AFS-16-3743-E 

Exemption No. 16778 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20591 

 

In the matter of the petition of 

 

PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-7749

 

for an exemption from § 91.9(a) 

of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations 

 

GRANT OF EXEMPTION 

 By letter dated November 16, 2015, Mr. Paul A. Perkins, Jr., Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), 

P.O. Box 90808, Lafayette, Louisiana 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) on behalf of PHI for an exemption from § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate 

Sikorsky S-92A helicopters with limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing 

while carrying up to 19 passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when 

operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules (VFR), and instrument 

flight rules (IFR). 

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft 

without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft 

Flight Manual. 

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that PHI is requesting an exemption for operations conducted in 

its Sikorsky S-92A aircraft when operating between land-based and offshore facilities 

or when operating between two offshore facilities. 
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The petitioner states its S-92As were certificated under part 29, amendment 47 

relating to safety and ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety 

today. Those S-92As are equipped with aircraft flotation gear and are certificated for 

ditching in and up to sea state 6. Additionally, when operating over water, each S92A occupant is provided, and wears, personal flotation equipment. Also, the S-92As 

are equipped with life rafts that can be deployed from inside or outside the aircraft. 

PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in 

accordance with Joint Aviation Requirement-OPS-3 which already permits similar 

operations with limited exposure to engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it 

has operated its S-92As under operations specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. 

The petitioner requests that this exemption extend to its operations “conducted outside 

the United States.” 

PHI states that it has operated under OpSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 

which authorized operations similar to International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) Performance Class 2 with limited exposure. The petitioner contends that 

during this period, no S-92A accidents have been caused by power loss due to engine 

failure during takeoff or landing. 

The petitioner states that it has instituted operational controls through its general 

operations manual, training program, and management surveillance. The petitioner 

states that it will conduct operations in such a manner as to minimize the time spent 

exposed to engine failure. The petitioner contends that this will be accomplished by 

following the manufacturer’s recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever 

feasible. Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude, 

and temperature ensure 150 feet per minute climb at 1,000 feet above the takeoff 

surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous 

one engine inoperative (OEI) power. 

PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to 

and from helidecks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight 

requirements appropriate to the aircraft configuration; (2) Training its crews in a Level 

D, Full Flight Simulator (FFS) initially and annually, ensuring the highest levels of 

proficiency and competency; (3) Conducting route checks to confirm that its crews 

remain procedurally compliant and use crew resource management principles during 

all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI’s Flight Data Monitoring Program (known as 

LAMP) to ensure flight profiles are in accordance with Performance Class 2 

procedures. 

The petitioner notes that it has accumulated over 150,000 hours of operational 

experience in this make/model all in accordance with OpSpec H100 and Performance 
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Class 2 profiles. This experience demonstrates that when takeoff and landing 

techniques are used to minimize exposure to forced landing due to engine failure, that 

this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent level of safety to Category A. The 

petitioner contends that without this relief, the S92A would become economically 

unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from service. The outcome 

would be a reversion to smaller, older, less sophisticated aircraft that do not provide 

the same level of safety. The petitioner asserts that this would result in an overall 

degradation of safety and not serve the most important stakeholder, the passenger. 

The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to provide the same 

level of safety that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that 

collected data related to the engine reliability reflects that the in-flight shutdown rate 

is less than 1 per 100,000 flight hours. 

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on January 12, 2016, 

81 FR 1467. No comments were received.

The FAA's analysis is as follows: 

The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds 

that a grant of exemption would be in the public interest and would provide a level of 

safety equivalent to that provided by the current regulations. 

The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation with the Sikorsky S-92A, under 

contract to various oil companies from land based facilities to offshore facilities within 

the Gulf of Mexico, and under other contracts throughout the world including 

Antarctica. PHI aviation operations within the United States are conducted under the 

provisions of part 135. 

Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires 

special consideration in operations, training, and standardization. Based on the 

drawings and photographs contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an 

overwater elevated helideck. 

The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may 

not be possible due to environmental or other factors. The FAA notes that regulatory 

agencies worldwide have already applied risk management techniques and permitted 

variations to specific operations, such as operations to helidecks with exposure to an 

engine failure, without a safe forced landing area. Risk assessment is used to determine 

whether to permit these variations. When operations without suitable areas for safe 

forced landings are being considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These 

factors include the likelihood of the event, the possible consequences, and any 

mitigating measures weighed against the potential benefits of the operation. Accident 
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history and other relevant safety data and analysis are crucial to making the operational 

determination. 

The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 and has 

accumulated more than 150,000 flight hours with this make/model helicopter under the 

provisions of OpSpec H100. This operations specification prohibits operations unless 

the current aircraft weight, altitude and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 

150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative 

and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power. These specifications are 

also similar to those characteristics of operations under ICAO Performance Class 2. 

The ICAO standard for Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure 

limits that exposure period to less than 9 seconds. The petitioner’s operations meet or 

exceed this standard, and ensure a positive 150 feet per minute climb rate at 1,000 feet 

above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at 

maximum continuous OEI power. 

The petitioner has proposed operational controls consistent with those in OpSpec 

H100. The FAA has decided to rescind that operations specification. A grant of 

exemption would provide for continuity of operations demonstrated since PHI began S92A operations in 2003. The FAA believes the limitations contained in OpSpec H100 

have been effective and therefore would continue them in limitations associated with a 

grant of exemption. 

The FAA notes that PHI was granted and authorized to operate under a similar Grant of 

Exemption No. 10507 that provided relief from § 91.9(a). The FAA has updated the 

conditions and limitations of the current exemption to clarify requirements concerning 

training and checking, the wearing of personal floatation equipment, and requirements 

for emergency equipment. 

Granting this petition is in the public interest, because these S-92A helicopters replaced 

older designs which do not offer the safety advancements and were not required to 

meet the more stringent performance requirements imposed on the S-92A and other 

similar aircraft certificated against the updated certification regulations. The FAA 

concurs with the petitioner that permitting the use of the S-92A provides those 

passengers with the safe transportation, while maintaining an efficient transportation 

system for the oil and gas industry. 

The FAA’s Decision 

 In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption is in the public interest. 

Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, 

delegated to me by the Administrator, PHI, Inc., is granted an exemption from 14 CFR 

§ 91.9(a) to the extent necessary to allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A helicopters with 
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limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 

passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two 

offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules. 

This exemption is subject to the conditions and limitations listed below. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. This exemption is limited to operations conducted in PHI’s S-92 helicopters. 

2. This exemption is limited to operations conducted between land-based heliports, 

between land-based airports and offshore heliports, or between two offshore heliports. 

All helidecks and heliports must be of sufficient size and weight bearing capacity to 

safely accommodate the S-92 helicopter during operations described below. 

3. This exemption is not valid for operations in foreign airspace without the prior 

authorization of the Civil Aviation Authority with jurisdiction over that airspace. 

4. PHI must make available and provide access, upon request by the FAA, to its 

historical engine reliability data for its fleet of S-92s, in order to provide ongoing 

surveillance of engine reliability. 

5. In addition to other routine preflight computations, approach and departure profiles 

must be determined in accordance with European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 

Performance Class 2 with defined limited exposure (PC2-DLE) procedures 

considering the planned takeoff or landing weight, altitude, temperature and wind. 

These computations and procedures must be approved by the manufacturer or 

accepted by the Administrator. The calculations in the planning process must 

indicate, in all cases, that the helicopter is able to climb, after acceleration to Vmini or 

above, with OEI and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power a 

minimum of 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff or landing surface. 

The planning process results must indicate the following appropriate takeoff and/or 

landing outcomes are possible after an engine failure when flown in accordance with 

the PC2-DLE (9 second) landing and takeoff profiles: 

a. below the Takeoff Decision Point, a rejected takeoff resulting in a safe OEI 

controlled descent and landing on the takeoff surface, 

b. above the Takeoff Decision Point, a successful OEI departure or an exposure 

of 9 seconds or less to a deck edge stike or an unscheduled landing or ditching 

c. during the final approach phase of flight prior to the Landing Decision Point, a 

rejected landing resulting in a safe OEI go-around, 

d. during the landing phase beyond the Landing Decision Point, a safe landing on 

the helideck surface or an exposure of 9 seconds or less to a deck edge stike or 

an unscheduled landing or ditching. 
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6. PHI’s FAA approved training program must include provisions for training and 

checking of pilots in PC2-DLE with total maximum theoretical exposure times of 9 

seconds or less performance planning and takeoff and landing profiles and procedures. 

Flight training of operating procedures for PC2-DLE type takeoffs and landings must 

be conducted in Level D flight simulation training devices. PHI must document the 

conduct and satisfactory completion of that training. 

7. Operations under the provisions of this exemption must be flown by crews consisting 

of two pilots who are qualified and current in normal and PC2-DLE operation of the 

S-92. 

8. Pilots must satisfactorily demonstrate the use of takeoff and landing profiles described 

in Condition No. 6 during initial and recurrent pilot competency and proficiency 

evaluations in accordance with §§135.293 or 135.297. For pilots that will only 

operate during day VFR, checking may be limited to competency checks in 

accordance with §135.293; however, this limitation must be recorded and these pilots 

must acknowledge the limitation in writing and refrain from conducting PC2-DLE 

operations in IFR or night conditions until night competency and IFR proficiency is 

checked. 

9. Occupants of flights conducted under this exemption must wear personal floatation 

equipment meeting the requirements of §135.168 (b)(1) whenever the aircraft is over 

water, and the aircraft must be equipped with floats, accessible rafts, and a 406 MHz 

Emergency Locator beacon in accordance with §135.168(d). 

10. PHI must establish parameters for takeoff and landing at elevated helidecks for its 

flight operations quality assurance program and provide ongoing surveillance of those 

operations to ensure flight profiles are being conducted in accordance with 

Performance Class 2 procedures. 

11. PHI Check Airmen will conduct periodic route observations to ensure Performance 

Class 2 procedures are properly followed and appropriate Crew Resource 

Management techniques are employed during all flight operations. 

12. PHI must advise all S-92 flight crewmembers, including those who have not received 

the above training and checking, of the provisions of this exemption and document 

that notification. 

13. A copy of this exemption must be carried onboard each S-92 utilizing these 

provisions. 

This exemption terminates on June 30, 2018, unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 
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Issued in Washington, DC, on . 

/s/ 

John S. Duncan 

Director, Flight Standards Service