Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1608-CR-1807 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John T. Wilson

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lucas Thomas,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1608-CR-1807

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman, 

Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48D03-0906-FB-206

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Lucas C. Thomas (Thomas), appeals the trial court’s 

revocation of his probation.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Thomas raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay into 

evidence; and

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Thomas to execute 

the remainder of his suspended sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On June 24, 2009, the State filed an Information, charging twenty-one-year-old 

Thomas with three Counts of child molesting as Class B felonies, Ind. Code § 

35-42-4-3(a), and one Count of child molesting as a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-42-

4-3(b), based upon his multiple sexual encounters with a twelve-year-old girl in 

Madison County, Indiana. On October 5, 2009, Thomas entered into a plea 

agreement with the State, pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty as 

charged. While sentencing would be left to the trial court’s discretion, the State 

agreed to recommend concurrent sentences. On November 16, 2009, the trial 

court accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment of conviction for 

four Counts of child molesting as Class B felonies and imposed a sentence of 

fifteen years—with ten years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction 
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(DOC) and five years suspended to probation—on each Count, all to run 

concurrently.1

[5] In addition to the “usual and ordinary conditions of probation”—such as 

complying with all laws and behaving well in society—the trial court directed 

Thomas to, within thirty days of being placed on probation, have a sex offender 

evaluation and follow all recommendations for treatment; to, within seven days 

of being released to probation, register with local authorities as a sex offender; 

and to comply with any special probation conditions for sex offenders. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 18). Such special conditions for sex offenders, 

included, in relevant part, the following:

5. You shall not miss any appointments for treatment, 

psychotherapy, counseling, or self-help groups (any 12 Step 

Group, Community Support Group, etc.) without the prior 

approval of your probation officer and the treatment provider 

involved, or a doctor’s excuse. You shall comply with the 

attendance policy for attending appointments as outlined by the 

[c]ourt. You shall continue to take any medication prescribed by 

your physician.

* * * *

9. You shall notify your probation officer of your establishment 

of a dating, intimate, and/or sexual relationship. You shall 

notify any person with whom you are engaged in a dating, 

intimate, or sexual relationship of your sex-related conviction(s). 

 

1

 There is no indication why the trial court entered a judgment of conviction for four Class B felonies instead 

of three Class B felonies and one Class C felony as Thomas was charged. Although it is unclear at what 

point this error was corrected, the Abstract of Judgment utilized at Thomas’ probation revocation hearing on 

July 11, 2016, reflects his proper convictions.
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You shall not engage in a dating, intimate, or sexual relationship 

with any person who has children under the age of 18 years.

10. Your probation officer must first approve any employment 

and may contact your employer at any time. You will not work 

in certain occupations that involve being in the private residences 

of others, such as, but not limited to, door-to-door sales, 

soliciting, home service visits or delivery.

* * * *

12. You must never be alone with or have contact with any 

person under the age of 18. Contact includes face-to-face, 

telephonic, written, electronic, or any indirect contact via third 

parties. You must report any incidental contact with persons 

under age 18 to your probation officer within 24 hours of the 

contact.

13. You shall not be present at specific locations where children 

are known to congregate including, but not limited to, parks, 

schools, playgrounds and day care centers.

* * * *

17. You shall complete a travel log and/or journal of daily 

activities as directed by your probation officer.

18. You shall not use any computer with access to any on-line 

computer service at any location (including your place of 

employment) without prior approval of your probation officer. 

This includes any Internet service provider, bulletin board 

system, e-mail system or any public or private computer network. 

You shall not possess or use any data encryption technique or 

program.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 23-24).
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[6] On March 17, 2014, Thomas was released from the DOC, and his five-year 

probationary period began. Five months later, on August 20, 2014, Thomas’ 

probation officer filed a Notice of Violation of Probation, alleging that Thomas 

had violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense in 

Delaware County: failure to register as a sex or violent offender, a Class D 

felony. On March 30, 2015, the trial court held a hearing, during which 

Thomas admitted that he had failed to register as a sex or violent offender. 

Based on the admitted probation violation, the trial court ordered Thomas to 

serve one year of home detention.

[7] On January 20, 2016, Thomas’ probation was transferred from Madison 

County to Delaware County. Six months later, Thomas’ new probation officer 

contacted the Madison County Probation Department to report that Thomas 

had violated his probation. Accordingly, on June 23, 2016, a probation officer 

filed a Notice of Violation of Probation with the Madison Circuit Court, which 

alleged that Thomas committed the following violations:

a) Failed to comply with all treatment recommendations, and 

provide written verification of compliance to Probation 

Department;

* * * *

c) Failed to keep appointments for treatment, psychotherapy, 

counseling, or self-help groups without the prior approval of your 

probation officer and the treatment provider involved, or a 

doctor’s excuse;

* * * *

e) Failed to notify your probation officer of your establishment 
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of a dating, intimate, and/or sexual relationship. You shall 

notify any person with who[m] you are engaged in a dating, 

intimate, or sexual relationship of your sex-related conviction(s). 

You shall not engage in a dating, intimate, or sexual relationship 

with any person who has children under the age of 18 years. 

[f]) You were alone with or had contact with a person under the 

age of 18. Contact includes face-to-face, telephonic, written, 

electronic, or any indirect contact via third parties. You failed to 

report any incidental contact with persons under age 18 to your 

probation officer within 24 hours of the contact.

[g]) You were present at specific locations where children are 

known to congregate including, but not limited to, parks, 

schools, playgrounds and day care centers.

[h]) You used a computer with access to any on-line computer 

service at any location (including your place of employment) 

without prior approval of your probation officer. This includes 

any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, e-mail 

system or any public or private computer network.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 31).2

[8] On July 11, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Thomas’ alleged probation 

violations. During the hearing, Thomas’ probation officer, Teresa Brown 

(Officer Brown), testified that Thomas was unsuccessfully terminated from his 

Sexual Offender Monitoring and Management (SOMM) program at Meridian 

 

2

 The petition originally included two additional alleged violations, labeled as b) and d), which claimed, 

respectively, that Thomas failed to register as required and possessed obscene matter. At the beginning of the 

evidentiary hearing, the State moved to dismiss those violations as they “were erroneously included.” (Tr. p. 

10). 
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Health Services due to non-compliance, including, in part, his failure to take all 

medications as prescribed for his bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Officer 

Brown also stated that she had received a report from the Department of Child 

Services indicating that Thomas was involved in a relationship with a woman 

who had minor children. When questioned, Thomas admitted the relationship 

to Officer Brown. Officer Brown also discovered that Thomas had 

accompanied his girlfriend and her minor children when they went swimming 

at Perry Creek Reservoir, which includes a park and playground. Once again, 

when confronted, Thomas admitted that he had engaged in this activity with 

minor children and that he did not report his contact to Officer Brown or record 

the excursion in his activity log. Officer Brown further testified that Thomas 

had been accessing the Internet without authorization, and he was maintaining

a profile on Facebook, using an alias, as well as a profile on the dating website 

Meet Me. Thomas admitted that he met several women using the online dating 

site. Thomas communicated with various people through Facebook, and those 

messages revealed that he was involved with procuring drugs for people; he was 

consuming alcohol; and he “got a job . . . making ten dollars an hour under the 

table moving n [sic] putting air conditions [sic] in” private residences. (State’s 

Exh. 4, p. 3).

[9] Thomas also testified at the hearing and primarily argued that his alleged 

violations should be excused. In particular, he claimed that he was asked not to 

return to his SOMM program until he remedied his outbreak of psoriasis and 

scabies, and he explained that he stopped taking his prescription medications 
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because they “made [him] feel like a zombie.” (Tr. p. 47). Thomas further 

insisted that he was in a private area at Perry Creek Reservoir and did not know 

that there would be children present, and he stated that he unintentionally 

forgot to log the activity. Furthermore, Thomas indicated that none of his 

contacts with children were sexually motivated, and he did not seek to lure 

minors on the Internet. Thomas stated that his landlord paid him some cash for 

helping out with installing air conditioning units on just one occasion, and 

Thomas denied any drug or alcohol use.

[10] At the close of the evidence, the trial court found “by preponderance of the 

evidence that [Thomas] violated the terms of his probation.” (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 35). Accordingly, the trial court revoked Thomas’ suspended 

sentence and ordered him to execute five years in the DOC.

[11] Thomas now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[12] It is well established that “[p]robation is a matter of grace, not a right to which a 

criminal defendant is entitled.” Robinson v. State, 955 N.E.2d 228, 231 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011) (citing Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). Thus, the 

discretion to revoke probation lies solely with the trial court. Woods v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). On appeal, our court reviews the revocation of a 

defendant’s probation only for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will consider 

only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and we do not 
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reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. “If there is 

substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s decision that 

a defendant has violated any terms of probation, the reviewing court will affirm 

its decision to revoke probation.” Id. at 639-40.

II. Hearsay

[13] Thomas claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain

hearsay into evidence. A probation revocation proceeding “is not to be equated 

with an adversarial criminal proceeding.” Watters v. State, 22 N.E.3d 617, 619 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind. 1999)). 

Rather, “probation revocation procedures ‘are to be flexible, [so] strict rules of 

evidence do not apply.’” Id. (quoting Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550). A trial court has 

broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and our court will not disturb a 

ruling on admissibility unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id.

[14] In probation revocation proceedings, trial courts do have discretion to admit 

hearsay evidence; however, the admission of such evidence “must not violate 

the due process standards provided by the United States Supreme Court.” Id.

Thus, hearsay evidence must “bear[] some substantial indicia of reliability.” Id.

(quoting Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in 

admitting hearsay “if it ‘has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness.’” Id.

(quoting Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind. 2007)). While no bright-line 

rule has been established for this reliability, our court has previously noted that 

“testimony of the parties directly involved, affidavits of parties directly 

involved, and certified copies would have sufficed without putting an undue 
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burden on the State.” Id. at 619-20. Ideally, a trial court should explain “on the 

record why . . . hearsay [is] reliable and why that reliability [is] substantial 

enough to supply good cause for not producing . . . live witnesses.” Reyes, 868 

N.E.2d at 442 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. 

Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

[15] Here, Thomas challenges the admission of State’s Exhibit 2, which consists of a 

progress report and letter explaining Thomas’ termination from the SOMM 

Program at Meridian Health Services. During the hearing, Officer Brown 

testified that she received the letter and progress report from the SOMM 

Coordinator at Meridian Health Services, which stated that Thomas was 

terminated from the SOMM program because he

was out of treatment compliance due to having unapproved 

relationships, having admitted contact with children to case 

manager, potentially using chemical substances such as spice and 

admitting to case manager he had gotten weed and a pipe for 

girlfriend, not taking prescribed psychiatric medication for 

months per self report, working an unapproved job.

(State’s Exh. 2, p.3) (internal quotation marks omitted). The SOMM 

Coordinator’s letter further explained that “[t]hese issues were addressed with 

[Thomas] multiple times through group, individual and case management 

services.” (State’s Exh. 2, p. 1).

[16] According to Thomas, the admission of State’s Exhibit 2, along with Officer 

Brown’s testimony relating thereto, “denied him his due process right to 

confront and cross examine all witnesses against him.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6). 
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Thomas contends that the trial court failed to “explain on the record why the 

hearsay is reliable and why that reliability is substantial enough to support good 

cause for not producing [the authors of the letter and progress report from 

Meridian Health Services] to testify.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). Thomas also 

points out that

[t]here was no showing by a qualified witness that the record was 

made at or near the time, or from information transmitted by 

someone with knowledge; or that the record was a regular 

practice of that business. Without the appropriate foundation by 

a witness having first-hand knowledge of the method by which 

the business prepares and maintains its records, or that without 

evidence the person preparing the record had personal knowledge 

of the facts or events reported, there is a total lack of 

trustworthiness.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 8). On the other hand, the State contends that its Exhibit 2 

was sufficiently reliable because Officer Brown testified that “Meridian Services 

sent monthly progress reports directly to her, which is standard procedure for 

anyone that is on probation and receiving treatment at Meridian Services.” 

(State’s Br. p. 12). The State further argues that the hearsay was reliable 

because it was “corroborated by [Thomas’] admissions.” (State’s Br. p. 12). 

We agree with the State.

[17] We acknowledge Thomas’ assertion that the trial court failed to provide an 

adequate explanation as to its decision to admit the hearsay. See Reyes, 868 

N.E.2d at 442. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact that State’s Exhibit 2 did 

not contain affidavits of the authors or a certification as a business record, we 
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find substantial indicia of reliability because the information contained in 

State’s Exhibit 2 was entirely corroborated by other evidence at the revocation 

hearing. Specifically, Officer Brown testified that Thomas admitted to her that 

he was involved in a relationship with a woman with minor children and that 

he had accompanied his girlfriend and her young children when they went

swimming at Perry Creek Reservoir. Furthermore, excerpts from Thomas’ 

Facebook account—which he identified as his during the hearing—establish 

that Thomas was involved in procuring illegal drugs for other people, as well as 

having obtained “under the table” employment installing air conditioners in 

private residences. (State’s Exh. 4, p. 3). Finally, Thomas testified during the 

revocation hearing that he had stopped taking the medications prescribed for his 

schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression. Accordingly, we find no abuse 

of discretion in the admission of State’s Exhibit 2 because the hearsay therein is 

substantially trustworthy.

III. Sanction

[18] Next, Thomas challenges the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation and 

impose the entirety of his five-year suspended sentence. “We review a trial 

court’s sentencing decision in probation revocation proceedings for an abuse of 

discretion.” Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). It is an 

abuse of discretion if the trial court’s decision “is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances.” Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 273 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Upon a finding that a defendant has violated a condition 

of probation, 
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the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). Accordingly, it was well within the trial court’s authority to 

order Thomas to execute his suspended sentence.

[19] Nevertheless, Thomas insists that he “demonstrated that Community 

Corrections was a strong alternative to incarceration.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 9-

10). We find no merit in this argument. Rather, the evidence reveals that 

Thomas was convicted of three Counts of Class B felony child molesting and 

one Count of Class C felony child molesting. Within five months of being 

released from the DOC and beginning probation, Thomas violated his 

probation by failing to register as a sex offender. After Thomas admitted to this 

violation, the trial court sanctioned him with one year of home detention. 

Despite the trial court’s show of leniency for his first probation violation, in 

June of 2016, Thomas was again accused of violating his probation. This time, 

the evidence established that Thomas violated no less than eight of his probation 

conditions: (1) he failed to complete sex offender treatment; (2) he failed to 

take his medication as prescribed; (3) he failed to notify his probation officer of 

his new relationship, and he commenced a relationship with a women having 

minor children; (4) he did not receive authorization for his employment, and he 

accepted employment that placed him in the private residences of others; (5) he 
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had contact with minors; (6) he visited a park/swimming area where children 

would be expected to gather, and he did not include this on his daily log; (7) he 

accessed the Internet; and (8) he failed to maintain good behavior/adherence to 

the laws by drinking alcohol and involving himself in drug transactions.

[20] We find that Thomas’ blatant and repeated disregard of the conditions of his 

probation demonstrates an utter disrespect for the court’s authority. He has 

established that he is not deserving of the grace and liberty of a probationary 

sentence because he refuses to conform his conduct to the rules that allow him 

to serve his sentence in society. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s order requiring Thomas to execute his five-year suspended sentence 

in the DOC.

CONCLUSION

[21] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court neither abused its 

discretion by admitting hearsay into evidence nor by imposing the entirety of 

Thomas’ suspended sentence following a determination that he had violated his 

probation.

[22] Affirmed.

[23] Crone, J. and Altice, J. concur