[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-15803

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

 D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-21797-JLK

 1:09-cr-20444-JLK-1

RANDY DEONARINESINGH, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(October 25, 2013)

Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Randy Deonarinesingh appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to 

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, in which he alleged that his appellate counsel

had provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge on direct appeal the 

application of the two-level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) 

(providing for a two-level enhancement where the offense involved “the 

production or trafficking of any (i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit 

access device, or (ii) authentication feature”).1

 Deonarinesingh pled guilty to bank 

fraud and conspiracy.

2

 In his § 2255 motion, Deonarinesingh contended that 

appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue on direct 

appeal that the enhancement did not apply given that his underlying criminal 

convictions exclusively involved the passing of fraudulent or counterfeit checks, 

which were not access devices within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

The magistrate judge determined that Deonarinesingh’s appellate counsel had 

provided deficient performance by failing to raise the enhancement on direct 

appeal, but that Deonarinesingh was not prejudiced by this deficient performance

because there was no indication in the record that Deonarinesingh would have 

 1

 In the current version of the Sentencing Guidelines, this provision is located at 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11). 

2 Deonarinesingh pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

371, to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; to make utter, and possess 

counterfeited securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a); and to transfer an implement 

designed for making a counterfeit security, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(b). He also pled 

guilty to one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.

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received a sentence other than the ninety-seven-month sentence that was imposed. 

The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation over 

Deonarinesingh’s objections and denied the § 2255 motion.

After denial of the § 2255 motion, Deonarinesingh sought a certificate of 

appealability (COA), which the district court denied. On appeal, we granted a 

COA to address only the following issue: Whether Deonarinesingh’s appellate 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal a claim 

that the district court erred in applying a two-level increase to Deonarinesingh’s 

offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B).

Deonarinesingh argues that the district court erred by concluding that he was 

not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance. Deonarinesingh 

argues that there is a reasonable probability that, on direct appeal, we would have 

remanded his case for resentencing. In its response, the government concedes both 

that Deonarinesingh’s appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to 

challenge the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) enhancement on direct appeal and that 

Deonarinesingh was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.

In a § 2255 proceeding, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de 

novo and factual findings for clear error. Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286, 

1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Because both prongs of the test enumerated in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), present 

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mixed questions of law and fact, we review both prongs de novo. Dell v. United 

States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013).

To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.

Ct. at 2064. The petitioner bears the burden of proof on both prongs of the 

Strickland test. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Courts need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an 

insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. 

Strickland’s two-part test also governs claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003).

I.

Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must establish 

prejudice by showing a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. “[A] reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The defendant 

must affirmatively prove prejudice because attorney errors “are as likely to be 

utterly harmless . . . as they are to be prejudicial.” Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 

551 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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A.

Relevant to determining the probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different but for counsel’s errors is whether the objection to the 

enhancement was preserved for appellate review. See Dell, 710 F.3d at 1274 

(stating that, on § 2255 motion collateral review, we judged whether the defendant 

had a reasonable probability of success on direct appeal, keeping in mind that a 

plain error standard would have applied to the claim on direct appeal). If it was 

preserved, on direct appeal “[w]e [would have] review[ed] de novo [the] district 

court’s application of the Guidelines to the established facts.” United States v. 

Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 

2375 (2012). If it was not, we would have reviewed for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 52(b); United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550, 565 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __ 

U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1648 (2012). Thus, if the objection had been preserved for 

review, it is more likely that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different;” that is, it is more likely that we would 

have vacated Deonarinesingh’s sentence on direct appeal under a de novo standard 

than a plain error standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The unique circumstances of this case make it unclear whether a de novo or 

a plain error standard would have applied on direct review. Deonarinesingh did 

not object to the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) enhancement; rather, the government noted that 

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the enhancement was improper. Deonarinesingh’s counsel never adopted the 

government’s objection to the enhancement, but Deonarinesingh did file a pro se 

letter adopting the government’s objection. The United States Probation Office 

responded to both the government’s and the pro se objection, and the district court 

addressed the issue directly in rejecting Deonarinesingh’s contention.

The contemporaneous objection rule does not exist for its own sake but “to 

protect judicial resources, in particular by ensuring that the trial courts will have an 

opportunity to avoid errors that might otherwise necessitate time-consuming 

retrial” and “to prevent counsel from sandbagging the courts by withholding a 

valid objection from the trial court in order to obtain a new trial when the error is 

recognized on appeal.” United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 

2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the objection must be 

specific and of the same kind raised on appeal so that the district court has an 

opportunity to address the precise issue. United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 

502, 507–08 (11th Cir. 1995).

Here, the objectives of the contemporaneous objection rule have been met. 

The government’s objection, specific to the sentencing enhancement, combined 

with Deonarinesingh’s pro se letter and the United States Probation Office’s 

argument, allowed the district court to consider the propriety of the enhancement, 

giving it the opportunity to avoid error at sentencing. Importantly, the district 

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court recognized and addressed the argument against enhancement, so that it had 

the opportunity to avoid error. Moreover, although counsel did not voice any 

objection to the enhancement, Deonarinesingh adopted the government’s 

objection, so it can hardly be argued that there was any attempt by Deonarinesingh 

at “sandbagging.” See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1276. Therefore, because the 

objectives of the contemporaneous objection rule were met, the objection was 

preserved for direct review, and it would have been subject to de novo review had 

appellate counsel raised the argument. Cf. United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 

1489, 1493 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying “normal appellate review” to claims of 

both co-defendants despite the fact that counsel for only one of the defendants 

objected).

B.

Because there is a “reasonable probability” that we would have vacated 

Deonarinesingh’s sentence on direct review under a de novo standard, 

Deonarinesingh has established prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. 

Ct. at 2068. A defendant receives a two-level increase to his offense level if the

offense involved the production or trafficking of any (i) unauthorized access device 

or counterfeit access device, or (ii) authentication feature. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). The Commentary to the Guidelines provides that the terms 

“unauthorized access device” and “counterfeit access device” both have the 

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meaning established in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e). U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.9(A). 

“[U]nauthorized access device” is defined as “any access device that is lost, stolen, 

expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent to defraud.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1029(e)(3). A “counterfeit access device” is “any access device that is 

counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access 

device or a counterfeit access device.” Id. § 1029(e)(2). The statute defines an 

“access device” as:

any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, 

mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other 

telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or 

other means of account access that can be used, alone or in 

conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, 

services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a 

transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper 

instrument).

Id. § 1029(e)(1) (emphasis added).

We have not considered whether a fraudulent check constitutes an access 

device, as defined by § 1029(e) or under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). However, in a case 

challenging the sufficiency of the indictment, we cited legislative history that 

stated that § 1029(e)’s definition of “access device” was “broad enough to 

encompass future technological changes and the only limitation . . . excludes 

activities such as passing forged checks.” United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 

1081 (11th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, § 1029(e)(1) expressly states that it excludes any “transfer originated 

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solely by paper instrument.” Legislative history and the unanimous determination 

of those of our sister circuits to have considered the issue that “access device” as 

defined in § 1029(e) does not include fraudulent checks would have lent appellate 

counsel further support for the argument that the district court incorrectly 

calculated the applicable Sentencing Guidelines. See S. Rep. No. 98-368, at 10 

(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3647, 3656 (stating that the definition of 

“access devices” under § 1029(e) “does not cover activities such as passing bad 

checks); H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

3689, 3705 (stating that the definition of “access devices” under § 1029(e)

“excludes activities such as passing forged checks); United States v. Butler, 646 

F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) cannot be applied 

to . . . a scheme limited to fraudulent check-cashing.”); United States v. Tatum, 518 

F.3d 769, 770–72 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that neither checks themselves nor the 

account numbers printed on them qualified as “access devices” for § 

2B1.1(b)(10)(B) purposes); United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 

1998) (holding that, for 1029(e) purposes only, the statute “unambiguously places 

the passing of bad checks . . . outside [its] scope”).

In cases on direct appeal, “[a]n error in the district court’s calculation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines range warrants vacating the sentence, unless the error is 

harmless.” United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009). The 

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guideline error is harmless if the district court unambiguously expressed that it 

would have imposed the same sentence, even without the erroneous calculation. 

Id. at 1248. If the error is harmless, we need only inquire whether the sentence is 

reasonable. See United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). For 

example, in United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008), we noted 

that, “[a]t sentencing, the district court judge also stated that he still would have 

imposed [the same imprisonment term] as a reasonable sentence, regardless of any 

guidelines miscalculation, because of the facts of the case and defendant’s 

misleading and shifting testimony offered in an effort to hide the truth.” In Keene, 

the district court stated that “even if the guideline calculations are wrong, my 

application of the sentencing factors under Section 3553(a) would still compel the 

conclusion that a 10-year sentence . . . is reasonable and appropriate under all the 

factors that I considered.” 470 F.3d at 1349. 

In contrast, where the district court has emphasized that the guideline range 

influenced the sentence, we have held that a calculation error was not harmless. 

See United States v. Paley, 442 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 

In Paley, our conclusion regarding the harmlessness of the sentencing error was 

based largely on the district court’s statement that it had been “a difficult 

sentencing” and that it had been “greatly influenced by the Advisory Guidelines.”

See id. We found that the erroneous calculation was not harmless in spite of the 

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fact that the district court emphasized that a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment 

“adequately reflect[ed] the seriousness of the offense and provide[d] just and 

reasonable punishment.” Id. at 1278.

Here, then, the district court’s reliance on Keene on collateral review is 

misplaced. During sentencing, the district court repeatedly stated that it relied on 

the guidelines range and the government’s “earlier announced position that they 

would not be recommending more than the low end of the guideline range.” The 

district court mentioned the precise length of the sentence it would eventually 

impose only as an explanatory aside to its declaration “that the government . . . 

recommends the low end.” Although the court stated that “it ha[d] the authority to 

sentence anywhere within the range or without the range,” such a statement does 

not negate the court’s reliance on the guidelines. Even though the court noted its 

authority to disregard the guidelines in reaching a sentence, it also emphasized that 

the guidelines would be “highly suggestive of the appropriate and proper sentence 

that should be imposed.” Under these circumstances, it is clear that the erroneous 

calculation “affect[ed] the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” 

Paley, 442 F.3d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted). The erroneous

calculation here is therefore not harmless.3

 

3 We note that the burden of proving that an erroneous Sentencing Guidelines 

calculation is harmless is on the government. See Paley, 442 F.3d at 1278. Not only does the 

government not contest Deonarinesingh’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his § 2255 

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Accordingly, because we would have found that (1) the district court erred in 

calculating the guidelines, and (2) the error was not harmless, Deonarinesingh has 

established prejudice. See id. at 1278–79.

II.

Because Deonarinesingh has established prejudice, we must now examine 

whether counsel’s performance was unreasonable—that is, whether “particular and 

identified acts or omissions of counsel were outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 

1313–14 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

defendant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

counsel’s performance was unreasonable. Id. Our review of counsel’s 

performance is highly deferential, and we apply a “strong presumption” that 

counsel’s performance was reasonable and that all significant decisions were made 

in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 1314 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We conduct an objective inquiry into the reasonableness of 

counsel’s performance, such that “a petitioner must establish that no competent 

counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. We

evaluate counsel’s effectiveness based on counsel’s perspective at the time. Id. at 

1316 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 

motion or the issue of harmless error, it has affirmatively argued that the error was not harmless.

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Appellate counsel is not required to raise all nonfrivolous issues on appeal, 

and, as a result, it is difficult for a defendant to show that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise certain issues on appeal, especially where counsel 

raised other strong issues. Payne v. United States, 566 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 

2009) (per curiam); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288, 120 S. Ct. 746, 

765 (2000) (stating that “only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those 

presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Appellate counsel does not render deficient 

performance by failing to raise an issue on appeal if the legal principle is unsettled. 

Black v. United States, 373 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2004). However, counsel’s 

ignorance of a well-defined legal principle could be inexcusable and demonstrate 

ineffective performance. Id. Further, we have held that “the mere absence of 

authority does not automatically insulate counsel’s failure” to raise the issue. 

Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(concerning counsel’s failure to object at trial). Rather, the fact that other circuits 

have addressed the issue on the merits may indicate that a challenge “on such 

grounds [is] not wholly without precedent.” Id.

Here, Deonarinesingh argues, and the government concedes, that 

Deonarinesingh’s appellate counsel performed deficiently. The district court

likewise found that appellate counsel was deficient. We agree.

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Deonarinesingh does not argue the strength of the ignored § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)

claim relative to that of the claims actually raised. Nevertheless, the government 

argues, and we agree, that the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) claim was “clearly stronger than” 

the claims actually raised on direct appeal: number of victims enhancement, 

aggravating role enhancement, sophisticated means enhancement, and substantive 

reasonableness.

Under the number of victims enhancement claim, Deonarinesingh previously 

asked this court to adopt the rule, established by the Sixth Circuit in United States 

v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005), that reimbursed victims of bank fraud 

are not victims for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). However, our decision 

in United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005) foreclosed this

argument by expressly refusing to apply the Yagar rule.

On direct appeal, we reviewed the decisions of the district court regarding 

the aggravating role and sophisticated means enhancements under a clear error 

standard. United States v. Deonarinesingh, 411 F. App’x 245, 247 (11th Cir. 

2011) (per curiam). We will not find clear error “unless, in view of the entire 

record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under clear error review, this court cannot reverse the 

district court where it “has chosen one of two plausible views of the evidence.” Id. 

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Thus, because there was substantial evidence to support the enhancements, 

Deonarinesingh faced a small likelihood of success on these claims.

Deonarinesingh’s substantive reasonableness claim likewise faced a 

substantial hurdle on direct appeal. We reviewed the sentence for substantive 

reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Deonarinesingh, 411 F. 

App’x at 249. The party challenging the sentence on appeal bears the burden of 

showing unreasonableness. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam). We ordinarily expect a within-the-guidelines sentence to be 

reasonable. Id. With such an exacting standard on review, any defendant 

challenging a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range is unlikely to be 

successful. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(stating that we had found only four out of “hundreds of sentences . . . to be 

substantively unreasonable”). In particular, Deonarinesingh’s sole argument 

supporting the substantive unreasonableness claim—that his co-defendants 

received lower sentences—did not articulate a cognizable challenge to the 

reasonableness of his sentence. Deonarinesingh, 411 F. App’x at 249 (explaining 

that “disparity between the sentences imposed on codefendants is generally not an 

appropriate basis for relief on appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

On the contrary, a § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) claim would have carried a substantial 

likelihood of success on direct appeal. Although we have determined that such a

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claim would have faced de novo review, we nonetheless examine its merit under a 

plain error standard.4

 To obtain reversal under plain error review, “(1) there must 

be error; (2) the error must be plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial 

rights.” United States v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The error must also “seriously affect the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1239 (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

As stated, the district court committed error by applying the §

2B1.1(b)(10)(B) enhancement at Deonarinesingh’s sentencing. In addition, that 

error was plain because the plain language of the statute “unambiguously places 

the passing of bad checks and similar conduct outside the scope of the federal 

statute.” Tatum, 518 F.3d at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted). The error 

also affected Deonarinesingh’s substantial rights as well as “the fairness, integrity 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Bonilla, 579 F.3d at 1239 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Antonietti, 86 F.3d 206, 209 (11th 

 

4 The record does not make clear the precise reason why appellate counsel decided not 

to raise the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) claim. It appears that he believed such a claim to be “frivolous,” 

though the record does not expound on whether uncertainty about the applicable standard of 

review impacted the decision. In order to follow the maxim “that every effort be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at that time,” Eagle

v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 940 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2065), we will examine the likelihood of success on a § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) claim under a plain 

error standard in order to determine whether that claim was “clearly stronger than those 

presented.” Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S. Ct. at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Cir. 1996) (finding that an incorrect calculation of a guidelines range constituted 

plain error).

In sum, the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) claim was “clearly stronger” than the claims 

appellate counsel raised on direct appeal, and appellate counsel was thus deficient 

in failing to raise the claim. Deonarinesingh has therefore established the first 

Strickland prong.

C.

Upon review of the record and after consideration of the parties’ appellate 

briefs, we hold that the district court erred by determining that appellate counsel’s 

deficient performance did not prejudice Deonarinesingh. Accordingly, 

Deonarinesingh’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance under 

Strickland by failing to appeal the application of the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) 

enhancement. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s decision denying

Deonarinesingh’s § 2255 motion, vacate Deonarinesingh’s sentence, and remand 

for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED.

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