This opinion i s consistent with the views expressed by Judge Floyd R. Gibson 1 at th e panel's conference on March 10, 1998 following oral argument of the case

. Judge Gibson has been disabled by illness from reviewing the opinion, which is being filed in the interest of avoiding undue delay. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-3681

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Mambu Fulgham, * * Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: March 10, 1998 Filed: April 30, 1998

_____________ Be fore BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD , 1 Circuit Judges.

_____________ BOWMAN, Circuit Judge. Mambu Fulgham

entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute m ore than fifty grams of cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 1(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 846. Prior to his plea, Fulgham moved to suppress evidence obtained in a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. TheThe Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United Sta tes District Court for 2 the Northern District of Iowa. -2- magistrate judge to whom t he motion had been referred recommended that the motion be denied . The District Court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation

. 2 Fulg ham appeals, claiming that the search warrant was not supported by probabl e cause. We affirm.
I.
On Janu ary 2, 1996, police officer Richard Knief prepared and submitted a n affidav it in support of a search warrant for the residence located at 200 Courtlan d Street in Waterloo, Iowa. In his affidavit, Knief indicated several bases to establis h probablecause. Knief first stated that Courtland Street was one of three streets in an area where numerous drug arrests had been made within the past two years. He noted that conc erned citizens had been calling on a daily basis reporting drugs sales in th e Courtland Street area.
Knief also stated that in mid-December of 1995, he received information from a confidential info rmant that Tony, a black male originally from Chicago, was staying at 200 Courtland Street and, along with several other black males, was selling crac k cocaine from the residence. In the affidavit, Knief said that he had spoken with thi s same info rmant on January 2, 1996, the same day Knief submitted the affidavit, an d that the informant claimed to have been present at 200 Courtland Street within the past forty-eight hours and to have seen Tony selling crack cocaine from the residence. In an attachment to the affidavit, Knief indicated that he had known this confidentia l informant for one year, and that the informant was a mature individual, was a person of tr uthful reputation, had no motivation to falsify information, had not given fals e information in the past, had supplied information in the past more than ten times, and-3-

hadhelped supply information leading to two search warrants, five arrests, and th e discovery and seizure of stolen property and drugs or other contraband.
Knief fu rther stated that the information given by the informant had bee n corroborated. According to the affidavit, Knief had corroborated the inform ation in two ways. First, Knief reviewed the records of the Waterloo Police Department an d indica ted in the affidavit that in August of 1995, the department received a complaint of an assault at 200 Courtland Street. The suspect implicated in th e assault was Jerome Antonio Kirk, a black male from Chicago, and Kirk listed his address as 200 Courtland Str eet. Second, Knief stated that he spoke with a second confidential informant o n January 1, 1996, and that the informant c laimed to have been present at 200 Courtland Street numerous times over the past month, including within the twenty-four hour s immediately preceding his conversation with Knief, and claimed to have witnessed a black man named Tony selling crack cocaine from the residence.
II.
We must determ

ine whether, under the "totality-of-the-circumstances analysis" set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the issuing magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that there was pro bable cause. When we review the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search warrant, great deference is accorded the issuing judici al officer. See United States v. Day , 949 F.2d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 1991).
When an af

fidavit contains information provided by a confidential informant, a key issue is whether that i nformation is reliable. See United States v. Brown , 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir. 1995). "Information may be sufficiently reliable to support a probable c ause finding if the person providing the information has a track record o f supplying reliable information, or if it is corroborated by independent evidence. " UnitedStates v. Williams , 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Draper v. United States , 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959 )). In the present case, the information was shown byFulgham is also know n as Tony and, like Jerome Antonio Kirk, is a black man 3 originally from Chicago. Ev en though Jerome Antonio Kirk was apparently not residing at the house at 4 the time of the search, we examine only those facts known at the time of the warrant application. See United States v. Williams , 917 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 1990). -4- Knief to be reliable in both ways. Knief represented in his affidavit that pas t informati on given by the first informant had proved to be reliable, resulting in several ar rests and the recovery of stolen property and illegal substances. In so doing, Knief established that the first informant had a reliable track record. Fulgham argues that the information given by the first informant was no t

3 corroborat ed and therefore could not provide the basis upon which probable caus e could be established. We conclude, however, that the information given by the firs t infor mant was corroborated with specific, consistent details provided by the secon d informant. In fact, th e two informants' tips were reciprocally corroborative, rendering their information

enough to support a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Jackson , 67 F.3d 1359, 1365 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that information from a n informant without a track record could be corroborated with information by a n informant with a reliable track record, thereby establishing probable cause), cert
. denied , 116 U.S. 1684 (1996). Further, the five-month-old police report described in the affida vit appeared to corroborate the informants' claims that a man named Ton y (presu mably short for Antonio), originally from Chicago, resided at 200 Courtlan d St reet. We agree with the District Court that the facts provided in Knief's affidavi t

4 sufficiently established that the information given by the confidential informants was reliable , and that the affidavit provided a substantial basis upon which the issuin g magistrate could conclude that probable cause existed. Even if probable cause were lacking, we find that the go od faith exception to the warrant requirement would apply. See United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 923In oral argument, Fulgham's counsel conceded this error. 5 -5- (1984) (establishing the good f aith exception). Under the good faith exception, where probable cause is fo und lacking suppression will not be required if: "(1) the executing offic ers relied in good faith on a search warrant signed by a neutral and detache d magi strate, and (2) the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. " Jackson , 67 F.3d at 1365 (citing Leon , 468 U.S. at 922-23). Therefore, absen t allegat ions that the magistrate was not neutral, "suppression is appropriate only if the officers w ere dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not hav e harboredan objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause." Leon , 468 U.S. at 926. Fulgham argues that Knief's statements were made in reckless disregard for the tr uth because Knief relied on the August 1995 police report for corroboration. In his brief, however, Fulgham claims that the police report was more than two-and-a-hal f years old when, in fact, at the time of the warra nt application the police report was just five mont hs old. We hold that Knief's use of the police report to corroborate th e 5 informants' tips was not in reckless disregard for the truth. Fulgham finally argues that the affidavit contained so few indicia of probabl e cause as to render Knief's reliance on the warrant unreason able. We find this argument to be without merit. Knief's reliance on the warrant was not unreasonable.
III. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, we hold that the mag istrate who issued the search warrant had a substantial basis upon which to determine probabl e cause existed. Further, we hold that the Leon good-faith exception would apply in any event. We therefore affirm the District Court's order denying Fulgham's motion t o suppress.-6-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.