O ra l a rg u m e n t w a s h e a rd in t h is c a se o n A p ril 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 , i n P u la sk i, G iles C o u n ty, T e n n e sse e , as p a rt o f t h is 1

C o u rt’s S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n fo r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 15, 200 5 S es sio n a t P ula ski 1



### STATE OF TENNESS EE v . PATRICK D. COLL INS

App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2001-T-324 F rank G. Clem ent, Jr., Judge

No. M2002- 02885-SC-S09-CO - F iled Jun e 29, 2005

We g ra nte d r e vie w o f this int e rl oc uto ry app e a l to de te rm ine wh e the r the de fe nd a nt w a s su ff ic ie ntl y advised of the conseque nces of ref using to take a breath-a lcohol test. The ar resting office r informe d the defendant that his license would be suspended for one y ear if he re fused the te st, but under the pro v is io n s o f T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 6 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 0 ) in e f f e c t a t th e ti me , the penalty was two y ear s. The trial c ourt held that the de fenda nt was not sufficie ntly ad v i s ed o f the conseque nces a nd barr ed the State f rom seeking any

suspension of the def

endant’ s driver’ s license. The trial c ourt also bar

red the State from arg uing to the jury on the DUI char g e that the de fenda nt had re fused the breath te st. The Court of Criminal Appe als reve rsed, holding that the def endant wa s adequately

advised of the cons eq u en ce s for r efusing the test. After revie wing the re cord a nd applicable authority , we a ffirm in part and re verse in part the de cis i o n of the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls o n th e se pa

rate g ro un ds set fo rth h e re in. We h oldthat a lth ou g h th e Sta te ma y re qu e st

su sp e ns ion of

Col lin s’ lic e ns e , th e Sta te ma y no t se e k a susp e ns ion of

lon g e r tha n o ne y e ar b e c a us e Col lin s w a s in c or

re c tly a dv ise d o f the c on se qu e nc e s o f r e fu sin g to t ake the te st.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Aff irm ed in p art and Reve rsed in part

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III
, C.J
., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.

V. Mic ha e l F ox, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , a ndDa rr e n J. Sco g g ins , Bu rn s, Te nn e sse e , for the Ap pe lla nt, Pa tr ic k D a vidCol lin s.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; E liza be th T. Ry a n, Se nio r C ou ns e l; V ic tor S. ( To rry ) Joh ns on , I I I , Di st ri ct Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndSc ott

R. McMurtry , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

This case comes to us on a pre- trial interlocutory appea l. The fa cts containe d in the limit ed

re c or d a re a s f oll ow s.

On Se pte mbe r 2 8, 20 00 , d e fe nd a nt P a tr ic k Co lli ns (“ Col lin s” ) wa s st op pe d f or sp e e din g in Davidson County , Tenne ssee. Af ter subjec ting Collins to a number of f ield so b ri et y t ests, the

arr esting office r dete rmined t hat C ollins was intox icated. T he off icer then re ad Collins a standard

sc ri pt, iss ue d b y

the Me tr op oli ta n N a sh vil le Pol ic e De pa rt me nt ( “ Me tr o” ), a dv isi ng Col lin s:

Th e re are re a so na

ble g ro un ds to b e lie ve y ou were drivi ng or in phy sical control of

a motor vehic le wh i l e u n der the influence of alcohol. I here by reque st y ou to submit to a bre ath alcohol test. You wi ll b e inf

or me d o f the re su lts a nd the n ha ve the ri g ht t o a blo odte st at y our o wn e xpe ns e . Y ou ha ve the ri g ht t o r e fu se thi s te st. Ho weve r, ac cording to Tennesse e state la w, if y ou do, y ou will be char g ed with violating the implied consent law a nd, if the court finds
y ou in v iol a tio n o f this la w, the n th e c ou rt wi ll s us pe ndy ou r l ic e ns e fo r o ne y e ar. Do y ou un de rs ta nd ? Will y ou take the br e a th t e st?

Colli ns did not take the bre ath t est. He w as subseque ntly indicted for driving unde r the influenc e of an intoxi cant ( “DUI ”) in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 55-10-401 ( 2000). The Sta te a lso so ught to su sp e ndCol lin s’ lic e ns e a s a pe na lty fo r h is f a ilu re to t ake the br e a th t e st pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-406 (2000).

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-406(a )(1) provides that any one driving a motor vehicle in this state “is de emed to have g iven co nsent to a test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or d ru g co n t en t of that per son’s blood.” This “implied consent” statute provides that ref usal to submit t o such a te st subjects the driver to r evocation of his license. See State v. Turner, 913 S.W .2d 158, 159-60 (Te nn. 1995). The sta tute further provides t h at “i f t he drive r wa s not advised of the conseque nces of such ref usal,” a court may

not suspend his license. Te nn. Code. Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 2).

Prior to 2000, the statut o ry re v o ca tion period was one y ear . As amende d eff ective July1, 2000, section 55-10- 406(a) (3) pr ovides for revocation periods of betwee n one and five y ear s. The

revoc ation period is two y ear s if the driver was pre viouslyconvicted of , inter alia, driving unde r the influence . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 3)(B ) (2000) . Colli ns had a prior conviction for driving under the influence and so, under section 55-10- 4 0 6 (a )( 3 )(B ), he w as subject to a two- y ear suspension for re fusing to take the alcohol test. Howeve r, although C ollins was arre sted nearly three

mon ths a ft e r the July

20 00 a me nd me nts too k e ff e c t, M e tr o’ s st a nd ardsc ri pt h a d n ot b e e n r e vis e d to-3-

c on fo rm to the a me nd me nts . T he arr e sti ng of fi c e r the re fo re state d to Colli ns that he wa s o nly

su bje c t to a

on e -y e ar s us pe ns ion fo r r e fu sin g to t ake the br e a th t e st.

Be cause the ar

resting office r had read him an incorrec t advisory statement, Collins m oved pr ior to tr ia l to strike the imp lie d c on se nt c ha rg e a nd ba

r the Sta te fr om a tte mpt ing to revo ke h is license. Collins also sought to bar the S t at e from arg uing to the jury on the DUI

char g e that he ref used to submit to a breath test knowing that he would lose his driver ’s license by ref usal.

The trial c ourt ruled that the State did not sufficiently inform Collins of the consequenc es of his refusa l to take the breath te st be cause Colli ns was informed that the c onsequenc e wa s a one- y ear , rathe r than a

two-y ear , suspension. The trial c ourt there fore ruled that the State c ould not seek penalties under the implied c onsent law. Reasoning that the statement of rights re ad by the offic er was “ wholly

defic ient,” the tria l court also held t hat t he S tate could not ar g ue to the jury that Colli ns kn e w h e wo uld los e his lic e ns e if he re fu se d the te st, be c a us e Col lin s wa s not in fa c t g oin g to l os e his license.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

g ra nte d the Sta te ’s re qu e st to c on tin ue the tr ia l in or de r t o p e rm it the Sta te to pu rs ue a n in te rl oc uto ry

app e a l a s to whe the r it c ou ld s e e k s us pe ns ion of Col lin s’ lic e ns e a nda s to wh e the r i t c ou ld a

rg ue to the jury

that Co lli ns re fu se d th e br e a th t e st kno wi ng that he wo uld los e his lic e ns e . T he Cou rt

of Cr imi na l App e a ls g rante d the int e rl oc uto ry app e a l andre ve rs e d th e tr ia l c ou rt , holding that Col lins was adequate ly informed of the consequence s of re fusing the bre ath test. The

c ou rt re a so ned th at it wou ld be c umb e rs ome a ndc on fu sin g to atte mpt to i nf orm a su sp e c t of

a ll po ssi ble c on se qu e nc e s o f r e fu sa l un de r the re vis e d s ta tut e . B e c a us e Col lin s wa s inf orme d th a t hi s license would be suspended, the Court of Criminal Appeals re asoned that “[a]nyadditional

e xpla na tio n o f the c on se qu e nc e s o f r e fu sa l w ou ld b e g ratui tou s on the of fi c e r’ s part.” Th e c ou rt

a lso he ld tha t th e Sta te wo uldno t be pr e c lud e d f ro m arg uin g to the jury

that Co ll in s kn e w h is l ic e ns e

wo uldbe su sp e nd e d if

he re fu se d th e br e a th t e st.

We gr anted r eview.

Ana lys is

T h is c a s e r e q u ir e s u s to in te rp r e t T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 55-10

- 4 0 6

. We

un de rt ake statut ory int e rp re ta tio n de no vo , withno pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss g ive n to the c ou rt s below. State v. Wilson, 132 S .W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004).

The re quirement that off

icer s advise drive rs of the co n s eq uence s of re fusing an alc ohol or dr ug te st i s se t f

or th i n s e c tio n 5 5- 10 -4 06 (a )( 2) . A s o f S e pte mbe r 2 8, 20 00
, the da te of Col lin s’

arr e st, that se c tio n p ro vid e d in pe rt ine nt p art :

Any law enfor ceme nt of

fice r who reque sts that the driver of a motor

v eh i cl e subm it to a test pursuant to this section for the purpose of de te rm ini ng the a lc oh oli c or dr ug c on te nt of

the drive r’ s b loo d s ha ll,-4- pr ior to c on du c tin g su c h te st, a dv ise thedrive r that r e fu sa l to su bmi t to such test will result in the suspension of the driver ’s oper ator’s license by the court and, if such driver is driving o n a r ev o ked,

su sp e nd e d o r c a nc e lle d lic e ns e , whe n the pe rs on ’s privi le g e to d o s o is canc elled, suspende d or re voked bec ause of a convic tion for vehicular assault under

§ 39-13-106, ve hicular h o micide under § 39-13-213, a g g ravated vehicula r homicide u n d er § 39-13-218, or driving under the influence of an intoxi cant unde r § 55-10- 401, that the re fusal to submit to such t est will, in addition, result in a fine and mandatory

jail or workhouse sentenc e. The court ha ving jurisdiction of the offense f

or which suc h driver w as plac ed under arr est shall not ha ve the a uth or ity

to s us pe ndthe lic e ns e of a drive r w ho re fu se d to submit t o the test if the drive r wa s not a dvised of the conseque nces of

su c h r e fu sa l.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 2) (e mphases adde d). We note that Collins was advised only that

re fu sa l to take the br e a th t e st w ou ld s ub je c t hi m to a su sp e ns ion of his lic e ns e , no t that the re wa s a pos s i b i l i ty

of a f ine or jail sentenc e. Since ther e is no evidenc e that Collins was driving on a

re vo ke d, su sp e nd e d o r c a nc e lle d li c e ns e a t th e tim e of his arr e st, ho we ve r, the “ c on se qu e nc e s” of his ref usal to take the te st were limit ed to suspension of his driver’s license. We express no opinion as to whether

the offic er’ s stat em ent would have been de ficient ha d Colli ns been subjec t to a fine or jail sentence

.

The c onsequenc es of r efusing to take an a lcohol or drug test are set forth in sec tion 55-10- 40 6( a )( 3) wh ic h, a s o f S e pte mbe r 2 00 0, state d in pe rt ine nt p art :

I f such pe rson having been place d under arr est and ther eaf ter ha ving b e e n r e q u e s t e d b y

a l a w e n f o r c e m e n to f

f i c e r t o s u b m i tt o s u c h t e st

a nd a dv i s e d o f

t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s f

o r r e f u s i n g t o d o s o , r e f

u s e s to submit, the test shall not be g iven, and suc h person sha ll be char g ed with violating this subsection (a)

. . . . I f the c ourt finds that the driver violate d the provisions of this subsection (a ), except as otherwise pr ovided in this subdivi sion (a)( 3), the drive r shall not be considere d as having committed a criminal offense ; howeve r, the court shall re voke the lice nse of suc h driver f or a pe riod of:

(A) O ne (1) y ear , if the per son does not have a prior convic tion for

a vio la tio n o f § 55 -1 0- 40 1 [D UI ] .

. . in this state or a sim ila r o ff e ns e in any other jurisdiction.

(B ) Two ( 2) y ear s, if the per son does have a prior convic tion for an offe nse set out in subdivision (A).-5-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-406(a )(3)

.

“T h e m ost basic principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the leg islative intent without undul y restric ting or

expanding a

stat ute’s cove rag e bey ond its int ended scope.” Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger
, 846 S.W .2d 262, 263 (Tenn.1993) ). Where the statute’s lang uag e is clea r and una mbiguous, we derive the leg islative intent from its plain and ordinary meaning

. Wil son, 132 S.W .3d at 341. I f, howe ver, “ the parties derive differ ent interpre tations f rom the statutory lang uag e, an ambig uity exis ts, a nd we must look to the entire statutory scheme in seeking to asce rtain l eg islative intent.” Owens, 908 S.W .2d at 926 (citing L y ons v. Rasar, 872 S.W. 2 d 8 9 5 , 897 (Tenn.1994) ). “In asce rtaining the intent of the leg islature, this Court may look to ‘the lang uag e of the statute, its subject matter, the obje ct and r eac h of the statute, the w rong or evil which it seeks to reme dy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be

a c c omp lis he d in its ena c tme nt. ’” Sta te v. Gi lli la nd , 22 S.W.3 d 266 , 2 75 (T e nn . 2 00 0) (q uo tin g Sta te

v. L e wi s, 95 8 S. W.2 d 7 36 , 7 39 (T e nn .1 99 7) ). “ Sta tut e s ‘i n pa ri ma te ri a ’ – tho se re la tin g to the sa me subject or ha ving a

common purpose – a

re to be construed tog ether

. ” Ow en s, 908 S.W .2d at 926 (c iti ng L y on s, 87 2 S. W.2 d a t 89 7)

. With the se princ ipl e s in min d, we turn to the pa rt ie s’ arg ume nts

.

Colli ns arg ues that fa ilu re t o apprise him of the two-y ear suspension provision constitutes

a f a il u r e to in f

o r m h im o f th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h is f a il u r e to ta

k e th e b r e a th te s t. T here fore , he

arg ue s, his fa ilu re to t ake the te st s ho uld no t su bje c t hi m to su sp e ns ion of his lic e ns e , a ndthe Sta te sh ou ld n ot b e pe rm itt e d to arg ue to the jury on the DU I c ha rg e that Co lli ns kn e w h e wo uldlos e his lic e ns e if he re fu se d th e br e a th t e st. Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t th e Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls c or

re c tly held that t he leng th of the suspension is immaterial; what matter s is that Col lins was informed that ref usal to take the te st would subject hi m to having his license suspended. C ollins further ar g ues that

a ll e v id e n c e o f

h is “ a ll e g e d r e f

u s a l” to ta k e th e b r e a thte s t s h o u ldb e s u p p r e s s e d a t h is D U I tria l. We decline to a ddress this broad a rg ument. The interloc utory appea l g rante d by the C ourt of Criminal Appea ls was limited to review of the tr i al court’s determination that the State c ould not seek suspension of Collins’ li cense and that the State could not arg ue to the j ury on the DUI char g e that Colli ns “knew ” he w ould lose his license if he ref used the breath te st. Additionally
, Colli ns did not

ra ise to the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls the arg ume nt that a ll ev id ence rela tin g to the br e a th t e st should be suppresse d. We theref ore c onfine our r eview to the que stions of whether the State may seek suspe nsion of his license and whether the S tate may arg ue to the j ury on the DUI char g e that Colli ns knew he would lose his license.

I n our view, the purpose a nd structure of sec tion 55-10-4 0 6 i n d i cate that the leg islature intended only

that a drive r be a dvised that his license will be suspende d if he re fuses a n alcohol or dr ug te st, no t th a t a

dr ive r b e a dv ise d o f the sp e c if ic le ng th of the su sp e ns ion . A s w e ha ve pr e vio us ly observe d, we must construe section 55-10- 406 toge ther with all of the dr iving unde r the influenc e

s t a t u t e s

. T u r n e r , 9 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 6 0

. T h e p u rp o s e o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s “ t o r e m o v e f r o mt h e h i g h w a y, prosec ute, and punish those who eng ag e in the dang erous mena ce of driving under the influence .” I d.; see a ls o St a tev

. L a w r e n c e , 8 4 9 S. W. 2 d 7 6 1
, 7 6 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( d r iv in g u n d e r th e in f lu e n ce statutes are “‘intende d to e nable the drunken driver to be appre hended befor e he strikes’”) (quoting Hug hes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. 1975) ).-6-

Thus, the purpose of

the implied c onsent statute is not to a llow motorists suspected of driving

un de r the inf

lue nc e to m ake a n “ inf

or me d c ho ic e ” abo ut w he the r t o ta ke a n a lc oh ol or dru g te st;

r a t h e r , i ti s t o a d v a n c e t h e S t a t e ’ s o b j e c t i v e o f k e e p i n g i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v e r s o f f t h e r o a d w a y s

. In fu rthe ra nc e of thi s obje c tiv e , “[t]he le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to ena ble the Sta te to e sta

bli sh the of

fe ns e by sc ie nti fi c e vid e nc e . F or

the pr ivi le g e of op e ratin g a ve hic le on ou r hig hw a y s, the drive r c on se nts to a test to determine w hether that privileg e is, as a la w enf orce ment office r suspects, being abused.” Turner , 913 S.W .2d at 160. We note also that sec tion 55-10-406(a )(3) specific ally p rovides that

revoc ation of a driver’s lice nse under the circ umstances applicable to Collins doe s not c onstitut e a criminal off

ense, a s it confer s only an adminis trative penalty

. Turner
, 913 S.W .2d at 163. Therefor e, the rule tha t we strictly

construe the statute ag ainst the State does not apply . I d.

Viewing the statute in this light, we conclude that section 55-10- 406(a) (2) r equire d only that Colli ns be informe d that his license would be suspe nded if he ref used to ta ke the breath test. Section 55-10-406( a)( 2) does not mandate that the spec ific l eng th of the suspension, which va ries ac cording
to the dr ive r’ s p ri or

his tory , b e sp e lle d o ut f or the drive r. Ra the r, se c tio n 55 -10 -40 6(a) (2 ) s e ts g e ne ra l pa

rame te rs , r e qu ir ing that a dr ive r be inf orme d th a t r e fu sa l to be te ste d w ill re su lt i n a lic e ns e suspension and could re sult in a mandatory fine a nd mandatory

jail or workhouse sentenc e. As the Court of Criminal Appe als noted, the 2000 a mendments did not alter the lang uag e re quiring that the driver be advised that ref

usal to take the test will result i n suspension. The amendments also did not chang e the pr ovision b arring suspe nsion of the license when the c onsequenc es of r efusa l are not stated.

The pa

rticular c onsequenc es of r efusa l are spelled out separ ately in section 55-10-406( a)( 3). That section specifie s the l eng th of t he suspension as we ll as the maxi mum fine and the minimum ja il o r w or

kh ou se se nte nc e . H a d th e le g isl a tur e int endedthe se c on se qu e nc e s to be sp e lle d o ut t o

eac h driver w ho is requeste d to take an a lcohol or drug test, the leg islature would have included the sp e c if ic c on se qu e nc e s in se c tio n ( a )( 2) of the statut e . T he le g isl a tur e didstat e wi th sp e c if ic ity in

se c tio n (a )( 2) the pr ior c on vic tio ns wh ic h su bje c t a drive r to a ma nd a tory

fi ne a ndja il o r w or

kh ou se sentenc e; this bolsters our conc lusion that the le g islature did not intend to r equire arr esting office rs to enumerate the entire rang e of c onsequenc es of r efusa l to ta k e an alcohol or drug test in the advisory stated to drivers. Bec ause the specific conseque nces a re spe lled out in a separ ate se ction,

we c onclude that a

g ener al statement of c onsequenc es is sufficie nt.

Although w e conc lude that the advisory statement made to a driver need not be specific , we disag ree with the State and with the Court of Criminal Appea ls that i t n ee d n o t b e accura te. L aw

e nf or c e me nt of

fi c e rs ma y no t “ mis inf

orm mo torist s, so me of

wh om m a y

un de rs ta ndthe ina c c ur a te

warning a nd rely

upon it.” Peopl e v

. J o hnson, 758 N.E.2d 805, 811 (I ll. 2001) (emphasis adde d) (h old ing that r e sc iss ion of su mma ry su sp e ns ion of

drive r’ s li c e ns e wa s w arr a nte d if a n in a c c ur a te

warning w as g iven and “ that misinformation di re ct l y af fec ts the motorist’s potential length of suspension”).

Had the a rre sting off

icer simplyadvised Collins that his license w ould be “suspende d,” we would have little difficulty in concluding that the statute’s requireme nt that Colli ns be advised of theO ur hol din g i s l i mi t ed t o app l i cat i on of t he i mp l i ed cons ent l aw a s codi f i ed i n T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed 2

s ec t i on 55- 10- 406.

-7- c on se qu e nc e s o f r e fu sin g the br e a th t e st w a s met

. He re , h ow e ve r, the arr e sti ng of fi c e r i nc or

re c tly advised Collins, pursuant to Me tro’s standard form, that ref usal to ta ke the br eath test would subjec t him onlyto a one- y ear

suspension.

There is no evidence i n the re cord tha t the arr esting office r intended to de ceive Colli ns or acte d with bad fa ith. I f the re cord showed t h at t h e office r had intende d to misl ead Collins, we

wo ulda g re e wi th C oll ins that th e S tat e sh ou ld b e pr e c lud e d f ro m se e kin g a ny

su sp e ns ion of

his license w hatsoeve r. See State v. Stade , 683 A.2d 164, 166 (Me. 1996) (“[A]lthough the State’s interest in pre venting drunk driver s from oper ating on our hig hway s is gr eat, t h e S t at e has no leg itimate interest in a llowing its law enfor ceme nt of fice rs

. . . to a ffirma tively

mislead citizens about the c on se qu e nc e s o f t akin g or fa ili ng to take a blo od -a lc oh ol t e st. ” ). I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, the ba sic require ment of sec tion 55-10-406(a )(2) was met: Collins was informed that his license would be suspended if h e r e f

u s e d to ta k e th e b r e a th te s t. T h a t th e arr e s ti n g o f f ic e r th e n w e n t b e y o nd the minimum require ments of the statute a nd i n co rr ec t l y advised Collins that his l icense would be suspended f

or one y ear

rathe r than two does not void the advisory statement bec ause the office r’s

e rr or wa s ma de wi tho ut a n int e nt to de c e ive Col lin s. We the re fo re ho ld that the Sta te ma y se e k to suspend Collins’ driver’s lice nse, but that the State may not seek a suspension of g reater than one
y ear

. I ndeed, the State rec og nized the unfairne ss of subjecting Colli ns to a two-y ear suspension and 2
repr esente d to the trial court that it would see k only a one- y ear

suspension.

Our holding that the er

ror in the a dvisory

limit s the State to seeking a one- y ear suspension does not mean, a s Colli ns arg ues, that the S tate shoul d be bar red f rom arg uing to the jury

that Colli ns knew he would lose his license if he refused the breath test. The provisions for advising a driver of the c on se qu e nc e s o f r e fu sin g a dr ug or a lc oh ol te st onl y app ly to the Sta te ’s abil ity to s e e k th e c ivi l penalty of license suspension. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 4). The issu e of w hether Colli ns’ re fusal to take the test is a dmissibl e in his criminal DUI trial is e ntirely separ ate. We see

no rea son to bar the State f rom prese nting evidence and arg uing to the jury that the ar

resting office r informed Collins that his l icense would be suspende d if he re fused the br eath test.

Conclusion

Having considere d the re cord a nd applicable authority , we hold that the implied consent law does not requir e an a

rre sting off

icer to enumerate the entire rang e of conseque nces of ref usal to take an alc ohol or drug test. Howeve r, bec ause Collins was er roneously advised that he would be subjec t only to a one- y ear

suspension, the State may not seek to suspend Colli ns’ driver ’s license for long er than one y ear . We theref

ore r ever se the Court of Criminal Appe als in pa rt. We a ffirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in part a s to the admis sibili ty of C ollins’ ref usal to take the test on the DUI char g e,

a nd we ho ld that the Sta te ma y arg ue to the jury that Col lin s wa s tol d that he wo uldlos e his lic e ns e if he re fused the breath test. Costs are taxed equally to the State and to Patrick Da vid Coll ins and h i s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.-8- ___________________________________ E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE