Page 1 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

April 1, 2013 

Congressional Committees

Subject: DOD Procurement of Mi-17 Helicopters

This letter and enclosed briefing slides responds to the Senate Armed Services Committee 

report 112-173 accompanying the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, which directed 

GAO to review the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement of Mi-17 helicopters through 

Rosoboronexport, a Russian state-owned arms export firm. In response, we reviewed: (1) 

the reasons for DOD’s cancellation of a 2010 competitive solicitation for 21 Mi-17 

helicopters; (2) the extent to which DOD evaluated the availability and feasibility of 

alternative procurement approaches for military or civilian variants of the Mi-17 helicopter; 

and (3) DOD’s assessment of the impact that contracting directly with Rosoboronexport may 

have had on the risk of access to technical data, aircraft safety, and counterfeiting.

To address our objectives, we reviewed key documents in the Navy and Army Mi-17 

contract files, including the solicitation; determination and findings; source selection plan; 

and cost and price analysis. We reviewed DOD internal memorandums, DOD audit reports, 

bid protest decisions, related hearing transcripts, and external DOD correspondence. We 

interviewed officials at DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Management 

Office; Naval Air Systems Command; Combined Security Transition Command—

Afghanistan; Army’s Aviation Engineering Directorate; and the Department of State. In 

addition, we interviewed four potential vendors of Mi-17 helicopters, selected based on their 

interest in past and planned Mi-17 procurements. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to cancel its 

competitive solicitation for 21 civilian Mi-17s because Russian authorities told DOD in late 

2010 that, in accordance with Russian law, they would sell the helicopters only through 

Rosoboronexport since they were intended for military end use. Specifically, in response to 

letters written by the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

confirmed to DOD that it considered the Mi-17s to be military because they were for use by 

the Afghan Air Force, and therefore could be sold only through Rosoboronexport, the sole 

entity responsible for Russian military exports.
Page 2 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD did not assess alternative means for procuring Mi-17s after verifying that Russia would 

sell the helicopters to the United States only through Rosoboronexport. The Navy’s original 

procurement strategy in 2010 was to purchase civilian Mi-17s and subsequently add 

weapons to them for use in Afghanistan. However, given the Russian government’s 

determination, DOD officials stated that no alternative approaches to procure the helicopters 

were available to them as any attempt to procure a new civilian aircraft could be blocked by

Rosoboronexport if DOD did not go through them, and purchasing used helicopters posed 

safety concerns. Although some potential vendors told us that, if awarded a contract, they 

could provide these aircraft to DOD at a lower cost, an Army analysis determined that the 

price paid to Rosoboronexport for the Mi-17s was reasonable and fell within the historical 

range of the unit price paid for similar aircraft. 

DOD determined that the Rosoboronexport contract offered the Army greater access to 

technical information from the original equipment manufacturer and increased assurance of 

safety compared to previous Mi-17 contracts. However, the risk of counterfeiting may be 

similar. The 2011 contract with Rosoboronexport provided Army officials with extensive 

access to the original equipment manufacturer’s facilities and allowed for technical 

discussions on the aircraft’s design, testing, and manufacturing processes. This level of 

insight enabled the Army to determine that the Russians’ process was sufficient by U.S. 

standards to certify airworthiness. However, both Rosoboronexport and other vendors have 

purchased new Mi-17s that came from the original equipment manufacturer—a practice 

used to decrease the risk of counterfeiting. Therefore, we found no evidence that shows 

how Rosoboronexport would decrease the risk of counterfeit parts over other vendors if 

aircraft were purchased new from the original equipment manufacturer. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. In its written comments, 

reproduced in Enclosure II, DOD generally agreed with our findings. In addition, DOD 

provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. State provided no 

comments. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State and 

appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-4841 or courtsm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this 

report are John Neumann, Assistant Director, Leigh Ann Haydon; Ellen Ramachandran; 

John Krump; Pete Anderson; and Roxanna Sun. 

Michael Courts

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosure
Page 3 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

List of Addressees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate 

The Honorable Buck McKeon

Chairman 

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Armed Services Committee

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bill Young 

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky 

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 4 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Enclosure I: DOD Procurement of Mi-17 Helicopters

DOD Procurement of 

Mi-17 Helicopters

Congressional Briefing

For more information, contact Michael Courts, courtsm@gao.gov. Page 1
Page 5 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Contents

• Introduction

• Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Summary

• Background

• Objective 1: Reasons for Canceling Navy Solicitation

• Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to 

Rosoboronexport

• Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, 

and Counterfeiting

• Detailed Scope and Methodology

Page 2
Page 6 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Introduction

• To support the Afghan military, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

been procuring Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters due to their ability to 

operate in the high elevations of Afghanistan. 

• Prior to 2010, DOD competitively procured a small number of Mi-17 

helicopters through U.S. companies, whose subcontractors purchased 

them new from the original equipment manufacturer in Russia. 

• In 2010, the Navy initiated a competitive procurement for 21 Mi-17s in a 

civilian variant but canceled the solicitation and transferred responsibility 

for it to the Army at the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

• In 2011, the Army contracted with a Russian state-owned arms export 

firm, Rosoboronexport, to purchase 21 Mi-17 military helicopters with the 

option to buy 12 additional aircraft. 

• Members of Congress have criticized the Army contract for its structure 

and cost, and because of Rosoboronexport’s alleged arms sales to Syria. 

Page 3
Page 7 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Objectives, Scope and Methodology 

• Senate Report 112-173, accompanying the 2013 National 

Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review the current 

process for procuring Mi-17 helicopters through 

Rosoboronexport. 

• Specifically, we reviewed: 

1. The reasons for DOD's cancellation of a 2010 competitive solicitation for 21 Mi-17 helicopters; 

2. The extent to which DOD evaluated the availability and feasibility of alternative procurement approaches for 

military or civilian variants of the Mi-17 helicopter; and

3. DOD’s assessment of the impact that contracting directly with Rosoboronexport may have had on the risk of access 

to technical data, aircraft safety, and counterfeiting. 

Page 4
Page 8 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Objectives, Scope and Methodology 

• We reviewed key documents in Mi-17 contract files, DOD internal 

memorandums, bid protest decisions, related hearing transcripts, 

and external DOD correspondence. 

• We interviewed officials from DOD’s Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Army, Navy, and Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan, as well as officials from Department of 

State. We also interviewed potential vendors of Mi-17s, selected 

based on their interest in past and planned Mi-17 procurements. 

• For a complete discussion of our scope and methodology, see 

slides 28-31. 

Page 5
Page 9 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Summary

• DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to cancel its 

competitive solicitation for 21 civilian Mi-17s because Russian authorities told 

U.S. government officials in late 2010 that, in accordance with Russian law, 

they would only sell the helicopters through Rosoboronexport since the 

aircraft were intended for military end use. 

• DOD did not assess alternative means for procuring Mi-17s after verifying that 

Russia would only sell the helicopters to the United States through 

Rosoboronexport. Some potential vendors we spoke to told us that, if 

awarded a contract, they could provide these aircraft at a lower cost; however, 

an Army analysis determined that the price paid to Rosoboronexport for the 

Mi-17s was reasonable. 

• DOD determined that the Rosoboronexport contract offered it greater access 

to technical information from the original equipment manufacturer and 

increased assurance of safety compared to previous Mi-17 contracts. 

However, the risk of counterfeiting may be similar. 

Page 6
Page 10 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Background: Mi-17 Helicopters

• The Mi-17 is a multi-use transport helicopter that was developed by the 

former Soviet Union for use in Afghanistan and that is now widely used 

throughout the world. 

• Since 2005, the United States has been procuring Mi-17s to build the 

capacity of the Afghan military and is working toward a total fleet size of 

approximately 80 helicopters. The Afghan military had approximately 50 

Mi-17s as of 2012, and the Army currently plans to purchase at least 30 

additional Mi-17s. 

• Mi-17s can be produced in either civilian or military variants. Military 

variants contain features that differ from civilian variants, such as 

increased power supply and structural reinforcements to carry external 

weapons. 

Page 7
Page 11 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Background: Mi-17 Helicopters

• New Mi-17s are produced in Russia by the original equipment 

manufacturer, Russian Helicopters.

• Another Russian state-owned company, Rosoboronexport, is 

the sole authorized exporter of military end use products from 

Russia. 

• As a result of multiple violations of U.S. law, Rosoboronexport 

was subject to U.S. sanctions that were imposed in 2006 and 

lifted in 2010.

Page 8
Page 12 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Background: History of DOD Mi-17 Helicopter 

Procurements

• In 2009, the Navy procured four new civilian Mi-17s from a 

Huntsville-based firm, Defense Technologies Inc., whose 

subcontractors purchased the aircraft from the original 

equipment manufacturer.

• In July 2010, the Navy released a competitive solicitation for 

21 new Mi-17s in a civilian variant. At the direction of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy canceled this 

solicitation and transferred the requirement to the Army in 

December 2010. 

Page 9
Page 13 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Background: History of DOD Mi-17 Helicopter 

Procurements

• In January 2011, the Army issued a solicitation for military Mi-17s 

with plans to award the contract to Rosoboronexport. DOD justified 

the need for Mi-17s from Rosoboronexport based on the public 

interest exception to the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirement 

to provide for full and open competition. Several U.S. firms filed bid 

protests related to the procurement of 21 Mi-17s, but all protests 

were denied or dismissed. 

• The May 2011 contract with Rosoboronexport contained options for 

DOD to purchase an additional 12 military aircraft. DOD exercised 

these options in 2012. 

• In November 2012, the Army issued a request for information to 

identify potential sources from industry to purchase an additional 30 

military Mi-17s. 

Page 10
Page 14 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Background: DOD Procurement of 21 Mi-17 

Helicopters

Page 11
Page 15 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Canceled Mi-17 Solicitation after Learning That Russia 

Would Sell Them Only through Rosoboronexport

• DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to cancel its competitive 

solicitation for 21 civilian Mi-17s because Russian authorities told U.S. government 

officials in late 2010 that, in accordance with Russian law, they would only sell the 

helicopters through Rosoboronexport since the aircraft were intended for military end 

use. 

• DOD confirmed Russia’s position after the U.S. Ambassador to Russia wrote two 

letters to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October and November 2010 to 

obtain the Russian government’s official position on the procurement. 

• One letter from the U.S. Ambassador cited DOD’s understanding based on previous 

purchases that the Mi-17s were determined to be civilian by the Russian Ministry of 

Defense and thus were not controlled by Rosoboronexport. 

• In response, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that it considered the Mi- 17s to be for military use because they were to be used by the Afghan Air Force. 

These officials stated that the procurement had to occur through a direct contract with 

Rosoboronexport, the sole entity responsible for Russian military exports. 

Page 12

Objective 1: Reasons for Canceling Navy Solicitation
Page 16 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Canceled Mi-17 Solicitation after Learning That Russia 

Would Sell Them Only through Rosoboronexport 

• Representatives from three out of the four potential Mi-17 vendors 

we spoke with told us there is disagreement on who the 

appropriate authority is to make that decision. The fourth vendor 

did not raise this as an issue. 

• One vendor’s analysis of Russian law stated that only the Russian 

Ministry of Defense can certify an export as civilian or military. This 

vendor received letters from the Russian Ministry of Defense in 

January and September 2010 indicating that the Ministry saw no 

barriers to exporting the aircraft in the proposed civilian 

configuration. 

• State Department and Army officials told us that the Russian 

Ministry of Defense is not currently responsible for making this 

determination. 

Page 13

Objective 1: Reasons for Canceling Navy Solicitation
Page 17 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Canceled Mi-17 Solicitation after Learning That Russia 

Would Sell Them Only through Rosoboronexport

• In ruling on a bid protest challenging the Navy’s cancellation, the 

Federal Court of Claims found that DOD’s actions to clarify the law 

through diplomatic channels via the U.S. Embassy in Russia served 

as a reasonable basis for canceling the solicitation.

• While the Navy solicitation was ongoing, DOD was in the process of 

establishing the Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project 

Management Office to centralize its management of Mi-17s and 

other non-standard rotary aircraft. 

• DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense transferred the 

requirement to procure Mi-17s to this new office shortly before 

canceling the Navy solicitation. 

Page 14

Objective 1: Reasons for Canceling Navy Solicitation
Page 18 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• DOD did not assess alternative means for procuring Mi-17s after 

verifying that Russia would only sell them through 

Rosoboronexport. 

• The Navy’s original strategy in 2010 was to purchase civilian Mi-17s 

and subsequently add weapons to them for use in Afghanistan. The 

Russian government’s determination that these 21 Mi-17s were 

considered military exports differed from previous procurements. 

DOD officials told us that the Russian government ignored DOD’s 

military end use of the civilian helicopters during the time that 

Rosoboronexport was subject to sanctions. 

• Senior DOD officials stated that any attempt to procure a civilian 

aircraft for military end use could be blocked by Rosoboronexport if 

DOD did not go through them. 

Page 15

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 19 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• When the procurement was transferred from the Navy to the 

Army, the Army changed the requirement from civilian to 

military Mi-17s. An Army official told us that the military 

configuration had always been more desirable, so the Army 

pursued this option once the sanctions against 

Rosoboronexport were lifted. 

• DOD officials stated that purchasing used Mi-17s on the open 

market was not a viable option because they had experienced 

safety and maintenance problems impacting cost and 

schedule with these aircraft in the past.

Page 16

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 20 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• Representatives from two vendors we spoke with stated that the Army’s 

solicitation of military Mi-17s limits competition to only Rosoboronexport. 

• These representatives told us that other civilian Mi-17s have the same 

operational capabilities as the military variant sought by the Army and 

believe that it would not require a contract with Rosoboronexport. DOD 

officials disagreed with these statements.

• Further, representatives from one vendor said it was currently in 

communication with Russian Helicopters, which indicated that it could 

modify a civilian Mi-17 to a military configuration at the original equipment 

manufacturer with assurance of airworthiness. DOD officials stated that 

this option would still require DOD to take additional steps to ensure 

airworthiness. They also stated that it does not address the current 

Russian determination that Mi-17s must be sold to DOD through 

Rosoboronexport.

Page 17

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 21 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• In response to congressional interest, DOD released a 

request for information in November 2012 seeking 

alternative procurement approaches for 30 additional Mi-17 

military helicopters. 

• An official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

stated that DOD was not aware of alternatives to 

contracting with Rosoboronexport at this time, but will 

reassess once they evaluate responses from the request 

for information. 

Page 18

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 22 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• Although the Army requested it, Rosoboronexport did not provide certified cost 

and pricing data, stating that it was prohibited from doing so under Russian 

law. The Army performed an analysis based on historical prices paid by U.S. 

and foreign buyers, as authorized by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

• The aircraft used for purposes of comparison all had different configurations. 

For example, one aircraft used for a point of comparison was a military variant 

that contained no armament, whereas another aircraft was a civilian variant. 

• Despite the differences in configuration among these aircraft, Army officials 

were able to determine that the unit price paid to Rosoboronexport—$17.15 

million—fell within the historical range and was therefore reasonable. 

Page 19

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 23 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• Beyond the analysis conducted required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 

Army officials conducted another analysis comparing the costs of the 

Rosoboronexport contract with the estimated costs of procuring the same aircraft 

through a U.S. vendor, provided they were not blocked by Rosoboronexport. 

• Based on this estimate, Army officials told us that buying military aircraft directly 

from Rosoboronexport was less costly than buying a civilian aircraft from a U.S. 

vendor and then modifying it to a military configuration. 

• Additionally, a DOD Independent Review Team, including members from the 

Defense Contract Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency, 

reviewed the Army’s contract with Rosoboronexport and did not take exception to 

the Army’s conclusion that the negotiated price was fair and reasonable.

Page 20

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 24 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

DOD Did Not Assess Alternative Approaches, but an Army 

Analysis Determined Price Paid for Mi-17 Was Reasonable

• We did not compare the cost-effectiveness of the procurement 

approaches taken by the Army and the Navy because the aircraft 

obtained were not the same configuration. 

• Two potential vendors we spoke with stated that if awarded a contract, 

they could modify the aircraft to a military configuration at a 

significantly lower cost than Rosoboronexport. However, the Army 

maintained that the price paid in 2011 was reasonable given the 

extensive modifications. 

• Although these vendors said it was possible for them to modify an Mi17, the Army said that this option raised airworthiness issues. Neither 

vendor has ever completed these military modifications.

Page 21

Objective 2: Alternative Procurement Approaches to Rosoboronexport
Page 25 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• Prior to the 2011 contract with Rosoboronexport, the Army did not 

have the design knowledge and technical data necessary to certify 

airworthiness, which is a certification that an aircraft is mechanically 

safe for flight. 

• Moreover, according to an Army report, Army engineers were not 

able to verify the process used by Russia to certify airworthiness of 

civilian aircraft, in part because stringent U.S. trade sanctions 

prevented the Army and DOD from directly engaging with relevant 

Russian entities prior to 2011. 

• As such, the Army faced substantial risk in fielding the Mi-17 

helicopters prior to the 2011 Army procurements from 

Rosoboronexport. 

Page 22

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 26 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• The Army took multiple steps to mitigate this risk. For 

example, for some aircraft in the Afghan fleet, it imposed 

costly reductions in the operating time of aircraft 

components. These reductions were necessary because 

the Army could not determine their life expectancy.

• Once the Army gained access to the original equipment 

manufacturer through the 2011 contract with 

Rosoboronexport, Army officials reported millions of dollars 

in cost avoidance by eliminating these reductions. 

Page 23

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 27 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• The 2011 contract with Rosoboronexport provided DOD officials with extensive 

access to the original equipment manufacturer's facilities and allowed for 

technical discussions on the aircraft’s design, testing, and manufacturing 

processes. DOD officials stated that this level of access was unprecedented and 

they would not have received this access under another contract. 

• Although DOD did not obtain the technical data for the 21 Mi-17s, the level of 

insight that the Army gained into the Russian process for assessing safety and 

airworthiness enabled the Army to issue a memorandum that determined that the 

Russians’ process was sufficient by U.S. standards to certify airworthiness. 

• Army officials also emphasized the benefits of having the original equipment 

manufacturer add weapons to Mi-17 aircraft rather than having the modifications 

done later by a third party on civilian aircraft. They said the benefit of this 

approach is that it ensures that militarization is aligned with airworthiness. 

Page 24

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 28 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• Army officials stated that in the past DOD had operated 

used Mi-17s, and in maintaining those aircraft, they had 

identified numerous instances of counterfeit parts that 

affected safety and airworthiness. 

• For example, in a recent overhaul of a refurbished, civilian 

Mi-17, Army engineering officials identified 35 parts that 

were either not authentic or suspect counterfeit parts.

• Due to the prevalence of Mi-17s on the world market, 

counterfeit or substandard parts have been a long-standing 

problem with the helicopter. 

Page 25

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 29 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• An Army official told us that obtaining new aircraft through the 

original equipment manufacturer decreases the risk of counterfeit 

parts because this manufacturer has greater knowledge of its 

supply chain. 

• A 2010 report by the U.S. Department of Commerce found that it 

is a best practice to obtain parts directly from an original 

equipment manufacturer, reducing the potential for procuring 

counterfeit parts. 

• The Army’s contract with Rosoboronexport provided it a direct 

relationship with the original equipment manufacturer, which 

increased the Army’s confidence that it was receiving authentic 

parts. 

Page 26

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 30 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Although DOD Determined Rosoboronexport Contract Offers 

Greater Access to Manufacturer and Increased Assurance of 

Safety, the Risk of Counterfeiting May Be Similar

• Both Rosoboronexport and two previous vendors 

purchased new Mi-17s that came from the original 

equipment manufacturer and Army officials said no 

known issues with counterfeit parts have been 

identified to date. 

• As such, we found no evidence that shows how 

Rosoboronexport would decrease the risk of counterfeit 

parts over other vendors. 

Page 27

Objective 3: Impact on Access to Technical Data, Safety, and Counterfeiting
Page 31 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Detailed Scope and Methodology

• To determine why DOD canceled its 2010 competitive solicitation 

for 21 Mi-17s:

• We reviewed key documents in Navy and Army Mi-17 

contract files, including the solicitation; determination and 

findings; source selection plan; and cost and price analysis. 

• We reviewed DOD internal memorandums, bid protest 

decisions, related hearing transcripts, and external DOD 

correspondence. 

• We also interviewed officials from DOD’s Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Naval Air Systems Command, Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan, and the Department of 

State.

Page 28
Page 32 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Detailed Scope and Methodology

• To assess the extent to which DOD evaluated alternative procurement 

approaches:

• We reviewed Mi-17 contract files, DOD internal memorandums, bid 

protest decisions, related hearing transcripts, and external DOD 

correspondence. 

• We interviewed officials from the Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing 

Aircraft Project Management Office; Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Naval Air Systems 

Command; and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan. 

• In addition to DOD officials, we interviewed four potential vendors of Mi-17 

helicopters, which were selected based on their interest in past and 

planned Mi-17 procurements. 

• To compare the costs of buying civilian versus military variants of the Mi17, we reviewed Army cost and pricing analysis, Mi-17 contract files, and 

DOD audits. 

Page 29
Page 33 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Detailed Scope and Methodology

• To assess the impact of contracting directly with 

Rosoboronexport on technical data, safety, and counterfeiting:

• We reviewed Army airworthiness standards, an Army audit 

report, and best practices for ensuring authentic parts. 

• We analyzed documentation provided by the Army to 

determine the prevalence of these issues in prior 

procurements. 

• To determine how these issues affected DOD procurement 

decisions, we interviewed officials from Army’s Non-Standard 

Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Management Office; Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; and the Army’s Aviation Engineering Directorate. 

Page 30
Page 34 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

Detailed Scope and Methodology

• We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 

through March 2013 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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Page 35 GAO-13-319R Mi-17 Helicopter Procurement 

(121096)

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