alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4829 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4829

  To direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
 Services to clarify that implanted active middle ear hearing devices 
    are prosthetics and are not subject to the hearing aid coverage 
                 exclusion under the Medicare program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 29, 2024

 Ms. Klobuchar (for herself and Mr. Lankford) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
 Services to clarify that implanted active middle ear hearing devices 
    are prosthetics and are not subject to the hearing aid coverage 
                 exclusion under the Medicare program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hearing Device Coverage 
Clarification Act''.

SEC. 2. ACTIVE MIDDLE EAR IMPLANT COVERAGE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services shall clarify that implanted active middle ear hearing devices 
are prosthetics that are not subject to the hearing aid coverage 
exclusion under section 1862(a)(7) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395y(a)(7)).
    (b) Prosthetic Defined.--The term ``prosthetic'' has the meaning 
given such term in section 414.202 of title 42, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or a successor regulation).
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the Annual Report of Molecular Imaging Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-KSB for
the year ending June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), Kenneth C. Frederick, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Dennis M. Mulroy, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do
each hereby certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                            
|--------------------------------------------
|/s/ Kenneth C. Frederick                    
|Kenneth C. Frederick Chief Executive Officer



Dated: October
15, 2004



|                                         
|-----------------------------------------
|/s/ Dennis M. Mulroy                     
|Dennis M. Mulroy, Chief Financial Officer



Dated: October
15, 2004



[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
has been provided to Molecular Imaging Corporation and will be retained by Molecular Imaging Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.]
1... See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-063-CV

IN RE ELVERA M. JOHNSON, IN RELATOR

HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DISTRICT 

CLERK OF PARKER COUNTY, TEXAS

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

The court has considered relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and

prohibition and is of the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly,

relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition is denied.

Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let

execution issue.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL A: DAUPHINOT, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MCCOY, J.

MCCOY, J. would request oral argument on the mandamus issue.

DELIVERED: April 18, 2008
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON L. SCOTT,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2586 LKK GGH P

vs.

 CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On October 31, 2005, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations

herein which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any

objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Neither

party has filed objections to the findings and recommendations.

The court has reviewed the file and finds the findings and recommendations to be

supported by the record and by the magistrate judge’s analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

/////

Case 2:04-cv-02586-LKK -GGH Document 41 Filed 01/11/06 Page 1 of 2
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1. The findings and recommendations filed October 31, 2005, are adopted in full;

and 

2. Defendants’ June 30,2005, motion to dismiss is denied; within twenty days of

the date of this order, defendants shall file a response to the complaint.

DATED: January 10, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

sc2586.jo

Case 2:04-cv-02586-LKK -GGH Document 41 Filed 01/11/06 Page 2 of 2
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 50 (Thursday, March 15, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12169-12170]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-4719]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP07-340-000]


Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation; Notice of Proposed Changes 
in FERC Gas Tariff

March 9, 2007.
    Take notice that on March 6, 2007, Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation (Columbia) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1, the following revised tariff 
sheets with a proposed effective date of June 1, 2007:

Fifth Revised Sheet No. 390
Original Sheet No. 390A
Sixth Revised Sheet No. 391
Second Revised Sheet No. 392

    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as

[[Page 12170]]

appropriate. Such notices, motions, or protests must be filed in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 154.210 of the Commission's 
regulations (18 CFR 154.210). Anyone filing an intervention or protest 
must serve a copy of that document on the Applicant. Anyone filing an 
intervention or protest on or before the intervention or protest date 
need not serve motions to intervene or protests on persons other than 
the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#8bcdced9c8c4e5e7e2e5eed8fefbfbe4f9ffcbedeef9e8a5ece4fd"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cd8b889f8e82a3a1a4a3a89eb8bdbda2bfb98daba8bfaee3aaa2bb">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Philis J. Posey,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-4719 Filed 3-14-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22D0191.PATRICKBARNES v.RICHMOND COUNTYCONSTRUCTORS.

Patrick Barnes seeks to appeal an adverse workers’ compensation decision

made in favor of Richmond County Constructors (the “Employer”) and American

Zurich Insurance Company (the “Insurer”). The record showsthat after the Appellate

Division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the “Board”) affirmed the

administrative law judge’s decision, Barnes appealed to the superior court. On

October 21, 2021, the superior court held a hearing and it entered an order purporting

to affirm the Board’s award on November 18, 2021. On December 16, 2021, Barnes

filed an application for discretionary appeal from the November 18, 2021 order. The

Employer and Insurer, however, argue that Barnes’s appeal to the superior court was

previously affirmed by operation of law, rendering the superior court’s order a nullity

and Barnes’s application for discretionary appeal untimely. We agree.

OCGA § 34-9-105 (b) provides, in relevant part, that “the decision of the board

shall be considered affirmed by operation of law if no order of the court dispositive

of the issues on appeal has been entered within 20 days of the date of the hearing.”

Here, because a hearing was held on October 21, 2021, the Board’s award was

affirmed by operation of law on November 10, 2021, the 20th day from the date of

the hearing. This is the date that controls for purposes of filing a timely application

for appeal. See OCGA § 34-9-105 (d); Coronet Carpets v. Reynolds, 199 Ga. App.

383, 383 (405 SE2d 103) (1991). The superior court’s subsequent award was a mere

nullity. See MacKenzie v. Sav-A- Lot Food Store, 226 Ga. App. 32, 34 (1) (485 SE2d

559) (1997).

In order for this Court to have jurisdiction, we must have a timely filed

January 10, 2022
application for discretionary appeal. Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734 (380 SE2d 57)

(1989). An application is timely if it is filed within 30 days of the entry of the order

the applicantseeksto appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582

(420 SE2d 393) (1992). Thus, Barnes had to file his application within 30 days of

November 10, 2021, the date that the Board’s decision was affirmed by operation of

law. His application – filed on December 16, 2021 – is untimely. Accordingly, this

application for discretionary appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill, 204 Ga. App. at 582. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/10/2022
July 20, 1942

No. 47404.

Suit 4368.

#### United *States*v. *W. H. & L. D. Betz.*

C. D. 487 reversed. C. A. D. 208.
#### In the Matter of Nomura Securities International, Inc., et al., Appellants. Stephen C. Freidheim, Respondent.

[634 NYS2d 95]

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Martin Schoenfeld, J.) entered May 5, 1995, which denied petitioners’ application to disqualify respondent’s counsel in the parties’ arbitration proceeding, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The IAS Court properly denied petitioners’ motion to disqualify counsel, as their claims that a conflict of interest exists do not bear careful scrutiny *(see, Matter of Abrams [John Anonymous],*62 NY2d 183, 196). Petitioners’ assertion that counsel will be forced to cross-examine two other individuals whom it also represents, appears remote, at best. Similarly, petitioners’ claim that another employee, also represented by opposing counsel, was privy to confidential information relating to petitioners’ litigation strategy against respondent in his arbitration claim, is not supported by any competent evidence and, in fact, denied by the employee. Furthermore, petitioners brought this application to disqualify only six days before the arbitration proceeding was to commence, although they knew of the counsel’s multiple representations at least three months prior to that date, and thus, disqualification could "stall and derail the proceedings, redounding to the strategic advantage of one party over another” *(S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp.,*69 NY2d 437, 443). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Kupferman, Asch and Williams, JJ.
#### Anthony Ciotti, Appellant, v New York Hospital et al., Respondents.

[634 NYS2d 204]

—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), entered August 18, 1993, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, and upon the denial of the plaintiff’s motion, *inter alia,*to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, was in favor of the defendants dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

" ' "A verdict in favor of a defendant should not be set aside as against the weight of the credible evidence unless the preponderance in favor of the plaintiff was so great that the finding in favor of the defendant could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence” ’ ” *(Cerasuoli v Brevetti,*166 AD2d 403, 404, quoting *Olsen v Chase Manhattan Bank,*10 AD2d 539, *affd*9 NY2d 829; *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129). Here, the jury was entitled to accept the opinion of the defendants’ witness that the defendants did not depart from good and accepted standards of medicine in their delivery of the plaintiff. Thus, it cannot be said that the verdict in the defendants’ favor could not have been reached by a fair interpretation of the evidence.

In addition, we need not reach the issues raised by the plaintiff concerning expert testimony on proximate cause and the trial court’s charge as to proximate cause. Because the jury ceased deliberating after determining that the defendants were not negligent, they never reached the issue of proximate cause. Thus, the expert testimony on proximate cause and the court’s charge on proximate cause could not have affected the jury’s verdict *(see, Radloff v Adler,*205 AD2d 973; *Olsen v City of New York,*141 AD2d 709).

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>



                                  EXHIBIT 32.1


             Section 1350 Certification of Chief Executive Officer
                           and Chief Financial Officer


<PAGE>



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                                   AS ADDED BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Clifton Savings Bancorp,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the
undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as added by ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by
                  the Report.




                              /s/ John A. Celentano, Jr.
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              John A. Celentano, Jr.
                              Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer



                              /s/ Christine R. Piano
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Christine R. Piano
                              Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer


Date: November 2, 2007
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-546
In Re: RICHARD A. CAROLINA, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-97-1312-6-17AK) Submitted: August 13, 1998 Decided: September 1, 1998 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard A. Carolina, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Richard A. Carolina has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus from this court seeking an order compelling the district court to grant his motion to compel discovery in a civil case terminated adverse to Carolina. Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Mandamus relief is only available when there are no other means by which the relief sought could be granted, see In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987), and may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re Catawba Indian Tribe of S. Carolina , 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny mandamus relief. We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
No. 61899.

#### Jean Lindow, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 310763-K (San Juan).

Opinion by

Eord, J.

The protest was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

Michael A. Sweet,

Plaintiff,

vs.

O. C. O’Connor, et al.,

Defendants.

No. Civ. S 04-2703 FCD PAN P

Order

-oOoApril 13, 2005, the court dismissed the complaint with leave

to amend within 60 days. Plaintiff has not filed an amended

complaint, nor otherwise responded to the court’s order. Good

cause appearing, the court hereby orders that plaintiff shall,

within 10 days of service of this order, file an amended

complaint. Otherwise this case will be dismissed without

prejudice. Local Rule 11-110; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Dated: June 23, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

Case 2:04-cv-02703-FCD-EFB Document 7 Filed 06/24/05 Page 1 of 1
No. 55269.

#### Phil Kronfeld, Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 161697-K (B), etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

It was stipulated that the Federal Reserve bank certified dual rates of exchange for the currencies involved in the liquidation of the entries for the dates of exportation of the merchandise covered by the entries and that the circumstances relating to the liquidation of the said entries are similar in all material respects to those in Abstract 54732. In view of this stipulation and following the cited decision it was held that the currencies of the-invoices covered by certain enumerated entries should have been converted in the manner directed by the judgment of this court in said Abstract 54732, in accordance with Bureau of Customs Circular Letter No. 2675, dated October 19, 1949.
exh_1011.htm


Exhibit 10.11


 



2015 BONUS PLAN


 


Irv Alpert


 







 


Compensation


 


Bonus Components:


 



	
·

	
A one-time bonus upon 100% achievement of sales plan.








	
·

	
Ten percent of bookings in excess of sales plan from existing channel clients








	
·

	
Five percent of every new sale from a lead generated by Irv.








	
·

	
A one-time bonus upon extension of an existing client under terms and conditions approved by either the CEO or CFO.








	
·

	
Ten percent of every new sales dollar generated during the first quarter of 2015.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY J. BIGGS, No. CIV-S-04-2667 MCE/CMK

Petitioner, 

v. ORDER

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, 

ET AL., 

Respondents. 

 /

On May 17, 2005, the magistrate judge filed findings and

recommendations which recommended this action be dismissed for

petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies. The

magistrate’s findings and recommendations gave notice to all

parties that any objections were to be filed within twenty days. 

Petitioner did not file any objections within the twenty day

period. 

///

///

Case 2:04-cv-02667-MCE -CMK Document 14 Filed 08/10/05 Page 1 of 3
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2

On June 30, 2005, the court adopted the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge and denied petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus.

On July 13, 2005, petitioner filed a document entitled a

“Request for Reconsideration of Judge’s Order to Adopt the

Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendations and Denial.” In this

document, petitioner contends that he never received the

magistrate’s findings and recommendations filed May 17, 2005. 

Petitioner asserts further that he would have filed objections

had he received these findings and recommendations. This

document was docketed as a notice of appeal. 

This court now construes petitioner’s July 13, 2005 request

as a request for an extension of time to file objections, not a

notice of appeal. However, without remand, the district court

has lost jurisdiction to dispose of a motion after an appeal has

been taken. Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir.

1984). If the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remands this action

back to the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of California, this court will grant petitioner’s request for

additional time to file objections to the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations.

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:04-cv-02667-MCE -CMK Document 14 Filed 08/10/05 Page 2 of 3
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3

For the foregoing reasons a certificate of appealability

should not be issued and the Clerk of Court is directed to serve

a copy of this order on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.

DATED: August 10, 2005

_________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-02667-MCE -CMK Document 14 Filed 08/10/05 Page 3 of 3
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Colleen Leavitt

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2468 LKK CMK 

vs.

Shasta County Board of Supervisors, et al.,

Defendants.

 / ORDER

On July 15, 2005, plaintiff filed a request for an extension of time to file the

administrative record in this case. 

Good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff is granted until July 20,

2005, to file the administrative record. 

DATED: July 21, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-02468-LKK -CMK Document 28 Filed 07/21/05 Page 1 of 1