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i 

75–672 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–150] 

NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT: 

WHAT’S THE CONNECTION AND WHAT 

DOES THAT MEAN FOR U.S. SECURITY 

AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATION POLICY? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, August 1, 2012, Nonproliferation and Disarmament: What’s the 

Connection and What Does That Mean for U.S. Security and Obama Administration Policy? ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, August 1, 2012 .................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2012 

NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT: WHAT’S THE CONNECTION 

AND WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR U.S. SECURITY AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATION POLICY? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Graham, Ambassador Thomas, Former Special Representative to the President on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament (Clinton Administration) ............................................................................................................... 5 

Schake, Dr. Kori, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution ....................................... 4 

Rademaker, Hon. Stephen G., Former Assistant Secretary of State .................. 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Graham, Ambassador Thomas ........................................................................ 69 

Rademaker, Hon. Stephen G. .......................................................................... 42 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ....................................................... 39 

Schake, Dr. Kori ............................................................................................... 55 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘A Call for Global Nuclear Disarmament,’’ article by Scott D. Sagan, 

Nature magazine, July 5, 2012 .................................................................... 91 

Letter to Hon. Thomas P. D’Agostino from Mr. McKeon and Mr. Turner, 

July 26, 2012 ................................................................................................. 107 

Seven slides submitted by Mr. Turner ........................................................... 109 

‘‘Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,’’ essay by Scott D. 

Sagan, excerpted from ‘‘Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate,’’ American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 

2010 ................................................................................................................ 94 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

Testimony of Matthew Kroenig, Assistant Professor of Government, 

Georgetown University; Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on 

Foreign Relations .......................................................................................... 148 

Testimony of Scott D. Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political 

Science, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and 

Cooperation, Stanford University ................................................................ 116 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 207 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 205 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 191 
(1) 

NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT: WHAT’S THE 

CONNECTION AND WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR U.S. 

SECURITY AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATION POLICY? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, August 1, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:11 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I call to order the hearing of the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee. 

With unanimous consent, we are going to dispense with our 

opening statements, having our written opening statements put 

into the record. 

I am going to ask also unanimous consent that two articles of 

Scott Sagan and one letter by Chairman McKeon and myself be 

placed into the record concerning modernization and U.S. deterrent 

risk. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 91, 94, and 107.] 

Mr. TURNER. I wanted to frame the issue before I get to our 

speakers. 

We, unfortunately, are under the time constraints that votes are 

likely to occur in the middle of our hearing. So we can get the most 

opportunity to hear you, instead of us, we are going to dispense 

with the opening statements, other than to acknowledge that the 

title of our hearing today is Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 

What’s the Connection and What Does That Mean for U.S. Security 

and Obama Administration Policy, the point being, obviously, that 

nonproliferation is others having nuclear weapons and disarmament is us giving up the weapons that we have. The point of 

the hearing is trying to delineate the differences there and the differences in the goals as we try to strengthen our deterrent to ensure that we are not at risk. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. TURNER. With that, I am going to turn to our panel members 

and ask that they take 5 minutes in which to deliver their opening 

statements. Their written statements will be admitted into the 

record. 
2 

We have The Honorable Stephen Rademaker, who is the former 

Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Schake—is that correct—who is 

the Research Fellow at Hoover Institution, from Stanford University; and Ambassador Thomas Graham, who is the former Special 

Representative to the President on Arms Control, Nonproliferation 

and Disarmament for the Clinton Administration. 

With that, I will go to Mr. Rademaker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a 

real pleasure for me to be here today, and I welcome the opportunity to speak to the subject of today’s hearing, which is the connection between nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. 

I think there is near unanimity—well, first, let me say I have 

prepared a written statement which I am not going to read to you. 

I am going to summarize some of the key points in the next few 

minutes. 

I think there is near unanimity in Washington that nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest threats facing our country. There is 

a theory that is put forward by active proponents of nuclear disarmament that there is a connection between nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, and essentially what is suggested 

is that if we move—if our Nation moves decisively in the direction 

of nuclear disarmament that that will translate somehow into 

greater success or at least additional progress in dealing with the 

problem of nuclear proliferation. 

I wish that theory were true. If it were true, I would probably 

be a passionate supporter of immediate movement toward nuclear 

disarmament, because I think it would then help us solve what 

truly is one of the critical risks facing our country. 

As explained in my testimony, however, I am skeptical that there 

is such a connection; and I make three principal points in my testimony which I will just touch on here. 

The first is that I believe those who advocate the existence of 

such a linkage completely disregard the importance of U.S. nuclear 

weapons as a tool of nuclear disarmament[sic]. For the entire duration of the nuclear era for the last 65 years, the reason there hasn’t 

been more nuclear proliferation, in my view, in large measure has 

to do with the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the eyes 

of our allies and others who worry about the existence of nuclear 

weapons in the hands of some other countries, principally Russia 

and China. And I point out that we shouldn’t let today’s nuclear 

proliferation problems obscure the more fundamental proliferation 

problem that we faced over the nuclear era. 

Today, the problem comes from countries like Iran and North 

Korea, which are relatively poor, relatively undeveloped. But that 

has not been the traditional nuclear proliferation risk. The traditional risk has come from wealthy, advanced countries that wonder 

why they didn’t have nuclear weapons. And our policy throughout 

the Cold War—and I would argue into today—is to reassure those 

kinds of countries that they don’t need their own nuclear weapons 
3 

because they can rely on America’s nuclear weapons to defend 

them. 

So our arsenal is actually, I would argue, the most powerful tool 

we have of nuclear nonproliferation. And so for those who advocate 

either abolishing that tool or moving decisively in the direction of 

abolishing it, they need to explain how we will deal with this problem that has existed throughout the Cold War era and since the 

Cold War in the absence of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

The second major point I make is that the so-called obligation of 

the United States to engage in nuclear disarmament derives from 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article VI of the NPT. I often 

like to go back and read that article to audiences because there is 

a lot of lore about what the NPT requires, much of it exaggerated, 

in my view. 

When one goes back and reads the actual legal obligations set 

forth in Article VI, it quickly emerges that the NPT doesn’t really 

require all of the things that we are told that it requires. Article 

VI is only one sentence long. I won’t read it all, but I will parse 

it. Because I think if you parse the language, what emerges is the 

real legal obligation that we have under Article VI of the NPT. 

When you parse the one sentence of Article VI of the NPT, what 

emerges is a legal requirement on the United States and the other 

nuclear weapon states to, quote, ‘‘Pursue negotiations in good faith 

on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.’’ 

And that is the obligation. And I would contend that we have 

more than complied with that obligation because we have had arms 

control agreement after arms control agreement negotiated between us and the Soviet Union and, more recently, us and Russia; 

and that fulfills the obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective 

measures. 

Now, I go into some additional details about how under the language of the NPT the ultimate obligation to disarm, to get rid of 

nuclear weapons is actually tied to a separate obligation to bring 

into effect a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is 

something that is profoundly aspirational but not on the horizon. 

And, of course, proponents of nuclear disarmament would immediately change the subject at the mention of a treaty on general 

and complete disarmament because, of course, that is not something that we will see anytime soon. 

I think it is useful to recall a 1969 memo written by Dr. 

Spurgeon Keeny, who was then a member of the NSC staff, and he 

wrote a memo to Secretary—actually, then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger describing article by article the requirements 

of NPT. 

With respect to Article VI, which is the article that is pointed to 

as the requirement that we disarm, he said that, quote, ‘‘It is an 

essentially hortatory statement and presents no problems.’’ 

I think there are very few people who would even recognize that 

statement today, but that was the understanding at the time—— 

Mr. TURNER. If you can summarize. I am certain you will 

have—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. My third point—and I am happy to go through 

it in greater detail in response to questions—but the notion that by 

giving up our nuclear weapons we are going to inspire others to do 
4 

more—to join us in doing more about the risk of nuclear proliferation in countries like Iran and North Korea and elsewhere, there 

is simply no evidence that this works. We have had, you know, 31⁄2

years of the Obama administration, and I would argue there is no 

evidence during the Obama administration that this theory has 

worked. In fact, I can point to plenty of instances where we are getting less cooperation than we did in the past. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker can be found in the 

Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Dr. Schake. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KORI SCHAKE, RESEARCH FELLOW, 

HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Dr. SCHAKE. I would make four quick points. 

The first is I agree with Steve’s assessment that there is actually 

not evidence that reductions in the American arsenal precipitate 

reductions in other countries’ arsenals. And that if you go case by 

case over countries that have crossed the nuclear threshold or considered to have active nuclear programs and that walked back from 

them, oddly enough, actually the main inhibitor to crossing the nuclear threshold is reliable security guarantees from the United 

States. And if you look at the 30-some cases of countries that have 

the scientific and the industrial and the engineering ability to be 

able to have active nuclear programs of their own, most of them 

are actually close American allies that have chosen not to. 

There are a couple of interesting cases that fall outside that category—Sweden and South Africa, for example—in which there are 

other motivations that drove it. In the case of Sweden, a genuine 

belief that their security would be achieved more robustly without 

nuclear weapons because they believed that would actually make 

them a target in the time frame they were making their decision 

of Soviet forces. And in the case of South Africa, because of a pending regime change, that they did not want the arsenal to go into 

the hands of their successor regimes. 

What I mean by that is my second point, which is that, actually, 

motivations are not simplistic. They vary widely by country. It is 

not simply the United States. It is not simply regional rivalries. It 

is not—it very often has to do with prestige, with factors that are 

unique to that country’s history. So a sweeping generalization, a 

generalized conclusion that the size or structure of the United 

States arsenal is the determinant is actually not true. 

Third, I actually think if we reduce the American strategic nuclear forces to levels that are being considered by some in the current administration—that is, 300 deployed nuclear weapons ourselves—that we are actually getting dangerously close to that line 

that would precipitate threshold countries to want to cross it. 

Because, you know, China has—what—250 nuclear weapons, 

Pakistan 100 or so. You are getting close to the level at which 

other countries that might see a prestige value of having arsenals 

greater than the United States would, in fact, cross the threshold 

or increase the size of their arsenals; and I believe very strongly 

that that would diminish rather than increase American security. 
5 

And my last point is just a caution against making major forcesizing or force-structuring decisions on the basis that we understand other countries’ motivations well enough to be able to determine what they are doing. Even in the historical cases where you 

can do the forensics, this is actually art, not science, and there are 

lots of reasons to believe that we actually don’t know. And so assessing other countries’ motivations and making major force sizing 

and structuring decisions on that basis I think is a bad set of 

choices. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schake can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, FORMER 

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT ON ARMS 

CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (CLINTON ADMINISTRATION) 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

the opportunity to be here. 

Mr. TURNER. I am not certain your mic is on. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the 

opportunity to testify here today; and I commend the subcommittee 

for conducting this hearing, because this really is an important 

subject. It has been debated for years, and it is important to have 

these debates in the Congress, because that is our national legislature where these debates should take place. 

First, let me comment on who are these people that are advocating zero nuclear weapons and the elimination of nuclear weapons. 

The first on the scene, the primary organization to do that was 

the organization put together at the Hoover Institution in California. This group was led by former U.S. Secretary of State George 

Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former 

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Chairman of 

the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee Sam Nunn. They were 

the ones who really began in recent years to debate about the importance of eliminating nuclear weapons as a threat to U.S. security. 

They wrote several Wall Street Journal op-ed articles to advocate 

their position. In the first one they said, among other things, that 

unless urgent new actions are taken the U.S. will soon be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than 

was Cold War deterrence. They cite President Ronald Reagan and 

his comments on nuclear weapons and how strongly he believed 

that they should be eliminated, calling them totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of 

life on earth and civilization. And at the end of that article they 

close by saying, we endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to 

achieve that goal. 

That is what got the recent movement toward the elimination of 

weapons begun. President Obama simply picked that up and advocated it himself. And it is certainly the case that every American 
6 

President has endorsed the goal in principle, but two have actually 

endorsed it happening, President Ronald Reagan and President 

Obama. 

With respect to whether there is a connection between disarmament and nonproliferation, I would argue, yes, there is very 

much a connection. It is true that Article VI of the Nonproliferation 

Treaty, our central security instrument, is vague, but you have to 

look at the background behind it. 

President John F. Kennedy greatly feared worldwide proliferation, calling it, in his view, the greatest possible danger and hazard. The nonproliferation treaties with the associated nuclear umbrella policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union largely stopped that 

proliferation, but it was based on a strategic bargain. 

It was very clear during the negotiations in the late 1960s and 

also when the treaty was made permanent in 1995 that the rest 

of the world was not giving us nonproliferation for the world as a 

gift. It was a bargain. It was a basic bargain based on nonproliferation for most of the world, disarmament and peaceful cooperation 

by the five nuclear weapon states mentioned in the treaty—or permitted by the treaty. That is U.S., France, Russia, China, and the 

U.K. 

And first and foremost of these measures that those signing up 

to make themselves militarily permanently second class wanted as 

political balance for making this commitment was a comprehensive 

test ban. It is the only arms control agreement mentioned in the 

NPT, and it is of central importance to the bargain. 

Forty-some-odd years later this basic bargain still is largely 

unachieved. There have been some advances, but many things such 

as the test ban and stopping the production of fissile material have 

not been achieved. 

Well, first, before I close, let me just mention it is certainly true. 

I agree with what has been said about the threats of Iran and 

North Korea to the NPT, our central security document. Those 

threats must be dealt with. There is no question but that they are 

serious. There is no question in my mind that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, and of course North Korea has already achieved 

them. So they are very serious threats. 

The elimination of nuclear weapons is a policy for the long term. 

Everyone recognizes that. The four statesmen who I mentioned, 

they recognized that. For that to ever happen, it is important that 

the NPT hold together in the interim; and unless the basic bargain 

is better observed, in my mind, there is a substantial possibility 

that it will not. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Graham can be found in 

the Appendix on page 69.] 

Mr. TURNER. If you could conclude. 

Okay, thank you. 

Just a few things to address. 

Again, I think we struggle with this issue of nonproliferation 

versus disarmament. And we struggle with it. And I started the 

framing of it, as you know, disarmament is us and nonproliferation 

is the other guys. And I think the concern is that as we all talk 

with the issue of wouldn’t it be great to live in a world that has 
7 

no nuclear weapons that there is no risk in making sure that we 

pursue nonproliferation. 

In fact, we lessen risk from nonproliferation. There is a risk in 

disarmament. And so having that balance as to how that goes is 

how the discussion from a policy perspective plays out. 

And in this issue that I think sometimes does get confused. I 

think there people who do believe that nonproliferation is our disarmament, as opposed to the other guys. 

That discussion as you were all raising of the issue of the NPT 

and this CTBT, the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty, 

on the issue of its language with respect to disarmament. But I 

think I heard from all of you an understanding that I want to lay 

down as a foundation. I think everyone agrees that the NPT and 

the CTBT, nonproliferation and the test ban, that neither one of 

those documents—one having been ratified, the other not, the test 

ban treaty not having been ratified—neither one of those documents require disarmament in the United States. 

Mr. Rademaker, you said that in your opening statement, so I 

will take you as a yes on the NPT, but on the CTBT you would 

also agree? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The CTBT, by its terms, certainly does not require. 

Mr. TURNER. That is what I want to make certain. 

Dr. Schake, you also agree that neither the NPT nor the CTBT 

require disarmament of the United States. 

Dr. SCHAKE. If Steve Rademaker says so, I believe it. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. 

And, Ambassador, you also agree, also, that the language, the 

terms of those NPT having been ratified, CTBT not having been, 

but if it was ratified, neither would require disarmament in the 

United States. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

That then I think helps in the framing of this, also. 

And then I wanted to go on to an issue of in our goal of nonproliferation, meaning the other guys, the issue of Iran, North 

Korea is of grave concern. Now there are those that would say as 

the United States disarms—and Mr. Rademaker, you were addressing this issue in part—that there are those that would say that as 

we go down in our numbers that we will discourage others from 

going down. Those would say, well, if the United States would 

eliminate 75 percent or 90 percent of our nuclear weapons, then 

Iran wouldn’t pursue it. And you said there is no historical basis 

for that. 

I would like to put up slide 7 to illustrate your lack of no historical perspective on that. The United States actually has reduced 

our nuclear weapons by 90 percent over the top period end, by 75 

percent over the end of the Cold War, and those stars are time periods of others then pursuing nuclear weapons. And I believe that 

the last one of 2005–2008—2006 is North Korea, showing that they 

have been. And we all know that today it is our belief that as we 

continue to decline Iran continues to do—to seek nuclear weapons 

capability. 

[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 115.] 
8 

Mr. TURNER. Now, Dr. Schake, I really appreciated your comments on that we don’t really know why someone would—we can’t 

ever tell someone else’s motivations for seeking nuclear weapons. 

But we do know that there are bad people out there who have bad 

designs, who want to dominate other countries, invade other countries. We have seen that over even the most recent history. We 

have seen that there are countries that kill their own citizens. And 

certainly, there are those who would seek those nuclear weapons 

to continue or to strengthen their ability of those activities. 

Similarly, the issue of, you know, with Iran, our concern is that 

they support terrorist organizations and how would that assist 

them in support of the terrorist organizations and would we see 

them support them with nuclear weapons. 

One of the concerns that we had with the New START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] was a desire by the administration in its 

U.S.-Russia cooperation policy to seek Russia cooperation to put 

pressure on Iran to dissuade them in their program. 

I think we have slide 4 and 5. 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 112.] 

Mr. TURNER. And these slides show that 4 days after the New 

START treaty entered into force, the Russian Foreign Minister 

Lavrov said at a press conference in London that, with the approval of resolution 1929 in June last year, practical possibilities 

to impose sanctions on those related even indirectly to the Iranian 

nuclear program have been exhausted, meaning they are done. 

Again, this is 4 days after the New START treaty was ratified. 

And I would like to tip the question then to you guys. 

Since we see that from the first slide that historically people are 

not dissuaded by our reducing our numbers and there is a risk in 

our reducing our numbers and since we see that Russia has not 

been persuaded even with New START to help us dissuade Iran, 

how do we stop others? How do we persuade others in nonproliferation to not pursue nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, you have to negotiate with them. 

And certainly I would agree that unilateral U.S. reductions, other 

than its effect on our own defense policy, would have no effect on 

other countries. There is a difference between drawing down weapons because you think you have too many, which is what we have 

done, and negotiating agreements on the basis of a bargain with 

other countries. We have tried with North Korea. We almost succeeded, and then we backed away from the negotiations and allowed them to build 10 to 12 weapons. 

With Iran, we could sit here all day and argue about Iran policy. 

It is very complex. They have very complex reasons for wanting nuclear weapons, including prestige, fear of Pakistan, fear of the U.S., 

wanting to be a regional dominant player. So to negotiate with 

them, that is very difficult, and I am not certain that we can. 

I think we can probably—we have, anyway, in the past, negotiated with North Korea. Other countries we have successfully negotiated. Russia has reduced their weapons under agreements. We 

have reduced our weapons under agreements. We should engage 

China on this when we get them in their—we still have far more 
9 

weapons and so does Russia than China does, but at some point 

we should try to engage them. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador, I want to get to the other two for a 

moment. But, before I go on, you would agree that Iran’s support 

of terrorist organizations makes it that much more of a concern as 

it seeks nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I think that Iran is a direct—— 

Mr. TURNER. Your microphone is off, sir. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I am sorry. I keep turning it on and off. 

I think Iran is a direct threat to the survival of the NPT because 

of what an Iranian stockpile might mean. I think they certainly do 

support terrorist organizations. 

It is difficult for me to imagine, however, Iran developing nuclear 

weapons and handing them over to terrorist organizations and 

thereby not having control over them anymore, because they might 

be used against them. They have some experience with that. 

But I don’t want to—— 

Mr. TURNER. I think there is a lot of people who could have mentioned that, and I know that is one of the concerns. 

Dr. Schake. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I don’t want to minimize that. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I agree Iran is the real problem. 

North Korea is a terrible danger crossing the nuclear threshold. 

They are predominantly a danger to themselves, first and foremost, 

to the South Koreans, to the Japanese. 

Iran is a threat to everybody, and if Iran is allowed to cross the 

nuclear threshold then validity of the NPT will be so badly ragged 

that I think you are just going to see a cascade of proliferation 

throughout the Middle East. 

And, Congressman Turner, I think you hit on the essential point, 

which is the nature of the regime really matters. We don’t care if 

Sweden crosses the nuclear threshold, even though it would be a 

bad thing for the overall regime, because Sweden is not a threat 

to its own population. It is not a threat to its neighbors. 

Iran is a real worry because it is a danger to the Iranian people. 

It is a danger to American allies in the region. It is a danger to 

the United States and to our regions—to our allies around the 

world. 

I wish that we could find a way to turn a key in the lock and 

encourage the Iranians to do something different than they appear 

to have done over the course of the last 18 years. I don’t see any 

evidence that we are making progress on that. They have had so 

many opportunities to take yes for an answer and get back into the 

good graces of the Europeans and the United States and come into 

the—like sort of mainstream of the international order. They keep 

saying no to that. 

And so it seems to me that that limits the tools we have to 

credibly deny them nuclear weapons if they should acquire them. 

Constrain their activity and punish it. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you. 

First point I would make about Iran and North Korea is, I believe—and I think Ambassador Graham, I just heard him agree— 

there is no relationship between U.S. policy toward nuclear disar-
10 

mament and what they are going to do with their nuclear weapons 

programs. 

In other words, we could cut our nuclear arsenal in half. We 

could eliminate all of our nuclear weapons. It would not translate 

to diminished interest on their part in having nuclear weapons. So 

there is not that kind of correlation. 

In fact, I would argue with North Korea, if we gave up our nuclear weapons they would want nuclear weapons even more passionately than they do today because then they could be one of the 

most powerful countries in the world. That is the kind of psychology that exists in Pyongyang. 

On the question of what we do about Iran and North Korea, Ambassador Graham says we negotiate. Yes, of course, we negotiate; 

and every administration since these problems has emerged has 

tried to negotiate with these regimes. The problem is there has 

been a lack of interest on the other side in coming to a suitable solution to the problems, and so I think every administration has 

quickly come to the conclusion that negotiations alone are not a 

sufficient policy. 

Negotiations have to be coupled with meaningful pressures being 

brought to bear on the governments in North Korea and in Iran. 

And when President Obama speaks today about Iran, he doesn’t 

talk about the strength of his diplomatic option. He talks about the 

strength of the economic sanctions that he has tried to bring to 

bear. And what has manifested, try as we might, we have not yet 

brought sufficient pressure to bear because the Iranian nuclear 

program continues unabated. 

Mr. TURNER. If I might go to the Ambassador for 1 minute, and 

then I will go to Mr. Langevin, but if you could summarize in a moment. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I just want to make it clear I am not in 

favor of giving up nuclear weapons. I am in favor of negotiations. 

Secondly, Iran is really difficult. North Korea, we have negotiated successfully with them, and we did stop their program for 

a while, for about 8 years. But Iran is—I think we are going to 

have to—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry. I am sorry. Could you back up? When 

did that occur? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. 1994. 

Mr. TURNER. In 1994, what occurred? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. They renegotiated an agreed framework 

with them which stopped their plutonium program until 2002. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, I don’t think everyone has the same confidence level that you do that that was effective. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, it did stop it. They didn’t build any 

plutonium weapons during that period and they did afterwards. 

But Iran is much more difficult. It may be we will have to play 

for time, try to drag it out as long as we can. Time is on our side. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador, thank you. 

Since you brought up the time period, Mr. Langevin, if I could, 

Mr. Rademaker, anybody want to respond to that time period of 

1994 to 2002? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, I would be pleased to. 
11 

I think what Ambassador Graham is referring to is the period of 

the so-called agreed framework which was negotiated during the 

Clinton administration between the United States and North 

Korea. He is correct that, pursuant to that agreement, North Korea 

did shut down their nuclear reactor and therefore they stopped 

generating spent nuclear fuel. They never surrendered their spent 

nuclear fuel, which was ultimately the source of plutonium, as they 

should have done under that agreement. 

But, more importantly, I think it mischaracterizes the situation 

to say that from 1994 through 2002 there was no progress in Iran’s 

nuclear weapons—I am sorry, in North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program. Because what happened toward the end of that period 

was they began work on uranium enrichment. And the reason it 

collapsed in 2002 was Ambassador James Kelly, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, traveled to North Korea 

and confronted the North Koreans with evidence that they were 

cheating on the agreed framework by standing up an enrichment 

capability. They admitted it to him and then later backtracked and 

said, no, they hadn’t admitted it. 

Of course, now they admitted it again. So now it is clear that 

Kelly heard them correctly. They were in fact cheating, and the 

cheating began during the agreed framework. It is not something 

that began after 2002. The agreed framework collapsed due to 

North Korea cheating on it. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, as I said, I think the dispute is over the effectiveness of it; and after Mr. Langevin we will probably return back 

to this. So don’t forget what you were going to say, Ambassador, 

because I know this is important. It goes right to the heart of what 

we have done when we go to, well, what should we do. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our panel. I have enjoyed this discussion. 

Let me go to this. On July 25th, 2012, in joint testimony to the 

Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, General 

Cartwright and Ambassador Pickering noted that, and I quote, ‘‘An 

arsenal shrunk to 900 total U.S. weapons matched by comparable 

Russian reductions would demonstrate a serious U.S. and Russian 

commitment to fulfilling their disarmament obligations in Article 

VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, thereby help rally the anti-proliferation community to greater efforts to thwart would-be 

proliferators.’’ 

Furthermore, they added that, and I quote, ‘‘The idea is not that 

virtuous U.S. and Russian behavior in the form of steep nuclear 

arms reductions will inspire aspiring proliferators to abandon their 

quests. We do not subscribe to this naive notion. Rather, there are 

reasons to believe that such behavior could inspire the anti-proliferation partners to get tougher with recalcitrant states seeking 

the bomb.’’ 

So how do you respond to that statement? And our non—well, 

let’s start with that. How do you respond to that? 

Dr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I am happy to respond to that. 

I wish that statement were true. I wish it were true. I wish it 

were demonstrably true that deep U.S. nuclear reductions will in-
12 

spire not the Irans and North Koreas to stop nuclear proliferation 

but inspire other countries in the world to do more against Iran 

and North Korea. I think that was the thrust of the statement you 

just read. 

Regrettably, I see no evidence that this is true. 

No one can fault President Obama for not being deeply committed to nuclear disarmament, to the global zero goal. He has 

taken meaningful steps. He negotiated a new arms control agreement. He made concessions at the NPT review conference a few 

years ago. His heart is in the right place. But international cooperation with U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea, it has 

not increased. There has been one U.N. Security Council resolution 

adopted during the Obama administration ratcheting up sanctions 

on Iran. There were three such resolutions adopted during the 

Bush administration. 

The one adopted during the Obama administration was a good 

resolution. But, unlike the previous three, it was opposed. It was 

actually voted against by two countries, Brazil and Turkey. 

Now Brazil and Turkey are precisely the kinds of countries that 

one would expect to be inspired by U.S. leadership on nuclear disarmament. Whatever they were inspired to do, it backfired, because they voted against the resolution to ratchet up sanctions on 

Iran and North Korea. 

And, you know, Congress is—I think in a few minutes you are 

going to be voting on the House floor on a new Iran sanctions bill. 

And, you know, what is that bill about? Fundamentally, it is like 

all of the other Iran sanctions bills over the past 10 years. It basically uses U.S. sanctions not against Iran and not against North 

Korea but U.S. sanctions against other countries to compel them to 

do more. 

So I mean nuclear disarmament isn’t compelling and isn’t inspiring them to do more, and so in a few minutes you probably are 

going to vote to impose U.S. sanctions on other countries that don’t 

do more. And it is regrettable that is the way we have to proceed, 

but U.S. leadership on nuclear disarmament is not producing the 

kind of reaction internationally that we would like to see. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I agree with Steve’s point. 

I would just add that we have actually a terrific large-scale example from the end of the Cold War, which is that, with the end 

of the Cold War, the United States and the NATO allies reduced 

our non-strategic nuclear forces, our weapons deployed in Europe 

by 93 percent, almost 2,000 weapons, and that didn’t precipitate 

greater cooperation on Iran sanctions. It didn’t precipitate the Russians being more helpful on nonproliferation. It didn’t even precipitate the Russians reducing their non-strategic nuclear weapons in 

Europe. 

So I just don’t think analytically there is a connection between 

those two things, as much as I wish there was. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, I agree with General Cartwright’s 

statement. I have generally found in my work in nonproliferation 

and disarmament that senior military people of the United States 

have a very sound view of what reality is. 

With respect to carrying out our nonproliferation obligations and 

eventually moving toward a situation where we can have a multi-
13 

lateral disarmament negotiation involving China, Britain, and 

France, we do have to move to lower levels to get somewhere close 

to where they are. And I think if we were to move to that number 

that we would be going in the right direction. 

We have far more weapons than we need in today’s world as opposed to the Cold War. But I would certainly not argue that reducing the U.S. stockpile, in negotiation or not, with our other nuclear 

weapons state partners, the P5, would have any effect on Iran. 

They march to their own drummer. 

And by the same token I think the jury is out on how much effect 

sanctions have had either on what Iran is doing. I mean, I have 

some ideas about what we might do, but they would be different 

from that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Let me turn to, at the 2010–2012 Nuclear Security Summits numerous countries around the world made specific pledges to combat 

nuclear terrorism by securing and eliminating dangerous nuclear 

weapons, usable materials, ratifying nuclear terrorism conventions 

and treaties, strengthening export controls, countering nuclear 

smuggling, and more. To what extent has President Obama’s leadership on nuclear security, arms control, and disarmament contributed to the willingness of other countries to take on greater responsibilities in the nuclear security arena? 

Ambassador Graham, let’s start with you. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, I think on that particular subject, 

the NSS, the Nuclear Security Summit, it has been decisive. It 

wouldn’t have happened but for him. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think President Obama has done a good job 

focusing attention on the risk of loose nuclear material and the 

need to bring them under control. I think these Nuclear Security 

Summits have been a good idea. 

I don’t think any of us should be deceived into thinking that this 

is some new idea, that this was some new problem that was discovered during the Obama administration and addressed during the 

Obama administration for the first time. There has been awareness 

of this problem for a long time. 

Senators Nunn and Lugar showed great leadership two decades 

ago in spotting this problem and setting aside U.S. resources to attempt to get these kinds of materials under control. This has been 

an ongoing effort ever since the President George H.W. Bush administration to try and get these materials under control. 

And you are correct. Progress has been made during the Obama 

administration, as has been made during the previous administrations. 

Would that progress have been achieved but for President 

Obama’s commitment—expressed commitment to global nuclear 

zero, to the greater progress towards nuclear disarmament? I don’t 

believe so. I mean, I do not believe that that commitment on his 

part is what resulted in the progress that we have seen. 

I think, you know, when Ukraine gives up HEU [highly enriched 

uranium] that it is using to fuel a research reactor it is not making 

a calculation based on, well, the Americans are moving forward 

with nuclear disarmament, so we will give up this HEU. They 

make a decision based on, you know, what is in their national in-
14 

terest. And, you know, there is a transfer of resources involved. We 

facilitate this. We pay for this. And, you know, these are not unwilling partners. They are happy to do it. But it costs money. So 

the arrangements have to be made for the work to be done. 

And President Obama has done a good job but so have his predecessors, and it really has little to do, in my opinion, with President 

Obama’s commitment to the global nuclear zero agenda. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. My final question is, why does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty matter? 

Dr. Graham. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. What is it about, Congressman? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

matter? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Why does it matter? 

Well, as I was saying earlier, the NPT is based on a strategic 

bargain, nonproliferation for most of the world in exchange for disarmament and peaceful cooperation by the five nuclear weapon 

states. 

The negotiators of the NPT made it very clear that, number one, 

that meant a comprehensive test ban. They understood that reductions during the Cold War and probably thereafter in nuclear 

weapons, which is what they wanted most, were extremely difficult 

and would take a very long time. But at least the nuclear weapon 

states could stop testing. 

As I said, it is a strategic bargain. It is not a gift from all of 

these countries of the world. Just give up the weapons, because you 

are such nice guys. They are giving up—they have been asked by 

treaty, they are required by treaty to give up the most destructive 

weapons, to never have the most destructive weapons that have 

ever been produced. They bargained for that. And the principal 

provision, principal agreement that gives the necessary political 

balance to the NPT is the test ban. That has been clear for 45 

years after the treaty was negotiated. 

Review conference after review conference failed over the inability to agree to that. So I think personally that the test ban is in 

the national security interests of the United States for a number 

of specific reasons, and in particular it makes it difficult for other 

countries to develop sophisticated nuclear programs that don’t now 

have them. 

But, beyond that, it is the essential glue that holds together the 

NPT; and I am not sure, looking years into the future, whether the 

NPT can hold together without it. And if the NPT doesn’t hold together, well, today’s security situation will seem like paradise by 

comparison with what will happen after that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Rademaker, would you comment, please. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. In my opinion, Ambassador Graham seriously 

exaggerated the risks to the NPT in the event that the CTBT is 

not ratified. 

The first point I make about the CTBT is it is not coming into 

force for decades, no matter what the United States does. There is 

a provision in the CTBT called Annex 2 that requires 44 states to 

ratify that treaty before it enters into force. So far, 7 of those 44 

have not ratified. 
15 

One of them is the United States, and in Ambassador Graham’s 

testimony he asserts that as soon as the United States moves forward most of the others will as well. He doesn’t say all of the others will, because it is clear not all of the others will. 

But I would actually argue that probably none of the others will, 

because the countries that are holding out have their own reasons 

for doing so. The CTBT will not enter into force until North Korea 

ratifies it. It will not enter into force until Iran ratifies it. It will 

not enter into force until India and Pakistan ratify. It will not 

enter into force until Israel and Egypt ratify. Egypt in some ways 

may be the hardest one of all of those cases for reasons that I could 

go into, but they have a very serious problem with that treaty 

under current circumstances. And until all of those countries ratify 

it, it will not enter into force. We are decades away from that being 

possible, in my opinion. 

In the meantime, there is, in fact, a nuclear testing moratorium. 

The last major country—the last nuclear weapon state to test a nuclear weapon was France. The United States hasn’t tested nuclear 

weapons for over 20 years. 

I would predict this moratorium is going to continue. For the 

non-nuclear weapon states, existence of a moratorium is, in my 

opinion, more important than the existence of a treaty forbidding 

testing. 

And so I think this dire prediction that the NPT will collapse if 

we don’t ratify the CTBT better not be true. Because, as I say, we 

are decades away from it entering into force in the most optimistic 

scenario, and I think the United States is not on track to ratify it, 

either. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So you are arguing that even the fact that CTBT 

exists but hasn’t been ratified, are you saying that that has absolutely no effect at all on proliferation issues? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think bringing the CTBT into force will not 

slow down the Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons programs. 

You know, North Korea was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It had undertaken a solemn obligation not to 

process nuclear weapons. It went ahead and produced a nuclear 

weapon. 

Advocates of the CTBT want us to believe that it is a hedge 

against nuclear proliferation because countries need to test a nuclear weapon before they can deploy it; and so, if they are forbidden 

to test it, they will never do that. 

Well, you know, all of those countries are already forbidden to 

possess them. So, you know, if they are prepared to violate one 

treaty obligation in order to acquire nuclear weapons, what makes 

anyone think that they wouldn’t be prepared to violate two treaty 

obligations, the NPT and the CTBT, in order to deploy nuclear 

weapons? 

So, no, I don’t see where it gives us much meaningful at all in 

the struggle against nuclear proliferation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I know my time has probably expired, but Dr. 

Graham, if you do care to comment, respond, that would be okay. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, first, I would say that a treaty is better than a moratorium because you get verification with the treaty 

and some enforcement. And so, I hope that someday we can have 
16 

a treaty. With respect to who might join? Well, China, Israel, and 

India have all, at various times, said that they are waiting on us. 

Egypt, it is pretty clear, is waiting on Israel. Pakistan, it is pretty 

clear, is waiting on India. So we come down to Iran and North 

Korea, just where we are with everything else. We will have to deal 

with them. Whether we can or not remains to be seen. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I would be interested in your comment on 

Egypt. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. What is that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Comment on Egypt. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Egypt, as I said, is waiting for Israel. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. In my experience, Egypt is not waiting on 

Israel to ratify the CTBT. Egypt is waiting on Israel to join the 

NPT, which is a radically different step than ratifying the CTBT. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, Egypt—of the countries of the world, 

Egypt and Indonesia were probably the two strongest ones to have 

a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They were in the forefront for 

years. They have been committed to it for years. Maybe they have 

had a change of heart, but I doubt it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. I wonder what their communications were to North 

Korea when they began their testing. I was concerned about—I 

really appreciated Mr. Langevin’s opening question with the issue 

of—which was framing really what we are trying to discuss here, 

of those that believe that our actions are going to dissuade others 

from pursuing nuclear weapons. And there was a statement in the 

quote that I would like to pursue for just a moment. Mr. Franks 

has allowed me to use a portion of his time for that. 

In the statement that Mr. Langevin read, the words ‘‘antiproliferation community’’ was in there. So I have a few questions 

about the anti-proliferation community. One, who is the antiproliferation community? Second, do they have any influence? And 

the third thing is, if there is such an anti-proliferation community, 

by the definition, why is it that they would be more or less motivated to pursue others not seeking nuclear weapons based upon 

anything that we do with respect to our own arsenal? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, I guess I have to answer that one. 

Frankly, I have never heard of the anti-proliferation movement or 

community. It is usually called the nonproliferation community. So 

I assume that is what the group or community that the general 

was referring to. I think that—— 

Mr. TURNER. Either way. Who are they? Do they have influence? 

And if they are such nonproliferation community, why is it that 

their commitment to nonproliferation as the nonproliferation community would be lessened or strengthened based upon the accounting of the size or lack of size of our arsenal? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, if he is referring to the nonproliferation community in the United States, he is referring to various organizations that promote nonproliferation, such as the group I described at Hoover, and also, many NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] that operate at the U.N. and here in Washington. I guess 

they would—particularly some of the ones here in Washington perhaps were encouraged by his statement. But I don’t think it would 

have any effect on their commitment to their objectives. 
17 

Mr. TURNER. That’s what I think. Thank you for saying that, 

Ambassador Graham. It really has no effect on their commitment. 

Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, I think you ask an excellent 

question. And it is precisely the right question. The whole premise 

of that assertion that was ascribed to General Cartwright and Ambassador Pickering that there is some group out there, group of 

countries that are waiting to do more but holding back because 

they need to see more progress on nuclear disarmament before they 

will do more to stop proliferation, that assumes a degree of calculation on the part of proliferation opponents that I don’t believe exists. I don’t believe there are a group of people out there, a group 

of countries out there opposed to nuclear proliferation but holding 

back, and by holding back, allowing, consciously allowing Iran and 

North Korea to make additional progress on their nuclear weapons 

programs because they are angry, they are angry at America for 

not disarming faster, they are angry at the other nuclear weapons 

states, and so they are letting Iran and North Korea to make 

progress, waiting for us to do more before they will do more. I don’t 

believe that exists. I have never heard—— 

Mr. TURNER. It would be illogical and wrong. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Correct. I have never heard a single country 

identified as behaving in that manner. And all countries—who is 

the nonproliferation community? It is all of us. Because all of us 

care about the risk of nuclear proliferation. So America is part of 

it. Could America do more against nuclear proliferation? Absolutely. Why don’t we do more? Because we have other priorities. 

We could go to war against Iran. If we wanted to stop the Iranian 

nuclear weapons program, we would invade, right? That would stop 

it. But that would come at a cost, and we are not prepared to pay 

that cost. And short of going to war, there is a long list of other 

sanctions we could impose, other measures we could adopt. But all 

of them would come at a cost. And we are not prepared to pay the 

cost. 

So just as the United States makes a calculation based upon its 

national interests about how far it is prepared to go, every other 

country does the same thing. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Schake, I am going to have to step out after 

your answer, and then Mr. Franks is going to chair the remainder 

of the hearing. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I would just pile on that when we talk about the 

nonproliferation community, we are not just talking about states 

and their choices, we are talking about civil society groups that are 

part of the richness and the delightful texture of free societies. 

There aren’t those groups with the freedom to activate in the kinds 

of countries we are worried about crossing the nuclear threshold. 

Mr. FRANKS [presiding]. The second string has arrived here. I 

was particularly impressed, Dr. Schake, by your very straightforward conclusion that the nuclear weapons, as dangerous as they 

are, the real danger is in whose hands they are in. You know, I 

sleep fairly safe at night, fairly soundly at night, not too worried 

about my 4-year old twins knowing that England has nuclear 

weapons. But I am fairly nervous about Iran gaining nuclear weap-
18 

ons. And Dr. Rademaker, I, again, appreciated your comments related to others somehow responding to our actions. 

You mentioned, related to Iran’s nuclear program, and I know 

that is on everyone’s mind, sanctions. And I am going to build a 

premise and just ask you to respond, all of you, if you will. And 

that is that, you know, we have had economic sanctions against 

North Korea for 60 years. And in the last couple of decades, almost 

to starvation. And they have tested twice. And given Iran’s, some 

of their leaders’ commentary, which is pretty dramatic at times, I 

am just wondering what type of sanctions program do you think 

will dissuade them from pursuing a nuclear weapon? 

It appears to me that if indeed their goal is to gain nuclear weapons, that I have the distinction of being one of the first Members 

of the House 7 years ago to suggest that and to call for them to 

be referred to the Security Council; if that is the case, then is there 

a diplomatic solution? Are sanctions going to be effective? I will 

stop there and ask you to respond. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. First, to clarify, are you speaking about North 

Korea? Or North Korea and Iran, or—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I am talking about Iran in this particular case. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. With regard to Iran, I have not despaired about 

sanctions because I believe there is more that can be done. But it 

is evident that all that we have done up to this point has not been 

enough. So the question is, is there more that we can do? And I 

think—the good news is that there is more that we can do. The 

problem is that it is hard. We have done a lot, but Iran remains 

vulnerable. Most importantly, Iran’s economic lifeblood is its oil exports. And in the most recent—not the round of sanctions that you 

are going to be voting on in a few minutes, but the previous one 

adopted as part of the Defense Authorization Act last year, new 

sanctions were adopted, applied to the financial sector, but the object of those sanctions was to make it increasingly difficult for Iran 

to export oil by making it impossible for countries to pay for the 

oil that they might buy from Iran. 

That was absolutely a step in the right direction. But I think the 

real linchpin of trying to bring enough economic pressure to bear 

on Iran for them to change their calculation has to involve pushing 

their oil exports down in the direction—much further down in the 

direction of zero. Because when that revenue stops, then I think 

their economy will be in such a situation that the regime will have 

no choice but to take steps with the nuclear program that would 

relieve the economic pressure. We haven’t gotten there yet. We 

have taken some steps in the right direction, but we need to figure 

out how to drive Iranian oil exports towards zero and cut off that 

revenue. 

Mr. FRANKS. Dr. Schake, I want to get to you, but my concern 

is if you listen to Iranian President Ahmadinejad, related to economic sanctions, his quote is, ‘‘If they want to continue with the 

path of sanctions, we will not be harmed. They can issue resolutions for 100 years.’’ 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said, ‘‘With God’s help and 

without paying attention to propaganda, Iran’s nuclear course 

should continue firmly and seriously. Pressures, sanctions, and assassinations will bear no fruit. No obstacles can stop Iran’s nuclear 
19 

work.’’ That seems to me that there is a fairly strong intent there. 

And given what I just said related to 60 years of sanctions against 

North Korea, do you think that Iran generally, truly—I mean, some 

of us have suggested sanctions that would be so significant that a 

crow flying across Iran would have to pack a lunch. And yet those 

of course didn’t gain traction in this environment. But I am not 

sure that even they would be effective. And Dr. Schake, perhaps 

you would like to respond to that as well. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I think Congress has been exemplary in pushing the 

sanctions issue, but obviously it is not working because the government of Iran is still saying the kinds of things that the government 

of Iran is saying, and they are continuing to pursue their nuclear 

weapons program. It does seem to me that sanctions may be approaching a point at which they force the Iranian leadership to 

deal with domestic pressure. And I think in authoritarian societies, 

punishing the society writ large for the choices of bad leaders 

raises ethical questions. 

And one of the things I really like about the sanctions that Congress has pursued is that it is not just blanket punishment for Iranians, it targets the people involved with the program, it targets 

the people who are funding the program, it targets banks that— 

and secondary suppliers. That is terrific. 

Nonetheless, I think the sanctions that are on Iran now begin to 

bite in a way that the leadership ought to be worried about regime 

change coming from within the country. And that argues for continuing to turn the screws on sanctions. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, you know, just for the record, I have certainly 

argued for sanctions and regime change in every way possible. I 

guess I have just begun—it has begun to occur to me that perhaps 

the administration’s lack of making it clear that the sanctions and 

the regime change efforts and all of those would be ultimately 

backstopped by a military threat if it became necessary—and I 

don’t know where that threshold is crossed—there doesn’t seem to 

be a backstop there. 

And so I am just concerned whether the sanctions can be effective. I hope they can. No one argues for them more than I do. But 

ultimately, I am just not certain that that—and it seems to me that 

that is a pretty important question to be certain about, given that 

if Iran gains nuclear weapons, my own perspective is that we will 

need a new calendar because it will change our world that much. 

I think that they will give them to terrorists the world over. And 

I base that upon what they have done with explosively formed 

penetrators in Iraq and other places that they know that we know 

that they know will kill our troops. Three out of four of our casualties are connected to those kinds of things. So that is a concern. 

Let me shift gears—— 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Could I comment on that? 

Mr. FRANKS. Please. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, in my view, Congressman, there is 

no evidence that sanctions have been successful in deterring Iranian behavior yet. And I am very skeptical that at least in the 

short-term foreseeable future, that they will. The problem is not 

that the sanctions aren’t good. They are well-written and sound. 

But they cheat on them with China and Russia. They manipulate 
20 

around them by selling oil through foreign banks and taking payment in gold. And there is lots of loopholes in them. There is exceptions for this organization and that organization. 

I just am very skeptical that sanctions really will ever work as 

far as stopping Iran’s program. I would like to see—I hope that I 

am proved wrong. I would like to see the program stopped. But I 

think it is unlikely through sanctions. And the military option, of 

course, is there, but our experts, like Secretary of Defense Gates 

tells us, that it would just slow down Iran for a few months unless 

we make it into a major war, I mean, a big-time war, with months 

of bombing and an invasion. That could happen. I don’t think it is 

very likely in the aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq. So my sense 

is that as important as this issue is, we may have to try to figure 

out some other way to stop them. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I am all ears, Ambassador. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, I think one thing is we have had 

some success with sabotage, either directly through getting access 

to the equipment, or sending in computer worms, which did set 

them back some months. And I think the important thing here, 

Congressman, in the end this isn’t going to be solved until there 

really is some kind of change of government there. They have a 

horrible government. And they have a public that is pro-west, middle class, well-educated, wants to live in a democratic state. Time 

is on our side. 

And so I think we should play for time through measures like 

this and other measures. That is my best judgment, looking at 

what people say about what it is we are doing, either the military 

option or—or might do, military option, and what we have done 

with sanctions so far. If they work, great. I am all for it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, let me, as I say, shift gears and play off of 

what you spoke of as the whole time frame. You know, oftentimes, 

as you know, when we predicted that North Korea was a decade 

away from testing their missile capability, they tested that year. 

And so our predictive timetables have often been a little off. And 

in this case, that seems to be a pretty significant implication. So 

Mr. Rademaker and Dr. Schake, all of you, what time frame do you 

suggest if Iran chose to move towards actually gaining a warhead? 

Just one or two, let’s say. Because one or two warheads, how long 

would it take them to do that from this moment if they were serious about it? Your prediction. I know there are only two kinds of 

people who predict the future, those who don’t know and those who 

don’t know they don’t know. But your prediction would be? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. How quickly could they achieve a warhead from 

a decision to produce one? 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think very quickly, actually. The key timeline, 

really, is their production of fissile material, which they are making enormous progress on. You know, Ambassador Graham talks 

about the Stuxnet virus and sabotage. And, you know, I have read 

the same reports, and it sounds like some good things were accomplished. Unfortunately, when the IAEA reports every quarter on 

the rate of production of enriched uranium in Iran, the graph has 

just continued straight upward. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 
21 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So maybe it would be an even steeper upward 

line, but it is a rate of progress that is bringing Iran increasingly 

close to where they would have ample fissile material to produce 

not one, not two, but multiple nuclear warheads should they choose 

to do so. The Obama administration has basically said for them— 

as I understand it, for them the red line is evidence that Iran has 

decided to actually produce a nuclear weapon. 

I worry that by the time we receive persuasive evidence of that, 

it will be too late, that they will be so close that maybe they will 

even already have the weapon by the time we realize that they 

have made the decision. Because again, the critical path is the 

fissile material. And that tells us what their options are. And we 

need to stop their production of fissile material. You know, there 

is what I would consider a fairly dangerous theory afloat that Ambassador Graham may actually agree with it, a theory that we 

ought to allow Iran to continue enrichment, cut some diplomatic 

deal with them that allows them to keep producing enriched uranium under safeguards and measures designed to satisfy us that 

they are not turning that enriched uranium into highly enriched 

uranium that they could put in a weapon. 

That has not been the policy of the international community up 

until now. It has not been what is required under U.N. Security 

Council resolutions. But there are still plenty of advocates in the 

diplomatic community and elsewhere saying that is the best we are 

going to achieve with Iran, we need to put this confrontation behind us, let’s cut a deal that allows them to enrich uranium under 

safeguards. I think that is a scenario for Iranian nuclear breakout. 

Mr. FRANKS. I couldn’t agree with you more. It occurs to me that 

under the increased sanctions programs of the last few years, you 

know, Iran has tripled its uranium output, and it is moving enrichment facilities deep underground at Qom, and it is now restraining 

the IAEA from even inspecting weaponization facilities. So when I 

hear that time is on our side, I have a hard time embracing that. 

Dr. Schake. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I want to pile on that very notion, because I agree 

with Ambassador Graham that Iranian society is changing in positive, vibrant ways that are really good for Iran’s long-term future. 

I do not believe time is on our side for exactly the reason Steve 

Rademaker said, which is the graph of their uranium enrichment 

is off the charts. And what we are trying to play is the nexus of 

those two things, right, because the good outcome is an Iranian 

government that we don’t fear taking these kinds of choices. And 

I don’t think we are anywhere near that. 

If I could just say one more thing about the timeline, because I 

agree that is exactly the right question. The most honest assessment I have ever seen of that is the one that the Rumsfeld Commission on ballistic missile defenses did in 1999, which was that 

they believed Iran had the capacity to build weapons within 5 

years of the decision to do so, and we have no idea whether they 

have already decided to do so. My guess is that in the year 2012, 

they have already long decided to do so. And it is quite dangerous, 

I think, the way that both Secretary of Defense Panetta and the 

Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, have both said with 

such blithe ease that Iran has not made that decision. I don’t be-
22 

lieve we know that. I don’t believe that the burden of proof should 

be shifted to us to prove that they haven’t done it, instead of them 

to prove that they haven’t done it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I mean just an observation on my part, it 

seems like we had more evidence than the O.J. Simpson trial, because this notion—but let me ask one last question, and I will give 

you a chance to answer it, Ambassador, because I would love to 

continue here, but in the interests of time, and in respect to everyone else here. There are a lot of different little idiosyncrasies that 

we could analyze, but in your minds, what is the significance of 

Iran gaining nuclear weapons? And what is our best option, if you 

are each President of the United States—and in some cases that 

would—if you are each President of the United States, what would 

be your recipe for preventing Iran to gain nuclear weapons? Would 

you allow them to go ahead and gain the weapons, and we will pursue the delusional policy of containment? I mean, what would be 

your ultimate answer to being able to prevent this? Because I just, 

you know, people like me have had a very, very difficult time with 

this question because I think it is one of the most seminal national 

security questions in the world. So Dr. Rademaker—I keep calling 

you Dr. Rademaker. But Mr. Rademaker, go with you. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I am not a doctor or an ambassador. I am sorry. 

Mr. FRANKS. Pretty bright guy either way. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. There is time. Mr. Chairman, I like your question a lot because I think it really points up one of the problems 

inherent in the global zero agenda, or the world without nuclear 

weapons agenda that we hear so much about. I absolutely don’t 

recommend allowing Iran to get nuclear weapons and then trying 

to deal with it down the road. I think we need to stop that. And 

I think there have been a lot of ideas thrown out today about what 

we need to do, what else we can do to stop that from happening. 

Regrettably, I think if you had to predict today are we on track to 

succeed? Are we going to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon? The evidence that I see suggests no. 

You know, we failed in North Korea. We tried for a long time, 

but we failed. North Korea got nuclear weapons. I hate to say it, 

but I think the likelihood is that we are going to fail on Iran. Certainly we are failing right now. And so your question then is what 

do you do when that happens? Well, as Dr. Schake said, if Iran 

gets nuclear weapons it radically transforms the Middle East. And 

there are a number of implications having to do with how aggressive they will be in doing all the bad things they are already doing, 

like supporting terrorism, and trying to disrupt the Middle East 

peace process, and those sorts of things. But more immediately for 

the nuclear weapons issue, is the risk that Iran’s neighbors are 

going to feel profoundly threatened by an Iranian nuclear weapon. 

And unlike in Northeast Asia, you know, where North Korea got 

a nuclear weapon but every other country in the region could kind 

of relax about that because they all either had their own nuclear 

weapons in the cases of Russia and China, or they lived under the 

U.S. nuclear umbrella. So for Japan and South Korea, they know 

that there are American nuclear weapons there to protect them in 

the event that North Korea uses nuclear weapons against them. 
23 

In the Middle East, there is really only one country in Iran’s vicinity that is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that is Turkey. 

There are a lot of countries that are going to feel deeply threatened, particularly the Arab countries. Because there are religious 

and ethnic differences between the Iranians and their Arab neighbors. These are serious countries, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE. I mean, 

serious countries that are going to be deeply worried about their 

security. And they are all going to wonder the day after Iran tests 

a nuclear weapon—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Rademaker, I want you to know I am in violent 

agreement with every word that you said, but what would be the 

way to prevent this? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the formula—I don’t think the day after 

that happens we are going to despair and say, well, I guess now 

every country in the Middle East is going to have a nuclear weapon, that is a pity, we failed, let’s go home to America. I think the 

day after that happens, our policy will change, and it will become 

one of trying to persuade all of those countries that they don’t need 

to deploy nuclear weapons in reaction to Iran. And how do you persuade them of that? Well, you know, throughout the Cold War, we 

confronted that problem. The way we dealt with it was through the 

policy that the experts called extended deterrence. 

Mr. FRANKS. But I don’t think I am hearing you—it sounds like 

you are saying after they get them. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I am sorry? 

Mr. FRANKS. You are saying after they get them, we don’t want 

everybody else to get them. That is a fine idea. But how do we prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You are right, I was speaking to what I thought 

was the first part of your question, which was how do we respond 

if they get them? 

Mr. FRANKS. If they get them, I think we all jump off the Capitol. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Using American nuclear weapons to deter 

them. Which is why unfortunately there is still a need for American nuclear weapons is the point that I was getting at. But how 

do you stop them from getting them in the first place? 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think a lot of the ideas that were suggested 

here, we have to try all of them. We have to ratchet up our sanctions, we have to bring to bear a credible threat that military force 

actually is on the table. I mean, Obama will sometimes say all options on the table, but I don’t think the Iranians believe it. There 

are plenty of reasons why they think the administration—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Since they are thinking about bombing our own embassy here, I think perhaps you make a good point that they may 

not be as afraid of us as we would like them to be. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think that is exactly right. We have to construct a series of measures that will force them to reconsider the 

course that they are on. And it is going to require greater exertions 

on our part. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I agree with you, but I will have to tell you 

that your response is not that comforting to me. And with total respect. Dr. Schake, would you like to take a shot at how do we prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons? 
24 

Dr. SCHAKE. Yeah. I think the only way you prevent Iran from 

gaining nuclear weapons is to credibly convey that we will not permit it to happen. We will destroy it, we will advocate the overthrow 

of any Iranian regime that moves on the path to getting nuclear 

weapons. We have tried in so many different ways to cajole and 

persuade them that they shouldn’t want what they think they 

want. And it looks to me like we make, again, no progress on this. 

The only time it looks to me the Iranians were serious about walking back from their nuclear program was the letter from the Iranians in the spring of 2003 after we had invaded Iraq. 

Military force really matters. And if they think that they do not 

have the ability to get there without us taking it away from them, 

I believe that is the only thing that has demonstrated any ability 

to put a restraint on this program beyond their access to nuclear 

materials. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am going to let Ambassador Graham respond 

here. I just want to throw in here that I think that really is the 

issue. You know, we are all nonproliferators, even those of us that 

advocate for a strong nuclear capability in America for all kinds of 

reasons. But the reality is that as much as we favor these other 

things, it occurs to me that the best way that we can prevent some 

military action against Iran is for them to know and believe that 

we will, indeed, respond militarily if that is necessary. And I do not 

think we are there. Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Thank you, Congressman. First, let me 

just make a brief comment on what would happen if they did acquire nuclear weapons, the Iranians, in the Middle East, because 

that did come up. And I think that the proliferation, the spread of 

weapons would be quick. Many of us believe that all it takes for 

Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons is a phone call to 

Islamabad, and they will have the weapons because they paid for 

the Pakistani program. Saudis at very high levels have told me 

they will make that phone call if there ever is an Iranian stockpile. 

I think that is some deterrence for Iran, because the last thing they 

should want is for Saudi Arabia to have nuclear weapons. They are 

right next door. 

So I myself have long believed that they won’t ever take that 

final step to actual—an actual stockpile, that their objective is to 

get right close so they can build weapons quickly, a nuclear weapon 

capability, which, in itself, would be bad, but not quite as bad. But 

that is anybody’s guess. But that is virtually a certainty, in my 

opinion. 

Coming back to the question of how can we stop them? As I said 

earlier, there is no good evidence that sanctions will stop their program. Maybe, possibly if they are tightened up and some new sanctions are developed. I mean, I won’t say it is impossible. But the 

track record is not good. And I don’t think we should place much 

reliance on that, on sanctions. 

Military options, as I said before, we are talking about probably 

being able to delay them a few months or maybe even a year unless we want to have an all-out war with 65 million people. And 

if it is that serious, I mean, if we take it that seriously, I am not 

saying that—I am not saying yes or no, but I think it is unlikely, 

after having fought two wars, that we are going to fight another 
25 

one in the near future. I think the Iranians are well aware of that. 

So I don’t think that military threats are going to deter them very 

much either. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let’s see if I can. I would like to get to what your 

thought what will prevent it. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, I don’t think anything will prevent 

it. I think we have got to try disrupt, sabotage, make it difficult 

for them to move forward through various under-the-table means, 

and try to drag it out as long as we can. And in terms of time being 

on our side, I meant long term, not how fast can they build weapons. But I don’t think this regime will last forever. But I just don’t 

really realistically see anything else than that that is likely. Yes, 

we could have a war. I think it is unlikely. It is possible. Unlikely. 

Sanctions might work. Unlikely. A brief military attack probably 

wouldn’t work, but, of course, we could try it. 

Mr. FRANKS. The Israelis tried it at Osirak. Let me, if I could 

then, without objection here, I am going to go to Mr. Langevin 

again. Without objection, the statement from Dr. Sagan will be included in the record of today’s hearing. And hearing no objection, 

so ordered. And thank you for your patience, Mr. Langevin. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 116.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thanks to 

our witnesses, their patience today as well, and the dialogue we 

have engaged in today. I wanted to turn back to the reset discussion that we are having with Russia. Obviously, despite disagreements in some areas, Russia clearly is an important partner on a 

range of critical security issues. And President Obama’s pragmatic 

approach, many would believe, in engagement with Russia has 

yielded numerous benefits, including Russian logistical support for 

the U.S. mission and troops in Afghanistan, especially access to key 

transit routes; the security and elimination of hundreds of weapons 

worth of dangerous Russian-origin nuclear weapons usable material; and Russian support for the toughest U.N. Security Council 

sanctions against Iran to date; and withdrawal by Russia of its contract to sell advanced air defense weapons to Iran among other 

things. 

So to what extent has the reset and the New START Treaty, 

which reduces the number of Russian deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons aimed at the U.S. homeland and gives the United States 

an essential window into their composition and location, help to 

strengthen U.S.-Russia cooperation in other areas central to U.S. 

security? And what would have been the impact on U.S.-Russian 

relations had the U.S. Senate rejected the New START treaty? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. If New START had been rejected by the 

Senate, the effect on U.S.-Russian relations would have been very 

bad. They made that clear themselves. There was some talk that 

they wouldn’t cooperate on Iran at all. Of course, I would not say 

that they have been exactly a stalwart in dealing with Iran, Russia, and China. It was just an essential step to maintain and develop decent relations with the one country, the one country in the 

world whose cooperation is absolutely utterly essential if nonproliferation is going to succeed. It cannot succeed without longterm, or even medium-term—without U.S.-Russian cooperation. 
26 

We, together, have 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, 

and we just must cooperate, as we always have, going back many 

decades into the Cold War. So I thought START was a valuable 

agreement. It essentially drew the line at where both sides are 

now. And that is a good thing. And it is very important to the relationship. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I, too, was in favor of New START, because I believe 

that Russia is trending badly: president Putin’s reelection. But 

even before that it was clear that the constraints on civil society 

and the Mafia nature of business in Russia is trending in a way 

that is dangerous for American interests as well as the interests 

of the Russians. 

So I am very much in favor of locking the Russians into binding 

agreements on things like their strategic nuclear forces, and things 

like the World Trade Agreement. Russia joining the World Trade 

Organization actually creates the possibility of Russia’s business 

practices being subject to scrutiny and to law. And I think that is 

very much in American interests. 

Whether these things would have happened without the reset 

policy, I don’t know. It seems to me that every new American administration tries to reset relations with Russia. I mean, I remember President Bush talking about looking into Putin’s eyes and seeing his soul. And, but every new administration should try to reset 

relations with Russia. It matters in ways that are hugely important. But I actually think the constraint on the Russian-American 

relationship is the Russians, the Russian Government, and the bad 

way that it is trending. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You asked an interesting question, Congressman. The question really is what—of the things that have happened in the U.S.-Russian relationship since New START, how 

many of them are attributable to ratification of the New START 

treaty, and how many of them would have happened even without 

the New START treaty? Of course, that is an unknowable. There 

is a thing called the post hoc, ergo prompter hoc fallacy where you 

assume one thing happened and then another thing happened, 

therefore the first one must have caused the second one. We need 

to be mindful of that fallacy as we analyze some of these issues 

that you threw out. 

I am reminded that Vice President Biden predicted—not just predicted, he asserted solemnly that one of the reasons the Senate 

needed to ratify New START was that this was important in the 

power struggle between then-Prime Minister Putin and then President Putin—I am sorry, then-President Medvedev, and that if we 

didn’t approve New START, that would work badly for President 

Medvedev, and probably result in Prime Minister Putin returning 

as president of Russia. 

Well, to the extent ratification of START was supposed to do 

something about that, it obviously failed. But on the issues that 

you alluded to, Afghanistan, and transit for our U.S. troops there, 

I personally believe that it is not in the interests of the Russian 

Federation for NATO to fail in Afghanistan. You know, the Russians will play games, they will try and bring some pressure to 

bear on us over that issue, but at the end of the day it is in Russia’s interests for NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. And I don’t be-
27 

lieve they are going to take steps contrary to their interests that 

would contribute to failure by us and NATO in Afghanistan. 

So I think transit is something that they have decided to allow 

because they made a calculation that it was in their interests. 

Support for a U.N. Security Council resolution against Iran. I 

have commented on this already. The Russians supported three 

U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran 

during the Bush administration in the absence of a new arms control agreement. They supported one during the Obama administration. Now, if you go back and study the evolution of that resolution, 

it is quite evident that as in the case of the three previous ones, 

Russia did everything it could to water down that resolution. It 

was walked back on issue after issue. But that is the way things 

work at the U.N. But let’s just say, Russia could have been a lot 

more helpful in putting together a strong resolution. Russia chose 

not to be helpful in making that resolution stronger. 

Then, of course, there was the quote that the chairman put up 

on one of the slides earlier in the hearing, where 2 or 3 days after 

the resolution was adopted, the Russians announced that is it, no 

further U.N. Security Council sanctions measures against Iran. We 

are finished with that. And that is the line that has persisted since 

2010. I mean, today, the reason the U.N. Security Council is not 

a venue where Iran sanctions resolutions are being considered is 

because Russia says no. 

So, did our ratification of the New START cause Russia to take 

that position? Of course not. But you know, should we pat ourselves on the back over the one resolution adopted in 2010? I would 

suggest not. I mean, I think Russia supported what it supported 

in 2010 for reasons that had nothing to do with the New START 

treaty. And on the S–300s, you know, one of the interesting features of that Security Council resolution was they crafted it in such 

a way that the transfer of S–300 air defense missiles to Iran is permitted under the Security Council resolution. 

So as a policy matter, they have announced they are not going 

to do it. But they made sure that the international law that follows 

from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 would permit them to 

make that transfer if they chose to. So again, less helpful than they 

could have been. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Without objection, a 

working paper by Dr. Matt Kroenig, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons and 

Nonproliferation: Is There a Link?’’ will be entered into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 148.] 

Mr. FRANKS. And I just want to thank all of you. In terms of 

searching for that question on how to prevent Iran from gaining 

nuclear weapons, let me just suggest to you here in adjourning the 

meeting, that whatever the efforts that you make, or whatever the 

costs that we have as a Nation to implement that, it seems to me 

that it will pale in its significance compared to the costs of failing 

to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. So thank you all for 

what you do. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(33) 

Opening Statement for Chairman Michael R. Turner 

July 20, 2012, hearing ofthe Strategic Forces Subcommittee 

This hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come to order. 

I'm pleased to welcome you all today for our hearing on "Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament: What's the connection and what does that mean for U.S. security 

and Obama Administration policy?" 

Before I start with the subject oftoday's hearing, I think it's important to state a 

rising concern of mine regarding information we were provided last week on the 

B61 LEP. 

For the third time in two years, NATO reaffirmed recently that it wants U.S. 

forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons to remain in Europe. 

Yet, we are faced with the risk, of our own doing, that we may fail to honor that 

commitment. Why? Because the latest NNSA estimate is that this LEP, originally 

projected to cost $4 billion is now going to cost at least $8 billion, and, while it has 

already been delayed once by NNSA, from FY17 to FY 19, there is a risk of further 

delay. 

These schedule delays and cost increases have occurred despite the fact that 

STRATCOM has trimmed the military requirements to the bare minimum and 

increased the risk it is willing to tolerate to about as far as it can. 

This is the latest evidence that NNSA is simply incapable of performing its basic 

mission, which is to provide the nuclear capabilities required by President 

Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and his November 2011 nuclear 

modernization funding promises. 

It is past time for the President to step up and offer some solutions to tix the 

NNSA. This is the point that Chairman McKeon and I made in a letter to the 

Administrator earlier today: NNSA cannot continue to put the modernization ofthe 

U.S. deterrent at-risk. 

Now, to the subject oftoday's hearing. 
34 

A central tenet of the Obama Administration's security policy is that, if the U.S. 

"leads by example" we can "reassert our moral leadership" and influence other 

nations to do things relevant to our nonproliferation goals. l 

It is the way the President intends to advance his goal of working toward a world 

free of nuclear weapons and to deal with the stated twin top priorities of the 

Administration: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

For example, in his December 2009 speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 

Oslo, the President stated: 

In the middle of the last century, nations agreed to be bound by a treaty 

whose bargain is clear: All will have access to peaceful nuclear power; those 

without nuclear weapons will forsake them; and those with nuclear weapons 

will work towards disarmament. I am committed to upholding this treaty.!! 

is a centemiece of my foreign policy.2 

Obviously, if the theory that infonns this "centerpiece" is wrong, we could be 

risking a lot. 

It is important to note that we could be jeopardizing our own security and the 

nuclear umbrella that assures 31 other countries of their security by reason that, as 

our capacity is reduced, the propensity of other countries to build their own 

deterrent is increased - exactly the opposite of what we intend. 

By agreeing to anns control agreements like New START or other agreements or 

unilateral actions like the U.S. statement on missile defense accompanying the 

START treaty, we are placing ourselves in a situation where we could be 

sacrificing our freedom to deploy the full range of missile defenses we need. 

Were we to ratify the CTBT, we would forever legally give up our right to test 

weapons while not extending the same limitation to other states. That's a very 

serious limitation. 

I The preceding statement is attributed to U.s. Senator Jon Kyt based on remarks he made at the National Policy 

Conference of The Nixon Center & The Richard Nixon Foundation on May 19.2010. The attribution was 

unintentionally omitted by committee staff in Chairman Turner's original opening statement. 

2 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. December 10, 

2009. 
35 

Significant consequences could come from doing what the President suggests, and 

the question of whether the risks are justified looms heavily before us today. 

Put another way: Is it true that if we lead by example, others will follow that lead, 

and nuclear weapons will cease to exist? And, does our nonproliferation 

credibility in the world depend on taking these actions suggested by the President? 

One ofthe first places President Obama chose to "lead" was in his new Nuclear 

Posture Review, which set the top five priorities for the United States involving 

nuclear security: 

I. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 

2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security 

strategy; 

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force 

levels; 

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; 

and 

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 3 

About this prioritization, the late Therese Delpech said it best: 

"The [Obama] 2010 NPR gives top priority to nuclear terrorism and nuclear 

proliferation. Then the goal of 'reducing the role of US nuclear weapons in 

US nuclear strategy' is asserted. Maintaining strategic deterrence is third on 

the list. This order is weird.,,4 

I have to agree. It is weird indeed that strategic stability with Russia and China 

and others comes third among the President's priorities. 

Here's what we've done in disarmament already: 

32010 Nuclear Posture Review, Executive Summary, pg iii. 

" Therese Delpcch, "Nuclear Deterrence In The 2 pI Century." Rand Press. 
36 

• the u.s. has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile by 75 percent since the 

end of the Cold War and 90 percent since the height ofthe Cold War (this 

doesn't even include the NEW START figures). 

• The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1992. 

• It has not designed a new warhead since the 1980s nor has it built one since 

the 1990s. 

• We have pulled back almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons, and in the 

new NPR, we will retire our sea launched cruise missile. 

• The Administration negotiated a New START treaty, and forced it through a 

lame duck Senate, where only the United States had to reduce deployed 

nuclear weapons. 

What has this "leadership" gotten us? Have Iran and North Korea been impressed 

enough to come into compliance with the NPT? Have they followed our lead? 

Has it kept Russia, China, France, Great Britain, India, and Pakistan from 

modernizing (and in some cases growing) their nuclear weapons stockpiles? 

Russia is, in fact, deploying a new multipurpose attack submarine that can launch 

long range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads against land targets at a range of 

5,000 kilometers. What is even more incredible is that this new system was not 

"counted" by the New START treaty. 

If you tum to the screen [see slide I], you'll see that in fact, while President 

Obama has been reducing, Russia has been pouring money into its nuclear forces. 

This slide was provided by the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories to a recent 

delegation of U.S. officials. I would suggest that it shows that Russia is, in fact, 

preparing to break out from the INF treaty, and may be in violation of the CTBT 

and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. 

In addition, Russia's President has said that "possessing nuclear weapons is crucial 

to pursuing independent policies and to safeguarding sovereignty." 

Russia is modernizing virtually every nuclear weapons capability it has. Russia 

clearly is not interested in following President Obama's lead. 
37 

Will Pakistan or North Korea ratity the CTBT just because the U.S. does? It is very 

unlikely that they would do so. In fact, both nations continued their nuclear 

weapons tests after the U.S. unilaterally stopped testing and even after the U.S. 

signed the CTBT. 

Have these steps motivated our allies to be more helpful in dealing with real threats 

like Iran and North Korea and with nuclear terrorism? 

Bottom line: there is no evidence our moral leadership in arms control and 

disarmament will convince countries to set aside their calculations of the impact of 

nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism on their national security, and help us 

address these threats. 

Notwithstanding this reality, the President isn't done yet. 

The Obama administration reportedly is weighing at least three options for 

reducing U.S. nuclear forces: cutting to roughly 1,000-1,100; 700-800 or 300-400. 

The president may soon seek to have the U.S. make the deepest reductions to its 

nuclear forces in history. 

Let me be clear, putting aside what I believe is a disproven theory on U.S. nuclear 

reductions at the heart of the President's theory, the idea offurther reductions 

should be off the table, and for a simple reason: the President has broken his 

promise to modernize the deterrent, which is the only reason, and a fundamental 

part of the contract the president agreed to, when the New START treaty was 

ratified. 

Case in point is the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear 

Facility, the construction of which the President pledged a little more than a year 

ago to accelerate and which in this year's budget he deferred for five years, which 

may as well be a cancellation, which I understand the National Nuclear Security 

Administration and the Office of Management and Budget originally advocated. 

The President may consider this leadership, but I consider it to be breaking his 

word. 

I am pleased to welcome today the following experts: 
38 

• The Honorable Stephen Rademaker 

Former Assistant Secretary of State 

• Dr. Kori Schake 

Research Fellow, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University 

• Amb. Thomas Graham 

Former Special Representative to the President on Arms Control, 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament (Clinton Administration) 

These witnesses are leading thinkers on issues of nonproliferation and 

disarmament. 

I look forward to their views on the following questions: 

• What are the United States' commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty? 

• Have past U.S. disannament activity and any "dividends" for U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives, including preventing proliferation to and by 

states like Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan? 

• What are the specific accomplishments, if any, in the past and by the current 

administration as a result of U.S. disarmament activity, including the New 

START treaty with Russia? 

• What would be the likely accomplishments from future actions by the 

United States, including potential ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 

Test Ban Treaty or further U.S. nuclear force reductions, including pursuant 

to the Administration's pending Nuclear Posture Review implementation 

study? 

Now, I turn to my Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez, for her opening statement. 
39 

Opening Statement 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing on 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament: What's the connection and what does 

that mean for U.S. security and Obama Administration policy? 

Ranking Member Loretta Sanchez 

August 1, 2012 

I would like to join Chairman Turner in thanking our witnesses, Mr. Rademaker, 

Dr. Schake, and Ambassador Graham, for being here today. 

I would also like to thank Dr. Scott Sagan, and ask for unanimous consent that his 

testimony and his article "Shared Responsibilities/or Nuclear Disarmament" be 

introduced for the record. 

Chainnan Turner, our Committee members and I agree that the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons represents one of the gravest threats to US and international 

security. 

The nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea and the risk of other countries and 

terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons are among the most serious threats facing our 

country. 

These are difficult problems, but so far we have avoided a world where many more 

countries have nuclear weapons. During the Kennedy Administration, there were 

predictions of dozens of nuclear weapon states by the end of the 1970s. 

The reasons these predictions did not become a reality is US leadership and the 

1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

With nearly 190 member states, the NPT remains a cornerstone of our security, 

ensuring that most states did not acquire nuclear weapons. Only a handful of states 

including North Korea and Iran remain either outside the treaty or in violation of 

commitments made under the treaty. 

Under the NPT bargain, over 180 non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire 

nuclear weapons. And in exchange the 5 nuclear weapons states (United States, 
40 

Russia, China, United Kingdom and France) commit to pursue negotiations on 

nuclear arms control and disarmament. As Ambassador Graham notes in his 

testimony, the NPT was not a gift to the nuclear weapons states. It was a bargain. 

This bargain is still relevant. 

In 1995, US led successful efforts to indefinitely extend the Treaty -- and for this 

we owe a particular debt of gratitude to Ambassador Graham. 

This was a bet in favor ofthe continued viability of the NPT, including that nuclear 

weapons would not spread and that progress would be achieved on nuclear arms 

control and dismmament. 

This extension meant that most ofthe world gave upforever the right to acquire 

nuclear weapons. And as part of their commitment to maintaining a strong NPT, 

nuclear weapon states in 1995 made promises, which were reiterated in 2000 and 

which included among other steps: entry into force of Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty and progress on reducing the number of nuclear weapons. 

Many ofthe promises made on arms control have not been realized. However, 

they remain necessary as we need progress on nonproliferation, including 

additional international pressure on Iran and North Korea, tougher nuclear 

inspections and reducing the use of nuclear bomb-grade materials for civilian 

purposes. 

Beyond the problematic actions by North Korea and Iran, making progress on 

nonproliferation remains important as additional countries become interested in 

acquiring enrichment and reprocessing technology, which ifunchecked could lead 

to a dangerous world where nuclear weapons-usable materials are readily available 

to countries and potential terrorists. 

Allowing the NPT to unravel would have disastrous consequences. 

It is in this context and to reduce the dangers from an outdated Cold War legacy 

that that President Obama sought to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons 

in his 2009 Palm Sunday speech in Prague, in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

and the pending implementation of the updated Nuclear Posture, and in the 2010 

and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits. 
41 

The link between nuclear nonproliferation and arms control is widely recognized 

and continues to be meaningful. 

The 2009 Commission on the Nuclear Posture of the United States, co-chaired by 

Former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, noted that 

"nations may not show the nuclear restraint the United States desires or support 

nonproliferation efforts tf the nuclear weapon states take nofurther agreed steps to 

decrease their reliance on nuclear arms." 

Last year, Secretaries George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Senator 

Sam Nunn wrote in the Wall Street Journal that "the realization that continued 

reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is 

encouraging, or at least excusing, the spread of these weapons, and will inevitably 

erode the essential cooperation necessary to avoid proliferation." 

And just last week General Cartwright and Ambassador Pickering, in joint 

Congressional testimony, explained "The idea is not that virtuous US. and Russian 

behavior in the form o.fsteep nuclear arms reductions will inspire aspiring 

proliferators to abandon their quests ... Rather, there are reasons to believe that 

such behavior could inspire our anti-proliferation partners to get tougher with 

recalcitrant states seeking the bomb." 

In conclusion, I look forward to your thoughts on the link between nuclear 

nonproliferation and disarmament and specifically: 

• Do the NPT commitments, and associated promises, still matter? And 

can we risk losing the NPT? 

• What kind of engagement do we need with our allies in Northeast Asia 

and in NATO to maintain extended deterrence guarantees? 

• Has the reset with Russia helped nonproliferation efforts, including 

strengthened sanctions on Iran? 

• What actions are needed to constructively engage with the Non-Aligned 

Movement to achieve further progress on nonproliferation? 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
42 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER 

Principal, The Podesta Group 

"Nonproliferation and Disannament: What's the connection and what does that mean for U.S. 

security and Obama Administration policy?" 

Committee on Anned Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

U.S. House of Representatives 

August 1,2012 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for 

inviting me to testify today about the connection between nuclear disarmament and 

non pro I iferati 0 n. 

The context fClr this discussion is, of course, the goal President Obama has mticulated of 

achieving a world without nuclear weapons. It is not unusual, of course, for presidents and other 

political leaders to commit to ambitious goals like this. We can all recall, for example, previous 

presidential commitments to end poverty, cure cancer, and stop drug abuse. What sets President 

Obama's goal apm from these other examples is that he appears to really mean it. This is not a 

pious aspiration that he has embraced, knowing full well that it can never be fully achieved. To 

the contrary, he appears to believe his goal of global nuclear disarmament is achievable, and he 

is committed to using the power of his oflice to try to bring it about. Because he takes this goal 

seriously, we have to as well. 

President Obama and other advocates of global disarmament offer a number ofreasons 

tor wanting to abolish nuclear weapons from the planet. The one that brings us here today is 

their oft-repeated contention that decisive movement in the direction of nuclear disarmament will 

better position America to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Because preventing 

proliferation is one of our nation's top national security concerns, they argue, nuclear 

disarmament is a small price to pay to protect ourselves against the risks attendant upon the 

spread of nuclear weapons, such as nuclear terrorism, regional instability, and nuclear war. 

I have two principal quarrels with this line of argument. First, I think the proponents of 

nuclear disarmament seriously underestimate the value of America's nuclear arsenal as a tool of 

nuclear nonproliferation. By advocating that we abolish that tool, or at least move decisively in 

the direction of abolishing it, they are advocating a course that may actually increase the risks of 

nuclear proliferation. 

Second, I know of no evidence to support the theory that nuclear disarmament by the 

United States will translate to increased leverage in the struggle against nuclear proliferation. 

know of earnest assertions that are regularly made in this regard, but those assertions do not 

withstand rigorous analysis. This is a case where, regrettably, the wish is the father of the 

thought. J say regrettably because I also wish the vexing problem of nuclear proliferation could 

be solved by such a simple step as getting rid of our own nuclear weapons. Sadly, it cannot. 
43 

Nuclear Weapons as a Tool of Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Nuclear weapons have been with us for more than sixty-five years, and for most of that 

time the main reason more countries didn't acquire nuclear weapons was that they were 

confident they didn't need them thanks to America's nuclear umbrella. The proliferation 

problems we face today from countries like Iran and North Korea tend to obscure the fact that 

traditionally the risk of proliferation has been greatest in countries that are technologically and 

economically advanced. During the Cold War, countries like Germany, Japan and South Korea 

that feared nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and China gave serious thought to developing 

nuclear weapons. So did others like Sweden, Taiwan, and Australia. 

The reason none of these countries developed nuclear weapons was that they concluded 

that they didn't need such weapons because they could rely on America to defend them. This 

has long been one of the declared goals of America's nuclear arsenal. Experts label this 

"extended deteITence". The concept is that America's nuclear weapons exist to deter not only 

attacks on the United States, but also to deter attacks on our friends and allies. The label is 

unfortunate, because only experts understand what it means. To the extent it is about reassuring 

potential nuclear powers that there is no need for them to realize that potential, a better label 

might be "active nonproliferation." 

For proponents of nuclear disarmament, the historical success of extended deterrence is 

an inconvenient fact. They tend to dismiss it as an artifact of the Cold War, something that has 

become irrelevant in the 21 st century. A good example is the report issued two months ago by a 

Commission of the Global Zero organization entitled "Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force 

Structure and Posture." This report airily dismissed the importance of extended deterrence with 

the assertion that 

No sensible argument has been put forward for using nuclear weapons to solve any of the 

major 21 SI century problems we face-threats posed by rogue states, failed states, 

proliferation, regional conflicts, terrorism, cyber warfare, organized crime, drug 

trafficking, conflict driven mass migration of refugees, epidemics or climate change. A 

large standing Cold War-like nuclear arsenal cannot productively address any of these 

dangers-for instance, it is untenable to reliably deter or defeat terrorists with no return 

address, and its impact on proliferation may be largely counterproductive. Nuclear 

weapons have 011 balance arguably become more a part of the problem than any solution. 

For instance, our large nuclear stockpiles and infrastructures run risks of then by nonstate actors. 1 

This kind of "end of history" triumphalism has fallen out of favor in other areas, but not among 

supporters of nuclear disarmament. Sadly, there is no reason to believe that the end of the Cold 

War has changed the psychology that led countries facing nuclear threats during the Cold War to 

consider acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. 

1 http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6395~GZ%20US:ti!20Nuclear%20Policy%20Commission~.20Report.pdf, p. 2. 

2 
44 

Consider the two cases that we worry ahout most today: North Korea and Iran. North 

Korea has broken out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but its two non-nuclear 

armed neighbors, South Korea and Japan, have so far resisted calls to deploy nuclear weapons of 

their own. The reason for this has little to do with the NPT, and everything to do with the 

contidence they have in our treaty commitments to them and in the reliability of America's 

nuclear arsenal. Notwithstanding this, there are periodic calls in both countries to match North 

Korea's nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons of their own. As a nation, we have every interest 

in discouraging such calls and reassuring our allies of the reliability of our defense guarantees. It 

would be perilous for us to take any steps with our nuclear arsenal that would lead them to 

question the reliability of those guarantees. The risk of "theft by non-state actors" of American 

nuclear weapons pales by comparison to the risks to the global nonproliferation regime that 

would follow from a decision in Seoul or Tokyo that America's nuclear umbrella was no longer 

reliable. 

With regard to Iran, the experts tell us that one of the main reasons we have to worry 

about that country's nuclear weapons program is that ifIran follows North Korea in breaking out 

of the NPT, we will face a "cascade of proliferation" in the Middle East, which will result in the 

"unraveling of the NPT." Fundamentally what the experts are telling us is that the situation in 

the Middle East is ditferent than in Northeast Asia. North Korea could break out of the NPT 

without triggering a cascade of proliferation in Northeast Asia because all of North Korea's 

neighbors either already have nuclear weapons (Russia and China), or live under the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella (South Korea and Japan). In the Middle East, by contrast, only one of Iran's neighbors 

lives under the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Turkey), and all oflran's Arab neighbors will confront the 

question whether they need to match Iranian nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons of their 

own. 

I do not believe that America will react to an Iranian nuclear breakout by saying "How 

regrettable. Now there's going to be a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East." To the 

contrary, I believe we will immediately go to work trying to persuade the Arab countries ofthe 

region that they do not need to deploy nuclear weapons of their own. How will we persuade 

them of this? We know of only one model for doing this, and that is the model we successfully 

employed during the Cold War of defense guarantees and extended deterrence. 

Proponents of nuclear disarmament would have us believe that with our increasingly 

precise and powerful conventional weapons, America is today capable of providing extended 

deterrence with conventional rather than nuclear weapons. This theory overlooks the fact that 

Iran's nuclear weapons are not really warfighting weapons, but rather weapons of mass terror. 

Does anyone really believe that the Saudis, for example, will accept that they can relax about the 

potential obliteration of Riyadh because, should Iran do that, America will usc its precise 

conventional weapons to surgically decapitate the Iranian leadership and wipe out Iran's key 

military and nuclear installations so that kind of thing can never happen again? 

Nuclear breakout is not an improbable scenario with Iran, but rather the most likely one 

should events continue on their current trajectory. Again, it would be perilous to take steps today 

with America's nuclear forces that would render us incapable of stopping the cascade of 

proliferation in the Middle East that has been predicted should Iranian breakout occur. 

3 
45 

Leverage to Combat Nuclear Proliferation 

One of the principal claims offered by the Obama Administration in support of its 

disalmament agenda is that it will strengthen America's hand in seeking to prevent nuclear 

weapons proliferation. As stated in the Obama Administration's 2012 Nuclear Posture Review: 

By demonstrating that we take seriously our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear 

disarmament, wc strengthen our ability to mobilize broad international support for the 

measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and securc nuclear materials 

worldwide.2 

The comment about "our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament" is, of course, a 

refercnce to Article VI of the NPT. Contrary to what many proponents of disarmamcnt would 

have us believe, Articlc VI of the NPT does not impose on the United States and the other four 

nuclear-weapons states a free-standing obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons. This 

Articlc consists of only one sentence, stating that: 

Each ofthe Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 

effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear anns race at an early date and to 

nuclear disarmament, and to a Treaty on general and complete dismmament under strict 

and effective international control. 

If one parses this language, it is evident that it imposes no binding legal obligation to 

abolish nuclear weapons. Rather, the operative legal requirement is to "pursue negotiations in 

good faith on effective measures relating ... to nuclear disarmament. ... " Further, Altide VI 

imposes this requirement in parallel with an obligation on all parties to the NPT -those with 

nuclear weapons and those without-to "pursue negotiations in good faith on efrective measures 

relating ... to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 

international control." 

The treaty's eleventh permubulatory paragraph makes clear the understanding of the 

parties that these two obligations are linked. and that final "elimination from national arsenals of 

nuclear weapons" would take place not prior to, but rather "pursuant to a Treaty on general and 

complctc disarmament." There is, of course, no treaty on gencral and complete disarmmnent, 

nor has there ever been a serious effort to negotiate one. 

It is no wonder, therefore, that in a 1969 memo to then National Security Adviser Henry 

Kissinger, Spurgeon Keeny of the NSC staff stated that Article VI "is an essentially hortatory 

statemcnt and presents no problems."} 

Since then, however, the United States has acquiesced in increasingly aggressive 

interpretations of the obligations imposed on the nuclear weapon states by Article VI, to the 

point where few today would be able even to explain, much less publicly agree with, Mr. 

4 
46 

Keeny's assessment in 1969. As a result, it is certainly the case that expectations have been 

created in the international community going well beyond the actual requirements of Article VI 

of the NPT. Essentially what the Obama Administration is telling us, therefore, is that if the 

United States appears to be moving resolutely to satisty those expectations, we will be rewarded 

by progress on the problem of nuclear proliferation. 

It is fair to ask, however, how that reward will be delivered. One way it could be 

delivered is by the nuclear proliferators themselves. Perhaps countries like Iran and North Korea 

will be so inspired by the example we set that they will decide to join us in committing to nuclear 

disarmament. It would, of course, be nice if these countries were moved by the power of our 

example to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. This notion is so preposterous, however, 

that not even the most ardent supporters of nuclear disarmament would argue this with a straight 

face. 

So ifthe theory isn't that proliferators will be inspired to follow our example, it must be 

that the rest ofthe international community will be inspired to reciprocate by stepping up their 

insistence on full compliance by other countries with the nonproliteration obligations set forth 

elsewhere in the NPT. 

This is a plausible-sounding theory, but there is no evidence that the theory works in the 

real world. In order for the theory to be true, there would have to be members of the 

international community willing and able to do more to stop nuclear proliferation, but holding 

back out of frustration over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament by the United States. If this 

theory is true, it should be possible to name at least one or two countries that arc acting in this 

manner. I am unable to do so, however, and I've never heard supporters of President Obama's 

theory identify the countries that will do more to stop proliferation in response to our doing more 

to eliminate our nuclear weapons. 

There are, of course, plenty of countries that could do more to stop proliferation. Indeed, 

all countries, including the United States, could do more. But I know of no country that is doing 

less than it otherwise would do but for perceived foot-dragging by the United States on nuclear 

disarmament. 

The reason the United States isn't doing more to combat proliteration isn't because we 

don't care about it, and it certainly isn't because we're angry with the other nuclear weapons 

states for not disarming faster. It's because we have other national priorities in addition to 

nonproliferation, and because we face political, economic, and diplomatic constraints on what 

we're prepared to do in confronting determined proliferators like Iran and North Korea. The 

same is true, in my opinion, of every other country in the world. 

Not only can I not think of a country that would do more to help us stop the Irans and 

North Koreas if only we disarmed faster, I have a hard time thinking of a category of countries 

for which this might be true. Let's review the categories of countries when it comes to 

disarmament and nonproliferation. 
47 

First, there are the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states-Russia, China, thc United 

Kingdom, and France. Countries in this category are in fact the biggest obstacle to more 

concerted intemational pressure against Iran and North Korea. The reason international 

economic sanctions on Iran and North Korea are not more biting is because Russia and China 

stand prepared to veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that would tighten sanctions, and for 

most ofthe world, the Security Council's requirements define how far they are prepared to go in 

pressuring Iran and North Korea. And why are Russia and China blocking the imposition of 

tougher sanctions? In both cases there is a long list ofreasons that boils down to a calculation of 

where their national interests lie. But in neither case are they holding back because they are 

worried that America isn't disarming fast enough. 

Next there are America's close Jriends and allies, the countries that benefit most directly 

fi'om the American nuclear umbrella. Some of these countries are in fact strong champions of 

nuclear disarmament-Germany and Japan in particular come to mind. A closely related 

category is passionately anti-nuclear non-allies, countries like Sweden, Ireland, Austria and New 

Zealand. 

From countries in both of these categories there is certainly plenty of criticism of 

America's nuclear weapons policies. But there is also at least as much concem about nuclear 

proliferation, because these countries arc acting out of genuine conviction that nuclear weapons 

are bad, not anti-American animus. So to suggest that they are holding back in their efforts to 

prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea in order to pressure America to do more on 

nuclear disarmament ascribes to them a degree of tactical calculation that they likely would find 

offensive. These countries might well try to persuade us that there are other countries that would 

do more if America would disarm faster, but they themselves would never consciously allow 

Iran to inch closer to obtaining the bomb in order to pressure America on disarmament. 

The final category is the nonaligned movement, or NAM, led on nuclear issues by such 

countries as Brazil, Egypt and South Africa. These are among the most outspoken countries in 

the world in favor of nuclear disarmament, so ifanyone is holding back on nonproliferation in 

order to coax more progress on disarmament, it is most likely them. 

The Obama Administration cannot be faulted for not doing enough to impress the NAM 

with the sincerity of its commitment to nuclear disarmament. Since taking office it has: 

Issued a Nuclear Posture Review disavowing the development of new nuclear weapons 

types and significantly limiting the circumstances under which America would use 

nuclear weapons. 

Negotiated and brought into force the New START agreement, mandating a one-third 

reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and 

Russia. 

Organized the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit, to which 47 nations were invited. 

Attended the 2010 NPT review conference, where it promised U.S. participation in 

regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. 

6 
48 

Prepared an implementation study pursuant to the Nuclear Posture Review, which press 

reports say will recommend a further one-third reduction in the number of strategic 

weapons deployed by the United States. 

Speaking at the NPT review conference in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly 

articulated the Administration's expectation that these steps toward nuclear disarmament will be 

reciprocated: 

as we work to uphold our end ofthe basic bargain of the NPT, we are asking all 

signatories to do the same, to work with us to strengthen global nonproliferation rules and 

hold accountable those who violate them. 4 

So how has the world responded? 

The Administration achieved no meaningful progress at the NPT review conference on 

any of the ideas it proposed for strengthening the NPT. And the conference issued a final 

statement criticizing Israel on nonproliferation grounds, but not Iran. 

Later in 20 I 0, the Administration persuaded the U.N. Security Council to impose a fourth 

round of economic sanctions on Iran. Not only were these sanctions watered down by Russia 

and China, as has happened in the past, but NAM member Brazil, along with Turkey, voted 

against the resolution imposing the sanctions. This was in stark contrast to the three previous 

Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, all of which were approved 

unanimously. 

Not only that, Brazil and Turkey brokered a deal with Iran prior to the vote with the 

express purpose of scuttling additional U.N. sanctions. In addition, they declared their flat-out 

opposition to the goal-formally adopted by the Security Council in 2006-ofrequiring Iran to 

suspend uranium enrichment. The word for this is not progress, but regress. 

Since that time, additional progress has been achieved in tightening economic sanctions 

on Tran, but that progress is almost entirely attributable to mandates of the U.S. Congress and 

decisions of the European Union. SigniJicantly, the aim of many of the new U.S. and E.U. 

sanctions is to pressure NAM members and others to do things in their relations with Iran that 

they have heretofore been unwilling to do on their own. 

So it's fair to say that if President Obama was expecting additional cooperation on 

nonproliferation li'om the NAM or anyone else as a reward for picking up the pace of nuclear 

disarmament, he's still waiting. 

Conclusion 

All of these facts demonstrate that nuclear disarmament affords no silver bullet solution 

to the continuing problem of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps there arc other reasons for America 

to consider modest additional nuclear weapons reductions. And certainly we need to continue to 

4 .http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmf2010/0~424.htrn. 

7 
49 

fulfill our obligation under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate in good faith on effective measures 

relating to nuclear disarmament. But as we make decisions relating to these matters, we should 

not allow our judgment to be clouded by fanciful notions that our actions are going to be 

rewarded with stepped up cooperation by others in combatting nonproliferation. 

We will make progress against proliferation as we always have, on the merits ofthe 

issue, by persuading others that it is in their interest to cooperate with us against nuclear dangers. 

By the same token, we need to make decisions about our nuclear force structure in the same 

manner, on the basis of a sober and objective assessment of our global defense requirements, not 

wishful thinking. 

8 
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51 
52 

I 

DISCLOSURE FORM. FOR WITNESSES 

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53 

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55 

Dr. Kori Schake 

Does Reducing the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Advance Non-Proliferation? 

The question is enormously consequential, for if reductions in our arsenal 

cause threshold states to back away from proliferation, or states whose 

possession of nuclear weapons threatens the United States and its interests to 

relinquish their nuclear weapons, then reducing U.S. nuclear forces could 

increase our security. There is, however, no evidence that reducing our nuclear 

deterrent has that effect. 

Variety of Motivations 

States choose to acquire nuclear weapons for a range of reasons. 

Deterring attack or denying an adversary military advantage are the obvious 

spurs to nuclear possession. But they are not the only rationales, in some cases 

perhaps not even the principal ones. Regional distributions of power, national 

pride, bureaucratic politics, the influence of military in government, and norms of 

behavior that accord with national identity all affect state choices. 

The list is not comprehensive; we cannot truly know what is motivating 

proliferant behavior. States rarely openly and honestly give their reasons for 

acquiring nuclear weapons, since posseSSion is often not an end in itself but a 

means to affect the choices of other states and organizations. Politicians 

mislead, mischaracterize, and perhaps even misrepresent to themselves their 

motivations. Historical forensics permit us to evaluate, imperfectly, a state's 

choices after the fact. 

The Iranian government, for example, characterizes their nuclear programs in 
56 

terms designed to stoke national pride and a sense of injustice toward those who 

would interfere. Until recently, at least, that has succeeded domestically: there is 

widespread support in Iran for their nuclear programs. A RAND study in 2010 

found that 97% of Iranians consider nuclear enrichment a national right, although 

only 32% would support Iran developing nuclear weapons. This gives the Iranian 

government enormous incentives to maintain the belief that national pride is their 

motivation, even if it is not their motivation. 

It is clear, though, that motivations vary, and often do not remain constant 

over time. In the U.S. case, for example, preventing Nazi Germany from 

acquiring a war-winning advantage was the initial motivation for our nuclear 

program, but the program continued after Germany's surrender. Shifting 

motivations are the norm rather than the exception, because states find 

additional justifications, bureaucratic momentum propels a program once started, 

prestige of the state becomes engaged once the program begins, and 

compensating actions by regional rivals reinforce security concerns that may 

have been initial motivations. 

In some ways this makes most interesting the cases of states that begin 

nuclear programs but decide against crossing the nuclear threshold. Two of 

those cases bear particular scrutiny: Sweden, and South Africa. The Swedish 

case is one of a country capable of developing nuclear weapons deciding its 

security was better served by foregoing the possibility: it serves as a virtuous 

example. The South African case appears to be one of a country developing 

nuclear weapons in order to preserve their domestic political practices from 
57 

outside intervention that disarmed as the result of change of governance. 

Regime change precipitated denuclearization in South Africa, and there is 

considerable evidence to suggest the same dynamic was at work in Argentina 

and also Brazil when they walked back their nuclear programs. The types of 

governments and their relationship to their population matter. 

The salient point about motivations is that they do not correlate to the size or 

composition of U.S. nuclear arsenal. In the past twenty years, the United States 

has made significant reductions to its nuclear forces, as have the United 

Kingdom, France, the NATO alliance, and even Russia; in that same period of 

time, China, India and Pakistan have increased their nuclear arsenals, North 

Korea crossed the nuclear threshold, and Iran has been engaged in suspicious 

nuclear activity for which it will not satisfy International Atomic Energy Agency 

concerns. 

Supply Side Thinking 

Because assessing motivations is such an imprecise and fallible art, most 

non-proliferation efforts have concentrated on restricting access to nuclear 

materials, knowledge, weapons and delivery systems. The exception to this 

approach -- and it is an enormous one -- is the extension of nuclear guarantees 

to American allies and allowing their participation in nuclear missions and 

planning. 

More than thirty countries have the industrial infrastructure and scientific 

knowledge to develop nuclear weapons. Most of those countries are American 

allies: Japan, Australia, most of NATO Europe. In some cases they have 
58 

lingering historical resonances that an assertive unilateral defense posture would 

accentuate (Japan, Germany). In other cases they have national identities 

associated with norms of cooperative international security (the Netherlands, 

Norway). In all cases except Britain and France, they concluded that sharing in 

the American nuclear guarantee served their purposes better than developing 

forces of their own. And even France and Britain would consider their 

independent nuclear deterrents affected by choices about the American nuclear 

arsenal. 

Those same countries are also the most active and creative designers of nonproliferation ideas, the most assiduous in policing transgressions against the 

norm. They caught the idea from us and advanced it, because norms spread 

among communities that have broad commonalities of values and perspectives. 

It is much more difficult to gain traction where there is little societal commonality. 

Reducing U.S. nuclear forces even has the potential to spur proliferation 

among U.S. allies who rely on the guarantee of our nuclear umbrella extending to 

their defense. We have committed to the defense of twenty seven NATO states, 

Japan, South Korea, Australia. They have chosen instead to rely on the promise 

of our country to protect them, including by use of nuclear weapons. So, 

ironically, the most effective prevention against nuclear proliferation is the 

existence of U.S. nuclear forces and extension of defense commitments. 

Another argument that is often raised in connection with the non-proliferation 

effect of nuclear guarantees is that it inhibits proliferation to our friends, but 

encourages proliferation by their regional rivals. That is, a guarantee to Japan 
59 

would incentivize Chinese possession of nuclear weapons, a guarantee to Saudi 

Arabia would incentivize Iranian nuclear acquisition. This is likely true; what data 

exists seems to support that proposition. And if preventing proliferation as a 

universal good is the point of our policies, then the U.S. should withhold such 

guarantees. But the abstract good of non-proliferation is not, or should not be, 

the purpose of our policies; it should be subordinate to the concrete good of 

protecting our interests and our friends around the world. 

We would not care particularly if Sweden developed nuclear weapons; we 

would care greatly if Iran did. We were much less concerned about India 

crossing the nuclear threshold than we were, and are, worried about Pakistan as 

a nuclear state. The nature of a state and its international behavior great affect 

our judgment of the consequences of it breaching the norm of non-proliferation. 

Fostering norms that reward responsible actors is a worthwhile endeavor, and 

ought to be high up on the list of American national security objectives. But it is 

no substitute for protecting our interests and our friends when the objectives 

come into conflict. 

Case Study: Post-Cold War Europe 

Questioning the validity of extended nuclear deterrence is, of course, a parlor 

game of long standing, especially among NATO experts. Europeans worried the 

U.S. would not trade New York for Paris, worried the U.S. would lose a 

conventional war rather than escalate to fight a nuclear war, worried the Soviets 

could succeed conventionally before NATO could make the decision to escalate, 

and many other permutations. More recently, the German Foreign Minister 
60 

advocated withdrawing NATO nuclear forces from Germany. Foreign Minister 

Westerwelle was encouraged in this by some in the Obama Administration who 

support the proposition that reductions in our nuclear forces would precipitate 

reductions by Russia. 

Despite the Obama Administration's advocacy, NATO allies unanimously 

concluded they were best served by relying on the U.S. guarantee and sharing 

the burden of nuclear deterrence: allies believe that as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, NATO must remain a nuclear power. Three times in the past three years, 

NATO allies have had the opportunity to walk back their support for U.S. nuclear 

forces stationed in Europe. The NATO Experts Group led by Madeleine Albright, 

the Alliance Strategic Concept unanimously adopted, and the Defense Review to 

implement that strategy all endorse the importance of nuclear weapons in NATO 

strategy, the importance of U.S. nuclear forces stationed in Europe to "make our 

security indivisible," and the value of sharing in nuclear missions rather than 

relying on U.S. strategic nuclear forces alone. They believe our non-strategic 

nuclear forces stationed in Europe reinforce transatlantic solidarity and give them 

important ways to participate in nuclear deterrence. 

Europe is perhaps the least persuasive case on which to base the argument 

that reductions in the U.S. arsenal cause reductions in the arsenals of other 

countries. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has reduced its nuclear 

inventory by more than 90%. Intermediate-range nuclear forces were eliminated 

by treaty before the end of the Cold War; the entirety of reductions after the Cold 

War have been in sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons. Nearly 2,000 sub-
61 

strategic nuclear weapons were redeployed away from NATO Europe. The 

Russian reaction, so hoped for by advocates of setting an example of restraint? 

Nothing. The Russians did not remove a single nuclear weapon from west of the 

Ural Mountains. Nor did they diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their 

doctrine (the incapacities of Russian conventional forces have given incentives 

for increasing reliance on nuclear weapons). The Russians claim their substrategic nuclear forces are essential for defending their long land border in Asia, 

but their deployments remain in Europe. Russian military exercises also 

routinely incorporate the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and their leaders 

casually discuss deploying sUb-strategic forces to Kaliningrad as a means of 

"balancing" the expansion of NATO to include the Baltic states. 

History gives few clean test cases for theories of international behavior, but 

the choices of NATO and Russia about sub-strategic nuclear forces repudiate the 

idea that virtuous reductions by us will lead to comparable behavior by our 

adversaries. 

If You Carry An Umbrella, It Won't Rain 

Even states to which we have not committed formally or by treaty consider 

our nuclear forces important in their decisions about proliferation, but not in the 

way the question posed to this panel suggests. Countries of the Gulf, for 

example, believe that as long as regional adversaries do not attain nuclear 

weapons, the U.S. conventional guarantee is sufficient to ensure their security. 

Saudi Arabia, however, has made clear that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, 

a conventional guarantee will be inadequate. Other countries in region are also 
62 

likely to press for either weapons of their own or extension of the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella to cover them. By retaining robust nuclear forces of our own, we foster 

the understanding by allies and countries that share our interests that they may 

be able to rely on nuclear guarantees from us rather than developing their own 

weapons. There is a point at which a small U.S. nuclear arsenal would create 

skepticism it could bear the numerous claims upon it. 

It is even possible that U.S. nuclear forces in the numbers being considered 

by the Obama Administration are small enough to provoke proliferation. That is, 

adversaries may be tempted to believe if they accumulate more nuclear weapons 

they could reach parity with or surpass the United States. And while it may seem 

an odd and empty boast to American ears, the dynamics of proliferation are 

complex and deeply embedded in national cultures and circumstances. 

Superiority over American military power would be a compelling claim, especially 

for countries that cannot compete with the dynamism of American society. The 

countries we are most concerned about acquiring nuclear weapons are countries 

that believe they deserve to be great powers but are not -- and those are 

precisely the type of countries that might see advantage in the claim of replacing 

the United States as the world's strongest power or foreclosing to it military 

options. 

Nuclear weapons are existential -- their killing power is so destructive and the 

international norm against their use so deeply engrained that they are distinctive. 

Creating such devastation by other means would not carry the same 

psychological effect. The beliefs of policymakers early in the nuclear age, to 
63 

include President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford, that nuclear weapons were 

no more than increased yield explosives, has not proven true. The norms that 

have grown up around nuclear weapons are extremely powerful. 

It is important to recognize that the United States is the main beneficiary of 

the norm against nuclear use. Having the strongest conventional military forces 

of any country gives us the ability to prevail in the non-nuclear domains. 

Whether we will continue to dominate as new arenae of action such as cyber 

warfare evolve is an open question, but tangential to whether nuclear reductions 

advance non-proliferation. The main warfighting purpose of nuclear weapons is 

to render any conventional war against the United States unwinnable. For in 

conventional wars, sometimes the most capable force loses. 

The central argument for U.S. reductions is that it creates a norm of restraint, 

an example that will affect the choices of other states. To the extent that 

argument holds true at all, it applies principally to our allies, not to the countries 

we would be concerned about acquiring nuclear weapons. And yet, even our 

allies have repeatedly and recently sought to preserve the nuclear forces and 

commitments of the United States. 

The soundest course of policy is to size and structure the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal to deter attack on the United States, to protect its friends and interests in 

the world. As in other military realms, sensible planning advocates a wide 

margin for error. In the nuclear realm specifically, that wide margin prevents any 

country from believing they could disarm our second strike capability or foreclose 

our military options. 
64 
65 
66 

t'/J.894 P.V3 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFOR~t~T10N 

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appearing bt!funl HOllse committees to include in thell' wrh:ten statl!ments a t,UlTieulum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of B.1.y federal contracts or grall\$ 

{including subcontracti lind 5ubgmntsj received during the current and two previ"\J~ 

fIScal years either by the witness or by all r.ntity repte;entcd by the "'~tntl'l~. TIlls form is 

intended 10 assi£! witne~ses ap'learing before the HO\lse Armed Services Committee ill 

oomplying with the House rule. Ple~se· !lote tha! a copy oftbese SUltelOOnts, ",1th 

appropriate redactlollS to pl'Otect·tlw witness's personlll jlIivlIcy (iroeludll'lg home address 

and phone number) 'will be made publicly aVllllable in electronic funn not later than one 

day after !he witness's apperu:ance before the committee, 

WitnelsDall'le:~ 

Capadty In whlcb appearing: (che<:k one) 

,lLlndividulll 

If appearing in a representlltivc eapa.tity, name I)f tbe company, assadation or o,her 

entity being represented: 

FISCAL YEAR l(}ll 

federal grant(s} I federal agency doUIU' value subject(s} of contract or 

contracts gl'l'Int 

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FlSC4.L YEAR 2010 

I f~derlll gtant($) I federal agency 

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67 

nSCAL YEAR 2l)ll9 

I Federal grant(s)/ f~deral agency dollar v OlIn!!! subjl!d(g) of contract or 

~onlTads grant 

fV"'>.I-..<>. 

." "~ 

Federal Contl"llct infmmalion: {fyou or the entity you represent before !he Committee 

Oil Armed Services has c01ltracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please pro"ide the follov.ing inlonnatioll; 

Number of colltracts (including $ubeonuacts) "'~th rite !l;deral govenun.ent: 

Federal a!!encies mlh which fe<krsl contracts are held: 

CutTenl fiscal yoor (2011): ____________ _ 

Fiscal year 2010: Flsc.al year 2009:------------------' 

List of subjects offederal cOllllact(s) (for example, ship COIl~truCtlOll, aircr~fI pru1$ 

manufactUring, softwl'll'e d0Sign, force structure CIlllilultlut!, architecture & engineering 

serviee$, etc,): 
68 

Ii ederal Grant Lnformation: If Y Oil or the entity you repreoont Wore· the Committee 011 

Anued Services ha$ Jltat:l~ (including sllbgrantsJ with !l!l~ federal goverrune·nt, please 

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(2011)' ___________ , 

risen! year2009: ________ ~ 

List of subjects offederal grants(s) (fur example, materials relleilt(h, sodological study, 

somv= design, etc.), 

Fi.scal F~a!J·"~c~~:,·----------------~-~--------,~-, yeM' 2009: _________________ _ 

C\ll'I'ellt fiscal, year (2011); ______ ~ _____ _ Fi$cal ycarlOlO' _______________ _ 

Fisc~l j'e~ Za09: ____________ ~ ____ , 
69 

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament: What's the Connection and What does it 

Mean for U.s. Security and Obama Adminish"ation Policy? 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

U.s. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 

August 1, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez and Members of the 

Subcommittee. 

It is as always an honor to appear before a distinguished Congressional 

Committee. Many of our important national debates are played out before 

committees of the Congress. In my personal judgment nuclear policy has 

received too little attention in open public hearings by the Congress. Thus I 

commend the Subcommittee for this hearing. 

I am a substitute witness for Professor Scott Sagan so my testimony is 

additive to his. Scott has submitted an excellent paper to the Committee and I 

endorse it in its entirety. My objective will not be to repeat what Dr. Sagan has 

already said but to introduce some other thoughts. 

First I have noticed that there is an impression among some that it was 

President Obama that first adopted the policy of seeking a nuclear weapon free 

15 
70 

world. That is not the case. All during the Cold War and for years afterward 

one could not mention the concept of the elimination of nuclear weapons 

without being laughed out of the room. However, President Ronald Reagan 

made no secret of his passionate commitment to it. Perhaps no one believed that 

he really meant it yet he and General Secretary Gorbachev nearly negotiated 

such an agreement at the Reykjavik summit meeting in 1986. 

As the years after the failure to achieve such an agreement at Reykjavik 

passed and world disorder and access to dangerous technologies became more 

threatening, concern about the mere existence of nuclear weapons began to 

increase. Finally, four senior American statesmen: former U.s. Secretary of State 

George Shultz; former U.s. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; former u.s. 

Secretary of Defense William Perry; and former Chairman of the U.s. Senate 

Armed Services committee Sam Nunn decided to do something about this on the 

20th anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting. This so called Gang of Four 

vigorously advocated/reviewing President Reagan's dream of nuclear 

disarmament in op-ed articles published in the Wall Street Journal in January, 

2007 and January, 2008. In the 2007 Article the four authors said the following 

"Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during 

the Cold War because they were a measure of deterrence. The end of the Cold 

War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet - American deterrence obsolete. 

Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard 

,\n,bac;sa.dnr 
71 

to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose is 

becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective . 

... . Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the 

u.s. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more 

precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly 

than was Cold War deterrence . 

.. .. Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, 

which he considered to be 'totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing 

but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization' ... The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons .... What 

should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at 

Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be 

launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete 

stages .... Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and 

practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be 

perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with American's moral heritage .... We 

endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working 

energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.. .. " 
72 

The American president subsequently endorsed this policy. The Russian 

president also has endorsed this policy. A number of other world leaders have 

done the same. The entry into force of the New START Treaty and the two 

successful Nuclear Security Summits are significant, practical, concrete steps 

toward achieving the goal of the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons of 

the type envisioned by the four authors. 

President John F. Kennedy truly believed that there was a serious risk that 

nuclear weapons were destined to sweep all over the world. In March of 1963 in 

response to a reporter's question at a news conference, he said, "Personally, I am 

haunted by the feeling that by 1970 ... there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 

4 and by 1975, 15 or 20 .... I would regard that as the greatest possible danger 

and hazard." He spent much of his presidency pursuing the cause of 

nonproliferation. President Kennedy had been told by the outgoing Secretary of 

State, Christian Herter, in December of 1960 that nuclear weapons would spread 

to additional countries and that the most likely next nuclear weapon states were 

India and Israel. He took this very seriously. 

If such anticipated proliferation had in fact happened, there could be 

significantly more than two dozen nuclear weapon states in the world today, 

with nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals. Dr. Mohamed El 

Baradei, the distinguished former Director General of the International Atomic 

:\Improjiicralinn arh1 
73 

Energy Agency was quoted in 2004 in a speech in Washington DC, as follows, 

"The danger is so imminent. .. not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear 

weapons but also terrorists getting their hands on some of these nuclear 

materials- uranium or plutonium." Director General El Baradei also stated in a 

presentation that year to the IAEA General Conference that more than 40 

countries perhaps now have the capability to build nuclear weapons. Thus, if 

such proliferation had taken place, under the circumstances with that many 

nuclear weapon states in existence, potentially every significant conflict could 

have brought with it the risk of going nuclear, and it might have become 

extremely difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist 

organizations. 

However, in 1965 the UN General Assembly took up the subject of 

nonproliferation. A Resolution was passed which over the next few years proved 

to be the blueprint of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, The NPT. Among 

other things this Resolution called for "balanced obligations" between nuclear 

weapon and non-nuclear weapon states in the treaty to be negotiated. The NPT 

was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, and came to be recognized as 

the principal reason- along with the parallel extended deterrence policies of the 

United States and the Soviet Union- that President Kennedy's darkest 

nightmares have thus far not been realized. Beyond the five nuclear weapon 

states recognized by the NPT, to date, only four nations have acquired nuclear 

\,\'hc1l's til\' CC'lHwclion ,md \'dldt (hK'S il \jcdn for C'.". ,,c··,·un"· 

Obdm" i\dmiH1~tl'ali(\n l\,licY; 

,\Ugllst 
74 

weapons - two of them - India and Israel, were virtually there in 1970 - the date 

of entry into force of the NPT. This is far from what President Kennedy feared. 

But the success of the NPT was no accident. It was based on a carefully 

crafted central bargain which incorporated the "balanced obligations" concept. 

In exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapon states (today more 

than 180 nations, most of the world) not to acquire nuclear weapons and to 

submit to international safeguards to verify compliance with this commitment, 

the NPT nuclear weapon states pledged unfettered access to peaceful nuclear 

technologies and undertook to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations 

aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It is this central 

bargain that for the last four decades has formed the central underpinnings of the 

international nonproliferation regime. 

However, one of the principal problems with all this has been that the 

NPT nuclear weapon states have never fully delivered on the disarmament part 

of this bargain. The essence of the disarmament commitment in 1970 and 

thereafter was that pending the eventual elimination of nuclear weapon arsenals 

the nuclear weapon states would: agree to a treaty prohibiting all nuclear 

weapon tests, that is a comprehensive nuclear test ban; negotiate an agreement 

prohibiting the further production of nuclear bomb explosive material; 
75 

undertake obligations to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals; and give 

legally binding commitments that they would never use nuclear weapons 

against NPT non-nuclear weapon states. However much of these disarmament 

elements of the NPT basic bargain have not been accomplished forty years later. 

But the NPT is essentially a strategic international political bargain which 

should be observed, it is not a gift from the non-nuclear weapon states. 

Therefore, few deny that today the NPT is in crisis. The question is how long can 

it remain viable as an unbalanced treaty with an important part of its basic 

bargain unrealized and a significant part unraveling as North Korea and Iran 

pursue the bomb. It is true that the norm of nonproliferation runs deep after 

forty years. It may be that the NPT can limp along for some years with only 

limited further proliferation or maybe not. But if the NPT ever fails today's 

security situation will seem like paradise by contrast. 

Recognizing this vulnerability of the NPT, and with the end of the Cold 

War accompanied by the potential spread of nuclear weapon technology to failed 

and failing states and international terrorist organizations, serious efforts have 

began to attempt to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called 

for in the NPT, led by the four authors as outlined above. 

Ir P,tgc 7 or 1:') 
76 

Since the mid-twentieth century almost all American presidents have 

placed arms control and nonproliferation policy high on their agendas. 

President Eisenhower considered his failure to achieve a nuclear test ban his 

greatest disappointment. The NPT, was signed on President Johnson's watch. 

President Nixon oversaw the negotiation of the SALT I Agreements and the 

beginning of the SALT II Treaty process. The SALT II process was continued 

under President Ford and concluded under President Carter. President Carter 

also attempted to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban which was finally 

concluded under President Clinton's leadership. President Reagan advocated 

the abolition of all nuclear weapons and completed the medium range nuclear 

missile Treaty. The most successful arms control President was President George 

H. W. Bush. His Administration concluded four major arms control treaties 

during his four years as president: the START I Treaty, the START II Treaty, the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Chemical Weapons 

Convention. No other president completed more than one. Thus, nuclear arms 

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament negotiations have been at the center 

of U.s. foreign policy for much of the last 50 years. 

But explicitly prompted by the four authors, who met with him in 2009, 

no president has spoken out more eloquently and in such a comprehensive way 

as did President Obama in Prague last ApriL He declared his strong support for 

l.lbdll1.d < \dmini~h"ation 1 "nlkv ? 
77 

a replacement START Treaty to be followed by deeper cuts in nuclear weapons 

leading to a multilateral nuclear weapon reduction negotiation involving all of 

the nuclear weapon states. He reiterated his support for u.s. ratification and 

entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and 

confirmed his support for a process leading to a nuclear weapon free world. He 

underscored his commitment to the sh·engthening of the NPT, along with 

measures to do more to safeguard fissile material around the world. And he 

urged the prompt negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. 

But of very great importance is the CTBT as an essential part of the basic 

bargain of the NPT. The NPT, the central international agreement underlying 

international peace and security in today's world, again is a strategic bargain 

built on a fundamental arrangement, nuclear nonproliferation for most of the 

world in exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapon 

disarmament to be undertaken by the five NPT recognized nuclear weapon 

states, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The 

principal quid for the quo of most nations of the world to never acquire nuclear 

weapons is the test ban. It is the only arms control agreement explicitly 

mentioned in the NPT, in preambular clause ten, and it is the most significant 

commitment made by the nuclear weapon states to bring the necessary political 

balance to the NPT. Such balance for the NPT was first called for by the General 
78 

Assembly Resolution in 1965, which was introduced by Sweden and India and, 

which led to the negotiation of the NPT. Thus, in 1968, at the time of NPT 

signature (Treaty entry into force was in 1970) as well as in 1995 when the NPT 

was made a permanent treaty, the undertaking of the nuclear weapon states to 

conclude a CTBT in the near future was essential to close the deal. Indeed 

without the commitment to the CTBT, permanent extension would not have been 

possible in 1995 and without it we could be faced with a possible NPT expiration 

in a few years. The non-nuclear weapon states understood in 1968, as well as in 

1995, that, whereas nuclear weapon reductions are important and achievable, 

nuclear weapon elimination is a longer-term goal. But in exchange for their 

commitment never to have nuclear weapons, in their view at least, the NPT 

nuclear weapon states at least could stop the testing of nuclear weapons. The 

1995 Statement of Principles which accompanied NPT indefinite extension and 

which the political price for NPT permanent extension explicitly called for the 

negotiation of a CTBT in one year, that is, by the end of 1996. 

This deadline was met and the CTBT was signed in September 1996 with 

the United States as the first signatory. The Treaty provides by its terms that it 

will enter into force upon ratification by the 44 states that had nuclear facilities 

on their territory and were members of the Conference on Disarmament in 1996. 

Thirty-seven of those states have now ratified the CTBT and most of the rest are 

1'o1ge 10 of 15 
79 

waiting upon ratification by the United States. However, the u.s. Senate rejected 

the CTBT in 1999 and there has been no progress in the u.S. since. Yet this 

Treaty is essential to the long-term viability of the NPT, the existence of which is 

the principal reason that President Kennedy's nightmares of nuclear weapon 

proliferation have not happened. The NPT may not be able to survive as a viable 

regime without CTBT entry into force in the reasonably near future. 

However, the debate today is to a large degree focused on the threats to 

the NPT and international security posed by nuclear programs of North Korea 

and Iran. They are both very serious. North Korea has withdrawn from the 

NPT, built in the range of 10-12 nuclear weapons, established programs of both 

plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment to achieve further nuclear 

weapon capability, conducted ballistic missile tests and carried out two nuclear 

weapon tests - one a failure and one partly successful. In the process of doing all 

this North Korea threatens both the viability of the NPT and its neighbors in 

Northeast Asia. Iran appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapon capability from 

within the NPT. This program has created a major security problem for the 

world community. Should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile likely the 

result would be the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle 

East thereby destroying the NPT and creating a truly grave and long-lasting 

international security crisis. It is important to exert a major effort to resolve these 

two problems. 
80 

The North Korean program stretches far back into history but by 2000 this 

problem was largely solved. The Agreed Framework, which had stopped the DPRK 

plutonium bomb program, was in place. North Korea had done virtually nothing with 

the uranium bomb technology acquired clandestinely from Pakistan's Great 

Proliferator, A.Q. Khan. The DPRK had offered to permanently halt its missile program 

and had suggested that a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War was possible. 

But the following year this progress was not pursued by the United States. The Agreed 

Framework was abandoned. North Korea began developing its uranium bomb 

capability. The missile deal was terminated. Soon, in 2003, the DPRK withdrew from 

the NPT, conducted two reprocessing campaigns for plutonium, and built 10-12 nuclear 

weapons and carried out two tests. In 2010 North Korea unveiled a brand new uranium 

enrichment plant, perhaps superior to anything Iran has. After the second test the 

DPRK declared it was a nuclear weapon state. Missile tests continued. After all of this 

it may be difficult for North Korea to give up its now acquired, in their eyes, nuclear 

weapon status. 

The Iranian program also goes back many decades to the time of the Shah. But 

the West had its chances to bring it under control. First in 1997, after the liberal 

President Mohammad Khatami was elected there was a window when negotiations 

might have been possible. Three years later, the Clinton Administration did try by 

offering major trade concessions but apparently it was too little, too late. 

I)ic"c1rm,\l1wnt 
81 

The second chance came in the fall of 2001. On September 12, 2001 the whole world 

was with the u.s. It was a unique historic moment and opportunity. Iran believed it 

must respond to this, the Supreme Leader, Iran's President and others made statements 

to the effect that was no reason the u.s. and Iran could not work together and 

encouraged American investment in Iran. That fall Iran urged its Shia allies in 

Afghanistan to work with the Northern Alliance and the U.s.; Iran gave the u.s. a land 

supply route into Afghanistan across Iranian territory; it offered to return downed U.s. 

fliers; it helped greatly with the establishment of the Karzai government at the 

conference in Bonn and pledged $350 million to the new government. But this came to 

naught. 

The third and last chance came in April, 2003. After u.s. forces swept into 

Baghdad, Iran feared it might be next and decided to offer the u.s. a grand bargain, 

reportedly explicitly agreed to by the Supreme Leader. Iran offered to cease support of 

Islamic Jihad and Hamas and disarm Hezbollah, support the Saudi Palestine peace plan 

in the course of recognizing Israel and supporting the two state solution. Iran offered to 

open up its nuclear program to round the clock inspection and to permit direct U.S. 

involvement; there would be a united front against all terrorist organizations, especially 

Al-Qaeda. Iran would work with the u.s. to create a stable, democratic, secular 

government in Iraq. In return [ran wanted sanctions lifted, the right to claim war 

reparations from Iraq from the 1980-88 war, a recognition of their right to nuclear, 

chemical and biological technology consistent with existing treaties, and 

15 
82 

acknowledgement of [ran's "legitimate security interests", all, as they said, in a 

"dialogue of mutual respect." It is not certain that this was a serious proposal but the 

u.s. never answered it to find out. 

Iran's actions in negotiations, with various combinations of states, e.g., the EU 

Three (the U.K., France and Germany); the P-5 plus 1 (the U.N. Security Council 

permanent five with the addition of Germany), ever since probably has been tactical, 

not strategic. However, the negotiations presently going on between the P-5 plus 1 and 

Iran may hold promise only time will tell. 

As the four authors indicated, the U.s. soon may enter a new nuclear era that will 

be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly 

than was Cold War deterrence. As Paul Nitze indicated in his 1999 op-ed nuclear 

weapons would become a threat even to their possessors. The authors noted that 

President Ronald Reagan called for the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and they 

endorsed "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working 

energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal..." But no one anticipates that 

this policy, called for by the four authors, however desirable, can succeed rapidly. The 

elimination of nuclear weapons is not a policy for the short-term; it is a policy for the 

long-term. In the interim it is of the utmost importance that the NPT be restored to 

viability and that it hold the line for the many years ahead. The North Korean and 

\vjldt'S tJie Cnm"xtinH dlld \\'jl<'lt dOt'S it 

Ol)dTlU \'ulin"? 

;\ugw;t 
83 

Iranian threats must be effectively addressed and the NPT basic bargain set right in the 

eyes of the world community, thereby restoring the political balance of the NPT. 
84 

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. 

Work Address 

Executive Chairman 

Lightbridge Corporation 

1600 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 550 

McLean, VA 22102 

Home Address 

7609 Glenbrook Road 

Bethesda, MD 20814 

Work: (571) 730-1201 

Mobile: (202) 361-7452 

Fax: (571) 730-1259 

E-Mail: or 

Ambassador Thomas GraTlam, Jr. is the Executive Chairman of the Board of Lightbridge 

Corporation, a company which develops new types of nuclear power fuel based on high power 

density metallic technology. These fuels are designed to improve the economics of existing and 

new nuclear power plants while enhancing safety characteristics and proliferation resistance 

and reducing waste. Lightbridge is a U.s. company located in McLean, Virginia, listed on the 

NASDAQ, which conducts its primary research and development work in the United States and 

in Russia. 

In December of 2009, Ambassador Graham was appointed to the United Arab Emirates' 

International Advisory Board, helping to guide that country's nuclear energy program and hold 

it to the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation and h·ansparency. Ambassador 

Graham is also Chairman of the Board of CanAlaska Uranium Ltd. of Vancouver, Canada a 

uranium exploration company. 

Internationally known as one of the leading authorities in the field of international arms control 

and non-proliferation agreements designed to limit and to combat the proliferation of nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons. Ambassador Graham served as a senior U.s. diplomat 

involved in the negotiation of every major international arms control and non-proliferation 

agreement in which the United States was involved during the period 1970-1997. This includes 

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, the 

Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT II Treaty), The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (the 

START I Treaty and the START II Treaty), the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (IN F) Treaty, 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extension (NP1), the Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as the Acting Director of the u.s. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and for seven months in 1994 served as the Acting Deputy 

Director. From 1994 through 1997, he served as the Special Representative of the President for 

Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and 

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. 

Page 1 of2 
85 

Disarmament, appointed by President Clinton and in this capacity in 1994-1995 led u.s. 

government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of the NPT. He also served for 15 years 

as the general counsel of ACDA. 

He additionally served among other assignments as the Legal Advisor to the U.s. SALT II, 

START I, and START II Delegations, the senior arms control agency representative to the u.s. 

INF Delegation and the u.s. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Delegation. 

Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of The Chemical Weapon Convention and The 

Biological Weapons Convention. He drafted the implementing legislation for the Biological 

Weapons Convention and managed the Senate approval of the ratification of the Geneva 

Protocol banning the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. 

Ambassador Graham is a widely published author in both scholarly journals and major 

newspapers for example publishing a major article on nuclear weapon proliferation in the 

National Strategy Forum Review in 2007. A comparable article in the Baker Center Journal for 

Applied Public Policy at the University of Tennessee also was published in 2007. In 2008 with 

Ambassador Max Kampelman, Ambassador Graham published an article on the elimination of 

nuclear weapons in the Washington Jimes and an article on the Test Ban in SpectrulIl, the 

magazine of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Office. He also published an article with 

Russell Schweickart on asteroids, NASA and nuclear weapons in the March, 2008 issue of 

Scientific American. In the spring of 2012, the Baker Center Journal published a second article 

entitled the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Under Threat: Iran and North Korea. 

Ambassador Graham has authored six books. Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms 

Control lind international Law (2002), Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control and International Law in 

a Nuclear Era (2003) with Damien LaVera, CommOI1 Sense all Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004), 

Spy Satellites and Other Technologies that Hm'e Changed the Course of Histon) (2007) with Keith 

Hansen, and Endless Crisis: National Security Policy after 9/11 (2012), were published by the 

University of Washington Press. A second book with Keith Hansen, Prel'enting Catastrophe: The 

Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction was published by Stanford University Press in 2009. He has taught at many 

prestigious universities, including the University Of Virginia School Of Law, the Georgetown 

School of Foreign Service, the Georgetown University Law Center, Stanford University, the 

University of California at Berkeley, the Jackson School of International Studies at the University 

of Washington and the University of Tennessee. 

Ambassador Graham received an A.B. in 1955 from Princeton University and a J.D. in 1961 from 

Harvard Law School. He is a member of the Kentucky, the District of Columbia and the New 

York Bars and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He chaired the Committee on 

Arms Control and Disarmament of the American Bar Association from 1986-1994. Ambassador 

Graham received the Trainor Award for Distinction in Diplomacy from Georgetown University 

in 1995. On May 2, 2007 Ambassador Graham received the 2006 World Order Under Law 

Award of the International Section of the American Bar Association. He twice received the 

Distinguished Honor Award, twice the Superior Honor Award and the Meritorious Honor 

Award from ACDA. He also received the Meritorious Honor Award from the Department of 

State. 

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. 

Page 20f 2 
86 

mSCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovenunental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

J6'ndividual 

__ Representative 

If appearing in 11 representative capacity, name oCthe company, association or other 

entity being represented: 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

fed:ro:t~:~:(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract 

grant 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 

or 
87 

· 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 

Federal grant( s) I federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant --

I 

1 

I 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (Including suhcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following infonnation: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal govemmenl: 

Federal agencies with which fedcral contracts arc held: E. 

!VI .~'-_________ _ 

List of subjects offederal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc.): NOlVE 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 
88 

Current fiscal year (201 

Fiscal year 201 O: _______ ::.A"-.~~(Jn&'"·I'=?: _________ . 

Fiscal year 2009: _______ ~AaLl,'L1DAu·e __ ~ ______ . 

Federal Grant Information: Uyou or the entity you represcnt before the Committee on 

Armed Services has ,,'Tants (including subgrants) with the fedcral government, please 

providc the following information; /I//! AJi':: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Federal agencies with which fcderal grants are held: 

Fiscal year 

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software design, etc.): 

Fiscal year 

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/\.ggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(91) 

A call for global 

nuclear disarmament 

Danger from nuclear weapons is mounting. It is time to take control of the nuclear 

fuel cycle and move towards a world without warheads, says Scott D. Sagan. 

increasingly vulnerable tn theft and use by 

we,lpons are becoming 
92 

disarmament should be our goal. The COlll~ 

and plutonium reprocessing technologies. 

Islamahad. Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul 

Qadeer Khan then established an infamous 

Islamabad is aware orthese dangers and 

nations. 

The documents reveal that 

before 10V<lSl011 of Kuwait in 11)90, 

Sad dam predicted that Iraq would have 

nuclear weapons within five years. He asked 

rhetorically, "If the Arabs 

a nuclear bomb, wouldn't 

secret speech is chilling: "\Ve can guarantee 

The world is fortunate that Saddam was 

Nuclear weapons may have been a dangerstand how much the world h;)$ changed. 

The choice we face today is not between a 

world free of nuclear weapons or one with 

m,m), more nuclear states. 

ROAD TO DISARMAMENT 

armament are complex and serious. \Ve 

lack adequate disannarnent-yerification 

technology, such as techniques to permit 

remote sensing of covert weapons-related 

activities. Some allies rely on extended 

nuclear ~ us C01»-
93 

WORLD OF WEAPONS Slil<;:ethe start otthe cold war, 111IOilUrllbE?1 Qfnudei31 stilteshas rlsel1tonllle,(ldjlllgtoiegi()nillten~lOns 

12 " ·\Tl Rf \ OJ 

safer world than the one we liye in now. If we 

fail to work together to achieve nuclear disfraught with danger .• SftCf)W/£N~ i'?i 
94 

CHAPTER 1 

Shared Responsibilities 

for Nuclear Disarmament 

Scott D. Sagan 

Interest in nuclear disarmament has grown rapidly in recent years.l Starting with 

the 2007 Wall Stl'CCt Journal article by four f(mner U.S. statesmen-George 

Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perr)" and Sam Nunn-and tllllowed by endorsements from similar sets ofte)l·mer leaders fi·om the United Kingdom, 

Germany, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the support {ex global nuclear disarmament has spread 2 The Japanese and Australian governments announced the 

creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 

Disarmament in June 2008. Both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama 

explicitly supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons during the 

2008 election campaign. In April 2009, at the London Summit, President 

Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev called fi.lr pragmatic U.S. and 

Russian steps toward nuclear disarmament, and President Obama then dramatically reaftlrmed "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to 

seek the peace and secmity of a world without nuclear weapons" in his speech 

in Prague. 

There is a simple explanation for these statements supporting nuclear disarmament: all states that have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) are committed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an carll' date and to nuclear 

disarmament." In the United States, moreover, under Clause 2 of Article 6 of 

the Constitution, a treaty commitment is "the supreme Law of the Land." To 

1. This essay was first published in Daedalus 138 (4) (Fall 2009). 

2. George p, Shultz, \VilIiaffi J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam )Juno, "A \Vorld free of 

Nuclear vVeapons," TIH lVall Street Journal, January 4,2007, and "Toward:l Nuclear-Free 

World," The >Villi Jaouary 15,2008; Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Ritkind, D,l\"id 

Owen, ,:111d George "Stop \Vorrying and LC:lrn to Ditch the Bomb," The Ti;ll£.f 

(London), June 30,2008; Alexander Kwasnc\\'ski, Tadcusz ;\bzowieki, and Lech \Vales<l, "The 

Vanishing Bomb," The Moscow T£711C.\~ April 7, 2009; Helmut Schmidt, Richard \'on VVeizsacher, 

Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Toward a Xllclear~free \Vorld: A German View," 

Tribune, January 9, 2009; J\1assimo D'Alema, Gianfranco Fini, 

La J\lJlfa, Artnro Parisi, and Francesco Calogero, "A \Vorkt Free ofNudear 'iVcapons," 

Della Sera, July 24, 2008~ NIakolm Fraser, Gustav ~ossal, Barry Jones, Peter Gration, John 

Sanderson, and Tilman Ruft~ "Imagine There's ~o Bomb," The A!,e, April 8, 2009. 

SHARED RESPO~S[BIL1TIES fOR ,n:CLEAR DISARMAMENT 
95 

affirm the U.S. commitment to seck a world without nuclear weapons is therefore simply promising that the U.S. government will tiJ!low U.S. law. 

A closer reading of these various declarations, however, re"cals both the 

complexity of motives and the multiplicity oftcars behind the current surge in 

support of nuclear disarmament. Some declarations emphasize concerns that 

the current behavior of nuclear-weapons states (N\VS) signals to non-nuclearweapons states (NNWS) tbat they, too, will need nuclear weapons in the tllture 

to meet their national security requirements. Other disarmament advocates 

stress the growth of global terrorism and the need to reduce the number of 

weapons and the amount of tlssile material that could be stolen or sold to terrorist groups. Some argue that the risk of nuclear weapons accidents or launching nuclear missiles on Etlse warning cannot be entirely eliminated, despite sustained efforts to do so, and thus believe that lluclear deterrellce will inevitably 

fuil over time, especially if large arsenals arc maintained and new nuclear states, 

with weak command-and-control systems, emerge. 

Perhaps the most widespread motivation t()r disarmament is the belief that 

future progress by the NVVS to disarm will strongly inHuence the future willingness of the NNWS to stay within the NPT. If this is true, then the choice 

we face f,x the tLlture is not between the current nuclear order of eight or nine 

:t>.."WS and a nuclear-weapons-fi-ee world. Rather, the choice we face is between 

moving toward a nuclear-weapons-free world or, to borrow Henry Rowen's 

phrase, "moving toward life in a nuclear armed crowd."3 

There are, of course, many critics of the nuclear disarmament vision. Some 

critics focus on the problems of how to prevent nuclear weapons "breakout" 

scenarios in a fLlture world in which many more countries are "latent" NWS 

because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities to meet the global demand fix fuel for nuclear power reactors. Others have expressed fears that deep 11l1clear arms reductions will inadvertently 

lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging U.S. allies currently living under 

"the U.S. nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence to pursue their own nuclear weapons tcx national security reasons. Other critics worry about the "instability of small numbers" problem, fearing that conventional wars would 

break out in a nuclear disarmed world, and that this risks a rapid nuclear rearmament race by fOrIner NWS that would lead to nuclear tirst use and victory 

by the more prepared government. 

Some critics of disarmament t:1lsely complain aboLlt nonexistent proposals 

for U.S. unilatertll disarmament. Frank Gaffney, for example, asserts that there 

has been "a 17-year-Iong unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze" and claims that President Oba111a "stands to transform the 'world's only superpower' into a nuclear 

3. See Albert vVohlstetter, Thomas A, Brown, Gregory Jones, David lvlcGarvey, Henry Rowen, 

Vincent and Roberta \Vohlstetter, "lvloving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?" 

RejJort/or Control and DiJaffmU11Cllt Apfncy, ApriI22, 1976; http://w\\'\\'.npcc··\Vch 

.org/Frameset. asp~ Page Type=Singlc&PDFFilc= 19 7 51204-AvV -EtAl·· rVlodngTowardsLifc 

NllclcarArmcdCn)wd&PDFFoldcr=Essays. 

Sl-L\RED RESPONSIBILITIES fOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, A (;1.013o\L DEBATE 
96 

impotcnt."4 More serious critics f()eus on those problems-the growth and 

potential breakout of/atent NVVS, the ftlture of extended deterrence, the enf()[cement of disarmament, and the potential instability of small numbersthat concern mututd nuclear disarmament. These legitimate concerns must be 

addressed in a credible manner if significant progress is to be made toward the 

goal of a nuc!ear-weapons-ti'ee world. 

To address these problems adequately, the current nuclear disarmament 

etf()t"t must be transt(Jrmed fi"om a debate among leaders in the NWS to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS. 

This essay outlines a new conceptual framework that is needed to encourage 

l'-.'WS and Nl'-.'WS to share responsibilities tor designing a future nuclear-fuelcycle regime, rethinking extended deterrence, and addressing nuclear breakout dangers while simultaneously contributing to the eventual elimination of 

nuclear weapons. 

TIle NPT is otren described as a grand bargain between NWS and Nl'-.'WS. 

The NNWS, it is said, agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange t()t" 

the "inalienable right," under Article IV of the Treaty, to acquire civilian nuclear power technology under international nonproliferation safeguards and 

the promise by the NWS, under Article VI of the Treaty, to work in good f:,ith 

to eliminate eventually all of their nuclear weapons. '''lolfgang Panofsky, Ic)!" 

example, argued: 

Non-nuclear Weapons States were enjoined from acquiring nuclear weapons and Nuclear vVeapons States were t,xbidden to transfer nuclear weapons and the wherewithal to make them to an NNvVS. To compensate tor 

this obvious discriminatory division of the world's nations, NNWS were 

assured that they had an "inalienable right" to the peaceful application of 

nuclear energy, and the NvVS obligated themselves in Article VI of the 

treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.' 

In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama similarly maintained that 

"the basic bargain is sonnd: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons wilt not acquire them, 

and all countries can access peacetitl nuclear energy." 

These statements correctly highlight the important linkage between nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. But fi-aming the linkage in 

this way-\\ith NVVS seen as responsible tt)r disarmament and Nl'-.'WS responsible tor accepting nonproliferation sateguards on their nuclear power programs 

-is historically inaccurate and politically unfortunate. It is historically inaccurate because both Article IV and Article VI were written to apply to both the 

4. Frank GaHhey, Jr., "Peace Through \Veakness," February 16,2009; http://w"""\v\v.center 

tl:)[ secllritypolicy.org/p 17891,xml?cat_id= 120, 

5. K. H. Panofsky, "The :'\onproliferation Regime under Siege," Bulletin of the 

(August 5, 2007); http://www.thebulletin.org/web-cdition/op-eds/the 

-nonproliferation-regime-under-siege, 

SHARED RESPONSIRfLlT1ES fOR NCCLEAR DlSARMA'\-fENT 
97 

l',TVVS and the NNWS. This common description of the Treaty is unfortunate because it limits the prospects fi)r crafting a more comprehensivc and morc 

equitable implementation of the basic NPT bargains, based on shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS, in the future. 

Article IV of the NPT simply states, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 

develop research, production and use of nuclear energy fix peaceful purposes 

without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty." 

The expected global expansion of Duclear power, however, will lead to increasing demand fClr enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium arollnd the globe; 

a crucial question for future security therefore is whether the spread of nuclear 

power will lead to the spread of enrichment and plutonium ±llci-production 

facilities. Mohamed ElBaradei has been particularly forceful in warning of the 

security risks inherent in such a world of multiple "virtual nuclear weapons 

states," arguing for "a new international or multinational approach to the fuel 

cycle so as to avoid ending up with not just nine nuclear weapon States but 

another 20 or 30 States which have the capacity to de,-e!op nuclear weapons 

in a vcry short span oftime."6 George Perkovich and James Acton agree, noting that the NWS are unlikely to take the tInal steps toward complete disarmament if there are many states that could quickly get nuclear weapons material from their own national uranium or plutonium production facilities. "If 

no acceptable form of regulation can be established for the proliferation-sensitive activities that many states which today promote disarmament are seeking to conduct," they argue, "the abolition of nuclear weapons may not prove 

possible."7 

Many proposals exist for diHerent ftlrl11S of multinational fuel-cycle f'1Cilities (plants owned and operated by multiple states) or international flCilities 

(plants owned and operated by an international organization). Governments 

of many :\INWS, howcver, as well as some nuclear technology exporters, argue 

that creating any constraints on the national production of nuclear fuels would 

violate the "inalienable right" mentioned in Article IV. As Albert Wohlstetter 

once noted, it is as if some diplomats belicve that all states have "a new natural right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 1'lutonium."s 

Three important points about Article IV become clearer if one probes a 

little more deeply. First, this "inalienable right" is in reality a conditional right, 

dependent upon the state in question being "in conf()rmity" with Articles I 

and II of the :\I1'T. It is too often forgotten in the debate over the Iranian nuclear program, for example, that a state that is not behaving "in conformity" 

6. Ivlohamed EIRaradei 1 "Addressing Verification ChJllenges,'~ Statements of the Director 

General: Symposium on International Safeguards, October 16,2006; http://www.iaca.orgj 

NewsCel1ter/Statements/2006/ ebsp2006110 18. html. 

7. George Perkovich and Tames 1\1. Acton, '~Ab()li.shing Nuclear VVeapons," Adelphi Paper 396 

(London: International Institute for StrategjL Studies, 2008), 93. 

8. Alhert \Vohlstettcr, "Spreading the Bomh without Quite Breaking the Ruics," FOre{/fll Policy 

(Winter 1976/1977). 

SfL\RED RESPONSlllIl.1TIES fOR Nl'CLb\R DISARMAMENT, A l;UlllAL DEIlATE 
98 

with its Article II commitment "not to seek or receive any assistance in the 

manufacture of nuclear weapons" has at least temporarily sacrificed its rights 

to acquire civilian nuclear technology under Article IV. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decides whether or 

not a state is in compliance with its specific safeguards commitments. But the 

IAEA does not determine the appropriate response to a safeguards violation 

that is not remedied in a timely fashion; instead, it reports any such case of 

noncompliance to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly-as it 

did in 2004 with respect to Libya and in 2006 with respect to Iran-and then 

the Security Council must decide on appropriate responses. 9 

Second, Article IV refers to "all the Parties to the Trmty," not just the 

NNWS. This should lead to increased opportunities to share responsibility for 

nonproliferation and disarmament, for it suggests that as part of their Article 

IV commitment, the NvVS should reaf11rm that international safeguards can 

eventually be placed on all of their nuclear power plants and enrichment and 

reprocessing facilities. Indeed, such an agreement in principle, with an exception for facilities with "direct national security significance," was in fact made 

by Prcsident Lyndon Johnson in 1967, as a major compromise during the NPT 

negotiations.I" RcaHirming this commitment, as a responsibility under Article 

IV, should be easy to accept in principle; after all, if NWS arc committed to 

working in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, at some point they would 

become, to coin an acronym, FNvVS (f(Jrmer nuclear-weapons states), and the 

safeguard exceptions they currently maintain would no longer apply. 

In practice, it would be helpful for NWS to go beyond reat1irmations and 

expressions of principle and pick one or more model bcilitics to place under 

advanced sateguards, to demonstrate future intentions and help create best 

practices. Strict safeguards on existing nuclear-tilet production facilities in the 

NWS arc not really necessary tod"y to ensure that the materials ti'om the plants 

arc not diverted for nuclear weapons, since NVVS already have sufficient fissile 

materials from their military nuclear production programs. But placing new 

facilities under IAEA safeguards would signal equitable treatment and a longterm commitment to disarmament. Similar safeguards will also be needed if a 

Fissile Material Cut-ofT Treaty (FMCT), ending the production of materials 

for weapons, is sllccessfitlly negotiated, though in this case the verification and 

safeguarding functions would be best handled (at least initially) by a new organization of inspectors from NvVS, rather than the IAEA, so as to limit access into sensitive fanner weapons-material production facilities. 

Third, responsibilities for sharing the financial support ofIAEA international safeguards can be improved. Today, each IAEA member state pays into 

a regular budget of the Agency, from which the Safeguards Division draws 

funds for its inspection programs; but the Agency is strapped f,x fimds to deal 

9. Pierre Goldschmidt, "Exposing ~nclcar ~on-C()mpliance," SurvivalS1 (1) (2009): 143~164. 

10. Sec George Bunn, Arms Control by C(J1Umittfc (Stanfixd, Calif: Stani()rd University Press, 

1992),101. 

SHARED RESPO>;SIIlILlTlES FOR NUCLEAR DlSARMAYIENT 
99 

with the current leyel of inspections, and will be much more so if nuclear 

power continues to expand as expected and if the more intrusive regime required by the Agreed Protocol, which calls for advanced inspections, comes 

into force. One approach that has been advocated is to haye states pay more 

into the IAEA safeguards budget in proportion to the number and kinds of 

facilities they have on their soil that arc subject to inspection. This approach, 

however, places the tinancial burden only on the state that benefits hom the 

nuclear power plant or fuel facility in question and ignores that the l1onprolif 

eration benefits of the safeguards arc shared by all states. A better approach 

would be to have ail governments-both NWS and Nl\TVVS, and both states 

with nuclear power programs and those without nuclear power-substantially 

increase their funding support for the IAEA, to enhance its future safeguards 

capabilities. Indeed, it would be possible to have private industry and even 

philanthropic organizations interested in promoting more safe and secure llse 

ofnllclear power also contribute to the lAEA safeguards budget.]] 

Article VI of the NPT states in filll, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty 

undertakes to pursue negotiations in good f'lith on effective measures relating 

to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 

et1ectivc international control." Many diplomats fi-om NNVVS have complained 

at virtually every NPT review conference that the NVVS have not done enough 

to meet their disarmament commitments, and the l\1ay 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting was not unusual in that regard. The NNWS complaints arc not without some merit, for the recent Bush administration did 

not tollow through on some ofthe disarmament-related commitments (most 

specifically, seeking ratitlcation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) that 

previolls administrations had made at NPT review conterenccsY In addition, 

some former U.S. government officials have unhelpfully claimed that the 

United States neyer really intended to keep its Article VI commitments. Former CIA Director John Deutch, t()r example, asserted in Foreign Affairs in 2005 

that Washington was "unwise" "to commit under Article 6 of the Nonprolif 

eration Treaty [NPT] 'to pursue good-faith negotiations' toward complete 

disarmament, a goal it has no intention ofpursuing."l3 The Bush administration's 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was also widely interpreted to signal 

moyement away ±rom the NPT commitment to nuclear disarmament because 

the document declared that U.S. nuclear weapons "possess unique capabilities 

1 L for creative ideas on increasing the size and diycrsity of IAEA contributions, sec Thomas 

Shea, "financing IAEA Verification of the ~PT)" ~ovL'l1lhcr 2006; http://w\Vw.npcc·"wch.org/ 

Essays/20061113··Shea FinancingIAEAVcrification.pdf 

12. POI' differing views on this, see Christopher A. ford, "Dehating Disarmament: Inteq1reting 

Article VI of the Treaty on the i\on-Proliferation of Nuclcar \Vcapons," 77Jf No1tpro/~ferrttio1t 

Review 14 (3) 402--428, and Scott D. Sagan, "'Good Faith and ~uclcar Disarmament 

Nuclear TVt'apo1t.r: A Debate, cd. George Perkovich and James l\/L 

Endowment for IntcrnationJ.l Peace, 2009), 203--212. 

13. John Deutch, "A ~llclear Posture tcxToday," F01·e~!J1l4ffair.10anllary--_Fchruary 2005): 51. 

SHARED RESPO"SlllILlTIES fOR Nl'CLEAR DIS,\RMAI-IE)-';-r, .'\ (;J.OllAL DEBATE 
100 

· .. to hold at risk targets I that arc] important to achieve strategic and political objectives"; it called for the development of new nuclear warheads; and it 

outlined a strategy of "dissnasion," the policy of maintaining such a large advantage in military f()rces, including nuclear, that other states would be dissuaded from even considering entering into a military arms competition with 

the United States. 

Many diplomats and scholars have spoken about the specific arms-control 

and disarmament steps the United States and other NWS could take to demonstrate that they are pursuing their Article VI commitments more seriously. Missing from this debate is a discussion of what the NNWS can do to help in the 

disarmament process. Looking at shared responsibilities points to two specifIc 

ways in which the NNWS can better honor their Article VI commitments. 

First, just as NINS and NNWS should share responsibilities for funding the 

increasingly advanced international safeguards necessary for nuclear power facilities, the NWS and NWS should both contribute significantly to funding 

the necessary major research and development effort for improved monitoring and verification technologies that will be needed if nuclear disarmament is 

to progress to very low numbers of weapons. In October 2008, the British 

government invited the governments of the other NPT-recognized nuclear 

states-the United States, Russia, France, and China-to participate in a major 

technical conference examining future verification challenges and opportunities. Even more importantly, the British government recognized that R&D 

for disarmament verification must not occur in "splendid isolation," and so 

jointly sponsored test programs with the Norwegian government laboratories 

to identif}' promising technologies that would permit Norway and other NNWS 

to be more directly involved in implementing and monitoring future global 

nuclear disarmament.'4 

Second, f()Cusing on shared responsibilities helps identifY a more direct 

and stronger linkage between Article VI and Article lV of the NPT. Because 

NWS will be less likely to accept deep reductions to zero (or close to zero) if 

there arc more and more states with latent nuclear-weapons capability because 

ofthe spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, 

NNWS have both an individual interest and a collective responsibility to make 

sure that constraints are placed on sensitive fLIel-cycle facilities. In short, the 

NNWS should recognize that entering into negotiations about international 

control of the nuclear fuel cycle is an essential part of their Article VI commitment "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 

cessation of the nuclear arms race." 

A third common criticism of the disarmament goal is that nuclear force 

reductions might backfire, inadvertently encouraging nuclear proliferation, by 

undercutting U.S. extended deterrent commitments. In September 2008, for 

14. Des Bnnvll, "Laying the Foundation for i\'lultilateral Disarmament," February 5, 2008; 

http://W\\~\'. reachingcriticah,·ill.org/politicalj cd/ speeches08 /1 session/Fob5 UKDet$ec Des 

Brown.pdt: 

SHARED RESpO»;SrnfLlTIES fOR NUCLEAR nrSARMAME"T 
101 

example, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates declared that "the United States will need to maintain a nuclear force ... 

tor the ti)rcseeable tllture," basing this position in part on the need to protect 

U.S. nOll-nuclear allies: 

The role nuclear fi)rces play in the deterrence of attack against allies remains an essential instrument of U.S. nonproliferation policy by signitlcantil' reducing the incentives fi)r anum ber of allied countries to acquire 

nuclear weapons tor their own .... In the absence of this "nuclear umbrella," some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability.l; 

The term "nuclear umbrella," however, should be deleted from the strategic lexicon used by government officials and scholars alike. It connotes a 

ddensive, passive strategy-as if Japan, South Korea, and NATO countries were 

protected by some kind of missile defense shield-rather than the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a state that attacks a U.S. ally. Even 

more importantly, the nuclear umbrella term does not diHerentiate between 

two very difJerent kinds of extended deterrence policies: a U.S. commitment 

to use nuclear weapons tlrst, if necessar)" to defend an ally if it is attacked by 

all enemy who uses conventional t'Jrces, biological or chemical weapons, or 

nuclear weapons; and a more tailored U.S. commitmcnt to use U.S. nuclear 

weapons in retaliation against only a nuclear attack on an ally. The first form 

of extcnded deterrence was the U.S. Cold War policy in NATO and in East 

Asia and remains largely intact today despite the end of the Cold ~War. 

Adopting the second form of extended deterrence-maintaining commitments to joint defense but limiting the threat of nuclear weapons lise to retaliation against nuclear attacks on allies-would not necessarily lead to the nuclear proliteration cascade that Gates and Bodman seem to tear. Indeed, a more 

targeted U.S. nuclear guarantec, ifimplcmented properly atter alliance consultation, could have a number of positive strategic eHects. first, such a change 

might be welcomed by those allies who continue to value allied conventional 

military commitments, but feci that tlrst-use nuclear threats encourage nuclear 

proliferation elsewhere in the world. A more targeted nuclear guarantee would 

also make U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine consistent with Negative Security 

Assurances (NSAs )-commitmcllts not to use nuclear weapons against N~'VVS 

-which all tlve NPT-recognized NWS have made at past NPT review conferences and at the UN Security Council in 1995. In addition, abandoning U.S. 

threats to use nuclear weapons in response to another state using chemical or 

biological weapons against the United States or our allies could be followed 

by more credible deterrent threats to respond with devastating cOlwcntional 

military retaliation, and with a commitment to isolate and overthrow any leader 

15. Samuel \V. Rodman and Robert 1\1. Gates, "N"ationa.l Security and Nuclear \Vcapons in the 

21st Century," Scpttmbl:r 2008; http://\\'\\'w.ddcnselink.mil/ncws/l1uclcJrwcaponspolicy.pdE 

SHARED RESPONS[BILITIES HlR K]'CLEAR D[S,\RMAME;;T, A l;L01HL DEBATE 
102 

who uses outlawed chemical or biological weapons. Finally, limiting the role 

of U.S. nuclear weapons to deterrence of other states' use of nuclear weapons 

would signal strong support fix the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, 

for if such a no-first-L1se nuclear doctrine became universally accepted, the existing NWS could more easily coordinate moving in tandem to lower and equal 

levels of nuclear weapons on the road to zero. 

Such a change in U.S. and other powers' nuclear doctrine will not be easily accepted by all allies, nor will it be easy to implement within military establishments. NATO official doctrine, tor example, which has not been revised since 

1999, continues to assert (though it does not prove) that nuclear wcapons remain critical for a variety of threat scenarios: "[T]he Alliance's conventional 

forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique 

contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace."16 Interest in maintaining an expalJsive form of extended deterrence remains strong 

in East Asia as well. Ambassador Yukio Satoh, for example, correctly notes that 

the Japanese government's official "Defense Program Outline" states only 

that "to protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, 

Japan \\~ll continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent"; but Satoh has also 

recommended that the United States should now threaten to retaliate with 

nuclear weapons if North Korea uses chemical or biological weapons in any 

fllture conflict. '7 

The major responsibility for reducing the roles and missions that nuclear 

weapons play in the doctrines of the nuclear powers clearly falls on the governments of those natiolls. President Obama cllled for precisely such doctrinal change in his 2009 Prague speech, promising that "to put an end to Cold 

vVar thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy." This will require that U.S. politicians and military officers stop 

leaning on the crutch of nuclear weapons to shore up deterrence, even in situations in which the credibility of such threats is vanishingly thin. During the 

2008 U.S. election primary campaign, for example, Senators Hillary Clinton 

and Christopher Dodd both criticized then Senator Obama for saying that he 

would not consider using U.S. nuclear weapons to attack al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan (a U.S. ally), arguing, in Clinton's words, "I don't believe that 

any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the llse or 

non-use of nuclear weapons."'B In May 2009, General Kevin Chilton, the 

commander ofthe U.S. Strategic Command, took the "all options are on the 

16. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" (i\'ATO, April 1999); http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ 

1999/p99 ·065e.htm. 

l7. See '''Are the Requirements fIX Extended Deterrence Changing?" Carnegie Endowment 

f()1- International Peace Conference, April 6, 2009; tr.ll1script available at http://w\Yw.carncgic 

cnd<)',vment.org/evcnts/?fa=c\,cntDctail&id=1299. 

18. Reuters, "Obama, Clinton in New Flap over Nuclear \Neapons," August 2,2007; http:// 

"'\'i;'\\'.alertnct.org/thenews/ncwsdesk/N02381100.htm. 

SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES fOR Nl!CLE.-\R DISARMAMENT 
103 

table" argument to a new level, threatening U.S. nuclear retaliation in response 

to cvber attacks: "I think yon don't take any response options off the table 

from an attack on the United States of Ameli ca .... And I don't see any reason to treat cyber any differently. I mean, why would we tic the president's 

hands?"19 

While the United States and other NWS should take the first steps to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, there is much that NNWS can do to 

encourage and enable new nuclear doctrines to be adopted, in the spirit of 

shared responsibilities tt)!, nuclear disarmament. First, NNVVS that arc members of U.S. alliances can stop asking to be reassured about noncrediblc military options. This is not a new problem. Indeed, although the global strategic 

context is dit1erent, Henry Kissinger alluded to a similar dynamic when he admonished the NATO alliance back in 1979: 

We must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on 

the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide .... Don't you Europeans 

keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot possibly mean; and 

that if we mean them, we should not want to execute; and that if we execute, we'll destroy civilization. That is our strategic dilemma, into 'Nhich 

we have built ourselves by our own theory and by the encouragement of 

our allies.") 

Second, it would be helpfLll if the N:t-..rwS that are not members of U.S. 

alliances would spend as much time condemning states that are caught violating their commitments not to develop chemical or biological weapons as they 

do complaining that the NSAs oftered at the NPT review conterences should 

be legally binding. Finally, those U.S. allies that remain concerned about conventional or chemical and biological threats to their national security should, 

as part of their Article VI disarmament commitment, help to develop the conventional f()rces and defensive systems that could wean themselves away fi'om 

excessive reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons for extended deterrence. 21 

The final argument against nuclear disarmament concerns breakout scenarios and the challenge of enforcement. Harold Brown and John Deutch, 

for example, have argued that "[ p Jroliterating states, even if they abandoned 

these devices under resolute international pressure, would still be able to clandestinely retain a few of their existing weapons-or maintain a standby, breakout capability to acquire a few weapons quickly, if needed. "22 The breakout 

problem, howe\-er, applies to both new potential proliferators and former 

19. Elaine .M, Grossman, "L:,S, General Reserves Right to Use force, Even ~udcar, in Response 

to Cybcr Attack," Global Security Ncwswire, Alay 12, 2009~ http://gsn.nti.orgjgsn/l1\\l_ 

20090512_4977.php. 

20. "Kissinger on NA.TO," Time, September 17, 1979~ http://\v\yw.time,com/time/mag .. 1zine/ 

article /0,9171,920653.00. html. 

21. George Perkovich, «Extended Deterrence," Draft Paper Prepared tlx the Evans-Kawaguchi 

Commission, lvby 2009. 

22. Harold Rnw.'il and John DCl1tch~ "The ~uclcar Disarmament Fantasy," The Tl1all Street 

jout1tal, "!\!o\'cmber 19,2007. 

10 SHARED RESPONSl1llL1T1ES fOR ;;l'CLE,\R DISAR'IA.I-IE;;T, A l;LOBAL DEBATE 
104 

l','WS that have disarmed in a nuclear-fi·ee world. Thomas Schelling and Charles 

Glaser have made similar arguments about "the instability of small numbers," 

fearing nuclear use would be more likely at the final stages of disarmament or 

after nuclear disarmament occurs, because states would engage in arms races 

to get nuclear weapons in any subsequent crisis and the winner in any snch 

arms race would usc its nuclear weapons with less fear of nuclear retaliation. 23 

These are legitimate concerns, and addressing the challenges of verification and enf()rcement of disarmament should be a high priority f()r future disarmament effons. How can a vision of shared responsibility between the NWS 

and NNWS help address these vexing problems? First, I-.'WS and NNWS should 

work together to punish the violators of currently existing nonproliferation 

agreements. North Korea violated its NPT commitments by secretly taking 

nuclear material out of the Yongbyon reactor complex in the 1990s and by 

covertly starting a uranium enrichment program with the assistance of Pakistan. Iran similarly was caught in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement 

in 2002, when the covert Natanz enrichment facility was discovered and evidence of nuclear-weapons-related research was later released bv the U.S. intelligence community. Finaliy, Syria was caught violating its NPT commitments 

in 2007, when Israeli intelligence discO\'ered a covcrt nuclear reactor under 

construction. More consistent pressure by all tive permanent members of the 

UN Security Council (the P5 arc the United States, Russia, China, France, and 

the United Kingdom) should be matched by more uniform support by the 

NNvVS at the LA.EA and in the UN Security Council to create stronger resolutions condemning these violations and imposing sanctions on the violators. 

Such a display of shared responsibilities would both help resolve these prolit: 

eration crises and set better precedents for future challenges. 

Second, the NNWS and NWS need to work together more effectively to 

reducc the risks of nuclear weapons breakout in thc future. To help deter withdrawal from the NPT, the UN Security Council could adopt a binding resolution stating that it would consider any case in which a state withdraws from 

the NPT, after being tound to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreemcnts, to constitute a threat to international peace and security under the UN 

charter. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA could also discourage fLlture withdrawals from the NPT by making all fhture sales of sensitive nuclear 

facilities subject to safeguards agreements that do not lapse if a state withdraws 

from the NPT and including a "return to sender" clause in which the recipient 

state would be required to close down the facilities and return the sensitive 

technology and nuclear materials to the country of origin as soon as possible. 24 

23< Sec Thomas C. SchcIling~s essay "A world without nlldearweJPonsr'~ in Daedalus 138 (4) 

2009) as well as Schelling, '"The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," Forei,HN Ai 

1962). See also, Charles Glaser, "The Instability ofSmaU ~umbers Revisited," in ReNPTConsrusl1s, ed. NEe-had May (Stanford, Calif: Center tc)r International Security 

and Cooperation, 2008); http://iis·dh.stanbrd.edll/pllhs/22218/Rcbllild:SPTConscnslls.pdf. 

24. See Pierre Goldschmidt, "Concrete Steps to Improve the ~onproliterati()n Regime/' ;'\Jonproliferation Program Paper lOa ('Vashington, D,C.: Carnegie Endowment fc:)r International 

Peace, April 2009). 

SHARED RESPO};SIBILITlES EOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT !l 
105 

It is often i(xgottcn, however, that there is a logical link between Article 

VI and Article X of the NPT. It will be difficult fix the existing t-,'WS to take 

the final steps of nuclear disarmament without more confidence that NNWS 

will not withdraw ii'om the Treaty in the future, It will also be dit1icult fi)!' the 

NNWS to accept constraints on their Article X rights without more confidence 

that the existing nuclear powers will actually implement disarmament in ways 

that arc difficult fi)r them to reverse. At fllture NPT review conferences, the 

NWS and NNWS should therd'ore address how best to promote increased verification and transparency and to reduce incentives for NPT withdrawal and 

disarmament reversal as part of their joint responsibilities to work in good faith 

toward a nuciear-tJ'ee world, 

Efforts to prevent cheating on NPT commitments or tllture disarmament 

agreements may iail, of course, and stronger enforcement mechanisms thereic)re need to be considered, There are, fortunately, strong logical reasons to be 

optimistic about the prospects for enforcement in a nuclear-tree world: in such 

a world, the major powers, which would include both traditional NNWS and 

new former NWS, would take violations more seriously because small-scale 

cheating would pose an even greater risk to their security than is the case now. 

Today, the existence oflarge arsenals in the United States and Russia, and arguably in other NvVS as well, encourages some leaders to be complacent about 

the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations. Faith in the strength of nuclear 

deterrence leads some policy-makers to believe that North Korea or Iran, for 

example, will be deterred it'om ever using their nuclear weapons if the current 

negotiations faiL In a nudear-fi'ce world, however, such deterrence optimism 

would be tar less likely, and all major powers would share deeper fears of the 

emergence of new nuclear states." The temptation for buck-passing would 

remain, but the faith that nuclear deterrence would constrain a violator would 

not, and new institutional arrangements fex coordinating decision-making on 

sanctions and. conventional military operations, perhaps through the UN Security Council, could help produce more cflectivc enforcement of nonproliferation and disarmament, 

finally, it should. be noted that in a nuclear-weapons-free world, former 

NWS will retain the option of withdrawing from any disarmament agreement. 

The possibility of rearmament, however, is both a potential problem for stabili!:)', if a conventional war or deep crisis occurs between two latent nuclear 

states, and a potential source of stability, for each latent nuclear state \\~ll know 

that if it rushes to rearm, others may do so as welL "Irreversibili!:)'" is often 

cited as a key objective in any nuclear disarmament agreement (for example, 

this goal was cited in the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference). Yet in a world \\~thOllt nuclear weapons, the former NWS 

would. be "more latent" than others who did not have their technological expertise or operational experience, and an objective in the final negotiations in 

25. This 

mament," 

WlS first made hy Charles L. Glaser, "The Flawed Case t(X Nuclear Disar40 (1) (Spring 1998). 

12 SHARED RESrONSllllLlTIES fOR :-;UCLEAR DIS,\RMAMEN'L A (;LOlL\L DEllATE 
106 

the global disarmament process must be to create stronger veritlcation and 

monitoring capabilities to provide contldence that one state could not start 

the rcarmament process without others observing such actions. Nuclear deterrence would still exist in a nuclear-weapons-tree world, but it would be of 

a much more recessed and latent form than exists today. 

Some arc pessimistic abollt the prospects for latent nuclear deterrence, 

believing that it is inherently less stable than the current form of active nuclear deterrence. Sir Michael Quinlan, for example, argued that "it is sometimes suggested that the very fact of this reconstitution risk would se[\'c as a 

deterrent to war-weaponless deterrence, it has been called, a sort of deterrence at one remove. But that implies a worldwide and long-sighted wisdom 

on which it would surely be imprudent to count."'" Quinlan was certainly 

correct to remain skeptical about the degree we can ensure that "worldwide 

and long-sighted wisdom" will exist in the future world without nuclear 

weapons. But surely the same argument holds true, and in spades, for a future 

world with many states holding nuclear arsenals. We cannot design an international system in which wisdom and prudence are guaranteed. A nuclear-tree 

world would, however, reduce the consequences of individual failures ofwisdom and prudence. 

The technical and political challenges that confront proponents of nuclear 

disarmament are complex and serious. It is therefore by no means clear that 

the NWS will be able to overcome these challenges to achieve the goal of 

complete nuclear disarmament. What is dear, though, is that the existing 

NWS cannot reach the summit of a nudear-fi'ce world without the active 

partnership of the current Nl\'W'S. The NvVS and NWS have a shared responsibility felt' nuclear disarmament in the future, and will share a common fate 

if they fail to cooperate more effectively. 

26. Michael Quinlan, "Abolishing ~udt::ar Armourics: Policy or Pipedrcam~" Sttrpival 49 (2) 

(Winter 2007-2008): 12. 

SHARED RESPO~SIBILITIES fOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 13 
107 

;;~~,', 

d" 

'd 

"'," 

COl\1t"UTrnE ON ARMED SI'~RVI,Ct:S ::' ,~:,~:,,; 

:;,;: :,y, 

~t$. of :!'\tIlns.'lltill:lbrz 

tlJiC 20,:;15,,\o()35 'w, 

d'd" 

""", 

;,;: ::;i:;~:, 

'W,',' 

Thc Honorable Thomas P. D' Agostino 

Administrator 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

1000 Independence Ave., SW 

Washington. DC 20585 

Dear Administrator D' Agostino: 

July 26, 2012 

,'" 

Thank you for your July 2 response to our May 18 letter to President Obarna requesting 

his Administration present its own ideas for fixing the long-standing, well-documented problems 

with governance, mllllagement, and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise. We regret that 

your response does not address the fundamental problem: that NNSA and DOE are allowing cost 

and delay---4:iven largely by administrative and structural problems-to threaten the President's 

own nuclear modenlization objectives. As you and other Administration officials have 

recognized in repeated testimony. these nuclear modernization efforts are critical to U.S. and 

allied national security, especially as the Presidcnt considers further U.S. nuclear arms 

reductions. We do not sec. how the actions outlined in your letter solve this problem. 

The many independent, bipartisan national commissions and study groups who have 

investigated this problem have all reached strikingly similar conclusions and recommendations. 

In short, these groups have all made clear that the system is "broken," that "science lllld 

engineering quality is at risk'~ at the nuclear weapons labs, and that Hit is time to consider 

fundamental changes" to the entire organization and construct. 

Your response contains a litany of efforts that you indicate will fix these problems-but 

many of these efforts have been tried in the past or arc now several years old. We do not see in 

your response evidence of a coherent strategy with a vision of the expected end-state, nor do we 

see mention of how the individual efforts you outline will help achieve that end-state. 

We also arc concerned that your response to our letter to the President is overwhelmingly 

focused on the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). As the many studies and 

commissions have documented, significant parts oHhe problem lay outside ofNNSA-with the 

non-NNSA portions of DOE lllld with external oversight agencies. As Administrator, these 

problems are outside your ability to control or fix. As our May 18 letter did, we encourage you to 

ask the President to oifer a comprehensive reform package that addresses all of these elements, 

as H.R. 4310 does. 

,',',"" 

,:, 
108 

Administrator l)'J\uostino 

July 26,2012 ' 

Page 2 

Based upon your response, we must stronglY disagree \vith 

\vill be more effective al addressing tbose issues thun e,rescripli'(e legislation," 

ora comprehensive vision or plan for decisive action \ve continue to 

lOill conllw,,, has no choice once again act. as it did in 1999 it created 

the President's G'01-eign Intelligence Board then called "a 

dysfunctional bureaucracy that has pro"ven it is incapable itself' We have seen no 

action or plan of action by the President to convince us to the contmry. 

During the past several years, it has become clear to us that NNSA is not 

the needs. We have heard from multiple senior Derartment or Dclensc (DOD) 

thai, the to dramatically do"\vn-scope military requirements and slip 

what the military needs at a reasonable cost. Further, 

through the deferral of the Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, 

\\'e sec NNSA failing to fulfill the President's own policy (as in the 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Revil'''\' rcport) to create a responsive nuclear \vcapons infrastructure. The recent cost escalation 

in the B61 life extension is only I'urther evidence that NNSA cannot deliver on its 

primary mission at J. 

We repeat the request that concluded our previous letter: "V'/e encourage 

Administration to olTer a comprehensive rcfonn package as the I louse 11<1:)-

in time for conference on this year's national defens~ authorization bilL logcthe-: to 

find the solution." \Vc belk~ve that we share the same goal: a nuclear weapons enterprise 

"",,,,hlo "1,1"""",··,,,,, the nucIcardeterrent this country relics upon as its ultimate security 

guarantee, 

Chairman Chairman 

Comrnittec on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Strakgic For~cs 

ee: The Iionorable Barack Ohama, President onhc United States 

fhc } lonorabk Stcven Chu, Secretary of Energy 

rhe I lonorublc I,con Panctta, Secretary of Defense 

Mr. Jeffrey Zicnts, Acting Director, Office or Management and Budget 
109 

Slide 1 
110 

Slide 2 
111 

Slide 3 
112 

Slide 4 
113 

Slide 5 
114 

Slide 6 
115 

Slide 7 
116 

July 20, 2012 

Scott D. Sagan 

Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science 

Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) 

Stanford University 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

HEARING ON 

"NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT: 

WHAT'S THE CONNECTION AND WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR U.S. SECURITY 

AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATION POLICY?" 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to testifY today regarding the 

linkages between nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. The connecting 

relationships between these two nuclear policy agendas are complex and subtle, but real. I will 

be making three central observations about these linkages, historically and today, and present the 

evidence supporting these arguments. 

First, I will outline the strong legal and logical connections between nuclear disarmament 

efforts and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The legal requirements are outlined in Articles VI 

and IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the logical links between them ean be 

seen in the bargains that have been debated and struck between nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states in diplomatic negotiations and treaty review conferences. 

Second, I will prescnt the evidence demonstrating that the Obama Administration's effort 

to work in good faith toward eventual nuclear weapons disarmament has positively influenced 

the behavior of other states regarding three important goals of nonproliferation: reducing the role 

of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of some states, strcngthening the 

nonproliferation regime by creating consensus on stricter rules regarding nuclear safeguards and 

technology exports in the future, and by encouraging progress toward the entry into force ofthe 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which is properly seen as both a disarmament and a 

nonproliferation measure). 

Third, I will outline ideas for how the linkages between nuclear nonproliferation efforts 

and nuclear disarmament efforts can be managed more effectively. Specifically, it is important to 

increase appreciation in the U.S. and internationally of the fact that both Article VI and Article 

IV apply to nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states alike. There is, in short, "a 

shared responsibility" for nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states to work 
117 

together in good faith toward a world without nuclear weapons and toward a future with much 

deeper international control over civilian nuclear power facilities to reduce the risks of nuclear 

proliferation. I will spell out the policy implications of that argument in the conclusions. 

AI1icle VI, Article [V and the Bargains ofthe NPT 

Contrary to popular impression, Article VI ofthe NPT does not commit the nuclear 

weapons states to reach the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament. Instead, it commits 

"each ofthe Parties to the Treaty" ... "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 

relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." The 

NPT negotiation history reveals that this "good faith" language was in fact a compromise 

position between non-aligned movement leaders who wanted time-bound disarmament 

commitments and the U.S. and Russia who wanted no constraints on their nuclear programs 

whatsoever. Without this compromise, Washington and Moscow ofIicials feared that there would 

be no treaty agreement. I 

In April 2009, President Obama reaffirmed "clearly and with conviction America's 

commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" in his speech in 

Prague. [n the United States, since under Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Constitution, a treaty 

commitment is "the supreme Law of the Land," to affirm the U.S. commitment to seek a world 

without nuclear weapons is therefore simply promising that the U.S. government will follow 

U.S. law and abide by our treaty obligations. President Obama's Prague reaffirmation of the U.S. 

Article VI commitment was, nevertheless, important. It is true that all recent presidents, 

including Presidents Clinton and Bush, have stated that they support the NPT including Article 

VI, and all recent presidents, including President Obama, have resisted the calls from many nonaligned NPT member states to set a timetable for nuclear disarmament. It is also important to 

note that both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama explicitly supported the vision of a 

world free of nuclear weapons during the 2008 election campaign. 2 But during previous 

administrations, many statements by lower level officials led to skepticism on the part ofleaders 

from many non-nuclear weapons states about whether the U.S. commitment to Article VI was 

serious and sincere. For example, former Clinton Administration official, CIA Director John 

Deutch, asserted in Foreign Affairs in 2005 that Washington was "unwise" "to commit under 

Article VI 'to pursue good-faith negotiations' toward complete disarmament, a goal it has no 

intention ofpursuing.,,3 Similarly, the George W. Bush administration's 2001 U.S. Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) was widely interpreted to signal movement away from the Article VI 

I Mohamed Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trmty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, vol. 2. (London: 

Oceana Publications, 1980),568-571. 

2 Elisabeth Bumiller, "McCain breaks with Bush on nuclear disarmament." The New York Times, May 28. 2008, 

http://www.nytimes.comI2008/05/28/worid/americas/28iht-28mccainbush.13289423.html(Date Accessed: July 16, 

2011), and Alexander Mooney, "Obama says time to rid world ofnuelear weapons," CNN, July 16, 2008. 

http://articles.cnn.com!2008-07 -16/politics/ a bama.speech~ 1_ nuc Jcar-weapons-nuclear-terrorism-nuclearpolicy?~s~PM:POLlTICS (Date Accessed: July 16,2012). 

3 John Deutch,"A Nuclear Posture for Today," Foreign ii/fairs (January~February 2005): 51. 

2 
118 

commitment to work in good faith toward nuclear disarnlament because the document reportedly 

declared that U.S. nuclear weapons "possess unique properties" to deter U.S. adversaries, called 

for the development of new nuclear warheads, and outlined a "dissuasion" strategy of 

maintaining such a large advantage in military forces that other states would not even 

considering entering into a military anns competition with the United States. 4 

The perception that the U.S. was reneging on its Article VI commitment was widely 

shared among many non-nuclear weapons states delegates to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. 

This perception, valid or not, was a contributing factor to an unfortunate outcome: a failure to 

come to any consensus document in 2005 outlining the nature of challenges to the treaty and 

means to address those challenges. The Obama Administration's efforts to recommit the U.S. to 

work in good faith toward eventual nuclear disarmament is therefore best seen as a concerted 

effort to reverse that wide-spread belief that the U.S. was behaving in a hypocritical manner: 

asking non-nuclear weapons states to accept constraints on their behavior, while not accepting 

any constraints on U.S. behavior. 

What about Article IV? Contrary to the wide spread impression that Article IV ofthe 

treaty provides an "inalienable right" for civilian nuclear energy technology, in fact that right is 

explicitly made conditional on the honoring of other NPT commitments, most importantly the 

Article II obligation "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Article IV clearly states, "Nothing in this Treaty 

shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop 

research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and 

in conformity with Articles I and II ofthis Treaty." This conditionality clause was also the 

product of compromises made between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states during 

the original NPT negotiations. 5 

It is too often forgotten in the debate over the Iranian nuclear program that a state that is 

not behaving "in conformity" with its Article [[ commitments "not to seek or receive any 

assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" has at least temporarily sacrificed its rights to 

acquire civilian nuclear technology under Article IV. The Board of Governors ofthe 

International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) is responsible for ruling on whether or not a state is 

in compliance with its specific safeguards commitments. But the IAEA does not determine the 

appropriate response to a safeguards violation that is not remedied in a timely fashion; instead, it 

reports any such case of noncompliance to the UN Security Council-as it did in 2004 with 

·1 See Keith B, Payne, The Great AmC?rican Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practic{! From the Cold War to the 

Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), 391-392 and 434-435 and Hans M. Kristensen, 

"Nuclear Posture Review Report [Reconstructedl," F{!deration of American Scientists, January 8, 2002. 

http://www.fas.orglblog/ssp/united _statesINPR200 Ire.pdf (Date Accessed; July 16, 2012) . 

.5 George Bunn, Arms Control b}' Committee. Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press. 1992).90. 
119 

respect to Libya and in 2006 with respect to Iran-and then the Security Council must decide on 

appropriate responses. 6 

The linkages between nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament were highlighted 

in the 1995 NPT Review Conference in which the member states agreed to an indefinite 

extension of the treaty. Ambassador Thomas Graham, President Clinton's Special Representative 

for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, made this linkage clear in his reflection 

on the 1995 NPT Review Conference: "In July of 1993, the United States fortunately took a 

major step toward the achievement of indefinite NPT extension when President Clinton 

announced that the United States was prepared to negotiate a CTBT and would continue the 

existing nuclear testing moratorium. The CTBT had been the main NPT-related objective of nonnuclear weapon states parties since the entry into force ofthe NPT.,,7 Jayantha Dhanapala, the 

President of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, reached a similar conclusion about the bargain 

that produced indefinite extension and echoed Ambassador Graham's warnings about future 

dangers: 

The many supporters for indefinite extension clearly worked assiduously to achieve their 

goal. For their part, the nuclear weapons states did not by any means take the extension 

decision for granted and some of their initiatives probably did help them to win votes. 

Though some of such support may have resulted from the "pressure" that was allegedly 

exerted upon numerous states parties, it is important also to recall that the nuclear weapons 

states (the United States in particular) had been moving steadily in those years to a strong 

stance of support for the CTBT and, pending its conclusion, a moratorium on nuclear testing. 

Given the high priority that past Review Conferences had attached to the CTBT, such 

gestures were welcome to say the least. Similarly. the nuclear weapons states also got the 

message that something more was expected of them when it comes to security assurances; so, 

on 11 April, the Security Council adopted a resolution on the subject (however short it may 

have fallen from a binding legal obligation) ... .I therefore believe Thomas Graham got it 

exactly right when he wrote after this event, "it is important to understand that a failure to 

meet the obligations of the Statement of Principles and Objectives---especially reductions in 

nuclear weapons-will endanger the permanent status ofthe NPT or even the NPT regime 

itself"8 

6 Pierre Goldschmidt. "Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance." Survival 51, 1 (2009): 143-164. 

7 Thomas Graham, Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law (Seattle, W A: 

University of Washington Press. 2002). 261-262. 

S Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell. Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT' An Insider's Account (Geneva. 

Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2005), 57-58. 

4 
120 

Disarmament and Nonproliferation 

The Obama administration's April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) made the most 

explicit claim about the effect of U.S. nuclear weapons disarmament efforts on the nuclear 

nonproliferation policies of other states: "By demonstrating that we take seriously our NPT 

[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, 

we strengthen our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to 

reinforce the non-proliferation regime ... "" President Obama expressed a similar view about the 

potential influence of U.S. nuclear doctrine on other states' nuclear weapons doctrines in his 

April 2009 Prague speech: "To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of 

nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same." 10 To what 

degree have these claims been borne out by the evidel1ce? 

Nuclear Posture 

The 20 I 0 NPR elevated the goals of nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and disarmament 

to higher prominence compared with past posture reviews, which focused primarily on how best 

to maintain nuclear deterrence against a range of potential threats. Under the 2010 NPR, 

deterrence of nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies was deemed "the fundamental 

role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist." 

Furthermore, it stated that "The United States will continue to strengthen conventional 

capabi lities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the 

objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners 

the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons .... Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it 

would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital 

interests of the United States or its allies and partners." II 

The 20 I 0 NPR also presented a considerable shift in the lal1guage and criteria for 

applying negative security assural1ces to non-nuclear weapon states. Previous negative security 

assurances promised that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 

members of the NPT except "in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, 

its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state towards which it has a 

security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon state in association 

or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.'''2 The 20 I 0 NPR removed these specific reservations 

and linked nonproliferation and nuclear posture policies by shifting the yardstick for judging 

9 Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 6, 2010.12. 

www,defense.gov!npr/docs/20 1 O%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report. pdf_, 

10 Barack Ooama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama:' Prague, April 5, 2009. 

''lww. whitehouse.gov Ithe ""press _ officelRemarks-By-President-Barack -Ooama-I n-Prague-As-Del ivered! _. 

11 Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 6, 2010,16-17. 

v.ww.defense.gov Inpr! docs!20 1 O%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report. pdf. 

12 ·'U.S. 'Negative Security Assurances' at a Glance," Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, 2010, W\VW. 

armscontrol.org!factsheets/negsec. 
121 

applicability of the assurance to a state's record of compliance with its nonproliferation 

obligations: "The United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing 'negative security 

assurance' by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their 

nuclear non-proliferation obligations.,,13 Under the new formulation, if a non-nuclear weapons 

state that falls under the assurance-because it is in compliance with its NPT -related 

obligations-attacks the United States or its allies with conventional weapons, it would face a 

conventional, not nuclear, response and, in the case of a chemical or biological weapons attack, a 

conventional threat to the existence of the regime: "In making this strengthened assurance, the 

United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses CBW against the United 

States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military 

response-and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or 

military commanders, would be held fully accountable.,,14 

The "not in compliance" label refers to Iran, North Korea, and possibly Syria, as was 

pointed out in brietings by Obama administration officials in April 2010. 15 However, by not 

delineating a broader set of threats from particular states-as was the case when the 200 I NPR 

which reportedly explicitly listed North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, China, and Syria as threats to 

the United States-the 2010 version of the negative security assurance both limits the number of 

threatened states and suggests a path by which states can regain the guarantee. In other words, if 

the governments oflran or North Korea were to ahandon their nuclear amhitions and come hack 

into compliance with the NPT, then the U.S. negative security assurance would apply to them as 

well. 

It is important to note that the 2010 NPR docs not say that the United States gives the 

power to judge another state's nonproliferation compliance to any international organization, as 

some critics erroncously suggested. 16 The NPR does not detail precisely how compliance will be 

13 Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 6, 2010, 15. 

w\v\v,defense.gov/nprl docs/20 1 O%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report. pdf. T interpret "nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations" as referring to those obligations arising from NPT membership. This interpretation is 

consistent with comments on the NPR negative security assurance by Obama administration officials. For example, 

at the NPR rollout event in April 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates articulated the assurance as: "If a nonnuclear-weapon state is in compliance with the nonproliferation treaty and its obligations, the U.S. pledges not to 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it." Robert Gates. remarks at "DOD News Briefing with Secretary 

Gates, Navy Adm. Mullen, SecretaI)' Clinton, and Secretary Chu," Pentagon. Washington DC, April 6.2010, 

www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid .. 4599 .. ' 

lei Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 6, 2010, 15. 

ww\v,defense.gov Inprl docs/20 1 0%20nuclear%20posture%20rev iew%20report, pdf. 

15 Robert Gates, remarks at "New Nuclear Posture Review Briefing," Pentagon, Washington, DC, April 6. 2010, 

\V\V\v.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id_1355_. On Syria being a case of noncompliance that has not been resolved, see 

Samore, remarks at "International Perspectives on the Nuclear Posture Review," 5. 

16 For example, Keith Payne, a former Department of Defense official. said: "The new NPR appears to place the 

UN's IAEA and its Board of Governors at the heart of detemlining U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy options." quoted 
122 

assessed in each case, but U.S. otIicials have clarified that the United States reserves the right to 

judge the NPT compliance of non-nuclear weapon states. White House Coordinator for WMD 

Counterterrorism and Arms Control Gary Samore has said that, "'in compliance with their 

nuclear nonproliferation obligations' is intended to be a broad clause and we'll interpret thatwhen the time comes-we'll interpret that in accordance with what we judge to be a meaningful 

standard .... On the question of who determines, that's a U.S. national determination.,,!7 

Have other states followed suit? Regarding the impact on nuclear weapons states, the 

glass of U.S. influence is positive, but only halfful!. On the one hand, the U.S. effort to 

encourage other governments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their doctrine has been 

successful in two important cases: the government of the United Kingdom adopted a nuclear 

posture remarkably similar to that of the United States, and the Russian government's 20 I 0 

nuclear doctrine moved closer to the U.S. position and did not adopt the expansive roles and 

missions that had been anticipated prior to the 2010 U.S. NPR. On the other hand, the new 2010 

U.S. nuclear posture has had minimal direct influence with respect to France, China, India, and 

Pakistan. 

Regarding the UK, in October 2010, the British government issued its own "Strategic 

Security and Defence Review," which contained nuclear positions similar, and indeed at times 

virtually identical, to those outlined in Obama's Prague speech and in the NPR. The UK 

government restated both its NPT Article VI commitment and its reliance on nuclear deterrence 

as long as other states have nuclear weapons: "As a responsible nuclear weapon state and party 

to the NPT, the UK also remains committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear 

weapons .... It is right that the United Kingdom should retain a credible, continuous and effective 

minimum nuclear dcterrent for as long as the global security situation makes that neeessary.,,!8 

The UK government also presented new negative security assurances and a new posture 

regarding deterrence of chemical and biological weapons that was essentially identical to the 

positions laid out in the U.S. NPR: "We are now able to give an assurance that the UK will not 

use or threaten to usc nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In 

giving this assurance, we emphasize the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the 

NPT, and note that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those 

nonproliferation obligations.!9 

in Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: U.N. Nuclear Control:' Washington Times, April 8, 2010. 

\vww. was hingtontimes.cominewsi20 I Oiapri08iinside-the-ring-4943483 6/_ . 

17 Gary Samore, remarks at "International Perspectives on the Nuclear Posture Review," Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, Washington, DC, April 22, 2010, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0422carnegiesamore.pdC 

18 UK Ministry of Defence, "Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: "The Strategic Security and Defence 

Review," October 19, 2010, 5 and 37. 

wVIW.direct.gov.uk/prod _ consum _ dg/groups/dg_ digitalassets/@dgl@enidocumentsidigitalassetidg_191634.pdC 

19 Ibid., 37-38. 
123 

Regarding the Russian doctrine, the policies set before and during the 20 I 0 NPR 

consultation process deeply influenced the Russian government's perception of its security 

environment and strengthened the hand of moderates in Moscow in the ensuing domestic debate 

over Russia's nuclear weapons posture and nonproliferation policy. These dynamics paved the 

way for the New START, for significant changes in Russian arms sales to and support for 

sanctions against Iran in 2010, and for modest changes in Russia's national nuclear weapons 

posture. These new positions in Moscow stand in stark contrast to the confrontational attitudes 

that were dominant in 2007, when President Vladimir Putin publicly complained that the lack of 

progress on arms control was a threat to international security and Russian sales of advanced air 

defense systems to Iran (the S-300 system) were moving forward. 

Most significantly regarding nuclear weapons posture, as Pavel Podvig compellingly 

demonstrates in his article in the 20 II special issue of The Nonproliferation Review, the final 

version of the Russian nuclear doctrine, released in February 2010, outlined a modestly reduced 

role for nuclear weapons, a shift trom the more assertive Russian draft doctrine that had been 

publicly discussed in October 2009. 20 At that time, Russian officials suggested that a new 

flexible nuclear doctrine would be adopted that included a wide range of potential uses of 

nuclear weapons, including "a preventive nuclear strike on the aggressor" and "to repel an 

aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional 

and even a local war.,,21 While the final 2010 Russian posture document maintains that nuclear 

or other WMD aggression would still justify a nuclear response, it did not mention preventive 

strikes. It also restricted the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression to 

those attacks that were "imperiling the very existence of the state"-a much more limited set of 

circumstances and one closer to the U.S. govemmenfs "defending vital interests" criterion than 

earlier Russian positions. 22 

France, China, India, and Pakistan, however, have maintained their preexisting nuclear 

weapons doctrines with no signs of movement in directions that the United States would like to 

sec.23 The limited effectivcness ofthe shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine on these nuclear weapons 

states is especially disappointing with regard to India. since strategic relations between New 

Delhi and Washington have clearly improved over the past five years and U.S. doctrine has had 

significant impact on Indian doctrine in the past. For example, in its 1999 Draft Nuclear 

Doctrine, India adopted a similar negative security assurance to that made by the U.S. and other 

20 Pavel Podvig, "Instrumental Influences: Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review," The Nonpro/(feralion 

Review 18 (March 2011), 47. 

21 Nikolai Patrushev, as quoted in Dmitry Solovyov, "Russia Reserves Pre-emptive Nuclear Strike Right," Reuters, 

October 13,2009. 

22 "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation;' February 5, 2010. 

Vv"Vvw.sras.org/military _doctrine _russian_federation _ 2010. 

23 Thomas Fingar, "Worrying about Washington: China's Views on the U.S. Nuclear Posture," The Nonproliferation 

Review, 18:1 (March 2011), 51-68, and Harald MUlier, "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy 

and the 2010 NPT Review Conference," The Nonproliferation Review, 18: I (March 2011), 219-236. 
124 

nuclear weapons states. 24 In 2003, New Delhi also added caveats to their traditionally strict NoFirst-Use policy, regarding possible nuclear responses (0 biological or chemical weapons attacks, 

following the lead of the Clinton and Bush administrations' "calculated ambiguity" policy.25 

Given this past history of influence, and the improved relations with India, it is particularly 

disappointing (hat the Obama Administration has apparently made little effort and has had little 

influence on Indian nuclear doctrine encouraging New Delhi to return to its strict No-First-Use 

policy. 

The 2010 NPT Review Conference 

The Prague Speech, the 2010 NPR, and the successful completion of the New START 

agreement created incentives and space producing a positive outcome at the 2010 NPT Review 

Conierence. Harald MUller, a scholar who scrved on the German delegation, presents strong 

evidence for this test case of the positive effect of the Obama Administrations nuclear 

disarmament position on nonproliieration policy. MUlier's content analysis of the speeches given 

at the 20 I 0 NPT Review Conference demonstrates that only Iran and Cuba made negative 

references to the Obama administration's nuclear initiatives. In contrast, one third of the NPT 

parties made positive references to the NPR, two-thirds made positive references to the 20 I 0 

Nuclear Security Summit, and virtually all states surveyed mentioned the New START in 

positive terms, with Iran being the sole exception. Most importantly, the Obama Administration 

isolated Iran at the conference with the crucial assistance it should be noted, of Brazil and Egypt. 

According to MUller: 

The most impressive moment of the 2010 NPT Review Conference occLIITed toward 

the end of the third week, when Iran tried to derail the conference by demanding that 

the work of the three main committees should continue. Since it was obvious by that 

time that the committees could not achieve agreement, this was a showstopperwithout the committee reports, the conference would have had a hard time, 

procedurally, reaching a final declaration. Egypt had already struck a compromise with 

Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (the conference president), the United States, and 

others that the last week should belong to the plenary and the drafting committee. In a 

heated NAM ad hoc consultation on the floor, the Egyptian delegation leader reined in 

Iran, assuring NAM consent to Ambassador Cabactulan's procedural proposal. It was 

2.J- For more analysis see Scott D. Sagan~ 'The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine," in Scott D. 

Sagan (ed.). Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 219-263. 

25 "'The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India's Nuclear Doctrine." Afinistry qf 

External Affairs, Government of India. January 4. 2003. An unidentilied member ofthe NSAB was quoted in the 

press making a similar argument tying Indian policy to that of the P-5 nuclear powers: "All five nuclear weapon 

states ... reserve the right to launch nuclear weapons first Then why should India not do SO?'1 Elisabeth Rochel "'India 

Evaluating, Fine-Tuning Nuclear Doctrine, Experts Say," Hong Kong Agence France Press, January 14,2003. 

http://toolkit.dialog,comiintranet/cgi/prcsent''STYLE7393180 18&PRESENT~DB~985.AN~165050958,FM~9,SEARCH~MD.GenericSearch. 
125 

also telling that there was no significant NAM support (apart from Cuba and Syria) for 

Iran's two most urgent demands-namely, deleting positive language on the Nuclear 

Security Summit, and the Iranian allegation that the Obama administration's nuclear 

doctrine was even more threatening to non-nuclear weapon states than the Bush 

administration's (a position that led Iran to call for the exclusion from the International 

Atomic Energy Agency of nuclear weapon states that threatened non-nuclear weapon 

states). Egypt ensured that this radical demand did not find its way into the NAM 

position. In the end, the Egyptians apparently joined Brazil in a direct approach to 

Tehran to overcome the Iranian government's last minute resistance to adopting the 

final document. 26 

Overall, the 201 0 NPT Review Conference resultcd in a consensus document in 

which all 189 states "welcomed the reductions announced by some nuclear weapons states 

in the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines," "encourages all State parties that 

have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol," which is the 

[AEA's tougher safeguard regime that includes no-notice inspections, and "underlined the 

importance" of future discussions to create multinational control ofthe nuclear fuel cycle 

(by mechanisms like a uranium fuel bank).27 MUller's "insider" study of the NPT Review 

Conference strongly suggests that the U.S. would not have gotten this positive outcome 

(remember that the Bush Administration was unable to produce any kind of final 

consensus agreement at the 2005 NPT Review) without the Obama Prague speech, the 

2010 NPR, and the New Start agreements. Getting a positive NPT linal document still 

required the U.S. to agree to support the 2012 Middle East nuelear-weapons-free-zone 

conference (the price to get Egyptian cooperation), but without the major changes in U.S. 

policy many other non-nuclear weapons states (including Brazil and South Afi'iea) would 

not have suppOlied accepted a final statement encouraging steps to strengthen the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime. 

The Nuclear Suppliers Group 

The NPT, like most international treaties, includes a withdrawal clause. Article X, 

paragraph I states: 

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 

Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter ofthis Treaty, have 

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 

other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 

26 Harald Muller, "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review 

Conference," The Nonproliferation Review, 18: I (March 2011),219-236. 

27 "20] 0 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final 

Document," NPT/CONl'.2010IS0. New York, NY, 2010. hltp:llw\Vw.un.org/en/conf/nptl20101 (Date Accessed: July 

17,2012). 

10 
126 

advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as 

having jeopardized its supreme interests. 

This creates a significant danger because a government can legally develop a nuclear 

power infrastructure, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, and nuclear 

reactors and produce nuclear materials while a member in good standing, and then use the 

technology and resulting materials, ifit legally withdraws from the treaty, to build nuclear 

weapons later. There is no shortage of proposals to revise Article X of the NPT -the withdrawal 

clause-to make it more difficult for states to leave the Treaty. For example, an intemational 

agreement to have an automatic IAEA referral of any state that withdraws from the treaty to the 

UN Security Council for discussion and potential punitive action would provide a disincentive 

for invoking Article X. Requiring some form of multilateral ownership or international control of 

all fuel cycle facilities in the future would be a further constraint on unilateral withdrawal. Most 

importantly, an international consensus requiring that all fuhlre transfers of nuclear technology 

or materials be subject to the recipient state accepting a legal commitment to maintain permanent 

safeguards would decrease the incentives and increase the costs for any future decision to 

withdrawal from the NPT. Such reasonable proposals, however, arc unlikely to be approved 

within the NPT review conferences, because the NPT operates by consensus and has a number of 

members states opposed to such reforms, like Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Syria. Moreover, any 

legal amendment to the N PT such as the idea of lengthening the withdrawal notification time 

from tbree months to one year - would require that all member states take back the new draft 

treaty for reratitication debates, with highly uncertain outcomes. A major responsibility to 

strengthen the regime, address the withdrawal problem, and restrict the transfer of nuclear 

technologies, falls therefore on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which also operates by 

consensus, but has only 46 member states, aU of which export nuclear technology. 

An important improvement in the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime occurred in 

June 2011, when the NSG voted on new guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and 

reprocessing technologies. These changes have been underappreciated and warrant closer 

inspection. Before June 2011, the existing NSG guidelines simply called for all member states to 

"exercise restraint" in making sensitive transters. The new guidelines are more precise and add 

useful restrictions. First, the guidelines state that any state wishing to receive a transfer of 

sensitive nuclear technology must have "concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the 

supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, 

and retransfer.,,28 Second, the guidelines call for exporters to "avoid as far as practicable, the 

transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology" associated with uranium 

28 The Nuclear Suppliers Group, "Communication Received from the PClmanent Mission of the Netherlands 

regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material. Equipment and Technology," 

(emphasis added) INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1, July 26, 2011. 

http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/LengjPDFlinfcirc254rl Op 1.pdf (Date Accessed: July 13, 2012). 

11 
127 

enrichment. 29 Third, the guidelines state that "suppliers should authorize transfers ... only when 

the recipient has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional 

Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate 

safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and 

control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.,,30 

These new NSG guidelines represent a significant tightening ofthe international rules governing 

the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies. 31 Moreover, the new NSG guidelines demonstrate 

an additional way in which leaders among non-nuclear weapons states-most notably Brazil and 

South Africa-are cooperating more in the strengthening of the international nonproliferation 

regime than they were in the recent past. 

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be seen as both a nonproliferation 

effort and a disarmament effort. It supports nonproliferation by placing extra legal and political 

barriers against testing on any non-nuclear weapons state that chooses to withdraw tj'om tbe NPT 

in the future. The treaty, once it enters into force, also supports disarmament limiting the ability 

of less technologically capable nuclear weapons states to thermonuclear weapons or smaller 

tactical nuclear weapons. Here there is also direct evidence ofthe positive effects ofthe Obama 

Administration's disarmament efforts. For example, Marty M. Natalegawa, Indonesian Minister 

of Foreign Affairs, announced that his government would seek ratitication ofthe CTBT during 

general debate at the 2010 NPT Review Conference: 

After so many years during which the cause of nuclear disarmament lay inert, today, as we 

hold this NPT Review Conference, there are some positive signs. Countries appear awakened 

to the urgency for nuclear disarmament. The first steps in the right direction have been taken. 

The United States and the Russian Federation have signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START). We are also cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States' 

Nuclear Posture Review. We welcome these developments and what we expect will be the 

further marginalization of nuclear weapons. Every step forward, no matter how small, should 

give U.S. new momentum toward the next step so that we advance inexorably to our final 

goal of complete nuclear disarmament... Indonesia, Mr. President, wish [sic] very much to 

contribute to such positive milieu. Hence, I wish to inform the present august assembly that 

29 The Nuclear Suppliers Group. "Communication Received from the Pel111anent Mission of the Netherlands 

regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology," 

(emphasis added) INFCIRC/254/Rev.IO/Part I, July 26, 2011. 

htlp:!!www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org!LengIPDFlinfcirc254rl Op l.pdf(Date Accessed: July 13,2012). 

30 The Nuclear Suppliers Group, "'Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands 

regarding Certain Member States! Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material. Equipment and Technology;' 

IN FCIRC!254!Rev.I O/Part 1, July 26, 2011. htlp:!lwww.nuciearsuppliersgroup.orgiLengiPDF/infcirc254rl0pl.pdf 

(Date Accessed: July 13,2012). 

31 For 3n excellent analysis of the NSG see Mark Hibbs, "The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group," The Carnegie 

Endowment/or International Peace, 2011. http://camegieendowment.orgifi1eslJuture_nsg.pdf(Date Accessed: July 

13,2012). 

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128 

Indonesia is initiating the process ofthe ratitication of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty. It is our fervent hope that this further demonstration of our commitment to the 

nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda will encourage other countries that have 

not ratified the Treaty, to do the same. 32 

Indonesia's Parliament directly linked U.S. disarmament to nonproliferation when it 

ratified the CTBT on December 6, 2011 and its instruments of ratification were formally 

submitted on February 6, 2012. 

The most impOltant benefit of the U.S. ratitying the CTBT would be the effect of 

increasing pressure on India and Pakistan not to test again. Both nations would need to test in 

order to develop thelmonuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. 33 Indian government 

officials have linked ratitication ofthe treaty to the U.S. ratification, saying that India "won't 

stand in the way" ofthe Treaty coming into force, and observers believe that the Pakistani 

government would ratity the CTBT after India did S034 U.S. ratification could turn the current 

Indian and Pakistani moratorium on testing into a legal treaty commitment. This is important to 

hold off Pakistani development on tactical weapons and both states' development of 

thermonuclear weapons. 35 

Conclusions: Shared Responsibilities 

The United States should recognize that fi'om the perspective of the governments of many 

non-nuclear weapon states, the Obama administration's recommitment ofthe United States to 

work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, 

condition for them to take what they consider costly steps to strengthen the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime. Many governments identified the Prague speech, President Obama's 

support for the CTBT, and the New START agreement as genuine indicators of the United States 

taking its Article VI commitments more seriously. But they also are very aware that the United 

States committed itselfto bringing the CTBT into force as part of the 1995 NPT Review 

Conference decision to extend the treaty in perpetuity, and they arc deeply reluctant to make 

what they see as concessions regarding their civilian nuclear power interests and potential 

security interests based on what they fear might be broken promises in the future. Many foreign 

32 Statement by H,E. Dr. R,M, Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs Of the Republic ofIndonesia to 

the General Debate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 3, 2010. 

www.un,org/en/continpt/20] O/statements/pdtlindonesia_ en. pdf_ (Date Accessed: July ]3,2012). 

33 Sanjoy Majumder, "India nuclear test 'did not work,'" BBC Nnvs, August 27, 2009. 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8225540.stm (Date Accessed: July 17,2012). 

3.1- "India links eTBT with disarmament," Thaindian, March 30, 2009. 

http;! /www.thaindian.com/news portalluncategorizedlindia-links-ctbt -with-disannament_l 00 1 73358 .html, and 

Jonathan Medalia, '''Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments:' 

Congressional Research Services, December 7, 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf, and "Panel 

asks India, Pakistan to ratify CTBT," The Hindu, June J, 2006, 

http://www.hindu.com/2006!06/03!stories12006060305131400.htm 

}5 Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release, April 19,20 II. No PR94/2011-ISPR. 

http://www.ispr.gov.pkJfront/main.asp'?oo=(-pressJelease&id~l721 (Date Accessed: July 13,2012). 

13 
129 

governments are therefore clearly waiting to see progress on future arms control agreements and 

the ratification of the CTBT hefore they commit themselves to further actions regarding 

disarmament and nonproliferation. 

The governments of these reluctant non-nuclear weapons states, however, should also 

recognize that their refusal to approve progressive nonproliferation measures - such as the 

Additional Protocol, multilateral control mechanisms for fuel cycle facilities such as the IAEA 

fuel bank program, and pennanent safeguard arrangements - not only create concerns about their 

intentions by their regional neighbors, but also inevitably will reduce the willingness and ability 

of the nuclear weapons states to move safely toward lower numbers of nuclear weapons on the 

road toward disarmament. The potential spread of national uranium enrichment facilities and 

reprocessing facilities, both of which could be misused for building weapons, creates particularly 

understandable concerns about the future. For if nuclear states fear that new nuclear proliferators 

are just over the horizon no matter what they accomplish in the disarmament sphere. they will 

have fewer incentives to continue to work toward nuclear disarmament. 

We seem to be stuck in a situation where some non-nuclear weapons states are waiting 

for nuclear weapons states to do more before moving forward themselves on nonproliferation 

steps. And some nuclear weapons states are waiting for non-nuclear weapons states to do more 

before moving forward on disarmament steps. What can be done to break out of this 

nonproliferation logjam? A conceptual change is necessary to encourage a stronger 

understanding that nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states have a shared responsibility to work 

together toward both a world without nuclear weapons and toward a future in which the 

expansion of global nuclear energy use takes place with stronger and more penn anent safeguards 

to prevent potential weapons proliferation. 36 A careful look back at the key NPT articles should 

encourage such a vision of shared responsibility in t\\O important ways. 

First, contrary to the common claim that Article VI applies only to the nuclear weapons 

states, it is important to remember that the treaty text explicitly states that "each of the Parties of 

the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith" toward the goal of nuclear 

disarmament. Given the inevitable linkage between stricter and permanent safeguards and future 

disannament steps, the non-nuclear weapons states should treat multilateral efforts to control the 

fuel cycle and to institute pelmanent safeguards as part oftheir Article VI commitment. Under 

this logic, the non-nuclear weapons states cannot legitimately be told exactly what kinds of 

safeguards on the facilities will be needed in the future or exactly what kinds of reforms of the 

NPT regime should be initiated. But they should be reminded, often, that they also play an 

essential role in providing the conditions that could lead to a safer world without nuclear 

36 For futihcr analysis of these issues sec Scott D. Sagan, "Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A 

Global Debate," American Academy of Arts and Sciences. occasional paper, 2010, and Stephen E. Miller, "Nuclear 

Collisions: Discord, Reform, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 

occasional paper, 2012. 

14 
130 

weapons and that good faith requires constant attention and negotiations now, not in a distant 

future, toward a strengthened nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Second, it is equally important to note that Article IV refers to "all the Parties to the 

Treaty," not just the non-nuclear weapons states. This should lead to increased opportunities to 

share responsibility for nonproliferation, for it suggests that as part of their Article IV 

commitment, the nuclear weapons states should reaffirm that international safeguards can 

eventually be placed on all of their nuclear power plants and enrichment and reprocessing 

facilities. 37 Reatlirming this commitment, as a responsibility under Article IV, should be easy to 

accept in principle; after all, if nuclear weapons states are committed to working in good faith 

toward nuclear disarmament, at some point they would become, to coin an acronym, FNWS 

(former nuclear-weapons states), and the safeguard exceptions they currently maintain would no 

longer apply. In the near term, it would be helpful for the U.S. to go beyond reatlirmations and 

expressions of principle and pick more new facilities to place under advanced safeguards, to 

demonstrate future intentions and help create best practices. 

Final Observations 

The Obama Administration's reatlirmation of the U.S. willingness to honor its Article VI 

commitment to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, and its subsequent nuclear 

posture changes and arms control efforts, have created valuable dividends by leading to 

reductions in the role of nuclear weapons in other states' postures, by creating increased 

cooperation in setting more strict rules for nuclear technology exports, by encouraging improved 

global safeguard mechanisms, and by bringing the CTBT closer to entry into force. These efforts 

have not been a panacea, however, to all nuclear proliferation challenges. It is clearly 

disappointing that China and Russia and some non-aligned states have not supported deeper 

sanctions on Iran for its failure to honor previous UN Security Council resolutions. It is alarming 

that North Korea has moved forward with a uranium enrichment program and that Pakistan 

appears interested in developing tactical nuclear weapons. But the failure to achieve all U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives should not blind us to the successes that have been achieved. 

Indeed, even ifthe goal of global nuclear disarmament is someday achieved, our 

nonproliferation challenges would not be eliminated. A nuclear weapons-free world would not 

bc a world frcc of conflicts of national intcrcst; nor would it bc a utopia in which govcrnments 

never feel tempted to cheat on their international obligations. A world without nuclear weapons 

would not be a world without war. Indeed, the maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons 

would require that conventionally armed major powers be prepared to enforce nuclear 

37 Indeed, such an agreement in principle. with an exception for facilities with "direct national security significance." 

was in fact made by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, as a major compromise during the NPT negotiations. See 

George Bunn, Arms Conlrol b}' Committee: :Uanaging Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press. 1992), 101. 

15 
131 

disarmament and nonproliferation commitments in a fair and vigorous manner. Potential 

proliferators may have to be "forced" to be free. 

Nuclear weapons may have been a dangerous necessity to kcep the Cold War cold. But 

scholars and policy makers who are nostalgic for the brutal simplicity ofthat era's nuclear 

detcrrence do not understand how much the world has changed. The real choice wc face is not 

between a nuclear weapons-frec world or a return to bipolar Cold War deterrcnce; it is bctween 

working carefully to create constant progress toward a nuclear weapons-free world and stricter 

nonproliferation rules or living in a world in which there are more nuclear weapons states, more 

nuclear weapons, and more opportunities for their use. 

16 
132 

SCOTT D. SAGAN 

CURRICULUM VITAE - July 2012 

OFFICE ADDRESS: 

CISAC 

East Encina Hall 

616 Serra Street 

Stanford University 

Stanford, CA 94305-6165 

(650) 725-2715 

ssagan@stanford.edu 

CURRENT POSITION: 

Caroline S. G. Munro Professor, Department of Political Science. Stanford University 

Co-director (emeritus), Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), 

Stanford University 

Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University 

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2001 

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1995-2001. 

Vice-Chairman, Department of Political Science, 1996-1999. 

Chairman, International Relations Program, Stanford University, 1995-1997. 

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1987-1995. 

Lecturer, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1986-1987. 

Consultant, Strategic Nuclear Policy Branch, Nuclear and Chemical Division, Organization of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staft; 1985-1986. 

Research Fellow, The Center tor International Affairs, Harvard University, 1985-1986. 

Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs, Special Assistant to the 

Director and Staff Officer, Nuclear/Chemical Division, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

1984-1985. 
133 

Postdoctoral Fellow, The Avoiding Nuclear War Project, Center for Science and 

International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983-89 

EDUCATION: 

Harvard University, Ph.D. (Political Science) 1983. 

Thesis: "Deterrence and Decision: An Historical Critique of Modern Deterrence Theory." 

Winner of the American Political Science Association's 1983 Helen Dwight Reid Award for the 

best doctoral disseltation in international relations, law and politics. 

Oberlin College, B.A. with High Honors (Government) 1977. 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, co-authored with Kenneth N. Waltz, (3,d 

edition of 1995 book, revised with new chapters and sections on Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and 

Global Zero, forthcoming 2012). 

Inside Nuclear South Asia, Scott D. Sagan (ed.) (Stanford University Press, 2009). 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Dehate Renewed, co-authored with Kenneth N. Waltz, (2nd 

edition of 1995 book, revised with a new chapters and sections on India and Pakistan, 

terrorism, and national missile defense, W. W. Norton, 2002). 

Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 

Weapons, co-edited with Petcr R. Lavoy and James J. Wirtz, (Cornell University Press, 2000; 

Korean edition, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, 2010). 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Dehate, co-authorcd with Kenncth N. Waltz, (1" edition, 

W.W. Norton, 1995). 

Civil Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, edited by Scott D. Sagan (Center for 

International Security and Anns Control, Stanford University, 1994). 

The Limits C!f Sqfety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University 

Press, 1993). Winner orthe 1993/1994 Best Book Award from the Science, Technology, and 

Environmental Studies Scction of the American Political Science Association, 

Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989). 

Living with Nuclear Weapons, co-authored with Albert Carnesale, Paul Doly, Stanley Hoffmann, 

Samuel P. Huntington and Joseph S, Nye (Harvard University Press, 1983), 

2 
134 

JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES 

Arms, Disarmament and Influence: the Internationallmpacl of the 2010 U.S, Nuclear Posture 

Review, The Nonproliferation Review Special Section (March 2011), co-edited with Jane 

Vaynman (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 

On the Global Nuclear Future Vol. 2, Daedalus Special Issue (Winter 2010), co-edited with 

Steven E, Miller (MIT Press), 

On the Global Nuclear Future Vol. I, Daedalus Special Issue (Fall 2009), co-edited with Steven 

E, Miller (MIT Press), 

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS: 

"Should the U,S, or International Community Aggressively Pursue Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Policies? 'Yes' Argument," co-authored with Reid RC. Pauly, in Peter M, Haas, John A, 

Hird, and Beth McBratncy (cds,) Controversies in Globali::ation: Contending Approaches to 

International Relations, Second Edition, (CQ Press, forthcoming 2012), 

"A Call for Global Nuclear Disarmament," Comment, Nature, voL 487 (July 2012), pp, 30-32, 

"The International Security Implications ofU,S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions," Prepared 

for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America '.I' Nuclear Future, April 18,2011. 

'The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," The Annual Review of Political Science (March 

2011), pp, 225-244, 

"Reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review," co-authored with Jane Vaynman, The 

Nonproliferation Review (March 2011), pp, 17-37. 

"Lessons Learned from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review," co-authored with Jane Vaynman, The 

Nonproliferation Review (March 2011), pp, 237-262. 

"Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?" (debate with Kenneth N. Waltz), The National Interest (SeptOct 20 I 0), pp. 88-96. 

"Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation," in William C. Potter (ed.) Forecasting Nuclear 

Proliferation in the 21" Century: The Role of Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 20 I 0), pp. 80-101. 

"Alternative Nuclear Futures," co-authored with Steven E, Miller, Daedalus Special Issue: On 

the Global Nuclear Future Vol. 2, (Winter 2010), pp, 126-137. 

"Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?" co-authored with Steven E. Miller, Daedalus 

Special Issue: On the Global Nuclear Future Vol, I, (Fall 2009), pp, 7-18. 

"Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmanlent," Daedalus Special Issue: On the Global 

Nuclear Filfure Vol, 1, (Fall 2009), pp 157-168. 
135 

"Reply: Evidence, Logic, and Nuclear Doctrine," Survival, (October-November 2009), pp. 36-

46. 

'The Case for No First Use," Survival, (June-July 2009, 51 :3), pp. 163-182. 

"Introduction: Inside Nuclear South Asia" and "The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Doctrine," 

in Sagan (ed.) Inside Nuclear South Asia, (Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 1-24 and 

219-254. 

"Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations," in George Perkovich and James Acton 

(eds.) Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

2009), pp. 203-212. 

"Should the U.S. or International Community Aggressively Pursue Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Policies? 'Yes' Argument," co-authored with Josh A. Weddle, in Peter M. Haas, John A. 

Hird, and Beth McBratney (eds.) Controversies in Globali=ation: Contending Approaches to 

International Relations, (CQ Press, 2009), pp. 152-163. 

"The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," co-authored with Alexander Montgomery, Journal of 

Conflict Resolution (April 2009), Vol. 53, No.2, pp. 302-328. [Revised and reprinted in 

Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, ed. Matthew Kroenig, Erik Gartzke, and 

Robert Rauchhaus, Routledge, London, UK, 2011. pp. 294-329.] 

"A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Dism;ter?," (with Kenneth N. Waltz and 

Richard K. Betts) Journal of International Affairs (Spring/Summer 2007), pp. 135-152. 

"How to Keep the Bomb from Iran," Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006), pp. 45-59. 

"The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less 

Nuclear Security," Risk Ana~vsis (August 2004), pp. 935-946. Winner of Columbia 

University's Institute of War and Peace Studies 2003 paper competition on Political 

Violence. 

"Realism, Ethics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee (eds.) 

Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge University Press, Ethikon Series in 

Comparative Ethics, 2004). 

"Learning trom Normal Accidents," Organi::ation and Environment (March 2004), pp. 15-19. 

'The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in the October 1969 Crisis," coauthored with Jercmi Suri, International Security (Spring 2003), pp. 150-183. 

'The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," Asian Survey, (November/December 2001), pp. 

1064-1086. Reprinted in part in Forum on Physics and Society (April 2004). 

"Correspondence: Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats," International Security, 

4 
136 

(Spring 2001), pp. 193-198. 

'The Commitment Trap: Why the United Statcs Should Not Use Nuclcar Threats to Deter 

Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security, (Spring 2000), pp. 8SlIS. 

"The Origins of Military Doctrines and Command and Control Systems," in Lavoy, Sagan, and 

Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and 

Chemical Weapons, (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 16-46. 

"Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable," (with Peter R. Lavoy and Lewis A. Dunn) in Lavoy, 

Sagau, and Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkahle: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, 

Biological and Chemical Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp.230-2S7. 

"Review Symposium on Diane Vaughan's The Challenger Launch Decision," (with review 

essays by Karl E. Weick, Scott D. Sagan, and Karlcne H. Roberts), Administrative Science 

Quarterly (June 1997), pp. 401-40S. 

"Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International 

Security (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-87. [This article also appears in the International Security 

Reader, Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21''' Century 

(2010). Revised and updated versions of this article also appear as "The Causes of Nuclear 

Prolifcration," Current Histmy (April 1997), pp. ISI-IS6 and as "Why Do Statcs Build 

Nuclear Wcapons?" in Victor Utgoft: ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US. 

Interests, and World Order (MlT Press, 1999), p. 17-S0.] 

"Correspondence: Proliferation, Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International 

Security (Fall 1997), pp. 193-201. An exchange of letlers among Peter D. Feaver, David J. 

Karl and Scott D. Sagan. 

"Rcsponses and Reflections," Security Studies (Summer 1995), pp. 80S-810. A response to six 

review essays of The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, published as a special seclion on "The 

Kenneth Waltz-Scott Sagan Debate" in the same issue. 

"Toward a Political Theory of Organizational Reliability," Journal o.fCol1tingencies and Crisis 

Management (December 1994), pp. 228-243. 

"The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear 

Weapons," International Securi~y (Spring 1994), pp. 66-108. [Reprinted in part in Robert 1. 

Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The U,e of Force (SD' edition, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 

372-384.] 

"Organized lor Accidents," (A response to Bradley Thayer's "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: 

A Review Essay"), Security Studies (Spring 1994), pp. S09-S20. 

"From Deterrence to Coercion to War: Thc Road to Pearl Harbor," in Alexander L. George and 

William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits ojCoercive Diplomacy (Westview Press, 2nd edition, 
137 

1994), pp. 57-90. 

"Rules of Engagement," Security Studies (Autumn 1991), pp. 78-108. [Reprinted in Alexander L. 

George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Westview Press, 1991). pp. 

443-470·1 

"Reducing the Risks: A New Agenda for Military-to-Military Talks," Arms Control Today (JulyAugust (991), pp 16-21. [Reprinted in Reducing the Risk of Dangerous MilitUlY Activities 

(Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1991), pp.27-39.] 

"History, Analogy, and Deterrence Theory: A Review Essay," Journal of Interdisciplinary 

History (Summer 1991), pp. 79-88. 

"Change and Continuity in U.S. Nuclear Strategy" in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), America's 

D~fense (Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 279-317. 

"Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary HistOlY (Spring 1988), pp. 893-922. 

[Reprinted in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin and Prevention of 

Major Wars (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.323-352.] 

"SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy," International Security, 

(Summer 1987), pp. 22-51. 

"Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce," International 

Security (Winter 1986-87), pp.193-198. An exchange of letters between Jack Snyder and 

Scott D. Sagan. 

"1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security (Fall 1986), pp. 151-

175. [Reprinted in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Van Evera (eds.,) 

Military StrateKY and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton University Press, 1991), 

pp. 109-133 and Richard K. Betts (ed.), Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes 

of War and Peace (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 330-343. 

"Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management" International Security, (Spring 1985), pp.99-139. 

[Reprinted in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Sleven Van Evera (eds.), Nuclear 

Diplomacy and Crisis Management (MIT Press, 1990), pp. 159-199.] 

Contributor to Strategic Survey 1982-1983 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983). 

"Lessons of the Yom Kippur Alert," Foreign Policy (Fall 1979), pp. 160-177. 

"Congressional Demands for American Troop Withdrawals from Western Europe," (with Phil 

Williams), Journal (}f the Royal United Services Institute fiJr Defence Studies, (September 

1976). 

"Senator Mansfield and the NATO Alliance," Royal Air Forces Quarterly (Summer 1976). 

6 
138 

CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS: 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, co-authored with Kenneth N. Waltz (3rd 

edition with new chapters on Iran, North Korea, and Global Zero, W.W. Norton, expected 

2012) 

Testing the Nuclear Taboo and Commitment Trap, with Daryl Press and Benjamin Valentino 

(using experimental survey results to determine public attitudes about the use of nuclear 

weapons in certain scenarios) 

Deterring Rogue Regimes: New Dimensions of Deterrence in Theory and Practice 

(using recently captured and translated documents from Saddam Hussein's palaces) 

The Insider Threat: Protecting Nuclear lvfaterials 

BOOK REVIEWS: 

American Political Science Review, Arms Control Today, Contemporary Sociology, Journal of 

Contingencies and Crisis Management, The New Republic, Political Science Quarterly, 

Proceedings ~fthe u.s. Naval Institute, Survey, Survival, and The Washington Post Book World. 

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND MEMBERSHIPS: 

Member, Herbert Scoville Ir. Peace Fellowship Advisory Council, 2012 - Present. 

Member, Committee on Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel 

Cycles, National Academy of Sciences, 20 II Present. 

Board Member, Federation of American Scientists, 2010 Present. 

Expert Advisor, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 2008-

2009. 

Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) Committee on International Security 

Studies, and Co-Chair (with Steven Miller) of the AAAS Initiative on the Global Nuclear Future, 

2007 - Present. 
139 

National Intelligence Council "Global Expertise Reserve" Consultant, 2006 - 2009 

Member of Stccring Committce, American Assembly, 2006 2008 

Member, Visiting Committee, Department of Political Science, University of California, 

Berkeley, November 2006. 

Member, Distinguished Advisory Panel for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Sandia 

National Laboratory, 2000 - Present. 

Member, Undergraduate Advisory Council, Stanford University, 2000 - Present. 

Member, CAC Subcommittee on Analysis and Policy Formulation, Council on Foreign 

Relations, 2003-2005. 

Membcr, Visiting Committee, Department of Govcrnmcnt, Harvard University, 2003. 

Member, Advisory Panel on Investment Responsibility, Stanford University, 1999-2000. 

Member, National Board of Directors of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LA WS), 

1999-2005. 

University Fellow, Stanford University, 1996-1998. 

Member, Asia/Pacific Scholars Program Faculty Committee, Stanford University, 1996-1997. 

Co-dircctor, NATO Advanccd Research Workshop: "Improving Nuclear Weapons Safcty and 

Security in the Post-Cold War Era," Summer 1994. 

Member, 1995 Selection Committee for the MacArthur Foundation's Research and Writing 

Grants on Peace and International Cooperation. 

American Association for the Advancement of Science, Member of the Committee on Science 

and Intcrnational Security,1995-1996. 

Consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1989-1995. 

Consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1987-1991. 

Consultant to the RAND Corporation, 1987-1991. 

Member of Advisory Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Future of U.S.-Soviet Military 

Relations, 1989-1990. 

Member of Program Committee for Stanford in Washington, 1992-present. 

Member of Steering Committee, Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction Project, Henry L. 

Stimson Center, Washington DC, 1994-1997. 
140 

Member of Advisory Board, Nuclear Weapons History Project, National Security Archives, 

Washington DC, 1995-2000. 

Book Manuscript Reviewer: Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press, The 

Brookings lnstitution, Cornell University Press, University of Michigan Press, University of 

South Carolina Press, State University of New York Press, University of Georgia Press, 

University of Chicago Press, Stanford University Press. 

Grant and Fellowship Proposal Reviewer: The National Science Foundation, The John D. and 

Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Ploughshares Fund, The Smith Richardson Foundation, 

and the Woodrow Wilson Center. 

Article Manuscript Reviewer: International Security, International Organization, 

American Politicnl Science Review, Journal of Peace Researcil, Political Science Quarterly, 

Political Beilavior, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, The Nonproliferation 

Re"iew, Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, The European 

Journal of International Relations. 

Editorial Board Member: International Security, Security Studies, lntertlational Studies 

Quarterly, Journal o.fContingencies and Crisis Management, The N()npmliferation Review. 

Memberships: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Political Science 

Association, Council on Foreign Relations, Mayo Smith Society, lnternational Institute for 

Strategic Studies, and International Security. 

AWARDS AND HONORS 

Recipient of the Monterey Institute for International Studies' Outstanding Contribution to 

Nonproliferation Education Award, December 2009. 

Honorary Doctor of Laws, Ohio Wesleyan University, May 2008. 

Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Elected 2008. 

Recipient ofthe International Studies Association's 2008 Deborah Misty Gerner Innovative 

Teaching Award. 

Recipient of Stanford University'S 1998-99 Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching. 

Recipient of Stanford University'S 1996 Laurance and Naomi Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate 

Teaching. 

TEACHING EXPERIENCE: 

Co-Director, Interschool Honors Progranl in International Security, Stanford University, 2000-

9 
141 

2002,2003-2005,2007-2008. 

Department of Political Science Stanford Universitv (] 987-present): PS 014 "Ethics and War," 

PS 034 Intcrschool Honors Program in Intcrnational Security, PS IIOB "Strategy, War, and 

Politics," PS 114S "International Security in a Changing World," PS 143H "Strategic Studies," 

PS 145J "American Foreign Policy," PS 243A "International Relations Theory," PS 243B 

"Theoretical Issues in International Security," PS 142S "Managing Hazardous Technologies," PS 

138A "Advanced Study in International Security," PS 332 "Decision-Making," PS 301 "Case 

Studies, Comparative Methodology, and Theory Development," PS 310A, B, and C 

"International Relations Theory (Parts I, II, and !II)," SC (Sophomore College) 220 "The Face of 

Battle." 

Department of Governmcnt Harvard University (1986-1987): 

Gov 1790 "U.S. Foreign Policy," Gov 1745 "Strategy, Politics and Anns Control," Gov 90 "The 

Makers of Modern Strategy." 

PhD DISSERT A nON COMMITTEES CHAIRED (OR CO-CHAIRED) 

1. John Arquilla - Theory of Inlerstate War, 1991 

2. Nora Bensahel -The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Militmy Cooperation, 1999 

3. Tanisha Faza1 - Born to Lose and Doomed to Survive: Slate Death and Survival in 

the International System, 200 I. Winner of the 2002 Helen Dwight Reed Award. 

4. Taylor Fravel - The Long March to Peace: Explaining China's Settlement of 

Territorial Disputes, 2003 

5. Ron Hassner- The Path to Indivisibility: The Role of Ideas in the Resolution 

of1ntractable Territorial Disputes, 2004 

6. Alexander Montgomery - Social Action, Rogue Reaction: US Post-Cold War 

Nuclear Counterproliferation Strategies, 2006 

7. Todd Seehser - Winning Without a Fight: Power. Reputation, and Compel/ent Threats 

in International Crises, 2007 

8. Jacob Shapiro - The Terrorist's Challenge: Security, Efficiency, Control,2007 

9. Bryan Price - Removing the Devil You Know: Unraveling the Puzzle Behind Decapitation 

Effectiveness and Terrorist Group Duration, 2009. 

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Japan Foundation Center for Global 

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"Improving Nuclear Safety and Security After Disasters" 

1/1112 311113 Naval Postgraduate School 

"Deterring Rogue Regime: Rethinking Deterrence Theory and Practice" 

9/1111 8/31115 MacAlihur Foundation 

"Nuclear Security in a Changing World" 

10 

Principal Investigator 

$135,029 

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$2,000,000 
142 

101111 0 ~ 9/30112 Carnegie Corporation 

"Knowledge to Make a More Cooperative World" 

51 III 0 9/30111 Hewlett Foundation 

"The International Impact of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review" 

1011108 9/30/10 Carnegie Corporation 

"Knowledge to Make a More Secure World" 

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I 010 I 106 ~ 9/30108 Carnegie Corporation 

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"'Terrorist Strategies" 

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9115/06 ~ 9114/07 Department of the Navy 

"Explaining Variation in Terrorist and Insurgent Strategies and Tactics" 

1115/06 ~ 10114/06 Department or Homeland Security 

"State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness Program 

Assessment and Evaluation." 

1/0 I 103 12131/06 Compton Foundation, Inc. 

"Global Arms Control Summit: Training the Next Generation in 

Diplomacy" 

1010 I 104 ~ 09/30106 Carnegie Corporation 

"International Security in a World of Emerging Threats" 

10/01/04 ~ 08/31/06 Nuclear Threat Initiative 

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The William and Flora Hewlett 

05/01104 -- 03/31/06 Foundation 

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Through the National Exercise Program" 

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"South Asia and the Nuclear Future" 

Carnegie Corporation 

II 

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143 

1010 1102 ~ 9/30/04 

"International Security in a Changed World: Opportunities and 

Challenges" 

7/01/02 - 6/30103 Compton Foundation, Inc. 

"The Challenge of Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Nuclear 

Security" 

9/0 1/99 ~ 8/31102 W. Alton Jones Foundation 

"Strategic Stability: China and South Asia" 

9/01/00 - 8/31101 Ploughshares Fund 

"Security Issues in the Middle East" 

6/01/01 -10131101 Nuclear Threat Initiative 

"Nuclear Safety, Security and Stability in South Asia" 

6/01100 ~ 1101/01 Compton Foundation, Inc. 

"CISAC Workshop on Nuclear Safety and Security in South Asia" 

10/0 1/98 - 9/30100 Carnegie Corporation 

"International Security in a Changing World" 

7/01198 - 6/30101 Smith Richardson Foundation 

"The Future Role of Nuclear Weapons" 

9/01/97 8/31100 The Ford Foundation 

"Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars" 

6/01/95 - 3/0 l/97 W. Alton Jones Foundation 

"Reducing the Demand for Nuclear Weapons" 

3/01/94 - 12/31/94 NATO Grants: 

"Advanced Research Workshop: Nuclear Weapons Safety After the Cold 

War" 

9/01/90 _. 8/31191 

"Accidents at the Brink" 

PERSONAL DATA: 

Born: March 5,1955. 

Birthplace: Dearborn, Michigan. 

Carnegie Corporation 

Co-principal Investigator 

$1,605,200 

Principal Investigator 

$30,000 

Co-Principal Investigator 

$300,000 

Principal Investigator 

$40,000 

Principal Investigator 

$67,269 

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$60,000 

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$213,774 

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$250,000 

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$44,567 

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Family: Married to Sujitpan Bao Lamsam. 3 children: Samuel, 15; Charlotte, 18; and Benjamin, 21 

12 
144 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

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contracts grant 

Defense Threat DOD, Defense Threat $197,637.00 "Deterring Rogue Regimes: 

Reduction Agency Reduction Agency Rethinking Deterrence Theory 

via the Naval and Practice" 

Postgraduate School 

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Systems and 

Concepts for 

Countering WMD 

(PASCC) 

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N00244-12-I-002S 
145 

Sandia National DOE, Sandia $25,000.00 "Distinguished Advisory 

Laboratories National Laboratories Panel for Nonproliferation 

Disti nguished and Arms Control" 

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Sandia National DOE, Sandia $3,000.00 Keynote Address at Nuclear 

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148 

Date: July 31, 2012 

Word count: 9,167 

U,S. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: Is there a Link? 

Matthew Kroenig 

Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University 

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations 

Abstract 

Is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear posture and nonproliferation? Using a new 

dataset on U.S. nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2010, this paper examines the 

relationship between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear 

nonproliferation outcomes. I tind that there is no relationship between the size of the 

U.S. arsenal and: the exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other 

states; the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states; and 

voting on nonproliferation issues in the United Nations Security Council. These findings 

are robust to alternate conceptualizations and measurements of U.S. nuclear weapons and 

in variolls subsamples of data. This article contains important implications for 

international relations theory and U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
149 

Current U.S. nonproliferation policy rests on the idea that reducing the size of the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal and other arms control measures can reduce the incentives for other 

countries to engage in proliferation-related behavior. As U.S. President Barack Obama 

proclaimed. "To stop the spread of nuclear weapons ... we will work aggressively to 

advance every element of our comprehensive agenda-to reduce arsenals, to secure 

vulnerable nuclear materials, and to strengthen the NPT."l Deepti Choubey (2008, 3) 

explains, "A renewed debate on the desirability and feasibility of nuclear disarmament 

has emerged among U.S. policy makers and influential people on both sides of the 

political aisle. The notion that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is much harder 

without also reducing their number seems to be motivating much of this interest." 

According to this line of thought, the maintcnancc of a largc nuclear arsenal by the 

United States increases the likelihood that other countries will seek nuclear weapons and 

will complicate efforts to secure international cooperation to prevent the spread of 

nuclear weapons. If this is correct, therefore, reducing the number of warheads in the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal is a necessary step toward strengthening international 

nonproliferation cfforts. 

Indeed, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) enshrines 

into international law a formal link betwecn arms control and nonproliferation. 2 One of 

the grand bargains ofthe NPT is the promise by nonnuclear weapon states not to acquire 

nuclear weapons in exchangc for the nuclear weapon states' pledge in Article VI "to 

pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 

1 Statcment by President Barack Obama on the Relcase of Nuclcar Posture Review, 

White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, April 6, 20 I 0) 

2 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 22, 1970, available at 

htl p ://www.iaea.org/Publicatio ns/Documents/Infc ircs/Others/infcirc 140. pdf. 

2 
150 

nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. ,,3 Again, according to President Obama, 

'The basic bargain is sound: countries with nuclear weapons will move toward 

disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them."4 Beliefs about 

the U.S. arsenal posing an obstacle to international nonproliferation efforts are supported 

by anecdotal evidence from U.S. diplomats who report that foreign governments' 

unwillingness to SUppOlt international nonproliferation measures are the result of the 

United States' failure to make meaningful progress on its Article VI commitments. 

Other policymakers, analysts, and politicians contest the idea, howevcr, that the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal has a meaningful effect on proliferation (e.g., Brown and Deutsch 

2007). They claim that state decisions on nuclear proliferation issues are driven by other 

considerations and that the details of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are irrelevant to 

proliferation decisions in other states. According to this view, foreign governments' 

rhctoric about Atticle VI is merely a convenient cover under which to conceal more selfserving reasons for not adopting specific nonproliferation policies. Moreover, some go 

so far as to claim that, if anything, there might be a negative relationship between U.S. 

arsenal size and nuclear proliferation because a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal reduces the 

incentives for U.S. allies to pursue independent nuclear weapons capabilities (ISAB 

2007). 

Despite widespread and heated policy debates about a possible arms controlproliferation link, and a large academic literature on nuclear proliferation, scholars have 

not systematically examined this relationship. Scholars have identified a pressing need 

for a systematic study on the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear 

4President Obama, Prague Speech, April 6, 2009. 

3 
151 

proliferation, but the academy has not yet filled this lacuna. As Christopher Chyba 

(2008, 27) writes, "there has been too little empirical work dedicated to understanding 

what role U.S. nuclear weapons policy actually plays in ... states' nonproliferation 

decisions." 

This article seeks to advance our scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation 

by examining the relationship between U.S. nuclear force posture and nonproliferation. I 

begin by developing a logic, grounded in international relations theories on international 

institutions and norms, linking U.S. nuclear weapons to nuclear proliferation. I then 

develop a competing explanation, derived from power and interest-based theories of 

international politics, which suggests that state proliferation and nonproliferation policies 

are driven by narrower strategic, political, and economic interests and that the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal should have little effect on nuclear proliferation decisions in other states. 

Using a new dataset on U.S. nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2010, this article 

examines the relationship between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a variety of 

nuclear nonproliferation outcomes. I find that there is no relationship between the size of 

the U.S. arsenal and: the exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other 

countries, the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states; and 

voting on nonproliferation issues in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). I find 

some evidence to suggest that the larger the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the less likely U.S. nonallies are to explore nuclear weapons, but U.S. arsenal size appears to have no bearing on 

non-allied pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons. These findings are robust to 

alternate conceptualizations and measurements of U.S. nuclear weapons, including 

annual changes in the size of the U.S. arsenal, the natural logarithm of U.S. arsenal size, 

4 
152 

whether the United States is cutting the size of its arsenal, and the arsenal size of the five 

permanent members of the UNSC, and in various subsamples of data, including among 

both U.S. allies and U.S. non-allies, and in various historical time periods, including the 

Cold War and the post-NPT eras. 

This article makes several contributions to scholarly understandings of nuclear 

proliferation and to nuclear nonproliferation policy. First, it develops two new theories 

of the relationship between nuclear force posture and proliferation outcomes. Second, it 

provides the first systematic, empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear 

posture and proliferation. Third, it contains impOltant implications for U.S. foreign and 

defense policy. There is no evidence to suggest that cuts in the size of the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal will result in a noticeable decrease (or increase) in other states' desire to pursue 

nuclear weapons or to an increase (or decrease) in international cooperation on nuclear 

nonproliferation issues. This does not necessarily mean that Washington should not 

make further nuclear reductions, hut it does suggest that future nuclear force sizing 

decisions should be based on other considerations and that nuclear nonproliferation 

strategy should rely on other, more proven, policy tools. 

Explaining Nuclear Proliferation 

There is a voluminous literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. Studies 

on why countries explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons have examined the causal 

role played by: security threats, domestic politics, and international norms (Sagan 

1996/1997, Ruhlee 2009); levels of economic development (Singh and Way 2004, Jo and 

Gartzke 2007); the receipt of sensitive nuclear assistance (Kroenig 2009b); civilian 

5 
153 

nuclear cooperation agreements (Fuhrmann 20 I 0); economic development strategies 

(Solingen 1994, 2007); proliferation rings (Bruan and Chyba 2004, Montgomery 2005); 

national "myth makers" (Lavoy 1993); state institutions (Hymans 2012); the psychology 

of individual leaders (Hyrnans 200 I, 2006); complementarities with chemical and 

biological weapons (Horowitz and Narang this issue); security assurances (Bleek and 

Lorber); lAEA technical cooperation (Kaplow and Brown this issue); and international 

inspections regimes (Benson and Wen this issue). Gartzke, Kaplow, and Mehta (this 

issue) have explored the determinants of force posture, but none of these scholars have 

systematically examined the effect of U.S. nuclear weapons on nuclear proliferation. 

Scholars have paid less attention to the determiuants of states' nonproliferation 

policies, but there is a growing literature on this subject, explaining why states vary in the 

degree to which they are willing to help or hinder nuclear programs in other states. Using 

deductive logic to analyze U.S. nonproliferation policy, Feaver and Niou (1996) maintain 

that U.S. nonproliferation policy should depend on the political relationship between 

Washington and the proliferator, concluding that the United States should more 

vigorously oppose nuclear proliferation to enemies than to friends. Kroenig (2009a, 

2010) asks why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states. 

He argues that the spread of nuclear weapons imposes greater constraints on powerfnl 

states than weak states and that this leads to three strategic conditions under which states 

are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. States are most likely to provide 

nuclear assistance to states: over which they lack the ability to project power, with which 

they share a common enemy, and when the supplier's own security does not depend on a 

superpower security guarantee. Similarly, Fuhrmann (2009) examines why countries 

6 
154 

sign nuclear cooperation agreements and finds that states are more willing to cooperate 

with friends and with states with which they share common enemies. In an analysis of 

the determinants of state compliance with UNSC resolution 1540, Stinnet et al. (2011) 

argue that economically developed states are more likely to institute rigorous nuclear 

export control policies. Fuhrmann and Kreps (20 I 0) explore why states conduct 

preventive military strikes on nuclear facilities and find that states are most likely to 

attack proliferators that are governed by autocratic regimes and with which they share a 

history of past conflict. Explaining great power nuclear nonproliferation policy more 

broadly, Kroenig (forthcoming) argues that the better able a state is to project military 

power globally, the more committed it will be to preventing the spread of nuclear 

weapons and finds support for this argument in an analysis of NPT signature and 

ratification, the provision of nuclear assistance, and responses to Israel's nuclear program 

in the 1950s and 1960s. 

Scholars have not, however, systematically examined the relationship between the 

character of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and nuclear proliferation or other states' 

nonproliferation policies. 

The Anns Control-Nonproliferation Link 

Drawing on the major theoretical approaches to the study of international relations, [ 

extract implications about the impact of U.S. nuclear posture on nuclear proliferation. 

From these insights, I develop hypotheses about the relationship between U.S. nuclear 

posture and proliferation decisions in other states. 

7 
155 

Neo-Iiberal institutionalists (e.g., Keohane 1984) argue that international 

institutions can facilitate international cooperation by providing information about the 

behavior of other states, reducing transaction costs, and generating expectations of 

cooperation among members. The NPT facilitates cooperation between nuclear and 

nonnuclear states, providing an institutional mechanism to secure the nuclear weapon 

states' interest in preventing further nuclear proliferation and the nonnuclear weapon 

states' objective of bringing about eventual global disarmament. The maintenance of 

large nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states could be interpreted by the nonnuclear 

weapon states as a signal that the nuclear weapon states do not intend to comply with 

their disarmament commitments. Facing likely defection and not wanting to receive the 

sucker's payoff, nonnuclear weapon states may be more likely, therefore, to defect on 

their nonproliferation obligations when nuclear weapon states maintain large arsenals. 

Contrariwise, the possession of smaller nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states could 

be a signal of intent to meet their NPT obligations. Nonnuclear weapon states in this 

state of the world may be more likely to expect cooperation and may be more likely to 

reciprocate by complying with their NPT obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons. 

Sociological approaches to international relations also suggest that U.S. nuclear 

posture could have a profound impact on the proliferation behavior of other states. 

Constructivist scholars (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) maintain that states behave 

according to a "logic of appropriateness," rather than a "logic of consequences." That is, 

state behavior is heavily shaped by ideas, norms, and identities. Before setting policy, 

leaders ask themselves what kind of a state are we and what type of behavior is 

appropriate for a state like us. According to this conception of international politics, the 

8 
156 

behavior of powerful states can set an important example for other states. For example, 

Eyre and Suchman (1996) have pointed out that developing states procure expensive 

conventional arms and maintain national airlines, despite a lack of need and insufficient 

financial resources, due to international norms about the necessary accoutrements of 

modern statehood. As it relates to nuclear policy, therefore, the United States might 

shape international ideas about the utility and appropriateness of nuclear weapons 

possession through its nuclear posture. The maintenance of a large nuclear arsenal by the 

United States contributes to the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons provides a 

model of what it means to be a powerful and modern state and, therefore, encourages 

other states to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the maintenance of a smaller 

nuclear arsenal devalues nuclear weapons as a symbol of modern statehood and bolsters 

states' nonnuclear positions. The above logics give rise to our first hypothesis: 

Hypothesis I: The larger the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the more likely nonnuclear weapon 

states are to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. 

There are other states, however, for which a large U.S. nuclear arsenal might be a source 

of reassurance. In a series of multi and bi-Iateral treaties, including the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) charter, Washington commits itsclfto come to the defense 

of its allies in the event of armed attack. The U.S. nuclear arsenal, therefore, is intended 

to deter attacks, not only against the United States, but also against its allies. At present, 

9 
157 

there arc 63 states under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.s By extending deterrence to allied 

states, Washington hopes to convince these states that they can forgo independent nuclear 

capabilities and rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to provide for their defense. The 

maintenance of a large nuclear arsenal assurcs these states that the United States can 

credibly extend the nuclear umbrella and still maintain a large enough nuclear force to 

provide for its own security. A smaller nuclear arsenal, however, could be interpreted as 

a signal that Washington is not serious about meeting its alliance commitments. If allied 

states question the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee, they could be tempted to 

pursue independent nuclear capabilities. This logic leads us to our second hypothesis: 

Hypothesis 2: The larger the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the less likely U.S. allies are to 

explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. 

It is possible, however, that U.S. nuclear posture, whether or not it influences state 

decisions to explore, pursue, or acquire nuclear weapons, affects state decisions to 

cooperate on international nonproliferation measures in order to prevent other states from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. As Choubey (2008, 22) laments, too many analysts focus: 

narrowly on what influence the United States (posture) directly has on the decision 

making of a government considering proliferation. It fails to include a key to successful 

nonproliferation strategy. which is the behavior of other nations to shape the context in 

which states embarking on proliferation deal with pressures to desist and. moreover, on 

the willingness of other states to join in enforcement. 

5 According to Correlates of War, the countries in a formal defense pact with the United 

States include: the thirty-two Latin American countries party to the 1947 Rio Treaty; 

twenty-seven members of NATO; South Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Australia. 

10 
158 

Scholars (e.g., Kroenig 2009a) have recognized that nuclear proliferation has a "supply 

side." In other words, states can take a number of steps to assist or impede other states as 

they attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. At one extreme, states can provide sensitive 

nuclear assistance to aspiring proliferators to help them construct nuclear weapons. At 

the other extreme, states can engage in technology denial, launch preventive military 

strikes, levy international sanctions, vote in international bodies, and adopt additional 

policies that make it more difficult for other states to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The United States often seeks international cooperation to bring international 

pressure to bear on proliferators and prevent nuclear proliferation. There are both 

institutional and normative reasons to believe that U.S. nuclear posture could affect its 

ability to secure international nonproliferation cooperation. In Article I of the NPT, 

states pledge "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon 

State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.,,6 If the United States, 

however, is not seen to be honoring its Article VI commitments. other states might be 

less likely to maintain cooperation through strict adherence to Article 1. Similarly, in the 

normative realm, if the United States, the most powerful state in the international system, 

maintains a large nuclear arsenal to provide for its own security, other countries might be 

less able or willing to articulate what could be perceived as a hypocritical idea that 

nuclear proliferation is an illegitimate option for other states. This leads to the third 

hypothesis: 

6 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 22, 1970, available at 

http://www .iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc 140. pdf. 

11 
159 

Hypothesis 3: The larger the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the less likely states will be to adopt 

policies that prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

There are reasons, however, to be skeptical that U.S. nuclear force posture has a 

significant effect on the proliferation behavior of other states. Realist theories (e.g., 

Mearsehimer 200 I) of international relations maintain that state behavior is driven by 

power and interests and that institutions and ideas have little independent causal effect on 

international political outcomes. Applied to nuclear proliferation, these theories would 

predict that state decisions on proliferation would be the result of calculations about how 

nuclear weapons would affect a state's strategic interests defined more narrowly. 

Leaders in pro liferant states might consider: how nuclear weapons could help 

them deter conventional or nuclear attack from hostile states; whether they have the 

ability to produce nuclear weapons indigenously; whether they can obtain sensitive 

nuclear assistance from other more advanced states; the possibility that other states could 

levy international sanctions against them, or conduct a preventive military strike against 

their fledgling nuclear facilities. In other words, state decisions to launch nuclear 

weapons programs are determined by factors other than the size of the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal. 

It is possible that states would consider the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to the 

degree that they expect nuclear war with the United States, but for the vast majority of 

states in the international system, threat perceptions are much more likely to be 

determined by the capabilities of regional rivals (Sagan 1996/1997). Moreover, even 

states directly threatened by the United States are more likely to confront, and therefore 

fear, America's conventional, as opposed to its nuclear, capabilities (Chyba 2008). In 

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addition, for nonnuclear weapon states, the fact that the United States possesses nuclear 

weapons at all might be threatening regardless of the precise size of the U,S. arsenal. In 

sum, there is good reason to believe that the size ofthe U.S. nuclear arsenal, if considered 

at all, would be peripheral to states' proliferation decisions. 

For example, at the time of writing in 2012, Iran was making steady progress on 

its nuclear program and the international community, led by the United States, was 

bringing pressure to bear on Tehran designed to convince it to give up its nuclear 

program. It is likely that Iran's leaders were seriously considering a variety of questions 

including: would nuclear weapons improve Iran's security, had Iran's uranium 

enrichment capability advanced to the point that Iran possessed the technical capability to 

produce nuclear weapons, could Iran withstand the economic hardship caused by the 

economic sanctions imposed by the international community, would the United States or 

Israel conduct a military strike to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or to 

overthrow the regime? When considering these pressing issues, it is hard to imagine that 

Iran's leaders seriously weighed the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in their calculations, 

or to believe that if Washington had agreed to possess only 1,000 strategic, deployed 

nuclear warheads instead of the actual 1,550 warheads, that Iran would have abandoned 

its nuclear ambitions. 

When considering these more pragmatic issues, therefore, it is likely that the size 

of the U.S. arsenal would be a peripheral factor in states' proliferation decisions if it is 

considered at all. This discussion gives rise to our fourth hypothesis: 

Hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and 

the probability that other states explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. 

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Similarly, there is reason to believe that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal might not 

have much bearing on other states' nonproliferation policies. Rather, strategic theories of 

nuclear proliferation (e.g., Kroenig 201 0) would predict that when formulating a 

nonproliferation policy vis-a-vis another state, leaders would assess how the adoption of 

particular nonproliferation policies would affect their strategic, political, and economic 

interests more narrowly defined. States likely consider the security threat posed by a 

state's potential nuclear acquisition; whether the state's nuclear acquisition would 

disproportionately constrain other enemy states; how their allies or the international 

community would react to their choice of proliferation policy; whether the imposition of 

sanctions on a proliferant state would greatly harm their own economic interests; and 

how their political relationship with the proliferant state could be strengthened or 

damaged by their choice of nonproliferation policy. 

For example, at the time of writing in 2012, Washington was in negotiations with 

South Korea to convince Seoul to join an international embargo on Iranian oil. Getting 

South Korea's cooperation was critical to the success of the embargo because South 

Korea was the world's fourth largest importer of Iranian oil after China, India, and Japan. 

While Seoul was eager to cooperate with its ally in Washington, it was wary about 

joining the embargo that threatened to cut off 9.4% of its oil supplies, which were 

imported from Iran. In deciding whether to put more pressure on Iran, it is likely that 

South Korea's leaders assessed: the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran; how much the 

addition of South Korean pressure would marginally increase the probability that Iran 

abandoned its nuclear ambitions; the extent to which Seoul would jeopardize its 

relationship with Washington if it refused to join the international embargo on Iranian oil 

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and the amount of good will it could garner with the White House by signing up; and 

how much economic dislocation would be caused to the South Korean economy if it were 

weaned offIranian oil. In relation to these important and pressing issues, it is unlikely 

that South Korea's leaders stopped to consider the size ofthe U.S. nuclear arsenal, or that 

the size of the U.S. arsenal was an important factor in Seoul's decision. 

Again, when considering this panoply of factors, it is unlikcly that the details of 

U.S. nuclear posture would be a decisive, or even a relevant, consideration. This logic 

leads to our ftfth hypothesis: 

Hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between the size ofthe U.S. nuclear arsenal and 

the probability that other states adopt policies that prevent other countries from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. 

There are of course a number of factors, other than U.S. nuclear posture, that can shape 

state proliferation and nonproliferation policies. I discuss these in the next scctions in 

which I describe the data and examine the evidence for the previous hypotheses. 

Empirical Analysis 

To examine the effect of nuclear posture on nuclear proliferation, I explore the 

relationships bctween the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a variety of proliferationrelated outcomes. I first examine the determinants of state decisions to explore, pursue, 

and acquire nuclear weapons. Next, to study nonproliferation policy, I analyze the 

correlates of state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon 

states and voting patterns on nuclear proliferation issues in the UNSC. 

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Nuclear proliferation 

In this section, I analyze the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and whether 

other countries explore, pursue, or acquire nuclear weapons. The unit of analysis is the 

country year and the relevant universe of cases is all nonnuclear weapon states in the 

international system from 1945 to 2000, the final year for which data on many of the 

control variables arc available. The dependent variables measure whether countries 

Explore, PUI~~ue, or Acquire nuclear weapons, respectively. These variables are drawn 

from a study by Christopher Way and Sonali Singh (2004), which analyzes the cOlTelates 

of nuclear proliferation. A list of states engaged in these various levels of proliferation 

behavior is available in Table I. 

(Insert Table I here) 

The key independent variable is U.S. Arsenal. Drawing on newly declassified 

data released by U.S. President Barack Obama in May 20 10, it measures the size of the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal in number of warheads in every year from 1945 to 2010.7 I count all 

nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal, including tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.s 

This variable ranges from a low of six in 1945 to a high 01'31,255 in 1967.9 Information 

on the size ofthe U.S. nuclear arsenal from 1945 to 2010 is displayed in Figure I. 

7 http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-

03 _facCsheecus_nuclear_transparency _finaL w _date.pdf 

8 I assess that aggregate stockpile counts provide the best indicator of U.S. nuclear 

arsenal size. Moreover, due to data limitations, I am unable to produce separate counts of 

tactical and strategic weapons, or of deployed and non-deployed weapons, for each year. 

9 In order for numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons to affect proliferation decisions in other 

states, leaders in other states must have accurate information about the size of the U.S. 

16 
164 

(Insert Figure I here) 

I control for other factors thought to influence the probability that a country 

engages in proliferation-related behavior including: levels of economic development, 

gauged by both GDP per capita and Industrial capacity; the intensity of a state's security 

environment, measured by whether a country is engaged in a Rivalry; whether the 

country has a Security guarantee from a nuclear-armed state; domestic political Regime 

type; Openness to the international economy; and Liberalization, or movements toward 

greater levels of economic openness. I also include a measure to gauge the Year of the 

observation to account for the fact that many states began pursuing the nuelear option at 

the beginning of the nuclear era. More detailed information on the definition and 

measurement of these variables can be found in Singh and Way (2004). In the models 

assessing nuclear acquisition, I also control for whether the country has ever received 

Sensitive nuclear assistance from a more advanced nuclear state as recommended by 

Kroenig (2009b). 

I employ Cox proportional hazard models and cluster robust standard errors by 

country. The results are presented in Table 2. 

nuclear arsenal in each year. While the precise number of U.S. nuclear weapons was a 

state secret until recently, there is good reason to believe that foreign leaders possessed 

accurate information about the approximate size of the U.S. arsenal. Indeed, the newly 

released data reveal that previous estimates by outside organizations, like the National 

Resources Defense Council (2011), are strikingly similar to the true figures. 

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165 

As we can see in Table 2, there is no relationship he tween the size of the U.S. 

arsenal and the probability that countries explore (model!), pursue (model 2), or acquire 

(model 3) nuclear weapons. IO U.S. arsenal is not statistically significant in any of the 

models. There is no support for the idea that the size of the U.S. arsenal is correlated 

with the probahility that other countries proliferate. 

Commenting hrieny on the control variables, we can see that countries with a 

security rival are more likely to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, 

countries above a certain level of industrial capacity are more likely to engage in all three 

levels of proliferation. The receipt of sensitive nuclear assistance increases the 

probability that a country acquires nuclear weapons. Year is negative and statistically 

significant in every model, demonstrating that states were more likely to begin nuclear 

activity early in the nuclear era. There is some evidence to support the idea that openness 

to the international economy and liberalization affect proliferation. The sign on the 

coefficient for Openness is negative and statistically significant in model I, while the sign 

on the coefficient for Liberalization is positive and statistically significant in model 2. 

The analysis of U.S. nuclear weapons on the proliferation hehavior of all states, 

however, is only the first step. It is possible that U.S. nuclear weapons affect 

proliferation hehavior differently in different categories of states, cancelling each other 

out in the aggregate data. Next, therefore, I explore the relationship between U.S. arsenal 

10 Censoring observations according to whether the state engaged in lower levels of 

proliferation as a prerequisite for engaging in higher levels of proliferation and renmning 

the analysis, produced similar results. 

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size on nuclear proliferation in two sub-categories of states: U.S. allies and U.S. nonallies. 11 

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 3. In model 4, we can 

see that there is no relationship between the size of the U.S. arsenal and the likelihood 

that U.S. allies explore the nuclear option. 

There are too few instances of formal U.S. allies pursuing or acquiring nuclear 

weapons to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. To probe the relationship hetween 

U.S. arsenal size and allied pursuit and acquisition, therefore, I compare the average size 

ofthe U.S. arsenal for country-years in which allies decided not to pursue or acquire 

nuclear weapons to country-years in which allies decided to pursue or acquire nuclear 

weapons. The average size ofthc U.S. nuclear arsenal for country-years in which U.S. 

allies did not pursue nuclear weapons is 17,920. The four instances in which formal U.S. 

allies decided to pursue nuclear weapons (France 1954, South Korea 1970, Argentina 

1978. Brazil 1978). the average size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was slightly larger at 

19.167.12 This finding is inconsistent with the idea that allies are more likely to pursue 

nuclear weapons, the smaller the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Turning to Acquire. the 

average size of the U.S. arsenal for country years in which U.S. allies refrained from 

acquiring nuclear weapons was 17,935 compared to an average arsenal size of lO,720 for 

the two country years (UK 1952 and France 1960) in which U.S. allies acquired nuclear 

weapons. The ditference in average arsenal size is quite large, but with only two 

11 I drop Security guarantee fi'om these tests because there is no variation for U.S. allies 

and scant variation among U.S. non-allies. 

12 The United Kingdom's pursuit of nuclear weapons hegins in 1945, a year in which the 

United States and the United Kingdom were not part of a formal alliance according to 

Correlates of War. 

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167 

observations of U.S. allies acquiring nuclear weapons, we cannot draw any meaningful 

conclusions from this difference without further study. Indeed, existing studies of British 

and French decisions to acquire nuclear weapons do not mention insufficient U.S. nuclear 

arsenal size as a possible motivation. 13 While it is possible that London and Paris would 

have been less likely to acquire nuclear weapons if Washington had possessed a larger 

nuclear arsenal, establishing this causal relationship would require additional study. In 

sum, this study does not allow me to conclude that a larger nuclear umbrella provides a 

more effective nuclear assurance to U.S. allies. 

Turning to the effect of U.S. nuclear weapons on the proliferation decisions of 

U.S. non-allies in Table 3, we do not find support for the idea that greater numbers of 

U.S. nuclear weapons encourages proliferation. Indeed, U.S. arsenal does not reach 

statistical significance in model 6 and, in model 5, the sign on the coefficient is negative 

and statistically significant, suggesting that, contrary to expectation, non-allies were more 

likely to explore nuclear weapons the smaller the size of the U.S. arsenal. 14 The 

estimated substantive effect of this unanticipated finding, however, is small. An increase 

in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by 1,000 warheads is associated with a 09% 

decrease in the risk that U.S. non-allies explore the nuclear option. 15 Moreover, as I 

See, e.g., Gowing 1974 and Scheinman 1965. 

14 For a similar finding, see Tago and Singer 2011. 

15 The states that explored nuclear weapons while not in a defense pact with the United 

States include: the Soviet Union and Great Britain (1945); France and Switzerland 

(1946); Israel (1949); Yugoslavia, Sweden, and India (1954); China (1955); NOIth Korea 

(1965); South Africa (1969); Libya (1970); Pakistan (1972); Iraq (1976); Algeria (1983); 

Iran (1984); Romania (1985). France and Great Britain are not coded as formal allies of 

the United States in 1945, according to Correlates of War, because the World War II 

alliance ended in that year and NATO was not created until 1949. Coding Great Britain 

and France, and even Israel and Sweden, as U.S. allies and rerunning the analysis did not 

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168 

report below, this finding is not robust to alternative measurements of U,S, nuclear 

posture, 

If there is indeed a relationship between these variables, it could possibly be 

explained by the concept of dissuasion. According to U,S, defense strategists, dissuasion 

is achieved when the United States discourages adversaries from developing a specific 

military capability by convincing the adversary that the United States possesses such an 

overwhelming level of superiority with respect to that specific military that the adversary 

has no hope of ever competing with the United States (Department of Defense 2005). 

According to this perspective, America's non-allies may have been more likely to explore 

nuclear weapons when the United States had a small arsenal becanse their leaders 

believed that they had an opportnnity to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. 

When the United States possessed a large arsenal, on the other hand, their leaders 

conclnded that they would never be able to compete with the United States in a nuclear 

arms race and channeled their resources toward other military capabilities. 

There are too few observations of U.S. non-allies acquiring nuclear weapons to 

conduct regression analysis. Instead, I compare the average size of the U.S. arsenal for 

the 4,930 country-years in which U.S. non-allies did not acquire nuclear weapons to the 

seven county-years in which U.S. non-allies did acquire llllclear weapons. These 

numbers, 18,444 and 18,912, respectively, are nearly identical, suggesting that the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons by America's non-allies is not significantly alIected by 

the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 

change the results. The negative relationship between U.S. arsenal size and non-allied 

pursuit is not the result of questionable codings of U.S. alliance relationships. 

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In sum, there is no SUppOlt for the idea that U.S. allies are less likely, or U.S. nonallies more likely, to explore, pursue, or acquire nuclear weapons, the larger the size of 

the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 

Next, I turn to nuclear nonproliferation policy. To begin, I analyze the relationship 

between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and state voting behavior on nonproliferation 

issues in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When states are found to be in 

noncompliance with their NPT obligations by the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG), their case is referred to the UNSC for consideration. 

UNSC members can enforce violations of the NPT by, for example, passing UNSC 

resolutions to impose sanctions on NPT violators. Other nuclear proliferation issues can 

also be taken up by the UNSC independent of a BOG recommendation. If the 

maintenance of a large nuclear arsenal complicates U.S. efforts to get cooperation on 

international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, we should expect to find a negative 

relationship between the size of the U.S. arsenal and whether countries vote "yes" on 

UNSC resolutions related to nuclear nonproliferation. 

To conduct the analysis, I construct a new dataset on votes in the UNSC on 

nuclear proliferation issues from 1945 to 2010. The dataset contains information on 375 

votes by 75 countries in 25 separate UNSC resolutions. Data on UNSC votes are drawn 

from the United Nations' official website. 16 The unit of analysis is the country-vote. 

16 http://www.un.org/depts/dhllresguide/scvote.htm 

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170 

The dichotomous dependent variable is UNSC vote. It is coded "I" if a country 

votes yes on the nonproliferation resolution and "0" if the country votes no or abstains. 17 

The key independent variable is U.S. arsenal. I control for other factors that might affect 

state voting on nonproliferation issues in the UNSC. We might expect militarily 

powerful countries to be more threatened by the spread of nuclear weapons and thus more 

likely to support nonproliferation measures in the UNSC (Kroenig 2010). To account for 

military power, I include Capabilities, a composite index containing information on total 

population, urban popUlation, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military 

manpower, and military expenditures. Data for this variable are drawn from the 

Correlates of War composite capabilities index, version 3.02, and extracted using 

EUGene (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Bennett and Starn 2000).18 I include 

Regime type to account for the fact that democratic countries may be more likely to 

cooperate with international institutions, including the IAEA and the UNSC. 19 To gauge 

the effect of economic development on UNSC voting patterns, I include GDP per capita. 

Finally, because NPT member states might be more likely to enforce violations of the 

NPT than nonmembers, I include NPT, which measures whether a statc was a member of 

the NPT at the time that the vote was taken.2o To test the correlates ofUNSC voting 

17 Estimating a multinomiallogit on a trichotomous variable (yes=l; 2=abstain; 3=no) 

and rerunning the analysis produced nearly identical results. 

18 Data on this variable are currently available through 2007. I extrapolated the 2007 

score for each country through 20 I 0 to prevent listwise deletion of observations due to 

missing data. While the capabilities scores from 2008 to 2010 will not be precise, they 

provide a more than adequate proxy of each state's military power at the time of each 

vote. 

19 Data on regime type for Bosnia-Herzegovia in 2010 and 2011 arc unavailable, resulting 

in five missing ohservations. 

20 Information on membership in the NPT is from the Institute for Defense and 

Disarmament Studics, accessed online at www.idds.orgiissNucTreatiesNPT.html. 

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behavior, I employ Logistic regression. Robust standard errors are clustered by 

country.21 The results are presented in Table 4. 

(Insert Table 4 here) 

Turning to Table 4, we can see that there is no relationship between U.S. arsenal 

size and state voting in the UNSC on proliferation issues. U.S. arsenal does not reach 

statistical significance in a fully-specified (model I) or a trimmed (modcI2) model. This 

test provides no empirical support for the idea that the maintenance of a large arsenal 

complicates u.s. etJorts to garner international cooperation on nuclear proliferation 

issues. 

Focusing on the control variables, we can see that NPT is positive and statistically 

significant, meaning that NPT member states are more likely to vote to enforce 

nonproliferation measures in the UNSC. This finding supports the intuition that nonmember states, snch as Israel, India, and Pakistan, might be less willing to support 

nonproliferation enforcement for fcar that they themselves might become the targets of 

snch measures. The other variables do not reach statistical significance. Military power, 

domestic political regime type, and levels of economic development do not appear to 

inflnence UNSC voting. 

As the final test of the link between U.S. nnclear weapons and other states' 

nonproliferation policies, I explore the determinants of sensitive nnclear technology 

21 Clustering by UNSC resolution did not change the core findings. 

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172 

transfers. 22 Providing sensitive nuclear assistance is the most direct way in which a 

country can aid another country's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability (Kroenig 

2010). If the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal complicates U.S. efforts to get cooperation 

on nuclear nonproliferation, we should expect to find a positive relationship between the 

size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the probability that other countries provide sensitive 

nuclear assistance. If, on the other hand, state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear 

assistance are driven by other factors, we should expect to find no relationship between 

these variables. 

To conduct these tests, I repeat the analysis of Kroenig (2009a) on the correlates 

of sensitive nuclear assistance after including u.s. arsenal. The dataset contains yearly 

information for all capable nuclear suppliers and potential nuclear recipicnt dyads in the 

international system from 1951 to 2000. Since the hypotheses explored in this research 

deal with the relationship between the nuclear posture of the United States and the 

proliferation behavior of nonnuclear weapon states or nuclear states outside the NPT, I 

include in my analysis only nuclear suppliers that lack nuclear weapons or are not 

members of the NPT.23 In other words, I exclude from my analysis nuclear suppliers that 

joined the NPT as recognized nuclear weapon states. The unit of analysis is the directed 

dyad-year. 

22 I do not assess the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear 

cooperation (Fuhrmann 2009) because the provision of peaceful nuclear assistance is 

consistent with the letter and the spirit of the NPT, has been found not to contribute to the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2009b, 2010), and existing measures of 

peaceful nuclear cooperation suffer from measurement problems, such as not adequately 

distinguishing between which agreements actually resulted in nuclear technology 

transfers and which did not (Bluth et al. 2010). 

23 Capable nuclear suppliers include nuclear weapon states, like the United States, and 

states that possess sensitive nuclear technology, but that have not yet produced nuclear 

weapons, such as Brazil. 

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The dichotomous dependent variable is Sensitive nuclear assistance. It measures 

whether a capable supplier state provided sensitive nuclear assistance to a potential 

nuclear recipient in a given year. Detailed information on the definition and 

measurement of this variable can be found in Kroenig (2009a). 

The key independent variable is U.S. arsenal. I also control for the other factors 

demonstrated to affect patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance including: the Relative 

power between supplier and recipient; the presence of a common Enemy between the 

supplier and recipient; whether the supplier is in a defense pact with a superpower 

(Superpower pact); the economic circumstances of the supplier, measured by CD? per 

capita, levels of Economic growth, Openness to the international economy, and Trade 

dependence with the potential recipient; domestic political Regime type; whether the 

supplier is a member of the N?T or Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSC); Distance and 

Distance squared between supplier and recipient; the security environment of the 

recipient (Disputes); the CD? per capita and economic Openness of the recipient; and 

whether the recipient is a member of the NPT. For more information on each of these 

variables, see Kroenig (2009a). 

I employ Logistic Regression to test claims about the correlates of sensitive 

nuclear assistance. Robust standard errors arc adjusted for clustering by dyad. The 

results are presented in Table 5. 

(Insert Table 5 here) 

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174 

Table 5 reveals that there is no relationship between the size of the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal and the probability that other countries provide sensitive nuclear assistance. U.S. 

arsenal is not statistically significant in a full (model I) or trimmed (model 2) model. 

There is no support for the idea that the smaller the size of the U.S. arsenal, the less likely 

other countries are to engage in sensitive nuclear transfers. 

Consistent with the findings of Kroenig (2009a), I find that strategic factors, 

namely the relative power between supplier and recipient, the presence of a common 

enemy, and the dependence of the supplicr on a superpower patron are corrclated with 

sensitive nuclear assistance. I also find that Trade dependence; NSG; Distance; Distance 

squared; and Openness (recipient) are statistically significant correlatcs of Sensitive 

nuclear assistance. 

Robustness Checks 

This section presents the results of a number of robustness tests. First, to assess whether 

the findings are sensitive to conceptualizations of the key independent variable, I crcate a 

number of alternate measures of U.S. arsenal size. I create variables that gauge: the 

natural logarithm of the U.S. arsenal, an ordinal categorization of U.S. arsenal size «100, 

100 - Ik, Ik-IOk, > 10k), annual changes in U.S. arsenal size, whether the United States 

cuts the size of its arsenal in any given year, and tbe combined size of the arsenals of the 

P-5 nuclear powers. Next, I assess whether the findings depend on historical time. It is 

possible that any relationship betwecn U.S. nuclear weapons and proliferation only came 

into existence after the establishment of the NPT in 1969. Similarly, it is possible that the 

relationship varies in the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. To test for these 

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175 

possibilities, I divided my sample by historical time period and conducted regression 

analysis on the resulting sub-samples of data. 

All of these tests produced similar results. I did not find statistically significant 

links between U.S. nuclear posture and proliferation. There were two exceptions to this 

general finding. First, I found that U.S. allies were more likely to explore nuclear 

weapons when the United States was cutting the size of its nuclear arsenal, suggesting 

that U.S. allies might doubt the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella when Washington 

engages in nuclear reductions, leading them to explore an independent nuclear option. 

Second, after 1968, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 

U.S. arsenal size and patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance, suggesting that, after the 

establishment ofthe NPT, states were less likely to provide nuclear assistance the larger 

the U.S. nuclear arsenal. These findings are interesting and might deserve further 

investigation. In sum, however, the overall pattern revealed in this study through dozens 

of statistical tests is that there is scant evidence of any statistically significant 

relationships between U.S. nuclear arsenal size and the proliferation behavior of other 

states. 

Discussion and Conclusion 

This aIticle examined the relationship between U.S. nuclear posture and nuclear 

proliferation. It found that there is no relationship between the size ofthe U.S. nuclear 

aI·senal and a variety of nuclear proliferation outcomes, including whether other states 

engage in nuclear proliferation themselves and whether they adopt policies designed to 

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Theories that suggest that 

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176 

the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is an important determinant of the proliferation 

behavior of other states, therefore, do not find empirical support. We cannot definitively 

conclude that there is not an association between these sets of variables, but this study did 

not provide any evidence of such an association. In contrast, the findings of this research 

SUppOlt the idea that state behavior on nuclear issues is determined by calculations about 

how nuclear proliferation outcomes affect their security, economic, and political interests 

narrowly defined, and that the details of U.S. nuclear posture are largely irrelevant to 

these calculations. 

Despite the null findings of this research, or rather because of them, this article 

contains important implications for U.S. national security policy. In his 2012 annual 

report to Congress on the projected threats to the national security of the United States of 

America, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper assessed that the prospect of 

nuclear proliferation in various countries constitutes a major threat to U.S. national 

security.24 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review announced that the United States would 

work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to state and non-state actors by deemphasizing the rolc of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Deemphasizing nuclear weapons would be achieved, in part, by reducing the number of 

nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The research presented in this article 

demonstrates, however, that alterations in U.S. nuclear posture may not have a 

meaningful impact on the proliferation behavior of other states. U.S. officials are correct 

to recognize nuclear proliferation as a threat to international peace and security, but, 

24 James R. Clapper, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 

for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," January 31, 2012, unclassified 

Statement for the Record. 

29 
177 

given the findings of this research, there is reason to believe that Washington's efforts to 

use disarmament as a means of advancing nonproliferation goals might not be met with 

success. 

It is possible, of course, that Washington has not yet gone far enough and, at some 

point in the future - perhaps complete nuclear disarmament- nuclear reductions will 

eventually result in nonproliferation breakthroughs. The findings of this research, 

however, should give us pause. Lacking evidence of a tight correspondence between 

U.S. arsenal size and proliferation behavior in the past, there is little reason to be believe 

that additional cuts will produce cooperation on nonproliferation issues in the future. 

It may also be the case that the measures employed in this article are too crude to 

capture the hypothesized dynamics and, rather than a measurable correlation between 

nuclear numbers and objective proliferation outcomes, we should expect the arms 

control-nonproliferation link to manifest itself more subtly in the realm of norms, ideas, 

and diplomacy. According to this line of thought, U.S. attitudes toward disarmament 

might have an important effect on the negotiating climate in international meetings, such 

as the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) held every five years. Some have claimed, for 

example, that perceptions about a lack of U.S. commitment to disarm contributed to the 

failure to produce a final consensus document at the 2005 RevCon. It is possible that 

these nuanced links exist and the search to uncover them could make an interesting 

avenue for future study. Yet, at the end of the day, scholars and practitioners are most 

concerned about tangible outcomes, such as whether nuclear weapons spread to 

additional countries or not. While it might be interesting to know whether U.S. nuclear 

posture leads to fi'osty receptions for U.S. diplomats in international fora, one might 

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178 

question the signifieance of this outcome for international relations theory and for U.S. 

national security policy. 

In short, this research suggests that the United States should place less weight on 

adjustments to the size of its nuclear arsenal as a nonproliferation tool and emphasize 

more proven methods of preventing nuclear proliferation, such as denying states the 

technology required to produce nuclear weapons and addressing the threat environments 

that motivate states to desire nuclear weapons in the first place. 

The findings of this article do not necessarily imply that the United States shonld 

refrain from making additional cnts to the size of its nuclear arsenal. There might be 

advantages to further nuclear rednctions, but the evidence does not suggest that increased 

international cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation meaSllres is among them. As U.S 

officials think about sizing the nuclear arsenal they should consider how U.S. nuclear 

posture affects the United States' ability to deter enemies and assure allies, the defense 

budget, and many other factors. Given the lack of support for a link between U.S. 

nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, however, it would be unwise to base future 

nuclear force sizing decisions on hopes that cuts to the U.S. arsenal can prevent the 

spread of nuclear weapons. 

31 
179 

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34 
182 

Table 1. Nuclear Proliferation, 1945-2000 

Country Explore Pursue Acquire 

Algeria 1983-1991 

Argentina 1978-1990 

Australia 1956-1973 

Brazil 1966-1990 1975-1990 

China 1956- 1956- 1964-

Egypt 1955-1980 

France 1945- 1954- 1960-

Germany 1957-1958 

India 1948- 1964-1966, 1972-1975, 1980- 1987-

Indonesia 1964-1967 

Iran 1974-1979,1984- 1989-

Iraq 1976-1991 1976-1991 

Israel 1949- 1955- 1967-

Italy 1955-1958 

Japan 1941-1945,1967-1970 

North Korea 1962- 1980- 2006-

Norway 1947-1962 

Libya 1970-2003 1970-2003 

Pakistan 1972- 1972- 1987-

Romania 1978-1989 

Russia 1945- 1945- 1949-

South Africa 1969-1991 1974-1991 1979-1991 

South Korea 1970-1975 1970-1975 

Sweden 1945-1970 

Switzerland 1945-1969 

Taiwan 1967-1976,1987-1988 

United Kingdom 1945- 1945- 1952-

United States 1945- 1945- 1945-

Yugoslavia 1949-1962,1974-1987 1953-1962, 1982-1987 

35 
183 

Table 2. Hazard Models of NucIear Proliferation, All States, 1945-2000 

Independent variable I 2 3 

(Explore) (Pursue) (Acquire) 

U.S. arsenal -0.060 -0.020 -0.075 

(0.042) (0.049) (0.063) 

Security guarantee -0.899 -0.917 

(0.615) (0.652) 

Sensitive nuclear assistance 1.683** 

(0.753) 

GDP 3.24e-03 -0.019 

(0.055) (0.051) 

Industrial capacity 2.245  2.201 ** * 34.234**** 

(0.544) (0.750) (2.888) 

Rivalry 1.435  2.197** * 2.476** 

(0.426) (0.758) (1.075) 

Regime type -0.007 0.016 

(0.031) (0.031) 

Openness -0.013* -0.022 

(0.012) (0.014) 

Liberalization -0.042 0.054* 

(0.025) (0.026) 

Year -0.087*** -0.097**** -0.166* 

(0.031) (0.028) (0.098) 

-69.513 47.226 25.018 

N umber of countries 157 157 187 

Total observations 5,317 5,665 7,239 

NOTE: Statistically significant parameter estimators are denoted by * (p 0.10) ** (p 

0.05), *** (p 0.01),   (p 0.001). Coefficients are estimates for Cox proportional 

hazard models; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, are in 

parentheses. GDP=gross domestic product. 

36 
184 

Table 3. Hazard Models of NucIear Proliferation, U.S. Allies and Non-U.S. Allies, 

1945-2000 

Independent variable 4 5 6 

(U.S. Allies (Non-Allies (Non-Allies 

Explore) Explore) Pursne) 

U.S. arsenal 0.054 -0.097**  0.010 

(0.103) (0.040) (0.051 ) 

GDP -0.155 0.032 6.50e-03 

(0.245) (0.048) (0.067) 

Industrial capacity 3.001 * 2.274**** 2.005*** 

(1.418) (0.675) (0.748) 

Rivalry 0.157 2.151*** 3.189** 

(0.882) (0.707) ( 1.415) 

Regime type -0.096* 0.054 0.060 

(0.056) (0.045) (0.049) 

Openness -0.059 -0.013 -0.019 

(0.043) (0.015) (0.018) 

Liberalization 0.022 -0.045 0.058** 

(0.050) (0.028) (0.026) 

Year 0.281 -0.089** -0.110*** 

(.215) (0.040) (0.035) 

Log likelihood -11.943 -40.911 -26.415 

Number of countries 46 126 126 

Total observations 1,765 3,552 3,792 

NOTE: Statistically significant parameter estimators are denoted by * (p 0.10) ** (p 

0.05), *** (p 0.01),   (p 0.001). Coefficients are estimates for Cox proportional 

hazard models; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, are in 

parentheses. GDP=gross domestic product. There are too few observations of U.S. allies 

pursuing or acquiring nuclear weapons and of non-allies acquiring nuclear weapons to 

conduct regression analysis. These models do not include Security guarantee because 

there is no variation on this variable for U.S. allies and scant variation among U.S. nonallies. 

37 
185 

Table 4. Correlates ofUNSC Voting on Nuclear Proliferation Issues, 1945·2010 

Independent variable I 2 

U.S. arsenal -9.42e-03 -0.011 

(0.017) (0.017) 

Capabilities 1.837 

(1.573) 

GDP per capita 4.35e-03 

(0.011) 

Rcgime type 0.009 

(0.020) 

NPT 0.985** * 1.060*** 

(0.330) (0.336) 

Constant 0.911** 1.016** 

(0.425) (0.431) 

Log likelihood -51.713 -52.286 

N 370 375 

NOTE: Statistically significant parameter estimators are denoted by * (p 0.10) ** (p 

0.05), *** (p 0.01),   (p 0.001). The dependent variable is UNSC voting coded from 

o (abstention or no vote) to I (yes vote). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are 

adjusted for clustering by country. Data on regime type for Bosnia-Herzegovia in 2010 

and 2011 are unavailable, resulting in five missing observations. 

38 
186 

Table 5. Correlates of Sensitive Nuclear Assistance, 1951·2000 

Independent variable I 

.2:---.-----

U.S. arsenal -0.013 -S.77e-03 

(0.034) (0.021 ) 

Relative power -25.585**  -33.959**** 

(11.298) (9.853) 

Common enemy 1.793  2.084** ** 

(O.5IS) (O.57!) 

Superpower pact -2.167  -2.223** ** 

(0.631) (0.612) 

GOP per capita 0.069 

(0.106) 

Economic b'Yowth 2.870 

(3.368) 

Openness ·0.002 

(0.009) 

Trade dependence 28.929** 30.214** 

(11.657) (11.871) 

Regime type -0.049 

(0.046) 

NPT ·0.415 

(0.910) 

NSG 2.3S9** 2.419  

(1.042) (0.713) 

Distance 20.451 **  IS.280** 

(S.079) (7.844) 

Dis tance squared -1.304*** -1.163"*** 

(0.505) (O.49S) 

Disputes (recipient) 0.155 

(0.152) 

Superpower pact (recipient) 0.528 

(O.S37) 

GOP per capita (recipieut) 0.020 

(O.OIS) 

Liberalization (recipient) 0.009 

(0.024) 

Openness (recipient) -0.017*** -0.015*** 

(0.006) (O'{)O6) 

NPT (recipient -0.135 

(0.702) 

Constant ·S3.450** ·74.726** 

(32.652) (30.S50) 

N 65.263 65.263 

NOTE: Statistically significant parameter estimators are denoted by * (p 0.10) ** (1' 0.(5), *** (p 

0.(1), **,,* (p 0.0(1). The dependeut variable is sensitive nuclear assistance coded from 0 (no 

assistance) to I (assistance). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for 

clustering by dyad. The model is estimated after including spline corrections for temporal 

dependence (Beck. Katz, and Tucker 1998). 

39 
187 

Figure I. Size of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal, 1945-2010. 

40 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(191) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. What are U.S. obligations under the NPT? I ask this because the 

President has explained his view that there is a bargain, for example, his Prague 

speech: ‘‘The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and 

all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.’’ 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In a memo from Spurgeon Keeney to incoming National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, explained that the negotiators’ view of 

the treaty suggests that Article VI is ‘‘an essentially hortatory statement.’’ 

Was Mr. Keeney, recently deceased, wrong? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. What’s more, the article clearly refers to ‘‘an end to the arms race 

. . . and complete and general disarmament.’’ 

Isn’t the arms race over? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. I don’t seem to recall a great and abiding concern each time the U.S. 

builds an aircraft carrier, only a nuclear weapon. Why is only part of the article 

important? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. When the Secretary of State appeared before the Senate during the 

process to obtain ratification of the New START treaty, she said the following: 

‘‘Moreover, by bringing the New START Treaty into force, we will strengthen our 

national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a 

core national security challenge—nuclear proliferation. Now, I am not suggesting 

that this treaty alone will convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. 

But it does demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we seek to hold 

these and other governments accountable, whether that means further isolating 

Iran and enforcing the rules against violators . . . A ratified new START treaty 

would also continue our progress toward broader U.S.-Russia cooperation. We believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran’s 

nuclear program . . .’’ (Testimony by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. 

Opening Remarks Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 18, 

2010.) 

Yet, four days after the New START treaty entered into force, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in London that, ‘‘with the 

approval of Resolution 1929 in [June] last year, practical possibilities to impose 

sanctions on those related—even indirectly—to the Iranian nuclear program have 

been exhausted.’’ 

Again, this was four days after the New START treaty was ratified. Was the Secretary of State wrong? Did she over promise? Did Russia care about U.S. disarmament in terms of ‘‘strengthening our hand’’ and continuing ‘‘our progress toward 

broader U.S.-Russian cooperation . . . including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program’’? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham stated in his prepared statement that, ‘‘the 

NPT may not be able to survive as a viable regime without CTBT entry into force 

in the reasonably near future.’’ 

He also stated that ‘‘should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile likely the result would be the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East 

thereby destroying the NPT.’’ 

i. Which is likely to happen first, the NPT being destroyed by the failure to ratify 

the CTBT or an Iranian nuclear weapon? 

ii. How do you propose to get Iran and North Korea to ratify the CTBT to assure 

its entry into force? 

iii. Which states are Iran’s principal supporters right now? Is it true that Russian 

and China are blocking further U.N. Security Council Resolutions? Please explain 

to me what interest these states have in letting Iran go nuclear just because the 

CTBT hasn’t entered into force? 
192 

iv. What interest do the non-nuclear weapons states have in taking on the expense of building nuclear weapons, and risking the instability of further proliferation, just because CTBT hasn’t entered into force. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Can you state your views on the desirability a world of nuclear disarmament? Was the last world without nuclear weapons a pleasant one? A peaceful 

one? According to former STRATCOM Commander Admiral Rich Mies, the last 

world without nuclear weapons was an incredibly violent one with World Wars that 

claimed tens of millions of lives. With strategic deterrence, the great powers no 

longer fight each other. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated that a world without nuclear weapons would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. Has that happened yet? Or is the pursuit of nuclear abolition really just 

an example of fighting the symptom and not the disease? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Should all sides to the CTBT have the same obligation? Should the 

administration make unequivocally certain there are no side deals, no special P5 

deals? If there are any, the admin should release them? Are you aware of any P5- 

only agreements incident to the CTBT? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller, while the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Verification, stated in a speech titled ‘‘The Long Road from Prague’’ 

that, 

‘‘The second major arms control objective of the Obama Administration is the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). There is no step 

that we could take that would more effectively restore our moral leadership and improve our ability to reenergize the international nonproliferation consensus than to 

ratify the CTBT.’’ 

When did the United States lose its moral leadership? Why? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham stated in his testimony that, 

‘‘And first and foremost of these measures that those signing up to make themselves militarily permanently second class wanted as political balance for making 

this commitment was a comprehensive test ban. It is the only arms control agreement mentioned in the NPT, and it is of central importance to the bargain.’’ 

If the CTBT was so important, why was it merely a preambular reference? Why 

wasn’t it made a legally binding commitment? Do you assert it is legally binding 

on the U.S.? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham also stated regarding the CTBT that, ‘‘Well, 

Egypt of the countries of the world, Egypt and Indonesia were probably the two 

strongest ones to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’ Please state what actions 

Egypt and Indonesia will take to deal with nuclear terrorism or the Iranian nuclear 

weapons program if, but only if, the U.S. ratifies the CTBT. 

Is there any evidence they will walk away from the NPT if the U.S. does not ratify the CTBT? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Traditionally, a President has directed his military advisers to determine, chiefly, what level of our nuclear force is needed to deter a potential adversary from attacking us or our allies. The answer to that question should be what 

drives the strategy—not a President’s political ideology. 

For example, here’s how Secretary Powell stated President Bush looked at the 

issue: 

‘‘President Bush gathered his advisers around him and he instructed us as follows: Find the lowest number we need to make America safe, to make America safe 

today and to make America safe in the future. Do not think of this in cold war 

terms, don’t think in terms of how many more weapons do we have to have in order 

to make the rubble bounce even more.’’ (Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on ‘‘Treaty on Strategic Offensive 

Reductions: The Moscow Treaty.’’ July 9, 2002.) 

The House Armed Services Committee has been asking questions, holding briefings with the administration and even hearings in my subcommittee—all without 

any detailed explanation from the administration of what exactly is being discussed 

in its review. 

All we know about it is from press reports, which indicate that the President, in 

PPD–11 and other instructions, has directed the Administration to consider possibly 

unilateral reductions down to levels of 1,000, 700 and 300 deployed warheads. 

What are your views about proceeding to U.S. nuclear force levels of 1,000 or 

lower, before even the New START treaty has been implemented? 
193 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. How would our allies respond? Would advanced, resource and technology capable states continue to feel comfortable relying on U.S. guarantees at 

such low levels? Could such reductions in fact stimulate proliferation? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. At what level would China build up to become a peer competitor? 

As a tangent, recently, arms controllers on a State Department Advisory Board have 

urged the United States to publicly declare ‘‘mutual vulnerability’’ with China. 

Could you please comment on whether you think this is a good idea? Why or why 

not? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The New York Times (Mark Landler, ‘‘Obama, on the trail, plays for 

time on foreign policy.’’ The New York Times. July 19, 2012) recently reported that, 

‘‘The casualties of the calendar include a presidential decision on how deeply to 

cut the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads, even below the levels in the New 

Start treaty with Russia. The administration has all but completed a review of options for Mr. Obama’s consideration, officials said, but the announcement has been 

delayed for months.’’ 

Are you aware of an Administration ever playing politics with a nuclear targeting 

review in this manner? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Former Secretary of State Rice stated in December of 2010, 

‘‘Nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must 

be on stopping dangerous proliferators—not on further reductions in the U.S. and 

Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threat to each other or to international stability.’’ 

Was she right? Should President Obama follow her advice? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The Obama Nuclear Posture Review stated that progress toward disarmament by the United States will enhance its leadership position to deal with 

threats to its security: 

‘‘By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons—meeting our NPT 

Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament—we can put 

ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with 

us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and 

secure nuclear materials worldwide.’’ (2010 Nuclear Posture Review) 

The question follows, has this policy worked? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. North Korea continues to build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the six party process is defunct, with North Korea walking away from its 

most recent deal in record time. 

How has U.S. disarmament action through, for example, the New START treaty 

helped to deal with North Korea? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Iran recently announced that it plans to build a nuclear navy and 

it may enrich nuclear fuel to as high as 90%, even talking about nuclear-powered 

oil tankers. Russia announced four days after the New START treaty entered into 

force that it would block further U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

Who precisely became more willing to help us adopt ‘‘the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime’’ to deal with Iran’s nuclear program because 

of the New START treaty or the NPR’s emphasis on reducing the roles and numbers 

of nuclear weapons? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR announced the U.S. would not build new nuclear 

weapons. In that same time, Pakistan, India, Russia and China have all announced 

the deployment of new nuclear weapons capabilities. 

What benefit did the U.S. get from the NPR decision constraining U.S. nuclear 

weapons development? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. ceased underground nuclear testing in 1992. Yet, France, 

China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all tested after that decision. 

Why didn’t they follow our example, our moral leadership, and stop testing when 

we did? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Libya announced it was giving up its weapons of mass destruction 

in 2007 as the Bush Administration was pressing for Congress to approve the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. 
194 

Why didn’t Libya choose to hang on to those capabilities in the face of U.S. efforts 

to develop new nuclear capabilities? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Rademaker, can you briefly relate to the Subcommittee what are 

the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the so-called PNIs? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. While serving as Assistant Secretary of State, you stated that: 

‘‘At the same time President Yeltsin committed to similar reductions in Russian 

tactical nuclear weapons, but considerable concern exists that the Russian commitments have not been entirely fulfilled. I can assure you that when European audiences talk about the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, their concern 

is directed toward the Russian tactical nuclear weapons and what countries they 

might be targeted on rather than the relatively small number of tactical nuclear 

weapons that remain in the NATO arsenal.’’ (Press Roundtable at Interfax. Stephen 

G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control. Moscow, Russia. October 6, 2004.) 

Was this a nice way of saying that the Russians were not complying with the 

PNIs? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As you know, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the so-called Perry-Schlesinger Commission, stated that, 

‘‘Russia has not shown the transparency that its neighbors and the United States 

desire on such matters. It has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. proposals for NSNF transparency measures and NATO’s requests for information. And it is no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments.’’ 

Do you agree with that judgment? I ask because, Administration statement about 

the so-called NPR Implementation Study have suggested the Administration may 

try to avoid the cumbersome treaty process, and perhaps simply make reductions 

by political commitment. What are your views on that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In 2007, the State Department’s International Advisory Board released a report, ‘‘Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States.’’ In that report, President Kennedy was quoted expressing a concern of his about nuclear proliferation following a classified briefing by his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: 

‘‘I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having 

to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.’’ 

As we know, thankfully, that didn’t come to pass. 

Why? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In 1968/69, the U.S. reached a high point of about 30,000 nuclear 

weapons. At that point there were five nuclear weapons states. The U.S. began reducing and the number of nuclear weapons states increased. For example, when the 

U.S. decreased to approximately 25,000 weapons, India went nuclear. At 10,000 

weapons, Pakistan. At 7,000 weapons, North Korea. We’re about to go below 5,000 

weapons and Iran is about to go nuclear. What lessons should we draw from this 

trend? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Do you agree China is in violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group requirements because of its support for Pakistan’s nuclear reactor programs, specifically the Chasma 3 and 4 reactors it is building for Pakistan? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. What steps should the U.S. take in response? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. What are U.S. obligations under the NPT? I ask this because the 

President has explained his view that there is a bargain, for example, his Prague 

speech: ‘‘The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and 

all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.’’ 

Dr. SCHAKE. U.S. obligations are not to transfer nuclear weapons or their technologies to non-nuclear weapons states, and to pursue good-faith negotiations toward effective disarmament under strict and effective international control. 

Mr. TURNER. In a memo from Spurgeon Keeney to incoming National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, explained that the negotiators’ view of 

the treaty suggests that Article VI is ‘‘an essentially hortatory statement.’’ 

Was Mr. Keeney, recently deceased, wrong? 
195 

Dr. SCHAKE. My read of the historical record is that the Nixon Administration and 

the Congress would have been unlikely to support the treaty if the disarmament 

commitments applying to the U.S. were considered more than hortatory. 

Mr. TURNER. What’s more, the article clearly refers to ‘‘an end to the arms race 

. . . and complete and general disarmament.’’ i. Isn’t the arms race over? 

Dr. SCHAKE. Our arms race with the Soviet Union is clearly over, as the Soviet 

Union is over. The Russians currently don’t seem interested in restarting it, but nuclear weapons have become a more important part of Russian military power as 

their conventional forces have collapsed, and the Russians seem to be defining their 

national interests mostly in opposition to ours, so it’s not out of the question they 

could again seek to assert national power through a build up of their nuclear forces. 

We may also in the coming decade begin to worry about the size and characteristics 

of Chinese nuclear forces. I wouldn’t rule out that the U.S. could again be faced with 

a nuclear arms race in which our own security depends on preventing nuclear superiority by another country. 

Mr. TURNER. I don’t seem to recall a great and abiding concern each time the U.S. 

builds an aircraft carrier, only a nuclear weapon. Why is only part of the article 

important? 

Dr. SCHAKE. That’s an excellent question, although I wouldn’t want to encourage 

arms control advocates to expand their scope to limiting our conventional forces. My 

interpretation of that section of the Treaty is to emphasize that only in the context 

of complete and general disarmament ought the U.S. to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. 

Mr. TURNER. When the Secretary of State appeared before the Senate during the 

process to obtain ratification of the New START treaty, she said the following: 

‘‘Moreover, by bringing the New START Treaty into force, we will strengthen our 

national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a 

core national security challenge—nuclear proliferation. Now, I am not suggesting 

that this treaty alone will convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. 

But it does demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we seek to hold 

these and other governments accountable, whether that means further isolating 

Iran and enforcing the rules against violators . . . A ratified new START treaty 

would also continue our progress toward broader U.S.-Russia cooperation. We believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran’s 

nuclear program . . .’’ (Testimony by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. 

Opening Remarks Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 18, 

2010.) 

Yet, four days after the New START treaty entered into force, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in London that, ‘‘with the 

approval of Resolution 1929 in [June] last year, practical possibilities to impose 

sanctions on those related—even indirectly—to the Iranian nuclear program have 

been exhausted.’’ 

Again, this was four days after the New START treaty was ratified. Was the Secretary of State wrong? Did she over promise? Did Russia care about U.S. disarmament in terms of ‘‘strengthening our hand’’ and continuing ‘‘our progress toward 

broader U.S.-Russian cooperation . . . including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program’’? 

Dr. SCHAKE. The New START treaty had no effect whatsoever on other countries’ 

willingness to hold proliferating governments accountable, nor does it appear to 

have facilitated broader U.S.-Russia cooperation. 

The only one of the Secretary’s assertions that has proven true is that the treaty 

did not convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. I think it’s just not 

true that the current size and composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has any effect 

on threshold nuclear states. 

The only way in which I could imagine U.S. nuclear force structure affecting 

threshold states is if we reduce our arsenal to such low numbers that they consider 

parity or supremacy within their reach—and that would foster proliferation, not restrain it. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham stated in his prepared statement that, ‘‘the 

NPT may not be able to survive as a viable regime without CTBT entry into force 

in the reasonably near future.’’ 

He also stated that ‘‘should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile likely the result would be the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East 

thereby destroying the NPT.’’ 

i. Which is likely to happen first, the NPT being destroyed by the failure to ratify 

the CTBT or an Iranian nuclear weapon? 

ii. How do you propose to get Iran and North Korea to ratify the CTBT to assure 

its entry into force? 
196 

iii. Which states are Iran’s principal supporters right now? Is it true that Russian 

and China are blocking further U.N. Security Council Resolutions? Please explain 

to me what interest these states have in letting Iran go nuclear just because the 

CTBT hasn’t entered into force? 

iv. What interest do the non-nuclear weapons states have in taking on the expense of building nuclear weapons, and risking the instability of further proliferation, just because CTBT hasn’t entered into force. 

Dr. SCHAKE. I do not believe the CTBT has any bearing on the NPT; I do, however, agree with Ambassador Graham that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could 

very likely set off a cascade of proliferation throughout the Middle East that would 

destroy the NPT. 

Mr. TURNER. Can you state your views on the desirability a world of nuclear disarmament? Was the last world without nuclear weapons a pleasant one? A peaceful 

one? According to former STRATCOM Commander Admiral Rich Mies, the last 

world without nuclear weapons was an incredibly violent one with World Wars that 

claimed tens of millions of lives. With strategic deterrence, the great powers no 

longer fight each other. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated that a world without nuclear weapons would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. Has that happened yet? Or is the pursuit of nuclear abolition really just 

an example of fighting the symptom and not the disease? 

Dr. SCHAKE. Desirable as a world without nuclear weapons might be, I don’t see 

how we uninvent them; and if we give ours up, it will only strengthen the incentive 

to acquire them for those countries and organizations that mean us harm. 

I agree that nuclear weapons have so far served to inhibit the strongest states 

from fighting each other; but they have not prevented wars, and they have not prevented wars even among states with nuclear weapons (Pakistan and India, for example). I would also caution that we have only a relatively small sample set from 

which to draw conclusions, so I’m uncomfortable making sweeping claims about the 

deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. 

It’s a really interesting question whether the weapons are just a symptom of the 

disease; my sense is the political objectives for which countries fight are the root 

cause, not the weapons themselves. The answer to your specific question is that 

we’re nowhere near the kind of transformation of world political order envisioned 

by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission as justifying a disarmed United States. 

Mr. TURNER. Should all sides to the CTBT have the same obligation? Should the 

administration make unequivocally certain there are no side deals, no special P5 

deals? If there are any, the administration should release them? Are you aware of 

any P5-only agreements incident to the CTBT? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I wouldn’t object in principle to side agreements among the P5, but 

any agreements impinging on or resulting from the Treaty must be subject to Congressional review. I am not expert enough on the CTBT negotiations to know if any 

side deals have been entered into 

Mr. TURNER. Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller, while the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Verification, stated in a speech titled ‘‘The Long Road from Prague’’ 

that, 

‘‘The second major arms control objective of the Obama Administration is the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). There is no step 

that we could take that would more effectively restore our moral leadership and improve our ability to reenergize the international nonproliferation consensus than to 

ratify the CTBT.’’ 

When did the United States lose its moral leadership? Why? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I do not agree with Rose Gottemoeller’s statement that the United 

States has lost its moral leadership, nor do I believe the CTBT is central to that 

leadership. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham stated in his testimony that, 

‘‘And first and foremost of these measures that those signing up to make themselves militarily permanently second class wanted as political balance for making 

this commitment was a comprehensive test ban. It is the only arms control agreement mentioned in the NPT, and it is of central importance to the bargain.’’ 

If the CTBT was so important, why was it merely a preambular reference? Why 

wasn’t it made a legally binding commitment? Do you assert it is legally binding 

on the U.S.? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I disagree with Ambassador Graham’s assessment. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham also stated regarding the CTBT that, ‘‘Well, 

Egypt of the countries of the world, Egypt and Indonesia were probably the two 

strongest ones to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’ Please state what actions 

Egypt and Indonesia will take to deal with nuclear terrorism or the Iranian nuclear 

weapons program if, but only if, the U.S. ratifies the CTBT. 
197 

Is there any evidence they will walk away from the NPT if the U.S. does not ratify the CTBT? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I do not see a connection between U.S. ratification of the CTBT and 

adherence by us or other countries to the NPT. 

Mr. TURNER. Traditionally, a President has directed his military advisers to determine, chiefly, what level of our nuclear force is needed to deter a potential adversary from attacking us or our allies. The answer to that question should be what 

drives the strategy—not a President’s political ideology. 

For example, here’s how Secretary Powell stated President Bush looked at the 

issue: 

‘‘President Bush gathered his advisers around him and he instructed us as follows: Find the lowest number we need to make America safe, to make America safe 

today and to make America safe in the future. Do not think of this in cold war 

terms, don’t think in terms of how many more weapons do we have to have in order 

to make the rubble bounce even more.’’ (Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on ‘‘Treaty on Strategic Offensive 

Reductions: The Moscow Treaty.’’ July 9, 2002.) 

The House Armed Services Committee has been asking questions, holding briefings with the administration and even hearings in my subcommittee—all without 

any detailed explanation from the administration of what exactly is being discussed 

in its review. 

All we know about it is from press reports, which indicate that the President, in 

PPD–11 and other instructions, has directed the Administration to consider possibly 

unilateral reductions down to levels of 1,000, 700 and 300 deployed warheads. 

What are your views about proceeding to U.S. nuclear force levels of 1,000 or 

lower, before even the New START treaty has been implemented? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I’m deeply skeptical nuclear forces of that size are an adequate deterrent, but I absolutely agree with you that we should have a strategy to guide the 

size and structure of the force, and I have not seen strategic guidelines that would 

justify a force of 1,000 warheads or less. 

Mr. TURNER. How would our allies respond? Would advanced, resource and technology capable states continue to feel comfortable relying on U.S. guarantees at 

such low levels? Could such reductions in fact stimulate proliferation? 

Dr. SCHAKE. Many American allies would be concerned that a U.S. decision to reduce arsenals that low would be an American disengaging from forward defense of 

allies and protection of the global commons. Even allies that purport to want to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons base that on having a strong U.S. strategic nuclear force. So, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, an advocate of removing U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe, argued it was only possible in 

the context of relying on the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. 

What we saw in the debate within NATO about reducing non-strategic nuclear 

forces was a rush by allies to reaffirm three times in the past few years their desire 

for close nuclear cooperation and stationing of nuclear forces in Europe. 

Allied concerns would be magnified by an Administration that, as the Obama Administration has, been stingy with military assistance and political support during 

military conflicts. Allies want reassurance of our commitments from us, and reducing our nuclear arsenal will not be reassuring to them. Absent confidence in our extending nuclear deterrence, it could well precipitate some countries capable of building nuclear forces of their own to do so. 

Mr. TURNER. At what level would China build up to become a peer competitor? 

As a tangent, recently, arms controllers on a State Department Advisory Board have 

urged the United States to publicly declare ‘‘mutual vulnerability’’ with China. 

Could you please comment on whether you think this is a good idea? Why or why 

not? 

Dr. SCHAKE. China is a long way from having the military capability to win a sustained conventional war against the United States. But they look to be investing 

substantially in asymmetric means like cyber that have the potential to eliminate 

dominant U.S. advantages. I believe they are building up militarily in order to chip 

away at U.S. military dominance and at U.S. political influence, especially with 

countries in the Asia-Pacific. 

The declaration and preservation of mutual vulnerability is a terrible strategic 

posture, far less stabilizing than a defense-dominant order. Mutual vulnerability 

may be a fact of life, but it ought not be our objective. 

I also doubt a declaration of mutual vulnerability would benefit us. This Chinese 

government would likely take it to mean the U.S. intends to sacrifice any interests 

we have that conflict with China’s, and that would only encourage the irredentism 

China is already inclined toward and frighten U.S. allies relying on our willingness 

to preserve the status quo in Asia against assertive Chinese claims. 
198 

Mr. TURNER. The New York Times (Mark Landler, ‘‘Obama, on the trail, plays for 

time on foreign policy.’’ The New York Times. July 19, 2012) recently reported that, 

‘‘The casualties of the calendar include a presidential decision on how deeply to 

cut the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads, even below the levels in the New 

Start treaty with Russia. The administration has all but completed a review of options for Mr. Obama’s consideration, officials said, but the announcement has been 

delayed for months.’’ 

Are you aware of an Administration ever playing politics with a nuclear targeting 

review in this manner? 

Dr. SCHAKE. It is not clear to me whether the Administration has been withholding the conclusions or has genuinely been unable to complete the ‘‘90 day review’’. 

Mr. TURNER. Former Secretary of State Rice stated in December of 2010, 

‘‘Nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must 

be on stopping dangerous proliferators—not on further reductions in the U.S. and 

Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threat to each other or to international stability.’’ 

Was she right? Should President Obama follow her advice? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I agree with Secretary Rice that our priority in arms control should 

be on reversing progress in the most dangerous proliferating states. We should be 

more concerned presently with Iran and North Korea than we are with Russia. 

But I am, perhaps, more concerned than she is (or was) about Russia’s reversion 

to authoritarianism and I would favor a treaty limiting non-strategic nuclear forces 

because of the way Russia has tried to intimidate European countries with suggestions of their use. Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO alliance has unilaterally 

reduced its non-strategic nuclear forces by 90% and it precipitated no change at all 

in Russian non-strategic holdings; bringing Russian NSNF under treaty limits 

would be beneficial. 

Mr. TURNER. The Obama Nuclear Posture Review stated that progress toward disarmament by the United States will enhance its leadership position to deal with 

threats to its security: 

‘‘By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons—meeting our NPT 

Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament—we can put 

ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with 

us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and 

secure nuclear materials worldwide.’’ (2010 Nuclear Posture Review) 

The question follows, has this policy worked? 

Dr. SCHAKE. No, it has not worked. 

Mr. TURNER. North Korea continues to build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the six party process is defunct, with North Korea walking away from its 

most recent deal in record time. 

How has U.S. disarmament action through, for example, the New START treaty 

helped to deal with North Korea? 

Dr. SCHAKE. It has not helped. 

Mr. TURNER. Iran recently announced that it plans to build a nuclear navy and 

it may enrich nuclear fuel to as high as 90%, even talking about nuclear-powered 

oil tankers. Russia announced four days after the New START treaty entered into 

force that it would block further U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

Who precisely became more willing to help us adopt ‘‘the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime’’ to deal with Iran’s nuclear program because 

of the New START treaty or the NPR’s emphasis on reducing the roles and numbers 

of nuclear weapons? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I see no evidence the New START Treaty or reducing the roles and 

numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons has had any effect on Iran’s nuclear program or 

other countries’ willingness to assist in containing and reversing the Iranian nuclear 

programs. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR announced the U.S. would not build new nuclear 

weapons. In that same time, Pakistan, India, Russia and China have all announced 

the deployment of new nuclear weapons capabilities. 

What benefit did the U.S. get from the NPR decision constraining U.S. nuclear 

weapons development? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I see no evidence the constraints on U.S. nuclear weapons development have had any affect on other countries’ decisions about nuclear weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. ceased underground nuclear testing in 1992. Yet, France, 

China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all tested after that decision. 

Why didn’t they follow our example, our moral leadership, and stop testing when 

we did? 
199 

Dr. SCHAKE. I believe the countries named considered the robustness of their nuclear arsenals or the political significance of conducting tests to be much more important than any action taken by the United States. 

Mr. TURNER. Libya announced it was giving up its weapons of mass destruction 

in 2007 as the Bush Administration was pressing for Congress to approve the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. 

Why didn’t Libya choose to hang on to those capabilities in the face of U.S. efforts 

to develop new nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I see no evidence of a robust connection between the numbers or 

types of warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the decisions of other countries 

about their nuclear programs. In the case of Libya, their renunciation of WMD programs was motivated by a desire to change their relationship with the United 

States, foster greater economic openness, and concern that we had overthrown another dictator we believed working assiduously to develop such weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Schake, please describe Russian and European reactions to the 

over 90% reductions to U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. 

Dr. SCHAKE. Russia’s long-standing position has been that both the United States 

and Russia should remove all nuclear weapons from Europe (they do not acknowledge a NATO role in assessing threats, conducting planning, and participating in 

nuclear missions). Yet the dramatic reduction in NATO’s nuclear arsenal did not 

precipitate any reductions in the numbers or deployment patterns of Russian nuclear forces. None. 

European reaction to the 90% reductions has been both positive and deeply appreciative. Our allies were appreciative President Bush’s leadership in considering reductions, grateful to be included in a NATO process of analyzing alliance threats 

and determining a nuclear and conventional force posture that deters potential aggressors and assures allies of our continuing common purpose and common defense. 

Our country continues to benefit from the solid alliance management that produced 

the NSNF reductions, as demonstrated by NATO allies three times in the past few 

years reaffirming the continuation of those decisions. 

Our European allies keep reaffirming the status quo: they believe we have made 

the right strategic decisions about alliance nuclear forces and their role in our defense, and they want to maintain them. We will have difficult decisions to make 

about modernization of nuclear-capable delivery systems in a time of great budget 

austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, but allies have agreed that NATO needs to 

have nuclear forces deployed in Europe, and that wide participation in nuclear missions is important to the deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. In 2007, the State Department’s International Advisory Board released a report, ‘‘Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States.’’ In that report, President Kennedy was quoted expressing a concern of his about nuclear proliferation following a classified briefing by his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: 

‘‘I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having 

to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.’’ 

As we know, thankfully, that didn’t come to pass. 

Why? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I think there are lots of reasons. The Kennedy Administration was 

perhaps projecting its fears, given that it had weathered nuclear crises with the Soviet Union over Berlin and Cuba. The Kennedy Administration wasn’t actually very 

good at assessing other countries’ motivations, either. And predicting the future 

tends very often to rely too heavily on extrapolating near term trends. It’s entirely 

possible they overestimated the number of countries that wanted nuclear weapons, 

or those that had the indigenous scientific and engineering capacity to produce 

them, or those that perceived marginal advantage from attaining them. I do think 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty has played an important role in fostering a norm 

against proliferation, and that has changed the trajectory. Control of nuclear materials through the Suppliers Group has been hugely important in preventing countries that want the inputs from attaining them. I also think countries that acquired 

nuclear weapons found they didn’t perhaps solve as many problems as they might 

have wished. But perhaps the most useful constraint on proliferation has been U.S. 

security guarantees. Most of the countries that have the scientific and economic resources to have crossed the nuclear threshold are American allies: Germany, Japan, 

South Korea. Our willingness to extend the deterrence of our conventional and nuclear arsenals to their defense has prevented them choosing to build arsenals of 

their own. And lastly, we should not underestimate the importance of diplomacy. 

The U.S. and its allies have put an enormous amount of effort into identifying countries approaching the nuclear threshold and affecting their decisions. That has had 

a very important effect in raising the costs to potential proliferators. 
200 

Mr. TURNER. In 1968/69, the U.S. reached a high point of about 30,000 nuclear 

weapons. At that point there were five nuclear weapons states. The U.S. began reducing and the number of nuclear weapons states increased. For example, when the 

U.S. decreased to approximately 25,000 weapons, India went nuclear. At 10,000 

weapons, Pakistan. At 7,000 weapons, North Korea. We’re about to go below 5,000 

weapons and Iran is about to go nuclear. What lessons should we draw from this 

trend? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I don’t believe there is a robust correlation between the size and 

structure of U.S. nuclear forces and proliferation. I don’t see evidence that either 

Pakistan or North Korea believed the reductions in our arsenal were relevant to 

their decisions to cross the nuclear threshold. 

The only instances in which I am concerned other countries may see a connection are: • if the U.S. arsenal is reduced to such a low level that a country, or a collection 

of countries, saw the ability to destroy our nuclear force; or • countries or organizations believed there was political value in surpassing the 

numbers of U.S. forces. 

It may seem counterintuitive, but it is quite possible that further reductions in 

U.S. nuclear forces could precipitate proliferation rather than prevent it. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you agree China is in violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group requirements because of its support for Pakistan’s nuclear reactor programs, specifically the Chasma 3 and 4 reactors it is building for Pakistan? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I do not consider myself knowledgeable enough to make a judgment 

on that. 

Mr. TURNER. What steps should the U.S. take in response? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I do not consider myself knowledgeable enough to make a judgment 

on that. 

Mr. TURNER. What are U.S. obligations under the NPT? I ask this because the 

President has explained his view that there is a bargain, for example, his Prague 

speech: ‘‘The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and 

all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.’’ 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The NPT Basic Bargain is that most of the world, now 

more than 180 countries, agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange for 

this the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT (the United States, the 

United Kingdom, the Soviet Union/Russia, France and China) agreed to share the 

technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Article IV of the Treaty) and to 

pursue negotiations in good faith on ending the arms race (long since ended) and 

nuclear disarmament (Article VI of the Treaty). The United States NPT obligations 

with respect to the Basic Bargain are the provisions contained in Articles IV and 

VI. Article IV is straightforward; Article VI on its face is a commitment to engage 

in good faith nuclear disarmament negotiations. But the negotiating record makes 

clear that it was the intent of this Article to ultimately achieve the end point of the 

negotiations—the complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. However, it 

was recognized by the nonnuclear weapon states that this would take a long time 

and in the meantime the nuclear weapon states were expect to achieve interim 

measures, such as the comprehensive test ban treaty, referred to paragraph 10 of 

the preamble to the NPT. 

Mr. TURNER. In a memo from Spurgeon Keeney to incoming National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, explained that the negotiators’ view of 

the treaty suggests that Article VI is ‘‘an essentially hortatory statement.’’ 

Was Mr. Keeney, recently deceased, wrong? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Article VI was a hortatory statement in the sense it did not 

call for a specific result at a specific time. It obligates the U.S. to ‘‘good faith’’ negotiations on nuclear disarmament. But as the World Court has said ‘‘good faith’’ does 

imply a result at some point. 

Mr. TURNER. What’s more, the article clearly refers to ‘‘an end to the arms race 

. . . and complete and general disarmament.’’ 

Isn’t the arms race over? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Yes, the arms race is over. But of course nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. And in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review 

Conference all NPT parties, including the United States, agreed to ‘‘An unequivocal 

undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of 

their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties 

are committed under Article VI’’ States understood that eliminating nuclear weapons would take a long time but that the nuclear weapons states should take interim 

steps sooner, such as a comprehensive test ban. The objective of achieving a test 

ban is set forth in an NPT preambular clause. And when the NPT was indefinitely 
201 

extended in 1995 the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, in the 

accompanying Document, ‘‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

and Disarmament’’, pledged themselves to a series of interim steps including the 

test ban again and a fissile material cut off treaty. 

Mr. TURNER. I don’t seem to recall a great and abiding concern each time the U.S. 

builds an aircraft carrier, only a nuclear weapon. Why is only part of the article 

important? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The NPT Article VI commitment to ‘‘general and complete 

disarmament’’ was interpreted to be separate from that to ‘‘nuclear disarmament’’, 

in the Final Document of 2010 NPT Review Conference by the consent of all NPT 

parties. 

Mr. TURNER. When the Secretary of State appeared before the Senate during the 

process to obtain ratification of the New START treaty, she said the following: 

‘‘Moreover, by bringing the New START Treaty into force, we will strengthen our 

national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a 

core national security challenge—nuclear proliferation. Now, I am not suggesting 

that this treaty alone will convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. 

But it does demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we seek to hold 

these and other governments accountable, whether that means further isolating 

Iran and enforcing the rules against violators . . . A ratified new START treaty 

would also continue our progress toward broader U.S.-Russia cooperation. We believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran’s 

nuclear program . . .’’ (Testimony by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. 

Opening Remarks Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 18, 

2010.) 

Yet, four days after the New START treaty entered into force, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in London that, ‘‘with the 

approval of Resolution 1929 in [June] last year, practical possibilities to impose 

sanctions on those related—even indirectly—to the Iranian nuclear program have 

been exhausted.’’ 

Again, this was four days after the New START treaty was ratified. Was the Secretary of State wrong? Did she over promise? Did Russia care about U.S. disarmament in terms of ‘‘strengthening our hand’’ and continuing ‘‘our progress toward 

broader U.S.-Russian cooperation . . . including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program’’? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The Secretary of State was not wrong. Ratification of New 

START will help progress to continue toward broader U.S.-Russian cooperation. But 

it won’t solve everything at once. Iran is very difficult for Russia; Iran has never 

aided the Islamic rebels in Chechnya and helped Russia overcome the violence in 

Tajikistan. But slowly it will improve. 

Mr. TURNER. During a recent event with the Obama Administration’s Acting 

Under Secretary for Arms Control, you told a gathering of the American Bar Association that CTBT ratification was an essential step toward eventual nuclear disarmament. (Zach Toombs, ‘‘U.S. Arms Control Official: Test Ban Treaty Faces ‘Uphill’ 

Fight In Senate.’’ The Center for Public Integrity. July 23, 2012.) 

Do you stand by that statement? Is the CTBT a key step towards eventual nuclear disarmament? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I stand by that statement because I do not think that the 

NPT can remain viable for the long term without CTBT entry into force. It is an 

essential part of the Basic Bargain. Nuclear disarmament in the long run will not 

be possible if the NPT falls apart. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham, perhaps you could help me with something. 

You state in your prepared statement that, ‘‘the NPT may not be able to survive 

as a viable regime without CTBT entry into force in the reasonably near future.’’ 

You also state that ‘‘should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile likely the result would be the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East 

thereby destroying the NPT.’’ 

Which is likely to happen first, the NPT being destroyed by the failure to ratify 

the CTBT or an Iranian nuclear weapon? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. That is a difficult question to answer. But if I must choose 

I would say an Iranian nuclear weapon—if Iran decides to build one—could happen 

first. 

Mr. TURNER. How do you propose to get Iran and North Korea to ratify the CTBT 

to assure its entry into force? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. That of course will be difficult. With respect to Iran, if it 

is only Iran and North Korea that are left to ratify before the CTBT would come 

into force and Iran does not ratify that would unequivocally expose their program 
202 

as a weapons program. So that concern might be persuasive to them. North Korea 

will probably require bribery or threats of some sort. 

Mr. TURNER. Which states are Iran’s principal supporters right now? Is it true 

that Russian and China are blocking further U.N. Security Council Resolutions? 

Please explain to me what interest these states have in letting Iran go nuclear just 

because the CTBT hasn’t entered into force? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Iran and China are Iran’s principal supporters, but it has 

nothing to do with the CTBT. China wants Iran’s oil. With Russia it is more complicated. Iran has never aided the Chechen rebels, but if they did given their proximity to Chechnya, the Russian position there might become untenable. Iran also 

aided Russia in controlling violence in Tajikistan. Iran is in addition a large Russian 

trading partner. 

Mr. TURNER. What interest do the non-nuclear weapons states have in taking on 

the expense of building nuclear weapons, and risking the instability of further proliferation, just because CTBT hasn’t entered into force? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. It’s more a question of national pride than anything. The 

nonnuclear weapon states gave up forever the world’s most powerful weapon. As 

things presently work in the world community that makes them a second class 

state. The great powers are the five NPT nuclear weapon states, (the U.S., the U.K., 

Russia, France and China), the P–5. The non-nuclear weapon states want political 

cover for agreeing to accept second class status. That cover is the Basic Bargain, 

particularly the CTBT. If it is never delivered some of them will think about no 

longer remaining a second class state, and become a state whose views countries 

listen to by acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. Lastly, Ambassador Graham, your prepared statement includes the 

following line, which I found curious: ‘‘the Clinton Administration did try by offering 

major trade concessions but apparently it was too little, too late.’’ Is it really your 

position that we didn’t offer enough to Iran to entice it to give up its illegal nuclear 

weapons program? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. When President Clinton did that, the reform leader in Iran 

Mohamed Khatami had been in power three years; the conservatives had had time 

to undermine him. If the offer had been made by the Clinton administration in 1997 

when he was just elected and was reaching out to the West, rather than 2000, he 

might have been sufficiently strengthened to go for real reform. 

Mr. TURNER. Should all sides to the CTBT have the same obligation? Should the 

administration make unequivocally certain there are no side deals, no special P5 

deals? If there are any, the administration should release them? Are you aware of 

any P5-only agreements incident to the CTBT? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Yes all sides to the CTBT should have the same obligation. 

The administration should be sure that there are no side deals, or special P–5 deals, 

this is a zero yield treaty and it applies to everyone. I am not aware of any P–5 

only agreement related to the CTBT. 

Mr. TURNER. Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller, while the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Verification, stated in a speech titled ‘‘The Long Road from Prague’’ 

that, 

‘‘The second major arms control objective of the Obama Administration is the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). There is no step 

that we could take that would more effectively restore our moral leadership and improve our ability to reenergize the international nonproliferation consensus than to 

ratify the CTBT.’’ 

When did the United States lose its moral leadership? Why? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The United States was seen by many NPT parties at the 

time of the 2005 NPT Review Conference as disavowing important previous commitments that it had made to all NPT parties. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham, you stated in your testimony that, 

‘‘And first and foremost of these measures that those signing up to make themselves militarily permanently second class wanted as political balance for making 

this commitment was a comprehensive test ban. It is the only arms control agreement mentioned in the NPT, and it is of central importance to the bargain.’’ 

If the CTBT was so important, why was it merely a preambular reference? Why 

wasn’t it made a legally binding commitment? Do you assert it is legally binding 

on the U.S.? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. A preambular reference was the best that the non-nuclear 

weapon states could get at the time, 1968. In 1968 near the close of the negotiations 

the U.S. and the Soviet Union promised the nonnuclear states that a comprehensive 

test ban treaty would be worked out in the Review Conferences. That never happened indeed was never attempted until the 1995 timeframe. A preambular clause 

is not legally binding on anyone. 
203 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Graham, you also stated regarding the CTBT that, 

‘‘Well, Egypt of the countries of the world, Egypt and Indonesia were probably the 

two strongest ones to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’ Please state what 

actions Egypt and Indonesia will take to deal with nuclear terrorism or the Iranian 

nuclear weapons program if, but only if, the U.S. ratifies the CTBT. 

Ambassador GRAHAM. In 1995 at the time of NPT extension Egypt and Indonesia 

were the two states most active in arguing for a comprehensive test ban treaty. But 

many, many others wanted it. This issue had to do with the NPT and the nuclear 

arms control structure and nothing to do with terrorism or Iran. Should the U.S. 

ratify CTBT that doesn’t mean those two states would do anything specific about 

terrorism or Iran. Indonesia isn’t even much of a player in the Iran debate. 

Mr. TURNER. Is there any evidence they will walk away from the NPT if the U.S. 

does not ratify the CTBT? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Egypt and Indonesia have not said that they would walk 

away from the NPT if the CTBT is not ratified. Egypt possibly might acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does. The CTBT relates to the long term viability of the NPT, 

whether it is a balanced treaty or not which can stand the test of time. 

Mr. TURNER. Traditionally, a President has directed his military advisers to determine, chiefly, what level of our nuclear force is needed to deter a potential adversary from attacking us or our allies. The answer to that question should be what 

drives the strategy—not a President’s political ideology. 

For example, here’s how Secretary Powell stated President Bush looked at the 

issue: 

‘‘President Bush gathered his advisers around him and he instructed us as follows: Find the lowest number we need to make America safe, to make America safe 

today and to make America safe in the future. Do not think of this in cold war 

terms, don’t think in terms of how many more weapons do we have to have in order 

to make the rubble bounce even more.’’ (Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on ‘‘Treaty on Strategic Offensive 

Reductions: The Moscow Treaty.’’ July 9, 2002.) 

The House Armed Services Committee has been asking questions, holding briefings with the administration and even hearings in my subcommittee—all without 

any detailed explanation from the administration of what exactly is being discussed 

in its review. 

All we know about it is from press reports, which indicate that the President, in 

PPD–11 and other instructions, has directed the Administration to consider possibly 

unilateral reductions down to levels of 1,000, 700 and 300 deployed warheads. 

What are your views about proceeding to U.S. nuclear force levels of 1,000 or 

lower, before even the New START treaty has been implemented? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I think that it should be a Pentagon decision based on their 

best judgment of what size force is desirable. And I also do not think that it should 

be a unilateral decision, we should negotiate with the Russians to the levels we 

want. It seems to me an agreement with Russia to jointly reduce to 1000 weapons 

would be a good follow on to New START. Some believe that this is the level required to persuade the other nuclear weapon states to be involved in the process 

and negotiate reductions of their stockpiles. 

Mr. TURNER. How would our allies respond? Would advanced, resource and technology capable states continue to feel comfortable relying on U.S. guarantees at 

such low levels? Could such reductions in fact stimulate proliferation? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I don’t favor unilateral reductions. If they are negotiated 

levels our allies as well as other states would be very positive about such an effort. 

Mr. TURNER. At what level would China build up to become a peer competitor? 

As a tangent, recently, arms controllers on a State Department Advisory Board have 

urged the United States to publicly declare ‘‘mutual vulnerability’’ with China. 

Could you please comment on whether you think this is a good idea? Why or why 

not? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I think it is most unlikely China would wish to build up 

to become a peer competitor. China is not our friend; they will compete with us but 

not with nuclear weapons. Cultural, economic and technological weapons (cyber) are 

their preferences. I do not support the idea of declaring ‘‘mutual vulnerability’’ with 

China. 

Mr. TURNER. The New York Times (Mark Landler, ‘‘Obama, on the trail, plays for 

time on foreign policy.’’ The New York Times. July 19, 2012) recently reported that, 

‘‘The casualties of the calendar include a presidential decision on how deeply to 

cut the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads, even below the levels in the New 

Start treaty with Russia. The administration has all but completed a review of options for Mr. Obama’s consideration, officials said, but the announcement has been 

delayed for months.’’ 
204 

Are you aware of an Administration ever playing politics with a nuclear targeting 

review in this manner? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I hate to sound cynical, and I am taking the question seriously, but I do not recall an administration that did not play politics with issues 

such as this. 

Mr. TURNER. Former Secretary of State Rice stated in December of 2010, 

‘‘Nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must 

be on stopping dangerous proliferators—not on further reductions in the U.S. and 

Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threat to each other or to international stability.’’ 

Was she right? Should President Obama follow her advice? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. I do not think that the U.S. and Russia should retain large 

nuclear weapon arsenals which serve no purpose. I do not agree with former Secretary of State Rice on this. 

Mr. TURNER. The Obama Nuclear Posture Review stated that progress toward disarmament by the United States will enhance its leadership position to deal with 

threats to its security: 

‘‘By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons—meeting our NPT 

Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament—we can put 

ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with 

us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and 

secure nuclear materials worldwide.’’ (2010 Nuclear Posture Review) 

The question follows, has this policy worked? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Little progress has been made toward nuclear disarmament, and no decision has been made to reduce the U.S. stockpiles below the 

New START levels, so it is too early to determine whether this policy has worked. 

I strongly favor further reductions but not unilateral ones. 

Mr. TURNER. North Korea continues to build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the six party process is defunct, with North Korea walking away from its 

most recent deal in record time. 

How has U.S. disarmament action through, for example, the New START treaty 

helped to deal with North Korea? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. All of this happened between 2003 and 2009, before New 

START. It took place because the U.S. in the 2001–2003 timeframe did not pursue 

an agreement which was possible at the time to prevent the expansion of the North 

Korean arsenal. New START is unlikely to have an effect on this fait situation. 

Mr. TURNER. Iran recently announced that it plans to build a nuclear navy and 

it may enrich nuclear fuel to as high as 90%, even talking about nuclear-powered 

oil tankers. Russia announced four days after the New START treaty entered into 

force that it would block further U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

Who precisely became more willing to help us adopt ‘‘the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime’’ to deal with Iran’s nuclear program because 

of the New START treaty or the NPR’s emphasis on reducing the roles and numbers 

of nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The Nuclear Posture Review asserted that meeting our 

NPT Article VI commitments to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons 

will put us in a stronger position, and it has. That did not and does not mean that 

Russia will automatically agree with us on sanctions. We now have a better relationship and that was all that was meant. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR announced the U.S. would not build new nuclear 

weapons. In that same time, Pakistan, India, Russia and China have all announced 

the deployment of new nuclear weapons capabilities. 

What benefit did the U.S. get from the NPR decision constraining U.S. nuclear 

weapons development? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The NPR did not make decisions on U.S. nuclear weapon 

development. It announced a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons and supported 

meeting our NPT commitments. India and Pakistan are not NPT members so it did 

not affect them. Russia in 2010 did agree to New START which we wanted, China 

remains far behind the U.S. in numbers. 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. ceased underground nuclear testing in 1992. Yet, France, 

China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all tested after that decision. 

Why didn’t they follow our example, our moral leadership, and stop testing when 

we did? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. France and China ceased testing in 1996. India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and have announced they will not test again so they did follow 

our moral leadership. North Korea does not follow anyone’s moral leadership. 
205 

Mr. TURNER. Libya announced it was giving up its weapons of mass destruction 

in 2007 as the Bush Administration was pressing for Congress to approve the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. 

Why didn’t Libya choose to hang on to those capabilities in the face of U.S. efforts 

to develop new nuclear capabilities? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. Libya announced it was giving up its WMD programs, nuclear and chemical in 2003. They made that decision in order to rejoin the world 

community; this was unrelated to anything that the U.S. did in its nuclear program. 

Mr. TURNER. In 2007, the State Department’s International Advisory Board released a report, ‘‘Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States.’’ In that report, President Kennedy was quoted expressing a concern of his about nuclear proliferation following a classified briefing by his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: 

‘‘I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having 

to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.’’ 

As we know, thankfully, that didn’t come to pass. 

Why? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. President Kennedy repeated this concern in public at a 

news briefing in March of 1963. It didn’t happen because of the entry into force of 

the NPT in 1970 and the associated extended deterrence policies of the U.S. and 

the Soviet Union. 

Mr. TURNER. In 1968/69, the U.S. reached a high point of about 30,000 nuclear 

weapons. At that point there were five nuclear weapons states. The U.S. began reducing and the number of nuclear weapons states increased. For example, when the 

U.S. decreased to approximately 25,000 weapons, India went nuclear. At 10,000 

weapons, Pakistan. At 7,000 weapons, North Korea. We’re about to go below 5,000 

weapons and Iran is about to go nuclear. What lessons should we draw from this 

trend? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. No lesson should be drawn from this history. The United 

States, as long as nuclear weapons exist, should possess the number of nuclear 

weapons needed to deter the use of a nuclear weapon by anyone else. President 

George W. Bush ordered the number of nuclear weapons unilaterally reduced by 50 

percent from roughly 10,000 to 5,000 because he concluded that was all that we 

needed. He was right to do this but it would have been better if it had been done 

pursuant to a treaty with Russia to bring them down as well. In 2010 the U.S. for 

the first time released the actual number of weapons in its nuclear weapon stockpile, around 5100. India probably has in the range of 100 to 120 nuclear weapons, 

Pakistan perhaps a few more. North Korea is estimated to possess 10–12 nuclear 

weapons and Iran, at present, has zero. Would anyone argue that 5100 weapons 

cannot deter 120 or 10–12? If the Department of Defense concludes that a somewhat 

lower total number than 5100 serves the interest of the U.S. Government better 

then we should move to that number. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you agree China is in violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group requirements because of its support for Pakistan’s nuclear reactor programs, specifically the Chasma 3 and 4 reactors it is building for Pakistan? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. If China is transferring sensitive nuclear equipment or materials to Pakistan without the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group then it 

would be acting in violation of NSG rules. However this is a difficult case to make 

since the U.S. pressured the NSG to make such an exception for India just a few 

years ago. 

Mr. TURNER. What steps should the U.S. take in response? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The U.S. should of course complain but our complaints will 

not persuade many because of our insistence a few years ago that an exception for 

this activity be given to India by the NSG. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why does the continued viability of the NPT matter? What is the 

impact of the NPT unraveling? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why would non-nuclear weapon states agree to give up forever 

their right to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We have no forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia 

and the presence of these weapons in NATO is becoming a more controversial issue 

within the Alliance. Given the cost of maintaining these weapons in excess of $10 
206 

billion just for the life-extension program, are there other approaches to extended 

deterrence that would maintain a strong nuclear alliance? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where did the current effort to reach the goal of global elimination 

of nuclear weapons come from, did it come from President Obama himself or is he 

following a bi-partisan policy first begun by President Ronald Reagan and now continued by former Secretary of State George Shultz? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why does the continued viability of the NPT matter? What is the 

impact of the NPT unraveling? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I think the NPT matters for two reasons. First, it provides the basis 

for IAEA inspections and U.N. Security Council action against violations by signatories to the Treaty. Second, it has established an international norm against proliferation by signatories that has been valuable. 

The impact of it unraveling would be a much more difficult and likely less effective effort to constrain nuclear proliferation. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why would non-nuclear weapon states agree to give up forever 

their right to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons? 

Dr. SCHAKE. The reasons vary among states, the most common being (a) they 

never had any plans to develop nuclear weapons in the first place; (b) confidence 

in security guarantees from reliable allies—the United States has actually been the 

most important discourager of capable countries crossing the threshold by extending 

our deterrent to their protection; and (c) the political and economic costs of proceeding against IAEA and U.N. sanction. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We have no forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia 

and the presence of these weapons in NATO is becoming a more controversial issue 

within the Alliance. Given the cost of maintaining these weapons in excess of $10 

billion just for the life-extension program, are there other approaches to extended 

deterrence that would maintain a strong nuclear alliance? 

Dr. SCHAKE. I respectfully disagree with your statement that the presence of nuclear weapons in NATO is becoming more controversial. They are substantially less 

controversial than at almost any time in NATO’s history—especially compared to 

anti-nuclear protests in Britain during the 1950s or Germany in the 1980s. Three 

times in the past few years NATO allies have reaffirmed the importance of nuclear 

weapons deployed in Europe and the benefits to the alliance of widespread participation in nuclear responsibilities. 

There are a variety of ways allies seeking to maintain a strong nuclear alliance 

can do so, but I think the essential element is sharing in nuclear responsibilities. 

Deterrence gets brittle when the burden is not shared in ways allies consider equitable. 

One reason forward stationing U.S. weapons in Europe matters so much, both to 

the U.S. and its allies, is that it shows potential adversaries that our European allies are willing to shoulder responsibilities, risks, and costs along with us. NATO 

allies have just reaffirmed again at the Chicago summit that we want our defense 

to be inseparable—no way for an aggressor to split the U.S. off from Europe. Not 

having the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent stationed in Europe might tempt an aggressor to believe otherwise, and that would be dangerous for us all. So NATO allies 

recommitted our governments to a defense strategy and a nuclear posture that continues the existing force. Europeans are also very nervous just now about Russia’s 

slide into authoritarianism and the Obama Administration’s ‘‘pivot to Asia.’’ Allied 

governments want to maintain the status quo in nuclear sharing because they’re 

worried aggressors might believe the U.S. no longer cares about Europe’s security. 

So now isn’t a terrific time for the U.S. to make changes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where did the current effort to reach the goal of global elimination 

of nuclear weapons come from, did it come from President Obama himself or is he 

following a bi-partisan policy first begun by President Ronald Reagan and now continued by former Secretary of State George Shultz? 

Dr. SCHAKE. As your question suggests, there is considerable continuity across 

presidential administrations aspiring toward a world without nuclear weapons; 

there is, however, also considerable continuity in their belief we do not live in that 

world yet. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why does the continued viability of the NPT matter? What is the 

impact of the NPT unraveling? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The unraveling of the NPT would almost certainly have led 

eventually to that highly proliferated world which was President Kennedy’s nightmare, 15–20 or more states with nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals. Only today, the number would be higher. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency said in 2004 that over 40 nations now have the ca-
207 

pability to build nuclear weapons. Proliferation on this scale would mean that every 

conflict would carry with the risk of going nuclear and it would be very difficult to 

keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations they would be so 

widespread. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why would non-nuclear weapon states agree to give up forever 

their right to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. NPT non-nuclear weapon states, more than 180 countries, 

most of the world, agreed pursuant to a Basic Bargain established by the signing 

of the NPT in 1968 and its indefinite extension in 1995, that they would never acquire nuclear weapons, the most powerful weapons ever developed. The structure 

of the Basic Bargain is that most of the world agreed never to have nuclear weapons 

in exchange for the commitment of the NPT nuclear weapon states (the United 

States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China) to share peaceful nuclear 

technology as well as pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear weapon arsenals. In the interim, prior to achieving 

nuclear disarmament in the far off future the NPT nuclear weapon states are expected to take interim steps including: a comprehensive test ban; deep reductions 

in nuclear weapons; a fissile material cut off treaty; and a legally binding commitment not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear 

weapon states in good standing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We have no forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia 

and the presence of these weapons in NATO is becoming a more controversial issue 

within the Alliance. Given the cost of maintaining these weapons in excess of $10 

billion just for the life-extension program, are there other approaches to extended 

deterrence that would maintain a strong nuclear alliance? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. U.S. land based forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe no longer have a role. They were deployed to offset the conventional force imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. But it is NATO that now 

that has superiority. 

However, these weapons should not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO 

and it would be good to withdraw them—should NATO consent—pursuant to a treaty with Russia withdrawing their tactical nuclear weapons from the European region. 

Extended deterrence can be maintained by the presence of U.S. nuclear armed 

ballistic missile submarines off the coast of Europe. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where did the current effort to reach the goal of global elimination 

of nuclear weapons come from, did it come from President Obama himself or is he 

following a bi-partisan policy first begun by President Ronald Reagan and now continued by former Secretary of State George Shultz? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The idea for the current effort came from the first Wall 

Street Journal article published in January, 2007 co-authored by former Secretary 

of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Sam Nunn. In that article the four authors note that President Ronald 

Reagan called for the abolishment of ‘‘all nuclear weapons’’ which he considered to 

be ‘‘totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.’’ And the four authors said in the article 

that ‘‘. . . unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to 

enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, 

and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.’’ In conclusion the 

four authors call for the achieving of ‘‘the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons’’. 

President Obama followed this lead at Prague in 2009 and thereafter. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you think it would have been better to have New START and 

Russia’s cooperation on not selling S–300 missiles to Iran, or would we be better 

off without New START and S–300 surface-to-air missiles in Iran? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do we have stronger multilateral sanctions on Iran now than we 

did in 2008? Has the U.S. contribution to the reset with Russia contributed to this 

effort? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you think it would have been better to have New START and 

Russia’s cooperation on not selling S–300 missiles to Iran, or would we be better 

off without New START and S–300 surface-to-air missiles in Iran? 
208 

Dr. SCHAKE. I believe Russia would have cancelled the S–300 missile sale to Iran 

whether or not there was a New START Treaty. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do we have stronger multilateral sanctions on Iran now than we 

did in 2008? Has the U.S. contribution to the reset with Russia contributed to this 

effort? 

Dr. SCHAKE. We do have stronger multilateral sanctions on Iran, but recall they 

were passed in the U.N. without the support of Turkey or Brazil, and achieved only 

by exempting most of Iran’s main oil customer (Japan, South Korea, and China). 

The Russians made clear, just 4 days after the U.N. sanctions bill passed, that it 

was the last round they would vote in favor of. Turkey and India are overtly circumventing the sanctions, part of why the Iranians may believe they can endure even 

seemingly stronger sanctions. 

The Iranians may also believe Europe’s financial crisis will make the higher cost 

of sanctions unsupportable. Europe’s enforcement of EU sanctions have actually had 

a greater economic effect, and possibly even political effect, than the U.N. sanctions. 

So I think it gives undue credit to the reset policy to suggest it made stronger 

sanctions possible. The credit actually should go more to Europe than to anything 

the U.S. did. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you think it would have been better to have New START and 

Russia’s cooperation on not selling S–300 missiles to Iran, or would we be better 

off without New START and S–300 surface-to-air missiles in Iran? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. It is of course far better to have New START and Russia’s 

cooperation on not selling the effective air defense missile, the S–300, to Iran. New 

START brought Russia’s arsenal—larger than ours—back under control and restored the START verification system of such great value to the U.S. If ever there 

was a win-win, this is it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do we have stronger multilateral sanctions on Iran now than we 

did in 2008? Has the U.S. contribution to the reset with Russia contributed to this 

effort? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. The fourth round of sanctions on Iran was adopted by the 

United Nations Security Council in 2010; they made the grip of sanctions considerably tighter. They likely would not have been possible without the U.S. reset policy 

with Russia. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What are your recommendations as the United States prepares for 

the 2015 NPT Review conference? What can we expect and what can/should the 

United States bring to the table? 

Ambassador GRAHAM. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference the NPT non-nuclear 

weapon states indicated that they would be much stronger in their demands for the 

implementation of the Basic Bargain in 2015. It is highly important that the U.S. 

ratify the CTBT before that date and also if at all possible make progress on a 

fissile material cut off treaty as well as a second round of New START negotiations. 

Æ