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THE CRISIS IN MALI: U.S. INTERESTS AND THE

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

Serial No. 113–3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 6

Ms. Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ................................ 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 9

Ms. Amanda Dory: Prepared statement ................................................................ 21

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 57

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and responses 

from: 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson .......................................................................... 59

Ms. Amanda Dory ................................................................................................ 66

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy 

III, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and response from the Honorable Johnnie Carson ................................. 68

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and responses from: 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson .......................................................................... 73

Ms. Amanda Dory ................................................................................................ 75

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina, and response 

from the Honorable Johnnie Carson .................................................................. 76

(1)

THE CRISIS IN MALI: U.S. INTERESTS AND 

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. The committee will come to order. We meet 

today to review the continuing crisis in Mali. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Engel, for 

opening statements, I will then recognize the chairmen and ranking member of the Africa and Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade Subcommittees for any opening remarks. 

Over the past year and a half, northern Mali, a vast desert landscape, has fallen to jihadists. Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate and others, many coming from outside the region, capitalized on the country’s weak government in order to take over this region. 

Bolstered by weapons that they received from Ghadafi’s stockpile, these forces have destabilized the entire region. Last month, 

scores of civilians—including U.S. citizens—were taken hostage at 

a remote Algerian energy facility. Those connected with the attack 

on our mission in Benghazi are thought to be connected to the militants in Mali. Militants in Somalia and northern Nigeria have received aid as well. They received training from these groups. As a 

matter of fact, this particular al-Qaeda franchise is the fastest 

growing al-Qaeda franchise in the world. 

But it is Mali that has paid the highest price. Extremists have 

attempted to destroy much of its rich cultural heritage. At the center of ancient trans-Saharan trade, Mali is home to priceless Arab 

and Islamic literature and mosques of historical significance. Several of the most ancient of these mosques have been destroyed. A 

culture is under attack. 

The militants sought to impose their radicalism onto Muslims 

they viewed as too liberal. Music was banned. Those who didn’t 

obey faced hanging, stoning, or flogging. An already tough life became hell on earth. 

With Mali’s capital, Bamako, in jeopardy, and its interim government pleading for help, the French Government took decisive action. Malians have welcomed French forces with enthusiasm—ultimate proof of the extremists’ brutality. 

2

Six thousand French citizens live in Bamako. They had been 

used as pawns, captured by this extremist organization and held 

for ransom for some number of years as the organization used this 

as its resource for hard currency. AQIM, frankly, is a threat to 

France. It has a chapter. It has a cell in Paris. But it also has cells 

in London and other capitals around Europe. So Paris had an interest in intervening. But there should be no doubt that this militancy in northern Mali and the region threatens us all. 

Yet, when France sought U.S. assistance, the administration was 

tepid in answering our ally’s call. It seems the bureaucracy slowed 

our pace of support. And as Secretary of Defense Panetta put it, 

‘‘Every time I turn around, I face a group of lawyers.’’ This is a 

NATO ally fighting al-Qaeda-linked terrorists—it shouldn’t be that 

hard. 

While the French understandably would like to wind down their 

mission quickly, and have an abrupt turnover to United Nations 

forces that, frankly, would be a disaster. This militant threat remains too committed and too deadly to push this mission on to an 

ineffective, under resourced or hamstrung peacekeeping force at 

this time. 

It doesn’t help that the administration has been divided. According to a former senior administration official, U.S. policy toward 

the region has been hindered by divisions between a Defense Department that wanted to confront the threat—and a cautious State 

Department that sought to instead contain it. We’ll hear from both 

Departments today. We hope everyone’s working in unison now. 

Testifying before this committee last month, then-Secretary Clinton noted that in this region, in her words, ‘‘we are in for a struggle, but it is a necessary struggle. We cannot permit northern Mali 

to become a safe haven. We have got to have a better strategy.’’

Today’s hearing is a step toward achieving that better strategy. 

I’ll now turn to Ranking Member Engel for his opening remarks. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very timely hearing on the situation in Mali. I was on C-Span this morning 

and I was asked several questions about this hearing. I think it’s 

very timely and very good that we’re doing this now. 

Last year, a coalition of Islamic extremists—including a regional 

affiliate of al-Qaeda—took control of northern Mali, an area larger 

than the State of Texas. Armed to the teeth with weapons plundered from neighboring Libya, they imposed a harsh form of Sharia 

law, amputating limbs, banning music and destroying priceless cultural artifacts. 

These troubling developments raised fears that northern Mali 

would become a source of instability for the entire region, and possibly a safe haven for terrorists plotting attacks on the United 

States and other western interests. The situation became even 

more urgent in early 2013, just this year, when the extremists renewed their offensive, and began driving south toward the capital 

city of Bamako. 

The international community was forced to act and France took 

the lead by launching airstrikes and putting boots on the ground. 

I’m pleased that we’re now supporting France and other West African nations participating in this critical effort, but I was disturbed 

by early reports that we were planning to charge Paris for proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:18 Apr 10, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\021413\78949 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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viding airlift. If we can find a way to pay for military flyovers at 

parades and professional sporting events, then surely we can cover 

the cost of aiding a close ally in an operation that supports U.S. 

national security interests. 

France has made it clear that it doesn’t plan to keep large numbers of troops in Mali on a long-term basis, and we must work with 

our allies and partners in the region to figure out next steps in 

terms of promoting security. Some have suggested that the West 

African troops now deploying to Mali should form the nucleus of a 

traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation. Is that the right approach, since efforts to dislodge the extremists from northern Mali 

will likely require offensive combat operations for some time to 

come? Should we explore alternatives to a blue-helmet peacekeeping mission, such as the model offered by the African Union 

force currently operating in Somalia? These are all questions that 

I hope we can discuss today. 

While the immediate focus in Mali is on the military operation, 

we must recognize that this is a complex and multi-layered conflict. 

The French and African successes on the battlefield will not be sustained if we ignore the non-military facets of the conflict, and if the 

political situation in Bamako is not resolved. 

Mali is now governed by an interim President that lacks popular 

legitimacy. The leader of last year’s coup, Captain Sanogo, continues to play a role in Mali’s political process. And it appears that 

elections, already postponed for a year until this April, will be postponed again until at least July. Clear steps must be taken toward 

having elections, Captain Sanogo must be marginalized, and the legitimate grievances of the entire population in the north must be 

addressed-not just those of the Tuareg minority. 

We must also focus on the human rights and humanitarian situation in Mali. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced 

by the current conflict and by severe drought. And there have also 

been reports of serious human rights abuses by the Malian military, a force that received U.S. training before last year’s coup, and 

which other countries are now supporting. 

Unless these issues are addressed in a meaningful way, there is 

a risk of further radicalization in the north and prolonged conflict 

along ethnic lines, which will make it even more difficult to stabilize the country. As we consider the U.S. role in Mali and seek 

to increase cooperation with other countries in the region, it is critical that we learn the appropriate lessons from past efforts. In particular, I am interested to hear how the Departments of State and 

Defense plan to evaluate counterterrorism and governance programs in light of the failures we have seen in Mali, and whether 

you believe, our witnesses believe, some rebalancing of our assistance for the region is in order. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, 

and once again thank the chairman for holding this important 

hearing. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We’re going to go now 

to Mr. Poe, who is the chairman of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade Subcommittee for 3 minutes, followed by Mr. Sherman, 

the ranking member, for 3 minutes. 

Mr. Poe. 

4

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mokhtar Belmokhtar is one 

of the rebel leaders in Mali. He leads a brigade called Those Who 

Sign with Blood. It is a spinoff group of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb. It was his followers that attacked an Algerian gas plant 

last month in a kidnap plot that left 37 dead including 3 Americans. Belmokhtar is running loose somewhere in Mali. The French 

are looking for him in the mountains. Mali is not, as some have 

thought recently, or thought in the past, some island in the South 

Pacific. It is a country in Africa. It’s even bigger than Texas. But 

I will say this, Mr. Chairman, Texas is bigger than France. 

One of those Americans killed at the gas plant was Victor 

Lovelady from my congressional district. Victor Lovelady is an oil 

and gas worker. He’s from Atascocita. He works in Nederland. 

That’s an oil and gas refining community and he worked on assignment for ENGlobal, when he was in Algeria. He’s a family man. He 

waited to go over to Mali until his kids were older and it was important to him that he was able to provide an income for his kids. 

He had 18 days left to go before he came back to Texas for his 

daughter’s birthday. He was killed. Life was stolen from him by 

those who kill Americans because they are Americans. He was not 

a diplomat. He wasn’t in the military. He was an American and 

that’s why he was murdered. 

Belmokhtar is a terrorist. The bandit of the desert must be 

brought to justice because really justice is what we do in this country. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe. We’re very saddened and 

very sorry for Victor’s family’s loss and all the other Americans 

who lost their lives there. 

We’ll go now to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We’re engaged in a struggle against extremist terrorism. We’ve put our overwhelming effort into Iraq and Afghanistan. So Americans naturally would reach the conclusion that the 

vast majority of the threat is in those two places. The fact is, this 

is a worldwide struggle. In 2012, Americans were aware not only 

of Iraq and Afghanistan, but our concerns with Yemen, Libya, and 

Somalia. Now they’ve learned that Mali is not in the South Pacific. 

I fear that Americans will become aware of dozens of other countries that so far have escaped our common knowledge and that we 

will be introduced to these countries and their locations and cultures because there will be a report that this is a new theater in 

the war that we are forced to wage against Islamic extremism. This 

is a worldwide effort. 

As the ranking member demonstrated in hearings we held several years ago, it even involves the tri-border area of South America, and of course, parts of 9/11 were plotted in Hamburg, Germany. It’s a worldwide effort and we cannot limit our scope to just 

one theater. We occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, but we cannot occupy every country where terrorists might find refuge or even support. This is going to last a long time. It has already lasted longer 

than any other conflict our nation has faced. In this effort, we need 

allies. 

Now to the extent that foreign policy is an expression of our psychological needs and attitudes, we would say America should always be number one, macho, in the lead of every effort. And nothVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:18 Apr 10, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\021413\78949 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

ing could be more disdainful than how some repeat the President’s 

phrase that sometimes we lead from behind. But the fact is we 

need allies and we cannot always be in the lead in every theater 

in this conflict. In this case, we are behind and we should stand 

behind France and applaud their efforts in Mali. And we should 

know that as this effort continues—it will be long—that we need 

allies, that we cannot invest too much effort into any one theater, 

and that not only do we need to cooperate with allies, but there are 

times and areas where they will take the lead and we will play a 

supportive role. 

I applaud France, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We’re going to go to 

our ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, Congresswoman 

Karen Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and Ranking Member 

Engel. I want to thank both of you for your leadership in moving 

swiftly to hold a hearing on the troubling situation in Mali. 

Let me also acknowledge and thank Assistant Secretary Carson 

and Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory of Defense for your leadership and willingness to come before this committee. 

Ambassador Carson, this week you gave an important talk at the 

Brookings Institution, not on Mali, but on the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo. You spoke of an Africa that is more stable today than 

it has been in decades. You said democracy is on the move. 

In 2012 alone, we have seen peaceful transitions in power from 

countries like Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal. For the first 

time in over 20 years, the Government of Somalia is once again 

recognized by the United States and in coming weeks, Kenyans 

head to the polls in an election that will be closely followed. 

As an important U.S. strategic partner, there is a great hope 

that Kenya’s election will be peaceful, transparent, and nonviolent. 

I reference these examples because it is important that we place 

Mali within the context of what’s taking place across the continent 

and this perspective is essential for our nation’s Africa policy. The 

situation in Mali is unique and dissimilar to the remarkable 

progress taking place across the continent, sustained peace, stability, clear examples of democracy and governance. This future is 

possible in Mali with U.S. support and the support of the international community. 

The current military intervention from France provides a backdrop to work to help Mali define, shape, and implement the current 

political dialogue. Mali’s President should be encouraged to consult 

all key political actors on the composition, mandate, and work of 

the Commission on Dialogue and Reconciliation and seek a political 

agreement on ways to conduct a dialogue. 

But let me be clear. The threat of AQIM and rogue fighters in 

northern Mali must not be ignored. These groups pose internal and 

external threats and must be held to account for their violent actions. There are reports that AQIM and others have recruited child 

soldiers, carried out executions, flogging, Taliban-style repression 

of women, and destroyed numerous religious shrines of cultural 

and religious importance. 

While pressure must be kept to ensure these groups are disbanded and not able to reconstitute themselves, it is important 

6

that the Government of Mali address accusations of human rights’ 

abuses perpetrated by its own armed forces. 

I am pleased to learn that President Obama has moved to release limited Defense funds to further support airlift and logistical 

support of African and French forces. I will be particularly interested to hear the witnesses today comment on the African-led support mission to Mali as part of the broader ECOWAS strategy and 

your thoughts on the possibility of sustaining gains made by 

French intervention. 

I thank you and I look forward to your testimony. I yield back 

my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman. Ambassador 

Johnnie Carson is the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as the national intelligence officer for Africa at the National Intelligence Council. Ambassador Carson’s distinguished 37-year career with the Foreign 

Service includes ambassadorships to Kenya, to Zimbabwe, and to 

Uganda. And it’s been my privilege over the years to work with 

Ambassador Carson on many difficult issues. And it is good to see 

you and to see you again, Ambassador Carson and have you with 

us. 

We also have Ms. Amanda Dory. She serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. Previously, she was the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense. 

We welcome both of our witnesses back to the committee and I’ll 

share with you that without objection we’ll have your full statements put in the record if you could focus on a 5-minute address 

here today. And members may have 5 days to submit statements 

and questions for the record as well that we would ask that you 

respond to. 

So we’ll begin with Assistant Secretary Carson. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Royce, thank you very, very much for 

that kind introduction. Thank you for your friendship. Thank you 

for your commitment to causes across Africa and your interest in 

the foreign policy of this nation. We look forward to working with 

you in the Africa Bureau in your new capacity as the chairman of 

the full committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to recognize Ranking Member 

Engel as well as the other members of the committee who are here 

with you and us this morning. I am pleased to have a chance to 

testify before you on this very important topic. 

The evolving crisis in Mali is one of the most difficult, complex, 

and urgent problems West Africa has faced in the past two decades. Mali’s problems reflect the fragility of governance in the region, the lack of economic development, especially in northern Mali, 

the absence of meaningful opportunities for people to engage with 

their government, and the widespread desperation that exists in an 

unforgiving arid region with chronic food insecurity. 

7

The March 2012 coup and subsequent loss of northern Mali to Islamic extremists demonstrates all too clearly how quickly terrorists 

prey upon fragile states. Poor governance, weak democratic institutions, and a lack of development and economic opportunity create 

fertile ground for terrorism and also political instability. 

As the Malian Government, regional partners, and the international community continue to respond vigorously to the ongoing 

crisis in Mali, we must be mindful of the four underlying challenges Mali continues to face: The continued presence of al Qaida 

in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, in northern Mali; the restoration 

of democracy which is essential; the need to begin negotiations 

with northern groups especially the Tuareg that renounce terrorism and recognize the unity of the Malian state; and a significant and ongoing humanitarian and development crisis across the 

northern part of that country. Failure to address these four challenges, comprehensively and simultaneously, risks perpetuating the 

cycle of violence and insecurity that has plagued northern Mali for 

decades and that has also threatened stability across the wider 

Sahel. 

First, the presence of extremists in northern Mali poses a threat 

to the entire Sahel region and beyond. The French are disrupting 

and dislodging terrorist enclaves and liberating northern towns 

and populations after more than a year of terrorist occupation. The 

United States strongly supports France’s efforts and has actively 

engaged to assist France in Mali. As of February 13, we have conducted 22 refueling missions which have provided about 867,000 

pounds of jet fuel to French aircraft. The United States Air Force 

has also flown 43 C-17 sorties moving French and Chadian personnel, supplies, and equipment into Mali and Niger. We have lifted 1,090 tons of equipment and supplies and over 830 passengers 

into the operational theater. We are also supporting the efforts of 

several African states who have contributed troops to AFISMA, the 

African-led International Support Mission to Mali. Subject to congressional notification, we intend to provide $96 million during Fiscal Year 2012 to support the AFISMA operation. This support includes training, equipment, and logistical assistance for the 

AFISMA troops. 

Although AFISMA is currently an African regional intervention 

force, we believe a transition to a U.N.-authorized and a U.N.-led 

effort which brings to bear all the comparative advantages of a 

U.N.-integrated mission would be suitable under the right conditions to consolidate French gains on the ground. A transition to a 

U.N. peacekeeping force will take time, however, as French and 

AFISMA operations continue and as the U.N. develops its plans in 

consultation with the Malian Government and with its African 

partners, this is something that will take time, but it is important. 

However, Mali’s problems cannot be solved by military means 

alone. The gains achieved by French and African forces on the battlefield in northern Mali will be short-lived if not accompanied by 

democratic elections, strengthened institutions, and national reconciliation. We welcome the Malian national assembly’s January 29 

unanimous approval of a political roadmap and timetable to restore 

the country’s democracy. 

8

Now the interim Malian Government must implement the plan 

seriously and expeditiously and elections must be conducted free 

from intimidation and interference by military and security forces. 

We continue to unequivocally state that coup leader Captain 

Sanogo and the rest of the military junta members must remove 

themselves completely and permanently from Malian politics. We 

have imposed targeted sanctions on some 87 individuals who were 

involved in the March coup who supported its authors or who continue to impede the restoration of democracy. 

Any continued interference in Mali’s progress toward the restoration of democracy is unacceptable and risks the imposition of further sanctions from the United States, our partners, and international organizations. We also recognize that the indigenous populations of northern Mali who have a history of resisting foreign Islamic extremists and who have welcomed the arrival of French 

forces, have legitimate political, social, and economic grievances. 

Stopping northern Mali’s cycle of instability will require a serious 

and sustained effort by Malian authorities, non-extremist northern 

groups, regional actors and international partners to address the 

legitimate political and economic needs of non-extremist northern 

groups from Timbuktu to Gao to Kidal. We are encouraging the 

Malian Government to quickly establish the Commission for Negotiations as called for in Mali’s political roadmap. We are also working closely with neighboring countries and the international community to lend support to the negotiating process. Any successful 

process must address the short-term need to restore Mali’s territorial integrity while at the same time laying the foundation for 

long-term open dialogue needed to address legitimate political and 

social grievances and to build trust between northern populations 

and their government. 

Lastly, the United States continues to work to mitigate the effects of the humanitarian crisis in Mali and in Sahel which has resulted in chronic food insecurity in the region and has left more 

than 400,000 individuals homeless and displaced since the start of 

the fighting in Mali in March of last year. 

In Fiscal Year 2012, and to date in Fiscal Year 2013, the United 

States has provided more than $120 million in humanitarian assistance to address the emergency in Mali. This is part of more 

than $467 million in humanitarian assistance we have provided to 

the Sahel region in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. We must remember that any military success will be fleeting without a democratic 

and creditable government that is responsive to the needs of all 

Malians. We will continue to work to ensure that military success 

can be translated into long-term political stability by encouraging 

expedited elections, marginalizing the military junta, holding accountable all perpetrators of human rights’ abuses and violations 

including those who were in the Malian army and supporting a national reconciliation process that addresses the long-standing and 

legitimate grievances of northern populations including those of the 

Tuareg. 

By continuing to address Mali’s multiple challenges simultaneously and comprehensively, we aim to break the cycle of conflict 

in favor of a just, lasting, and prosperous peace for Mali and for 

the region. 

9

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have a longer statement that has 

been submitted for the record. And I will be happy to take questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]


78949a-1.eps
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78949a-2.eps

insecurity that has plagued northem Mali for decades and threatened stability 

across the Sahel. 

1. Threatsfrom Terrorists in Mali and Beyond 

The presence of extremists in northem Mali poses a threat to the entire Sahel 

region - and beyond. While the security situation in northem Mali has changed 

over the last month due to French intervention, we remain concemed about the 

continued presence ofterrorist and extremist groups, including AQIM and the 

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The French are 

disrupting and dislodging terrorist enclaves, and liberating northem towns and 

populations after more than a year ofterrorist occupation. Neutralizing the full 

scope ofthe terrorist threat in Mali, however, is a long-term etlort. 

We also must remember that terrorism is a threat that knows no boundaries. 

We are partnering with cOlmtries throughout the region to support their efforts to 

strengthen border security and their capacity to respond to threats. Our regional 

counterterrorism support is coordinated through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP). The primary goal ofthis program is to address the threat of 

AQIM. As AQIM has expanded its reach through the tlow of anllS, supplies, and 

tighters from North Africa into the region, our assistance and support through the 

partnership continues to evolve to meet the changing threat. 

We continue to work with regional and intemational partners to deny 

terrorists safe haven wherever they attempt to operate. And while a security 

response is critical, we must not forget the underlying causes that drive regional 

instability and create opportlmities for violence to thrive. Terrorists and extremist 

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78949a-3.eps

groups exploited the political chaos created by the northern rebellion in Mali and 

the coup to expand their safe haven and impose their radical ideology on 

populations who have long considered such ideology abhorrent. Weak or 

nonexistent governance and a lack of development throughout the region make 

many countries vulnerable to such exploitation. We must therefore work 

collectively with the countries in the region to not only mount a strong and 

coordinated security response, but we must also reduce the underlying 

vulnerabilities to extremism by strengthening good governance and promoting 

economic development. 

We commend and strongly support the ongoing French and African military 

operation in northern Mali. On December 20, the United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC) adopted Resolution 2085, co-sponsored by the United States, which 

recognized Mali's overlapping challenges; underscored the international 

community's support for restoring peace, security, stability, and territorial integrity 

to Mali; and authorized the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 

(AFISMA). On January 10, extremist groups, including AQIM and Ansar al Dine, 

mounted a surprise attack into govermnent-held territory and captured the village 

of Konna north of Mopti in central Mali. Responding to a request by the Malian 

govermllent, France lalU1ched Operation Serval to prevent AQIM from moving 

further south. From the very begilming and at the request of the Malian 

government, we worked closely with the French to support their efforts and those 

of our African partners. We continue to support their etforts by sharing 

information, providing airlift support for personnel and equipment, and aerial 

refueling. My colleague Amanda Dory will go into more detail on Department of 

Defense support. We continue to coordinate closely at the highest-levels with the 

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78949a-4.eps

French on a wide-range of military and political efforts to promote long-tenn 

stability in Mali. 

Following the start of French operations on January 11, AFISMA began 

expediting the deployment of African troops to Bamako. Troops from Nigeria, 

Niger, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Chad are already in Mali. 

Subject to Congressional notification, the Department of State intends to provide 

up to $96 million during Fiscal Year 2013 to support AFISMA. As part ofthis 

assistance effort, we provided strategic airlift for the deployment of the Togolese 

contingent to Mali and are providing logistics support for AFISMA troops 

deployed in Mali. We have sent teams from our Africa Contingency Operations 

Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to those ECOWAS states that have 

pledged troops to AFISMA to identify gaps in training and equipment and to 

accelerate training and equipping of deploying troops. 

We welcome the continued progress of French and African operations in 

Mali. And we agree that the challenge now is to stabilize northern Mali and 

protect civilians and human rights while maintaining pressure on terrorist groups 

and advancing the political track. We believe a transition to a UN-authorized and 

UN-led effort - which brings to bear all the UN comparative advantages of an 

integrated mission - would be suitable tmder the right conditions to solidify French 

gains on the ground. Such a transition will take time, as French and AFISMA 

operations on the ground continue, and as the UN plans, in consultation with 

Malian and African partners, for an integrated UN mission in Mali. But the goals 

of any UN mission would include helping to stabilize those parts of Mali where the 

French have successfully pushed out extremist and terrorist elements, supporting 

4 
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78949a-5.eps

the Malian political transitional govenm1ent in its efforts to implement a 

comprehensive political roadmap and build effective goveming institutions, 

monitoring and reporting on human rights, and supporting regional and 

intemational efforts to address the humanitarian crisis. 

It is critical that the Malian Defense and Security Forces be adequately 

trained and equipped to effectively partner with the intemational force. Consistent 

with applicable legal restrictions, we terminated our foreign assistance programs 

with the govemment of Mali following the March 2012 military coup, inc1 uding 

foreign assistance activities with the Govemment of Mali; with a few limited 

exceptions in election support, humanitarian work, and life-saving health 

programming, our full assistance programming with the govemment cannot 

resume until a democratically-elected government is in place. The European 

Union (EU) is leading efforts to refon11 and rebuild the Malian military through an 

EU Training Mission which has already beglffi deploying to Mali. Many other 

countries have stepped up to provide support. During a January 30 donors' 

conference attended by over 90 countries and international organizations, and 

organized by the African Union in Addis Ababa, countries pledged over $455.5 

million in support for Mali, AFTSMA, and regional development. 

2. Restoring Democratical(y-Elected Government 

The gains achieved by French and African forces on the battlefield in 

northern Mali will be short-lived ifnot accompanied by elections, strengthened 

institutions, and national reconciliation to restore Mali's tradition of democratic 

govemance. Democratic elections will give the Malian govenm1ent the credibility 

5 
14


78949a-6.eps

it needs to effectively partner with regional militaries, negotiate with northem 

populations, and reassert civilian rule. We welcomed the Malian National 

Assembly's January 29 unanimous approval of a political road map to restore 

democracy and promote national reconciliation. We also welcome interim Malian 

President Dioncounda Traore's conunitment to implement this roadmap and hold 

presidential elections by July 31, 2013. The road map is a critical first step 

towards legitimate and inclusive govemance; an absolute necessity for any durable 

solution. We urge the interim Malian govenuuent to implement the plan seriously 

and expeditiously. 

The road map provides a framework to quickly move the political process 

forward, and clearly states that members ofthe current transitional govemment are 

not eligible to run for office, as called for by the Economic COlllillUnity of West 

African States (ECOWAS). While the road map reflects an important co11l11litment 

by many of Mali's political actors to hasten the retum to constitutional rule, we call 

on the Malian authorities to provide greater detail and clarity on the sequence of 

steps necessary to prepare for credible, free, transparent, and inclusive elections. 

We also urge the Malian govemment to move aile ad in developing the necessary 

legislation called for in the road map, including amendments to the electoral law. 

Elections must be conducted free from intimidation and interference by 

military and security forces. We continue to unequivocally state that coup leader 

Captain Sa.l1ogo and the rest ofthe military jlmta members must remove 

themselves - completely and permanently - from Malian politics. We have 

imposed targeted travel sanctions on 87 individuals who were involved in the coup, 

who supported its authors, or who continue to impede the restoration of 

democracy. Any continued interference in Mali's progress towards the restoration 

6 
15


78949a-7.eps

of democracy is unacceptable and risks the imposition of further sanctions from the 

United States, partner counties, and international organizations. 

We have strongly condenmed all human rights abuses in Mali by any group 

and call for the perpetrators to be held accountable. We support the statements 

from Malian oflicials and civil society leaders that that there will be no implU1ity 

tor human rights abuses. All actors - military, rebel, and otherwise - in Mali have 

an obligation to adhere to applicable international law and respect human rights. 

We support the African Union's conunitment to send hlllnan rights monitors to 

Mali and welcome the Swiss govenm1ent's pledge of$1 million to support the 

team's deployment. Ensuring the protection of its own citizens must be the 

tOlll1dation of any credible and legitimate govenm1ent. 

3. Negotiations with the North 

We condenm those in northern Mali who continue to align themselves with 

terrorists. There can be no dialogue with those who support terrorism. We also 

recognize that the indigenous populations of northern Mali, who have a history of 

resisting foreign Islamic extremists and have welcomed the arrival of French 

torces, have legitimate political, social, and econOlnic grievances. The Tuareg 

rebellion that started in northern Mali in January 2012 is part of a longstanding 

cycle of rebellion and failed attempts to address these grievances. Stopping 

northern Mali's cycle of instability will require a serious and sustained effort by 

Malian authorities, non-extremist northern groups, regional actors, and 

international partners to address the legitimate political and economic grievances 

of non-extremist northern groups from Timbuktu to Gao to Kidal. We applaud the 

political roadmap's support for long-term negotiations and its openness to dialogue 

7 
16


78949a-8.eps

with those groups that renounce armed struggle, adhere to the principles of 

democracy and the rule oflaw, and accept without condition Mali's territorial 

integrity. We call on Malian authorities to follow through on this commitment to 

address the political and economic needs of northern populations that reject 

terrorism and accept Mali's territorial integrity. 

We strongly support the resumption of negotiations with all parties who 

have cut ties to terrorist organizations, have renounced violence, and who 

recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity ofthe Malian state. 

We are encouraging the Malian govermnent to quickly establish the Connnission 

for Negotiations, as called for in the roadmap. We commend Burkinabe President 

Compaore, the ECOWAS-appointed mediator, for his leadership in the negotiation 

process and support his continued etlorts in this regard. We are also working 

closely with neighboring cOllltries and the international community to lend support 

to the negotiating process. Any successful process must address the short-term 

need to restore Mali's territorial integrity, while at the same time laying the 

foundation for the long-term, open dialogue needed to address legitimate 

grievances and build trust between the northern populations and their govermnent. 

4. Humanitarian Crisis 

Mali and the rest ofthe Sahel region have long suffered from chronic food 

insecurity. The conflict in Mali exacerbated an already difficult hlll1anitarian 

situation caused by drought and poor harvests followed by flooding. Since the 

start ofthe fighting in Mali, more than 400,000 people have become refugees or 

internally displaced. This includes over 240,000 people displaced within Mali and 

nearly 170,000 refugees in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Algeria. These 

8 
17


78949a-9.eps

numbers also include the more than 22,000 new refugees who have fled Mali and 

the more than 14,000 newly displaced persons within Mali since the extremist 

offensive and French counter operations began last month. We commend the 

neighboring countries that have welcomed Malian refugees despite their own food 

security challenges. 

The United States continues to work to mitigate the effects ofthis 

humanitarian crisis. In fiscal year 2012 and to date in fiscal year 2013, the United 

States provided more than $120 million in humanitarian assistance to address the 

emergency in Mali. This is part of the more than $467 million in humanitarian 

assistance we have provided to the Sahel region in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 

The humanitarian situation is and will likely remain very fluid, requiring strategies 

and programs to adapt in order to meet changing conditions on the ground. 

We continue to call on the intemational community to support a 

comprehensive hLUnanitarian response, including assistance for the displaced and 

conflict-affected in Mali and in the broader region. The U.N. Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently issued its 2013 consolidated appeal, 

seeking more than $370 million to assist 4.3 million vulnerable Malians 

countrywide. We are also urging the intemational community to respond 

comprehensively and adequately to the humanitarian needs across the whole Sahel 

region. 

In closing, we must remember that any military success will be fleeting 

without a democratic and credible govemment that is responsive to the needs of all 

Malians. We will continue to urge the interim Malian govemment to implement 

the political road map seriously and expeditiously. We are asking our partners to 

9 
18


78949a-10.eps

urge the same. Any militmy gains will be eroded if political instability and 

uncertainty return. The French and African intervention has created a valuable 

opportunity that must not be missed. We will work to ensure that military success 

can be translated into long-term stability by encouraging expedited elections, 

marginalizing the military junta, holding perpetrators accountable for human rights 

abuses, and supporting a national reconciliation process that addresses the 

longstanding and legitimate grievances of northern populations. By continuing to 

address Mali's multiple challenges simultaneously and comprehensively, we aim 

to break the cycle of cont1ict in favor of a just, lasting and prosperous peace. 

10 
19

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ambassador Carson. 

We’re going to go now to Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. 

STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for your 

time this morning and the opportunity to come to speak to you 

about what the Department of Defense is doing as it pertains to 

the crisis in Mali. 

DoD is very concerned about the conflict in Mali and is working 

with international and interagency partners to counter extremists 

and restore Malian sovereignty. Since January 11th, France has 

been operating in Mali following a request from Bamako to counter 

the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliates and to help the Malians 

regain control of their territory, consistent with the U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 2085. 

We are supporting the French through intelligence, air refueling 

services, and airlift as Ambassador Carson has already mentioned. 

The counterterrorism effort in Mali complements parallel U.S. strategic objectives that relate to the transition back to the democracy 

addressing legitimate northern grievances and ameliorating the humanitarian situation there. 

France’s intervention in Mali has contributed to our shared strategic objectives in multiple ways. These include shrinking AQIM 

safe haven, contributing to the restoration of Malian territorial integrity, and setting the conditions that will enable elections and a 

return to democratic governance. 

As you know, DoD engagement with the Malian armed forces is 

restricted by law and by policy as a result of the coup last March. 

There’s no consideration of putting U.S. combat forces on the 

ground in Mali. However, we continue to support Mali’s neighbors 

to contain and degrade shared threats. We’re working closely with 

the State Department to support the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, or AFISMA, authorized by U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 2085. 

Africa Command and the Department of State are engaged with 

AFISMA to refine the requirements for that mission and match 

them with international contributions. AFISMA will host its next 

planning conference next week. Currently, 13 different African nations are deployed to Mali and supported by 22 countries from outside the region including the United States. 

DoD’s broader efforts in North and West Africa are focused on 

building the capacity of partners to counter shared threats and provide for security for their people. We incorporate military professionalism, ethics, and human rights training throughout our engagements and that training yields positive results. As you well 

know, intervention by the military in politics is anathema to our 

values and the importance we place on civilian control of the military. 

The military coup in Mali was an outgrowth of the January 2012 

rebellion and the Malian Government’s response to it. This is the 

20

fourth such rebellion with Malian independence in 1960 and was 

the result of long-standing, unresolved conflicts between the government in Bamako and its northern populations. This time, unlike 

previous rebellions, northern Tuaregs began working with hardened and armed extremists, some associated with AQIM. Drawing 

on weapons and fighters from North Africa, this new rebellion resulted in an armed advance on northern population centers, destruction of world heritage sites and the imposition of brutal rule. 

DoD was actively engaged in Mali prior to the coup. Part of the 

challenge we encountered was that the Malian Government was 

less focused than we on countering AQIM and significant levels of 

narcotics and other trafficking in the region. From Fiscal Year 

2009 to 2012, DoD spent approximately $41 million in training and 

equipping a limited number of units of the Malian armed forces to 

enable them to put pressure on AQIM. However, rather than moving against AQIM, despite indications that the terrorist threat was 

growing, the Government of Mali focused primarily on the perceived threat posed by zoned Tuareg population. As a result, we 

began to shift our efforts to countries like Mauritania and Niger 

which were more focused on the counter terrorism mission. 

In the period following the rebellion and coup, northern Mali became a safe haven for AQIM and affiliates that made it easier for 

these groups to recruit supporters and connect with other extremists. This is part of a growing terrorist presence in the region that 

threatens U.S. citizens’ interests and partners as we saw in 

Benghazi, Libya and in Amenas, Algeria. 

While we have not seen indications that AQIM is capable of attacking the United States directly, the group maintains the ability 

to attack western interests and to attack or kidnap westerners for 

ransom. AQIM is part of a network of violent extremist organizations in Africa that stretches from Egypt to Libya to Somalia to Nigeria and Mali. The risk of cross fertilization and cross pollination 

between affiliated groups is one we’re very concerned about. The 

threat is dynamic and evolving and our efforts to counter it must 

be as well. 

As the French transition from combat operations against extremists to a stabilization mission, it will be critical that the international community help Mali and its neighbors craft a sustainable 

African-led solution and address legitimate grievances, maintains 

pressure on extremists and ensures protection of civilians. We 

should also anticipate a dynamic situation in the north with some 

groups forswearing violence to engage in political dialogue, while 

hard-core extremists retreat to the mountains and desert, refocusing their efforts on asymmetric attacks. 

In closing, DoD strongly believes in the need to address the parallel political, security and humanitarian crises and will continue 

to provide requested support to international and inter-agency efforts to do so. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

21


78949b-1.eps

The Crisis in Mali: U.s. Interests and the International Response 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

February 14,2013 

Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you 

today about the crisis in Mali and how the Department of Defense is working to secure our 

interests there. 

The Department of Defense is concerned about the conflict in Mali and is working with 

international and interagency partners to counter extremists and restore Malian sovereignty. The 

French are operating in Mali following a request from Bamako to counter the threat posed by al 

Qaeda and affiliates and to help the Malians regain control of their territory, consistent with UN 

Security Council Resolution 2085. We are supporting the French by providing intelligence, 

aerial refueling services, and airlift, and are pursuing a range of funding options for our 

contributions. The counterterrorism effort in Mali complements the parallel U.S. strategic 

objectives to support a sustainable solution to northern grievances, help Mali transition back to 

democracy, and ameliorate the humanitarian situation. 

As you know, DoD engagement with the Malian Armed Forces is restricted by interagency 

policy agreement as a result of the coup last March. However, we continue to work to support 

Mali's neighbors to contain and degrade shared threats. We are also working with the State 

Department to support the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) 

authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 on December 20. AFRTCOM 

and the Department of State are engaged with AFISMA to refine the requirements for the 

mission and match them with international contributions. 

DoD's broader efforts in North and West Africa are focused on building the capacity of partners 

to counter shared threats and provide security for their people. We incorporate military 

professionalism, ethics, and human rights training throughout our engagements and that training 

yields positive results. As you know, intervention by the military in politics is anathema to our 

values and the importance we place on civilian control of the military. 

The military coup in Mali was an outgrowth of the January 2012 rebellion and the Malian 

government's response to it. This rebellion is the fourth since Mali gained its independence in 

1960 and was the result oflong-standing, unresolved conflicts between the government in 

Bamako and its northern population. Unlike in previous rebellions, northern Tuaregs with 

legitimate political grievances began working with hardened and armed extremists, some 

associated with AQIM. Drawing on weapons and tighters from North Atrica, this new rebellion 

resulted in an armed advance on population centers, destruction of world heritage sites and the 

imposition of brutal rule. 

DoD was actively engaged in Mali prior to the coup, but part of the challenge we encountered 

was that the Malian government was not as focused as we were on countering AQIM. From 

Fiscal Years 2009 to 2012, the USG spent approximately $41M in training and equipping a 
22


78949b-2.eps

limited number of units in the Malian Armed Forces to enable them to put pressure on AQIM. 

However, rather than moving against AQTM - despite indications that the terrorist threat was 

growing - the Government of Mali focused primarily on the threat posed by the Tuaregs. As a 

result, we began to shift our efforts to countries like Mauritania and Niger, which were more 

focused on the counterterrorism mission. 

In the period following the rebellion and coup, northern Mali became a safe haven for AQIM and 

affiliates, that made it easier for these groups to recruit supporters and export extremism. This is 

part of a growing terrorist presence in the region that threatens U.S. citizens, interests, and 

partners, as we saw in Benghazi, Libya and Tn Amenas, Algeria. While we have not seen 

indications that AQIM is capable of attacking the United States directly, the group maintains the 

ability to attack western interests, and to attack or kidnap westerners for ransom. AQTM is part 

of a network of violent extremist organizations in Africa, from Egypt to Libya to Somalia to 

Nigeria. The risk of cross-fertilization and cross-pollination between affiliated groups is one 

we're very concerned about. The threat is dynamic and evolving and our efforts to counter it 

must be as well. 

France's intervention in Mali has contributed to shared strategic objectives in multiple ways. 

These include shrinking AQIM's safe haven, contributing to the restoration of Malian territorial 

integrity, and setting the enabling conditions for elections. We support the French military 

action, but there is no consideration of putting U.S. combat forces on the ground in Mali. We are 

also continuing U.S. capacity building activities to enable regional partners. Notwithstanding the 

setbacks DoD faced in Mali, our model of building the capacity of African partners to take 

responsibility for their own security remains appropriate, and has been successful with other 

states in the region. We have built strong security relationships with Mauritania, Niger, Burkina 

F aso, Chad, and elsewhere, and believe that persistent engagement with these partners will 

continue to yield benefits. 

As the French transition from leading combat operations to a stabilization mission, it will be 

critical that the international community help Mali craft a sustainable African-led solution that 

addresses legitimate grievances, maintains pressure on extremists and ensures protection of 

civilians. The DoD strongly believes in the need to address parallel political, security, and 

humanitarian crises, and will continue to provide requested support to international and 

interagency efforts to do so. 
23

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ambassador Carson, as I understand it, discussions are now underway to transition quickly into a U.N. peacekeeping operation 

and I also understand the administration is supportive of this 

move. 

As I noted in my opening statement, I am worried about prematurely taking that step. I think that might lead us right back 

to square one because, frankly, I don’t think there’s a peace at this 

point to keep in Mali. We met with the U.N. Secretary General yesterday. I know that he agrees with the Foreign Minister of Mali in 

terms of the situation on the ground that there isn’t a peace to be 

kept at this moment. 

So why push for the U.N. peacekeeping mission at this time? I 

think we’ve got plenty of examples on the continent where the conditions for a successful peacekeeping mission did not exist, but 

were authorized anyway and we’ve dealt with some of the challenges as a result. 

Quite frankly here what we need are some battle-hardened soldiers like the French Foreign Legion that are engaged there right 

now and that can root out these very violent jihadists before we 

end up deploying a hamstrung peacekeeping force. 

And I would ask, have we set on the ground conditions, the 

benchmarks that must be met prior to deploying this envisioned 

peacekeeping force? And if so, what are they? And again, just in 

concept, why push for a U.N. peacekeeping mission at this time? 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much for an 

excellent question. As I stated in my testimony, we believe that in 

time that the AFISMA force should transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force. We do not want to do that hastily. We don’t want 

to do it prematurely. We want to do it at a point at which it is 

timely, appropriate, and likely to be successful. We want to do it 

in conjunction with any decisions by the French in their departure, 

any decisions by the Africans in what they are prepared and want 

to do, as well as conditions which exist on the ground. But planning is important to help us get a sense of what may be required 

so that we are not surprised in the future by a sudden French 

withdrawal and a collection of African forces who might be better 

managed and organized under a U.N. peacekeeping regime. 

We think that over time the U.N. does have peacekeeping norms 

and standards which would be applicable and useful in Mali. 

I would add one other thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that 

there’s going to be an on-going need for a counterterrorism operation in northern Mali. And that probably will always reside in the 

hands of the French and not in the hands of the United Nations. 

Chairman ROYCE. I just wanted to raise our concerns because as 

we read about the push for the quick transition, you and I, I think, 

concur on some of the downsides if we make that too quick. 

Let me go to a question to Ms. Dory because in my opening statement I raised this issue that we were a bit slow in our response 

to our French ally. We’ve got multiple news outlets around the 

world that reported week after week on this story and we’re exactly 

a month now, I think, into when the French began the operation. 

But it’s only this week that we see that the administration reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:18 Apr 10, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\021413\78949 HFA PsN: SHIRL
24

sponded affirmatively on some of the provisions of assistance to the 

French such as the draw-down authority for refueling and airlift. 

As I understand it, the French put in the request as soon as the 

mission started. So if we were to contrast this and this is what’s 

gleaned from the reporting on this, if we were to compare it to the 

assistance to NATO allies with Libya, those requests for assistance 

took days. This takes a month. What’s the hold up here? And could 

Congress help speed up this process? Is there something we could 

do affirmatively to let you know that yes, we do want to support 

our ally in this mission? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you, Congressman. Secretary Panetta made 

very clear, as soon as we began to receive French requests, that we 

would be responsive to those as quickly as feasible as befitting allies. The first French request related to intelligence support, ISR 

coverage to airlift and to refueling. And each of those was met as 

quickly as feasible. Some of them came almost instantly and the 

others followed within days. 

The reference to paperwork this week, signed by the President 

that approved drawdown authority has to do simply with reimbursement, and the actual services have been provided since much 

earlier on. The intelligence, all of the channels available to us were 

fully opened as soon as the French made that request consistent 

with sharing guidelines that we have in place. That happened instantly in Paris, in Bamako, and in Senegal. So we were in a position to be very swiftly sharing intelligence. The Department of Defense quickly provided——

Chairman ROYCE. I don’t disagree with you on the intelligence 

front. 

Ms. DORY. Right. 

Chairman ROYCE. But you know the issue. You know the issue 

with respect to support for the French operation and you know 

some of the consternation that is created. 

Ms. DORY. In terms of the priorities that we were presented, the 

first priority was intelligence and ISR support and that is what—

we worked on the priorities that we received. The airlift followed 

second and has been very wholesome. Ambassador Carson gave the 

statistics to you. We’ve moved a mechanized battalion at this point 

from France into theater and are now working on a company that 

will provide IED support. The refueling services came third. Each 

of these was subject to legal review. That worked relatively 

smoothly and swiftly. Is never as quick as one might like when 

you’re on the waiting end, but it did move. And the French have 

expressed their gratitude and their support in multiple different 

conversations with DoD officials, with State Department officials, 

and with the White House. So we believe we’re in good shape in 

terms of our support to the French and our appreciation for what 

they are doing in Mali in terms of our shared interest there. 

Chairman ROYCE. I appreciate the attention to this because obviously, the Secretary of Defense Panetta was quite concerned about 

the length of time and the fact that, as he said, every time he 

turned around he was facing a group of lawyers that were holding 

up the process. So we appreciate the attention to this. 

My time has expired. I’m going to go to the ranking member, Mr. 

Engel. Thank you. 

25

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to ask both of 

you, we’ve spent tens of millions of dollars, almost 10 years of 

training African troops in Western Africa and particularly in Mali 

which I think obviously is a good idea, but it seemed to fall apart 

in the face of hostile forces. So how we’re looking to increase security assistance to Mali’s neighboring countries to deal with the 

spillover effects. 

Could you let us know what steps your two Departments are taking to evaluate your security assistance programs in light of some 

of the failures we’ve seen in Mali? 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman Engel, again, thank you for the question. We are constantly reviewing and reevaluating our programs 

and our security assistance programs and our relationships with 

governments. And we believe that much of the money that we have 

spent in the Sahel region has been put to good effect. 

There is no question that Mali is a political and military disappointment. Its military failed to perform on the battlefield and 

then it turned around and undertook a military coup dislodging a 

democratic government. But I would also take a look at the West 

African response to this crisis where we have had over a dozen African states, most of them associated with ECOWAS, all of them 

recipients of U.S. support and military assistance, responding with 

alacrity to a crisis in a neighboring state. 

The response from the government, a democratic government 

and a military in Niger, trained by the U.S. has been very positive. 

We’ve seen the same kind of response from governments in 

Burkina Faso. We’ve seen responses from Benin, Togo, Nigeria, 

Chad, and Mauritania; all of whom have received great military assistance from us and have benefitted from our programs. And in 

fact, they are responding in the way that we would want them to 

do, helping a neighboring state in trouble, dealing with a problem 

that is both national and sub-regional, and doing it in a collaborative fashion among themselves while also reaching out to the 

international community and the A.U. 

Yes, Mali is in trouble. Yes, they did not perform well, but the 

others in ECOWAS have stepped up to the plate and demonstrated 

that what we put in to their hands is doing precisely what we want 

it to do and that’s to respond to a crisis. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Ms. Dory? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. I think I would simply add to that two different dimensions. In terms of our overall strategy of building partnership capacity, when we’re working with partners, we focus on 

the capacity, but we also need to focus on the will and the shared 

sense of security objectives. And as we look back with Mali, I referenced this in my statement, we focus in terms of our training on 

increasing their capabilities with select units. But over time, there 

was a divergence in terms of their perception of the security environment and the threat environment and our own. So I think one 

of the lessons learned as we move forward is in terms of the partners with whom we’re engaging is the shared sense of will there 

alongside the development of capacity and capability. 

The second lesson I would point to is our view that in addition 

to tactical and operational engagements, it’s critically important to 

engage at an institutional level as well to ensure that the strategic 

26

approach that the ethics and the professionalism are there 

throughout in an institution and not simply with a unit that you 

may be engaging with. This is something our British and French 

colleagues do in terms of having advisors that are on site in different security institutions, ministries, and it’s something that 

we’re beginning to do at DoD outside the Afghanistan theater as 

well, and we’re looking to do that in the African context. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me just very quickly, because I know my time 

is up, ask you if you could briefly tell us what your current evaluation is of the threat that AQIM and the other jihadi groups, which 

are active in northern Mali—what threats do they pose to the U.S. 

homeland and our interests abroad? 

Ms. DORY. I mentioned briefly in my statement—in a different 

setting we could go into much more detail, but I think it suffices 

to say they do not at this point pose a direct threat to the U.S. 

homeland or territory. They certainly pose a threat to American 

citizens overseas, U.S. interests in the region, western interests, 

and African interests in the region. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We’ll go down to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for convening this meeting. I have two questions. One is on 

funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and 

the other one has to do with the AFRICOM; and let me lead up 

to those. 

The situation in Mali, as we have seen, does not exist in a vacuum. When analyzing the crisis in Mali, we’ve got to examine the 

spillover effect emanating from northern Africa, from the Maghreb 

to the Sahel region to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and beyond. Last 

month, former Secretary Clinton testified in front of the Senate 

and said there is no doubt that the Algerian terrorists had weapons 

from Libya. There is no doubt that the remnants of AQIM in Mali 

had weapons from Libya. So for years, radical Islamists and extremist organizations have been aggressively expanding their operations in Africa. 

Since 2001, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in attacks by 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates all across the continent, most notably in 

Maghreb and the Sahel regions. The recent attacks on our consulate and Embassies in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt underscore this 

harsh reality. If al-Qaeda becomes entrenched in Mali, the country 

that has been one of the most susceptible to al-Qaeda’s influence, 

it will eventually create a safe haven there, and this may cement 

the opportunity for terrorist organizations to further organize globally and have an even stronger trans-national reach. 

How did we get there? Did we not see this threat coming? And 

has the administration been naive to these growing threats? 

[Response follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

For several years, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) used camps in the 

mountainous regions of northern Mali to support attacks against Algeria and launch 

kidnap for ransom (KFR) operations in the northern Sahel. Recognizing that Mali 

and its neighbors did not have the adequate capacity to prevent AQIM from exploiting this large swath of remote territory or protect their porous borders, the United 

27

States took lessons from the earlier Pan Sahel Initiative and launched the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2006 to assist countries in the 

Sahel and North Africa, including Mali and Algeria, to improve their long-term defenses against the evolving threat. Long-term success of counterterrorism (CT) efforts in the region depends on the ability of the countries in the region to take responsibility for their own defenses, and consequently our programming focuses on 

building host-nation capacity to counter violent threats. The United States, France, 

and other countries focused on multi-year, multi-sector initiatives to enable Mali 

and its neighbors to improve their CT capacities. The approach reflected a common 

understanding that short-term CT approaches could not address the vulnerabilities 

that AQIM and other groups attempt to exploit. 

The TSCTP approach has proven successful in Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and 

Burkina Faso, where willing CT partners have intensified their efforts to confront 

the AQIM threat over the years. In Mauritania, for example, U.S. assistance has 

enabled military and law enforcement (police and Gendarmerie) to deploy and sustain units in the extremely austere frontier. Mauritania has also deployed U.S.-supplied aircraft to support its operations along the Malian border and is using U.S. 

assistance to improve the infrastructure of forward operating areas along the same 

border. Similarly, Niger has benefited from U.S. training and equipment to bolster 

its efforts to protect in borders and interdict terrorists attempting transit through 

its territory. 

By contrast, Malian security forces, including units exposed to U.S. training, 

failed to adequately respond to AQIM’s use of northern Mali as a safe haven. The 

flow of Libyan arms and fighters into northern Mali in the security vacuum after 

the 2011 Libyan revolution exacerbated this situation by significantly bolstering the 

capabilities on AQIM and other groups. The January 2012 rebellion in northern 

Mali overwhelmed the ability of Malian security forces to respond, and the military 

coup in March 2012 further spoiled the political environment and impeded the government’s ability to effectively respond to the crisis in northern Mali. The performance of Mali’s security forces is disappointing and demonstrated its institutions’ fragility. Notwithstanding Mali’s performance, our assistance to regional partners in 

their long-term defenses against AQIM and other extremists is consistent with U.S. 

national security objectives.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. On numerous occasions, the President has 

gone so far as to say that al-Qaeda has been ‘‘decimated and that 

it is on the path to defeat.’’ These sentiments illustrate that the administration has avoided the grim reality of the situation. Al-Qaeda 

is like the mythical hydra. It’s a beast with many heads, which if 

you cut off one head, two grow in its place. Weak governance has 

left these nations vulnerable to infiltration by radical groups like 

AQIM, Boko Haram, and other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations that are seeking refuge from the increased pressure that 

we’re putting to bear in the Middle East. 

Have the recent tragic events in Benghazi and Mali and Algeria 

finally gotten the attention of the administration? And for the 

many criticisms that the George W. Bush administration has gotten, he started a key counterterrorism initiative to fight this expansion, and it’s the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. It 

was created with the purpose of addressing these rapidly-evolving 

threats in Sahel and Maghreb regions by supporting partner countries in an effort to eliminate the terrorist organizations from getting a foothold in Africa. And although this important program has 

had successes, it comes as a surprise that combined funding for 

this partnership administered through State and USAID has decreased every year since 2009. 

So my question is: How would you assess the efficacy of the 

Trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership today? And given that 

the situation facing our frontline posts, our personnel, our interests 

in the region, the situation is not new. Why were programs like 

28

this partnership reduced on an annual basis under the administration when the threats were so apparent? 

And lastly, on U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, this is another 

key partner in assisting our allies in the region and leading our 

counterterrorism efforts. How can we best equip AFRICOM to play 

a more constructive role in fighting these threats from AQIM and 

other extremist groups? And do the African nations have the willingness and the capacity to assist and support U.S. security objectives in the region? 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARSON. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, let me take the first 

question. First of all, we believe that the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism program is important. The administration strongly supports 

it and endorses it. The very existence of this program for the last 

decade is a reflection of the fact that we did see terrorism emerging 

as a potential threat in the region and therefore we’re spending 

money in some ten different African countries across the Sahel in 

order to help them to enhance and boost their counterterrorism capacity, their border security, and their militaries. 

So the program, its very existence for more than a decade now, 

is a reflection of the fact that we were looking ahead, that we saw 

problems on the horizon. The fact that it continues to exist is a recognition of this. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I don’t want to take up more of the time I’m 

allotted. If you could give me those answers in written form, I 

would appreciate it. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARSON. I will. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Chairman ROYCE. Will go now to Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want 

to commend you and the ranking member for calling this important 

hearing before the committee. And I do want to personally again 

offer my strongest commendation to Ambassador Carson in the 

many years of tremendous service that he has given for our country, and Secretary Dory as well. 

I also wanted to thank my good friend and colleague from Texas 

in giving a great lesson in geography to our colleagues and to remind them that Mali is not a little island somewhere in the South 

Pacific. In fact, a couple of years ago, I was introduced on the floor 

of the House by one of our colleagues saying that I was from Somalia. I can fully appreciate and understand the concerns of my friend 

from Texas about sometimes the members of this committee and 

the Congress need to have a little better understanding of the geography of the regions of the countries and what we’re talking about. 

I do want to warn my good friend from Texas that there was a 

little joke that we from the Pacific have learned. The gentleman 

from Alaska was warning the gentleman from Texas to quit bragging about Texas being the largest state of the Union because when 

they divide Alaska in two, Texas will be only the third largest state 

in the Union. At least that’s what I understand it to mean. 

Secretary Carson and Secretary Dory, thank you so much for 

your testimony and trying to help members of the committee to understand better the crisis that we’re now faced with in Mali. 

29

There are two things that I wanted to certainly seek your understanding and clarification on. I know we keep throwing this word 

al-Qaeda all over the place as if al-Qaeda is only one little bunch. 

It’s my understanding that there’s basically two al-Qaeda functioning groups going on. And in Mali, one is the al-Qaeda Maghreb 

group and the al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden. 

And I wanted to ask Secretary Carson if you can make those distinctions, because there’s a little suggestion that I might offer to 

my colleagues of the complexity of the situation among the African 

countries. It’s not as simple as we think it to be. And always the 

danger of thinking that we know more or we know what we should 

do to help these countries with historical—things that we know 

nothing about hardly. 

[Response follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an affiliate of al-Qa’ida Core. AlQa’ida Core most likely does not have any operatives in Mali at this time and has 

never operated there as a group. AQIM has its own goals and reasons to pursue 

extremism based on its history as an Algerian-based terrorist group. While AQIM 

officially affiliated (or ‘‘publicly aligned’’) with AQ in 2006, AQIM’s activities are 

often not in line with AQ guidance. AQIM does not represent a threat to the U.S. 

Homeland or U.S. Vital National Interests at this time.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Carson can correct me that you’re 

talking about a society that historically has had tribal rivalries for 

centuries. This is true in other countries, not just in Africa, but in 

other regions as well. So now we’ve got this situation developing 

whether it’s in the Tuareg ethnic group, that seems to be the dominant group that’s having all these difficulties and trying to set up 

this democratic Government of Mali. But if I could ask Secretary 

Carson, is there a distinction between these two al-Qaeda functions 

or groups right now in Mali? 

Mr. CARSON. I’ll be prepared to provide you with a longer answer. Let me just say this. Mali is comprised of a population which 

is probably 98 percent Muslim and they have always been, for the 

most part, moderate Muslims. The AQIM that we know of is an extension of the GSPC from Algeria. Over the last decade and a half, 

as the Algerians have been successful in eliminating the jihadist 

and terrorist threat in the urban areas and in some of the rural 

areas, they have pushed jihadist Salafists down into the barren expanses of northern Mali. 

That AQIM leadership today, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar 

who Congressman Poe pointed out, is not a Malian. Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar is an Algerian and much of the leadership of AQIM 

which operates in northern Mali is, in fact, Algerian and 

Mauritanian. What we have tried to do in defining what the situation is is to not allow the long-standing, historical, and legitimate, 

political and social grievances of the Tuareg, in particular, to be 

hooked up to the jihadist Salafist and Islamist agenda of AQIM 

coming in from the north. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I’m sorry, Secretary Carson, my time is up. 

I will appreciate getting a submission in writing. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[Response follows:]

30

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

In 2012, elements of the Tuareg ethnic group, fueled by arms proliferation and 

returning mercenary fighters from the Libyan Revolution, launched a fourth Tuareg 

Rebellion with the avowed aim of establishing independence for northern Mali, underscoring their perceived marginalization and lack of development from the central 

government in Bamako. Early fighting with Malian security forces was not decisive, 

and, in the previous three revolts, the Tuareg and Malians had fought each other 

to stalemate and worked out their differences in negotiation. However, this time 

AQIM and the more extremist Tuareg-based Ansar al-Dine group provided more 

fighters, including returning mercenary fighters with arms from Libya. This tipped 

the balance in favor of the extremists who marginalized or recruited with money 

the other Tuareg factions, seizing the rebellion as their own. Malian security forces 

faced four shocks: the initial Tuareg rebellion; the addition of extremist forces to 

that rebellion that made it more effective; the lack of will power and capabilities 

on the part of the Malian government to effectively counter the rebellion; and the 

subsequent coup d’e ́tat by disgruntled elements of the Malian military. 

The Tuareg, in fact, are not the most populous group in northern Mali and there 

are other major ethnic groups there to contend with. The non-extremist Tuareg have 

given up on their demand for independence and are prepared to negotiate with the 

Malian government, and at least one group claims to have severed any ties with 

extremist groups. AQIM, MUJAO and what still exists of the more extremist Ansar 

al-Dine are under severe pressure by the French and African intervention and are 

beginning to disaggregate and become much less effective.

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very important and timely hearing. Welcome, Bill Delahunt, who just 

popped into the room, former Member of the House and friend. 

I regret missing the opening statements, Mr. Chairman. I would 

ask that my full statement be made a part of the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. SMITH. I was co-chairing, along with Steve Israel, a meeting 

on adoptions from Russia, Americans adopting, with Sergey 

Kislyak, the Ambassador, and it went over, so I apologize. 

Ms. Dory, let me ask you exactly what is the United States Government doing to implement the humanitarian and human rights 

elements of Resolution 2085 so that forces in Mali are trained in 

and are compliant with internationally human rights law including 

and especially sex trafficking training? And can we stem, in your 

opinion, the ethnic and religious reprisals by the forces that we 

support? 

Ms. DORY. Congressman, at this point, Department of Defense is 

not engaging at all with the Malian armed forces since the coup 

that took place last year. So through law and by policy the cutoff 

of security assistance to the Malian armed forces means that we 

are not actively engaged in training with them at the present time. 

Mr. SMITH. That doesn’t apply to AFISMA though. 

Ms. DORY. Exactly, it does not apply at all to AFISMA. 

Mr. SMITH. So what are we doing especially on the sex trafficking? Because we know with DR Congo and in other deployments in the past, there have been huge problems of exploitation, 

particularly of women and children. 

Ms. DORY. I think Ambassador Carson will want to speak to this 

as well, but what is currently happening with AFISMA is a process 

with the State Department and Department of Defense evaluating 

the different troop-contributing countries to see what their training 

needs are, what their equipment needs are and then to determine, 

along with the other elements of the international community who 

31

will train which forces. Those forces that will be trained by the 

U.S. will, of course, have the requisite ethics and human rights 

training included alongside their operational training. But that 

training has not yet begun. 

Mr. SMITH. So there won’t be uniformity. Particularly on the sex 

trafficking piece, there has been terrible, terrible abuse, as you 

know, and there has been a diminution of enforcement by the U.N. 

itself. I know this is going to be an African-led force when it comes 

to investigating allegations that had been made on other deployments. 

Ms. DORY. One of the other—we spoke earlier before your arrival 

about a potential U.N. operation operating in Mali at the appropriate time. And one of the benefits of that will be having the full 

complement of human rights observers, the political dimensions 

that the U.N. operation would bring to bear alongside a peacekeeping operation. That’s one of the reasons why we believe that 

that shift at the appropriate time from AFISMA—currently, Mali 

and France operating together, you’ll add in the AFISMA forces as 

they’re deployed and then employed into different locations in Mali 

and then eventually a U.N. peacekeeping. 

Mr. SMITH. I am always concerned it’s a matter of emphasis. I 

believe it will be done, but how robustly it will be done is always 

the question. 

Let me ask you, Ambassador Carson, in your testimony to my 

subcommittee on June 29 on Mali, you said, ‘‘We are coordinating 

closely with our mission in the United Nations to press the African 

Union and ECOWAS to define a clear mission for their proposed 

ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Mali. That said,’’ you testified, 

‘‘we think an ECOWAS mission to militarily retake the north is illadvised and not feasible.’’

Is that still your belief that it’s ill-advised and not feasible? What 

will be the mission of AFISMA peacekeeping force? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me——

Mr. SMITH. And if you could touch on the rules of engagement 

very briefly, too. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. Let me do and I’ll be very brief. First of all, 

we take seriously our responsibilities for implementing U.S. law 

with respect to human rights violations. The Leahy amendment, 

which is a part of that law, requires us to vet and approve any 

units that we supply, train, and support to make sure that they 

have clean human rights records. We are attentive to charges and 

allegations of these units. We do not want to be associated with or 

endorse any military units that have human rights violations. 

Most of the units deployed now moved in before there was any 

training and support, but units that we support moving in will be 

Leahy vetted and if, in fact, there are any violations, including sexual trafficking by these units, we will cut off our assistance to 

them, and we will expose them and certainly bring it up with government. So it is important to us. Leahy vetting is critical. 

The second thing that I would say is that I’m not sure that I said 

ill advisable in those stark terms. What I—and I’ll be glad to look 

at it, Congressman Smith. What I was saying is what we thought 

at the time that before ECOWAS moved in, we thought it should 

be an African-led force. We thought it should be well planned. We 

32

thought it should be well managed and integrated and that it also 

should be well resourced. 

What we did not want to do is to have an African force move in 

prematurely and be defeated by the very enemy they were trying 

to fight. 

[Additional information follows:]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED IN WRITING FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE

CARSON TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRIS- TOPHER H. SMITH

The intervention by the French has changed the state of play on the ground in 

Mali and all of our previous planning assumptions about the role of an ECOWAS 

force have been overtaken by recent events. The French are conducting offensive air 

and ground operations to clear northern population centers of armed terrorist 

groups’ control. After the French retake of the northern cities, Malian and the 

ECOWAS-led African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces 

are falling in behind the French by holding the recovered northern cities and maintaining security. Because the timeline for deploying ECOWAS troops to Mali was 

significantly abbreviated in response to the intervention, some of the currently deployed troops lack adequate training and equipment. State, largely through our African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, has accelerated the timeline for training troop contributing countries and will be providing 

training and equipment to the AFISMA troops that will begin to rotate into the mission this summer. The State Department is providing logistics support and equipment to the AFISMA forces. The European Union has begun deployment of its training teams to work with the Malian forces. 

At the time of the June 29 testimony, there was no plan for a French intervention 

and ECOWAS had not developed a sufficiently planned and financed concept of operations for a peacekeeping mission in Mali. Because there was no well-defined plan 

at that time, an ECOWAS mission to militarily retake the north was ill-advised and 

not feasible. We did not want an African force to move in prematurely and be unable to succeed. Since then, the situation on the ground has changed, and it continues to evolve. Now that France and its African partners have militarily retaken 

key population centers in the north, ECOWAS can play a role in stabilizing Mali 

through peacekeeping and not offensive operations. U.S. planners are currently in 

Bamako working with ECOWAS and the AU to develop a new concept of operations 

that will address the role of ECOWAS in the changed security environment in Mali. 

The French have stated that they intend to remain in Mali until AFISMA has demonstrated effective command and control, established logistics support, and is deployed throughout the entire country.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We’re going to go 

to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador Carson, I want to thank you for coming, along with your colleague, to tell us about Mali. I want to drift 

a little bit away from that and ask you to kind of lay out what 

other countries in the Sahel and West Africa are of security concern to the United States with the global effort against Islamist extremists and terrorism. What other countries might you be here 

testifying, along with Ms. Dory, about in the next year or two? And 

focus on West Africa and Sahel. 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman Sherman, I hope I’m not here testifying about any of them, and I don’t have a crystal ball, but let me 

just say that in my testimony I mention that there are criteria that 

make states in the region susceptible to terrorism: Weak governance, poor development, no borders, or very poor borders, and communities that feel that they have legitimate grievances that are not 

being responded to by central government authorities. 

But I would say that there is a growing awareness on the part 

of governments across the Sahel region that AQIM does constitute 

a serious threat, that they need to work with one another to comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:18 Apr 10, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_FULL\021413\78949 HFA PsN: SHIRL
33

bat this threat, and that they also need to respond to the economic 

and social needs of their people in a way that ensures that terrorist 

groups cannot make them vulnerable. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There are many West African Sahel countries that 

want to thank you for not naming them individually in your response to my question. 

Ms. Dory, it has been widely reported that the U.S. is eager to 

build a drone base in Niger. To the extent you can tell us in an 

open hearing, has that base begun construction or even been completed? Are drones being launched from that base and how many 

U.S. personnel are there? 

Ms. DORY. To start, we do not have a drone base in Niger, so 

hopefully that is helpful. What I can say is that commensurate 

with the growing threat in the region, Africa Command, as well as 

the intelligence community is very interested in increasing resources that are focusing on the region to improve our understanding of what is happening there and we are seeing a growth 

in intelligence resources of all kinds to include ISR. 

What you’re referring to in part, I believe, is news that stemmed 

from the recent conclusion of a status of forces agreement with the 

Government of Niger. This is the type of foundational agreement 

that we pursue in many different countries in Africa that have regular relationships with Africa Command for purposes of exercises 

and other activities. So that was what made it into the news and 

then an extrapolation about a drone base from there. But we are 

certainly——

Mr. SHERMAN. A news report that was an exaggeration. Unusual. 

Ms. DORY. It does happen. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador Carson, resolving the on-going conflict in northern Mali is obviously critical to maintaining the stability and integrity of the Malian state, along with setting a date 

for elections, the roadmap for transition, adopted by Mali’s Parliament on January 30 that lays out a need for opening negotiations to separatists in the north. What is your assessment of this 

roadmap and does it provide a good path, a clear path toward reconciliation and unity? 

Mr. CARSON. I think the roadmap is a significant and important 

document. It demonstrates and underscores a consensus of the Malian political class and the Parliament to stand behind a rapid 

transition to elections and a new democratic dispensation. 

I think that it is incumbent upon all of us in the international 

community to encourage as strongly as possible the Malian Government to follow this roadmap and live up to the time table that’s 

outlined there. 

Chairman ROYCE. We’ll go to Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

Ambassador Carson, I want to thank you for your many years of 

service and your great contributions to our country over your life, 

and those of us who know about it really respect you, and you are 

providing us good information today as well and thanks for that. 

I’d like to get a little bit of understanding about this conflict and 

about why we have to be involved or even France has to be involved. Is this essentially an ethnic or tribal conflict in this counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:18 Apr 10, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_FULL\021413\78949 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

try? Do we have black Africans in the south and Arabic Africans 

in the north? Is that the nature of this conflict? 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman, the situation is a very complex one. 

There are historical disagreements that divide the Tuareg, in particular, who were mostly northern Berber and Arab descendants 

from those who live in the southern part of the country. The Tuaregs were a political and security problem for the French long before independence in——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ambassador Carson, it sounds like this was 

a real caldron before al-Qaeda actually ever existed and perhaps 

we are superimposing today’s definitions on to an ancient conflict. 

I will tell you, the Pushtans in Afghanistan have been at war with 

the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan forever and we are finding it very difficult to get out of that country when we got in after 

we are attacked. It seems to me that—are you confident that the 

West can come into a situation like this that sounds like it has historic, ethnic, and tribal roots and actually make a difference? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me say, as I’ve tried to say in my testimony and 

in other comments, there are several things happening simultaneously here. This is a very complex problem. I do not want to in 

any way diminish the threat and concern that we should all have, 

particularly the French in the region, about AQIM. 

It is also true that the issues of the Tuareg are decades and decades old and they certainly predate the arrival of AQIM. But AQIM 

and its existence in the region is a fact and they have to be dealt 

with. I think it is important to make sure that we don’t conflate 

the historical and legitimate grievances of communities in the 

north with the ideological and jihadists who are part of AQIM. 

And I would say, if I could, that my colleague said that we may 

not have an immediate threat to our own homeland, but the region 

and the French do have serious concerns. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note, Mr. Ambassador, I remember 

hearing stories about Khartoum and Sudan and sending down 

Colonel Gordon during the last century and there have been these 

upheavals and these conflicts between southern central black Africans and the Arabic Africans in the north have been going on for 

centuries. It seems to me that the United States does not need to 

get itself involved in trying to create stability which seems like almost an impossible task because this instability has been going on 

for centuries. I’m as upset and concerned about radical Islam and 

their association with terrorism as anyone else, but simply to have 

them superimpose themselves in a conflict like this, we could be 

just getting involved in a quagmire that we will never get out of. 

I mean Afghanistan is complicated enough. 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman, I don’t think that we are engaged, involved directly ourselves. We are assisting the French and we are 

assisting the Africans. But we have no intentions of putting boots 

on the ground or engaging our forces militarily there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My time has run out, but let me just say that 

we are not saying boots on the ground, but it sounds like to me 

we’re trying to be the king makers. We’re trying to be the decision 

makers and in the end everyone is going to end up hating us in 

no-win situations like this. Thank you very much again, Ambassador Carson, for your insights and we deeply appreciate it. 

35

Chairman ROYCE. Karen Bass? 

Ms. BASS. I’m oh so tempted to respond to my colleague, but I 

think I’ll do that after the hearing. Let me thank you for your testimony again. 

I wanted to ask a few things leading up to talking about the elections, but I’m wondering and the chairman mentioned also about 

our delay in getting involved after the French. I’m wondering 

whether Section 7008 that prohibits the State Department and 

USAID from participating because of the coup and until there is an 

election, if that, one, was a contributing factor to any delay, and 

if there’s any change that should be made in that section. Two, I 

know that elections are scheduled for June, and I would hate to see 

them postponed, but on the other hand I’m very concerned as to 

whether or not Mali is going to be ready for elections. And if there’s 

efforts to push them prematurely, I want to know what you know 

about the process, what’s going on, who might be the candidates 

beyond the current President, what we might be doing to support 

their efforts? And then if there can be credible inclusive elections, 

especially considering that over 300,000 persons are displaced and 

are we providing any resources for the election? 

Mr. CARSON. Congresswoman Bass, again, thank you very much 

for your question and also for your interest and support on the Africa issues that we face. 

First of all, I would just underscore all the points that my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory made with respect to whether there was delay or not. I think that we tried to 

respond as expeditiously and in serial fashion to the French requests as they came in, and we certainly support and are assisting 

them to the best of our ability. 

The legislation that you referred to requires the U.S. Government to cut off assistance to any government that comes to power 

as a result of a military coup d’etat, and so as a result of the March 

23 coup in Mali, we did cut off all but emergency help and food assistance. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. CARSON. I don’t think that the legislation needs to be 

changed. I think it is a strong affirmation of the U.S. support for 

democracy and against coup d’etat. So I would say it has not had 

an impact on our relationship in terms of providing support to the 

French and others. 

That legislation does have a carve out that allows us to support 

elections. And we do have the capacity through State Department 

and USAID to help the Malian Government with technical and financial support to run elections as they have outlined in their 

roadmap. And it is our intention to join others in the international 

community in providing them with support probably through IFES, 

probably through NDI or IRI here in the United States. So we will 

go ahead to do that. 

I believe that it is possible for the Malian Government to hold 

inclusive, credible, free, and transparent elections by July 31, 

which is the date that is outlined in the timetable and the roadmap. 

As I said before, I think it’s incumbent upon the regional states 

and ECOWAS for the international community, for the U.S., 

36

France, Britain, and the European Union to push as hard as possible to make these elections——

Ms. BASS. Since that’s so soon, do you know anything about the 

process? I mean I am assuming, but not sure that the current 

President might run. Are there any other candidates? I mean that 

seems like such a short timeline. 

I also wanted to throw in a question about AFRICOM. 

Mr. CARSON. Let me just say on that, neither the current President nor Prime Minister will be candidates in the election. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. CARSON. I point out that Mali was scheduled to have democratic elections in April about a month before the coup d’etat. There 

are a number of individuals who would be candidates for the presidency. There are formed political parties. And the one thing I think 

is important to remember is that although Mali is the size of both 

Texas and California combined, some 90 percent of all Malians live 

in the southern part of the country and have not been affected at 

all by the military operations in the north. 

The Tuaregs and others, the Malian Arabs comprise only 10 percent of the population, and there are ways now that major cities 

have been recaptured to hold elections and also to hold elections in 

refugee camps and among displaced people. So it should not be an 

impediment. They can do it. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. has put a lot 

of resources into this region through counterterrorism programs including training security forces and attempting to secure porous 

borders and promoting democracy. Arguably, these haven’t gone so 

well. Overall, the amount of aid to this region with a particular 

focus on Mali has reached $1 billion over the last 7 years. 

We’ve also heard testimony that the level of support has actually 

been inadequate and not commensurate with the threat. 

However, it seems, as usual, the U.S. bears most of the burden 

on these initiatives and, in some cases, because world leaders are 

not as well equipped or don’t want to get involved and thus take 

a back seat, expecting the U.S. to take the lead. Now in this case, 

we welcome France’s initiative to take action so quickly. Regardless, the U.S. is expected to supply cargo planes, surveillance aircraft, airlift support, and other things. The U.S. also recently 

pledged to contribute approximately $96 million to support the African-led international support mission in Mali, as you had indicated Mr. Ambassador, while China and India together contributed 

$1 million. So $96 million from the U.S., $1 million from China and 

India, and the African-led force expects another $50 million to $60 

million in U.S. support. In this time of economic constraints and 

sequestration, if I might add, we’ve got to look at every U.S. taxpayer dollar being spent. 

Are other nations planning to provide assistance to this operation? What are we doing to see that other countries take a bigger 

assistance role, especially financial-wise, and share the burden to 

build up the capacity of regional forces? China has been a big player in the region for many years, so why isn’t China, for example, 

offering more assistance? One million dollars from China and 

37

India, compared to $96 million from the U.S. I’d ask either one to 

address that particular issue. 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman, thank you. I would say that there are 

others in the international community who have stepped up to the 

plate, particularly our colleagues in the European community. They 

have initially pledged some 50 million euro. They have also agreed 

to put on the ground a European military training mission which 

has the purpose of retraining, rebuilding, and rehabilitating the 

Malian military. 

I would also add that across Europe from the U.K. to Denmark 

to Germany to Canada, all of those countries have also come to the 

assistance of the French and have provided transport aircraft and 

assistance as called upon. We are not out there alone with the 

French. Others are there as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. What about China, in particular, though? And 

India? First and second most populous nations on earth and growing economies and everything, yet China especially does not—well, 

you don’t have to answer that, but it’s a question that I think we 

should emphasize more and more. 

Let me mention one other thing because I’m going to run out of 

time. As Chairman Royce had mentioned in his opening remarks, 

Mali boasts some of the richest cultural heritage in the world 

today. It’s been a center of religious mysticism, its mosques and 

mausoleums have been named world historical sites. Its tombs of 

Muslim saints and warriors date to the 15th century, and its libraries hold 700,000 ancient manuscripts. This heritage has been 

systematically targeted by the Islamists laying claim for the country’s northern towns. Malians were forbidden to worship as they 

did before. They were restricted from playing music, an integral 

part of society there. Limbs, as the chairman mentioned, have been 

hacked off. These Malians were specifically targeted because their 

practice of Islam was too liberal for these extremists. 

Ambassador Carson, you talked and emphasized, I think, Mali’s 

lack of development, but what about this radical ideology being imported from outside the region as a source of their woes? Your formula had emphasized elections and development and national reconciliation. How do we make sure that we’re pushing back against 

this violent ideology as well? It seems that’s really what the average Malian is concerned and worried about. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you. Two quick comments on that. First, we 

here in Washington and in the administration were deeply, deeply 

shocked and appalled by the destruction of historical manuscripts 

that date back over several centuries that were in Timbuktu. In 

the past, we have put money into the preservation of those documents through our Ambassadors Cultural Fund. 

The second thing that I would say is that we recognize that radicalism is a problem and we do have programs that are jointly run 

by the State Department, USAID, and our colleagues in the Defense Department to counter violent extremism, reaching out to 

vulnerable communities and vulnerable population groups especially young men who are unemployed and who could be susceptible to a radical message and agenda. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Cicilline. 

38

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Carson and Assistant Deputy Secretary Dory for your testimony today. 

Ambassador Carson, I’d like to follow up a little bit on Congressman Bass’s questions about the likely political future in Mali and 

ask you to comment on. It seems as if the presence of these extremist organizations, these terrorist organizations is really happening 

at the ground level in the delivery of services and responding to 

economic conditions on the ground. I’m wondering whether you 

have an opinion as to whether or not that terrorist organization 

will be reflected in the outcome of the elections in any way. 

Secondly, what is the path for some reconciliation with the separatist Tuaregs in the north, if there is one and whether or not since 

so much of the political legitimacy is going to be the outcome of 

this election? Do we have a sense of who is likely to prevail in 

those elections and what the relationship might be going forward 

with the United States? 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman, thank you. I think AQIM does not 

have the popular support across northern Mali, and I do not think 

that they will gain in any way from democracy and elections. As 

I say, people like Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the leadership of AQIM 

are actually not Malian. They’re Algerian. They’re Mauritanians. 

And those individuals don’t have the kind of popular following that 

will allow them to become elected officials. 

Second, I would say that the overwhelming welcome that the 

French troops received across northern Mali is a reflection of the 

fact that they too felt deeply oppressed by what AQIM was doing 

to impose Sharia law: Cutting off hands and limbs, and banning 

things like cigarettes, beer, and television. These are things that 

did not sit well with the Malian community. 

Third, I would say is that there have been formed political parties. There are political leaders who will contest elections, and I believe that those elections can go well. Prior to March of last year, 

Mali had had 20 years of democracy and had had several Presidential and parliamentary elections that had gone well. I think this 

can be restored. There is the democratic tradition that we want to 

help to restore. Reconciliation can take place. 

Again, I’ll refer back to my colleague who made a slight reference 

to a point that I think has to be underscored. In Bamako, many 

people had a different perception than we did of what the threat 

in the north was. We have always been deeply concerned about the 

AQIM threat, about the jihadists and the old GSPC people who 

came down from Algeria. In Mali, the government in Bamako 

through the threat was the age-old traditional enemy, the Tuareg. 

The Tuareg have had legitimate grievances that go back to the 

1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, and they’re about political representation, 

about a fair share of the development projects that are there. So 

there has to be a solution overall that accommodates their political 

grievances as long as they renounce violence, territorial secession, 

and any jihadist tendencies. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Ambassador, I’m also going to ask you 

to respond in writing—because my time is running out—to two 

other issues, and I’d ask the Deputy Secretary to do that as well. 

One is the current capabilities of this terrorist organization in light 

39

of the French military action. What’s your assessment of their capabilities today? 

And the second issue which I would like you to address is: General Ham raised concerns that the Malian army had not spent sufficient time focused on human rights and rule of law. I’m interested 

to know what we’re doing to be sure that that is corrected and your 

assessment of what the current deployment of West African troops 

is on that issue of human rights and rule of law and whether you’re 

satisfied that we are engaging or other troops from other countries 

are being engaged with sufficient sensitivity to important human 

rights and rule of law issues. So I could invite written responses 

on that. And again, thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. CARSON. I’ll take the first part and let my colleague take the 

second part. I think AQIM has been degraded, but not defeated and 

we should expect asymmetrical activities rather than face-to-face 

combat. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think we can do that in writing. I think that 

will satisfy the member. 

Mr. CARSON. Okay. 

[Responses follow:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DAVID CICILLINE

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been degraded, but not defeated. 

AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and affiliated 

groups continue to pose serious challenges to our interests in Mali, especially our 

efforts to promote democracy, civilian security, economic prosperity and regional stability and cooperation. These extremist groups’ goals and methods remain antithetical to Malian populations, leaving the extremists with little room to expand over 

the long term. These groups exploited the political chaos created by the northern 

rebellion and coup d’e ́tat to expand their safe haven in the north and impose their 

extremist ideology on local populations. Although they have been largely pushed out 

of key towns in northern Mali, they still have the ability to launch asymmetric attacks, as we have seen in the recent violence in Gao and Kidal. 

Although the coup d’e ́tat and subsequent division of the country have hampered 

Malian, regional and international counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel, we continue to enhance our work with Mali’s neighbors to increase their capacity to secure 

their borders, disrupt AQIM supply lines, and contain the spread of extremist 

groups. The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has bolstered capacity, fostered regional cooperation and combated violent extremism in the region. 

Lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will require that the countries in the Sahel 

develop the capacity to counter this threat, along with other transnational threats 

such as drug smuggling and human trafficking. In addition, we believe it is critical 

to enhance the stability, governance, economic prospects and inclusivity of nations 

in the region in order to undermine the foundation of extremist philosophies. This 

is only possible in an environment that is secure enough for programs that work 

to achieve these objectives can operate. Although such an environment has been 

lacking in northern Mali, we are confident that extremism in this region can ultimately be defeated. 

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MS. AMANDA DORY TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DAVID CICILLINE

General Ham has noted that we didn’t pay ‘‘requisite attention’’ to military professionalism, civil-military relations, and the rule of law. A key word there is ‘‘requisite’’—how do we adjust the quantity and/or quality of our focus on these critical 

topics? What are appropriate measures of effectiveness? And at the most fundamental level, how can outsiders best support the forward progress of democracy and 

the appropriate role for militaries on the African continent? With all that said, each 

military training mission that we undertake with our partner militaries does include human rights training as a part of the curriculum. 

40

Looking back, DoD has identified areas for improvement in our partnerships with 

foreign militaries. These include: additional engagement at an institutional level in 

addition to operational training (e.g. the Defense Institute Reform Initiative and the 

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program) as well as an increased focus on building political will and a shared understanding of the threat. 

Many of the West African countries deploying to Mali have already received training in proper military conduct from the United States and will receive additional 

training either from us or from European partners. That training is not a guarantee 

of appropriate behavior, but we believe that appropriate efforts are being taken to 

encourage professional military conduct.

Chairman ROYCE. We’re going to go to Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is that 

Qatar delivered weapons to Libya probably with the green light of 

the United States before Ghadafi failed. After Ghadafi met his 

maker, some of those weapons were sent into Algeria. Belmokhtar 

even said in a press statement that he used some of his money to 

buy those weapons. According to General Ham, his group is the 

richest of all the al-Qaeda operatives because they have $50 million 

they’ve gotten from kidnappings and ransoms primarily of Europeans and tourists. 

My question is do we have any understanding that the weapons 

used by Belmokhtar or other al-Qaeda groups had that traffic flow 

from Qatar, Libya and then these al-Qaeda operatives? 

Do you want to weigh in on that, Ms. Dory? 

Ms. DORY. Sure. I’d be glad to. I can’t specifically say what the 

connection would or wouldn’t be. I think what we do know is a tremendous amount of weapons trafficking in the region, much of it 

related to the access to weapons in Libya after Ghadafi’s fall, they 

have moved in all different directions. It’s very difficult to track for 

the regional states themselves in terms of the vast distances we’ve 

referred to already, and the limited amount of border security capabilities they have. And if you layer on top of that the limits to the 

amount of intelligence focus and assets that we have in that area, 

so you can—the theory is clear in terms of the connection of the 

weapons and other traffic moving through the region. But whether 

there’s a direct connection back to UAE weapons, I cannot tell you. 

Mr. POE. You wouldn’t argue with—or would you?—Belmokhtar’s 

statement that he bought weapons for AQIM that came into Libya. 

Would you argue with that statement? 

Ms. DORY. I would not argue with his statement. 

Mr. POE. I have two other questions. I’ll try to get to them. As 

of right now, today, February 14, starting with the Embassy attack 

in Benghazi, is there anybody anywhere that we have held or believe to be accountable for those actions, and are they in custody 

some place? 

Ms. Dory, do you know that the bad guys have been apprehended? 

Ms. DORY. I am not aware of the current status of the FBI investigation in terms of who is in custody. 

Mr. POE. So you don’t know that there is anybody? 

Ms. DORY. I do not know. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Ambassador, did you want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. CARSON. The response is the same. I don’t have any information that I can provide you. I’ll get some if we’ve got it. 

Mr. POE. I would accept your statement you’ll get us some. 

[Response follows:]

41

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE TED POE

The State Department defers to the FBI on any updates regarding their ongoing 

investigation into the September 11, 2012 attacks on our facilities in Benghazi.

Mr. POE. The other comment or question I had is about AQIM, 

foreign terrorist—labeled foreign terrorist organization. They seem 

to roam Africa at will. Borders are poor. 

But Ms. Dory, you made the comment that you don’t think that 

they are a threat to the American homeland. I know the Ambassador made a comment that they’re kind of on the way down, but 

tell me what you see the future holds for AQIM? 

Ms. DORY. I think the future for AQIM depends on how sustained the intention of the international community is to addressing the problem set and continuing to dedicate resources to putting 

pressure on the organization. As we’ve seen, the French intervention has certainly set them back tremendously. They no longer hold 

territory, key cities, in the northern part of Mali. They are now on 

the run. They have moved into different parts of Mali that are less 

beneficial in terms of ability to hold terrain, more difficult terrain. 

I think it will depend on the continuation of French operations 

going forward, the ability to rebuild the Malian defense forces to 

take action within their own territory. It also depends on the 

neighbors and the actions that they take. We are helping——

Mr. POE. Let me interrupt you real quick. Do we know the policy 

of the French? Is it France’s policy that they’re going to root them 

out and get them or do we know what their long-term goal is with 

AQIM and what they’re doing in Mali? 

Ms. DORY. The French strategic approach at this point is to in 

response to the actions taken by terrorist organizations moving 

south in Mali they took immediate action and that’s what we’ve 

seen the last month. They’re now looking to have African partners, 

the AFISMA forces and Malians, to step forward and help stabilize 

in the key population centers and the——

Mr. POE. Excuse me. If you have anything else to add, please put 

it in writing. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Grayson. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, your testimony alluded to the grievances of the 

northern populations including the Tuareg. And I’d like to ask you 

some true or false questions in that regard. 

The civil war in Mali started as a Tuareg tribal revolt, sort of 

an independence movement. Is that true or false? 

Mr. CARSON. I never like to do true and false. I would say partially correct. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Partially correct. I’ll go with that. Now the Tuareg 

independence movement, that actually dates back for decades, true 

or false? 

Mr. CARSON. Elements of the Tuareg community have had desire 

for greater autonomy for many years. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right, and the Tuaregs actually represent a 

majority in some parts of northeast Mali, particularly the desert 

areas. True or false? 

Mr. CARSON. The Tuareg are a minority within a minority. They 

are not the dominant group in northern Mali. They are the most 

42

publicized group. They are also the group that’s willing to stand up 

and fight. The north of Mali has Berber. They have Malian Arabs, 

Berber. They have Songhag and Fula. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now the Tuaregs have never associated themselves as a tribal group with al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group. 

True or false? 

Mr. CARSON. The grievances of the Tuareg and the political and 

economic aspirations of the Tuareg go back to, as I said, back to 

1870, 1880, when the French came in direct contact with them. I 

don’t think al-Qaeda was around in those days. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right, now you mentioned that there’s an interesting mix of people in northern Mali and northeast Mali. And in 

fact, it is true that the Tuaregs have been discriminated against by 

other Mali groups including up to mass killings of Tuaregs. Is that 

a fair statement? 

Mr. CARSON. I think that there’s a lot of truth to that. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right, and in fact, the Tuaregs and the AQIM 

are mortal enemies. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me just say they have had different historical 

and political trajectories. As I said before, the Tuareg have not traditionally been jihadists or radical Muslims. They have, like many 

of the people across the Sahel in Mali, going all the way from Senegal to Niger and Burkina, have been moderate Muslims who have 

not been jihadists or Salafists. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But in fact, even in the past 12 months we’ve seen 

Tuaregs and AQIM forces fight each other to the death. 

Mr. CARSON. They have come together, and they’ve also split 

apart, and they’ve come together. As I’ve said, one of the things 

we’ve been trying to do and to underscore is that we don’t want to 

have these linkages created. I think both groups found at one point 

it was opportunistic to work together, but I think many of the Tuaregs did not find some of the things that were being done by AQIM 

as acceptable. 

Mr. GRAYSON. You mean the torture? 

Mr. CARSON. Sharia law has never been practiced in northern 

Mali. Cutting off hands and limbs has been anathema. 

Mr. GRAYSON. You mean to the Tuaregs and to other reasonable 

people? 

Mr. CARSON. To Tuaregs and other communities who are also 

Muslim. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And the Tuaregs have sometimes been the victims 

of that, correct? 

Mr. CARSON. I think in terms of the internal and ethnic conflicts, 

they have been the victims of political violence, but they also have 

inflicted political violence as well. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now whether the Tuaregs have independence or 

not really has no impact on us here in the United States, right? 

It’s no threat to us in the United States if the Tuaregs were independent, correct? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me just say that we support the territorial integrity of Mali. We do not support the dismemberment or the vulcanization of that country. We do not support the aspirations of 

some Tuareg to have an independent state of Azawad. We support 

the territorial integrity of that country. 

43

Mr. GRAYSON. I understand that, but the question was if there 

were such a state, it would be more no more of a threat to us than 

south Sudan is to us today, correct? 

Mr. CARSON. Again, it’s hypothetical. I don’t even want to try and 

answer what I can’t see. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We will go now to Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. As a prosecutor, I prefer 

leading questions with short answers. So I have two questions here 

and I’m going to ask each of you to respond. 

Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, I’d like to start with you, if 

you would, please? The Ambassador said we have no intentions for 

boots on the ground in Mali, and I take him at his word. However, 

the best intentions often head south at warp speed. How confident 

are you about the degree of support we will get from the Mali people? 

And question number two, and equally important, what is the 

probability that the U.S. wades deeper into this, and where are we 

when the French bail out? 

Ms. DORY. So your first question, sir, was how we would be received by Malians. You said we would not have boots on the 

ground, but then you said how would we be received by the 

Malians? 

Mr. MARINO. Yes, how would we be? 

Ms. DORY. Hypothetically, again, I said the same thing in my 

statement. We do not envision U.S. combat forces on the ground in 

Mali. I do think the reception of the French in Mali is instructive 

in terms of the welcome that French forces have received, in terms 

of the overwhelming reception the French President received when 

he visited Mali, and in terms of the liberation of the northern cities 

and their support for the assistance rendered in ejecting the extremists from the cities in north Mali. 

Mr. MARINO. And what about the probability of us wading deeper 

into this disaster in Mali, and what happens when the French bail 

out? 

Ms. DORY. I wouldn’t want to give a probability in terms of a 

crystal ball what our future support will entail. I think what we 

can say is that we are strongly supporting the French at this point 

and we are strongly supporting African partners in terms of their 

ability to deploy forces into Mali and their ability to employ them 

going forward. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Ambassador, do you have a response? 

Mr. CARSON. I’m tempted to say, Mr. Marino, that I am not a 

lawyer. 

Mr. MARINO. I’m a prosecutor. I draw a distinction there. We talk 

about hypotheticals, and this is more of a statement than a question, so I’m not looking for a response unless you want to. I just 

hope and pray that as we go through this process in Mali, and any 

other country, that we try to anticipate as much as possible what 

the ramifications would be, and what the negative aspects would 

be down the road. I think sometimes we get caught up in the emotional part of situations like this and really do not pragmatically 

sit down and say what happens if? So just please bear that in 

mind. I yield back my time. Thank you. 

44

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Marino. Now we go to Mr. 

Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for putting 

this hearing together so quickly. I appreciate it. I think we all do. 

I think if there was any surprise to the international community 

it was how swiftly and effectively the French intervened. I mean 

it was pretty amazing how quickly they decided to put boots on the 

ground and to intervene and do so effectively. In fact, I’m 51 years 

old and I can’t recall a time when I could say that the French intervened swiftly and effectively. And yet, they have. And of course, 

they’re well received by the population there. I appreciate that very 

much. 

I would ask this and some statements were made about our assistance to them. I don’t want to put words in anyone’s mouth, but 

that we have done basically all that we could. Have they asked for 

anything that we have not assisted them in? 

Ms. DORY. No. 

Mr. VARGAS. Is there any assistance that they would ask for? I 

know drones were brought up and I know that we do have a reluctance to put boots on the ground, but we do have capabilities now 

that other nations do not have. If they were to ask for assistance 

from our drone capability, would we be willing to assist them in 

that? 

Ms. DORY. We are providing very full support across all the different elements of intelligence sharing. 

Mr. VARGAS. I guess I would ask not in intelligence sharing, but 

actually as a weapon, not so much to gather intelligence, but to actually eliminate the threat to either French troops or to civilian 

populations and use it as an effective weapon, not simply to gather 

intelligence. Would we be willing to share that capability with 

them? 

Ms. DORY. Those are not the types of platforms that we have in 

the theater. The intelligence surveillance for constant assets that 

we have are just that. They are focused on intelligence. 

Mr. VARGAS. There was an issue that was brought up earlier. 

Maybe you could answer this that there was a conflict, supposedly, 

between the State Department and the Defense Department here 

that there was an awkwardness, maybe lawyers in between. So we 

weren’t acting as expeditiously as we possibly could. Is there something to that that notion? That we were delayed in any way because of maybe a lack of coordination between the Defense Department and Department of State? 

Mr. CARSON. I think the level of inter-agency collaboration between State and Defense with respect to Mali has been close, continuous, tight, and uniform. And we have worked together on this 

issue in a very collaborative and, I think, in a very aggressive fashion. 

Ms. DORY. I would second that. 

Mr. VARGAS. I guess I would just conclude by saying I think this 

has been a very successful operation. Certainly to applaud the 

French. I think that from all I can tell we were with them as allies 

and continue to be allies and help them in any way that we possibly can. 

45

I do think that al-Qaeda is a threat around the world and I do 

think that when other nations like France and the French take the 

lead, we ought to applaud them. Maybe we can get some French 

fries back in this building. But in fact, that was one of the things 

that was pretty interesting about this whole thing. I think there is 

a notion that the French, in fact, quotes that the French are going 

to bail out. So far they seem to have been quite effective and quite 

aggressive. I’m not sure that we would have moved as quickly as 

they did, but they did it, I think, fantastically and we should applaud them for that. 

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, and Mr. Ambassador, that was 

good to hear, Ambassador Carson. That’s not what we read in the 

press or understood from some quarters who talked to us about 

this, but it’s good to know that Department of Defense and Department of State are working together to resolve these problems 

quickly and that some of the hurdles maybe that were faced because of the legalistic barriers have been overcome. 

Let’s go now to Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

coming to testify. As we’ve heard your testimony and obviously 

looked at some of your previous testimony, there are four components as you see it that must happen at the same time. My question to each one of you is as we start to look at that, taking the 

lead, obviously, the French have taken the lead in some components of that, but how do we make sure that we have all of those 

issues addressed and that we’re just not throwing money at a particular situation, whether it’s humanitarian relief or whether it’s 

intervention, boots on the ground, whatever the case may be? Who 

is going to manage that process, and how best can we address that? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me say that that is the work of our diplomatic 

establishment. I think that we have to remain diplomatically engaged on a bilateral basis with the Malian Government. We have 

to remain diplomatically engaged on a multilateral basis with our 

colleagues in New York, at the U.N., at the Security Council, and 

also with our European colleagues, particularly the French and the 

European Union, who take the greatest amount of interest. 

We have to, to the greatest extent possible, have a shared set of 

outcomes that we want to achieve and we need to be consistent in 

pushing those forward. But it’s not all the time public work, and 

it’s not all the time visible work but it’s that continuing diplomatic 

engagement at every level, not only in terms of what we do at 

State, but also our colleagues in the military as they interact with 

their military colleagues in Africa and Europe as well. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you would say more the State Department taking more the diplomatic lead in this than DoD? 

Mr. CARSON. At this juncture I would say yes, because this is—

the problems in Mali will not and cannot be exclusively defined as 

security and terrorist problems, and there must be solutions beyond the military and security and terrorist framework in order to 

make Mali a strong and stable country again. So there have to be 

both military and political solutions. 

I think the French have advanced the agenda on the anti-terrorist side and the security side. We have to advance the agenda 

46

on the political, diplomatic, and economic and development side. 

And also the reconciliation side between Tuaregs and those in the 

south. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Ms. Dory, would you agree? 

Ms. DORY. I would agree. I would add to what Ambassador Carson is discussing, that we have the State Department clearly leading the overall foreign policy direction, that we are working closely 

together at the strategic and policy level here in a very robust 

inter-agency process. We do so at the operational level in terms of 

Africa Command and the robust State Department participation on 

staff there and then the same thing repeats at the—in DoD we 

would call it the tactical level, but at the Embassy level in terms 

of the country team, the participation by attaches and supplemented planners who are working alongside the State Department 

colleagues. So it’s happening at all three levels very robustly. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And both of you have put an emphasis in terms 

of democratic elections and the critical nature of both of those, but 

without a respect for the rule of law. We’ve seen in other regions 

that democratic elections don’t necessarily translate into a sound 

government. How does Mali differ in that regard? 

Mr. CARSON. Elections are only one step in the democratic process. Strengthening democratic institutions is critical, creating political will, political space and political——

Mr. MEADOWS. Who does that? Who does that? 

Mr. CARSON. Again, I think we engage as diplomats with government and political elites and political power, political parties and 

we encourage our other democratic partners around the world to 

also do so in a very active fashion. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So do we have other success stories where we can 

see where that’s actually happened in the region? 

Mr. CARSON. I think we’ve got lots of success stories out there. 

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger. The number is quite substantial. I think there is a positive trajectory for democracy and a positive trajectory for stability. These are challenges, but there are also lots of successes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you both. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Castro? 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. I want to say first of all 

thank you to Ambassador Carson and to Ms. Dory for the work 

that each of you do on behalf of the nation on these issues. 

I have a question regarding AQIM and its relationship with core 

al-Qaeda. Earlier, we heard Mr. Rohrabacher ask or suggest that 

we may be superimposing certain labels on these terrorist groups. 

How do we go about distinguishing whether they have a strong and 

true connection to core al-Qaeda or whether they are simply imposters, so to speak, who are just adopting that brand name? 

Mr. CARSON. I may want to come back to you with a response 

from our colleagues in the intelligence community on this and how 

they define them, but there is a linkage between AQIM and core 

al-Qaeda, but I would rather have them define the strength of this 

relationship. 

[Response follows:]

47

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE JOAQUIN CASTRO

Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originated as an armed 

Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. The Groupe 

Islamique Arme ́ (GIA) was formed after Algeria’s military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 when it seemed that the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take 

power. In 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was formed, 

declaring its independence from the GIA, due to the GIA’s brutal tactics against civilians. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda 

senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri did not officially approve GSPC’s merger with alQaeda until September 11, 2006. Zawahiri’s videotaped acceptance of the merger 

marked the group’s public re-branding as an al-Qaeda affiliate. The group officially 

changed its name from GSPC to ‘‘Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb’’ 

in January 2007. 

In a July 2008 interview with the New York Times, the Emir of AQIM Abdemalek 

Droukdal, who also had been the emir of GSPC since 2004, stated that ‘‘Our general 

goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother.’’ Since its merger with al-Qaeda, 

some of AQIM’s attacks have reflected core AQ goals. In 2007, AQIM bombed the 

UN headquarters building in Algiers and the Algerian Constitutional Court, killing 

60 people. AQIM also has conducted kidnap for ransom operations against Western 

citizens and participated in the most recent Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali.

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. That’s no problem. Also you all have spoken 

about, I think you specifically, said that there are certain conditions in a nation that make it more susceptible to terrorism activity, including poor governance and poor development. I don’t think 

we’ve covered that yet. Can you give a description of the poverty 

and desperation that exists in this nation and others in that region? 

Mr. CARSON. I don’t know the precise number where Mali falls 

on the U.N. human rights development index. And I’ll find that 

number out for you. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. 

[Response follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE JOAQUIN CASTRO

Mali is among the 25 poorest countries in the world as measured by the U.N. 

Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite that measures the average achievement of a country in three basic human dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Of the 

187 countries ranked in the HDI, Mali placed at 174th. Its neighbors Niger, Burkina 

Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mauritania respectively placed 186th, 181st, 170th, and 

159th.

Mr. CARSON. But I’m almost certain that it ranks probably in the 

bottom 10 to 15 percent of the poorest countries in the world with 

the per capita income of the country probably being no more than 

$200 to $300 a year. 

Mr. CASTRO. But you would agree generally the better the standard of living, the harder it is for these terrorist organizations to 

coax folks to join their forces? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. And I would also add one other thing. Political engagement and the fact that people believe they have a 

stake in the country, the government, and that the government has 

a stake in delivering services to them. In northern Mali, the big 

problem that precedes many years before al-Qaeda is that the Tuaregs have felt that they’ve gotten the short end of the development 

stick: No roads, no schools, no clinics, and that promises made by 

48

the central government have not been lived up to. These are political grievances that also have an economic element to them as well. 

Mr. CASTRO. And then my final question, do you have any insight 

into the goals and future military presence of French forces? 

Ms. DORY. We are in constant discussions with the French at all 

different levels at this point. They are in the midst of conducting 

on-going combat operations while also looking ahead to the transition to the next phase as we’ve talked a little bit today. The stand 

up and force employment of the AFISMA force and then the eventual possibility of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. So we are in very 

robust dialogue with the French at senior leader levels, at operator 

levels about how they see this unfolding, conversations about when 

different transitions will happen. 

It’s very important for us to understand their intentions and vice 

versa and to connect with the on-going process of developing the 

AFISMA force so it’s available to be employed. The French are certainly not going to lose the gains that have been accomplished over 

the last month or so by a hasty transition to a force that’s unprepared to stabilize the government. 

Mr. CASTRO. And Representative Vargas asked you about whether we had ever said no to a request to our allies, the French, and 

your reply was no, that we haven’t. So I want to say thank you 

very much for that. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, both of 

you. 

Mr. Ambassador, in your previous responses to questions from 

my colleagues, did I understand you to say that we’re all of one 

mind in the United States Government with respect to how we 

should respond to the terrorist threat in northern Africa or in Africa? 

Mr. CARSON. I was talking about Mali and the specificity of the 

question about whether there was collaboration and cooperation between DoD and State. And I said that the collaboration and cooperation was very good and synergistic. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m looking at an article, Mr. Ambassador, from 

the Washington Post, published exactly 10 days ago. It quotes 

Charles Wald, the former Four Star Air Force General in charge 

of operations. He’s quite explicit about his critique of various folks 

including Vicki Huddleston, the U.S. Ambassador to Mali at the 

time, about conflicts and their approach to terrorism or figures associated with terrorism including Belmokhtar and what to do about 

him. Are you aware of that article, published 10 days ago? 

Mr. CARSON. I am aware of it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And do you find it accurate? 

Mr. CARSON. I think it’s out of context. I think the most important thing to remember there is that I think General Wald, who 

was the Deputy Commander of EUCOM, and Ambassador Huddleston were there, I think, probably 15 years ago. Much has changed. 

I think one has to look at the context in which they were talking 

and operating. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So this article is describing something from your 

point of view that’s way in the past? 

49

Mr. CARSON. It’s historical and it is dated. I think that one has 

to look at the context in which they were operating at the time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I just, I mean, ancient history, it quotes a 

2008 GAO report, talking about the lack of comprehensive, integrated strategy among the Pentagon, the State Department, and 

USAID. You’re saying that in the intervening 4 years that report 

is also now OBE? 

Mr. CARSON. Sir, I’m not aware of that report and so I can’t comment on it. I’m not aware of it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, in light of your testimony, whether you’re 

aware of the report or not, you obviously would disagree with that 

characterization, at least as it would apply in today’s context? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, because I think that as we both said here this 

morning, there is a robust inter-agency process that brings us together, both in a formal setting, but we also talk quite frequently. 

I meet with and see very frequently General Ham from AFRICOM. 

We travel together from time to time. There’s a robust amount of 

discussion and engagement there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Obviously, you can understand the sensitivity 

here. The fight against terrorism is very much on our minds. Our 

country has been badly victimized by terrorism. Much of the locus 

of terrorist activity or planning, and even deployment of capability, 

is now shifted to the African environment. And it’s imperative—

vigorous debate is one thing, but fundamental disagreement about 

approach and what to do by way of response would be of great concern, obviously to those of us here, especially on this committee, 

and we would want to know about it. So thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Dory, in the brief time I have left, could you 

tell us a little bit about our sense of the French military capability? 

Hollande was just there. Seemed to be announcing we’re pulling 

out. It looked like the insurgents kind of melted away in front of 

French-Malian troops as soon as they appeared in Goa or Timbuktu or wherever it might be. 

What is the French capability vis-a`-vis the insurgents? Should 

we worry that they just melted away, and they’ll return once the 

occupation or the military advance ceases, and what is our sense 

of what the French military intention is at least in the short term 

if not the long term in Mali? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. I would at the outset point out a comment 

made by Deputy Secretary Carter when he was recently visiting in 

France. He made the point there is a number that you can count 

on one hand of countries that are able to project power and employ 

force the way the French have in the past month, very impressive 

capability. And we have supported them along the way, as I’ve 

mentioned earlier, in terms of airlift, the refueling capability, intelligence, et cetera. So we feel very confident in French capabilities 

in the intervention in Mali. 

You’re highlighting the conflict inevitably will shift. They have 

made the point and we agree that the initial intervention can 

sometimes be the easiest part and then things get very complicated. Ambassador Carson has highlighted the complexity of the 

situation. I think we see that as the extremist exit from population 

50

centers and will pursue a variety of asymmetric tactics going forward. 

So I don’t think there’s an ability to say mission complete any 

time soon. It’s really entering into a new phase going forward. 

We’re confident in French capabilities, and we will continue to assist them. 

Chairman ROYCE. Alan Lowenthal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for holding this important hearing. 

According to the congressional—and I think you’ve touched upon 

this and actually the Ambassador mentioned it a little bit in his 

earlier statements, that according to—but I want to kind of dig 

deeper to the period that really occurred before the coup. According 

to the Congressional Research Report entitled ‘‘Crisis in Mali,’’ 

there are indications that prior to the coup last March, the Malian 

public was growing increasingly resentful of perceived government 

corruption and cronyism, and the corruption arguably left Mali vulnerable to instability, especially what we’ve talked about in the 

north and to terrorist insurgency. 

The U.S. was one of the largest bilateral donors to Mali prior to 

the coup with eight programs focusing on food security, health, 

education, governance, counterterrorism and military professionalization. And yet, our efforts failed to create a stable, transparent 

government protective of humanitarian rights. 

The question I have is going forward how can we assess our intelligence and practices to ensure that the U.S. foreign aid is administered most appropriately and effectively? And really, another 

way of saying it is how do we better support strong democracies 

that truly serve the people of their country? And how do we make 

those distinctions? 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you very much for the question. The short 

answer is that we take a hard look and reevaluate what went 

wrong as well. We try to calibrate our policies to both successes to 

replicate them and failures to prevent them. And so we do look. 

Again, I’m not aware of this report, ‘‘Crisis in Mali,’’ but I’m 

going to get a copy of it very quickly and read it and see what it 

says. Mali did have problems. It’s an enormously poor country. It 

had only had democratic leadership for 20 years. There was, in 

fact, a concern about growing corruption, and as I’ve pointed out, 

certainly people in the north and particularly Tuaregs felt that 

they were not getting the kinds of services from the central government that they thought they should be. So obviously therein is a 

problem that had not been sufficiently addressed. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. I yield my time back. 

Chairman ROYCE. And lastly, to the most patient, Lois Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and you are very kind. I’m 

learning the tricks of going in and out, but I’ve been here the whole 

time. And it’s been very interesting to hear the questions of my colleagues and your answers. Thank you very much for being here, 

and it’s obvious that many of my colleagues have a very intricate 

familiarity with this issue. 

I’m going to ask a more basic, a ‘‘living room’’ question which is 

my constituents sitting in a living room if they were listening to 

this what they would ask basically which is—and you can answer 

51

this in a general term, which is what are the immediate and longterm consequences to the United States and/or our allies if we just 

ignore Mali and the region and what’s going on? 

Mr. CARSON. We live in a very small and now very closely-knit, 

global, and interconnected community, and absolutely nothing overseas, not even in places in Africa that are confused between the Pacific and Africa itself, can be dismissed as something that we 

should not be worried about. We have had, and I’ll say this very 

quickly, enormous success in one part of the world where we 

turned out back on the issues of state failure—and we suffered the 

consequences of it—and that is Somalia. 

We walked away from Somalia in a relief effort after Blackhawk 

Down in 1993. And as a result, we saw Somalia as a country burn, 

and we saw its fragmentation and then we saw the impact on the 

region and we saw the impact on the global community. The global 

community impact was unprecedented levels of piracy along the 

Red Sea. The regional impact was the huge refugee crisis and food 

crisis. One hundred thousand, sorry, 700,000 refugees in Kenya 

alone, and for us in the United States, it was the terrorist events 

of August 7, 1998, when we lost not one, but two Embassies in 

Nairobi through something called Al-Qaeda East Africa that we 

don’t talk about very much these days because the foundation 

stones of it have been significantly weakened. But we forget that 

there was an Al-Qaeda East Africa that also did in Nairobi what 

was a precursor to 9/11. 

So we do have to keep our eye on these things and when we turn 

our backs on them the international community turns their backs 

on them. But these are global. 

The French acted not only because they were concerned about 

what was happening in Mali and the region, but for one other reason and that is that the largest Malian community outside of Mali 

resides in France. And these are second and third generation 

Malians who were French men who can get on the plane as disgruntled youth, French youth, who happened to be black, whose 

families are Malian, and go back to Paris and potentially start to 

undermine French security as well. 

We can’t turn our backs on it. It doesn’t mean we have to lead 

the effort, but we must always be conscious about the effort and 

we must contribute wherever we can to its solution, which is why 

we work with the French and this is why we work with the Africans. We don’t have to lead it, but we can support it because if we 

turn our back on it, it might become powerful enough like events 

in Somalia to come back and haunt us. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think Ambassador Carson expressed well our 

concern. I will add that over the years, over the last 6 years, this 

particular franchise of al-Qaeda, in just the money that they raised 

by taking hostages and ransoming them, had raised $50 million, 

enough money to allow them to establish cells not only in France, 

but also in Switzerland, in Britain, Italy, and Germany. And if we 

look at the growth of this franchise, we begin to realize why the 

French took action and why the international community is appreciative of that. I think our Secretary of State put it well when she 

noted that we are in for a struggle, but it is a necessary struggle. 

52

We cannot permit northern Mali to become a safe haven. We’ve got 

to have a better strategy. 

This hearing today with Ambassador Carson and with the representative from the Department of Defense is an attempt to get 

the agencies to work more closely together and to work with us and 

Congress in order to implement a more effective strategy. 

I did want to recognize the Ambassador of Mali and the Ambassador of Niger who are with us and ask them to stand for a minute 

so that we might recognize you both. We thank you very much for 

your participation as well. We appreciate the work of the diplomatic corps. 

And with that we stand adjourned. We thank our witnesses very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(53)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

54

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78949n.eps

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

February 14, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via the Committee 

website at http://wv.'wForeignAffairs house.gov): 

DATE: Thursday, February 14, 2013 

TiME: 10:00a.m 

SUBJECT: The Crisis in Mali: US. Interests and the International Response 

WITNESSES: The Honorable Johnnie Carson 

Assi stant Secretary 

Bureau of African Affairs 

US. Department of State 

Ms. Amanda Dory 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atncan Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

US. Department of Defense 

By Direction of the Chairman 
55


78949m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON .FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINLTES OF FULL COl'vIl'vIITTEE HEAJUNG 

Day_--,-T",n",llr,-,s",d",aLv __ Date ___ O",2""Y.~1",4Y.~1",3 ___ Room ___ =-21"-"'-',2=---__ _ 

Starting Time 10:06 a.m. Ending Time 12:28 p.m. 

Recesses ~ ~to __ ) ~to __ ) ~to ----.J L-to __ ) ~to __ )( __ to __ ) 

Pr .. iding Member(,) 

Chairman Edward R. Ro}'Ce 

Check all of the following lhut apply: 

Open Session GJ 

Executiye (closed) ScssionD 

Televised GJ 

TITLE OF HEARIl\"G; 

Electronically Rt:conled (taped) GJ 

Stenographic Record GJ 

The Crisis in !',Iali: U.S. Interests and the InterlUltional Response 

COMMITTEE :\-lEMBERS PRESENT; 

See I11fached sheef. 

NON-COMMlTTIiI£ MEMHI£RS l'RI£SEJ\T: 

iVone 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same a. meeting notice attached? YCs[] NoD 

ar "rIO ", please list helm'!) and include title, agency, departmem, or organization.) 

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or 

TUlE ADJOl:AA'.ED 12:28 p.m. 

.Te- Marter, Director of Committee Operations 
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Hearing/Briefing Title: 

FULL COMMITTEE "Crisis in Mali: U.S. Intere,.t,. and the International Respon .• e" 

Date: FFHlWAIlY 14 2013 

Present Member Present Member 

X Ed"ard R. Royce. CA X Eliot L. EngeL NY 

X Christopher H. Smith. NJ X Eni FH. Faleomavaega. AS 

X Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. FL X Brad Shennan. CA 

X Dana Rohrabacher. CA Gregory W. Meeks, NY 

X Steve Chabot. OH Albia Sires. NJ 

Joe Wilson. SC X Gerald E. Connolly, V A 

Michael T. McCauL TX X Theodore E. Deutch, FL 

X Ted Poe. TX Brian Higgins_ NY 

X Matt Salmon. AZ X Karen Bass. CA 

X Tom Marino. PA X William Keating. MA 

X Jeff Duncan. SC X David Cicilline. RJ 

X Adam Kinzinger, IL X Alan Grayson, FL 

X Mo Brooks, AL X Juan Vargas, CA 

Tom Cotton, AR X Bradlcy S. Schncider. IL 

X Paul Cook. CA X Joseph P. Kennedy TIl, MA 

X George Holding. NC X Ami Bera, CA 

Randy K. Weber, Sr., TX X Alan S. Lowenthal, C A 

X Scott Perry, PA X Grace Meng, NY 

Steve Stockman. TX X Lois FrankeL FL 

X Ron DeSantis. FL X Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

X Trey RadeL FL X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Doug Coil ins. GA 

X Mark Meado\\'s. NC 

X Ted S. Yoho, FL 

X Luke Messer, IN 
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CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH 

CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTER:::: 

hUI)·I'chrI0~rllith.hO(jGO_!J"\' 

Qi:oltgress of tfJe Wttittb $tlltcs 

li)Otl%C of 3RcprtSelltatibc% 

COMM:TTEES: 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

AFRICA, GLOBAL I-fEAl TH, AND 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Cor~GRESSjONAl-EXEGUTIV-E 

COMMISS!ON ON CHINA 

DEAM NEW JERSEY DELEGATION 

"The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the 

International Response" 

FXCCI1J/S <if Remarks by Rep. Chris SlIIilh 

HOllse Comllli!!ee 011 Foreign Affairs 

FehruGly14, 2013 

Today's hearing on the crisis in Mali comes at a critical time in U.S. policy toward 

Africa. Many ofug in Congress have long argued that events in Africa have a strong bearing on 

U.S. interests, and the coup in Mali and resulting loss of two-thirds of the COllnlt'j" territory to 

Islamic extremists last year only proved our point. 

When my subcommittee held a hearing un MuB lust year, the State Dcpmtmcnt view was 

thut Mali had some concem for the United States, but the Admini,lralion was content to wait for 

the Economic Community of West African States to create a peacekeeping mission. When that 

didn't work as hoped for, the United Nations got involved to facilitate such a mission. Frunee, 

seeing an advance by the jihadi,ts into southern Mali, later intervened directly. 

The French have a direct stake in halting the advullce of jihad isis in the region. There are 

all estimated 6,000 French citiy.ens in Mali alone. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, or AQIM, 

has its origins in Algeria and may have ties to jihadists in France itself. Consequently, France 

has a morc immediatc stake than other Western nations in preventing AQIM and itsjihadist 

allies liOln using northern Mali as a pennanent base of operalions. 

Prior to the French intervention, Administration officials quietly criticized France for 

pushing for.a more immediate reaction to the Mali jihadi,ts. State Depatiment officials said 

donor nations should· train African troops and allow them to stem the tide of Mali's armed groups 

in the north. Unfortunately, the jihudists refused to cooperate with the timetable that could have 

delayed military actiollulltil summer at the earliest. Whether lhe longel' term plan would have 

been better is now moot. A military operation is underway, and we must determine the best 

course for American interests. 

Co-ChElIfmar. of: 1 ask r or.;.; on AI;tlE!iml.','sIJi$('!(1Sf • fll-Pl'lrtl~~" COfllitinn for CombMing Anti-Semitism • Lymr; DisCJSC C[lUCU$ 

Coa!Jt!on for Autism Rase-arch and fducatbn • Gluuu! InluHlut FrCL'UUII) CUtlw:; • 81 P",tll~~h C(lIl!-JI(!~>Jronal Pio-Llfe Cwcus 

SpillS Bifida CilUCUS • Vje~nall) Caucu, • Poland Caucus • Bosma Cwcus 

Ad Hoc Congreasiol1sl Commitl8cfor Irish AHa,rs • (;ongrcssion;)1 Caucus Or.lluman rratflcking 
58

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II is vilullhal we work with the French and African military nOW engaged in liberating 

northern Mali. The United States has agreed to train the non-Malian African forces and to 

contribute logistics for this mission. We also must transfer our experience in fighting in a 

guerilla war because it secms that with the recent suiciue homhing in Gao and the retreat of the 

jihadis(s into more familia,' regions, we can expect hit and run attacks over a long period. Money 

fi'om arms and drug trafficking will allow jihadists to prolong (his eonllicl. 

However, we must at the same time consider how to stabilize the situation in all of Mali now and 

in the future. A nation that was close to elections beforc the March 2012 coup that ousted (he 

outgoing Mali president is ceJ.tainly ill-prepared to conduct elections now. Hundreds of 

(housands orMalian" are scattered in refugee camps in southern Mali, Niger, Burkina Paso and 

Mauritania. Furthermore, Captain Amadou Haya Sonogo and his fellow coup leaders are 

poisonous not only (0 the establishment of democratic governance in Mali, but also to discipline 

and cohesion in the Malian army itself. 

Supporters ofthe coup leaders last year attacked interim President Dioneounda Tram'" 

and forced him to withdraw to France for medical treatment and later forced out the first Prime 

Minister. Similarly, Green Beret elements tied to 80nogo have clashed with Red Retel elements 

that suppOlted former President Toure. Meanwhile, the variousjihadist groups are splintering. 

All of these factors complicate our efforts moving forward in Mali and the Sahel-West Africa 

region. I look forward to any light our witnesses can shed on this complex and difficult mission 

in this region, 
59


78949d-1.eps

Questions: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary .Johnnie Carson by 

Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 14,2013 

• How would you assess the eiTicacy ofthe Trans-Sahel 

Countetierrorism Partnership today? 

• Given that the situation facing our front-line posts, personnel, and our 

interests in the region is not new, why were programs like this 

partnership reduced on an am1Ual basis under the Administration, 

when the threats were so apparent? 

Answer: 

The United States remains committed to working with our African 

partners to address immediate terrorism threats in North Africa and the Sahel 

region and build durable security sector and development institutions 

required to achieve counterterrorism objectives over the long term. The key 

countries in the affected regions must lead - and bc seen leading - efforts to 

address the AQIM challenge. We cannot rely on shortcuts when confronting 

terrorism in Africa and will work closely with our partners to build the long-
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tcnn capacity of regional governments to frustrate al-Qaeda and other 

terrorists groups. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) plays an 

important role in assisting the countries in West and North Africa to take 

responsibility for their own defenses against AQIM and its associated 

groups. It is thc U.S. Government's primary vehicle to support the longtenn capabilities of West and North African countries to address the AQIM 

threat. TSCTP is a multi-ycar commitment by the State Department, 

Department of Defense, and USAID to improve individual country and 

regional capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations, disrupt efTorts to 

recruit and train new terrorist fighters, particularly from the young and rural 

poor, and counter efforts to establish safehavens for domestic and outside 

extremist groups. TSCTP programming reflects our recognition that 

sporadic one-dimensional engagements without adequate sustainment will 

fail to achicve mcaningfullong-term results in a region with a low industrial 

baseline. In addition to our initiatives to bolster the capacities of regional 

military and law enforcement, several TSCTP programs have worked to 

counter the pull of violent extremism on youth, including educational and 

training courses in Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb, and extensive 
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youth employment and outreach programs, community development and 

media activities in Niger, Chad and Mali (though the programs in Mali are 

currently suspended). 

Funding levels since the launch ofthe Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) in 2006 reflect our strong commitment to an effective 

and sustainable counterterrorism effort in the region. Funding levels are 

adjusted during each fiscal year to reflect specific programmatic 

requirements, partner country priorities, ability of partner countries to 

effectively absorb outside assistance, and the overall budget environment. 

The State Department's TSCTP activities are supported by resources from 

several primary accounts. The State Department supports TSCTP with 

Economic Support Funds (ESF), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and 

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 

(NADR). Tn past years, wc supplemcntcd thosc resources at timcs with 

Section 1206 and 1207 funds and NADR funds from the Regional Security 

Initiative (RSI) overseen by the Department's Bureau for Counter-Terrorism 

(CT). The Department of Defense and USAID also fund TSCTP activities. 
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Questions: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by 

Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 14,2013 

Lastly, on U.S. Africa Command, AFRTCOM -- another key partner in 

assisting our allies in the region and leading our counterterrorism efforts: 

• How can we best equip AFRICOM to playa more constructive role in 

fighting these threats from AQIM and other extremist groups? 

• Do the Afiican nations have the willingness and the capacity to assist 

and support U.S. security objectives in the region? 

Answer: 

The radical ideology and violent tactics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQTM) are antithetical to thc vast majority of people in the region 

and the group's ability to mobilize significant popular support for its 

objectives has been largely frustrated. Governments in the region have 

intensified their counterterrorism efforts within their own borders during the 
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past several years and have responded quickly and proactively to the threat 

in northem Mali with diplomatic etTorts and deployments of peacekeepers. 

African leaders have repeatedly emphasized that Africans must ultimately 

take responsibility for Africa's defense and they have demonstrated that they 

will take responsibility for security and will partner with the United States, 

France, the European Union, and the United Nations to address a range of 

security threats. 

U.S. Africa Command (AFRlCOM) has a vital role in building more 

professional militaries on the continent-militaries that operate under 

civilian control and democratic norms, and that are used to defend the nation 

and not an individual leader or political party. In addition to sharing U.S. 

military knowledge and technical expertise, AFRICOM can help instill the 

importance of civilian control of the military, respect for human rights and 

civilian security issues, and broader adherence to the rule oflaw. In the 

Sahcl, there is a clear role for AFRICOM in supporting regional efforts to 

build and sustain the capabilities of professional militaries to more 

effectively monitor, control, and defend their territories against transnational threats including terrorism. AFRlCOM currently implements the 

bulk of the military CT training in the Sahel including on intelligence, 
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logistics, and combat mcdical treatmcnt. Tn addition, AFRTCOM will 

provide training to Nigerien troops to better enable them to participate in the 

African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and is 

currently providing embedded planners to AFISMA Headquarters in 

Bamako. 

We continue to recognize that our actions to respond to immediate 

security concerns must be balanced with vital recognition that a gradual 

militarization of U.S. policy on the continent could work against our national 

interests and strategic partnerships. The State Department and AFRICOM 

are working together to ensure that our words and actions do not contribute 

to a counterproductive imbalance in our engagement in the region. 

Furthennore, our security engagement cannot be separated from our 

long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, 

and rcspect for civilian security and human rights. AI-Qacda and other 

extremist groups are drawn to those locations where they can take advantage 

of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operations, cross 

borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security 

forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, 
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intelligence, and mobility to dismpt their activities. Their cause is advanced 

when human rights violations and corruption undermine the credibility of 

security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of 

weak or cormpt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, 

prosecute and incarcerate criminals. 
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CHARRTS No. HFAC-OI-007 

Hearing Date: February 14, 2013 

Committee: HFAC 

Member: Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen 

Witness: DASD(AfAf) Dory 

Questiou: How would you assess the efficacy of Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 

today? 

Answer: 1 assess the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to be a mixed success. 

Although our efforts have helped build the capacity of regional partners to undertake 

counterterrorism operations, the massive area involved and limited state capacity in the region 

present challenges. The TSCTP has proven to be a useful and effective mechani sm for enabling a 

whole-of-government effort in the region. 

The problem in Mali, in part, was that we did not have a strong partner in the Malian 

government. The Department realized over time that Mali was willing to accept our training and 

equipment but lacked the willingness to put them to use against shared threats. Instead, the US.-

trained Malian units were split up in order to create a guard force for the nation's president. As a 

result, we increased our efforts in neighboring countries like Mauritania and Niger, where we 

saw better returns on U.S. investment. 

It's also important to note two additional factors that limit our ability to build regional capability. 

The first is the inherent lack of capacity that characterizes many governments in the region. 

Their ability to address shared threats - and to absorb U.S support - is often quite limited. We 

work with them to find areas where we can enable partner units, but it is a slow process. The 

second factor is the prevalence of military coups d'etat in the region. Despite the U.S 

Government's efforts to promote democracy and military professionalism, coups do still occur 

and they oblige us to suspend our security relationships. This pattern of engagement and disengagement limits our ability to maintain our investments in the region and results in partners 

with less capability to counter shared threats. 

Question: Given that the situation facing our frontline posts, personnel, and our interests in the 

region is not new, why were programs like this partnership reduced on an annual basis under the 

Administration when the threats were so apparent? 

Answer: The Department has been focused on the threat posed by terrorism in the region and has 

been a consistent advocate of robust engagement through a variety of funding sources. The level 

of our efforts is regulated by our ability to engage, and the ability of partners to absorb our 

support. As you know, coups d'etat in the region and human rights abuses have limited our 

ability to engage some key partners. 
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Questiou: Lastly, on U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM - another key partner in assisting our 

allies in the region and leading our counter terrorism efforts: 

Answer: USAFRTCOM is at the forefront of provi ding much-needed capability to partners that 

are confronting shared threats. Unfortunately, the threat has grown considerably and we are 

assessing what additional efforts may be necessary in the region. These are likely to include 

additional institution building, advisory support, and additional training and equipping support. 

The Department continues to assess its priorities and to ensure that those priorities are adequately 

resourced, even in the current fiscally-constrained environment. 

Question: How can we best equip AFRTCOM to playa more constructive role in combating 

these threats from AQIM and other extremist groups? 

Answer: Yes, many do, and the Department continually assesses the progress that partners make 

in building and employing their capacity, and calibrates our assistance accordingly. 

With Mali, in the years prior to the coup, DoD realized that the Toure regime was not using the 

assistance we provided as actively and effectively in countering AQIM as we expected. Despite 

indications that the terrorist threat was growing, the Government of Mali focused primarily on 

the perceived threat posed by its own Tuareg population. As a result, we increased our efforts in 

surrounding countries like Mauritania and Niger, which were more focused on the 

counterterrorism mission. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by 

Representative Joseph P. Kennedy, lIT (#1) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 14,2013 

Assistant Secretary Carson: 

The Sahel region faces unique challenges in the years ahead as it confronts 

the increasing threat of AQTM's expanding sphere of influence compounded 

with limited economic opportunities for the next generation. 

Assistant Secretary Carson, in your testimony, you discuss the need to 

address lmderlying vulnerabilities in Mali by strengthening and promoting 

economic development. Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory, in your testimony, 

you mention that the United States continues to work to support Mali's 

neighbors to contain and degrade shared threats. 

In considering your testimonies, one thing that stmck me about Mali is the 

incredible youth of its population, and ofthe surrounding populations. The 

median age in Mali is 16.4 years. Tn Algeria it is 28.1 years; in Cote d'Tvoire, 

19.8 years; and in Niger, the median age is only 15.2 years. At the same 

time, many of the countries in the region face alanningly high 

unemployment. 

The dramatic number of young people facing limited economic opportunity 

provides fertile ground for terrorist organizations looking to take root and 

recmit new members. Based on each of yo ur testimonies, it seems that a 

critical part of deterring these organizations - and of preventing the 

exploitation of disaffected and unemployed youth after France withdraws its 

troops - must be strengthening Malian civil society through measures like 

education and infrastmcture. 

I am curious to hear how you believe the United States can effectively 

promote economic stability in Mali as foml of counterterrorism. What is the 

appropriate role for us there, and are there specific initiatives around 

education, family planning, healthcare or other sectors that you believe 
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deserve our focus? Beyond Mali, do you see a role for the U.S. in 

confronting global youth unemployment and the effect it can have on 

economic and political stability, especially in our most conflicted regions? 

Answer: 

Numerous studies highlight the complex nature of drivers that lead to 

extremism and demonstrate that there is no overarching "root cause" and 

that poverty is often just one of many factors that contribute indirectly to 

radicalization. A number of factors often work together and require a 

comprehensive approach to succeed. 

The U.S. government's cOlmterterrorism (CT) approach in the Sahel 

accounts for the interrelated nature of the drivers by anchoring our efforts to 

the goals of promoting democracy and good governance, economic 

opportwlity, civilian control over security forces, and respect for hwnan 

rights. Meaningful progress in these areas is cmcial to the success of 

ongoing efforts against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and 

associated networks. Violent extremists are drawn to areas where they can 

take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their 

operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract 

recrnits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the 

necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to dismpt their 

activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses lmdernline the 
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credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take 

advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to etlectively 

investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all forms of criminals. 

The programming designed to address these drivers in Mali is 

currently suspended since July 2012, based upon restrictions required by 

Section 7008 and additional policy restrictions on assistance. However, the 

United States has focused on these problems in other potentially vulnerable 

areas in neighboring countries in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa. These 

programs provide tangible benefits to youth at risk for recruitment by violent 

extremist organizations and commlmities in at-risk regions through youth 

employment and outreach initiatives and cOlllinunity development and 

media activities. In addition to delivering tangible benefits, such as 

vocational skills training, programs under the Trans-Sahara Counter 

Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) gathers beneficiaries from different 

communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events 

on topics related to religion and tolerance. 

The US has provided $120 million in humanitarian assistance to date 

to food-insecure and conflict-affected people in Mali, as well as Malian 

refugees in neighboring countries. These programs are critical for 
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humanitarian relief efforts. Development programs that are not considered 

life-saving are currently suspended. Upon the restoration of a credible 

democratically-elected govemment in Mali, we will look for opportunities to 

restart our historically strong partnership to build on previous work to 

improve health, education, economic livelihoods and living conditions. 

With improved govemance, Mali has the potential to be a major food 

producer for the region and achieve meaningful economic growth. While 

the United States can provide inIDlediate reliefto the people, help set the 

foundation for democratic elections, and provide basic social services in the 

interim, Mali's future development must be led by the Malian people. This 

can only be achieved through a duly-elected and inclusive govemment 

against a backgrolmd of peace and stability. Accordingly, it is critical that 

the Govemment of Mali and the Malian people be encouraged to pursue a 

simultaneous, dual-track approach directed toward the retum of democratic 

accountability and a negotiated peace. Neither will be sustainable over the 

long-term in the absence of the other. 

The TSCTP program described above is but one example of how, 

engaging youth is a vital policy priority as delineated by the USG's Youth in 

Development Policy released in November 2012. This Agency-wide 

guidance recognizes young people as a driving force in global development 
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and promotes youth participation as partners and leaders. The policy's 

guiding principles support US e1Iorts to mainstream youth in development, 

carry out etlective programs, and elevate youth participation throughout the 

world. A main objective ofthe policy is to promote the contribution of 

youth to more stable, democratic, and prosperous communities and nations. 

The Department of State's Office of Global Youth Issues has made 

the economic and political empowerment of youth, including African youth, 

a priority. The Office, led by a Special Adviser to Secretary Kerry, 

coordinates policy and programs that deal with youth unemployment. The 

Office is proactively coordinating responses that leverage public-private 

partnerships and a whole-of-govemment approach to this issue. The 

Department officially launched the Youth Livelihoods Alliance (YLA), a 

pnblic-private partnership that convenes foreign governments, the private 

sector, Illultilaterals, and civil society to address and find solutions to the 

underlying causes of youth unemployment by promoting practical and 

innovative solutions and the exchange of best practices in workforce 

development, skills training and job creation through entrepreneurship. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by 

Representative Ted Poe (I) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 14,2013 

The U.S. Department of State has imposed targeted sanctions on AQIM (a 

U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization), the MUJWA ("Movement 

for Unity and Jihad in West Africa" - a "Specially Designated Global 

Terrorist"), along with some oftheir members. To what extent, if at all, 

have these designations had an impact in curbing these groups' activities and 

available resources? 

Answer: 

Designations are a key counterterrorism tool, as they assist with legal 

actions, cutting tinancial flows, and garnering international cooperation. In 

2009, as a result ofthe Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organization 

(FTO) designation ofal-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), two Malian 

citizens, Harouna Toure and Idriss Abdelralmlan, were sentenced in a 

Manhattan federal court for conspiring to provide material support to AQTM 

and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries de Colombia (F ARC). 

The Executive Order 13224 designations of AQIM and MUJWA 

provide the Department of Treasury an ability to sanction individuals for 

providing support to AQIM and MUJW A. Treasury's derivative 
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designations playa key role in cutting off terror finance and deterring 

potential donors from providing support to designated terrorist groups. 

The Department of State also designates individuals under E.O. 13224 

to highlight the global threat posed by terrorist operatives. For example, on 

December 7, 2012, the Department of State designated MUJWA leaders 

Hamad el-Khairy and Ahmed el-Tilemsi. The domestic designations of 

AQIM, MUJWA, and affiliated individuals, such as el-Tilemsi and elKhairy, provide the basis for the United States to support United Nations 

1267 listing requests. Tn the case ofMUJWA, the United States worked 

closely with the intemational connnunity to impose multilateral sanctions on 

the organization, demonstrating intemational resolve in eliminating 

MUJWA's violent activities in Mali and the surrounding region. 
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CHARRTS No. HFAC-Ol-004 

Hearing Date February 14, 2013 

Committee: HFAC 

Member: Congressman Poe 

Witness: DASD(AfAf) Dory 

Question: #4 

Question: It is reported that Belmokhtar is hiding out in caves in the mountainous region of 

northern Mali. So far, the 4 drones and some 4,000 French troops in Mali have been unable to 

capture him. Please describe to me what the United States government is doing to bring 

Belmokhtar to justice Why is Belmokhtar not on our "capture and kill" list? Will he be added to 

it? 

Answer: Northern Mali's enormous size (it is double the size ofIraq) and the limited assets 

collecting against the threat network there make the effort extremely challenging. That said, we 

are actively working to increase our collection and to enable our sharing agreements so that 

Belmokhtar and his affiliates are brought to justice 

The Department continues to work closely with other departments and agencies to ensure the 

appropriate designations are assigned to Belmokhtar and the myriad extremist groups resident in 

North and West Africa 

Question: What are we doing to bring the perpetrators of the Benghazi attack on our consulate, 

the Egyptian attack on our Embassy, and the Algerian attack on the gas plant to justice? Are our 

special operations forces involved in any way? Have we apprehended anyone? 

Answer: DoD continues to support the ongoing FBI investigation of the attack in Benghazi, 

Libya, and is prepared to provide additional support if requested. We are additionally prepared 

to provide any requested support as may be necessary to help bring perpetrators of the In 

Amenas attacks in Algeria to justice. The Governments of Algeria and Libya have reaffinned 

their commitment to protect our embassies. The Government of Egypt is also committed to the 

protection of US. diplomatic personnel and facilities Since the September II, 2012 attack at 

the US. Embassy in Cairo, Egyptian security forces have increased protective measures around 

the perimeter and regularly coordinate with US. officials. 

In the aftennath of the Benghazi attacks, Secretary Panetta authorized a series of actions by US 

military forces to identify and locate the perpetrators of the attacks, and to assist other US 

agencies in their efforts to do the same. 

As Secretary Panetta has previously stated, the DoD is committed to bringing the perpetrators of 

those attacks to justice. However, the DoD has not yet captured any suspects involved in the 

attacks on our Embassies in Libya and Egypt in September 2012, or in In Amenas, Algeria in 

January 2013. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by 

Representative George Holding 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 14,2013 

We know there are trained terrorists in Mali and know they are well anned 

from the fall of Qadhafi. We know Mali has already undergone one military 

coup recently and scheduled democratic elections are being pushed back. 

We know splinter terror groups are committing violent and horrific acts 

against innocent civilians. This is not a stable nation or region by any stretch 

of the imagination. 

a. Can you please explain in detail what the State Department or State 

Department in conjunction with USAID is doing to ensure the 

hwnanitarian dollars we send to Mali are being used for their intended 

purpose? 

b. Are there any additional steps that should be taken to strengthen this 

oversight? 

c. Is there a point at which we should stop sending over humanitarian 

aid? 

Answer: 

Consistent with the legal restriction on assistance to the govemment 

of Mali following the March 2012 military coup, and to ensure that the 

humanitarian dollars we send to Mali are being used for their intended 

purpose, all humanitarian aid to Mali is being distributed through nongovernmental partners and public international organizations. We are not 
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partnering with the transitional government of Mali to distribute our 

humanitarian assistance. 

The State Department and USAID work closely together and with 

implementing partners to monitor and ensure that vital programming in Mali 

can continue and that implementing partners are taking appropriate steps to 

mitigate the risk of diversion to terrorist organizations or those acting on 

their behalf. All USG-supported partners working in Mali must lIDdertake a 

careful analysis ofthe risks of interventions, such as the possibility of 

assistance reaching terrorist organizations. Our partners base all proposed 

activities on viable, professional assessments of the situation on the ground 

and monitor targeted populations to ensure that they have received 

assistance. 

As one example of the monitoring and coordination of current USGsupported humanitarian assistance that takes place in Mali, USAID-funded 

food assistance is implemented through the UN World Food Program 

(WFP), reaching up to 564,000 food-insecure Malians annually. WFP's 

partners have national statT on the ground to identity vulnerable groups, 

organize distributions, and conduct post distribution monitoring. WFP 

complements this with a third-party monitoring system that conducts 

independent, monthly post distribution monitoring. A USAID officer in 
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Bamako works closely with WFP and implementing partners to monitor and 

ensure accountability of activities, and to date there has been no evidence of 

misuse of food resources. 

Funding for programs that provide humanitarian assistance, lifesaving, critical assistance in health and food security is considered on a caseby-case basis. The only humanitarian assistance being provided is critical, 

life-saving assistance to fill immediate and serious needs. There are 

currently more than 270, 000 mps in Mali and 179,000 Malian refugees in 

the Sallel region. We believe it is critical to continue this limited assistance 

to address this severe, ongoing humanitarian crisis.