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S. HRG. 112–737

ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS IN MALI: RESTORING

DEMOCRACY AND RECLAIMING THE NORTH

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 5, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Akuetteh, Nii, independent policy researcher, Washington, DC ......................... 37

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Carson, Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1

Dory, Amanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, U.S. Department of 

Defense, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

Dufka, Corinne, senior researcher, Africa Division, Human Rights Watch, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 34

Fomunyoh, Christopher, senior associate and regional director for Central 

and West Africa, National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC ................. 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Gast, Earl, Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 3

Mahmoud, Mohamed Ould, vice president, Lobbying Network for Peace, Security, and Development for Northern Mali, Bamako, Mali ................................ 45

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS IN MALI: RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND RECLAIMING 

THE NORTH 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I will be joined momentarily by my friend and 

ranking member, Senator Johnny Isakson of Georgia, and we 

expect other Senators to join, but I thought it was timely for us to 

proceed. 

I’m grateful for the support of the committee and the hard work 

of my staff in making possible today the first time we will have a 

witness testifying directly from a foreign country which is the subject of a hearing, and I hope that will contribute to an ongoing 

process of trying to expand the range and scope of testimony 

included in these hearings. 

Today’s focus is on Mali, and as we speak, there are three simultaneous crises occurring in Mali—a security, a political, and a humanitarian crisis—all three of which, in my view, threaten United 

States interests in Africa and require the attention of the U.S. Government and the world. That’s why we’ve convened this hearing 

today, to assess developments in Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore democracy, to reclaim the north, to stabilize the 

security situation, and to address ongoing humanitarian needs. 

I would like to welcome my friend and partner on the subcommittee, Senator Johnny Isakson, and I understand we may well 

be joined by others, and to thank our distinguished witnesses for 

sharing their insight and expertise. 

Earlier this year, a military coup deposed the democratically 

elected Government of Mali, and an ethnic rebellion staked its 

claim on the northern two-thirds of this vast country. This left a 

security and political vacuum that was exploited by Islamic extremists. As of today, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—more commonly known as AQIM—and two affiliated groups control the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

majority of northern Mali, an area roughly the size of the U.S. 

State of Texas, making it the largest territory controlled by Islamic 

extremists in the world. 

I am concerned that the current United States approach toward 

Mali may not be comprehensive and forward-leaning enough to 

address all three of these difficult, complex, and interconnected 

crises—security, political, and humanitarian. So today we will examine U.S. policy in these three areas with the goal of providing 

recommendations for a path forward. We will assess evolving plans 

for a regionally led, multilateral military intervention in northern 

Mali and consider the complementary goals of encouraging elections and restoring security by reclaiming the north. 

With growing ties between extremist and terrorist groups in 

Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, and beyond, there is growing concern that AQIM will leverage its new safe haven in Mali to carry 

out training and advance plans for regional or transnational terrorist attacks, making Mali, in the words of Secretary Clinton, a 

powder keg of instability in the region and beyond. 

The U.N. Security Council will likely vote in the coming weeks 

on a resolution authorizing a military intervention by ECOWAS 

and the African Union. Similar African-led interventions—for 

example, in Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia—have provided a model for 

multilateral and regionally led solutions that allow the United 

States and our allies to provide operational support without putting boots on the ground. 

This intervention will take time, and stability cannot be restored 

through military action alone. The situation in Mali is as much a 

crisis of governance as of security. The long-running grievances of 

the Tuaregs in the north and a political vacuum in the south must 

be addressed through diplomacy, rebuilding democratic institutions, and the restoration of a democratically elected government. 

In addition, any agreement that attempts to peel off groups currently aligned with AQIM will require a credible government to do 

so in Bamako. 

Elections are the key to not only resolving and restoring nowfrozen U.S. bilateral assistance, but also for reclaiming government 

control of the north and restoring Mali’s nearly three-decade-long 

history of democracy. 

Mali’s political and security challenges cannot be addressed as 

separate issues. As the U.N. Secretary General’s recent report on 

Mali suggested, the international community must work to address 

these multiple crises simultaneously and consider the implications 

of moving forward with elections that might exclude participation 

of northerners. Such an election could be viewed as a symbolic victory for AQIM and may further entrench those who aim to establish a permanent Islamic state in the north. 

In short, this conflict has caused humanitarian as well as security, as well as diplomatic challenges. There are more than 400,000 

people displaced in Mali, and an exacerbated and ongoing food crisis across the Sahel, leaving more than 4.5 million people in need 

of emergency food aid. NGOs have reported rampant human rights 

abuses in northern Mali, further adding to the instability and challenges, which include torture, executions, recruitment of child 

soldiers, amputations, as well as violations of women’s rights, 

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3

children’s rights, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms such as 

speech and religion. 

To provide insight on our path forward and to discuss these three 

strands, we have assembled two distinguished panels. First, we 

will hear from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 

Ambassador Johnnie Carson; then USAID Assistant Administrator 

for Africa, Mr. Earl Gast; and last, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Africa, Ms. Amanda Dory. We are grateful for your 

presence. 

On our second panel we will hear from senior associate and regional director for West Africa at the National Democratic Institute, Dr. Chris Fomunyoh; and then senior researcher in the Africa 

Division at the Human Rights Watch, Ms. Corrine Dufka; and then 

independent policy researcher, Mr. Nii Akuetteh; and vice president of the Lobbying Network for Peace, Security, and Development for Northern Mali, Mr. Mohamed Ould Mahmoud, who will 

be testifying via webcast in order to provide a first-hand perspective from Bamako. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of all our witnesses on 

these two panels, and would like to turn to Senator Isakson for his 

opening remarks. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Chairman Coons, and I commend you on calling this hearing on what is a very important and 

pressing issue in the ECOWAS area and in West Africa, where you 

and I traveled about a year and a half ago in the area to Ghana, 

Benin, and Nigeria, and there are a lot of fledgling democracies. 

We saw what happened in Cote d’Ivoire, where we ended up with 

free democratic elections and a transition of power out of a very 

difficult situation, and obviously our interest here today is to explore ways in which the United States can be of help to hopefully 

bring about free and fair elections in 2013 and return all of Mali 

back to a democratically represented country, as it has been for the 

last 20 years, until the March and spring initiative in the north 

which caused the coup and which caused the current problems. 

The United States has played a significant role in Africa in many 

areas where there were problems. The Sudan could be no better 

example, where because of United States involvement, nonmilitary 

involvement but diplomatic involvement and special envoy involvement brought about a process in 5 years that brought about the 

free elections in the south and the creation of the newest independent state in the world, the South Sudan. The United States 

can play a great role in that, and it’s important for us to understand the issues that affect us, the issues that affect that area, and 

what we can do to help. 

Of a personal note, I also have concern anytime al-Qaeda takes 

advantage of a vacuum or flows into an area because of poverty or 

because of lack of governance. That’s what’s happened in the north. 

Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb is present. To the extent they 

are present we don’t know for sure, and I’m anxious to hear from 

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our witnesses today to talk about that. But that also is a point of 

concern for our people of the United States and for our country. 

So I commend you on calling the hearing. I look forward to hearing from all our witnesses and thank all of them who are testifying 

today. 

Senator COONS. Thank you so much, Senator. 

Let’s now begin with our first panel, if we might, Assistant Secretary Carson. 

STATEMENT OF JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify before you on this important subject. I also want 

to recognize the ranking member, Senator Isakson, for his keen 

interest also in issues related to Africa. 

Mali’s March 21, 2012, military coup d’etat ended two decades of 

Malian democracy, resulted in the loss of the northern Mali to extremist groups, and further destabilized an already fragile Sahel 

region. Mali is now facing four distinct but overlapping challenges: 

restoring democracy, negotiating a political solution to the Tuareg 

rebellion, countering the threat from Al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, and responding to an ongoing humanitarian crisis. 

Mali, its regional partners, and the international community 

must respond to each of these challenges simultaneously. Without 

addressing each of these issues, Mali will not be able to make a 

successful political or economic recovery. 

Mali’s first challenge is the restoration of democratic governance. 

The framework agreement negotiated by ECOWAS with the military junta following the March 21 coup mandates that Mali’s interim government must organize elections and put in place a legitimate, democratically elected government by April 2013. 

While the interim government has made progress in strengthening governance, preparations for elections are moving slowly. We 

continue to strongly encourage the interim government to set a 

date for elections and to develop a roadmap for the transition to a 

new democratically elected government. 

The United States, along with the international community, 

stands ready to assist Mali in conducting free, fair, and transparent elections. 

The interim government should build on the preparations that 

were undertaken before the aborted April 2012 elections and hold 

elections by April 2013 with as many voters as possible. The 

United States looks forward to working with the interim government and the international community to examine the best mechanisms to ensure that voters from all regions of Mali, including 

those in refugee camps in neighboring countries, can participate in 

national elections. 

As Mali moves through its current political transition, we have 

been clear and unequivocal in our messages to coup leader Captain 

Sanogo and the Malian public about the need for Captain Sanogo 

to leave the political stage and to be held accountable for human 

rights abuses committed while he was in control. 

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5

We have imposed targeted travel sanctions on Captain Sanogo 

and more than 60 other individuals who were involved in the coup 

or who continue to impede the restoration of democracy. The U.S 

Government has also formally terminated its assistance to the 

Government of Mali except for programs providing critical humanitarian assistance in health care and food security. We will maintain these kinds of pressures until Mali transitions to a new democratically elected government. 

Elections and the restoration of Mali’s democratic institutions by 

2013 are critical for ensuring that the Malian Government has the 

legitimacy and the credibility that it needs to negotiate with the 

Tuareg and other northern populations and to coordinate effectively with regional and international partners to defeat AQIM. 

The ongoing rebellion in northern Mali by the Tuareg community 

is a second major factor contributing to Mali’s current political and 

security problems. The government must recognize and address the 

legitimate political and social-economic grievances of the Tuareg 

community. The United States commends the efforts of African 

leaders, including President Compaore of Burkina Faso, to facilitate dialogue between the interim government and northern groups 

that accept Mali’s territorial integrity and who reject terrorism. 

We support the commitment of interim President Traore to open 

a dialogue with those actors in the north who respect Mali’s territorial integrity. We also welcomed the news that representatives of 

the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, 

known as the MNLA, have retracted their declaration of independence of the north, and that key figures in the MNLA and the Ansar 

al-Dine have declared their readiness to negotiate with the interim 

government. These political negotiations should be pursued 

diligently. 

Mali’s interim government must demonstrate its commitment to 

negotiations by appointing a lead negotiator for the north. The interim government also must find ways to effectively address legitimate northern grievances in a peaceful manner. 

The Tuareg are not terrorists, and the grievances of the Tuareg 

should be resolved peacefully and not through military actions. 

The participation of Algeria and Mauritania, which are not members of ECOWAS, are also crucial in finding a lasting solution to 

the Malian problem. Later this week, a delegation of U.S. officials, 

including Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, will be traveling to Algiers to encourage the Algerians to play a more active 

role in addressing the political and security problems in northern 

Mali. Secretary Clinton was in Algeria to discuss Mali, among 

other issues, approximately a month ago. 

The third challenge in Mali is terrorism. We are gravely concerned about the presence and activities of terrorist and extremist 

groups in northern Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the 

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, known as MUJAO, 

and other affiliated groups have exploited the political unrest created by the March coup and northern rebellion to expand their safe 

haven in northern Mali and to impose their ideology on local communities throughout the northern part of the country. 

While these tactics remain alien to the vast majority of the population in the affected areas, AQIM and MUJAO have established 

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at least temporary relationships with a number of groups in northern Mali and currently control the key cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and 

Kidal. 

Any attempt to militarily oust AQIM from northern Mali must 

be African-led. It must be Malian-led. It must be well-planned, 

well-organized, and well-resourced to be successful. 

Military plans must also account for civilian security and humanitarian needs. 

We support the efforts of the interim government of Mali, 

ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, neighboring 

states, and others in the international community to prepare a 

military response, in accordance with international law, to address 

the threat of terrorists and extremists in northern Mali. The threat 

of military force has contributed, we think, to a change in some of 

the northern groups, as witnessed by the recent willingness of the 

MNLA and other members of Ansar al-Dine, to renounce their 

efforts to establish an independent state in northern Mali. 

The military concept proposed by ECOWAS and endorsed by the 

African Union provides a foundation for planning a proposed military intervention in northern Mali. However, several key questions 

must be answered to ensure that this response is well-planned, 

well-resourced, and appropriate. 

These issues include, among other things, the required force levels, the cost and funding needs, the logistical requirements, the 

operational timeliness, the protection of civilians, and ensuring 

that the proposed military action is adequately linked to a political 

strategy and an end state for military operations in the north. 

We have sent military planners to ECOWAS to assist with the 

continued development and refinement of the plans for international intervention. As the planning continues, we expect that 

many of the outstanding questions that I have raised, that we have 

raised as a government, will, in fact, be answered. 

We also continue to engage actively in New York with the U.N. 

and other international partners in preparation for the ongoing 

U.N. Security Council discussions on a resolution on military intervention in the north. As plans develop for the military operation, 

we will be better able to determine how the United States can best 

support ECOWAS and the AU elements in this effort. 

Mali’s neighbors have intensified their ongoing efforts to bolster 

their own security and to address the AQIM safe haven in northern 

Mali. Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger are all deeply concerned that 

any military intervention in northern Mali will cause a spillover of 

extremists into their own countries. These governments strongly 

favor exhausting all political dialogue before any intervention. 

We ourselves are assisting Mauritania and Niger, as well as 

some eight other states in the region, through our Trans-Sahara 

Counter-Terrorism Partnership program, TSCTP. This program is 

designed to help build long-term capacity to counter and marginalize terrorist organizations; disrupt efforts to recruit, train, and 

provision extremists; and to build up the capacities of the states in 

the region. 

However, lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will require 

that the countries in the Sahel develop the capacity to counter 

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AQIM, along with other transnational threats like drug smuggling 

and human trafficking. 

The fourth crisis in the region is one of humanitarian proportions. The human toll of these overlapping challenges has been 

enormous. Since the start of the fighting in northern Mali, more 

than 410,000 people have become refugees or internally displaced. 

Of these, nearly 200,000 people are displaced within Mali alone, 

and more than 210,000 Malians have fled to Niger, Mauritania, 

and Burkina Faso. Algeria also hosts large Malian populations of 

refugees. 

In an effort to mitigate the effects of the complex humanitarian 

crisis in the Sahel, we are providing humanitarian food assistance 

to those displaced in the region. In 2012, the U.S. Government provided some $445 million in assistance to the Sahel region, $119 

million of which was in support of emergency needs within Mali 

and among refugee populations outside of Mali. The humanitarian 

response should remain a civilian-led effort in order to ensure the 

neutral and impartial character of humanitarian operations. 

We have encouraged greater international cooperation and 

coordination in developing a comprehensive approach to Mali’s 

multiple crises and the greater Sahel. The U.N. Secretary General’s 

recent appointment of a special envoy for the Sahel will help provide the needed facilitation and coordination. We will discuss the 

drafting of the Secretary General’s integrated strategy for the 

Sahel at a meeting in Rome this Friday. It is important that the 

next U.N. Security Council resolution be based in part on the U.N. 

Secretary General’s recent report to the Security Council on Mali, 

and that the restoration of democracy, political negotiations with 

the Tuareg, and the humanitarian response receive the same level 

of priority as any discussions about military interventions against 

AQIM. All four of these challenges must be met simultaneously. 

ECOWAS clearly has a very important role to play in assisting 

Mali. Five of the organization’s 15 Member States share borders 

with Mali. Although they are not ECOWAS members, Algeria and 

Mauritania also share long borders with Mali and have important 

contributions to make. 

In closing, addressing these four overlapping challenges will 

require comprehensive, sustained, and dedicated regional and 

international support and engagement. We in Washington are committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We support inclusive dialogue and negotiations to address the economic 

and social needs of the marginalized populations in the north, especially the Tuareg. We support reunification of Malian territory, 

both through negotiations with Malians who support a unified and 

secular state and through well-planned and well-resourced Africanled military actions to dislodge the terrorists. We will also continue 

to address the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a much longer statement which I have 

submitted to you for the record. But again, thank you for this 

opportunity to testify, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Senator Isakson, for your keen interest in this issue. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON

Thank you very much, Chairman Coons and members of the committee, for the 

opportunity to testify before you on this most important subject. Mali’s March 21, 

2012, military coup d’etat ended two decades of Malian democracy, resulted in the 

loss of the northern Mali to extremist groups, and further destabilized an already 

fragile Sahel region. Mali is now facing four distinct but overlapping challenges—

the restoration of democratic governance, political negotiations with northern groups 

that reject extremism, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s expanded presence in 

northern Mali, and an ongoing humanitarian crisis. Mali, regional partners, and the 

international community must respond to each of these challenges simultaneously. 

Our response to any one of these challenges must not be dependent on the achievement of another. 

1. RESTORING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT

Mali’s first challenge is the restoration of democratic governance. The framework 

agreement negotiated by ECOWAS with the military junta following the March 21 

coup mandates that Mali’s interim government must organize elections and put in 

place a legitimate, democratically elected government by April 2013. 

While the interim government has made progress in strengthening governance, 

preparations for elections are moving slowly. The longer Mali’s political elite delay 

in putting this electoral process in motion, the more likely it is that the April 2013 

date will slip. We continue to encourage the interim government to set a date for 

elections and develop a roadmap for the transition to a democratically elected government. I recently sent a letter to Interim Malian Prime Minister Diarra urging 

him to support preparations for elections and repeating our assurance that the 

United States, along with the international community, stands ready to assist him 

in overcoming the challenges for carrying out free, fair, and transparent elections. 

My letter also emphasized our support for recent ECOWAS statements regarding 

the ineligibility of current members of the interim government to run in the 

elections. 

The United States has made elections in Mali a priority because historically transitional governments that are not pressed to hold elections and restore constitutional order tend to hold on to power long beyond their mandate. While we support 

Interim President Traore and Interim Prime Minister Diarra as they guide the transition government during this challenging time in Mali’s history, transition governments, including this one, are inherently weak. Mali needs now more than ever a 

strong democratic government to restore its democratic tradition and provide the 

strong leadership necessary to negotiate a political agreement with northern rebels, 

reform its security sector, and lead a military intervention in the north to restore 

and maintain Mali’s territorial integrity. Although there is currently some Malian 

public resistance to holding elections before the reunification of the country, we will 

continue to express the need to hold elections prior to recapturing the north. We 

encourage the interim government to consult with UNHCR and other stakeholders 

to find ways to hold polls in refugee camps so those displaced by the violence in 

northern Mali are given an opportunity to vote and ensure the participation of the 

population of northern Mali. Elections can send a strong message to coup leaders, 

extremists, and rebels alike—the Malian people will not allow violence to rob them 

of their democracy. 

The interim government should build on the preparations that were undertaken 

before the aborted April 2012 elections and hold elections as soon as technically feasible with as many voters as possible. The United States looks forward to working 

with the interim government and the international community to examine the best 

mechanism to ensure that voters from all regions of Mali, including those in refugee 

camps in neighboring countries, can participate in national elections. 

The 2013 elections must be transparent and free of intimidation from the coup 

leaders and their supporters. We have been unequivocal in our messages to coup 

leader Captain Sanogo and the Malian public about the need for Sanogo to leave 

the political stage and be held accountable for the excesses of this period, and in 

particular the human rights abuses and mistreatments credibly ascribed to Captain 

Sanogo and his associates. We have imposed targeted travel sanctions on more than 

60 individuals who were involved in the coup, supported its authors, or who continue to impede the restoration of democracy. We will maintain these kinds of pressures until Mali transitions to a democratically elected government. 

As a result of the March 2012 coup in Mali, the U.S. Government formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali. Funding for programs that provide lifesaving, critical assistance in health and food security, as well as democratic elections support programming, is reviewed on a case-by-case basis. These decisions will 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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be affected by the current political and security situation in Mali and how it develops, with recognition that these are complex challenges. Programs that have resumed include activities to reduce child mortality, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, essential life-saving services for maternal and child health, and preparation 

for the planting season to ensure food security. These activities are implemented 

through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

The United States firmly believes that Mali’s interim leaders must continue preparations in earnest to hold elections simultaneous with efforts to address the political grievances of Mali’s northern populations, restore Mali’s territorial integrity, 

and respond to the continued humanitarian crisis. Elections are critical for ensuring 

that the Malian Government has the legitimacy needed to negotiate with indigenous 

northern groups and effectively coordinate with regional and international partners 

to oust AQIM. 

2. REBELLION IN THE NORTH AND NEGOTIATIONS

The ongoing rebellion in northern Mali is another major factor contributing to the 

instability and crises in Mali and the Sahel. Recognizing that the Tuareg and other 

nonextremist groups in northern Mali have legitimate political and socioeconomic 

grievances, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community have encouraged 

a renewed and strengthened process of mediation to end the northern rebellion.

The United States commends the efforts of African leaders, including President 

Compaore of Burkina Faso, to facilitate dialogue between the interim government 

and northern groups that accept Mali’s territorial integrity and reject terrorism. 

We support the commitment of interim President Traore to open dialogue with 

those actors in the north who are committed to Mali’s territorial integrity and secular nature. We also welcomed the news that representatives of the Tuareg 

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) have retracted their 

declaration of independence of the north, and key figures in the MNLA and Ansar 

al-Dine have declared their readiness to negotiate with the interim government. 

Mali’s interim government must demonstrate its commitment to negotiations by 

appointing a lead negotiator for the north to peacefully address the long-standing 

political grievances of northern groups that accept Mali’s territorial integrity and 

renounce terrorism. The feasibility of a lasting negotiated settlement, however, will 

ultimately depend on the legitimacy that can only come with a democratically 

elected government. Long-term talks will be needed to address the legitimate social 

and economic needs of northern populations; these future negotiations are a necessary complement to the current short-term negotiations to separate those groups 

in the north who respect Mali’s territorial integrity and secular nature from the extremists and terrorist groups with whom negotiation is not an option. 

The participation of Algeria and Mauritania, which are not members of ECOWAS, 

also will be crucial to a lasting solution in northern Mali. This week, a delegation 

of U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Burns, will be traveling to 

Algiers to encourage the Algerians to play a more active role in addressing the crises in northern Mali, as Secretary Clinton did during her recent visit to Algeria. 

3. THREATS FROM TERRORISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST ELEMENTS

We are seriously concerned about the presence and activities of terrorist and 

extremist groups in northern Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Movement for 

Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and affiliated groups have exploited the 

political chaos created by the coup and northern rebellion to expand their safe 

haven in northern Mali and impose their radical ideology on local populations. 

While their tactics and ideology remain alien to the vast majority of the population 

in the affected areas, AQIM and MUJAO established at least temporary relationships with a number of groups in the area and currently hold the military upper 

hand in the areas under their control, including the key towns of Timbuktu, Gao, 

and Kidal. 

Any attempt to militarily oust AQIM from northern Mali must be African-led, 

well-planned, and well-resourced. Military plans must also account for civilian security and humanitarian response. We support the efforts of the interim government 

of Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, neighboring partners, 

and others in the international community to prepare a military response, in accordance with international law, to address the threat of terrorists and extremists in 

northern Mali. The threat of military force has contributed to change in some of the 

actors, witnessed by the recent willingness of the MNLA and some members of 

Ansar al-Dine to negotiate with the interim government. 

The military concept proposed by ECOWAS and endorsed by the AU provides a 

foundation for planning a proposed military intervention in northern Mali. The miliFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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tary concept proposes an Africa-led effort, but several key questions must be answered to ensure that this effort is also well-planned and well-resourced. These 

issues include outstanding questions about necessary force levels, the capabilities of 

the Malian and international forces to accomplish the objectives of the mission, cost 

and funding needs, logistical requirements, operational timelines, planning for minimizing impacts on civilian security and the humanitarian situation, and ensuring 

that the proposed military action is adequately linked to a sufficiently detailed political strategy and end state for military operations in the north. 

We have sent military planners to ECOWAS to assist with the continued development and refinement of the plan for international intervention. As the planning continues, we expect that many of the outstanding questions will be answered. We also 

continue to engage with the U.N. and our international partners in preparation for 

an anticipated U.N. Security Council resolution on a military intervention in the 

north. 

As plans develop for the military operation we will be better able to determine 

how the United States can best support the ECOWAS and AU elements of the military force. 

Mali’s neighbors have intensified their ongoing efforts to bolster their own security and address the AQIM safe haven in northern Mali. Algeria, Mauritania, and 

Niger are concerned that any military intervention in northern Mali will cause a 

spillover of extremists across their borders. This could also have repercussions on 

the security of refugees. These neighbors are increasing their border security, and 

we are urging UNHCR to work with host governments to ensure appropriate security and screening measures are in place in order to maintain the impartiality, 

neutrality, and civilian nature of refugee camps. These governments strongly favor 

exhausting political dialogue before an intervention. 

We are monitoring the actions of AQIM and other extremist and terrorist organizations in the north, and continue to work with the international community to address this evolving threat. We continue to enhance our work with Mali’s neighbors, 

to increase their capacity to secure their borders, disrupt AQIM supply lines, and 

contain the spread of extremist groups. We assist Mauritania and Niger through the 

Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which is designed to help 

build long-term capacity to contain and marginalize terrorist organizations and 

facilitation networks; disrupt efforts to recruit, train, and provision terrorists and 

extremists; counter efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist organizations; and 

disrupt foreign fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the region. 

Lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will require that the countries in the Sahel 

develop the capacity to counter this threat, along with other transnational threats 

like drug smuggling and human trafficking. 

4. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

The human toll of these overlapping challenges has been enormous. Since the 

start of the fighting in northern Mali, more than 410,000 people have become refugees or internally displaced. Of these, nearly 200,000 people are displaced within 

Mali, and more than 210,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger, Mauritania, and 

Burkina Faso. Algeria also hosts Malian refugees. 

In an effort to mitigate the effects of the complex humanitarian crisis in the 

Sahel, we are providing humanitarian and food assistance to those displaced by the 

conflict in northern Mali and those affected by the region’s food crisis. For 2012 to 

date, the U.S. Government provided more than $445 million in assistance to the 

Sahel region, $119 million of which was in support of emergency needs within Mali 

and among refugee populations outside of Mali. We support the work of the United 

Nations Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel and his efforts to ensure 

access to affected populations and coordinate the humanitarian response, including 

contingency planning for possible new displacements as a result of a military intervention. We hold that the humanitarian response should remain civilian-led in order 

to ensure the neutral and impartial character of humanitarian operations. 

5. RESPONSE FROM PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

We have encouraged greater international cooperation and coordination in developing a comprehensive approach to Mali’s multiple crises and the greater Sahel. The 

U.N. Secretary General’s recent appointment of a special envoy for the Sahel will 

help provide the needed facilitation and coordination. We will discuss the drafting 

of the Secretary General’s integrated strategy for the Sahel, at a meeting in Rome 

meeting on December 7. We will also discuss coordination at a UNSC ministeriallevel discussion on the situation in the Sahel to be convened by the Kingdom of 

Morocco on December 10 during its Presidency of the Security Council. UNSC ResoFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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lution 2071 provided a useful framework for addressing Mali’s four overlapping challenges. It is important that the next UNSC resolution, which will be based in part 

on the U.N. Secretary General’s report to the Security Council on Mali, ensures that 

the restoration of democracy, political negotiations with northern populations, and 

the humanitarian response receive the same level of priority as military preparations to oust AQIM. 

ECOWAS clearly has a very important role to play in coordination. Mali was a 

founding member of ECOWAS and 5 of the organization’s 15 Member States share 

borders with Mali. But we have to recognize that Algeria and Mauritania also border Mali, but are not members of ECOWAS. We have encouraged ECOWAS, the AU 

and our international partners to structure their engagements on Mali in a way that 

will incorporate Mali’s neighbors, including Algeria and Mauritania. 

We are continuing to work with our international partners to develop a specific 

plan for any military intervention in northern Mali that includes details on costand burden-sharing for the intervention. We look forward to consulting with Congress further to ensure the support necessary to make our policy in Mali successful. 

In closing, addressing these four overlapping challenges will require comprehensive, sustained and dedicated regional and international support. The United States 

continues to encourage Mali to prepare for elections to restore democratic governance. We are committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We support inclusive dialogue and negotiation to address the economic and social needs of 

marginalized groups in the north. We support reunification of Malian territory, both 

through negotiations with those Malians who support a unified and secular state 

and through well-financed, -resourced, and -managed military action to dislodge terrorists. And we continue to address the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region with 

assistance.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Carson, for your service and your very active and effective 

engagement with the region over such a long period. We’re always 

grateful to have your testimony. 

Next we turn to Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast. 

STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR 

AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GAST. Good morning, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member 

Isakson. Thank you for inviting me to speak before you today. I 

have submitted a longer statement for the record, but I thought I 

would use my time to briefly give you an update on the current situation and how it has affected our development programming, as 

well as outline some of the key factors that are needed for development to progress. 

The U.N. reports that 4.6 million persons in Mali are affected

by food insecurity and in need of assistance. They are recovering

from last year’s food shocks, high prices, and the effects of conflict 

and displacement. Nearly 200,000 Malians have been displaced 

within the country, and another 210,000 have fled to neighboring 

countries. 

In the north, international and local humanitarian actors are 

able to provide assistance in many places. However, access still 

remains negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and it is often very 

inconsistent. 

Moving forward, a necessary component for solving Mali’s complex crises is the establishment of a democratically elected government by April 2013, as called for by ECOWAS. The Government of 

Mali must pursue preparations for elections at the same time that 

it resolves the crisis in the north. To do this successfully, a legitimate process is needed to maximize the participation of populations that have been displaced by the violence. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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It is also necessary to develop provisions for how the north will 

be meaningfully included in a new government, and to engage the 

broader Malian population in a dialogue about national reconciliation. 

Prior to the coup, USAID’s broad development portfolio included 

activities to strengthen democratic institutions, grow the agricultural sector, support literacy and education, improve community 

health and health systems, and manage instability and threats in 

the north, and Mali had made significant gains in these areas. 

Annual economic growth averaged more than 5 percent across the 

past decade, reducing the incidence of poverty from 56 percent to 

44 percent by 2010. That was over a period of about 10 years. 

Mali liberalized its cereal markets. It opened up trade routes, 

and it improved conditions for doing business. 

What we have seen is that agricultural production has increased, 

particularly in areas where USAID support has been active. 

As a result of the March 2012 coup in Mali, the U.S. Government 

formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali. However, our support to address the emergency health, nutrition, and 

food needs of the Malian people continues. 

In evaluating which programs can move forward in light of the 

applicable legal restrictions, we consider whether they provide 

essential life-saving assistance, whether they support children, 

strengthen food security, or advance U.S. foreign policy. We also 

consider operational issues, including efficient management and 

oversight. This case-by-case analysis ensures that there is careful 

consideration of the context surrounding a proposed activity. 

Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor supporting elections in Mali. Programs trained poll workers and improved election 

monitoring systems, strengthened political parties, and provided 

voter education. 

When the electoral support activities resume, provided the consent of Congress, assistance will help support a foundation for free 

and fair elections in Mali and a peaceful political exit from the current situation. A key issue will be ensuring the inclusion and participation of the internally displaced persons and refugees in the 

political process. 

We plan to expand our election assistance programming to include broader civic engagement activities to support national reconciliation as part of the return to an inclusive democratic Malian 

society. The only USAID-supported economic growth activities that 

are continuing in Mali are those that address food security under 

the Feed the Future Initiative. Agricultural assistance has focused 

on supporting farmers and herders to increase their productivity, 

strengthen market linkages, and increase resilience to drought. 

Some health sector activities have been approved to continue, including programs aimed at preventing maternal and child mortality through the provision of basic community health services, 

support of malaria testing and treatment, and other critically community-based health interventions. 

Our approach to development programming is affected by the 

current political and security situation in Mali and how it develops. 

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives recently conducted an 

assessment to determine the feasibility and appropriateness of a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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transition program in Mali. If initiated, this program would allow 

the U.S. Government to respond to any opportunities and challenges that arise in the course of the transition, particularly in the 

areas of peace and security and reconciliation. 

The ability of the United States to resume full assistance will 

depend on a democratically elected government taking office. 

USAID continues to monitor current humanitarian needs and plan 

for possible future needs in Mali. Since the crisis in April, USAID 

has provided nearly $80 million to address humanitarian needs 

among Malians affected by drought and conflict. 

While initial harvest projections are positive for this coming year, 

the most vulnerable will continue to need additional assistance for 

recovery and resilience to future shocks. In the north we will continue to respond to needs when and where access allows. 

While USAID can provide immediate relief to the people, help set 

the foundation for democratic elections, and provide basic social 

services in the interim, Mali’s future development must be led

by the Malian people. This can only be achieved through a duly 

elected and participatory government against the background of 

peace and stability. 

Accordingly, it is critical that the Government of Mali and the 

Malian people be encouraged to pursue a simultaneous and multipronged approach to the return to democracy, accountability, and 

a negotiated peace. None of these gains will be sustainable in the 

absence of the other. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I welcome any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR EARL GAST

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for inviting me to speak with you today. Mali is facing a complex emergency: 

a political crisis, recovery from a major drought, and threats to internal and regional security. I would like to provide an update on the current situation and how 

it has affected our programming, as well as outline the key factors that are needed 

for development to progress. 

COMPLEX EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENT

Insufficient rains during the 2011 Sahel agricultural season led to nearly 19 million people being at risk of food insecurity, nearly half of whom required emergency 

food assistance during 2012, according to national governments and U.N. data. In 

fiscal year 2012, the governments of eight Sahel countries and the U.S. Government 

declared disasters. Since the beginning of this year, the United States has responded with more than $445 million in programming across eight countries in the 

Sahel. Food insecurity was exacerbated by the conflict in northern Mali, which led 

to large population displacement inside of Mali and to refugee flows in neighboring 

countries, further straining the ability of both displaced people and host communities to cope with increased food insecurity. 

Although all indications are that this past agricultural season was above average, 

the U.N. reports that 4.6 million people in Mali are affected by food insecurity and 

will still need additional assistance in order to recover from last year’s food shocks 

and deal with the ongoing high food prices and the effects of conflict and displacement. Humanitarian actors are currently refining monitoring of internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) and conducting individual registration of refugees. While this is ongoing, the numbers will fluctuate; the most recent estimates of IDPs inside of Mali 

stands at nearly 200,000 and the number of refugees is reported to be more than 

210,000. In the North, the conflict has more or less stabilized for the moment, allowing international and local humanitarian actors to provide assistance in many 

places. Many markets are open and trade is flowing across borders, and while there 

are more than 20 humanitarian organizations currently active in northern Mali, acFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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cess still remains negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The ongoing uncertainty has 

halted foreign and domestic investment in Mali, economic and tourism activity has 

slowed, and according to some estimates, 2012 economic growth projections have 

dropped from previous estimates of 6 percent to negative 1 percent or worse. It is 

also estimated that government revenues are one-fourth the level they were just 1 

year ago and accordingly, that the majority of basic social services are being provided by humanitarian organizations. 

In October, the U.N. Security Council adopted an important resolution addressing 

the overlapping governance, security, and humanitarian crises affecting Mali. In 

November, ECOWAS announced a plan to send an African-led force into northern 

Mali to resolve the security crisis. The United States has called on the interim 

Malian Government to engage in negotiations in earnest and appoint a lead negotiator for the north, demonstrating commitment to unifying the country. 

The Government of Mali must pursue preparations for broadly inclusive, legitimate, democratic elections in parallel to negotiations and military intervention to 

resolve the crisis in the north. The restoration of democratically elected government 

in Mali by April 2013, as called for by ECOWAS, is a crucial component of the overall long-term solution to Mali’s current crises. We support efforts by the interim government to ensure a legitimate process that maximizes the participation of populations that have been displaced by the violence, to develop provisions for how the 

North will be reflected in a new government, and to engage the broader Malian population in a dialogue about national reconciliation. 

Progress on security and the restoration of democracy is also linked to accountability. Persons must be held accountable for abuses, including abuses against civilians that have occurred in the context of this crisis. Accountability supports our 

peace and democracy objectives by helping victims, and society as a whole, address 

past wrongs and move toward the future. 

PAST DEVELOPMENT GAINS AT RISK

Mali has been a strong partner, particularly in the area of economic growth 

through the U.S. Government’s Feed the Future Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation program. The current threats to Mali’s stability and development 

are all the more concerning given the cooperation that has characterized relations 

between our governments and Mali’s past development gains. 

Prior to the coup, in fiscal year 2011, USAID and the Department of State provided $137.9 million in bilateral foreign assistance to Mali. The broad development 

portfolio included activities to strengthen democratic institutions, promote inclusive 

and sustainable agricultural growth, support literacy and educational development, 

improve health status and health systems, and manage instability and threats in 

the North. 

U.S. assistance has advanced significant development gains in Mali through our 

longstanding partnerships. I would like to outline just a few examples of the 

progress that has been made. These development gains are precarious in the current 

situation, and underscore the promise of the Malian people and the importance of 

returning to democratic rule. 

Over the past decade, annual economic growth has averaged more than 5 percent, 

reducing the incidence of poverty from 56 percent in 2001 to 44 percent in 2010. 

In the past two decades, under-5 mortality was reduced from 255 to 178 per 1,000 

live births—still ranking among the highest in the world, but demonstrating 

progress nevertheless. Access to education has increased from 20 percent of primary 

school children in school in the 1990s to 80 percent of children in school in 2011. 

Prior to the coup, print and radio media were vibrant and largely independent with 

230 stations, many established with USAID support, reaching more than 80 percent 

of the population. 

Mali has liberalized its cereal markets, opened up trade routes, and improved conditions for doing business. The most vulnerable have survived drought and other 

disasters through the response and resilience provided by USAID’s assistance. Agricultural production has increased in three regions where USAID has focused its 

assistance as a result of improved seeds and other inputs, extension services to improve farming methods and techniques, and farm-to-market linkages with greater 

private sector involvement. 

In addition, Mali has been a central participant in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) from its onset. Programs to address drivers of violent 

extremism were implemented in the Northern regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, 

focusing on radio programming, basic education, out-of-school youth vocational 

training, microenterprise development, governance, and conflict prevention and 

peace-building. USAID established 10 FM radio stations reaching 385,000 people, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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and extended national interactive radio instruction to 200,000 students at 1,270 religious schools (madrasas). Prior to the coup, the program had just begun a significant expansion to increase the scope of activities and geographic reach in the north. 

While USAID has made significant contributions to Malian development through 

its long engagement in the country and the hard work and diligence of the Malian 

people, recent events stand to reverse these gains. 

LIFE-SAVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONTINUES WHILE ASSESSING FUTURE NEEDS

As the complex crisis began to unfold in Mali, USAID proactively supported early 

initiatives to mitigate the impacts of food insecurity through programs aimed at increasing agricultural production, improving diets, and strengthening livelihoods—all 

of which limited the impact of this year’s shocks. Early fiscal year 2012 programs 

also focused on mitigating the impact of food insecurity through local and regional 

procurement of food, support for livestock health, and cash-based assistance to sustain adequate food consumption during the particularly hard lean season. In 

response to the conflict in the North, USAID scaled up assistance for IDPs, host 

families, and other conflict-affected populations, both in southern Mali, where populations were already struggling with decreased food availability, and in the North, 

once need was assessed and security permitted the safe delivery of life-saving assistance. USAID worked closely with the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which provided timely support to the Office of the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 

other U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations to respond to the resultant 

refugee situation. 

For the current crisis, USAID has provided over $80 million to address humanitarian and food needs among drought and conflict affected Malians. In addition, the 

U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provided 

more than $40 million in humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region and 

conflict-affected populations throughout the region. 

For the coming year, the humanitarian situation is likely to be similarly complex. 

While initial harvest projections are positive, the most vulnerable will continue to 

need additional assistance in order to promote their recovery from the previous 

drought and help build their resilience to future food crises. Many vulnerable people 

took on large debts or sold productive assets to cope with last year’s shocks. In addition, the conflict in Northern Mali remains fluid with various groups continuing to 

compete for position and territory in advance of a presumed ECOWAS military 

intervention, which will likely result in additional internal displacement and refugee 

outflows in 2013. USAID continues to monitor current humanitarian needs and plan 

for possible future needs in Mali. 

In the year to come, we aim to support recovery from the past drought and build 

resilience to future droughts by helping the most vulnerable to diversify their livelihoods, improve agricultural productivity, improve livestock practices, and adopt 

behaviors that improve nutritional status. In terms of IDPs currently in southern 

Mali, many are congregating in urban areas. Recent evidence has shown that they 

are increasingly moving out of host family situations and are in need of housing and 

livelihoods. In response, USAID plans to provide resources to ensure appropriate 

housing, likely in the form of cash grants to assist with rent and support livelihood 

development. In the north, USAID will continue to support livelihoods, safe water, 

sanitation and security, as well as respond to newly identified needs when and 

where access allows. USAID, with the State Department, also supports U.N.-led 

regional humanitarian contingency planning for displacement and other likely 

humanitarian needs in advance of any military intervention in the North. 

PRESERVING THE FOUNDATION NEEDED FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY

In addition to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, USAID recognizes the need 

in times of crisis to deliver basic social services and thus preserve the foundation 

needed to resume a democratic, peaceful, and productive society. The continuity of 

carefully provided development assistance in Mali is critical to supporting a return 

to constitutional and accountable governance. It is also important to protecting the 

considerable development gains that Mali has achieved, maintaining stability and 

encouraging the economic and social conditions that facilitate a rapid rebound following the reestablishment of elected leadership. 

As you are aware, section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (SFOAA) states that no funds appropriated under titles III through VI of that act can be, ‘‘obligated or expended to 

finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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head of government is deposed by military coup d’etat.’’ This restriction applies to 

assistance to the central, regional, and local governments of Mali. 

On April 10, 2012, the United States formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali, consistent with coup restrictions in the SFOAA. Some of the activities that were terminated included capacity-building programs for the Government 

of Mali Department of Health, public school construction, support for government 

efforts to increase agricultural production, and government capacity-building to spur 

commercial investment. Other assistance to Mali was also suspended on policy 

grounds, though certain forms of humanitarian assistance (including food assistance) and elections support were never terminated or suspended based on available 

legal authorities. 

Programs that are life-saving, critical assistance in health and food security, as 

well as democratic elections support programming, have been under consideration 

for resumption as part of a case-by-case policy and legal review. In evaluating which 

programs can move forward in light of the applicable legal restrictions, USAID and 

the State Department consider the policy importance of the activities—for example, 

whether the proposed activity provides essential life-saving assistance, supports 

children or strengthens food security, advances a strategic U.S. foreign policy objective—as well as operational considerations, including efficient management and 

oversight of funding. This case-by-case analysis ensures that there is a careful consideration of the context surrounding a proposed activity and the expected impact 

of such an activity if it is approved to move forward. The analysis also takes into 

consideration how to protect previous U.S. Government investments in the proposed 

activity. 

Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor supporting Mali’s planned April 

2012 elections, with activities that provided training of poll workers, political party 

strengthening, elections monitoring, and voter education. When the electoral support activities resume, assistance will help support a foundation for free and fair 

elections in Mali and a peaceful political exit from the current situation. A key issue 

in resuming assistance will be ensuring the inclusion and participation of internally 

displaced persons and refugees in the political process. USAID plans to expand its 

elections assistance program to include broader civic engagement activities to support national reconciliation as part of the return to an inclusive, democratic Malian 

society. 

The only USAID-supported economic growth activities that are continuing in Mali 

are those that address food security under the Feed the Future Initiative. Agricultural assistance has focused on supporting farmers and herders to increase their 

productivity, strengthen market linkages, and increase resilience to drought. This 

continued assistance is critical not only to preventing further deterioration of the 

food security situation in-country, but also to maintaining the stability of the most 

populated parts of the country that are outside of the conflict areas. 

Some health sector activities have been approved to continue in order to provide 

life-saving interventions. These include programs aimed at preventing maternal and 

child mortality through the provision of basic community health services, support 

of malaria testing and treatment, and other critical community-based health interventions. 

USAID has currently suspended all education activities in Mali that benefited the 

Government of Mali, which included teacher training, curriculum development, and 

other forms of education assistance. USAID’s peace and security programs, including those under the TSCTP, are generally on hold pending further analysis of the 

operating environment and policy considerations. A minimal amount of communitybased programs that address peace-building and youth engagement are slated to 

continue. 

These decisions are affected by the current political and security situation in Mali, 

with recognition that these are complex challenges. The ability of the United States 

to resume full assistance will depend on a democratically elected government taking 

office. 

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The restoration of democracy and the return to a development focus in Mali is 

important to the region and to Africa as a whole. As the situation evolves, we remain vigilant to changes in the operating environment and the risks and opportunities involved. 

Lives and livelihoods are at great risk without the prompt resolution of the current political, security, and food crises. While these crises are complex and interrelated, they also vary with regards to their timeframes for resolution. Under the 

right conditions, Mali has the potential to be a major food producer for the region 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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as well as advance trade and economic growth. Its history of partnership with the 

United States to improve health, education, and living conditions is noteworthy. 

While USAID can provide immediate relief to the people, help set the foundation 

for democratic elections, and provide basic social services in the interim, Mali’s future development must be led by the Malian people. This can only be achieved 

through a duly elected and participatory government against a background of peace, 

stability, and accountability for past abuses. Accordingly, it is critical that the Government of Mali and the Malian people be encouraged to pursue a simultaneous and 

multipronged approach to the return to democracy, accountability, and a negotiated 

peace. None of these gains will be sustainable in the absence of the other. 

I thank you for the opportunity for today’s discussion and invite any questions you 

have on our assistance to Mali and its development outlook.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Assistant Administrator Gast. 

Next we turn to Ms. Amanda Dory from the Department of 

Defense. 

Ms. Dory. 

STATEMENT OF AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. DORY. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson. I add my thanks for the opportunity to speak 

about the overlapping challenges in Mali and the broader Sahel 

region this morning, and how the Department of Defense fits into 

the broader picture of how the U.S. Government is addressing this 

situation. 

Department of Defense is extremely concerned about instability 

in Mali and is working closely with our interagency partners to 

strengthen efforts at countering AQIM and affiliates, as well as 

supporting Malian efforts to restore its territorial sovereignty. Our 

approach is to support Mali’s neighbors to isolate the terrorist 

threat and to enable ECOWAS and others to degrade AQIM while 

working to restore Malian sovereignty. 

This approach is consistent with section 7008 of the fiscal 2012 

State Appropriations Act, which proscribes certain assistance to the 

government of any country whose duly elected government is 

deposed by military coup. As a result of the coup in Mali, DOD

has ceased mil-to-mil capacity-building efforts with the Malian 

military. 

Since January 2012, northern, primarily Tuareg groups have 

waged a rebellion, driven by longstanding political and economic 

grievances. This rebellion is the fourth such rebellion since Mali 

gained its independence in 1960. Although not caused by instability 

in Libya, the flows of militants and weapons from Libya have 

strengthened the rebellion and made it more difficult for the 

Malian authorities to combat it this time. 

In late March, the President was overthrown by forces loyal to 

Captain Sanogo, who then installed a junta government. In response, ECOWAS imposed sanctions, as did the United States and 

others. ECOWAS has since brokered an agreement with the parties 

to establish an interim government, but Captain Sanogo continues 

to influence decisionmaking in Mali as head of a military reform 

committee. 

Northern Mali has become a safe haven for extremist and terrorist groups, including AQIM and affiliates. As the Government of 

Mali lost control of its northern territory, these groups took over 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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administration of northern cities and began imposing a harsh 

version of sharia law. This expanded safe haven and control of territory allows al-Qaeda and its affiliates to recruit supporters more 

easily and to export extremism. It also gives them greater control 

over illicit trafficking networks that provide an important element 

of their funding. 

Beyond the obvious threat to Mali’s citizens and its neighbors, 

the growing terrorist presence in Mali also threatens U.S. citizens 

and our interests in the region, to include the ability to attack embassies and conduct kidnapping operations. Although AQIM has 

not demonstrated an ability to attack targets in the United States 

homeland, it does have a history of attacks in the Sahel and 

Maghreb, and has expressed an intent to target Europe. 

The United States approach is focused on restoring democratic 

governance and security in Mali. This will require democratic elections, a political settlement of legitimate northern grievances, the 

restoration of Malian sovereignty, focused pressure on AQIM, and 

continuing a civilian-led response to the humanitarian situation. 

Department of Defense is working with African partners to enable 

ECOWAS to conduct military planning for an African-led international military force called AFISMA. This is very much an African-led process. Our efforts are aimed at making our partners more 

capable both at combating the terrorist threat in their territories 

and at providing better security for their people more generally. 

The worsening situation in Mali also poses a risk to the surrounding governments in the region, especially Mauritania and 

Niger. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is the 

interagency mechanism for coordinating U.S. Government capability efforts to enable governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to 

counter AQIM. Department of Defense, the State Department, 

USAID, and others work closely to coordinate our capacity-building 

efforts to ensure unity of effort with the 10 participating partners, 

which include Mali and its neighbors. 

ECOWAS, with the support of other partners, is planning for a 

military intervention in northern Mali in tandem with the African 

Union’s work on a comprehensive strategic concept for the resolution of the crises in Mali. 

Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa Command, is actively supporting the military planning effort through the provision 

of planning expertise. The broad strategic concept for that deployment is sound. More specific planning is underway to address myriad operational details. 

The U.S. Government is exploring options for supporting countries that contribute forces to the ECOWAS mission. This could include the provision of training and equipment to countries that 

would contribute forces to deploy as part of the AFISMA international military force and additional planning and advisory support. 

I’ll stop for now and look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AMANDA DORY

Mister Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

speak with you today about the overlapping challenges in Mali and how the Department of Defense is responding to the situation. 

The Department of Defense is extremely concerned about the instability in Mali 

and is working closely with interagency partners, especially in the State Department, to strengthen our efforts at countering Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) and supporting Malian efforts to restore its territorial sovereignty. 

Our policy is to support Mali’s neighbors to isolate the terrorist threat, and concurrently to enable the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to degrade AQIM while working to restore Malian sovereignty. This approach is consistent with the section 7008 of the FY 2012 State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, which proscribes certain assistance to the government 

of any country whose duly elected government is deposed by military coup d’etat. 

As a result of the coup in Mali, DOD has ceased mil-to-mil capacity-building efforts 

with the Malian military. 

Since January 2012, northern, primarily Tuareg, groups, have waged a rebellion, 

driven by longstanding political and economic grievances. This rebellion is the 

fourth Tuareg rebellion since Mali gained its independence in 1960. Although the 

rebellion was not caused by instability in Libya, the flows of militants and weapons 

from Libya strengthened the rebellion and made it more difficult for the Malian 

authorities to combat it. 

In late March, President Ahmadou Toumani Toure was overthrown by forces loyal 

to Captain Amadou Sanogo, who then installed a junta government. In response, 

ECOWAS imposed sanctions, and the State Department reached the conclusion that 

a military coup d’etat had occurred, triggering the appropriations act restriction on 

most assistance to that government. As stated before, the Department of Defense 

followed suit, ceasing all DOD capacity-building efforts in Mali. ECOWAS brokered 

an agreement with the parties involved to establish an interim government, with 

Diouncounda Traore as President and Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister. 

Captain Sanogo continues to influence decisionmaking in Mali as head of a military 

reform committee. 

Northern Mali has become a safe haven for extremist and terrorist groups, including AQIM and affiliates. As the Government of Mali lost control of its northern territory, these groups took over the administration of northern cities and began imposing a harsh version of Islamic sharia law. This expanded safe haven and control 

of territory allows al-Qaeda and its affiliates to recruit supporters more easily and 

to export extremism. It also gives them greater control over illicit trafficking networks that provide part of their funding. 

The growing terrorist presence in Mali threatens U.S. citizens, interests, and partners in the region. AQIM maintains the ability to attack regional embassies and 

other Western interests, and to attack or kidnap Westerners in the region for ransom. Indeed the group is currently holding Western hostages. Although AQIM has 

not demonstrated an ability to attack targets in the United States, it does have a 

history of attacks in the Sahel and Maghreb, and has expressed an intent to target 

Europe. 

The U.S. approach is focused on restoring democratic governance and security in 

Mali. This will require democratic elections, a political settlement of legitimate 

northern grievances, the restoration of Malian sovereignty, increased pressure on 

AQIM, and continuing a civilian-led response to the humanitarian situation. The 

Department of Defense is working through African partners to enable ECOWAS to 

conduct military planning and limit the threat posed by AQIM. Failure to provide 

robust support to local partners at this stage could allow the threat to grow to a 

point where regional states could no longer address it. This is very much an Africanled process and our efforts are aimed at making our partners more capable, both 

at combating the terrorist threat in their territories and at providing better security 

for their people generally. 

The worsening situation in Mali is also a risk to the surrounding governments in 

the region, especially Mauritania and Niger. The lack of Malian control in the north, 

the increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons, and a history 

of Tuareg grievances in the region, raise the possibility that the situation in Mali 

could destabilize neighboring states. The food insecurity across the region further 

underscores the fragile political situation in the region. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the interagency 

mechanism for coordinating U.S. Government capacity-building efforts to enable 

governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to counter AQIM and has 10 regional partners. The Department of Defense, the State Department, USAID, and others work 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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closely to coordinate our capacity-building efforts to ensure unity of effort. Mauritania and Niger are both critical partners in TSCTP and are acting proactively to 

defend their territories, but their capacity is limited. For those reasons, the Department of Defense—in close coordination with the State Department—is providing 

capacity-building assistance to these governments. These efforts include enhancing 

Mauritania’s ability to collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

and to project power throughout its territory. We are also supporting Niger to help 

it better control its borders and project power within its territory. 

ECOWAS, with the support of other partners, is planning for a military intervention in northern Mali in tandem with the African Union’s Strategic Concept for the 

Resolution of the Crises in Mali. The Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa 

Command, is actively supporting the military planning effort through the provision 

of planning expertise. The broad strategic concept for that deployment is sound; 

more specific planning is underway to address operational shortfalls. We understand 

that the ECOWAS mission in the north will have the dual objectives of restoring 

Malian national sovereignty and countering al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The United 

States strongly believes in the need to address the parallel political, security, and 

humanitarian crises simultaneously. 

The U.S. Government is considering options for supporting countries that contribute forces to the ECOWAS mission. This could include the provision of training 

and equipment to countries that would contribute forces to deploy as part of the 

international military force and additional planning and advisory support. France 

and the European Union are also planning to provide significant support, and it will 

be critical to coordinate our efforts closely. The specific needs of troop contributing 

countries are not clear yet. Once we better understand the needs of the ECOWAS 

troop contributing countries, we will be able to assess how the U.S. Government and 

other international partners can best support that effort.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory. I’m grateful to the panel and for the opportunity to 

explore further this complex and very challenging situation. 

If I might, first just on the question of sequencing, all three of 

you spoke to the interrelated and complex challenges on the path 

toward restoring democracy, dealing with humanitarian issues, 

addressing historic grievances in the north, and resolving security 

concerns in the north. In fact, Secretary Carson, I think you said 

in your testimony a response to any one of these challenges must 

not be dependent upon the achievement of another. Yet, they seem 

inextricably intertwined. 

For reasons of our own laws, which I support, we’ve ceased milto-mil aid. We’ve cut off a lot of vital aid that will then make more 

difficult, in some ways, the accomplishment of the security objectives, the electoral objectives. 

Please, if you would, in turn, just explain how you see the 

sequencing of events—elections, addressing regional and historic 

grievances in the north, restoration of sort of basic humanitarian 

support and services, and regional planning and execution—under 

an ECOWAS Malian-led, regionally led effort. How do these three 

things move forward, and is it possible to move forward on a security resolution without an election? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, a very good question. We 

have said that these four challenges must be handled simultaneously and in parallel. They must all be considered critical, and 

they all must be considered important. Addressing some of these 

challenges along one lane will move faster than along another lane, 

but we should not hold any one of these programs or efforts or 

streams of activity hostage to the success or the completion of 

another. 

For example, we have to move forward in continuing to provide 

humanitarian services and assistance to the north, to displaced 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

populations to the extent that we have access to them through 

NGOs and through the international community, and we are doing 

that. We are continuing to push as hard as we can for political 

negotiations between Tuareg groups and nonterrorist groups in the 

north with the government. We are at the same time moving forward with discussions about military planning and preparation. 

And primarily on the democracy front, we do think that it’s absolutely critical that the government not lose sight, in putting down 

a strategy, a roadmap, and a timetable for the return to democracy 

in that country. 

I mention this last because in many ways it’s critically important. If, in fact, there are going to be successful political negotiations with the Tuareg and the other northern groups who have 

political and social-economic grievances, they have to have a legitimate government in Bamako that they can rely on to fulfill these 

agreements. This has been a failure in the past. Negotiations and 

deals have been made with the Tuareg and others, and the government in Bamako has reneged on them. There needs to be a credible 

government in Bamako to be sure that these things are going to 

be done. 

Equally, while we move ahead and work with ECOWAS and the 

international community on an African-led response to the terrorist 

problem in the north against AQIM and extremist groups, in the 

end, even if these terrorist groups are pushed out and eliminated, 

there will need to be a credible government in Bamako capable of 

extending services and providing security and authority over the 

areas that are recaptured from the north. 

So there is a centrality in all of this. There also needs to be a 

credible government there to be able to deliver humanitarian response and to build up resilience against recurring droughts and 

food shortages, all in parallel, simultaneously. We should not hold 

the continued movement toward democracy hostage to the success 

of the military operations. We should not hold military operations 

and planning hostage to the completion of a restoration of democracy. But we must keep all four of these things clearly as objectives 

and goals, moving simultaneously toward them. 

Senator COONS. Let me follow up with a more focused question 

about elections. In order to have a government that is credible in 

terms of negotiating some resolution to historic grievances that 

have led to four Tuareg rebellions, how critical is it to have northern participation in the election, and how is it possible to have 

meaningful northern participation in the election with 400,000 

IDPs and refugees and with a very unstable security situation in 

the north? These two seem inextricably intertwined and very difficult. If you could just briefly address the question, how do you 

include northern participation in the election? 

Ambassador CARSON. It can be done, and it would have been 

done in April 2012. The coup in March occurred approximately 6 

weeks before national elections were to be held. They would have 

been difficult elections in the north, but they could have, in fact, 

occurred. 

It’s important to remember both a little bit about the geography 

as well as the population distribution. Although some 55 percent 

of the north has been taken over by the rebellious groups, only 10 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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percent of Mali’s population lives in the northern part of the country. Some 90 percent of the population would have been able to 

carry on with elections. 

But we also realize it is important not to exclude the north, but 

to include the north. Even today, it is possible to accommodate 

many, many of the northerners. We estimate that something in the 

neighborhood of 800,000 to 1 million people are residing in the 

north—resided in the north. We think that probably half of that 

population, as we’ve talked about, has in fact left—approximately 

400,000 people—200,000 dispersed in refugee camps in the region, 

particularly in Mauritania, where one camp has 110,000 Malians. 

There are approximately 30,000 to 40,000 in Niger and Burkina 

Faso, and 200,000 dispersed to the south. 

If there were elections, the elections could be held in the 

Mauritanian refugee camp, supervised by the UNHCR or with 

their assistance. This has happened before in other places, and 

those who are in the south as displaced persons could also be identified so that they could vote. It’s not ideal but, in fact, it could 

occur. 

Historically, the north has voted in a smaller percentage of the 

population than any other zone, and we estimate that in the last 

national elections it accounted for a very, very small percentage of 

the national turnout. The north must be included because we 

believe that, aside from the AQIM threat, there is a legitimate concern that people in the north have not benefited the way people in 

the south have from education, from health care, infrastructure. So 

they must be accommodated because this is important. 

But we don’t think that the movement toward the restoration of 

democracy should be held hostage to a complete military victory in 

the north. That’s a date that is uncertain, and we may not know 

it. And there was tremendous instability across the north during 

the last national elections, as well. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

I’m going to turn to Senator Isakson for our next set of questions. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ms. Dory, for your testimony. I have a question for 

you which I understand I may need to receive the answer in a 

secure area, which I would be happy to do. But in your statement, 

you say AQIM maintains an ability to attack regional embassies 

and other Western interests, and to attack or kidnap Westerners 

in the region for ransom. 

Given what happened in Benghazi, do you know if we have any 

evidence that it was Al Qaeda in the Maghreb that was a part of 

the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, and ultimately the 

death of Chris Stevens? 

Ms. DORY. I think in this setting we can say that AQIM played 

a role, and the investigations are still underway precisely how 

AQIM members interacted with others, and the rest is better left 

to a closed session. 

Senator ISAKSON. And we’ll try and arrange that at some appropriate time. 

On that same point, you acknowledge that U.S. Africa Command 

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tion in the north. I guess that should be a potential intervention 

in the north. Is that correct? 

Ms. DORY. It’s correct to say that the intervention is in the planning phases at this point. The intervention would be led by the 

Malian Armed Forces with support from the international military 

force. There is no construct or intention of having a U.S. boots-onthe-ground type of support to that intervention, but at this point 

we’re providing planning and support exclusively, and we will look 

at opportunities to provide training support to those partners with 

whom we can engage. 

Senator ISAKSON. In your statement it says we understand the 

ECOWAS mission in the north will have dual objectives of restoring Malian national sovereignty and countering al-Qaeda and its 

affiliates. I understand the sovereignty goal. On countering alQaeda, you’re talking about a significant, potentially significant 

military intervention. Do you think the people that you’re planning 

to train are going to be sufficiently capable of taking on a force like 

al-Qaeda? 

Ms. DORY. For any military force to succeed, it’s a combination 

of training, equipping, and will. I believe that the countries in the 

region are demonstrating the will and the intent to intervene. They 

are certainly capable to do some of the related missions, and for 

those where additional training and equipping is required, that’s 

the role of the international community to provide that support. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Carson, thank you, as always, for your tireless 

efforts on behalf of the African people and the United States interests in Africa. I appreciate the great job that you do. 

On the question that was raised by Senator Coons regarding 

elections and your statement that it’s absolutely essential that the 

north be included in those elections—I think that’s what you said, 

and I agree with that—we have a recommendation. I haven’t talked 

this over with the chairman yet, but I think I’m right. You can tell 

me if I’m wrong. 

There’s a gentleman in Nigeria who pulled off the Nigerian elections when Goodluck Jonathan was elected. He was the election 

commissioner. His name was Yaeger, if I’m not mistaken. Jaeger? 

I’d get him over there in a heartbeat and see if you couldn’t get 

his help to do that because he overcame similar obstacles of violence, and it was in the north where they had their problems in 

Nigeria. So I just wanted to throw that out as possible help. 

Mr. Gast, on delivering—we’ve got a bunch of people hungry 

because we had a famine in Mali, particularly in the north. Since 

the coup, have we been disrupted from being able to get humanitarian aid to the people in Mali? 

Mr. GAST. Initially, Senator, I would say that that was the case. 

There was a period where no humanitarian assistance was being 

delivered. Since then, since the early months, our partners who are 

operating in the north have been able to negotiate access. For the 

most part, the population in need, their needs are being met. 

And so in addition to the displaced persons, whether they’re refugees or internally displaced persons, as well as those who are still 

residing in the north, the needs are being met. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator ISAKSON. Has the coup in the north caused a refugee 

problem in any of the bordering countries? Have there been people 

who have left Mali because of the disruption? 

Mr. GAST. Yes, roughly 210,000 persons. 

Senator ISAKSON. And where have they gone? 

Mr. GAST. Mainly to Mauritania. The majority have gone into 

Mauritania, and then a sizeable population going into Niger. 

Senator ISAKSON. Is USAID assisting in those camps to get

humanitarian services? 

Mr. GAST. We are, but primarily through PRM. 

Senator ISAKSON. And PRM stands for——

Mr. GAST. I’m sorry. That’s the State Department Population, 

Refugee and Migration Bureau. 

Senator ISAKSON. You have the most acronyms of anybody I’ve 

ever heard. 

Mr. GAST. Sorry about that. [Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. I’m going to have to learn acronyms one of 

these days. 

Mr. GAST. The short answer is yes, the needs are being met. 

Senator ISAKSON. Good. 

Ambassador Carson, the goal is to have elections by April. Is that 

right? 

Ambassador CARSON. Yes, sir, by April or as soon as technically 

feasible. 

Senator ISAKSON. I’d just ask this question and get you to just 

opine on it. It’s not really a specific question. But if you have a 20-

year successful democracy in West Africa, which Mali was, and 

then you have a coup, things leading up to that coup had to take 

place which created some degree of instability, and also those 

things probably are still present to a certain extent and need to be 

overcome for an election. Do you know what led to the deterioration 

of the democracy that caused the coup? 

Ambassador CARSON. The proximate cause of the coup was the 

series of military defeats that occurred in the north. These were 

military defeats at the hands of the Tuareg. The military felt very 

strongly that it was being underresourced, that it was not being 

given the kind of equipment and material support that it required 

to go after the Tuareg rebels and to fight a successful military 

campaign. 

The Tuareg, of course, were fighting because they felt that the 

government had not fulfilled its obligations under the last agreement signed in Algiers in 2006. This combined with growing discontent among some elite in the south with the corruption of the 

outgoing government under former President ATT were probably 

the precipitating reasons for the coup d’etat. Military discontent 

and elite disaffection in the south with corruption and poor governance and poor delivery of services. 

Senator ISAKSON. So Africa’s biggest developmental problem, 

which is corruption, is still alive and well in Mali. Is that correct? 

Ambassador CARSON. Indeed. I think that the former President, 

ATT, toward the end of his administration, was not resolving, and 

he was not responding effectively to crises in his own country. I 

think that he probably had begun to tune out, had not focused sufficiently on the economic and social issues in the south, and had 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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neglected deeply the issues throughout the north. His leadership 

was starting to flag. His interest had flagged, and he was not doing 

a very effective or energetic job. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

We’ll go to a second round of questions. First, if I might, to Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory, just what is the feasibility of plans 

to train and restructure and equip a force of 5,000 Malian Armed 

Forces? As was just referenced by the Assistant Secretary, the 

proximate cause of the coup in many ways was a series of military 

defeats, and the capacity of the Malian Armed Forces is a critical 

first step. What’s the feasibility of that? Under what timeline is it 

possible to stand up a Malian security force that could actually 

meaningfully contribute to retaking the north? And if elections 

were held, what kind of role might the U.S. be prepared to play 

directly in training or supporting or equipping the Malian forces, 

rather than through regional partners? 

Ms. DORY. In terms of feasibility, I think that’s the key dimension in the planning process, which is at what point do your missions align with your proposed concept of a maneuver in alignment 

with the force generation process? And you don’t engage until 

you’ve assessed that the feasibility in a situation of moderate risk 

is accessible to the force on the ground. So the feasibility is built 

into the planning process, which continues. 

We’re very fond of quoting former Commander in Chief, General 

Eisenhower, in the Department when it comes to focusing. On preparing for a battle, the criticality of the planning process, even 

above the plan itself, is that process of bringing the different military components together, identifying the scheme of maneuver, 

what the vulnerabilities are, how those can be addressed, and then 

interfacing in a very robust way with the political process, to refer 

to your second question. 

I think one of the concerns that we have at this point is that the 

military intervention planning has moved relatively robustly and is 

making excellent progress. The political development, relatively 

speaking, is underdeveloped as far as a political roadmap is concerned, whether it’s the roadmap to elections, as Ambassador Carson was speaking to, or a roadmap for the negotiations between 

Bamako and the various disaffected elements in the north that are 

willing to renounce violence and engage in a negotiations process. 

Obviously, if we get to a point of elections being held and being 

able to resume assistance with the Malian Armed Forces, that will 

be an important step forward for the United States to be able to 

directly help the Malian Armed Forces, in addition to support to 

other troop contributing countries. 

The European Union, France, others have all already begun to 

reengage with Malian Armed Forces. So it’s not as if there is 

absent support for them in the intervening period. 

Senator COONS. What lessons have we learned, if I might, both 

Ms. Dory and Mr. Gast? We were actively engaged—I think the 

USAID mission just celebrated a 50th anniversary in Mali. We 

were actively engaged in mil-to-mil training, equipping, support, 

and very broadly in democracy support and in trying to create and 

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sustain a culture of democracy. What lessons are there that we 

might learn going forward about political failures, ignored domestic 

issues? Our rather abrupt requirement that we break off relations 

and support here has created a great difficulty, with regional consequences. What lessons would you suggest we learn from this? 

Mr. GAST. Thank you, Senator. An excellent question. I would 

say in the best of times, Mali is a country in crisis, and when one 

looks at the human development index, Mali is a country that 

ranks in the bottom dozen. As Assistant Secretary Carson mentioned, 90 percent of the population is in the south, and that population is also in need of services. 

So it is unfortunate that the government hasn’t included, both in 

the delivery of services as well as in the governance of the country, 

the people of the north. And although we have implemented programs in the north, unless there is the connection between government and individuals, our programs aren’t going to have the effect 

of people feeling as though they’re part of the society. 

So there was an effort planned over the last couple of years, 

where the development partners, in tandem with the government, 

the central government, would deliver resources to the north, again 

with the government out in the lead and with the donors supporting. Unfortunately, the pace of that was too slow and not very 

effective. 

Another point moving forward I think is that we do need to concentrate on decentralization and making connection between government delivery of services and the individual at the community 

level. 

Ms. DORY. To build further on the comments about the resource 

base within Mali, clearly there are difficult choices for the government there involved between guns versus better types of decisions, 

and the resourcing for the Malian Armed Forces was insufficient, 

relatively speaking, to the building threat that they now face visa-vis AQIM. I think in terms of the United States support to the 

Malian military, we provided training and equips for many years 

now, but in relatively modest quantities, and I don’t think that 

level of resourcing was commensurate with the threat either. 

I think the other lesson learned for us is to look beyond the tactical level of training that’s provided by Department of Defense to 

consider what ways we might also engage in terms of institutional 

development with defense institutions, and that’s something in the 

last several years where we are really ramping up within the 

Department the ability to provide advisors and other types of institutional reform engagement with various military partners to ensure that, just as we’re looking at strengthening at the tactical 

level, we’re also focusing on the institutional strength of these defense institutions. 

Senator COONS. Let me ask a last question. Then I’ll turn to Senator Isakson. 

Ms. Dory, can we afford to wait what may well be a year for 

planning, training, assembly of a regional force for the completion 

of negotiations for a successful election? In some press accounts, 

AQIM in northern Mali is described as, at this point, the best 

funded, best equipped, most potentially lethal AQ affiliate in the 

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tion that we should have an area the size of Texas controlled by 

terrorists who are engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping, that 

have had an inflow of some sophisticated weaponry from Libya is 

to some quite concerning. 

Can we afford to wait a year for a regional solution, or is that 

the only way to achieve an appropriate security solution? 

Ms. DORY. I think one of the things that, as we look at the situation on the one hand, your question, can we afford to wait, on the 

other hand can we afford not to wait to allow the political environment to be more conducive to a successful military intervention 

and to allow the process of force generation to proceed, which does 

take time to train, equip, develop a force before it’s employed. So 

in a sense, we have few choices but to allow those processes to unfold. Clearly, we’re concerned that it takes time to do so, but I 

think we have a sense of moving forward as rapidly as feasible, as 

rapidly as the circumstances will allow us to do so, recognizing the 

tremendous leadership that the African partners have already 

shown both in terms of the political dynamics and the initiatives 

that are supporting this AFISMA planning process at present. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. I really just have one question. Ms. Dory, if, as 

Johnnie Carson said, or Secretary Carson said, if military discontent with the government support was a major contributing factor to the coup, and the military is going to be a major contributing 

factor to how successful an election is going to be, in your testimony you say there’s a Sanogo, Captain Sanogo is in charge of the 

reform of the military for the interim government, do you know his 

capabilities and whether he’s capable of pulling off the type of 

support it would take to bring the military together to support an 

election? 

Ms. DORY. Captain Sanogo as a field-grade officer is certainly

capable in terms of the activities that he has already caused of creating a difficult condition by mobilizing others to support a coup. 

Whether he is capable of leading the difficult efforts to restructure 

an institution and to mobilize the resources that will be required, 

I would say that I question that at this point. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. That’s all my questions. 

Thank you for your testimony, all of you. 

Senator COONS. I’d like to thank our first panel. I’m mindful of 

the time. We have a four-member second panel. Senator Isakson 

and I, I know both, are very concerned about and interested in this 

and will follow up with each of you, perhaps with additional questions but also actions that are appropriate and ways in which we 

might work together collaboratively to support U.S. efforts in what 

is a very challenging and dynamic security, humanitarian and diplomatic context. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. We’ll take a brief 

break while the second panel comes. 

[Pause.] 

Senator COONS. I’d like to now turn to our second panel on today’s hearing about Mali and the path forward. Our second panel 

will include Mr. Fomunyoh, followed by Ms. Dufka, followed by Mr. 

Akuetteh, and then last by Mr. Mahmoud, who is joining us live 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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from Bamako. This is our first attempt at live testimony by—

forgive me, is it Google Hangout? [Laughter.] 

Senator COONS. I suspect no one has testified by Google Hangout, a thing I didn’t know existed. So my thanks to the technical 

assistance and the policy support of several very capable folks who 

made this happen. 

Dr. Fomunyoh, if you might begin? Thank you and welcome, and 

we appreciate your repeat testimony before this subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AND WEST 

AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Thank you very much, Chairman Coons and 

Ranking Member Senator Isakson. On behalf of the National Democratic Institute, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss recent political developments in Mali. 

Today Mali faces three interwoven crises: An ongoing armed 

occupation of two-thirds of the country with a humanitarian emergency in the north that has displaced an estimated 450,000 people; 

persistent political uncertainty in the capital, Bamako; and a 

severe food shortage that is affecting the entire Sahel subregion. If 

this crisis were allowed to fester, they would have a devastating 

and long-lasting negative impact on Mali and its neighbors in west 

and north Africa, especially countries such as Niger, Mauritania, 

and Algeria, with which Mali shares common and often very porous 

borders. 

Mali’s current transition often looks like a three-legged executive 

because of the ambiguous division of power and influence amongst 

three main actors: Iterim President Dioncounda Traore; Prime 

Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, who was given expanded powers 

under an ECOWAS-brokered agreement as the junta left power; 

and former coup leader Captain Sanogo, who continues to pull 

some levers of power from behind the scenes. Without strong political leadership and clear decisionmaking in Bamako, Mali’s transition government would find it difficult to achieve its two primary 

objectives, which are to reconquer the country’s northern regions 

and organize credible elections before May 2013. 

When I was in Bamako in October, the country seemed to face 

a conundrum of sorts in that some Malians argued that elections 

cannot be conducted in a peaceful and inclusive manner while the 

north is occupied by extremists. Others believed that the government in Bamako may lose its legitimacy at the expiration of the 

May 2013 ECOWAS deadline and that only credible elections can 

provide the next government with the legitimacy to tackle the 

country’s challenges. 

Holding elections before May 2013 would require significant technical and political commitments on the part of Malians and development partners. Increasingly, Malians are demanding that the 

impending military operation in the north not preclude active preparations for national elections. 

Concrete steps would have to be taken to include displaced populations and Malian refugees in the electoral process, given that the 

electoral law of Mali allows for Malians residing outside of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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country to vote. Working in collaboration with organizations such 

as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that maintain statistics on displaced persons and refugees, the 

government could take steps to allow the now significant population of refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced 

persons to vote while out of the three occupied regions of the north. 

At the same time, as logistically challenging as it may be, holding elections in major cities in the northern regions would be the 

strongest signal possible of Mali’s exercise of sovereignty over its 

territory and of early steps at rebuilding its democracy. 

The transition government must continually and clearly communicate government plans and actions to the public and be cognizant 

of the potential crisis of legitimacy that looms on the horizon once 

the May 2013 date lapses. 

The international community needs to harmonize its approach 

toward the simultaneous pursuit of polls that could lead to a legitimately elected government in Bamako and military actions to 

retake the north. Contradictory public statements that take the 

military option off the table in the short or medium term may only 

serve to embolden the extremists, allowing them time to reinforce 

their presence in the north. Such declarations also exacerbate fears 

amongst many Malians that there may be a conspiracy afoot to 

break up their country. 

Active United States support for Mali’s return to civilian democratic rule would bolster the hand of pro-democracy forces within 

the country and further reinforce the work of regional bodies such 

as ECOWAS and the AU that are deeply invested in Mali’s return 

to democratic rule. 

Many Malians in the precoup era were proud of their country’s 

democracy, although they envisaged consolidating it further by 

strengthening institutions and enhancing transparency and accountability in governance. Nine months after the March 2012 military coup, the false excitement about dramatic change in the early 

days of the coup has now been superseded by consternation over 

the cloud of uncertainty that now hovers over Mali. 

Despite the numerous challenges confronting Malian democrats 

today, I am optimistic that with concerted efforts and the right 

kind of support, Malians will be able to rebuild a stronger, renewed 

democracy that works effectively for all of the country’s citizens. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Dr. Fomunyoh. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fomunyoh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), I appreciate the opportunity to discuss recent political developments in Mali. Since Mali’s first steps toward democratization in the early 1990s, 

NDI and other U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations have worked with Malian 

legislators, party leaders, and civil society activists to support the country’s nascent 

democracy. Early this year, and with funding from USAID and other partners, NDI 

was providing technical assistance to citizen observers of the electoral process, fostering interparty dialogue, and taking steps to increase the participation of women 

and youth in political processes. I last visited Bamako in October, and met with 

civic and political leaders to gauge the level of election preparations and their overall commitment to a democratic transition. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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1For more information on the humanitarian crisis in northern Mali, see UN HCR: ‘‘Mali 

Emergency.’’ Available: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4f79a77e6.html. 2For more information on the Sahel food crisis and its impact on Mali, see World Food Program ‘‘Sahel Crisis: Country by Country.’’ Available: http://www.wfp.org/stories/sahel-crisis-bycountry. 

INTRODUCTION

Today Mali faces three interwoven crises: an ongoing armed occupation of twothirds of the country and a humanitarian emergency in the north that has displaced 

an estimated 450,000 people 1; persistent political uncertainty in the capital, 

Bamako; and a severe food shortage that is affecting the entire Sahel region.2

Should Mali rebound from these crises, Malian democrats and the international 

community would need to better understand the reasons for the political alienation 

of citizens, including youth, women, and ethnic minorities from the previous democratically elected government so as to avoid future backsliding. On the other hand, 

if the current situation were to be allowed to fester, they would have a negative impact on its neighbors in West and North Africa, especially countries such as Niger, 

Mauritania, and Algeria, with which Mali shares common and often porous borders. 

The military coup of March 2012 brought to the fore Malian disenchantment with 

the country’s fledgling democracy under the previous government of President 

Amadou Toumani Toure. While the immediate trigger of the coup may have been 

the military’s frustration with losses incurred in fighting separatist rebels and 

jihadists in the country’s northern regions, the population in Bamako showed surprising indifference to the coup while it was in progress, and was willing to embrace 

the group of junior officers that staged the coup once President Toure agreed to step 

down. The overthrow of Toure surprised many in the international community, especially because it came 6 weeks before Presidential elections in which Toure was not 

a candidate. However, the country’s democracy showed many weaknesses in the last 

decade, notably: consistently low voter turnout; allegations of widespread corruption; 

ineffective institutions; and the embrace of a ‘‘consensus politics’’ model in which 

almost all political parties aligned their policy to those of the head of state. 

Shortly after the March coup regional organizations—notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the international 

community at large—strongly condemned the military’s incursion into politics and 

hence denied the coup leaders legitimacy. By April 2012, ECOWAS had negotiated 

an agreement whereby the military junta relinquished power to the former speaker 

of the National Assembly, who became interim President and who appointed a 

Prime Minister after consultations with the junta. 

COMPETING POWER BASES IN BAMAKO

Under the agreement brokered by ECOWAS, the coup leader, Captain Amadou 

Sanogo, ceded power to the transition government. Despite these early signs of a 

swift return to civilian rule, the junta continues to influence decisionmaking in 

Bamako and thereby threatens to undermine prospects for a prompt resolution to 

the security crisis in the north and the timely organization of elections in 2013. 

Many months after the coup, Captain Sanogo and his allies dominated public space 

and discourse, with frequent appearances on the state-run radio and television station. By tapping into the frustrations of citizens who were marginalized by the previous government, Sanogo gained early support among unemployed youth and others who organized rallies in his favor. Also, some military officers with close ties 

to Sanogo were appointed to key positions in the transition government, such as the 

Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, the Minister of Territorial Administration, 

Decentralization, and Territorial Integrity, and the Minister of Internal Security 

and Civil Protection. As recently as October 2012, it was revealed that Sanogo had 

been appointed chairman of the Committee on Security Sector Reform in August—

a position that allows him to wield considerable influence within the Malian military even as that position further undermines both the credibility of civilian authority in Bamako and the professionalism of the Malian Armed Forces. 

Mali’s current transition often looks like a ‘‘three-legged’’ executive because of the 

ambiguous division of power and influence among three men—interim President 

Dioncounda Traore, who derives his power from the Malian Constitution and 

ECOWAS support; Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, who was given expanded 

powers in the initial agreement that forced the junta to give up power after the 

coup; and Captain Sanogo, who seems to pull the levers of power from behind the 

scenes. 

Upon President Toure’s resignation on April 8, the Malian Constitutional Court 

conferred power to the then-President of the Malian National Assembly Dioncounda 

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3The full text of ECOWAS’s statement, Communiqe 311/2012, ‘‘ECOWAS determined on its 

two-pronged approach to resolving Mali crisis,’’ dated November 12, 2012, is available at: http:/

/news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=311&lang=en&annee=2012. 4The full text of resolution 2071 is available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/

sc10789.doc.htm. 

Traore. President Traore, a member of Mali’s largest political party, ADEMA, is 

viewed by critics as emblematic of the ‘‘old guard’’ of the Malian political elite whose 

mismanagement contributed to citizen discontent and the military coup. In a brazen 

show of disrespect for President Traore, supporters of the military junta staged 

demonstrations and physically attacked Traore at the Presidential palace on May 

21. He was later evacuated to France for medical attention, and returned 2 months 

later, but has seemed hesitant in asserting his leadership. 

After consultations with party leaders and the military junta, President Traore 

appointed Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister in a government largely composed of technocrats. Prime Minister Diarra is criticized by his opponents for his 

family ties to the former autocrat Moussa Traore, who ruled Mali from 1968–1991 

(Diarra is Traore’s son-in-law) and his alleged closeness with Captain Sanogo. In a 

move that is seen as possibly intended to curb the personal partisan ambitions of 

Diarra and other members of the transition government, ECOWAS declared in 

November that none of the transitional leaders would be allowed to contest the 

Presidential elections of 2013.3

On August 20, Traore named a broad-based government of national unity. He also 

declared his intention to appoint two transition Vice Presidents and hold a national 

convention to validate his government’s proposed structure and a transition roadmap. However, as of early December, the new transition bodies have not been created, and the government had yet to release a detailed roadmap for the elections 

or the transition process. Mali’s 147-member National Assembly’s mandate has been 

extended until the end of the transition; but its responsibilities could conflict with 

those of the National Transition Council (Conseil Nationale de la Transition–CNT), 

should one be created as proposed by President Traore. 

Against this backdrop, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2071 (2012) of October 

12 was welcome news. It clarified the leadership structure in Bamako and strengthened the hand of the interim President by recognizing his legitimacy and urging 

him to present a timeline for elections. The resolution also reiterated its previous 

demands that remnants of the military junta refrain from further interference in 

the political process.4

Without strong political leadership and clear decisionmaking structures in 

Bamako, Mali’s transition government would be challenged to instill much-needed 

confidence regarding its ability to achieve the two primary goals of the transition 

which are to reconquer the country’s northern regions in the immediate term and 

organize credible Presidential and legislative elections before May 2013. Similarly, 

the lack of such leadership would deprive development partners and the international community in general of a strong and reliable anchor in the Malian Government to facilitate partnerships and technical assistance in meeting these two 

goals. 

EVOLVING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND CRYSTALLIZING DISAGREEMENT

Since March 2012, new political movements and alliances have emerged in Mali. 

Currently, there are seven major political groupings that are likely to influence the 

country’s political transition and its future:

• The Unified Front for the Safeguard of Democracy and the Republic of Mali 

(FDR) is a grouping of political parties, civil society organizations and labor 

unions that was opposed to the coup in March and continues to speak out 

against the national convention favored by Captain Sanogo. At various times, 

the FDR also has called for the resignation of Prime Minister Diarra. 

• The Alliance of Patriotic Democrats for an End to the Crisis (ADPS) is another 

antiputsch grouping led by former Prime Minister Soumana Sacko. 

• The Alliance IBK 2012 is a coalition supporting former Prime Minister Ibrahim 

Boubacar Keita, a leading Presidential candidate prior to the coup. Originally 

part of the FDR, the Alliance IBK separated from the group in April but still 

shares the FDR’s staunch opposition to the coup and its advocacy for a swift 

return to democracy. 

• At the other end of the spectrum, the Coordination of Patriotic Organizations 

in Mali (COPAM) is the most prominent organization affiliated with Captain 

Sanogo and the coup makers. COPAM has organized large demonstrations in 

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Bamako demanding the resignation of President Traore and protesting against 

foreign military assistance in the reconquest of the north. • The Convergence for Saving Mali (CSM) is a coalition formed in support of 

Prime Minister Diarra. • The Force for Reconciliation, Democracy, and Peace (FRDP-Mali-Ko) aligns 

itself with COPAM and others in staging demonstrations in favor of Captain 

Sanogo. • The Coalition of Immigrants from the North (COREN) is a heterogeneous group 

of northerners that seeks to draw attention to the plight of Malians from the 

northern regions and urges a swift reconquest of the three occupied regions.

The recent controversy over the national convention on the transition roadmap is 

illustrative of a sharp political discord between junta sympathizers and their opponents that will continue to fester in the coming months. The FDR threatened to 

boycott the convention, claiming that participation had been stacked in favor of projunta forces and that its input had not been incorporated into the agenda. The transition government responded by delaying the convention until December 11–13, 

although the participation of the FDR and its allies has yet to be confirmed. 

IMMINENT MILITARY ACTION IN NORTHERN MALI

From most indications, an international military intervention to assist the Malian 

military to retake the north is inevitable. The Malian Government, ECOWAS and 

the African Union have asked for military intervention as a matter of urgency. 

Extremists continue to consolidate their control over the three northern regions of 

Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu; historic sites are being destroyed; and sharia law is 

being rigorously implemented in those areas. Many Malians are fearful that without 

military intervention, the partition of their country would become a geopolitical reality and extremist elements would have found a safe haven and enormous territory 

from which to destabilize other fragile democracies in the subregion and beyond. 

The persistent insecurity that now prevails in northern Mali would have a significant impact on the credibility of the 2013 electoral process if the estimated 450,000 

displaced citizens are not able to vote and the government is not able to hold elections in the three occupied regions. 

The recent U.N. Security Council resolution on Mali lays the groundwork for regional and international support to the Malian Government in organizing a military 

operation to retake the north of the country. ECOWAS is prepared to deploy approximately 3,300 troops to assist in this effort. While dissonant voices have 

emerged with regard to the exact timing of such an intervention, it is hoped that 

regional and international efforts to support the Malian military will bolster the 

country’s transition leadership, provide strategic guidance, and embolden a now 

weakened and demoralized Malian military. The role of countries such as Algeria, 

Mauritania, and Chad that are not members of ECOWAS, but share a common border with Mali and/or have combat experience in the Sahel, would be crucial in such 

a military undertaking. 

TWO BENCHMARKS ON THE HORIZON: MILITARY OPERATION IN THE NORTH

AND COUNTRYWIDE ELECTIONS

The first half of 2013 will be of paramount significance to Mali’s political transition as two critical benchmarks would have to be met: the ECOWAS-mandated May 

2013 deadline for the holding elections and swearing in of a civilian democratically 

elected President; and the launch of a military operation to retake the country’s 

three northern regions. 

When I was in Mali in October, the country seemed to face a conundrum of sorts 

in that some Malians argued that elections cannot be conducted in a peaceful and 

inclusive manner while the north is occupied by extremists; others believed that the 

government in Bamako may lose its legitimacy at the expiration of the May 2013 

deadline granted by ECOWAS, and that elections would therefore need to be held 

by this date so as to elect a government with the legitimacy to tackle many of the 

country’s challenges. Holding elections before May 2013 would require significant 

technical and political commitments on the part of Malians and development partners, as a number of challenges would have to be addressed with urgency. Increasingly, Malians are demanding that the impending ECOWAS-African Union (AU) 

military operation not preclude active preparations for national elections. 

As of today, the transition government has yet to release a credible roadmap for 

elections. While an audit of the voter register is underway, the government has not 

consulted other elections stakeholders, such as political parties and civil society 

organizations, to obtain their buy-in to the process. The government has not yet 

updated the voter register, nor has it defined how to facilitate voting by displaced 

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citizens and Malian refugees in neighboring countries. As a result, many Malians 

are doubtful that the transition will be as broadly inclusive and participatory as 

originally hoped. For example, according to the electoral law, Mali’s voters list 

should have been updated from October 1–December 31, 2012. This did not occur, 

even in the regions of the country where the security situation is stable. Hopefully, 

when the political decision is made to proceed with election preparations, the Minister of Territorial Administration would invoke a section in the electoral law that 

allows for an exceptional update of the national voter registry outside of the usual 

October–December timeframe. 

Concrete steps would have to be taken to include displaced populations and 

Malian refugees in the electoral process, given that the electoral law allows for 

Malians residing outside the country to vote. Working in collaboration with organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) that maintain statistics on displaced persons and refugees, the government could update the voter rolls to include the now-significant population of refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced persons. Some analysts speculate that even if the military operation succeeds in liberating key cities in the 

north relatively quickly, some remnants of occupying forces may retreat into the 

more remote areas of the north. Under these circumstances, holding credible elections in major cities in these northern regions would be the strongest signal possible 

of Mali’s exercise of sovereignty over its national territory and of early steps at 

rebuilding its democracy. Organizing elections in the north would be challenging. 

Nevertheless, it would reassure Malians that the country is on track to restoring 

national unity and civilian democratic rule across its entire territory. 

LOOKING FORWARD—A LOOMING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

As the electoral deadline of May 2013 approaches, questions about the continued 

legitimacy of the Malian Government will likely be raised by various domestic constituencies and their international allies. 

An early release of the electoral timeline would help calm political tensions and 

assure Malians that the transition government has the political will to work toward 

restoring the country’s democracy and rebuilding its democratic institutions. The recent declaration by ECOWAS leaders that members of the transition government 

would not be permitted to stand as candidates in the 2013 polls is an important step 

in building citizen confidence in the impartiality of those leaders as they execute 

the transition. Public commitments by these officials themselves would provide further assurances and invite greater citizen engagement in the electoral process. 

The transition government must continually and clearly communicate government 

plans and actions to the public, and be cognizant of the potential crisis of legitimacy 

that looms on the horizon once the May 2013 date lapses. 

CONCLUSION

For decades, Mali faced governance challenges, even as its leadership continued 

to profess its commitment to democracy. Indeed, the quick unraveling of Mali’s democracy is yet another reminder that multiparty elections alone, even when regularly held, are not a guarantor. As we seek to assist Malian democrats forge a path 

toward elections in 2013 and restore the country’s democratic institutions in the 

post-election phase, we must draw hard lessons from this experience to make sure 

that future institutions are more inclusive, effective, and transparent in their management of public affairs and resources. 

To do so, the international community must maintain pressure on coup leaders 

to return definitively to the barracks and avoid any undue influence on the governance and electoral processes. Development partners can also contribute to a credible 

transition by encouraging meaningful, inclusive dialogue around political and electoral issues, as many political party leaders and civil society activists feel excluded 

from decisionmaking process. They should provide more technical assistance to 

Mali’s shaky transition government in finalizing and widely publicizing, as soon as 

possible, a credible electoral timetable. The sooner such a timetable is released, the 

greater prospects will be for higher public confidence in the country’s prospects to 

transition back to civilian democratic rule. At the same time, the international community needs to harmonize its approach toward the simultaneous pursuit of polls 

that would lead to a legitimately elected government in Bamako and military operations to retake the north. Contradictory public statements that take the military 

option off the table in the short or medium term may only serve to embolden the 

extremists, allowing them time to reinforce their presence. Such declarations also 

exacerbate fears among many Malians that there may be a conspiracy afoot to break 

up their country. 

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Restoration of U.S. aid programs to Mali would have a positive impact on the 

country’s ability to tackle many of the political and technical challenges I have outlined today. The U.S. Government can be a valuable interlocutor with Malian partners in shaping transition and electoral processes. While some of the missteps or 

sluggishness of the past few months can be attributed to inexperience on the part 

of Malian transition leaders, renewed American involvement in Mali during this 

critical period could enhance prospects for successful and peaceful elections in the 

coming year. Active U.S. support for Mali’s return to civilian democratic rule would 

also bolster the hand of pro-democracy forces within the country and further reinforce the work of regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the AU, that are deeply 

invested in Mali’s return to democratic rule and have benefited from American support in the past. 

Once touted as a model of democratic progress in West Africa, Mali quickly lost 

this standing after the coup in March. Many Malians in the pre-coup era were proud 

of their country’s democracy, although they envisaged consolidating it further by 

strengthening institutions and enhancing transparency and accountability in governance. Nine months after the March 2012 military coup, the false sense of dramatic change of the early days of the coup have been superseded by consternation 

over the cloud of uncertainty that now hovers over Mali because of developments 

in the northern regions and political maneuvering in Bamako. Despite the numerous challenges confronting Malian democrats today, I am optimistic that with 

concerted efforts and the right kind of support Malians will be able to rebuild a 

stronger, renewed democracy that works effectively for all of the country’s citizens. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Ms. Dufka. 

STATEMENT OF CORINNE DUFKA, SENIOR RESEARCHER, 

AFRICA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. DUFKA. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member Isakson, for providing Human Rights Watch the opportunity to testify this morning. It is a great honor to be here. 

Since April, I’ve conducted four research missions to Mali during 

which I have interviewed hundreds of victims and witnesses to 

serious abuses and war crimes in both the Islamist-controlled north 

and government-controlled south. I’ve also spoken with a wide variety of other individuals, many from the armed factions from various different groups, government officials, civil society and religious leaders. I am also in daily phone contact with Malians all 

over the country who keep me abreast of ongoing violations and 

dynamics. 

This hearing comes at a critical time not only for Mali, but for 

Mali’s partners, including the United States, as they struggle to 

establish a vision and actionable plan to put Mali back together in 

a way that doesn’t simply turn back the clock to December 2011. 

I will today briefly characterize our findings on abuses by all factions, very briefly. It’s more detailed in the testimony that I’ve submitted. And then I’ll highlight four issues the United States might 

consider as it crafts a response to the crisis, and perhaps more 

importantly, the issues that gave rise to it. 

With respect to Islamists groups, since consolidating their control 

in the north, Ansar al-Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM have become increasingly repressive as they tighten their grip over the population, 

among whom, I wish to emphasize, they have precious little support. Abuses committed include frequent, often severe beatings, 

arbitrary arrests against those engaged in haram or forbidden behavior such as smoking, drinking, watching television, listening to 

music, or having music on one’s cell phone. Countless women that 

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I have interviewed have been beaten and detained for failing to 

adhere to their dress code. 

The Islamists have also carried out summary executions, including the January execution in Aguelhoc of some 70 Malian soldiers, 

which is, to date, the single most serious war crime of this conflict. 

Also in Aguelhoc, Islamists stoned to death a couple for adultery. 

A witness I spoke with described seeing the man and the woman 

crouch, hands bound, in a hole as the Islamists hoisted large rocks, 

shattering the skull of first the woman and then the man. As well, 

they have carried out eight, at least eight limb amputations as 

punishment for theft. 

These punishments were meted out by the Islamic police, often 

after a summary trial before a panel of hand-picked judges, many 

of them foreign. These trials can only be described as a cruel parody of justice. 

They have also recruited hundreds of child soldiers as young as 

11. Dozens of witnesses I’ve interviewed, and a few children as 

well, have seen these kids in training camps manning checkpoints, 

guarding prisoners, and applying sharia. In advance of the planned 

intervention, they have ramped up recruitment. Indeed, a witness 

I spoke with just yesterday had just seen, just visited three of these 

camps within the Gao region in which she saw many, many children being planned. 

The Islamists have also destroyed mausoleums, shrines, amulets, 

ritual masks, both in Timbuktu as well as the Dagon Country, 

which hold tremendous significance for Malians. They have as well 

denied Malians, who have a rich musical tradition, to be able to 

play or listen to their local music. Quoting one witness, ‘‘They have 

erased our history. They have taken all joie de vivre from our 

lives.’’

With respect to the MNLA, they too have perpetrated numerous 

and often systematic abuses after taking over the towns of Menaka, 

Goundam, Niafounke, and Gao. These included the abduction and 

brutal rape, often gang rape of numerous women and girls, widespread pillaging of hospitals, schools, aid agencies, government 

buildings, and use of child soldiers. The MNLA has done absolutely 

nothing to rein in their forces, as well as even acknowledge that 

these abuses have taken place. 

Briefly, with respect to the Malian Army, the coup, of course, has 

led to a striking deterioration in discipline and command and control within the army. For example, very worryingly, in the days 

after the attempted countercoup on April 30, security forces 

directly under the command of Captain Sanogo disappeared at 

least 21 soldiers allegedly implicated in it. A witness I interviewed 

told me how at 2 a.m. on May 3, the soldiers removed at least 21 

men from Kati barracks, put them bound and blindfolded into a 

military truck, and they have not been heard from since. Many 

other victims of torture described how they were stabbed, starved, 

burned with cigarettes, and forced at gunpoint to sodomize one another. 

The security forces have also intimidated opposition voices, 

including journalists who have been abducted by masked gunmen, 

beaten and dumped on the outskirts of Bamako after being warned 

to stop criticizing the military. More recently, they have done the 

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same thing. They have tried to abduct, descended upon the home 

of a local rapper who wrote a song critical of the military. 

Outside of Bamako, soldiers have detained and executed numerous men accused of collaborating with the groups in the north. 

Most of these victims were Tuareg and Arab. In September, 16 

Islamic preachers were executed within a military camp in Giabali, 

and in October eight Tuareg herders were executed by soldiers also 

in Giabali. 

Again, there has been no meaningful effort to investigate, much 

less hold accountable, those implicated in any of these incidents, 

and as others have noted, disturbingly, Sanogo, who we believe—

we have testimony suggesting he is directly implicated in the torture and disappearances, was rewarded with the position of being 

put in charge of security sector reform. 

Briefly, with respect to recommendations, I want to highlight 

four areas. The first is to publicly raise abuses by all sides. The 

U.S. Government has been very strong in their condemnation of 

Islamic behavior, of the Islamic forces, as well as Sanogo. However, 

I would say they also have to widen that view, widen that criticism 

of the Malian Army outside of Sanogo, as well as the MNLA. The 

United States should press all parties to investigate and prosecute 

those responsible, as well as stand firm against any attempt to 

include an amnesty as part of an eventual negotiation. 

The second area addresses rising ethnic tension. Mr. Chairman, 

over the last 8 months I have observed an alarming increase in 

ethnic tension. Perceptions of neglect or favoritism by the Malian 

Army or international community of one community or the other 

has led communities to seek redress for their grievances, including 

through the formation of armed militias and apparent organized 

plans to settle scores outside the legal framework. 

I cannot emphasize enough how impunity, not only for Path violations during Path Tuareg rebellions, but also more recent violations, is fueling this tension on all different sides from all different 

ethnic groups. If not addressed, I believe these tensions could, in 

the short term, lead to incidents of deadly collective punishment, 

and in the long term sow the seeds for future violence. 

To address this, I urge the U.S. Government to do a few things. 

No. 1, as the negotiation process takes shape, push Mali to ensure 

the grievances of all northern residents are heard, not just those 

who have taken up arms. The second would be press the Malian 

Government to adopt a communication strategy that addresses the 

rising level of ethnic tension and to respond to hate speech that 

incites violence. No. 3, through USAID, support Malian civil society 

to be able to support community radios and peacebuilding initiatives, and that’s something that should not wait. It should be done 

now. And the fourth would be to ensure the situation in Mali is discussed by the Atrocities Prevention Board. 

The third area I want to address, and this gets to Senator 

Isakson’s question, is adopt policies that address the underlying 

causes of this conflict. Mali’s recent crisis is rooted in years of deterioration in the institutions—the police, the army, the judiciary, 

the Parliament—that should have protected and represented them 

adequately. Mali’s partners turned a blind eye to corruption scandals, criminality creeping into state institutions, some predatory 

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behavior by the security forces, and lagging development indicators 

countrywide, but especially in the north. 

Mali’s judiciary, which could have mitigated some of these problems, was severely neglected, allowing a dangerous culture of impunity. And as we have seen, narcotraffickers, extremist religious figures, and those with ethnic agendas have taken advantage of this 

rule-of-law vacuum. The United States must support programs in 

the short and long term that serve to strengthen Mali’s stressed institutions. 

The last point is, in advance of the planned military intervention, 

I urge the United States to press for a strong human rights component within this military intervention to avoid some of these problems that we have seen with AMISOM intervention in Somalia, 

which failed to adequately monitor human rights abuses, particularly indiscriminate shelling. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Ms. Dufka. 

We have just about 15 minutes left in our hearing. 

Mr. Akuetteh. 

STATEMENT OF NII AKUETTEH, INDEPENDENT POLICY 

RESEARCHER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, good 

morning, and thank you very much for including me. But I really 

appreciate that you are focusing on such a grave problem in Africa, 

so I can’t thank you enough. I submitted a longer statement, so I’ll 

just take a few minutes to highlight some of it, but I would like 

for it to be kept in the record. 

Senator COONS. Yes, it will. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. I mentioned that some issues in the way Mali

descended, we have to keep certain things in mind. One of them 

is the connection with Libya. The Tuareg rebellion had occurred 

many times, but this particular one did not occur because of incidents—did not start because of incidents inside Mali but because 

of weapons that flowed over from Libya. And I think it is interesting that Libya does not share a border with Mali, but troops and 

men went all the way, and it seems to me the question should be 

raised about why they were not seen. Mali’s Army had been 

trained in the Trans-Sahara counterterrorism program, and yet 

they collapsed very quickly. So it seems to me that also raises 

questions. 

But the core of my testimony is I am suggesting four improvements in U.S. policy, particularly in the State Department. Mr. 

Chairman, I notice that some people look at the crises as three, 

others say four. I think that the international community, it would 

be good to actually add a fifth dimension, which is contagion, because I think it is important, whether three or four, they are inside 

Mali. But the reason that ECOWAS is so concerned is the real risk 

that this will not be contained inside Mali. So I think it’s important 

to stress contagion. 

Second, I think that the State Department, if we listen carefully, 

my reading of their priorities is elections first, by all means, and 

then negotiate. As for intervention, maybe. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Frankly, I think that should be the other way around, that it’s 

very hard to have real elections with so much insecurity around, 

and populations have moved. So the security issue is extremely important, and I’m reminded of what happened in Cote d’Ivoire, 

where they took 5 years to do an election and still questions were 

raised. I fear that if you rush elections in Mali, you are giving people all kinds of excuses who lose to stir up trouble and make allegations. So it’s important to establish enough security so the elections can be credible. 

I also think that while the grievances of Tuaregs must be addressed and minority issues are very important, Mali has almost 

60 ethnic groups. So we must be careful that it’s not seen as favoritism toward Tuaregs, which might suggest to other groups that 

the way to get attention is to create the same kind of problem. 

And the fourth and final area of policy recommendation that I’m 

making, Mr. Chairman, is actually that I do think that since 9/11 

and United States counterterrorism policy in Africa, I think the 

problem in Mali should be an opportunity and an occasion to do a 

thorough review of the whole strategy, because, for instance, the 

Trans-Sahara counterterrorism issue, as I mentioned, its job was to 

make the Malian Army strong, and yet the army collapsed very 

quickly. The Operation Flintlock, which used Mali as the base to 

train soldiers, again it raises the question why did the Malian 

Army collapse so quickly. So I think this is an opportunity to do 

a very thorough review and raise a lot of questions. 

My particular question, because I really think that democracy is 

so important, that in the training of African soldiers, I would very 

much like it if the respect for civilian leadership and for democracy 

is stressed, that the first thing the soldiers have to learn is to respect their civilian leaders and the democracy process, and any 

training to make them better fighters must come second. 

I thank you very much again for including me, and I’ll be happy 

to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NII AKUETTEH

OPENING

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, other subcommittee members, thank 

you. The personal honor of your invitation is my smaller reason. The much bigger 

reason is this: Being African-born and a strong believer in democracy, I very much 

appreciate that you are devoting the moral prestige and other priceless resources 

of this great institution of democracy to the deadly cocktail that is assailing Mali. 

It has and continues to inflict much suffering on millions of Malians. Furthermore, 

it is contagious and poses grave threats to the rest of Africa, to Europe and even 

to the United States. In walking me through the process, your staff astounded me 

with their competence, promptness, patience, courtesy and sense of humor. I am 

grateful to them as well. 

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

Tuesday, January 17, 2012, (45 weeks ago) is a very important date in understanding Mali’s dizzying decent. That was the day heavily armed Tuaregs (hardened 

former fighters for Libya’s late leader, Col. Gaddafi) fired opening shots and reignited the latest Tuareg secessionist war against Mali. 

Other 2012 dates are also vital. One is Thursday, March 22, 2012, when Capt. 

Amadou Sanogo and his fellow putchists chased their commander in chief away 

from the Presidential palace, declared themselves the government, and effectively 

killed the infant that is Mali’s much admired democracy. It is crucial to keep in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39

mind their professed reason: Allegedly, the democratically elected President, 

Amadou Toumani Toure, himself a former general, had not prosecuted the war in 

the north well enough; the treasonous soldiers bragged they would do a far better 

job. 

Within hours, the world—with one curious exception—sharply and emphatically 

rejected the coup. ECOWAS, the African Union, the U.N., even the international 

financial institutions, were all scathing in their condemnation. 

The lone exception was the U.S. administration. Initially, following an interdepartmental meeting, the State Department spokesperson was strangely sympathetic to the coupmakers, questioning whether this was really a coup, and speaking 

about the coupmakers’ ‘‘legitimate grievances,’’ about the government needing to 

negotiate, and taking days before announcing that some aid has been suspended as 

required by law. Happily this puzzling equivocation from the State Department has 

since disappeared. 

From Mali’s neighbors, there was not the slightest hint of such equivocation. By 

promptly closing land-locked Mali’s most vital borders, ECOWAS forced the reluctant coupmakers to hand over power to an interim regime which in turn was forced 

to agree to a 1-year deadline for holding the previously scheduled legitimate 

national elections. 

The next memorable day came 15 days after the coup. The Tuareg secessionists—

allied with three jihadist fighting groups—completed conquest of 66 percent of Mali 

(a territory rivaling France in size). On Friday, April 6, from Paris, they declared 

the conquered territory the independent nation of Azawad. This proved a phantom 

independence. And rather brief. Not a single country recognized the declaration. 

Much worse soon followed. The Tuareg secessionists, the MNLA, had implemented 

their war project by forming alliance with three jihadist groups—AQIM, Ansar Dine, 

and MUJAO. Within weeks, the jihadists turned on their former allies killing and 

chasing them out of the population centres in the north, taking over and announcing 

their real intent—an Islamic rule based on strict sharia law. What has transpired 

since is more legitimately described as a reign of terror: summary executions; amputations and floggings; forced marriages; conscription of child soldiers; confiscation of 

private property; enforcement of dress codes; banning of much music; and destruction of ancient Islamic shrines recognized by the globally as World Heritage monuments. Understandably, a large proportion (perhaps half) of Malians in the north 

who are able to have fled. That non-Malians (from as far away as Pakistan and 

Afghanistan) have played leading roles only makes the situation more intolerable. 

Two more dates must be mentioned. On Sunday July 15, with little territory 

remaining under their control, some Tuareg secessionist leaders told Reuters they 

were renouncing independence. 

Mr. Chairman, my condolences. Reason: I am acutely aware that the remaining 

date carries pain for Americans and especially for this full committee—Tuesday September 11, 2012. That day witnessed the murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and 

three other patriots in Benghazi, Libya. The relevance to Mali is this: Though investigations are ongoing, there have already been believable hints that some of the 

murderers of Ambassador Stevens are jihadists who came from northern Mali. 

There is a reason for my recounting these many dates in 2012: They show that 

Malians and friends could be forgiven for regarding this year as our own annus 

horribilis. 

And yet this one year of agony does not reflect the entire historical journey traveled by Mali and its people. For West Africans and hundreds of millions of others, 

admiring fascination with Mali goes back centuries to the ancient empire. After 

military dictatorship dampened the pride brought by 1960 independence, people 

again held their heads high when ‘‘the soldier for democracy,’’ Amadou Toumani 

Toure, in 1991 and 1992, stopped the massacre of protesting women and children, 

humanely but decisively eased out the dictatorship, set the democratic experiment 

on course, and then gave up power to an elected politician. Ten years later, there 

was little surprise when popular sentiment brought him back to power on the 

strength of two landslide electoral victories. 

However, there was disappointment when, many years into the Toure administration, Malians and outsiders began recounting stories of corruption in Mali. 

More than disappointment, concern was the emotion evoked in some observers by 

one other observation. What triggered the concern were the incentives provided to 

the Malian Government by U.S. antiterrorism strategy in general and in particular 

by three elements—the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Program, AFRICOM, and 

Operation Flintlock. Some observers including me felt unease that, as operated, 

these elements in U.S. policy might prove an ineffective and even counterproductive 

strategy for combating terrorism is Mali, and perhaps in other African countries as 

well. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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That is not to say terrorism does not bother Africa. To the contrary. Terrorism 

and violent extremism remains the gravest of threats to Africa—by itself and because terror attacks makes it impossible for Africans to respond to other challenges 

and opportunities. The attacks must be fought robustly and effectively. The war 

waged in Algeria by what is now AQIM; the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; al-Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; the World Cup bombing in 

Kampala—all these have killed and maimed thousands of innocent Africans, even 

when the declared targets have been Western officials, installations, and interests. 

Clearly, defanging violent extremists across the continent saves African lives and 

otherwise serves African interests. 

There are two parts to the concern about U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Mali. 

One is overreliance on militarization instead of on democratization, reconciliation, 

and development. The other is a near-exclusive focus on incoming foreign jihadists 

such as AQIM at the cost of paying even greater attention to the home-grown challenge of Tuareg grievances. 

When in January, Tuareg fighters abandoned Col. Gaddafi, and returned to Mali 

to launch the latest of their latest secessionist wars, there was a sinking feeling that 

our worst fears had happened. 

FOUR SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S. POLICY

Mr. Chairman, in June, I paid close attention to the Mali testimony that Ambassador Carson gave in the other chamber. In the ensuing 6 months, I have tried 

being an even keener observer of the Mali situation: monitoring events on the 

ground in Mali and dissecting the words and deeds of the major stakeholders—

Malian factions; ECOWAS countries, especially Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, 

and Nigeria; non-ECOWAS neighbors especially Algeria, Mauritania, and Chad; the 

African Union; the European Union, especially France, Germany and Italy; the 

United Nations, and above all, the United States. 

In his June testimony, Ambassador Carson reacted as follows to Malian and African vows to restore territorial integrity, ‘‘We think an ECOWAS mission to militarily retake the north is ill-advised and not feasible.’’ Months later, however, at the 

U.N. and in Algiers to push a reluctant Algeria, Secretary Clinton said kinder 

things about military intervention. And last week at Howard University, here in 

Washington, another senior State Department official said this: ‘‘We support the 

efforts of the government of Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, 

neighboring partners, and others in the international community to prepare a military response as necessary, in accordance with international law, to restore the 

unity of Mali.’’

The pattern is unmistakable: U.S. policy toward Mali is evolving—for the better, 

in my opinion. This is commendable. 

Despite this progress, however, some concerns remain. Put another way, further 

improvements are possible and needed in current Mali policy. Consequently, the 

heart of my testimony today is to highlight four such concerns/improvements. They 

are unequal, varying in individual importance and weights. 

The first concern/improvement is semantic and may appear trivial and unimportant. But I believe this appearance is deceptive because precise semantics reflect 

clear thinking which is a pre-requisite for effective problemsolving. 

A cocktail of four crises. That is how today’s Mali situation is described by the 

U.S.—and by all the major global actors and even most analysts. The four are: the 

Bamako-centred broken democratic rule; the deeply rooted, recalcitrant secessionist 

aspiration and wars of the Tuaregs; Mali’s loss of integrity over most of its territory 

and the control of that area by violent religious extremists, significant numbers of 

whom are foreigners; and the humanitarian crisis centred in the north, epitomised 

by mass displacement of the population and fueled by environmental deterioration, 

by the secessionist war, and by harsh jihadist rule. 

While agreeing that these four crises are afflicting Mali, I add a fifth dimension—

contagion—which must be recognized and explicitly included in the discussion and 

analyses. By contagion I refer to the clear and present danger that Tuareg irredentism, large population displacements, and most critically, jihadist violence, will not 

be contained within Mali’s borders. Indeed they are already boiling over and destabilizing other countries. And not just in Africa: Jihadist violence especially has not 

been shy in declaring Europe and the U.S. as its prime targets. 

To a significant degree, the international community already appreciates the high 

contagion risk in Mali. Contagion and enlightened self-interest—and nothing else—

explain why Paris, Bonn, and Brussels, are so seized by the agony an impoverished 

African country. I am convinced that were the risk of contagion negligible, Mali 

would get little or no global attention. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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But I am also convinced that significant benefits would flow from explicitly adding 

contagion—correctly counting Mali’s crises as five. Put another way, I believe the 

American and European general publics, if they became more persuaded that the 

jihadists in Mali have them in the cross-hairs, would be far more supportive of rapid 

reaction to help the Malians. In other words, recognizing the high risk of contagion 

would mean much less foot dragging and hand-wringing outside Africa when it 

comes to extinguishing the jihadist threat in Mali. 

Nor can it be denied that such foot dragging does exist. Irrefutable evidence is 

the reason. Exhibit A, to my mind, is time: Seven months after 66 percent of Mali 

was violently sliced off by irredentists who were then shoved aside by their own 

jihadist allies who immediately began terrorizing and pushing out much of the populace, the U.N. Security Council has still not authorized an alarmed Africa to use 

force. Perhaps the Council has a convincing argument for such nonchalance. If so 

I have not heard it. Which makes me wonder: Would Security Council authorization 

would be this slow in coming had the amputee country whose cultural heritage are 

being smashed been a rich, powerful global player—Brazil, China, Canada, Germany, or Italy? 

African disappointment and frustration at the delay is unmistakable. This is 

apparent in a leaked letter sent last Thursday by the Africa Union’s head, President 

Boni Yayi of Benin to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The letter described 

U.N. foot dragging as ‘‘beneath the expectations of the African Continent as a 

whole,’’ warned that this ‘‘will be interpreted as a sign of weakness,’’ and advised 

that ‘‘What we must avoid today is giving the impression that we lack firmness in 

the face of determined terrorists.’’

But reluctance to urgently and forcefully dislodge the terrorists from Mali is not 

confined inside the Security Council. Sadly, and hoping I am wrong, it seems apparent in U.S. policy too. As observed above, compared to June, U.S. today is noticeably 

more serious about Mali’s terrorism crisis. 

But this progress is clearly limited and insufficient. The State Department continues to discourage a swift restoration of Mali’s territorial integrity and a forceful 

end to the terrorizing and displacement of northern Malians which has continued 

for 7 months. This conclusion seems inescapable after scrutinizing what last week’s 

Howard University statement said about intervention and contrasting that with its 

stance on elections and negotiations. 

On national elections across Mali in 2013: ‘‘The United States firmly believes that 

Mali’s interim leaders must continue preparations in earnest to hold elections in this 

timeframe simultaneous with efforts to restore territorial integrity. We continue to 

encourage the interim government to set a date for elections. The interim government should build on the preparations that were undertaken before the aborted 

April 2012 elections and hold elections as soon as possible with as much of the country as possible . . . The return of democracy must not be held hostage to the security 

agenda.’’ [emphasis added]. 

On negotiations with the brutal terrorist and secessionist groups: ‘‘We urge the 

interim government to find ways to effectively address northern grievances in a 

peaceful manner . . . We also welcome the news that representatives of MNLA have 

retracted the declaration of independence of the north, and key figures in the MNLA 

and Ansar al Dine have declared their readiness to negotiate with the interim government. Mali’s interim government must demonstrate its commitment to negotiations by appointing a lead negotiator for the north.’’ [emphasis added]. 

And on the overwhelming Africa desire to militarily eject the jihadists and restore 

Mali: ‘‘We . . . recognize that an African-led, multinational force, supported by the 

international community, may be necessary to assist the Malians to dislodge extremists from the north. . . . ’’ [emphasis added]. 

Reflecting on these pronouncements, I conclude thus: The two top priorities of the 

Department are first, elections by May 2013, and second, negotiations with northern 

groups including the irredentist MNLA and the jihadist Ansar Dine. 

Sugar-coating feels impossible; so here goes: I disagree respectfully but firmly 

with these State Department priorities. Instead I believe the number one priority 

must be swift African-led international military intervention (with zero European 

and American boots on the ground, none) to restore Mali. Intervention must be 

given higher priority over elections and over negotiations—vital as those two are. 

To flip one of the State Department’s assertions: Re-asserting Mali’s sovereignty, restoring its territorial integrity, and ending the terrorizing of its population—these 

steps must remain top priority and they must not be held hostage to hasty illplanned elections in only parts of the country, nor to endless haggling with violent, 

untrustworthy groups of questionable legitimacy. But there is another State Department argument that I do fully endorse, ‘‘Any military response in Mali should be 

well planned, managed, and resourced, and account for civilian security . . . ’’ No 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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question about that. But the bottomline remains that I believe the State Department’s current priorities—putting security and Mali’s restoration on the back 

burner—have it backward. 

Several arguments support my critique. To begin with, ECOWAS and the African 

Union clearly prefer making security and Mali’s restoration the number one priority. 

President Yayi’s fresh letter is only one indicator among many of this strong African 

preference. This is not to deny that forceful U.S. advocacy of a different strategy 

can be extremely valuable in such a global effort. But it is to say that an unmistakable contradiction must be acknowledged: dismissing what Africans are loudly 

demanding negates the following assertion routinely made by State, ‘‘The United 

States supports the principle of regional ownership . . . ’’

A sequencing question also arises in this disagreement over priorities. State is 

right in saying that all of Mali’s crises are critical and all must be addressed simultaneously. However, to govern is to choose; this observation is a cliche precisely because it is so true. Consequently, choices and setting of priorities must be made in 

allocating resources to Mali’s crisis. This poses a question: Is it a better sequence 

to first establish reasonable peace and security in Mali as a condition for properly 

preparing, organizing, and holding credible elections across the country? In contrast 

to State, my answer is emphatic yes. 

Now it may well be that current Malian conditions and other information justify 

the opposite sequence preferred by State: prioritizing hasty, ill-prepared truncated 

elections in only part of a war-torn country over the restoration of sovereignty, law 

and order over 66 percent of Mali’s territory. But if so, such conditions and information must be woven into a convincing argument. So far, I have not seen such an 

argument; I am yet to see the persuasive case made. 

One’s preferred images for seeing military intervention in Mali constitute another 

important consideration in the priorities disagreement. In a way it is a variation 

on the sequencing question. Two images capture my view: Proper military intervention in Mali to me is akin to a fire brigade that must race to a dangerous fire in 

a crowded neighborhood. My other image is of intervention as the sending of a 

SWAT team to a hostage situation. Either way, I see the proposed African-led military intervention as a first responder. And like all first responders, it must still respond first to bring to the swiftest end to a dangerous emergency wreaking havoc. 

To reiterate: In northern Mali, 7-month-old dire havoc must be swiftly ended. For 

Malians the havoc takes the form of summary executions; amputations and 

floggings; forced marriages; conscription of child soldiers; confiscation or destruction 

of private property; enforcement of dress codes; banning of much music; destruction 

of ancient Islamic shrines recognized by globally as World Heritage monuments; and 

forcing much of the northern population into involuntary exile. 

For the international community the havoc also includes contagion—the reality 

that the jihadists will keep trying to attack bigger fish, especially France and the 

United States. 

The urgent need to immediately halt northern Mali’s havoc is crucial. This urgency drives my strong recommendation that the State Department should upend 

its current priorities and adopt a new one where military intervention is deemed 

a higher priority than elections and negotiations—even though those two are very 

important. This recommendation is the second—and by far the most important—

among the four policy improvements that this testimony is advocating. 

Now to the third desired policy improvement. It emanates from observed American attitudes toward the Tuareg minority in Mali. Mr. Chairman, in the very first 

paragraph of this testimony I identified myself as an ardent believer in democracy. 

Vanity was not the reason. Nor does self-pity drive this other self-description: I am 

a double ethnic minority—within both of the two countries I love: Ghana where I 

was born and the United States where I immigrated almost four decades ago. 

Rather, I offer the self-observations as possible explanations of political sentiments 

I hold: I happen to possess deep empathy for minorities everywhere and minority 

rights to me are no mere academic concept. 

Notwithstanding these sentiments, I am today concerned about romanticization of 

the Tuareg political project in Mali. I fear this may be coloring and tilting U.S. policy views and positions. Specifically, evidence abounds of persistent U.S. pressure, 

throughout 2012, for Mali to concede ‘‘that the Tuaregs and others in northern Mali 

have legitimate political and socioeconomic grievances’’ and to negotiate with them. 

Washington has exerted this pressure on Bamako and on ECOWAS, even though 

throughout the spring of 2012, when the MNLA Tuareg had the choice, they rejected 

negotiation and opted to plunge Mali into war, dismemberment, and other dire consequences. And even though the MNLA cynically formed alliances with brutal 

Islamists like Ansar Dine—whose leadership contains ethnic Tuaregs as well. I fail 

to understand the U.S. is running so much interference for a minority that rejected 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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negotiation, unleashed devastating war, broke Mali’s territorial integrity and ceded 

most of the country to marauding jihadists. 

Two reasons drive my concern. Democracy, equal justice and peaceful coexistence 

within multiethnic African countries constitute the big one. According to one U.N. 

data source, Tuaregs form two related branches among Mali’s 57 ethnic groups. At 

813,000 they constitute 5 percent of today’s population of 16,319,000. Given this 

slim proportion within much diversity, extra care must be taken to avoid creating 

the impression of unfair ethnic favoritism for the Tuaregs—especially one purchased 

through the barrel of a gun. 

African colonial history is my other reason. After carving up Africa, 19th century 

European imperialists embarked on strategies of divide, weaken, and rule. They vigorously promoted division by romanticizing some groups while demonizing others; 

by rewarding others while depriving others; and by stirring up mutual prejudice, 

suspicion, and antagonism. The baleful consequences still plague Africa more than 

a century later. The visible signs discernible from Rwanda to Nigeria, and from 

Kenya and Congo to Cote d’Ivoire are only the tip of an iceberg. This politicized ethnicity may even apply to Mali’s Tuaregs. Some analysts suggest that in addition to 

legitimate grievances, the four secessionist wars of the Tuaregs have been driven 

by a superiority complex. Allegedly, with independence approaching, French colonialists encouraged the lighter-skinned Tuaregs to refuse to live under the rule of 

Mali’s darker-skinned majority, presumed to be inferior. These analysts claim that 

this is a reason why the very first Tuareg rebellion against Bamako’s rule happened 

within days of independence. 

The third policy improvement this testimony is advocating then is this: The U.S. 

must put in place effective mechanisms and bend over backward to ensure that its 

pronouncements and positions are not perceived as playing ethnic favorites in Mali. 

Policy review and adjustment is the fourth and final improvement this testimony 

calls for. The policy in question is America’s counterterrorism strategy not just in 

Mali before the implosion, but across the Sahel-Sahara area and from 9/11 to today. 

If a reason for the review is required, perhaps the following can suffice. A question has persisted since Mali’s implosion almost a year ago: Why did the collapse 

of the much-admired 20-year democracy happen so fast and with such apparent 

ease? To find answers, all possibilities must be explored. As noted above, some observers, several years ago, had become concerned at the counterterrorism strategy’s 

close militaristic embrace of Mali’s young democracy. Consequently, one hypothetical possibility is that the strategy inadvertently contributed. After all, Captain 

Sanogo, the soldier who inflicted the fatal blow, had been trained multiple times by 

the U.S. as part of the strategy. 

I have a preferred list of constituent elements within the strategy which must be 

scrutinized for their possible impact on Mali. They must include AFRICOM, the 

Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Program (TSCTP), Operation Flintlock, and the 

curriculum used to train African soldiers. The policy review must establish if any 

of these produced unintended or unforeseen consequences in Mali. If so the consequences and their causal mechanisms must be fully understood. One narrow practical reason why is obvious. Any detrimental consequences in Mali must be guarded 

against in Mauritania and Niger where TSCTP is being operated right now. A 

broader positive reason can also be advanced for the policy review: It could lead to 

improvements that make more effective the overall strategy that the U.S. has used 

to fight the scourge of terrorism across Africa since 9/11. 

THUMBNAIL ANSWERS TO SELECT QUESTIONS IN INVITATION LETTER

Mr Chairman, your invitation letter posed several questions. They have proved 

extremely helpful in shaping the preceding bulk of my testimony. In this rump section I will provide direct thumbnail answers to a select few.

Q1: What recommendations do you have for U.S. policy as we consider next steps 

in addressing the simultaneous political, security, humanitarian crises in Mali?

As the bulk of the testimony elaborates, I make four strong recommendations. 

Washington must: 

(a) Highlight the high contagion risk in Mali and designate contagion as crisis #5. 

(b) Change the State Department’s current priorities and place military intervention to dislodge terrorists from northern Mali above elections and negotiations. 

(c) Take precautions to prevent U.S. from being perceived as practicing ethnic 

favoritism to benefit Tuaregs. 

(d) Conduct thorough, in-depth review of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, especially how the component elements of AFRICOM, TSCTP, Operation Flintlock, and 

training of African soldiers worked or not in Mali and then adjust policies accordingly.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Q2: Why were we so unprepared for the recent coup in Mali, a country which was 

largely heralded as a stable democracy for so many years? What lessons can be 

learned from this experience as we look at U.S. policy toward Mali and the region?

This first is among the questions that can only be well answered following a thorough policy review. One superficial answer is that presumably we, like everyone 

else, were taken in by the appearances and failed to drill below the surface. Regarding causes, chances are that many causal factors contributed to Mali’s implosion. 

Good candidate hypotheses to test include: (a) the extreme fragility of all infant democracies; (b) the incentive to focus on foreign terrorists diverted Mali’s attention 

from aggrieved domestic groups such as the Tuaregs; (c) why TSCTP failed to make 

a capable fighting force of Mali’s army; (d) the failure to detect and neutralize 

armed Tuaregs moving into Mali from Libya; and (e) the failure to come to the aid 

of Bamako once Tuaregs from Libya struck in January and to give sufficient help 

in defeating returning Tuaregs. Lessons, like causes, are best extracted after thorough policy review. Excellent early warning systems that target domestic grievances 

may be one likely lesson. Another might be to change curriculum for training African soldiers to imbue them with sacred and robust respect for civilian control.

Q3: What are the regional implications of AQIM’s presence in northern Mali and 

what is the extent of the threat to U.S. interests?

The implications cannot be good—especially the more time AQIM has to create 

a thriving haven in northern Mali, a territory as big as France. Significantly, it has 

already been reported that AQIM personnel probably participated in inflicting the 

U.S. national trauma that was the Benghazi murder of Ambassador Stevens and his 

three colleagues. 

Being no expert, I must defer to the judgement of the countless experts advising 

both State and DOD—except to observe that with time the threat to the U.S. can 

only worsen.

Q5: How can the government in Bamako negotiate more effectively with the

Tuaregs?

I believe legitimacy on both sides is the key, a critical prerequisite. The Bamako 

government must be democratically elected. Similarly, Tuareg leaders negotiated 

with must also be legitimate representatives of the community and its subgroups. 

We must not be satisfied with unelected, self-appointed Tuareg individuals. This 

again bolsters the sequence that this testimony advocates: security first, then impeccably prepared democratic elections to reveal Mali’s real leaders both in Bamako 

and among Tuaregs.

Q6: How might military operation impact the humanitarian situation in the north 

and plans for elections, and what is a realistic timetable for holding elections in 

2013?

Clearly, war would affect the humanitarian situation for the worse. However precautions can and must be taken to minimize the detrimental effects. This is because 

the risks and consequences of not intervening and leaving northern Mali at the 

mercy of the brutal jihadists, those risks and consequences are far worse than intervention and they will only deteriorate with time.

Q7: What are potential implications of holding elections without the participation 

of the northerners in the north?

I believe this runs a high risk of opening up a messy post-elections Pandora’s box. 

Sore losers would make all manner of claims. At worse they could ignite small wars 

and stir up other trouble across a land already torn by war and instability. 

This risk bolsters the argument for a sequence of restoring Mali first and thereafter making impeccable plans and preparations for free and fair elections nationwide. 

Cote d’Ivoire’s recent trauma may be instructive. Ex-President Laurent Gbagbo’s 

claim of rigging failed to convince the world precisely because there had been 5 

years of pains-taking and transparent electoral preparations. The Gbagbo claims 

would likely have been more credible, the world would have been more divided and 

the Ivorian civil war would have been longer and bloodier had the elections been 

less well prepared. 

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman, let me express again my deep appreciation for this focus on a 

grave situation afflicting countless Africans. I hope that my opinions are of some 

use. I would be glad to respond to any questions or clarifications you might have.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Akuetteh. 

Mr. Mahmoud, you’ve been quite patient. You are, if I understand correctly, in Bamako at the U.S. Embassy, and I’m grateful 

for your taking the time and for being quite patient in joining with 

the six other witnesses we’ve already heard from. I’d like to invite 

your testimony now. 

STATEMENT OF MOHAMED OULD MAHMOUD, VICE PRESIDENT, LOBBYING NETWORK FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND 

DEVELOPMENT FOR NORTHERN MALI, BAMAKO, MALI 

Mr. MAHMOUD. Thank you very much for inviting me to talk 

about the issue. 

Early in January 2012, the rebellion started under the label of 

MNLA, National Movement of Azawad Liberation. It took 3 months 

for the army to be defeated and sent back to the capital, Bamako. 

The national army was at the threshold of its capacity to sustain 

security and national integrity. Therefore, the morale of the troops 

was seriously undermined, and the military was horrified by exactions of the insurgents mainly in Aguelhoc and Tessalit. Accordingly, the army claimed munitions and guns to be more equipped 

to face the insurgents. This demand was followed by demonstrations and riots from the army which led to the coup in March 2012. 

However, the northern part of the country was really occupied by 

all kinds of networks—drug trafficking, arms smuggling, hijacking, 

tribal conflicts, and so on. The National Security Forces had never 

controlled the area for the last 20 years and, therefore, the GISP 

had found a no-man’s land to operate and implement his terrorism 

activities. They enrolled and trained many young people coming 

from many countries. 

The GPC—the Salafist Group for Call and Combat—became 

AQIM—Al Qaeda of the Northern Maghreb—and developed an 

international network of recruitment of jihadists. Furthermore, 

AQIM became the most important security actor in northern Mali 

and controlled all roads of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. 

AQIM leaders also developed a strong connection with security officials, politicians, traders, and some local chiefs’ tribes. This situation turned AQIM into an important actor within the local communities by delivering some basic services such as health care and 

water supply, and later on, the group started offering equity and 

justice through the soft application of sharia law. 

Meanwhile, officials of the central government were very reticent 

to talk or hear about these issues because of their strong involvement in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and the liberation of 

Western hostages. As a result, community leaders became more 

and more skeptical of the role of the central government to take 

charge of the local security issues and deliver justice and equity all 

over the country, especially where controlling drug trafficking and 

AQIM are concerned. 

Alternatively, leaders in the north started to concert and organize themselves to determine the best way to face the terrorist activities and take control of drug trafficking. In December 2009, all 

community leaders and stakeholders from the north held a meeting 

in Kidal to share information and debate about the best approaches 

to deal with terrorist activities. The 3-day meeting resulted in the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

46

formation of the Chiefs Network for Lobbying for Peace and Development. 

Groups controlling the northern part. Since the clashes between 

MUJAO and MNLA, there remain only three main groups controlling the area: Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM. These different 

groups have one common interest, the implementation of the sharia 

law. MNLA, on the other hand, was claiming the independence of 

the Azawad Republic. 

MNLA currently has no control of any territory in the north, but 

they are claiming to adhere to the values of democracy and 

‘‘laicite’’—secularism—unlike the three other groups. MNLA is composed of former Tuareg rebellion officers and intellectuals and is 

reinforced by the former Libyan Leaders Legion. This organization 

was the most popular among the youth community, but today it 

has lost its credibility as it has lost its ability to control the north. 

During the last months, MNLA has lowered its own political ambitions and instead of claiming the independence of Azawad, MNLA 

members are now talking about federalism. 

Ansar Dine was created by Iyad Ag Aghaly to balance the leadership of rising MNLA, which did not accept him as a leader. On the 

other hand, Ansar Dine was created to protect the interests of the 

Ifoghas community, and it has benefited from the protection of 

AQIM where Iyad Ag Aghaly used to be an important intermediary 

with the central government to free hostages. 

Ansar Dine is today controlling two main regions, Kidal and Timbuktu. This group is joined by some jihadists of AQIM and MNLA 

fighters. Ansar Dine has tried to combine forces with MNLA many 

times without success, up until now. This failure of having a single 

Tuareg organization has demobilized too many fighters from 

MNLA to Ansar Dine. 

It seems today that Ansar Dine has integrated militants and 

fighters from MNLA and built credibility within the Tuareg 

community. 

The relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM is a tactical deal 

to consolidate the leadership of the Ifoghas communities and create 

a connection between AQIM and local leaders. In reality, Ansar 

Dine had no sound political agenda, and this explains the will of 

Ansar Dine to join jihadists in the implementation of sharia law. 

This practice does not fit with the expectations and traditions of 

the Tuareg community. 

Ansar Dine has the strongest military position compared to 

MUJAO and MNLA. To get Ansar Dine out of the influence of 

AQIM, we need to create a space of debate for the Tuareg community as a whole in order to decide what will be the most appropriate future of the society, the ruling system, and the spiritual 

and cultural dimensions. The strategy to create the space and 

framework for people to talk would help dilute the role of the 

actual Ansar Dine leaders. 

MUJAO is an international network of jihadists hosted by the 

Lamhar community of Gao. It is composed of Arabs who are specialized in drug trafficking and who have a strong connection with 

AQIM leaders. The only agenda held by MUJAO is to create terror 

beyond the Malian borders and to impose their local leadership on 

other communities in the region. This is the most criminal organiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47

zation and will never give up drug trafficking and terrorism as 

activities. 

People’s perceptions and expectations. The majority of people living under the occupation and who are in refugee camps want to see 

an end to AQIM’s activities and living in a strong state which can 

ensure freedom, equity, and justice. War is the last wanted solution 

because terrorists and others groups could easily escape and leave 

the people under the bombs of international community. 

How to get the north back to the country. First of all, we need 

a legitimate and credible central government in the south. We have 

to organize free and independent elections. This does not mean 

that the north is neglected, but it’s the part of starting point. 

To engage talk with Ansar Dine and MNLA; to create spaces for 

people and local leaders to debate on the future of their lives; and 

to change the national governance which could allow freedom of 

choices. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahmoud follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOHAMED OULD MAHMOUD

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Early in January 2012, the rebellion started under the label of MNLA (National 

movement of Azawad liberation). It took 3 months for the army to be defeated and 

sent back to the capital, Bamako; the national army was at the threshold of its capacity to sustain security and national integrity. Therefore, the moral of the troops 

was seriously undermined, and the military was horrified by exactions of the insurgents mainly in Aguelhoc and Tessalit. Accordingly, the army claimed munitions 

and guns to be more equipped to face the insurgents; this demand was followed by 

demonstrations and riots from the army which led to the coup in March 2012. 

However, the northern part of the country was really occupied by all kinds of networks (drugs trafficking, arms smugglings, hijacking, tribal conflicts, and so on). 

The national security forces had never controlled the area for the last 20 years, and 

therefore, the GISP had found a no man’s land to operate and implement his terrorism activities. They enrolled and trained many young people coming from many 

countries. 

The GPC (The Salafist Group for Call and Combat) became AQIM (Al-Qaeda of 

the Northern Maghreb) and developed an international network of recruitment of 

jihadists. Furthermore, AQIM became the most important security actor in northern 

Mali and controlled all roads of drugs trafficking and arms smuggling. AQIM leaders also developed a strong connection with security officials, politicians, traders and 

some local chiefs tribes. This situation turned AQIM into an important actor within 

the local communities by delivering some basic services such as health care and 

water supply, and later on, the group started offering equity and justice through the 

soft application of sharia law. 

Meanwhile, officials of the central government were very reticent to talk or hear 

about these issues because of their strong involvements in drugs trafficking, arms 

smuggling, and the liberation of Western hostages. As a result, community leaders 

became more and more skeptical of the role of the central government to take 

charge of the local security issues and deliver justice and equity all over the country, especially where controlling drugs trafficking and AQIM are concerned. 

Alternatively, leaders in the north started to concert and organize themselves to 

determine the best way to face the terrorist activities and take control of drugs trafficking. In December 2009, all community leaders and stakeholders from the north 

held a meeting in Kidal to share information and debate about the best approaches 

to deal with terrorist activities. The 3-day meeting resulted in the formation of the 

‘‘Chiefs Network for Lobbying for Peace and Development.’’

GROUPS CONTROLLING THE NORTHERN PART

Since the clashes between MUJAO and MNLA, there remain only three main 

groups controlling the area: ANSAR DEEN, MUJAO and AQMI. These different 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

48

groups have one common interest—the implementation of the sharia law. MNLA, 

on the other hand, was claiming the independence of the Azawad Republic.

• MNLA currently has no control of any territory in the north but they are claiming to adhere to the values of democracy and ‘‘laicite’’ (secularism) unlike the 

three other groups. MNLA is composed of former Touareg rebellion officers and 

intellectuals and is reinforced by the former Libyan Leaders Legion. This organization was the most popular among the youth community, but today, it has 

lost its credibility as it has lost its ability to control the north. During the last 

months, MNLA has lowered its own political ambitions, and instead of claiming 

the independence of Azawad, MNLA members are now talking about federalism. 

• Ansar Dine was created by Iyad Ag Aghaly to balance the leadership of rising 

MNLA which did not accept him as a leader. On the other hand, Ansar Dine 

was created to protect the interests of the Ifoghas community, and it has benefited from the protection of AQIM where Iyad Ag Aghaly used to be an important intermediary with the central government to free hostages. Ansar Dine is 

today controlling two main regions (Kidal and Timbuktu). This group is joined 

by some jihadists of AQIM and MNLA fighters. Ansar Dine has tried to combine 

forces with MNLA many times without success up until now. This failure of 

having a single Touareg organization has demobilized too many fighters from 

MNLA to Ansar Dine. 

It seems today that Ansar Dine has integrated militants and fighters from 

MNLA and built credibility within the Touareg community. 

The relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM is a tactical deal to consolidate the leadership of the Ifoghas communities and create a connection between 

AQIM and local leaders. In reality, Ansar Dine had no sound political agenda, 

and this explains the will of Ansar Dine to join jihadists in the implementation 

of sharia law. This practice does not fit with the expectations and traditions of 

the Touareg community. Ansar Dine has the strongest military position compared to MUJAO and MNLA. To get Ansar Dine out of the influence of AQIM, 

we need to create a space of debate for the Touareg community as a whole in 

order to decide what will be the most appropriate future of the society, the ruling system, and the spiritual and cultural dimensions. 

The strategy to create the space and framework for people to talk would help 

dilute the role of the actual Ansar Dine leaders. 

• MUJAO is an international network of jihadists hosted by the LAMHAR community of GAO. It is composed of Arabs who are specialized in drugs trafficking 

and who have a strong connection with AQIM leaders. The only agenda held 

by Mujao is to create terror beyond the Malian borders and to impose their local 

leadership on other communities in the region. This is the most criminal organization and will never give up drugs trafficking and terrorism as activities. 

PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

The majority of people living under the occupation and who are in refugee camps 

want to see an end to AQIM’s activities and living in a strong state which can insure freedom, equity, and justice. War is the last wanted solution because terrorists 

and others groups could easily escape and leave the people under the bombs of 

international community. 

HOW TO GET THE NORTH BACK TO THE COUNTRY

• First of all, we need a legitimate and credible central government in south. We 

have to organize free and independent elections. This does not mean that the 

north is neglected but it’s the part of starting point. 

• To engage talk with Ancar Deen and MNLA; 

• To create spaces for people and local leaders to debate on the future of their 

lives; and 

• To change the national governance which could allow freedom of choices.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Mahmoud. 

I’m going to ask one question. Just if I could summarize, and 

thank you for your testimony, each of the four members of this 

panel. The United States has had a long and a close relationship 

with the Malian people. We have long supported development, security, democracy. The developments of the last year, nearly 2 

years, have been very upsetting, disturbing, troubling. We now 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49

have a significant area of Mali and many of its people facing security challenges, legitimacy challenges, human rights abuses, fundamental human rights abuses caused by many different actors, and 

this should cause us in the United States to reconsider some of our 

strategic approaches and some of our choices. 

If each of you had one suggestion for what is the most important 

thing that we should be taking away from this hearing and pressing for the United States to do, whether to advance human rights, 

to advance a secure and credible election, to advance a regional 

strategy that is successful, or to ensure that we effectively engage 

with the real human needs of the people of Mali, what is your one 

suggestion for us, for our actions going forward? 

Mr. Mahmoud, I will start with you, and then Mr. Akuetteh, Ms. 

Dufka, and Dr. Fomunyoh. 

Mr. MAHMOUD. I think for us, the first thing to do is to get this 

election done, a legitimate government in Bamako, so that they can 

stop openly the rebellion movement in the north. As far as we don’t 

have legitimacy, we can’t move forward to a peaceful north, and 

even the south part of the country. 

I’m afraid that even Bamako and the other cities will be occupied 

by the terrorists and so on. So we should be rushing to get this 

election done as soon as possible. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Mahmoud. 

Mr. Akuetteh. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you very much. My choice would be, my 

recommended choice would be a regional strategy for combating 

terrorism, because I do think if you look at what has happened, a 

lot of Africans have been killed. So terrorism in Africa is not just 

a threat to the United States. It is to Africans, too. 

Now, the kind of strategy that I will stress, though, is I think 

it has to be rooted in democracy and social justice and good governance inside every African country. That will then take away the 

grievances and the things that will attract—create terrorists. 

Now, if there are foreign terrorists coming around, there are different ways of dealing with them. But I do think that it has to be 

rooted in democracy because if we focus on foreign terrorists and 

ignore what is happening inside countries, I think it’s really dangerous. For 2 years, some of us were worried about the lack of 

focus on the Tuareg problem until they moved back from Mali. 

So I think the regional strategy rooted in democracy as a way of 

fighting the big threats of terrorism across Africa. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Ms. Dufka. 

Ms. DUFKA. You’ve given us the most difficult question. I would 

say a few things. Of course, I see things through the prism of ruleof-law institutions which, as I’ve noted, were very weak. 

I would say to encourage a dialogue in which all Malians can be 

a part, because to focus only on the Tuaregs and those Tuaregs 

who have taken up arms, which are a tiny minority—there were 

a lot of Tuaregs who were not in favor of this war. They felt it was 

a very opportunistic action on the part of a very few. So to open 

up with respect to the north, to ensure that there is a dialogue so 

that all voices in the north can be heard, not just the Tuaregs who 

have taken up arms, and to ensure a dialogue that would address 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

50

the underlying causes which affect all Malians, not just Malians in 

the north but some of these rule-of-law issues that affect all 

Malians. 

And then, of course, do not forget the issue of addressing abuses 

and the culture of impunity, which could potentially lead to much 

graver violations in the future as military intervention happens 

and after a vacuum is left in some of these areas in the north in 

which abuses could happen. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. A broad and inclusive dialogue, and real 

accountability. 

Dr. Fomunyoh. 

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Mr. Chairman, I would say the one thing to take 

out of this is I think all of us are trying to draw lessons from the 

Malian experience and asking ourselves constantly what happened 

to this country that for 20 years seemed to be a functioning democracy. I think one of the takeaways for us is that elections, even 

when held regularly, do not necessarily an effective democracy 

make. 

So even if we fast-forward into 2013 and the military operation 

goes well, and the big cities are regained by the government in 

Bamako, and we have good elections, inclusive elections, I think 

the one lesson that we should all take from this experience is the 

need for sustainable partnerships, that democracy support programs shouldn’t end with support for an electoral process. We 

really have to deepen the process of service delivery and strengthening of institutions. 

Senator COONS. Terrific. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

those concise summations. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Underlining concise, I’ll be quick. 

I thank all of you for your testimony. Mr. Mahmoud, thank you 

very much for your testimony. You focused on one of the first, most 

important needs is a credible government in Mali, in the south. 

I’ll ask Ms. Dufka a question. I asked the DOD lady before, Amy, 

or Amanda. Evidently, from your testimony, Captain Sanogo is not 

the kind of guy that would be the representative of reform. Is that 

correct? 

Ms. DUFKA. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. I think that’s representative of what Mr. 

Mahmoud said and what they need in terms of the government to 

build on. 

Second, I want to make a comment. Mr. Akuetteh made a critical 

observation, adding contagion as a fifth concern in Mali, and it may 

be really the biggest concern for the United States of America, 

because if this spreads across boundaries and if Al Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb becomes more and more powerful in neighboring 

partners around there, it will be a significant problem not just for 

the United States but for all of West Africa, and I appreciate your 

testimony on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson. I’m

always grateful for your partnership and for the ease with which 

our staff works together to prepare these important hearings. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

51

Forgive us but it is past 11 o’clock, our appointed hour. All of 

your testimony, all of your written testimony will be submitted for 

the record. 

There were several other Senators who expressed real interest in 

this hearing today but due to their schedules were not able to join 

us. So I’m going to leave the record open for a week, which will 

allow other Senators to submit questions for the record of any of 

our witnesses, and for us to then take some actions going forward. 

I’m grateful for the support efforts that made it possible for us 

to get a great and full discussion of the many challenging issues 

facing us in the United States, in the region, and in Mali. 

Thank you, Mr. Mahmoud, for joining us from Bamako. 

Thank you, Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you, Ms. Dufka. And thank 

you, Mr. Akuetteh. We are grateful for your testimony today. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Æ

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER