AFS-16-3743-E Exemption No. 16778

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-7749

for an exemption from § 91.9(a)

of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations

GRANT OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated November 16, 2015, Mr. Paul A. Perkins, Jr., Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), P.O. Box 90808, Lafayette, Louisiana 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of PHI for an exemption fr om § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A helicopters with limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules (VFR), and instrument flight rules (IFR).

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual.

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that PHI is requesting an exemption for operations conducted in its Sikorsky S-92A aircraft when operating between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities.2

The petitioner states its S-92As were certificated under part 29, amendment 47 relating to safety and ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety today. Those S-92As are equipped with aircraft flotation gear and are certificated forditching in and up to sea state 6. Additionally, when operating over water, each S92A occupant is provided, and wears, persona l flotation equipment. Also, the S-92As are equipped with life rafts that can be depl oyed from inside or outside the aircraft.

PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in accordance with Joint Aviation Requirement-OPS-3 which already permits similar operations with limited exposure to engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it has operated its S-92As under operations specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. The petitioner requests that this exemption extend to its operations “conducted outside

the United States.”

PHI states that it has operated under OpSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 which authorized operations similar to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance Class 2 with limited exposure. The petitioner contends that during this period, no S-92A accidents have been caused by power loss due to engine failure during takeoff or landing.

The petitioner states that it has instituted operational controls through its general operations manual, training program, and management surveillance. The petitioner states that it will conduct operations in such a manner as to minimize the time spent exposed to engine failure. The petitioner contends that this will be accomplished by following the manufacturer’s recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever feasible. Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude, and temperature ensure 150 feet per minute climb at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one engine inoperative (OEI) power.

PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to and from helidecks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight requirements appropriate to the aircraft conf iguration; (2) Training its crews in a Level D, Full Flight Simulator (FFS) initially and annually, ensuring the highest levels of proficiency and competency; (3) Conducting route checks to confirm that its crews remain procedurally compliant and use crew resource management principles during all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI’s Flight Data Monitoring Program (known as LAMP) to ensure flight profiles are in accordance with Performance Class 2 procedures.

The petitioner notes that it has accumulated over 150,000 hours of operational experience in this make/model all in accordance with OpSpec H100 and Performance3

Class 2 profiles. This experience demonstrates that when takeoff and landing techniques are used to minimize exposure to forced landing due to engine failure, that this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent level of safety to Category A. The petitioner contends that without this relief, the S92A would become economically unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from service. The outcome

would be a reversion to smaller, older, le ss sophisticated aircraft that do not provide the same level of safety. The petitioner asserts that this would result in an overall degradation of safety and not serve the most important stakeholder, the passenger.

The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to provide the same level of safety that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that collected data related to the engine reliability reflects that the in-flight shutdown rate is less than 1 per 100,000 flight hours.

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on January 12, 2016,

81 FR 1467. No comments were received.

The FAA's analysis is as follows:

The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds that a grant of exemption would be in the public interest and would provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the current regulations.

The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation with the Sikorsky S-92A, under contract to various oil companies from land based facilities to offshore facilities within the Gulf of Mexico, and under other contracts throughout the world including Antarctica. PHI aviation operations within the United States are conducted under the provisions of part 135.

Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires special consideration in operations, training, and standardization. Based on the drawings and photographs contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an

overwater elevated helideck.

The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may not be possible due to environmental or ot her factors. The FAA notes that regulatory agencies worldwide have already applied risk management techniques and permitted variations to specific operations, such as operations to helidecks with exposure to an engine failure, without a safe forced landing area. Risk assessment is used to determine whether to permit these variations. When operations without suitable areas for safe forced landings are being considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These factors include the likelihood of the event, the possible consequences, and any mitigating measures weighed against the potential benefits of the operation. Accident4

history and other relevant safety data and analysis are crucial to making the operational

determination.

The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 and has accumulated more than 150,000 flight hours with this make/model helicopter under the provisions of OpSpec H100. This operations specification prohibits operations unless the current aircraft weight, altitude and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power. These specifications are also similar to those characteristics of operations under ICAO Performance Class 2. The ICAO standard for Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure limits that exposure period to less than 9 seconds. The petitioner’s operations meet or exceed this standard, and ensure a positive 150 feet per minute climb rate at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power.

The petitioner has proposed operational controls consistent with those in OpSpec H100. The FAA has decided to rescind that operations specification. A grant ofexemption would provide for continuity of operations demonstrated since PHI began S92A operations in 2003. The FAA believes the limitations contained in OpSpec H100

have been effective and therefore would con tinue them in limitations associated with a grant of exemption.

The FAA notes that PHI was granted and authorized to operate under a similar Grant of Exemption No. 10507 that provided relief from § 91.9(a). The FAA has updated the conditions and limitations of the current exemption to clarify requirements concerning training and checking, the wearing of persona l floatation equipment, and requirements for emergency equipment.

Granting this petition is in the public interest, because these S-92A helicopters replaced older designs which do not offer the safety advancements and were not required to meet the more stringent performance requirements imposed on the S-92A and other similar aircraft certificated against the updated certification regulations. The FAA concurs with the petitioner that permitting the use of the S-92A provides those passengers with the safe transportation, while maintaining an efficient transportation system for the oil and gas industry.

The FAA’s Decision

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption is in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, PHI, Inc., is granted an exemption from 14 CFR § 91.9(a) to the extent necessary to allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A helicopters with5

limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules.

This exemption is subject to the conditions and limitations listed below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. This exemption is limited to operations conducted in PHI’s S-92 helicopters.

2. This exemption is limited to operations conducted between land-based heliports, between land-based airports and offshore heli ports, or between two offshore heliports. All helidecks and heliports must be of sufficient size and weight bearing capacity to safely accommodate the S-92 helicopter during operations described below.

3. This exemption is not valid for operations in foreign airspace without the prior authorization of the Civil Aviation Authority with jurisdiction over that airspace.

4. PHI must make available and provide access, upon request by the FAA, to its historical engine reliability data for its fleet of S-92s, in order to provide ongoing surveillance of engine reliability.

5. In addition to other routine preflight computations, approach and departure profiles must be determined in accordance with European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Performance Class 2 with defined limited exposure (PC2-DLE) procedures considering the planned takeoff or landi ng weight, altitude, temperature and wind. These computations and procedures must be approved by the manufacturer or accepted by the Administrator. The calculations in the planning process must indicate, in all cases, that the helicopter is able to climb, after acceleration to V mini or above, with OEI and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power a minimum of 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff or landing surface. The planning process results must indicate the following appropriate takeoff and/or landing outcomes are possible after an engine failure when flown in accordance with the PC2-DLE (9 second) landing and takeoff profiles:

a. below the Takeoff Decision Point, a rejected takeoff resulting in a safe OEI controlled descent and landing on the takeoff surface,

b. above the Takeoff Decision Point, a successful OEI departure or an exposure of 9 seconds or less to a deck edge stike or an unscheduled landing or ditching

c. during the final approach phase of flight prior to the Landing Decision Point, a rejected landing resulting in a safe OEI go-around,

d. during the landing phase beyond the Landing Decision Point, a safe landing on the helideck surface or an exposure of 9 seconds or less to a deck edge stike or an unscheduled landing or ditching.6

6. PHI’s FAA approved training program must include provisions for training and checking of pilots in PC2-DLE with tota l maximum theoretical exposure times of 9 seconds or less performance planning and ta keoff and landing profiles and procedures. Flight training of operating procedures for PC2-DLE type takeoffs and landings must be conducted in Level D flight simulation training devices. PHI must document the conduct and satisfactory completion of that training.

7. Operations under the provisions of this exemption must be flown by crews consisting of two pilots who are qualified and current in normal and PC2-DLE operation of the

S-92.

8. Pilots must satisfactorily demonstrate the use of takeoff and landing profiles described in Condition No. 6 during initial and recurrent pilot competency and proficiency evaluations in accordance with §§135.293 or 135.297. For pilots that will only operate during day VFR, checking may be limited to competency checks in accordance with §135.293; however, this limitation must be recorded and these pilots must acknowledge the limitation in writing and refrain from conducting PC2-DLE operations in IFR or night conditions until night competency and IFR proficiency is

checked.

9. Occupants of flights conducted under this exemption must wear personal floatation equipment meeting the requirements of §135.168 (b)(1) whenever the aircraft is over water, and the aircraft must be equipped with floats, accessible rafts, and a 406 MHz Emergency Locator beacon in accordance with §135.168(d).

10. PHI must establish parameters for takeoff and landing at elevated helidecks for its flight operations quality assurance program and provide ongoing surveillance of those operations to ensure flight profiles are being conducted in accordance with Performance Class 2 procedures.

11. PHI Check Airmen will conduct periodic route observations to ensure Performance Class 2 procedures are properly follo wed and appropriate Crew Resource Management techniques are employed during all flight operations.

12. PHI must advise all S-92 flight crewmembers, including those who have not received the above training and checking, of the provisions of this exemption and document

that notification.

13. A copy of this exemption must be carried onboard each S-92 utilizing these provisions.

This exemption terminates on June 30, 2018, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.7

Issued in Washington, DC, on .

/s/

John S. Duncan Director, Flight Standards Service