Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC15-1486

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SHARON MYERS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

[February 23, 2017]

PARIENTE, J.

The issue before the Court is whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal

misapplied our precedent from Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 2010), and 

Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999), when it reversed the trial court’s 

determination that the defendant, Sharon Myers, was in custody for the purpose of 

administering Miranda1 warnings based on the totality of the circumstances. State 

 

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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v. Myers, 169 So. 3d 1227, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). We have jurisdiction. See

art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2

At the heart of this issue is the constitutional right against self-incrimination 

under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 

9, of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, we review the constitutionally required 

“procedural safeguards” first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that “assure that [a criminal defendant] 

is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be 

compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. at 444, 439. As this Court recently stated in 

State v. Horwitz, 191 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 2016), in Florida, the right “against selfincrimination, as one of our Constitution’s fundamental rights, must be—and has 

long been—broadly construed.” Id. at 439 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 

965 (Fla. 1992)). 

In this case, police interrogated Myers on two occasions—both times at the 

police station—first within hours and then just days after her husband was 

murdered and after her son and his friend had already confessed to the murder and 

implicated Myers in planning and facilitating the murder. The entire tenor of the 

 

2. See Dorsey v. Reider, 139 So. 3d 860, 862 n.1 (Fla. 2014); Van v. 

Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 246 (Fla. 2013) (citing State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468, 

471 n.2 (Fla. 2012)).
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interrogations, which were conducted by a team of multiple officers, was 

accusatorial, aggressive, and confrontational. As the trial court found, during both 

interrogations, Myers was “immediately and aggressively confronted by multiple 

officers about her involvement in the murder. The tone of their questioning

indicated that law enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect.” 

For the reasons more fully explained below, we conclude that Myers was in 

custody for purposes of Miranda warnings during both interrogations, and the Fifth 

District did not afford proper deference to the trial court’s findings, nor did it 

adequately consider the factors this Court set forth in Ramirez and explained in 

Ross guiding police on when Miranda warnings are necessary. We agree with the 

trial court and with Judge Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District’s decision that “a 

reasonable person would have felt constrained” in the circumstances in which 

Myers was interrogated. Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1232 (Cohen, J., dissenting). As

Judge Cohen explained, “courts should view attempts by law enforcement to 

circumvent [Miranda] safeguards warily.” Id. Thus, Myers’ constitutional right 

against self-incrimination under both the United States Constitution and the Florida 

Constitution was violated by the failure of police to safeguard her constitutional 

right through the administration of Miranda warnings before proceeding with 

Myers’ custodial interrogations. Accordingly, we quash the Fifth District’s 

decision below.
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I. BACKGROUND

On June 16, 2008, Gary Kenney, Myers’ husband,3 was found murdered in 

his family’s home in Merritt Island, Florida. He had been shot several times and 

had several lacerations to his wrist and neck. Shortly after the victim’s body was 

found, Myers’ son, Darryl Kenney, and his friend, Rubin Nero, were apprehended 

near the scene and confessed to the murder. Both Darryl and Rubin implicated 

Myers in planning and facilitating the murder. As a result, law enforcement

officers believed that Myers was an integral part of the conspiracy to murder Gary

and brought her to the police station for questioning on June 16, 2008, and June 20, 

2008. 

The first questioning on June 16, 2008, occurred sometime after 2:00 a.m. 

At that time, Myers was staying with her in-laws while her home was being 

processed as a crime scene. Deputy Sheriff Kent of Brevard County (“Agent 

Kent”) testified at the suppression hearing that it was after midnight when he and 

Brevard County Sheriff’s Agent Martin (“Agent Martin”) arrived at the in-laws’

home. 

Upon their arrival to Myers’ in-laws’ home, Agent Kent explained to Myers 

that he needed more information from her about her husband’s murder, and,

 

3. Sharon Myers (defendant) was known as Sharon Kenney at the time of 

the murder. 
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according to him, Myers “volunteered to come down to [the] Merritt Island 

precinct” for questioning. Agent Kent testified that he advised Myers that she was 

free to leave before they departed the in-laws’ house. Myers rode to the precinct in 

the front seat of Agent Kent’s agency-issued, unmarked vehicle without handcuffs.

Upon arrival at the precinct, Myers was placed in a room, which, due to

ongoing building renovations, was not originally designed for questioning and was, 

therefore, smaller than a typical interview room. Myers was seated in the corner so 

that she would be seen on the camera inside the room. The door was closed for 

privacy, but it was not locked. Myers was questioned for approximately ninety 

minutes about her involvement in the murder. A four-man team consisting of 

Agents Kent, Martin, Vitaliano, and Reyes took turns questioning Myers. After 

questioning Myers, Agent Kent returned Myers to her in-laws’ home around 4:00 

a.m. She again rode in the front passenger seat of his unmarked car without 

handcuffs. 

The next day, investigators executed a search warrant on the hotel room in 

which Darryl stayed in the days leading up to the murder. During the search,

Agent Kent found letters that Darryl received from Myers while incarcerated;

Darryl had been released just days before the murder. Agent Kent testified that his 

review of those letters over the next few days revealed more evidence, which led 

him to believe that Myers was complicit in Gary’s murder. Based on this 
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information, Agent Kent decided to question Myers further about the contents of 

the letters.

On June 20, 2008, Agent Kent and another agent arrived at Myers’ home 

during the daytime. Agent Kent explained to Myers that he “needed her to speak 

with [him] again regarding some new evidence that had come up.” He “asked if 

she would be willing to come down to the [Criminal Investigations Division

(“CID”)] building in Rockledge.” Again, Myers was told she was free to leave 

before the questioning commenced. And, according to Agent Kent, Myers “again, 

as the first time, volunteered to do so.” Similar to the first time Myers was 

questioned, Myers rode in the front passenger seat of Agent Kent’s agency-issued, 

unmarked vehicle without handcuffs.

Upon arrival at the CID, Agents Kent and Vitaliano escorted Myers into a 

standard interview room. Myers was again seated in the corner, although not for 

any particular reason, according to Agent Kent. The same four-man team from the 

first interview, plus a fifth agent, Agent Spadafora, questioned Myers for

approximately one hour and forty-five minutes. Thereafter, Agent Kent 

transported Myers home. 

After being charged with the murder, Myers filed a motion to suppress the 

statements she made to police on June 16 and June 20, alleging that her statements 

were illegally obtained because the interviews constituted custodial interrogations. 
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After a hearing, during which the lead investigator testified and video recordings of 

both interviews were played in open court, the trial court granted the motion to 

suppress. In the trial court’s order granting Myers’ motion to suppress, the trial 

court further explained:

Although [Myers] was told at the start of each interrogation that she 

was not in custody, a reasonable person would not have felt free to 

leave. During both interrogations, she was seated in the corner of a 

small room with law enforcement blocking her access to the door. 

The door remained closed throughout her interrogations. Officers 

were seated in close proximity to [Myers], invading her personal 

space. [Myers] was never offered a break and was given water on 

only one occasion. [Myers’] daughter was allowed to see [Myers]

only briefly, until Agent Kent told her to leave. [Myers] was never 

reminded during either interrogation that she was not in custody. At 

the end of the second interrogation, Agent Kent told [Myers] “you’ve 

always been free to go,” but that alone does not vitiate the need for the 

Defendant to be advised of her Miranda rights. Further, [Myers] was

dependent upon law enforcement for transportation back to her 

residence.

. . . On both occasions, [Myers] was immediately and 

aggressively confronted by multiple officers about her involvement in 

the murder. The tone of their questioning indicated that law 

enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect. Officers indicated they

had information from [Myers’] “conspirators” that she had acquired 

the weapons used in the murder and that she had arranged for Mr. 

Kenney to come home at the time of the murder. Agent Kent told 

[Myers] he had spent hours reviewing the letters [Myers] had written 

to Darryl and that based on those letters, he knew [she] was involved.

He had copies of the letters, and quoted from them to [Myers].

. . . Multiple officers questioned [Myers] in a tag-team style 

designed to elicit information from [her]. One officer used a 

sympathetic approach to gain [Myers’] trust, another officer accused 

[Myers] of being “full of unadulterated sh[]t”, and another officer 

graphically described the wounds on the victim’s body. Yet another 

officer posed as a friend, based on prior acquaintance with [Myers], 
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and then sought incriminating testimony from her. At least five 

separate officers questioned [Myers] during her two interrogations.

. . . Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court 

finds [Myers] was in custody at the time of her interrogations and

because she was not advised of her Miranda rights, her statements to

law enforcement must be suppressed. However, the Court also finds

that those statements were voluntary and therefore can be used for 

impeachment purposes at trial. Carlisi v. State, 831 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2002).

Trial Court Order (emphasis added).

The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Myers’

motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 

established that Myers was not in custody during the interviews. Myers, 169 So. 

3d at 1229-30. After reviewing the evidence and the trial court’s findings of fact,

the Fifth District reversed the trial court, concluding that “a reasonable person in 

the defendant’s position would have felt free to terminate the interviews,” after 

emphasizing that the officers told her that she was free to leave at any time. Id. at 

1231. 

II. ANALYSIS

Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 9, of the Florida Constitution provide a constitutional right against selfincrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; see Horwitz, 191 So. 

3d at 439. In Miranda, the seminal case on the right against self-incrimination, the 

United States Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, 
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whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 

secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. As we explained 

in Ross:

“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a 

fundamental [sic] with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and 

not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of 

interrogation.” [Miranda, 384 U.S.] at 476. The Supreme Court has 

also recognized that the prophylactic Miranda warnings are “not 

themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead 

measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination 

[is] protected.” [Oregon v. ]Elstad, 470 U.S. [298,] 305 [(1985)]

(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)). As 

recognized in Elstad, the Miranda exclusionary rule sweeps more 

broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself: “A Miranda violation does 

not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal 

presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned 

statements.” Id. at 307 n.1 (emphasis omitted). This presumption is 

irrebuttable for the purposes of the State’s case in chief. Id. at 307.

These protections are equally applicable under the Florida 

Constitution. As this Court has recognized, “[t]he protections 

enunciated in Miranda have been part of this State’s jurisprudence for 

over a century pursuant to the Florida Constitution.” Ramirez, 739 

So. 2d at 573; see also Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 964-66. Traylor[, 596 

So. 2d at 964,] explains the contours of our state constitutional law:

The basic contours of Florida confession law were 

defined by this Court long ago under our common law. 

We recognized the important role that confessions play in 

the crime-solving process and the great benefit they 

provide; however, because of the tremendous weight 

accorded confessions by our courts and the significant 

potential for compulsion—both psychological and 

physical—in obtaining such statements, a main focus of 

Florida confession law has always been on guarding 

against one thing—coercion. . . . The test thus is one of 
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voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by 

an examination of the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the confession. This determination is to be 

made by the judge, in the absence of the jury, based on a 

multiplicity of factors, including the nature of the 

questioning itself.

Ross, 45 So. 3d at 413-14 (footnote omitted). 

The Fifth District concluded that Myers was not in custody on either 

occasion for the purpose of requiring the administration of Miranda warnings, 

emphasizing that the agents told Myers that she was free to leave prior to both 

interrogations. Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1231-32. On the other hand, the trial court 

and Judge Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District highlighted other factors within the 

Ramirez framework that indicated that Myers was in custody during both 

interrogations, including the agents’ aggressive and accusatorial tone. Id. at 1232

(Cohen, J., dissenting).

We proceed by explaining the federal and Florida constitutional rights 

against self-incrimination and case law surrounding those rights. We then analyze

the totality of the circumstances surrounding Myers’ interrogations within this 

framework. Ultimately, we conclude, consistent with the trial court and Judge 

Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District, that Myers’ constitutional right against selfincrimination under the United States and Florida Constitutions was violated by the 

failure of police to administer Miranda warnings because her interactions with 

police on both June 16 and June 20, 2008, were custodial interrogations.
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A. The Federal and State Constitutional Right Against Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 

nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 

Const. amend. V. Article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution provides, “No 

person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against 

oneself.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court 

“required that any individual held for [custodial] interrogation must be clearly 

informed as to his or her rights, including the ‘right to remain silent, that any 

statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and . . . [the] right to 

the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’ ” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 413 

(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). Informing persons of their constitutional 

rights, referred to comprehensively as Miranda warnings, is likewise required 

under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 

965-66. 

Florida’s right against self-incrimination is part of the Florida Constitution’s 

Declaration of Rights, “a series of rights so basic that the framers of our 

Constitution accorded them a place of special privilege,” and is, therefore, 

fundamental. Id. at 963; State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109 (Fla. 2004) (“It is 

settled law that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the Declaration of 
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Rights of the Florida Constitution is a fundamental right.”). In Traylor, this Court 

emphasized the significance of Florida’s fundamental rights, specifically the right 

against self-incrimination:

Special vigilance is required where the fundamental rights of 

Florida citizens suspected of wrongdoing are concerned, for here 

society has a strong natural inclination to relinquish incrementally the 

hard-won and stoutly defended freedoms enumerated in our 

Declaration in its effort to preserve public order. Each law-abiding 

member of society is inclined to strike out at crime reflexively by 

constricting the constitutional rights of all citizens in order to limit 

those of the suspect—each is inclined to give up a degree of his or her 

own protection from government intrusion in order to permit greater 

intrusion into the life of the suspect. The framers of our Constitution, 

however, deliberately rejected the short-term solution in favor of a 

fairer, more structured system of criminal justice:

These rights [enumerated in the Declaration of 

Rights] curtail and restrain the power of the State. It is 

more important to preserve them, even though at times a 

guilty man may go free, than it is to obtain a conviction 

by ignoring or violating them. The end does not justify 

the means. Might is not always right. Under our system 

of constitutional government, the State should not set the 

example of violating fundamental rights guaranteed by 

the Constitution to all citizens in order to obtain a 

conviction. 

Bizzell v. State, 71 So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1954). Thus, even here—

especially here—where the rights of those suspected of wrongdoing 

are concerned, the framers drew a bright line and said to government, 

“Thus far shalt thou come, but no farther.” 

Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 963-64.

It is also important to reemphasize the purpose of Miranda warnings. As the 

United States Supreme Court explained in Miranda:
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[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal 

court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which 

their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being 

compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that 

without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of 

persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling 

pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and 

to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). In other words, the purpose of 

Miranda warnings is to ensure that the person is aware of his or her constitutional 

right against self-incrimination. See id. As this Court articulated in Ramirez:

This constitutional guarantee [against self-incrimination] “is fully 

applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966). Thus, to be admissible in a 

criminal trial, the State must prove that the confession was not 

compelled, but was voluntarily made. . . .

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a 

bright-line rule to guard against compulsion and the coercive nature 

and atmosphere of custodial interrogation, and “assure that the 

individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains 

unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” [Id.] at 469. . . .

“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is . . .

fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not 

simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” [Id.]

at 476. . . . Therefore, “unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and 

waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence 

obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the 

defendant].” [Id.] at 479. The protections enunciated in Miranda 

have been part of this State’s jurisprudence for over a century 

pursuant to the Florida Constitution. 

Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 572-73 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Essentially, a 

suspect must be informed of his or her rights via Miranda warnings when subjected 
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to custodial interrogation by police. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68; Ramirez, 

739 So. 2d at 572-73. 

Recently in Horwitz, we explained that the right “against self-incrimination 

provided in the Florida Constitution offers more protection than the right provided 

in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 191 So. 3d at 439

(citing Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 888 (Fla. 2011)). Although this Court has 

previously construed the procedural safeguards of Miranda in accordance with 

United States Supreme Court precedent and relied on United States Supreme Court 

precedent for guidance in determining when custodial interrogation occurs, 

consistent with federalist principles, this Court has also developed its own 

framework, as set forth in Ramirez and Ross, to guide police and courts in 

determining when Miranda warnings are necessary. As we explained in Traylor:

[W]hen called upon to construe their bills of rights, state courts should 

focus primarily on factors that inhere in their own unique state

experience, such as the express language of the constitutional 

provision, its formative history, both preexisting and developing state

law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the state, the 

state’s own general history, and finally any external influences that 

may have shaped state law.

596 So. 2d at 962; accord id. at 965-66; see Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 56

(2010) (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)). 

Therefore, our analysis under Florida’s constitutional right against self-
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incrimination provides the basis for our determination of custodial interrogation in 

this case.

B. Defining “Custodial Interrogation”

In State v. McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824 (Fla. 2016), we defined 

“interrogation” as “when a state agent asks questions or engages in actions that a 

reasonable person would conclude are intended to lead to an incriminating 

response.” Id. at 833; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining “interrogation” as 

“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers”). Pursuant to this definition of 

interrogation, both times that police questioned Myers in this case were 

interrogations for Miranda purposes. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833. Thus, the 

specific issue in this case is whether the police interrogations of Myers on June 16 

and June 20 were custodial for purposes of requiring the administration of Miranda

warnings. 

As to determining whether an interrogation is custodial, we explained in 

Ramirez that “[c]ustody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only formal 

arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with 

formal arrest.” 739 So. 2d at 573. As we stated in Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188 

(Fla. 2010), “[t]he standard for ‘custody’ is whether, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, a reasonable person would feel that his freedom of movement has 
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been restricted to a degree associated with an actual arrest.” Id. at 197 (citing 

Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573). 

In Ramirez, we adopted a “four-factor test . . . [for determining] whether a 

reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself in custody”: 

(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; 

(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent

to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; 

[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave 

the place of questioning.

739 So. 2d at 574. This Court explained these factors in Ross:

[I]t must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a 

reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint of 

his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the 

suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with 

police. 

45 So. 3d at 415. 

Likewise, in McAdams, we reiterated what establishes “custody” for 

Miranda purposes:

“Custody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only 

formal arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement 

of the degree associated with formal arrest. A person is 

in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same 

position would believe that his or her freedom of action 

was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest. 

“The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the 

police, but rather how a reasonable person in the 

suspect’s position would have perceived the situation.” 

Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573. Although we approved in Ramirez a 

four-factor test to provide courts with guidance in determining 
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whether an individual in is custody . . . . [C]ourts are to consider the 

totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable 

person would believe that his or her freedom of action has been 

curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest. 

McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We further 

explained in McAdams that no “single specific comment, question, or 

circumstance . . . converts an encounter from noncustodial to custodial.” Id. at 

839. Rather, “[a] situation can commence as a voluntary interaction with police, 

but slowly intensify and become more pressured, pointed, and accusatory until it 

evolves into custodial status.” Id. 

Although the four Ramirez factors frame our analysis, “the ultimate inquiry 

is twofold: (1) the ‘circumstances surrounding the interrogation;’ and (2) ‘given 

those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at 

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvorado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004)). 

C. Standard of Review for Determining “Custody”

“Determining whether the defendant was ‘in custody’ so as to require the 

administration of Miranda warnings involves a mixed question of law and fact 

subject to independent review.” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 414. In Thompson v. Keohane,

516 U.S. 99 (1995), the United States Supreme Court explained why such 

independent review is necessary:
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[C]lassifying “in custody” as a determination qualifying 

for independent review should serve legitimate law 

enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to ensure 

protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our 

decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of 

independent review potentially may guide police, unify 

precedent, and stabilize the law.

Id. at 115. Because determining whether an interrogation was custodial is 

somewhat fact-dependent, the object of our jurisprudence is not to set forth a 

bright-line rule but to ensure that in situations when a reasonable person would not 

feel free to leave, police properly administer Miranda warnings. See id. Although 

the determination of whether a person is in custody is a mixed question of law and 

fact, we nevertheless endeavor to provide clear guidance to police as to when 

Miranda warnings should be given. 

This Court has explained: 

[A]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of 

correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with 

regard to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but 

appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law 

and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the 

context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article 

I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. 

Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850 

So. 2d 514, 521 (Fla. 2003)). Further:

Suppression issues are extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the 

gamut from (1) pure questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law 

and fact, to (3) pure questions of law. . . . Appellate courts cannot use 

their review powers in such cases as a mechanism for reevaluating 
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conflicting testimony and exerting covert control over the factual 

findings. As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to 

the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all factbased issues, and the proper standard of review depends on the nature 

of the ruling in each case. 

State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001) (footnotes omitted).

Also, as in this case, where a defendant is recorded either by audiotape or 

videotape, appellate review of the facts is aided in determining whether the trial 

court’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. at 160. 

Keeping that standard of review in mind, we turn now to review the circumstances 

surrounding Myers’ interrogations within the framework of the Ramirez factors. 

The trial court also considered the facts of this case in the context of the Ramirez

factors before concluding that Myers was, in fact, subjected to custodial 

interrogation for Miranda purposes.

D. Application of the Ramirez Factors to This Case

As we stated above, the four factors relevant to the custody inquiry are: 

(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; 

(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent 

to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; 

[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave 

the place of questioning.

Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. This is a conjunctive test, so no factor is solely 

determinative of whether Myers was in custody for Miranda purposes. See, e.g., 

Ross, 45 So. 3d at 416.
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1. The Manner in Which Myers Was Summoned For Questioning

The first factor from Ramirez is “the manner in which police summon the 

suspect for questioning.” 739 So. 2d at 574. Myers’ first interrogation took place 

in the early morning hours after her husband’s body was found. Agents Kent and 

Martin went to Myers’ in-laws’ house and explained that they “needed to interview 

her” regarding the ongoing investigation of her husband’s murder. Myers agreed 

to accompany the agents to a local precinct for the interview. According to Agent 

Kent, prior to leaving her in-laws’ house, the agents told Myers that she was free to 

leave. However, Myers was dependent upon Agent Kent for transportation back to 

her home. Nevertheless, Myers rode, without handcuffs, to the precinct in the front 

passenger seat of Agent Kent’s unmarked car.

The second interrogation occurred days later. This time, Agent Kent and 

another agent arrived at Myers’ home during the daytime and requested that she 

come to the CID to speak with them about letters they had found in the hotel room, 

where her son had stayed in the days leading up to the murder. Again, agents 

indicated that Myers would be free to leave, and, according to Agent Kent, Myers 

again went voluntarily. Agent Kent drove Myers without handcuffs in the front 

passenger seat of his agency-issued, unmarked vehicle.

Although the manner in which Myers was summoned for questioning both 

times was not particularly coercive or forceful, Agent Kent indicated on both 
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occasions that he “needed” to question Myers. Neither time was Myers given the 

option to transport herself to the place of questioning, and Myers only learned of 

the agents’ need to question her when both officers physically arrived to see her. 

The fact that Myers was not handcuffed is certainly not, in isolation, indicative of 

the interrogations being noncustodial. 

Further, the timing of these interrogations is significant. Myers was first 

summoned to the police station sometime after 2:00 a.m., just hours after her 

husband’s murder. Prior to the second interrogation, Agent Kent told Myers that 

the questioning would be related to letters she had written to her son while he was 

in prison, which would have conveyed to a reasonable person that the purpose of 

the interrogation was accusatorial, not investigative or neutral. Under these 

circumstances, a reasonable person in Myers’ position would not have felt free to 

decline the interrogation or leave. Thus, this factor favors a finding that Myers 

was in custody, and we proceed to review the other factors. 

2. The Purpose, Place, and Manner of the Interrogation

The second factor we consider is “the purpose, place, and manner of the 

interrogation,” which has always been an important consideration in the custody

inquiry. Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. In this case, this factor weighs heavily in 

favor of a finding that Myers was in custody. As borne out by the evidence, the 

purpose of these interrogations, especially the second, was not just to gain 
- 22 -

information about the circumstances surrounding Myers’ husband’s murder but 

also to gain incriminating information about Myers. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 

833. 

From the commencement of the first interrogation, it would be clear to a 

reasonable person that the interrogations were not being conducted for routine 

information-gathering purposes. Within seconds of beginning the interrogation, 

Agent Kent told Myers that her son, Darryl, confessed to killing his father and 

implicated her in facilitating the murder. Agent Kent told Myers that they could 

track the phone calls between her and Darryl while Darryl was in prison and on the 

day of the murder. He told her that all of the letters she sent Darryl in prison were 

read by corrections officers, and suspicious contents were photographed.4 

Law enforcement already knew that Myers’ son and his friend had confessed 

and implicated Myers as being involved in orchestrating her husband’s murder, 

and agents made Myers aware of this knowledge. Thus, the interrogation was 

clearly intended to elicit a confession from Myers to further support the case that 

agents were building against her. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833. As we stated 

 

4. Although Agent Kent testified at the suppression hearing that he did not 

discover the letters until after the first interrogation, his reference to the letters 

during the first interrogation indicates that he was at least aware at that time of the 

existence and incriminating nature of the letters, which further indicates that law 

enforcement already knew Myers was involved in the murder and considered her a 

suspect at the time of the first interrogation.
- 23 -

in Ross, “a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating statements in a coercive 

manner, undermin[es] the very purpose of Miranda. Miranda itself addressed 

‘interrogation practices . . . likely . . . to disable [an individual] from making a free 

and rational choice’ about speaking . . . .” 45 So. 3d at 427 (quoting Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 464-65). Indeed, Agent Vitaliano told Myers that he was “accusing [her] of 

being a coconspirator to [Gary’s] murder.” Thus, this factor weighs in favor of 

finding that the first interview was custodial.

It is even clearer that the purpose of the second interrogation was obtaining a 

confession. Upon arrival at the CID, Agents Kent and Vitaliano escorted Myers 

into an interrogation room and began the second interrogation as follows:

KENT: Okay. So let’s—let’s—Sharon, let’s you and I move along as 

if we haven’t had a conversation, although you and I spoke Monday 

night at length.

I think some of the things that you told us Monday night just 

isn’t true. I think that there’s some things that you need to clear up for 

us. And I am going to give you the opportunity today, right now, to 

tell the truth. 

And all of these details, as painful as they’re going to be, I need 

to know why you felt the necessity to plot and plan to have your 

husband being murdered at your son’s hands. 

Whether your son did it or this hitman that you were trying to 

hire did it, why did you feel pushed to that level? What did he -- what 

had Gary done? 

(Emphasis added.) Before Myers could even say a word, she was told that officers 

knew she was lying and she needed to tell the truth to explain why she planned her 

husband’s murder. 
- 24 -

As to the place of the interrogations, Myers was seated in the corner of a 

small room in a sheriff’s office, while under video surveillance, with several agents

surrounding her during both interrogations —four agents during the first interview 

and five agents during the second interview. In such small quarters surrounded by 

authorities, it is likely, as the trial court concluded, that “a reasonable person would 

not have felt free to leave.” Accord Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663.

Also, the agents sat so close to Myers at times during the second 

interrogation that their knees touched her. At other times, the agents held Myers’

hands. This intimidation, coupled with intermittent sympathy and physical contact 

by the agents, further supports the conclusion that a reasonable person would not 

have felt free to leave—for fear of either emotional retaliation or physical restraint 

by the agents, who had not shown any boundaries.

Turning to the manner of the interrogations, the second interrogation was 

extremely accusatorial. In the words of the interrogators: 

KENT: You and Darryl Kenn[e]y conspired, planned, you gave 

financial support. You facilitated vehicle support. You put him up in 

a place. You told him where to get the gun. You helped your son kill 

Gary Kenn[e]y. 

Why did you do it? What drives a mother to write letters like 

that to her son? What drives a woman to try to get phone numbers of 

hitmen to kill her husband? . . . It’s all in black and white right here, 

Sharon (indicating). You can’t deny it. You can’t say it didn’t 

happen. 

What you’re saying about: Well, I never wanted that to happen. 

I didn’t plan for that, is lies. You are lying when you say that because 
- 25 -

you did plan for it. You did prepare for it. You wrote it down. That’s 

where you f[*****] up.

It went from thought to action, and you detail it all out in these 

letter.

Sharon, this is the time for you to tell us why it happened. 

Okay, this is the time to tell us, right here and right now. You wanted 

him dead didn’t you?

MYERS: I really don’t. 

KENT: You wanted him dead, didn’t you?

MYERS: I really don’t.

KENT: Time and time again, Sharon, you said you wanted him dead. 

You wanted him to disappear. You thought about pushing him over 

the edge at the gator farm. You thought about poisoning his potatoes. 

You wish he would have a wreck and die on his way to work. You 

wished the door would’ve fell on him and crushed his bones.

Ain’t that what you wanted, you wanted him dead? You 

wanted him dead for a reason, what’s the reason? You obviously 

wanted him dead for a reason. You helped plan to get him murdered. 

You tried to help your son get away with the murder. You told your 

son to go move the body out of the house. . . . 

Don’t get it twisted. We’ve got eye witnesses. There’s 

neighbors and friends of yours that were coming out of the movie 

theater that seen you in the mall parking lot talking to your son and 

Rubin Nero after Gary was dead. You can’t hide no more, Sharon. 

You’re not getting away with it. You might have thought you were. 

You might have thought you were scot-free, but you’re not.

The only option you have left, the only option you have left is 

to help yourself and tell me why you wanted Gary Kenn[e]y dead.

MYERS: I didn’t really want him dead.

KENT: Do you want me to read the letters again?

MYERS: No.

KENT: You wanted him dead.

MYERS: I wanted him to go away.
- 26 -

KENT: Forever?

MYERS: No.

KENT: You wrote that. Do you want me to read it?

MYERS: No, it’s not --

KENT: You wanted him dead, why can’t you admit it? Don’t be 

scared now. When you were having these evil thoughts, you were 

strong enough to write them.

. . . .

MYERS: I didn’t really want him dead.

KENT: Well, you shouldn’t have conspired with your son to kill him. 

When your son came to you when he got out of prison, and laid out 

his plan to you.

MYERS: I didn’t know he was going to kill him.

KENT: Bulls--t. Don’t forget, Sharon, Darryl is talking. He don’t 

want to get the needle in his arm.

VITALIANO: You know, when a person is backed into a corner they 

are willing to tell all. Okay? And when a person is facing their life, 

they are going to talk to us. It don’t matter if it’s mom, dad, brother, 

sister, all of that is out the window. It’s out the door. Okay?

And that’s why we are here talking to you right now. All right, 

this is your opportunity. Not a lot of people get opportunities like 

this, this is to help your side of the story. All right, this is it. This is 

the time. This is where you need to start telling the truth. Because all 

of this other stuff that you have been talking about is not the truth. 

It’s not going to cut it. Okay? You tell me, you put, you know, 

six people, five people, and you read these letters and we present this 

evidence, what do you think a person is going to think? Put yourself 

in our shoes, what would you think?

(Emphasis added.)
- 27 -

Further, officers threatened Myers that if she did not confess, she would not 

be able to raise her youngest child, her teenage daughter would be charged with 

accessory to murder, and her oldest son could “get the needle in his arm.” Agent 

Reyes told Myers that her son, Darryl, would never get out of prison, get married, 

have children, grow old, or “enjoy the joys of life” if she did not take responsibility 

for the murder. He told her that by not taking responsibility for the murder she was 

going to let Darryl “rot” in prison and be “portrayed like a monster.” Specifically, 

Agent Reyes said: 

[Darryl] is your martyr, your own flesh and blood. Your son 

you gave birth to, the son you raised and you loved, turns out to be 

your martyr. He gave up his life to kill your husband so you could be 

happy. . . . 

. . . .

You weren’t responsible when you poisoned your son to do this 

act. Be responsible now and maybe people could say: You know 

what, maybe Darryl—maybe Darryl was manipulated in a certain 

way. He definitely was vulnerable. And his mama is the one that 

helped him get to that point.

Rather you don’t want to own up to what really happened and 

Darryl is taking the whole brunt of this. He is your martyr. He [is] 

going to give the rest of his life for your cause. And you did nothing 

to stop it, Sharon. I’m sorry, but you did nothing to stop it.

Here’s your chance to show your love for Darryl and to speak 

and tell us the truth of what really happened; to show the world . . . 

(Emphasis added.) 

In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the United States Supreme

Court explained:
- 28 -

“[A]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual 

susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might 

be an important factor in determining” what the police reasonably 

should have known. [Rhode Island v.] Innis, 446 U.S. [291], 302, n. 8

[(1980)]. Thus, custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda

includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the 

officer’s knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the 

officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to “have . . . the 

force of a question on the accused,” Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 

870, 874 [(5th Cir. 1980)], and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response.

Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. Indeed, while interrogating Myers, the agents knew, 

especially due to the letters they read, that Myers had a “special susceptibility” to 

coercion under pressure regarding her children, which would be “reasonably likely 

to elicit an incriminating response” in order to save her son from the officers’ 

threats and have the opportunity to raise her other children. Id. Thus, the agents’ 

statements regarding Myers’ son further indicate coercion. 

Further, the place and manner of these interrogations would be especially 

intimidating to a reasonable person. In considering this factor in Ross, we wrote:

However, at the point when Detective Waldron informed Ross about 

the bloody pants, the detective’s focus shifted from merely 

questioning a witness to attempting to obtain a confession and 

pressuring Ross to admit his involvement in the crime. The detective 

repeatedly told Ross that he knew Ross committed the crime and the 

only question remaining was why. This type of questioning, which 

was highly confrontational and accusatorial, lasted for hours and took 

place in a very small room at the station with at least two officers in 

the room. Moreover, at this point, when Ross asked for a smoke 

break, the detective told him to smoke in the room, while the 

questioning continued. This factor clearly supports a conclusion that 

the defendant was in custody.
- 29 -

45 So. 3d at 415-16 (emphasis added). 

Similar to Ross, in this case, both times Myers was questioned four or five 

officers alternated in questioning her for between ninety minutes and two hours, 

often employing a good-cop/bad-cop strategy or, as the trial court characterized it,

a “tag-team style designed to elicit information.” Both times, the officers 

intermittently raised their voices, cursed at Myers, called her a liar, and told her 

that they could prove she was guilty so she had no choice but to confess. 

Specifically, Agent Kent yelled at, belittled, and mocked Myers, as he aggressively 

and continuously repeated, “You wanted him dead, didn’t you?” 

Agent Vitaliano told Myers that if she confessed, he would talk to his boss, 

the State Attorney’s Office, and “everybody” and tell them that he believed that 

she was a battered woman who felt she had no choice. Agent Spadafora—who 

was not otherwise involved in the investigation—was sent into the interrogation

room to pose as a friend and “familiar face” to Myers, but he also attempted to 

extract a confession from Myers.

In conclusion, the purpose, place, and manner of both Myers’ interrogations

was similar to the aggressive and accusatory manner of the interrogation in Ross, 

which this Court determined was custodial for purposes of Miranda. See Ross, 45

So. 3d at 415-16. The agents were clearly searching for a confession, rather than 

merely gathering information. They repeatedly told Myers that they knew she 
- 30 -

directed her son to murder her husband, and the only remaining question was why. 

She was questioned for hours in small rooms by multiple agents in a 

confrontational and accusatorial manner. And, although Myers was told she was 

free to leave before reaching the place of questioning, she was also told to “stay 

right here” and relied on the officers for transportation. As in Ross, this factor 

strongly supports a conclusion that Myers was in custody during the interrogations 

and that Miranda warnings should have been administered. See id.

3. The Extent to Which Myers Was 

Confronted With Evidence of Her Guilt

The third factor is “the extent to which the suspect is confronted with 

evidence of his or her guilt.” Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. In this case, this factor 

is intertwined with the second factor. Myers was extensively confronted with 

evidence of her guilt throughout both interrogations. As described above, the first 

interrogation began with Agent Kent telling Myers (1) that Darryl confessed and 

implicated her in facilitating the murder, (2) that her phone calls with Darryl were 

tracked and recorded, and (3) that letters she wrote to Darryl in prison had been

photographed. She was told that both Darryl and Rubin informed the agents that 

Myers instructed Darryl to remove her husband’s body from the house after the 

murder. 

Like the first interrogation, the second interrogation began with officers

confronting Myers with strong evidence of her guilt. She was immediately told 
- 31 -

that the police had evidence to prove that she intended for Darryl to kill her 

husband. Agent Kent then read excerpts from some of the many, extremely 

incriminating letters found in Darryl’s hotel room, which Myers acknowledged she 

had written. In the letters, Myers wrote about devising a plan with Darryl to kill 

Gary. She discussed “feelings of homicide” as well as providing Darryl with a 

gun, a truck, and money to facilitate the murder, or hiring a hitman, whom she 

planned to pay with Gary’s motorcycle. In her letters, Myers also provided Darryl

with information about the victim’s daily routine, including the time he would 

leave for work in the morning and that he would often step outside alone in the 

middle of the night. She wrote to Darryl that she hated her husband, wished he 

would die in an accident, and that she kept hoping to get a phone call saying that 

he was dead. She repeatedly discussed her or Darryl getting her “problem to go 

away” and “get[ting] the job done” without her “get[ting] into any trouble” or him 

“spend[ing] anymore time in jail.” Agent Kent also read Myers a letter written to 

her by Darryl, which the agents found in Myers’ home:

Mom, we will play dirty. We need to get Amanda to play along if she 

really wants Gary gone. You, under no circumstances, are to do 

anything to Gary just (indiscernible). I am going to feed the gators 

when I get out. Let me handle the situation when I get out. Because 

if he so much as touches any[one] again, I will torture him. Make 

sure you have the keys and $500 ready for me when I get out. Okay? 

When I get out, we will go through everything, the works. Does Nana 

still have all the guns? Gary will pull a disappearing act in 86 days. I 

am going to show him. PS, Let me handle Gary. Get it all planned 

out. Keep the motorcycle for me. Let me do this. Don’t worry.
- 32 -

Myers was also told that agents had information that she recently asked her 

husband to renew his life insurance policy. At one point, one of the agents 

described the evidence against Myers as a “mountain of evidence” to “which any 

reasonable person would say: ‘Oh my God.’ ” 

Myers was also told that her daughter had given a sworn statement 

indicating that she and Myers were both aware of Darryl’s plan to murder Myers’ 

husband. Agents also told Myers that her daughter had been “running her mouth” 

about the murder plot. Agent Kent said that even though Myers was not present at 

the time of the murder and did not pull the trigger, he knew that she facilitated the 

murder, helped Darryl get the gun that he used in the murder, provided him with 

transportation, and helped him try to cover up the murder.

Myers was confronted with very strong, indisputable evidence of her guilt, 

including the letters, phone records, and statements of coconspirators and 

witnesses. Many of the letters were read aloud to her during the interrogation, and 

boxes filled with even more letters were brought into the interrogation room for her 

to see. She was repeatedly told that the police could prove that she was behind her 

son killing her husband. She was told that a jury would find her guilty in ten 

minutes. Thus, similar to our conclusion in Ross, this factor weighs in favor of 

finding that Myers was in custody for Miranda purposes.
- 33 -

4. Whether Myers Was Told That She 

Was Free to Leave the Place of Questioning

The final Ramirez factor for considering whether a defendant was in custody 

is “whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of 

questioning.” 739 So. 2d at 574. The Fifth District improperly emphasized this 

factor in concluding that Myers was not in custody. See Myers, 169 So. 3d at 

1229-30.

Contrary to the emphasis the Fifth District placed on this factor, police 

merely stating that a suspect is free to leave or terminate the interrogation does not 

automatically render the interrogation noncustodial. U.S. v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 

1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he delivery of these statements [must be 

considered] within the context of the scene as a whole.” (citing United States v. 

Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that interrogation was custodial 

even though suspect was told that he was free to leave or terminate the interview at 

any time where questioning lasted over an hour in closed FBI car while 

investigators searched house)); McIntosh v. State, 829 N.E.2d 531, 538 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005). Ultimately, “[t]he Miranda test for custody does not ask whether the 

suspect was told that he was free to leave; the test asks whether ‘a reasonable 

person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation 

and leave.’ ” Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112). 
- 34 -

In this case, Agent Kent testified that when he and Agent Martin went to

Myers’ in-laws’ home to pick Myers up for the first interrogation on June 16, 

2008, he told Myers that she was free to leave while they were still at the in-laws’ 

house. And Myers was not told again that she was free to leave until the 

interrogation at the Merritt Island Precinct had concluded. Therefore, the officers’ 

statement at her in-laws’ house could have been understood to mean that she had 

an option whether to go with the agents to the precinct. Thus, the record does not 

support the Fifth District’s conclusion that Myers was told she was free to leave 

the place of questioning—the Merritt Island Precinct.

As to the second time police questioned Myers, the video reveals that once 

Myers was seated in the interrogation room and before questioning began, Agent 

Vitaliano informed Myers that she was free to leave at any time and asked her if 

she understood. Myers nodded to indicate her understanding. However, 

immediately after she nodded, Agent Kent told Myers that he thought she lied 

during the first interrogation and that he needed her to tell him why she planned

her husband’s murder. 

The police statement that Myers was free to leave during the second 

interrogation must not be viewed in isolation but, rather, in context of the entire set 

of circumstances. See, e.g., Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415. After being told she was free 

to leave at any time before questioning, Myers was immediately confronted with 
- 35 -

and accused of her guilt by police upon the start of the interrogation. Agents told 

Myers that they did not believe the statements she made previously and that they 

knew she was guilty of planning Gary’s murder. She was then confronted with 

extensive evidence of her guilt, including statements of coconspirators and letters 

between her and her son, in which they discussed plans of the murder. The fact 

Myers was free to leave was never repeated after the nearly two-hour interrogation 

began. Cf. Monroe v. State, 148 So. 3d 850, 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (finding that 

the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes where, among other 

reasons, “[i]n stark contrast [to Ramirez],” the defendant was “repeatedly informed 

. . . that he was free not to talk and to get up and leave the room anytime”). 

Moreover, even if Myers had wanted to leave, she was dependent upon 

officers for transportation to and from both interrogations. In other words, police 

were in control of Myers the entire time after she agreed to be questioned. Thus, 

this factor also weighs in favor of finding that Myers was in custody for purposes 

of Miranda.

E. The Totality of the Circumstances

Under a Ramirez analysis, no single prong should be considered in isolation. 

See, e.g., Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415. However, the Fifth District improperly elevated 

the fact that police advised Myers, before she agreed to be questioned, that she was 

free to leave, to determine that the interrogations were noncustodial. See Myers, 
- 36 -

169 So. 3d at 1231. This conclusion ignores that every other aspect of both 

interrogations would have led reasonable persons to believe they were not free to 

leave and, therefore, directs a conclusion that Myers was in custody during both 

interrogations. 

Moreover, although the Fifth District acknowledged that prongs two and 

three favored the defendant, it improperly weighed these against factors one and 

four by failing to give the appropriate emphasis to the evidence regarding the 

interrogation, including placement in a small room, confronting Myers with “a 

mountain of evidence,” accusations that she was lying, and use of the goodcop/bad-cop technique. Absent the agents’ one statement on each occasion that 

Myers was free to leave, every other fact surrounding the interviews indicated 

police coercion and custody. Thus, the Fifth District placed undue weight on the 

fourth factor at the expense of factors two and three, which is evidenced by its 

footnote explaining that the defendant did not cite any case where a defendant was 

found to be in custody where they were told they were free to leave at any time. 

Id. at 1231 n.3. We therefore conclude that both interviews were custodial and 

Myers was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to the commencement of each 

interview. 

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the purpose of 

the confrontational and accusatory interrogations in this case was to solicit a 
- 37 -

confession from Myers. After Darryl and Rubin implicated Myers in her 

husband’s murder, she was not only considered a suspect, but was treated by police 

during the interrogations in a manner that would lead Myers—or any reasonable 

person—to conclude that she was suspected in her husband’s murder and, 

therefore, compelled to answer the agents’ questions and not free to leave the place 

of questioning. We emphasize the words of Judge Cohen’s dissent as to how the

agents obstructed the purpose of Miranda in this case by failing to give Myers

Miranda warnings:

The requirement of Miranda warnings is ingrained in the 

constitutional analysis of the voluntariness of confessions. . . . As the 

trial judge recognized, courts should view attempts by law 

enforcement to circumvent these safeguards warily. We should do the 

same.

Id. at 1232 (Cohen, J., dissenting).

Reviewing a mixed question of law and fact governed by the totality of the 

circumstances, the Fifth District failed to defer to the trial court’s factual findings 

and to properly consider “the purpose, place and manner of interrogation” and the 

“the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of guilt,” as set forth 

in Ramirez and Ross. By concluding that a reasonable person in Myers’ situation 

would have felt free to terminate the interrogations, the Fifth District placed undue 

weight on the fact that Myers was told she was free to leave before being taken to 

the place of questioning. After considering the totality of the circumstances 
- 38 -

surrounding the questioning of Myers on June 16 and June 20, 2008, we conclude 

that a reasonable person in Myers’ position would have felt constrained, would 

have felt compelled to answer the officers’ accusatory questions, and would not

have felt free to terminate the questioning or leave the place of questioning on 

either occasion. 

III. CONCLUSION

In attempting to provide guidance to law enforcement as to when to 

administer Miranda warnings, we emphasize that no single Ramirez factor 

determines whether a defendant is in custody. However, when the interrogation is 

predominately accusatorial and confrontational in nature, taking place in the 

confines of a police interrogation room so as to lead a reasonable person to believe 

that he or she is suspected of a crime, all Ramirez factors are likely implicated. As

the trial court explained in this case, the questioning of Myers clearly would have 

led her to believe she was a suspect in her husband’s murder and was not free to 

terminate the interrogation:

Although [Myers] was told at the start of each interrogation that she 

was not in custody, a reasonable person would not have felt free to 

leave. During both interrogations, she was seated in the corner of a 

small room with law enforcement blocking her access to the door. 

The door remained closed throughout her interrogations. Officers 

were seated in close proximity to [Myers], invading her personal 

space. [Myers] was never offered a break and was given water on 

only one occasion. [Myers’] daughter was allowed to see [Myers] 

only briefly, until Agent Kent told her to leave. [Myers] was never 

reminded during either interrogation that she was not in custody. At 
- 39 -

the end of the second interrogation, Agent Kent told [Myers] “you’ve 

always been free to go,” but that alone does not vitiate the need for the 

Defendant to be advised of her Miranda rights. Further, [Myers] was

dependent upon law enforcement for transportation back to her 

residence.

. . . On both occasions, [Myers] was immediately and 

aggressively confronted by multiple officers about her involvement in 

the murder. The tone of their questioning indicated that law 

enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect. Officers indicated they

had information from [Myers’] “conspirators” that she had acquired 

the weapons used in the murder and that she had arranged for Mr. 

Kenney to come home at the time of the murder. Agent Kent told 

[Myers] he had spent hours reviewing the letters [Myers] had written 

to Darryl and that based on those letters, he knew [she] was involved. 

He had copies of the letters, and quoted from them to [Myers].

. . . Multiple officers questioned [Myers] in a tag-team style 

designed to elicit information from [her]. One officer used a 

sympathetic approach to gain [Myers’] trust, another officer accused 

[Myers] of being “full of unadulterated sh[]t”, and another officer 

graphically described the wounds on the victim’s body. Yet another 

officer posed as a friend, based on prior acquaintance with [Myers], 

and then sought incriminating testimony from her. At least five 

separate officers questioned [Myers] during her two interrogations.

. . . Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court 

finds [Myers] was in custody at the time of her interrogations and

because she was not advised of her Miranda rights, her statements to

law enforcement must be suppressed.

All four factors of the Ramirez test compel the conclusion that the totality of 

the circumstances created a situation in which a reasonable person would not have 

felt free to leave. Therefore, we conclude that Myers was in custody for Miranda

purposes, and because Myers was not provided Miranda warnings prior to the 

questioning on those dates, the statements she made during those interrogations 

were obtained in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed from the State’s 
- 40 -

case-in-chief at trial. Accordingly, we quash the Fifth District’s decision and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

LAWSON, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

CANADY, J., dissenting.

Because I conclude that there is no express and direct conflict of decisions 

underpinning our review, I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under 

article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Contrary to the view adopted 

by the majority, the Fifth District’s decision in State v. Myers, 169 So. 3d 1227 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2015), does not expressly and directly conflict with Ross v. State, 

45 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 2010), or Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999). 

The majority’s view is that Myers conflicts with Ross and Ramirez because 

“[u]nder a Ramirez analysis, no single prong should be considered in isolation,” 

but “the Fifth District placed undue weight on the [free-to-leave] factor at the 

expense of factors two and three, which is evidenced by” footnote three of the 

opinion below. See majority op. at 35-36. But the Fifth District did not consider 

the fact that Myers was told she was free to leave either in isolation or at the 
- 41 -

expense of the other Ramirez factors. Rather, the Fifth District expressly analyzed 

each of the four factors as follows:

Thus, as for prongs one and four, the manner in which law 

enforcement summoned the defendant for questioning did not suggest 

that she was in custody, and the defendant was told, prior to both 

interviews, that she was not under arrest and she was free to leave at 

any time.[N.3] 

[N.3] Notably, the defendant has not cited to any case 

where a defendant was found to be in custody where the 

defendant was told, prior to being interviewed, that 

he/she was free to leave at any time.

As for prongs two and three, although one purpose of the 

interview was to get the defendant to tell the officers her motive for 

participating in her husband’s murder, and the officers spent most of 

the time during both interviews confronting the defendant with 

evidence they said they had against her, under the totality of the 

circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would 

have felt free to terminate the interviews.

Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1231 (emphasis added). 

When determining whether a defendant is in custody during questioning, a 

court properly considers whether the police informed the defendant that he or she 

was free to leave the place of questioning, Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574, and the 

district court’s mention in a footnote that Myers failed to cite any case in which a 

defendant was determined to have been in custody during questioning despite 

being told that he or she was free to leave does not provide any indication, let alone 

express indication, that the court misapplied Ross or Ramirez by placing “undue 

weight” on the free-to-leave factor “at the expense of factors two and three.” In 
- 42 -

considering each of the four Ramirez factors, the Fifth District employed the legal 

standard our precedents have set forth. Even if we disagree with the result reached 

by the district court, “this Court is without power to simply assume jurisdiction in a 

case to correct what we perceive as error.” State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 523 

(Fla. 2005); see also Am. Wall Sys., Inc. v. Madison Intern. Group, Inc., 944 So. 

2d 172, 176 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“Like it or not, we must permit 

some district court decisions to become final even though we disagree with 

them.”).

The majority also asserts that the Fifth District misapplied our precedents by 

failing to properly weigh the Ramirez factors and “give the appropriate emphasis 

to the evidence regarding the interrogation, including placement in a small room, 

confronting Myers with ‘a mountain of evidence,’ accusations that she was lying, 

and use of the good-cop/bad-cop technique,” majority op. at 36, but neither Ross

nor Ramirez establishes a precedent regarding the “appropriate emphasis” to be 

given to such case-specific facts. And the majority’s disagreement with how the 

district court weighed the Ramirez factors does not establish express and direct 

conflict. Cf. Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1098 (Fla. 2013) 

(Canady, J., dissenting) (“But the fact that a majority of this Court disagrees with 

how a lower court has weighed the Kinney[ System, Inc. v. Continental Insurance 
- 43 -

Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996),] factors does not establish express and direct 

conflict.”).

I therefore conclude that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Fifth 

District’s decision based on express and direct conflict. Accordingly, I dissent.

POLSTON, J., concurs.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 

Conflict of Decisions 

Fifth District - Case No. 5D14-3037

(Brevard County)

Kevin John Mawn of Onek and Mawn, P.A., Titusville, Florida,

for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Wesley Harold 

Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, 

Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Respondent