the 

Iranian Quds force (the elite paramilitary unit of the 

Revolutionary Guards) has also placed operatives and 

trainers in embassies, charities, and Islamic religious 

and cultural institutions in the Hemisphere. The presumed intent is to enhance socioeconomic ties with the 

already well-established Shia Diaspora in the region, 

to collect intelligence and support extremists, and to 

help destabilize unfriendly regimes. Quds is also reportedly conducting training and support operations 

in Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela.68 The organization 

that has reportedly received the most financial, arms, 

and training support from Quds is the Colombian 
30

FARC and its political arm—the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB). In addition to its politicalpsychological missions, the CCB maintains what some 

have called a “Foreign Legion.”69 Not surprisingly, 

the mission of the CCB Foreign Legion is to carry out 

paramilitary operations to support extremists and 

nascent and long-standing insurgent groups and to 

help destabilize bourgeois regimes. Consequently, the 

CCB is reported to be active in, at the least, Argentina, 

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 

Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and 

Paraguay.70

Conclusions.

Some argue that all these agi-prop (agitation-propaganda) efforts aimed at the destabilization of bourgeois enemies and the organization of alliance activities are merely political theater. They are absolutely 

right. What they do not understand, however, is that 

4th Generation Asymmetric Warfare is directed at influencing an unconventional center of gravity—that 

is, public opinion and leadership. As a consequence, 

it is important to understand that Hugo Chavez’s 

Bolivarian Revolution is indeed political theater. It is 

intended to create political-economic-social disequilibrium, the weakening of an enemy state, and radical change over the long term. Accordingly, transition 

is grand strategic and epochal in scale. It ultimately 

witnesses change from the supposed misery of liberal 

democracy and capitalism to the promised love and 

harmony of “New Socialism.”71
31

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In The Sling and the Stone, Colonel T. X. Hammes, 

USMC (Ret.), argues that “Just as the world has evolved 

from an industrial society to an information-based society, so has warfare.”72 4GW does not attempt to win 

wars by defeating an enemy’s military forces. Both 

the epic, decisive Napoleonic battle (2nd Generation 

War), and the wide-ranging, high-tech, high-speed 

maneuver campaign (3rd Generation War—“Shock 

and Awe”) are irrelevant. 4GW is an evolved form 

of insurgency rooted in the fundamental precept that 

superior political will, when properly employed, can 

defeat greater military and economic power. It uses 

all available networks—political, economic, social, informational, and military—to convince the enemy decisionmakers that their goals are either unachievable 

or too costly to justify the perceived benefits. Using its 

networks, 4GW directly attacks the minds of enemy 

populations, policymakers, and decisionmakers to destroy their political will.73

These are the principal characteristics of what 

President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has called “4th 

Generation War,” “Guerra de todo el pueblo (“War 

of all the People,” “Peoples’ War,” or “War Among 

Peoples”). He asserts that this type of conflict has virtually unlimited possibilities for a “Super Insurgency” 

intended to bring about fundamental political-economic-social change in the Western Hemisphere.74 The 

urgency and importance of the 4GW threat have generated four related themes. First, several countries in 

Latin America and the Caribbean are paradigms of the 

failing state and have enormous implications for the 

stability, development, democracy, prosperity, and 

peace of the entire Western Hemisphere. Second, the 
32

transnational drug and arms trafficking, paramilitary, 

insurgent, and gang organizations in Mexico, Central 

and South America, and the Caribbean Basin are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human 

horror, and internal instability that, if left unchecked 

at the strategic level, can ultimately threaten the collapse of various states and undermine the security 

and sovereignty of neighbors. Third, poverty, social 

exclusion, environmental degradation, and politicaleconomic-social expectations—and the conflicts generated by these indirect and implicit threats to stability 

and human well-being—lead to further degeneration 

of citizen security. Fourth, these threats also constitute 

a serious challenge of U.S. national security, well-being, and position in the global community. 

The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations described above is straightforward. 

The contemporary, chaotic global strategic environment reflects a general lack of legitimate governance 

and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the 

world. Instability thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy are 

the general consequences of unreformed political, social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant misguided or poor governance. Ultimately, this 

instability, and the human, nonstate, and state destabilizers who exploit it, lead to a final downward spiral 

into failing and failed-state status. Again, it must be 

remembered that, as important as instability might 

be, it is only a symptom—not the threat itself. Again, 

the ultimate threat is the issue nobody wants to deal 

with—state failure.
33

The novelist John le Carré succinctly defines a failing or failed state in stark terms:

I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, 

the qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—

electoral suffrage . . . protection of life and property . 

. . justice, health and education for all . . . the maintenance of a sound administrative structure—and roads, 

transport, drains, etcetera—and—what else is there?—

ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails 

to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then one 

has to say that the contract between state and citizen 

begins to look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of 

the above, then it’s a failed state . . . an unstate . . . an 

ex-state.”75

The logic of the state failure situation demonstrates 

that the conscious choices that the international community and individual nation-states make about how 

to deal with this type of unconventional threat will 

define the processes of national, regional, and global 

security and well-being for now and into the future. 

This cautionary tale reminds us that protracted asymmetric war (4GW) is the only kind of conflict that a 

modern power has ever lost. It is surprising and 

dismaying that the world’s only superpower does 

not have a unified long-term strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational architecture to 

deal with Chavez’s 21st-Century Socialism and its associated asymmetric war.76 It would appear that this 

epochal transitional threat is being dismissed as too 

difficult, too ambiguous, and too far into the future 

to deal with. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that it 

is time to take the empirical evidence seriously and 

make substantive political-economic, social, informational, and military changes to deal effectively with 

the threat that one dare not speak its name.77
34

The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms 

with the pressing need to shift from a singular operational-tactical military-police approach to a multidimensional and multinational paradigm. That, in turn, 

requires a strategic-level conceptual framework and 

a supporting organizational structure to promulgate 

unified civil-military planning and the implementation of transnational responses to transnational threats. 

These efforts must be organized as a network rather 

than in the traditional vertical, top-down bureaucracies of most governments. Accomplishing such efforts 

will also require fundamental changes in how government leaders and personnel at all levels are employed, 

trained, developed, and promoted. Additionally, and 

most importantly, this interagency and multilateral 

process must exert its collective influence for the entire duration of a conflict—from the initial planning to 

the final achievement (or compulsion) of a sustainable 

peace. Remember, it is the last man standing—regardless of how badly beaten he might be—who is the winner in this type of conflict.

Recommendations.

Long lists of recommendations and measures of effectiveness will be irrelevant if the strategic-level conceptual and architectural foundational requirements 

are not implemented first. One of Carl von Clausewitz’s translators, Michael Howard, warned us years 

ago, “If [the political-psychological struggle] is not 

conducted with skill and based on realistic analysis 

. . . no amount of operational expertise, logistical backup, or technology could possibly help.”78 Nevertheless, 

there are a few high-level recommendations the U.S. 

Army could propose, and some more intermediatelevel recommendations it could implement.
35

• High-Level Recommendations:

— The Army could recommend a permanent 

interagency end-state planning capability. 

This capability should include transnational coordination and cooperation.

— The Army could recommend an updated 

executive-legislative understanding of the 

purpose of U.S. security and guidelines 

for amendments to the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961, in accordance with the new 

requirements of the nonkinetic tools of 

statecraft.

— The Army could help plan and implement 

indirect and direct actions against belligerent and politicized nonstate actors using 

Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians 

with appropriate political-cultural literacy 

and language skills.

— At the least, the Army could develop a design for using conventional armed forces in 

nontraditional roles mandated by the new 

sociology of deliberate conflict outlined 

above in Chavez’s Asymmetric Warfare 

Model, and the Paramilitary Operational 

Model for Compelling Radical Change. 

The Army could also develop a design for 

conflict based on the Chavez/Venezuelan 

model that is also being inadvertently used 

by belligerent and politicized non-state 

actors.79 Such a redefinition of mission, organization, and training would be useful 

in informing military reform debates in 

Latin America and elsewhere that still cling 

to the Westphalian model of sovereignty 

and warfare.80
36

• Intermediate-Level Recommendations for 

Leader Development and Professional Military 

Education:

— The study of the fundamental nature of 

conflict has always been the philosophical 

cornerstone for comprehending the essence 

of traditional conflict. It is no less relevant to 

unconventional war.

— Leaders at all levels must understand the 

strategic and political implications of tactical and operational-level actions. They must 

also understand the ways that military force 

can be employed to achieve political and 

psychological ends and understand and accept the ways that political considerations 

affect the use of force.

— Leaders must acquire the ability to interact 

collegially and effectively with U.S. civilian 

agencies, representatives of international 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local and global news media, 

and civilian populations.

— Leaders must understand that information 

and intelligence, and psychological and 

public diplomacy activities, are force multipliers. Professional military education and 

leader development must foster the concept 

that commanders at all levels have to take 

responsibility for collecting and managing 

human intelligence and conducting public 

diplomacy efforts for their own use. Also, 

they must understand the penalties that 

are paid when these instrument of power 

are ignored.
37

— Lastly, education and training for contemporary unconventional conflict must 

prepare military personnel to be effective 

war-fighters. Additionally, because of the 

highly charged political-psychological environment in which military personnel 

must now work, combatants must also 

display political-cultural sensitivity, considerable restraint, and strong discipline. 

Again, combatants must understand the 

price they will pay if a population should 

become alienated.81

• Lastly, the above recommendations can, inter 

alia, provide the bases for policy direction for:

— Security cooperation and building partnership capability.

— Strategic communications in terms of exchanging key messages or themes on a host 

of mutually important topics.

— Institutional and professional development 

between the U.S. Army and its international 

partners.

— Enhancing personnel exchange programs 

and political-cultural-language skills.

— Criminal-Transnational Criminal Organizations (C-TCO) training to improve professional competence of partner armies, while 

at the same time following the rule of law 

and the human rights of their citizens.82

Difficult as these recommendations may be to implement, they are far less demanding and costly in political, military, and monetary terms than the conven-
38

tional approach. The author of The Sling and the Stone

reminds us that allowing the age-old “business as 

usual” and “crisis management” approaches to work 

at cross-purposes with the reality of contemporary 

unconventional asymmetric conflict is a sure formula 

for failure in generating global stability and security.83

However, a final cautionary note is in order. The U.S. 

Army and other U.S. military forces must educate, 

organize, equip, and train to deal with an unpredictable enemy. Thus, the study of chaos, ambiguity, complexity, and flexibility must be essential elements in 

the education and development of strategic leaders. 

The most likely situation to arise in unconventional 

asymmetric conflict is that it might not be foreseen or 

planned for.84

ENDNOTES

1. President Chavez used this language in a charge to the National Armed Forces (FAN) to develop a doctrine for 4th Generation Asymmetric War. It was made before an audience gathered 

in the Military Academy Auditorium for the “1st Military Forum 

on Fourth Generation and Asymmetric War,” in Caracas, Venezuela, and was reported in El Universal, April 8, 2005.

2. In 2007, we emphasized Venezuelan President Hugo 

Chavez’s adaption of asymmetric war and summarized its consequences by taking a page from a Harry Potter adventure. See 

Max G. Manwaring, Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular 

Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 37-38. We characterized Chavez as a metaphorical “Master” of asymmetric war. In 

Harry Potter’s first adventure, he was cautioned by his friends to 

never speak the name of the cunning and evil main antagonist in 

the entire series of adventures. See J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and 

the Sorcerer’s Stone, New York: Arthur A. Levine Books, 1997, pp. 

11, 54-57.
39

3. Erik Becker Becker, “Chavez: una incision en la historia de 

Venezuela” (“Chavez: a sharp stimulation in the history of Venezuela”), Dialogo Politico, December 2003, pp. 155-174; Heinz Dieterick, “Nace la Doctrina Militar de la Revolucion Venezuelana” 

(“A Military Doctrine Emerges for the Venezuelan Revolution”), 

December 17, 2004, available from www.aporrea.org/actualidad/

a11176.html; “Special Report: Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela,” The 

Economist, May 14-20, 2005, p. 25; Steve Ellner, “Revolutionary and 

Non-Revolutionary Paths of Radical Populism: Directions of the 

Chavez Movement in Venezuela,” Science and Society, April 2005, 

pp. 160-190; Andres Benavente Urbina and Julio Alberto Cirino, 

“El populismo Chavista en Venezuela” (“Chavista populism in 

Venezuela”), in La democracia defraudada, Buenos Aires, Argentina: 

Grito Sagrado, 2005, pp. 115-139; Julio Alblert Cirino, “La Revolucion Mundial Pasa Por Hugo Chavez” (“World Revolution Will 

Go Through Hugo Chavez”), Part 1, in Panorama, April 20, 2005 

and Part 2, April 27, 2005; Manuel Cabieses, “Donde va Chavez? 

Una entrevista al president venezolano” (“Where is Chavez going? An interview with the Venezuelan president”), October 19, 

2005, available from www.alterinfos.org/article.php3?id_article=66; 

Adolfo R. Tayihardat, “La exportacion de la revolucion Bolivariana” (“The exportation of the Bolivarian revolution”), October 3, 2005, available from www.analitica.com/va/internacionalels/

opinikon/1693165.asp; Alvaro Vargas Llosa, “The Return of Latin 

America’s Left,” The New York Times, March 22, 2005; and “The 

Chavez Machine Rolls On,” The Economist, December 2, 2006, pp. 

41-42.

4. William Neuman, “Chavez Says His Cancer Shows Signs of 

Return,” The New York Times, February 22, 2012, p. A4. 

5. See Endnote 2, above. Also see Leopoldo E. Colmenares, 

“Implicancias de los Movimentos Populistas” (“Implication of 

Populist Movements”), unpublished manuscript, presented at the 

Centro de Estudios Hemisfericos de Defense, Washington, DC, 

July, 10-13, 2007.

6. Lenin said that a “new society” will only be created by 

gradual and systematic application of agitation and propaganda. 

See V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats,” in 

Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1975, p. 4. Also see Lenin, “Speech in Closing the 

Congress, April 2, 1922, p. 533.
40

7. The Economist, “The 2008 and 2010 Latinobarometro Polls,” 

November 15, 2008, pp. 46-47, and December 4, 2010, p. 51.

8. Joshua Kucera, “What is Hugo Chavez Up To?” Wilson 

Quarterly, Spring 2011, pp. 22-30.

9. Cirino, “populismo Chavista,” 2005; and “Chavez mete 

mas presion,” 2005.

10. Ibid. Also see The Economist, “Special Report: Hugo 

Chavez’s Venezuela,” May 14-20, 2005, pp. 23-24; The Economist,

“The Chavez Machine Rolls On,” December 2, 2006, pp. 41-42; The 

Economist, “Chavez Victorious,” December 9, 2006; and Ellner, 

“Revolutions,” 2005.

11. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract [1762], G. D. H. 

Cole, trans., Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952. Also 

see Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, Chicago, IL: University of 

Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 13-27, 192 .

12. Ibid.

13. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and 

U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, pp. 5-6.

14. Steven Metz, “Relearning Counterinsurgency,” a panel 

discussion at the American Enterprise Institute, January 10, 2005. 

Also see Paul E. Smith, On Political War, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989.

15. “War of All the People” is another translation of Hugo 

Chavez’s words in this context. Thus, he interchangeably uses 4th 

Generation War, Super Insurgency, People’s War, Asymmetric 

War, and War of All the People.

16. Jane’s Military and Security Assessments, “Venezuela at a 

Glance,” December 12, 2011. Also see International Crisis Group, 

“Violence and Politics in Venezuela—Militias,” Latin American 

Report No. 38, August 17, 2011, pp. 26-27. 
41

17. Reported in El Universal, January 5, 2005; El Universal, 

March 8, 2005; Europa Press, April 3, 2005, La Voz, April 3, 2005; 

El Universal, April 8, 2005; Taylherdat; and The Economist, “The 

Americas: A Caribbean Tripoli? Venezuela’s Militias,”April 9, 

2011, p. 44. Also see General Gustavo Reyes Rangel Briceno’s 

speech when he accepted the post of Ministro del Poder Popular para la Defensa (the paramilitary forces of Venezuela), July 

18, 2007. 

18. Michael Shifter, “In Search of Hugo Chavez,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006, p. 46; The Economist, “Chavez Victorious,” 

December 9, 2006; and Michael Shifter, “Hugo Chavez: A Test for 

U.S. Policy,” Washington, DC: Interamerican Dialogue, March 2007; 

and The Washington Post, “Venezuela Lets Councils Bloom,” May 

16, 2007.

19. Stephen Johnson, “South America’s Mad-TV: Hugo 

Chavez Makes Broadcasting a Battleground,” The Heritage Foundation Policy Research & Analysis, August 10, 2005, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), “New Regional Voice,” April 22, 

2005; FBIS “Expanded Telesur News Coverage Furthers Anti-US 

Line,” December 22, 2005; FBIS, “Perspective Audience,” August 

5, 2006; and FBIS, “Telesur’s Deal with Al-Jazirah,” February 27, 

2006. Also see “Iran launches Spanish TV channel,” The Guardian, 

January 31, 2012, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/

jan/31/ iran-launches-spanish-tv-channel/print.

20. Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology and Insurgency,” Small Wars 

& Insurgencies, Spring 2004, pp. 107-109.

21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret, trans. and eds., New Brunswick, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, [1832] 1976, p. 596. 

22. Ibid. Also see The Economist, “Special Report: Hugo 

Chavez’s Venezuela,” May 14-20, 2005, pp. 23-24.

23. Lenin, “Tasks of Social Democrats,” p. 4.

24. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

25. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
42

26. Ibid. Also see Lenin, “The State and Revolution,” p. 324.

27. Lenin, “On Revolutionary Violence and Terror,” p. 425.

28. Colonel T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), The Sling and the 

Stone, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006.

29. Lenin, “Socialism and War,” p. 188.

30. Smith, Utility of Force, 2007. 

31. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 

Beijing, China: PLA Arts and Literature Publishing House, 1999, 

pp. 143, 157.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 154.

34. Ibid., pp. 41, 123. Also see Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurency, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1964, p. 35.

35. See Endnote 2. 

36. Lenin, “Capitalist Discords and Concessions Policy,” pp. 

628-634.

37. Sendero Luminoso’s former leader, Abimael Guzman, made 

that particular statement in “El Discurso del Dr. Guzman” (“Dr. 

Guzman’s Speech”), Rogger Mercade U., ed., Los partidos politics 

en el Peru (Political parties in Peru), Lima, Peru: Edicones Latinoamericanos, 1985, pp. 85-90.

38. Chavez interview with Manuel Cabieses, Punta Final, October 19, 2005. Also see Abraham Guillen, Philosphy of the Urban 

Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen, Donald 

C. Hodges, ed. and trans., New York: William Morrow, 1973, pp. 

231, 249, 253, 279, 283.
43

39. Lenin, “Report on War and Peace,” pp. 545-546, 549.

40. Qiao and Wang, 1999, p. 109.

41. The idea of Wizard’s Chess is taken from J. K. Rowling, 

Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, 1997, pp. 282-284. Also see 

Max G. Manwaring, “The New Master of Wizard’s Chess: The 

Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare,” Military Review, 

September-October, 2005, pp. 40-49.

42. Robert J. Bunker, “Grand Strategic Overview: Epochal 

Change and New Realities for the United States,” Small Wars & 

Insurgencies, December 2011, pp. 728-733.

43. Guillen, “Philosophy,” pp. 233, 279.

44. President Chavez has adopted Jorge Verstrynge’s book, 

Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare. He liked the book so much that he 

had a special edition printed and distributed to the Venezuelan 

officer corps with express orders to read it, learn from it, and develop new asymmetric war doctrine. Verstrynge argues that the 

destruction of the United States will come about when its vast 

conventional military might cannot be used to combat its asymmetric enemies effectively. See Verstrynge, Peripheral Warfare and 

Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare, Madrid, Spain: El Viejo Topo, May 2005.

45. See General Briceno’s speech, dated July 18, 2007. Also see 

J. Boyer Bell, Dragonwars, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 417-418. 

46. Briceno speech, July 18, 2007.

47. Ibid.

48. Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, and Pamela T. Surko, “The State Failure Project: Early 

Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk 

Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, New York: Rowman 

& Littlefield Publishers, 1998. 
44

49. Steven D. Krasner and Carlos Pascal, “Addressing State 

Failure,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, pp. 153-155. Also 

see Chester A Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs, 

September/October 2003, pp. 32-44; and Steven D. Krasner, “An 

Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy,” Policy Review, No. 163, 

Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 2010. 

50. Krasner and Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” 2005.

51. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 

Politics: Trends and Transformation, 6th Ed., New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 1997, pp. 443-447. 

52. Taylhardat, “La Exportacion,” 2005.

53. Ilan Berman, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, 

Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, February 16, 2012; and 

Norman A. Bailey, testimony before the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives, February 2, 2012. Also see 

Douglas Farah, “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized 

States: Emerging Alliances, PRISM 2, No. 3, June 2011; and “Las 

FARC mantienan contactos con grupos armadas Bolivarianos de 

Venezuela desde 2002” (“The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have maintained contacts with Bolivarian armed 

groups in Venezuela since 2002”), El Tiempo, February 9, 2010.

54. Dieterich.

55. Farah, “Pipelines,” 2011.

56. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

57. Farah, “Pipelines,” 2011. 

58. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Drug Cartels, 

Street Gangs, and Warlords,” Nonstate Threats and Future Wars,

Robert J. Bunker, ed., London, UK: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 40-53; 

John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism, Crime, and Private Armies,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Winter 2002, pp. 239-253; and 
45

Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005.

59. Bailey and Berman, “Testimonies,” 2012.

60. Ibid.

61. John P. Sullivan, “Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third 

Generation Gangs,” Global Crime, August-November, 2006, pp. 

488-490.

62. Joshua Kucera, “What is Hugo Chavez Up To?” The Wilson 

Quarterly, Spring 2011.

63. Reported in El Universal, September 23, 2009.

64. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 

December 30, 1999, Article 325. Also see Mark Bromley and Carina Solmirano, Transparency in Military Spending and Arms Acquisitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, Stockholm, Sweden: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), January 

2012, pp. 31-32.

65. Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, The Americas, posted August 12, 

2011; and Jane’s International Defense Review, International Defense 

Digest, posted October 21, 2011.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid. Also, Author Interviews conducted in Latin America 

in July and August 2009.

68. Bailey and Berman “Testimonies,” 2012; Farah, 

“Pipelines,” 2011; Office of the Secretary of Defense, unclassified 

report on the Military Power of Iran, April 2010; and “Iran and 

Latin America: Brothers in Arms?” The Economist, January 14, 

2012, p. 36.

69. Doug Farah, Traditional Organized Crime, Criminalized 

States, and Terrorism in Latin America, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, p. 41.
46

70. Author Interviews, July and August 2009, in Bogota, Colombia; Lima, Peru; and Santiago, Chile. 

71. Briceno speech, July 18, 2007.

72. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 2006, p. i.

73. Ibid., pp. 1, 210, 246-257.

74. Chavez used this language in a charge to the National 

Armed Forces to develop a doctrine for 4GW. See Endnote 2.

75. John le Carré, The Constant Gardner, New York: Scribner, 

2001, p. 137.

76. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 2006; and “Fourth Generation Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

77. See Endnote 2.

78. Michael Howard, The Causes of War, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 109.

79. Author Interviews with Carter, Galvin, Wilhelm, and General James T. Hill, USAR (Ret.), in Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2003. Also see Bunker, 

“Grand Strategic Overview,” December, 2011.

80. Ibid. 

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, pp. i, 14-15. 

84. General Frank Kiston (UK, Ret.), Warfare as a Whole, London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1987, p. 61.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil