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DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAHRIR SQUARE: TWO

YEARS LATER, WHAT HAS CHANGED?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–9

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 8

Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D., chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom ...................................................................................................... 14

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 

The Brookings Institute ....................................................................................... 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement ............................................ 10

Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 16

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................ 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 54

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy 

III, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D. ............................................................. 55

(1)

DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAHRIR SQUARE: TWO 

YEARS LATER, WHAT HAS CHANGED? 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. I want 

to recognize the presence in the audience of a dear friend of our 

committee, Annette Lantos, the widow of the late chairman of this 

committee, Tom Lantos. It is always a pleasure, Annette, to see 

you. Thank you. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good 

friend, Mr. Ted Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 

1 minute each. 

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record 

and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions 

for the record, subject to the length limitation and the rules. 

Before I begin my remarks, I would like to convey my deepest 

condolences to the families of the nearly 20 tourists killed and others injured in the horrific hot air balloon accident in Egypt today. 

Our thoughts and prayers are with their families. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Two years ago, 

on January 25, Egyptians were poised to cast off the yoke of oppression and maybe, just maybe, bring an end to authoritarian rule 

in Egypt. The hopes of the Egyptian people and those of many 

other nations across the globe, including here in the United States, 

would be that Egypt would finally be able to transition to true 

democratic rule. 

Then in June 2012, Mohammad Morsi and the Islamic Muslim 

Brotherhood came to power. Hopes for a free and democratic society in Egypt quickly eroded into fears that the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government would turn on its people. Last November, 

Morsi took unilateral action to consolidate his power by issuing a 

decree that he would be immune from judicial challenge while also 

orchestrating a draft constitution that imposes strict Islamist practices. 

2

The new constitution was hastily put together after opposition 

parties and religious and ethnic minority groups abandoned the 

discussion over their objections to the Islamist-dominated proceedings. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood-led government was 

able to integrate Sharia law into the constitution while leaving out 

crucial protections for ethnic and religious minorities. 

In addition, there have been reports of unprecedented crackdown 

on Egyptians trying to express their freedom of speech, freedom of 

the press, and freedom of assembly. Earlier this month, a live TV 

broadcast caught Morsi’s police agents brutally beating, stripping, 

and dragging an Egyptian civilian, Hamada Saber, during protests 

against the regime in Cairo. Dozens of protesters have died or have 

been injured in clashes with the Morsi regime, yet this has not deterred Morsi, nor has it affected the Obama administration’s stance 

on Egypt. 

Since the 2-year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Egyptians have rushed to Tahrir Square and to the streets chanting the 

same slogans they used to oust Mubarak. In their eyes, this revolution is not over. Their objectives have not yet been reached as they 

thirst for democracy and protections of their human rights. Nevertheless, the U.S. administration continues to double down on its 

failed Egypt policy and has done nothing to prevent U.S. taxpayer 

dollars, F–16 fighter jets, tanks, and other support to be sent to the 

Morsi regime. 

Much attention has justifiably been given to the Benghazi attacks on September 11th, but many may forget that our Embassy 

in Cairo was also attacked on that same date. During this attack 

the Egyptian Government failed to provide the necessary security 

support needed to prevent the protesters from breaching the walls 

of our Embassy. 

As our nation is set to face dramatic economic cuts this week due 

to sequestration, we should not be providing funds without conditions to the Muslim Brotherhood-led government that is not conforming to democratic principles and is not on the right path to fulfill its obligations to the international community and to its own 

citizens. 

As the administration seeks to send hundreds of millions of U.S. 

taxpayer dollars to the Morsi regime, we need to reexamine our aid 

package and use it as leverage to promote true, democratic reforms 

in Egypt. To accomplish that, I reintroduced HR 416, the Egypt Accountability and Democracy Promotion Act. This bill conditions our 

security and economic assistance to Egypt in order to advance US 

national security interests by ensuring that Egypt protects freedom, human rights, the rule of law, civil society organizations and 

upholds the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. 

During Morsi’s tenure, videos surfaced showing Morsi describing 

Jews as ‘‘bloodsuckers and descendants of apes and pigs.’’ Morsi 

has yet to demonstrate his willingness and ability to properly secure the Sinai. And Morsi has rolled out the red carpet to 

Ahmadinejad in an attempt to reestablish ties with Iran, a state 

sponsor of terrorism that actively seeks the destruction of our closest friend and ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel. We must 

recognize that the Morsi government is unstable and not yet proven worthy of unabated economic and military support. 

3

And with that, I yield to the ranking member, my friend, Mr. 

Deutch for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thanks 

to the witnesses for appearing today and before I start, I also 

would like to just express my condolences to the families of those 

who were lost in the tragic hot air balloon accident, families who 

literally are in all parts of the globe, and our thoughts and prayers 

will be with them. 

In the aftermath of Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year reign, US policy toward Egypt has become increasingly difficult to navigate as Egypt’s 

civil society and government institutions are now led by inexperienced politicians whose organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, had 

been banned for decades. The fact remains that Egypt is now governed by an Islamist government and we must determine how US 

policy should reflect this change. The United States continues to provide $1.3 billion in military 

funds to the Egyptian military in hopes of wielding American influence and creating a stable security situation for the United States 

and for our allies. Despite our large amount of assistance, we still 

have major disagreements with Egypt. There is no doubt we have 

a drastically different world here with President Morsi. And the 

history and belief system of the Muslim Brotherhood is profoundly 

alarming for both the United States and for our ally, Israel. 

The tempting position, therefore, is to oppose all aid to Egypt. 

Such a decision, I believe, would have serious ramifications for our 

interests. First, it is likely that Egypt would abrogate its peace 

treaty with Israel. Second, the Egyptian military would lose tremendous power and the military still operates virtually independent of the Morsi government and weakening the military 

would give the Muslim Brotherhood nearly complete control. Third, 

it is safe to say that Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime would 

love nothing more than to see the U.S.-Egypt relationship crumble 

as it would bolster Iran’s ambitions to be the region’s power. Therefore, despite my objections to many aspects of the current Egypt 

Government, I cautiously continue to support our military and economic assistance to Egypt, but only, only if we can be certain that 

our aid is used in the smartest and most effective way possible; 

only, only if it protects the security interests of the United States 

and our allies. 

The collapse of U.S.-Egyptian relations would pose a grave security threat to our troops in the region and to Israel, and the effects 

would reverberate throughout the Middle East. The US has been 

cautious in dealing with the new Egyptian leadership, and continued political missteps and outrageous statements by President 

Morsi seem to repeatedly highlight our concerns. Morsi’s attempts 

at seizing extra presidential powers in November, the rushed passage of an incomplete constitution, and the continued refusal to engage with opposition parties have reignited tensions across Egypt. 

These actions beg the question can Mohammad Morsi and a Muslim Brotherhood-led government be a reliable US partner? Morsi 

has shown little appetite for taking political risks, save for his role 

as broker of the cease fire between Hamas and Israel last fall. 

Despite the United States’ strong condemnation of Morsi’s past 

anti-Semitic and anti-Israel comments, he has yet to disavow these 

4

and other past statements of great concern. This is incredibly troubling. Yet, Morsi has repeatedly given assurances that he will uphold the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel. 

In addition, the Egyptian military has been destroying smuggling 

tunnels in the Sinai into Gaza, the main route used to transport 

weapons to Hamas. But the Sinai became a virtually lawless region 

following the revolution. Instability in the Sinai had given way to 

an increase in kidnappings and activity by radical groups, all of 

which culminated in an attack along the border that killed 16 

Egyptian soldiers last August. In the 6 months since the attack, 

the Egyptian military has ramped up is efforts to control the Sinai 

and I am encouraged by the cooperation between Israeli and Egyptian militaries, but it remains to be seen whether Morsi has the political will to withstand any future rise in domestic opposition to 

the Peace Treaty with Israel. 

I am encouraged by yesterday’s news that President Morsi has 

moved parliamentary elections to May in order to allow for all 

Egyptians to take part. The secular opposition, now somewhat 

united, is already threatening to boycott those elections. President 

Morsi must engage the opposition in a meaningful way. Efforts to 

shut out the opposition will result in the continued polarization 

within Egypt and continues to keep tensions running high on the 

streets. 

It is incumbent upon the United States to send a clear message 

that democracy must be upheld. President Morsi simply must commit to ensuring the rights of all Egyptians. We have got to ask ourselves and I hope our witnesses will address what level of trust, if 

any, exists between the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition 

parties. Is the Muslim Brotherhood attempting to consolidate 

power? And finally, what are the next steps to ensure that American interests and the interests of our allies are protected while not 

letting Egypt become a failed state or worse. 

I look forward to exploring these issues and others with our 

panel. And again, thanks very much for being here today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. I will recognize members for a 1-minute opening statement should they desire. 

Mr. Chabot of Ohio, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this important hearing to look at developments in Egypt, 2 years after the socalled ‘‘Arab Spring.’’ One of the great concerns I had at the time 

of the revolution in Egypt, a concern I know you shared as well, 

was that the rise to power of the Muslim 

Brotherhood and its Islamist jihadist allies would threaten the 

peace and security in the region, particularly with regard to our 

closest ally in the Middle East, Israel. I am sorry to say that those 

concerns 2 years later have not been alleviated. 

I am looking forward to hearing the testimony from our distinguished panel of witnesses this morning, who I know will share 

their thoughts with us on what’s happening now in Egypt and 

what developments we can expect to see in the months ahead with 

regard to our bilateral relationship, the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, Egypt’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 

5

stability or lack thereof of the Morsi government. I know their comments will be enlightening and I know we all look forward to them. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Vargas 

of California is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I want to 

thank you for holding this hearing and thank the distinguished 

panel for being here today. I, too, have great concerns about the 

issues in this region, especially here in Egypt. The Morsi regime 

and the Muslim Brotherhood rule means that our national security 

interests for the rights—and also the rights of the Egyptian people, 

I think, are threatened. I’ve seen, all of us have seen, since the assumption of office in June 2012, President Mohammad Morsi has 

done a terrible job in bringing about a peaceful transition of power 

from marginalizing his opponents, critics, and protesters to 

strengthening the relationships with Iran. Morsi’s actions have 

rightfully caused great concern here in the United States. 

I would also ask the panel if they could address the issue of what 

effects these developments in Egypt will have on our peacekeeping 

forces. My understanding is that we continue to have 600 Americans in Egypt as well as 1,000 others in the force. So anyway, I 

would like to hear about that, too, because I think it is very important for us to know how Egypt is stabilizing the peace with Israel 

and as well threatening our own troops. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for 

coming. You know, one of the concerns especially over the next few 

days as we deal with sequester which we’re all going to get sick 

of hearing, I already am, we’re dealing with the question and the 

issue of America’s role in the world and especially when it comes 

to Egypt. What I am concerned about and what I am interested in 

hearing from you is what do we do to stay engaged in Egypt? What 

leverage do we have besides just aid? Because I am afraid that 

we’re sending the message both with sequester and I think frankly 

with this administration’s actions that America is disengaging from 

the world. 

My concern is when you see America retreat from the world, you 

see that retreat followed up by chaos coming where America once 

was. And I fear the day when our allies no longer love us and our 

enemies no longer fear us. And so my concern and my question is 

how do we ensure that we have the maximum leverage in Egypt? 

How do we maintain an alliance with them, but also hold them accountable to the values that we believe and frankly, the values that 

America stands for around the globe. 

I thank you all for coming. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts is recognized. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the 

ranking member and thank you very much, the witnesses, for being 

here today and to the chair again for holding a very important 

hearing today. 

We heard so much about the role of Egyptian youth in igniting 

the Arab Spring, the Arab Awakening, and the important role that 

6

it played in Tahrir Square and the demonstrations and the youth 

movement throughout North Africa and the Middle East. And I 

would love to get and am looking forward to hearing your comments about what the international community, what the United 

States can do and should be doing in order to make sure that so 

many of these young adults that are coming of age in a transition 

to democracy continue to believe in democracy and continue to 

make sure that they have a stake in this process as it moves forward. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I am not going to make a statement, Madam 

Chairwoman. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I will give your time to Mr. Meadows of 

North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you to 

the witnesses for being here today, specifically as we look at this 

particular issue. I would love for you to address as we start to look 

at there has been reports recently of a draft constitution and comparing that to the 1971 constitution and the word changes that are 

out there. So as we start to look at that, some of the things mentioned in there were very problematic when we look at a democracy 

and truly the rule of law. So I would love for you all to comment 

on that. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Congresswoman Meng of 

New York is recognized. Thank you. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member, and 

thank you to the witnesses for being here today. There are obviously very disturbing trends in Egypt that must be closely monitored. Egypt must recognize that its greatest threat is not Israel, 

but rather the scourge of extremism and violence that is overtaking 

its country and threatening the stability of its neighbors. As such, 

our military aid to Egypt must increasingly focus on border security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency activities. And we 

must insist that our aid serves these purposes. 

So as not to repeat the mistakes of the past, we must pressure 

Mr. Morsi’s government to build the institutions and civil society 

necessary to achieve true democracy. Relatedly, I am deeply concerned about the threats to women in Egypt. The recent surge and 

violence against women and the curtailment of their political rights 

are not only women and human rights issues, but they also lead 

us to question the Egyptian Government’s commitment to a free 

and democratic society. I look forward to hearing from the panel. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member and panelists. I just want to say, you know, in these tough economic times, 

it is absolutely necessary for us to scrutinize every dollar that the 

American people spend and for our Government to follow through 

with that and that we give it in good faith that we get a good return on that investment. And I look forward to hearing your statements today so that we can draft up some great policies to help 

both countries and the rest of the world. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

7

Congresswoman Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I look forward to hearing this panel. I am interested in really the good and the bad and 

the ugly. I would like to know what Egypt is doing well to bring 

security to Israel and the Middle East. And what are the areas 

that we need to be concerned about. I think all of us and the American people, especially as we talk about the budget cuts and so 

forth, is for you to tell us why continued aid to Egypt would be important for the security of Israel and important to the stability of 

the Middle East. 

I would like to echo Ms. Meng and say that I, too, am concerned 

about the reports of rape and attacks on women protesters. And I 

would want to know what, if anything, can be done about that. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Weber of Texas is 

recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I really don’t have a lot 

to say. I am looking forward to hearing from our panel. I am interested in the jets sales, the jets that are set to go to Egypt. I don’t 

know if any of you are set to address that, but I hope to have some 

discussion about that and I echo my good friend and colleague, Dr. 

Yoho’s comments about we need to be very good stewards of our 

money and good policy going forward. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. And Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I, too, welcome our witnesses today. I think it is really important that this 

subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee be very cognizant of the fact that Egypt is a work in progress. It is not going 

to be perfect. And where it is not and we can try to influence it 

in a positive direction, that is what we need to do. 

We have a lot at stake. This is the largest Arab population in the 

world. Camp David must respected. We have a lot at stake in this 

relationship. And so I think we need to eschew harsh rhetoric while 

still trying to use our good influence to good effect on the Morsi 

government. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, 

but I would hope we would keep moderation and nuance in mind 

in what is an emerging and evolving Egypt. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And now the Chair is pleased to 

welcome our witnesses. First, we have the Honorable Elliott 

Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on 

Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Previously, he served as 

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy National Security 

Advisor in the administration of President George W. Bush. Welcome, Dr. Abrams. 

Next, we would like to welcome Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett, chair 

of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Also, 

Dr. Lantos established the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights 

and Justice in 2008 and serves as its President and Chief Executive Officer, carrying on the legacy of our late chairman and dear 

colleague, Congressman Tom Lantos. We welcome you. 

And finally, we welcome Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Dr. Wittes 

is a senior fellow and the director of the Saban Center for Middle 

8

East Policy at Brookings. Dr. Wittes served as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from November 2009 to 

January 2012. 

I would like to kindly remind our witnesses that your prepared 

remarks have been made a part of the record and I kindly request 

that you keep your statements to 5 minutes. Thank you so much 

and we will begin with the Honorable Elliott Abrams. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a pleasure to 

be here today. I thank you for the invitation. The questions the 

members have posed will only take about 4 hours to answer. 

There are a lot of disturbing trends as several of you have mentioned. More charges have been filed for the crime of insulting the 

President in the less than 1 year of Mohammad Morsi’s rule than 

since 1892. 

Freedom of assembly, I’ll give another example, is very much 

under threat under new laws that have been proposed. The problem seems to be that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders of Egypt are 

not seeking compromise and accommodation. They are seeking just 

to rule Egypt and rule it in their direction. The chairman of the 

Egyptian Human Rights Organization wrote recently ‘‘as the situation stands, a grim future lays ahead for democratic transformation 

and human rights in Egypt.’’ And he added that Egypt’s new draft 

constitution ‘‘fails to offer the necessary safeguards for human 

rights.’’ In fact, the term human rights doesn’t appear. 

The thing is President Morsi won by 51 to 48. He didn’t win in 

a giant landslide in that June election last year. Nearly half of all 

Egyptians did not want a Muslim Brotherhood government. And 

that should have suggested that accommodation and compromise 

were the way to go and the healthiest thing, but don’t seem to. 

As you know, Egypt’s economy is in real trouble, too: The Egyptian pound falling, foreign currency reserves falling, tourism falling, foreign direct investment falling. Desperate need for foreign 

currency with which to buy bread. Egypt is the largest importer of 

grain in the world, but grain traders today say ‘‘they are living 

hand to mouth.’’

Now the IMF keeps postponing, having to postpone loan negotiations due to political turmoil in Egypt. There is another huge problem which is the growing lack of law and order, the rising crime 

rate, and especially the number of assaults on women. There is an 

epidemic of sexual harassment and rape in Egypt. And women who 

take to the streets to protest are often themselves subject to more 

abuses. 

I want to go back to the economic because the fact is they are 

linked. Egypt cannot solve its economic problems until it addresses 

its political problems. The economic solutions require some hard 

steps and those cannot be taken unless there is a kind of consensus. But there is no political consensus and therefore, there is 

no consensus on what to do on the economy. 

The political crisis and the economic crisis are linked. 

9

So I would urge the committee to take a bottom to top look at 

our aid program, the timing, the conditionality, and the composition. I don’t think we should return to what was really our pattern 

of decades which was if their foreign policy is okay, we don’t much 

care what happens inside Egypt. I think that was a mistaken policy. 

I don’t think we should be supplying things like F–16s that 

Egypt does not need to address the security concerns that it really 

has: The absence of law and order in the streets, the problems of 

anarchy, really, in parts of the Sinai, the prevention of terrorism 

in the Sinai. We run a great risk, I fear, of appearing to many 

Egyptians to be indifferent to the human rights struggle that is 

taking place in Egypt today. If we are on auto pilot with the aid 

program, that is the message that they are going to receive. And 

despite the huge changes in Egypt in the last couple of years, there 

really haven’t been many changes in our aid program. So there is 

no impact from President Morsi’s horrendous anti-Semitic comments. There is no impact from the new constitutional provisions 

which disfavor anyone but Sunni Muslims. There is no impact from 

the continuing trial of 43 NGO workers who were set to work on 

our aid program. Those trials have not ended. But there is no impact on our aid program. 

I think all of this needs to be taken into account as you look forward to the continuation of the aid program in Egypt. I don’t think 

it can be right that those vast changes there lead to zero changes 

in the way we give aid to Egypt. I urge to undertake that kind of 

review. And I thank you again, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

very important hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Abrams. 

Dr. Lantos Swett, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT, PH.D., CHAIR, U.S. 

COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. This 

is an extraordinarily important hearing. We can always rely on 

you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, to draw attention to the most 

pressing issues of the day and so I am really very grateful that you 

have chosen to convene this hearing. 

The short and simple answer to the question how have things 

changed in the last 2 years is that much has changed in Egypt, but 

much more needs to change if the Egyptian people are going to realize their hopes for a genuine democracy that represents all Egyptians, fully respects the rule of law, and complies with international human rights standards including freedom of religion and 

belief. These issues matter significantly. 

Madam Chair, because of these concerns I led a UCIRF delegation to Cairo earlier this month to assess religious freedom condition in the country. And I think that gives me a bit of an advantage because I literally was there in just the last few weeks and 

look forward to answering your questions about the very fascinating encounters we had with a wide range of individuals. 

The overwhelming sense we got from nongovernment interlocutors with whom we met was that there was little reason for optimism about the country’s short-term trajectory under President 

Morsi. Some we spoke with felt strongly that the Morsi government 

has not been inclusive of or taken seriously the liberal and secular 

opposition’s views. The most common concerns we heard focused on 

the poor state of the economy, increasing radicalization in a society 

that negatively impacts women and religious minorities, troubling 

provisions in the new constitution limiting religious freedom and 

other rights, and frustration about the continuing climate of impunity for numerous acts of violence, including those targeting Coptic 

Christians since the beginning of the revolution 2 years ago. 

Regarding the violence and continuing climate of impunity, it is 

unclear to what degree how much the current government could effectively do to improve the situation even if it had the genuine desire to do so, but we found skepticism among many we spoke to 

that that desire was there. As a consequence of the ups and downs 

in Egypt over the past 2 years, there have been some positive societal developments, particularly among religious and secular groups. 

Christian communities, including Coptic, Orthodox, Protestant, 

Catholic, and others, have started to organize with opposition 

groups and representatives from al Azar to counter religious extremism. Notably, all Christian groups have come together to form for 

the very first time in Egyptian history a council of churches which 

has held its first meeting just last week. 

Overall, our visit to Egypt confirmed that the situation is indeed 

complicated and concerning. Egypt is arguably the most important 

country in the region and during this transition is inadequately 

protecting the rights of its citizens, including the right to freedom 

of religion and belief. The United States has a unique role to play 

15

and our Government must do more to press Cairo to implement 

real and meaningful reforms. We cannot afford to sit idly by. 

And before I close my testimony, I would like to share a very dramatic encounter I had with the Deputy Minister there that in some 

ways was the most revealing episode of our whole visit. I brought 

up to him the comments that others have referenced by President 

Morsi calling on the Egyptian people to nurture their children and 

grandchildren in hatred of Jews and Israel down to the last generation, calling Jews the descendants of apes and pigs. And I was sitting much, much closer to him than we are, a little more like the 

distance between my good friend and colleague, Elliott Abrams. 

And I said to this individual who happened to be a Salafi Muslim, 

I said, ‘‘Your President is calling on hatred of me and of my children to be nurtured and by your children down to the last generation. Your President is calling me the descendant of apes and pigs, 

calling my seven children the descendants of apes and pigs.’’

You could hear a pin drop in the room. I said, ‘‘This is not the 

conduct, this is not the language, of a civilized society. This is not 

the way people address their fellow citizens and their fellow human 

beings in a civilized society.’’ I pivoted and said, ‘‘What if your 

President, tomorrow, were to stand up and address the Egyptian 

people and the world and say, enough, this is a stain on our character. This is a stain on our national honor. Never again, no more 

will we permit people in positions of responsibility and power in 

our country to speak in this way about our cousins, the Jews.’’ I 

said, ‘‘Well, he would receive plaudits from every corner of the 

world, deserved plaudits. And it would open potentially a new day 

for the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world.’’

Well, when I shared this experience the next day with a reformer, their answer to me was very interesting. They said, ‘‘The 

day after the day after President Morsi said something like that he 

would be assassinated by his own people.’’ And I found that to be 

perhaps the most disheartening and most illuminating moment of 

our trip to Egypt. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lantos Swett follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Cofman Wittes. 

STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking 

Member Deutch, distinguished members, I am delighted to be with 

you. US policy toward Egypt since the revolution has rested on two 

pillars: Preserving the Camp David Peace Treaty and the security 

of the Israeli-Egyptian Gaza border and trying to provide economic 

assistance that could, with wise Egyptian policy, help to stabilize 

the Egyptian economy and help a new government deliver for its 

people. But like a stool with only two legs, this strategy is incomplete and it will not produce stability in Egypt for the reasons my 

friend, Elliott Abrams, has noted. 

The United States needs to weigh in and press the President of 

Egypt and his party, as well as other relevant parties, to make the 

necessary accommodations to put Egypt back on the path to a stable, democratic transition. Now some argue that the United States 

can’t have any real impact on Egyptian politics today. I disagree 

for two reasons. First, because we still have a lot to offer and it 

is not all about our assistance dollars. Second, because Egyptians, 

both inside and outside government, still care what we think and 

what we do about it. If they didn’t care, if they thought we didn’t 

matter, they wouldn’t spend so much of their time trying to embroil 

us in their domestic arguments. 

And because they still care, I believe the leverage we have is 

probably most effectively deployed as incentives, not as arm twisting. Our recognition, our investment, our visits, our good opinion, 

our expressions of partnership all matter, along with our aid dollars. 

Now we can’t afford to take a short-sighted approach to Egypt’s 

transition. We cannot afford to focus on a transactional relationship with the current winners. We can’t assume we know who will 

come out on top at the end of this messy transition. We have to 

keep our focus on two long-term goals. First is building lasting stability through democracy. And that is the choice of the Egyptian 

people. They have made clear that whatever economic and social 

problems they are facing, they want to solve them through democratic means. So we need to support that goal consistently. 

The second is building a broad coalition in Egypt to support cooperative relations with the US. We will never return to the days 

when Egypt’s interests were defined by a single man. The US 

should not be seen as having taken sides in Egypt’s fractious politics. We need to engage broadly with Egyptian politics, with Egyptian society, to make the case for partnership and we do have common interests with Egypt and with the Egyptian people. 

Egyptians have suffered greatly from Islamist terrorism. In polls, 

they reject violence against civilians at a higher rate than any 

country in the world where Gallup does this polling. Egypt’s peace 

treaty with Israel has spared a generation of Egyptians the destruction of war and brought them stability. Egypt’s majority, its 

young people, want a better future and they know that in the 21st 

24

century this requires Egypt to be connected to the world and the 

norms that we share. 

Let me turn briefly to the record of the Muslim Brotherhood 

which raises real concerns as my colleagues have stated about their 

commitment to core democratic principles, their obligations as 

democratic actors. We should communicate our concerns consistently and at the highest levels, but we also have to recognize that 

with all their flaws, the Brotherhood won the freest and fairest 

elections in Egypt’s modern history. They may win the next election. They may not win forever, if human rights can be protected 

and a strong pluralist system can be built, but we cannot ignore 

the Brotherhood or wish them away. 

The real leverage we have is that the Brotherhood-led government wants our recognition and they seek our partnership. So we 

can make clear that their electoral victory does not absolve them 

of their basic obligations to democratic rules and norms, if they 

want to be recognized as democratically legitimate on the global 

stage. 

The political opposition, of course, has lessons to learn as well. 

And I think all of these actors will either learn the art of the deal 

or they will fail in the eyes of Egyptians and the world. 

Let me make one more comment about something disturbing that 

I have heard from a number of Egyptians in recent weeks who are 

so worried about the instability and chaos in their own country, 

that they have begun to talk about the possibility of a military 

takeover again. I think a military takeover would be a disaster for 

Egypt, for Egyptian stability, for American interests. Military rule 

would divert attention and resources from crucial border security 

and counterterrorism functions. It would undermine our ability to 

continue the cooperation that is so valuable, both to us and to 

them. And that is especially important for the US as we continue 

to drawdown from Afghanistan, face terrorism challenges in Gaza 

and Sinai and the prospect for confrontation with Iran. 

Distinguished members, I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cofman Wittes follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent testimony. Thank you, the three of 

you so very much and I am sure that we will have very good questions after I am done. 

But I wanted to ask two questions. Number one, on conditioning 

US aid to Egypt and number two on the prospects of improved relations or deterioration of relations with Israel. Would you agree that 

our leverage to be credible we cannot simply grant financial aid to 

Egypt until Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government meets certain conditions that cannot and must not be waived, and do you 

support conditioning our US aid to Egypt until it recognizes certain 

conditions, its citizens’ human rights, religious minority rights, protects law and order, cracks down on illicit activities in the Sinai, 

etcetera? 

And secondly, on relations with Israel, how do you see EgyptIsrael relations in this coming year and with the elections that 

Egypt is going to be holding in the near future? Do you think that 

this will be good for Israel, the kind of language to be used? Is it 

a bargaining chip in all of the political debate, etcetera? We will 

begin with the Honorable Elliott Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Those are very difficult questions. On the question of relations with Israel, Morsi has 

been careful. For example, within the last few weeks, Hamas made 

another request to open an office in Cairo. And the Government of 

Egypt said no. And you have seen the reports about the flooding 

of those Sinai smuggling tunnels with water and with sewage. So 

those are two things we care a good deal about. Those tunnels are 

how those arms get into Gaza. The Government of Egypt seems to 

be doing a good job, indeed a better job than the Mubarak regime 

did. 

So I think Morsi realizes that any trouble with Israel would be 

devastating at least, at least economically in terms of foreign investment, tourism, the IMF. 

Just on the first part, I want to say I agree with you. I think conditionality is important. And again, the two go together. If there ls 

no political conditionality, the economic——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I don’t want to cut you off because I know 

you elaborated on that in your statement. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Right. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If I could have the two other witnesses. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Absolutely. Can you hear me now? Sorry 

about that. I was saying that in 2012, UCIRF did in fact, recommend that the United States Government should certify 

progress on protection for religious rights and broader human 

rights as a condition of disbersement of military assistance. So the 

position that UCIRF has taken in the past, recent past, has been 

that there should be some conditionality on aid as a means of exercising leverage. We’re still in the process of our deliberations for 

our upcoming report, so I won’t address that specifically, but I will 

say here under the watchful gaze of my late father, that I know 

that when he was serving in Congress, not only his watchful gaze, 

but his dog, Gigi. So that that is a double whammy. I really better 

behave myself. But he did support a degree of linkage and conditionality. And he always felt that that was a means of leverage. 

32

On the issue of relations with Israel, I agree with my colleague, 

Elliott Abrams, that Morsi has been careful, but I think the underlying danger, and this is a great fear that I have, is that as this 

government is unable to deliver on a whole range of promises, you 

have these huge raised expectations on the part of the Egyptian 

people that are now slamming into all sorts of disappointment on 

the economic front, on the political liberty front, on the rights front, 

and there is, unfortunately, a long history in that region of the 

world of unifying people——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am going to cut you off a second, just so 

I can have Tamara speak. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Of course. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think we have 

to distinguish between the military aid and the economic aid. The 

economic aid, as you know, has been shrinking over the last 10 

years or so. And so I think on the economic side we can be most 

effective either by putting more money on the table if we think it 

is a good investment or more likely by working with others. If you 

look at the total package of assistance that is waiting on the signing of an IMF loan, it is about $14.5 billion. That is a much more 

significant lever than what we can provide alone. And so we should 

work to develop conditions that are shared by the Western governments and the multi-lateral organizations that are providing this 

aid. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will wait for your Israel answer at another time. 

My ranking member, Ted Deutch is recognized. Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. Egypt is currently 

among the largest recipients of aid from our country. Our aid to 

Egypt is a stipulation of the Camp David accords. It has been the 

backbone of our relationship with Egypt for decades now. 

If we were to eliminate aid to Egypt, we risk US security, I think 

Israel security, stability within the region. We give bad actors in 

the region, like the Iranian regime, I think exactly what they 

would want, but it is not just a question, and you have already 

started speaking to this. It is not just a question of whether or not 

we provide it, it is how—I think we need to ask the question, how 

do we provide, what do we provide, and in the context of both of 

those questions, how human rights respect for women and religious 

minorities, democratic principles, to the extent there is conditionality, how are those—how do we do it? What are the metrics? How 

do we figure that out as to how we provide the aid? 

When we provide foreign military funding to countries they pay, 

as I understand it, they pay for their purchases up front. In the 

case of Egypt, they have the opportunity to finance their purchases. 

They pay their contracts out over time. The only other country that 

enjoys that system, I think is Israel. And so the Egyptian military 

now has multiple contracts outstanding with American defense 

firms. A study that the GAO did back in 2006 found that Egypt 

had agreements in place in excess of $2 billion, some of which 

weren’t going to come due until 5 years later. The point is if something happened that required a quick cutoff of US aid to Egypt, 

like a violation of the Camp David Accords, at that point the 

United States and ultimately the American taxpayer would be on 

33

the hook to pay the termination penalties that the defense contractors would be owed. 

So should that continue and should the conditionality be part of 

perhaps how we administer that aid? 

And then finally, and you have spoken to this some, but I would 

like you to elaborate, for the past 30 years, Egypt has been purchasing military hardware like F–16s and Apache helicopters. 

M1A1 tanks, but Elliott Abrams has spoken to this and we have 

now heard from many of my colleagues that perhaps it is in our 

national security interest and Israel’s security interest and most 

importantly Egypt’s own security interest that we shift from supplying those sorts of offensive capabilities to advance counterterrorism capabilities. And I would like you to address what that 

would actually look like, what that shift would entail. 

And then the last question is would the Egyptian military and 

would the Egyptian Government object to greater intelligence and 

counterterrorism cooperation with the United States? And if the 

answer to that is no, they wouldn’t object, then shouldn’t they acknowledge that US assistance may be better served by focusing on 

those other areas? 

Dr. Wittes, let us start with you and then we will come back. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Thank you, Congressman Deutch. Briefly, 

I think on the economic side the most important change we can 

make is to reverse the one change we have made since the revolution. We have halted our democracy assistance and our support for 

Egyptian civil society. And in a moment of transition, that is, I believe, a mistake and something we need to correct. We need to resume that support now. 

On the military side, yes. I think that increasingly the Egyptian 

military and the Egyptian Government are aware that their primary security challenge is not a massive land force invading their 

country. It is the 21st century security challenges we are all facing 

and that we need to work together to combat. And I think in many 

ways the Libyan revolution and the spiraling effects of that on the 

neighborhood drove that point home. 

I think this is a time when together Egypt and the United States 

can do a real strategic reassessment of military aid and how we 

use it. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Mr. Abrams, what would that look like? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Too much of the money goes to very big ticket items 

like F–16s. If you are trying, for example, to keep order in Sinai, 

F–16s are not helpful. Other things may be. Helicopters may be. 

APCs may be. Jeeps may be. Training may be. So I think you 

would lose some of the big ticket items, but you would have a different composition of the military aid program. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. I am out of time, but I hope Dr. Swett you 

will have an opportunity to speak to if we move to conditionality 

what would those metrics look like? What would we actually expect 

to have happened in order to accomplish that? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank our witnesses 

again for their testimony this morning. I don’t know if any of you 

had the opportunity to watch 60 Minutes a couple of weeks ago 

34

when President Obama and Secretary Clinton appeared for a joint 

interview to reflect on the administration’s foreign policy. The 

President made an interesting statement. He said and I quote: 

‘‘When it comes to Egypt, had it not been for the leadership we 

showed, you might have seen a different outcome there.’’ My first 

thought was did he really say that? And my second thought was 

I can’t believe the interviewer let that go unchallenged. 

Today, in Egypt, its Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President has 

carried out a naked power grab of considerable proportions. He 

bullied through a new constitution backed by the Brotherhood that 

threatens the rights of women and non-Muslims. Garbage is piling 

up in the streets. The police force is said to be just as corrupt as 

it was during the Mubarak regime. Civil uprisings are occurring 

throughout the country. Opposition figures cite abduction and torture by government officials. And now we even hear that bakeries 

throughout Egypt are contemplating a strike later this week to protest rising wheat prices. 

So I guess I would have to ask just how much worse could things 

have been in Egypt without the benefits of this President’s alleged 

leadership? If I may, I would also like to get your thoughts on parliamentary elections now scheduled for April. Egyptian opposition 

leader Mohamed ElBaradai told the BBC yesterday that if the elections are held, given the adoption of the Islamist-drafted constitution, it could set the country on a ‘‘road to total chaos and instability’’ and then he added ‘‘we need to send a message loud and 

clear to the people here and outside of Egypt that this is not a democracy, that we have not participated in an uprising 2 years ago 

to end up with a recycling of the Mubarak regime.’’

I wonder if you might want to comment further on the prospects 

for the parliamentary election and what further bumps in the road 

we can expect as we approach the April dates? 

Dr. Abrams, I would like to hear your thoughts on those points 

that I just brought up. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. The problem goes back again to the 

lack of any kind of consensus. The government is moving forward 

despite opposition and not seeking to get any buy in from groups 

outside of the Muslim Brotherhood. So one could envision parliamentary elections that would kind of bind up the nation’s 

wounds. I don’t think these will because the opposition doesn’t believe that the ground rules are fair and believes as you just said 

that the constitution was railroaded through. So they are just being 

disregarded. 

My fear is that if you combine that with a declining economic situation, you are going to see more and more disorder and the temptation, as Dr. Wittes said, is always in a situation like that to look 

for a foreign enemy. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. We only have a limited amount of time 

so let me go to another question. I will open this up to all the panel 

members. As we all remember when we saw the protesters on 

Tahrir Square, the ones who really did favor reform and change 

and democracy and all the rest, it was inspirational to a lot of 

folks. And of course, the Brotherhood at that time was saying we 

are not interested in governing. We don’t want the presidency. 

35

That is somebody else’s business. And of course, they were the organized group in the country and we saw what happened. 

Are there any prospects for the non-Muslim Brotherhood folks to 

be better organized and do better down the road? Where are we 

there? And I will go with Dr. Wittes here and then we will move 

down that way, although I only have a minute, so if you could 

make it relatively brief. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Thank you. I will be as brief as I can. The 

other political parties right now believe that because of the crisis 

facing the President and the Brotherhood, they can fight this out 

in the streets. Both sides are playing a zero-sum game and that is 

not constructive. Ultimately, if these opposition parties are going to 

be successful, they have to get in and compete and win people’s 

votes. And so yes, the President needs to reach out to them and 

change the electoral law so they will come on board and they need 

to bargain and come on board and run. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Dr. Swett? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Yes. I think that we saw in the religious 

communities a new activism, a new sense on the part of some of 

the minority communities that they need to get engaged politically 

and to some degree make common cause with the secularists. They 

have no confidence in this government. No confidence in their role 

in the society in the future. And there were very, very grave concerns expressed about the constitution and the way it bakes into 

the cake some of the illegitimacy that they see in the government. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I ran out of time. Just let me say it was 

a real honor to work with your father on this committee for so 

many years. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Thank you so much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It really was. He was a hero to so many. 

Congressman Vargas is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate 

the opportunity. If this was a tabula rasa, a blank slate, we would 

never give aid to this country. I mean an oppressive leader, who 

oppresses his people; the Muslim Brotherhood that doesn’t respect 

other religions; the President who has said the most anti-Semitic 

things we have heard in the last years. I mean this is simply a 

country that we wouldn’t want to give aid, especially military aid. 

However, a lot of us do remember Anwar Sadat. We do remember that Egypt did come together and sign a peace treaty. We remember him ultimately causing his life. They didn’t kill him the 

next day, it took a few years, but they ultimately did assassinate 

him for that. He spoke at the Knesset. 

So I guess my question to you is obviously we all have great concern about Egypt, its size, its strength, its peace treaty with Israel. 

Could you comment about that? I think the American people think 

it is crazy to give these guys money and F–16s, but at the same 

time there is this other side. 

Dr. Elliott Abrams, could you comment on that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Several members of the committee have said this 

is the most populous Arab country and in some ways has long been 

the most influential. I don’t think any of us are thinking about 

breaking off from Egypt, particularly because we don’t like this 

government which may last for a couple of years or a couple of decVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:12 Apr 29, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\022613\79578 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

ades. So I think the question is as you look at the aid program, not 

what will make this government happy, but given the changes in 

Egypt and our uncertainty about where they will be one or 2 or 5 

years down the road, what should that aid program look like? 

I don’t think a program that looks exactly as it did, exactly as 

it did when Hosni Mubarak left office, except that we have stopped 

the human rights programs can possibly be the right way to go. 

But I wouldn’t stop the aid or suspend the aid. I would change it. 

Mr. VARGAS. How would you change it? Since you haven’t had 

much time here, I would like to ask you how would you change it? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Very briefly, I would say look, we need to sit down 

with the new Government of Egypt and say the status quo won’t 

work for us. It won’t work for Congress. It won’t work for the 

American people. Let us put together a new package and talk to 

the Egyptian military about what their needs for this coming decade are. 

I don’t think that they are in a position to say to us, particularly 

if we are talking with other donors, go away. We are not interested 

in re-thinking this. So I think it would look like a military aid 

package that is adapted to the real dangers facing Egypt today. 

And on the economic side, I think Dr. Wittes is right. It is not so 

much would we give, it is that we have enormous influence as part 

of a coalition of donors. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I don’t have the competency to address the 

specifics of the military aid package, but on the broader issue of 

conditionality and linkage, I think that when we, as a country, set 

aside our human rights concerns for what we perceive as our hardcore, tough interest, military interest and security interest, we are 

showing a shortsighted lack of vision and we lose not only the 

moral power of the cause we seek to advance, but we also lose the 

credibility with what is in that part of the world called the Arab 

street. We lose that sense on the part of the people in the country 

that we are standing for important values. 

And so I think we really do need to look at conditionality and 

linkage when it comes to vast sums of aid, whether military or otherwise and we cannot disconnect that from the situation of religious freedom or broader human rights in the society. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Just something very brief to add. We want 

a long-term relationship with country. It is a geo-strategically important country. But at a moment of tremendous change, we need 

greater flexibility in the way we engage. And so we need to look 

at the aid package in that light. How do we increase our flexibility? 

And in that regard, I think the issue of the cash flow financing that 

Congressman Deutch raised is a very important one because when 

that military aid is tied down, we don’t have the flexibility to make 

the changes we need. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. And one quick last question to Dr. 

Abrams. Our 600 peace keepers, I believe we still have in Egypt. 

If you could comment on that, any danger to them? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. That is a really important point. It is not a 

fighting force. It is an observer force, the O in MFO is Observer. 

Mr. VARGAS. Right. 

37

Mr. ABRAMS. There have been a couple of incidents already. Because there is a real breakdown of order in the Sinai, so it seems 

to me that we need to look first of all, are they really able to defend 

themselves. And secondly, again, as part of the aid package, is the 

Egyptian army ready, willing, and able to defend them? 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Meadows is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you. As each of you have testified, we keep 

coming back to this change in the mix as we see it, perhaps going 

from more of a military assistance to an economic assistance or as 

Dr. Wittes said, democracy assistance. 

Can you characterize that a little bit better in terms of well, we 

are not just sending dollars there with no conditionality, as you 

would put it? How would we look at the dollars that were spent 

in terms of taking away from the military assistance and seeing if 

we truly have some stability in terms of peace keeping within the 

region? Each one of you can comment on that. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. I think the military assistance, we have to 

recognize it plays an economic role as well indirectly in that it is 

a large component of the military budget. And——

Mr. MEADOWS. You mean our military budget? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. No, the Egyptian budget. So it has a displacement effect. To the extent that our military assistance is helping them carry out crucial functions, if we were to transfer that to 

economic assistance some other way they would have to pay for 

that or it wouldn’t get done. So we do need to look at the practical 

consequences of making such a shift. 

I am actually of the view that working with others in the international community, we could put an economic package on the 

table that would be significantly larger and could be a positive incentive for the right kinds of decisions by an Egyptian Government. 

The administration put into its last budget proposal a Middle East 

transition fund that would make money available to governments 

in the region that were making good choices. 

Mr. MEADOWS. What are those good choices? Let us get back to 

the condition. We all talk—we all want to get together and sing 

Kumbaya. But what are those good choices that we are looking at 

there? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Transition to democracy, in other words enshrining human rights, protecting minorities, building good institutions with transparency and accountability, good economic choices 

meaning free market choices and choices that will produce stability 

and deliver for people, not just for corrupt cronies. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay, based on the changes to the constitution, 

do you see that those protections for religious freedom as being 

really valid? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. If I could address that? I think one of the 

most critical issues that we would need to look to as a metric as 

to whether or not Egypt is going to be capable of reforming is, in 

fact, whether they revisit this very problematic constitution. There 

are a number of very, very troubling provisions in it. There are 

some that sound good, but they are overridden by competing proviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:12 Apr 29, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\022613\79578 HFA PsN: SHIRL
38

sions that in all likelihood will trump the good ones, the nice rhetoric. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. And there are provisions that aren’t discussed that much on this side, here in this country that were 

brought to our attention by women’s groups for example, lowering 

the age at which girls can be married off, lowering the age of child 

labor, a number of really, really problematic things and perhaps 

the overarching problem is that the constitution, the process by 

which it was adopted, written and adopted, lacks credibility. And 

so you have this huge divide in the society where all the people we 

would like, all the reformers, all the secularists, all the minority 

communities, the human rights activists, will have nothing to do 

with it and reject it. 

So unless we see a willingness on the part of the Morsi government to revisit the constitution, to reopen the process and change 

some of these very problematic provisions, I think that would be a 

very, very troubling indicator. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So would all of you agree that that becomes one 

of those conditions that becomes a line in the sand that if they are 

not willing to do that that we need to reexamine our aid to the region? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. You know, I would say I am uncomfortable 

with the language line in the sand because of the complexity of 

things. We have all talked about the fact that Egypt is in that region a very indispensable nation. It is the largest nation and as 

goes Egypt, so may go much of the region. So we want to see Egypt 

succeed. 

And the matter of conditionality and the matter of linkage is one 

that has to be handled deftly. I know there has been a lot of talk 

about sequester and meat cleavers. We don’t want in terms of the 

way in which we approach issues of conditionality to be done in a 

manner that doesn’t reflect deftness and flexibility. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So a soft condition? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I am more comfortable with that language. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Grayson, my Florida colleague is recognized. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. I am wondering is there any evidence 

that Egyptians themselves regard relations with Israel as an important part of their political discourse? For instance, is there polling to show that if they rank the important issues to them individually that they rank the relationship between Egypt and Israel as 

an important issue? 

Let’s start with you, Ambassador. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Mr. GRAYSON. You are a very honest man. Anyone else want to 

take a shot at that? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I don’t know the answer to the question specifically about polling on the relationship with Israel, but I believe 

that the Pew Research group has done polling on something that 

is very linked which is the levels of anti-Semitic attitudes in Egypt 

and they are off the charts. Don’t hold me to this, but I believe they 

39

are among the highest in the world and among the highest in the 

region. 

I didn’t really get to finish an answer earlier, when——

Mr. GRAYSON. You are going to have to on somebody else’s time. 

I am sorry. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Okay. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But let me continue talking about what we are 

talking about here. Let me ask you this, do the main Egyptian political parties have stated positions on Egypt-Israel relations and if 

so, what are they? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. The Brotherhood’s stated position or rather 

the Brotherhood’s party, the FJP’s stated position is to maintain 

the Camp David Treaty, although there are individuals within the 

party who have called for a national referendum on whether to 

keep the treaty. This is part of the ambiguity that makes this period so uncertain and troubling. 

Amongst the other parties, I don’t have these facts in front of me. 

My recollection is that a number of them have said yes, we would 

maintain all of Egypt’s international obligations. But of course, the 

treaty itself is de minimis in a way. It is what are they willing to 

do if they are holding the reins of power to keep the peace and to 

deal with security challenges as they arise. 

As Elliott Abrams noted, even the Morsi government has taken 

a number of very specific steps that we felt were important to keep 

the peace. They know that this is a sine qua non for us. I think 

the question we have to ask ourselves is is that all we want? 

Mr. GRAYSON. Well, given the high level of anti-Semitism that 

you just described why is it that no political party in Egypt has 

tried to galvanize its own support by trying to exploit that antiSemitism or has that happened? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I think that has happened. I think that is 

incorrect what you just said. In fact, I think exploiting anti-Semitism is taking place on a daily basis from pulpits, in newspapers, 

and academia and on the part of politicians. The great fear that I 

have is that if Egypt is not successful and we want Egypt to succeed, it is an old playbook, not a silver lining’s playbook, it is an 

old, dark cloud playbook. In that region and in other parts of the 

world that whipping up anti-Semitism, finding a scapegoat, and 

making Israel, which I must say in the minds of most Egyptians, 

Israel and Jews are synonymous. There is no differentiation between hatred of Jews and hatred of what they view as the Jewish 

Zionist entity. So sort of the bright lines that we might say, will 

they or won’t they abide by the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accord, and 

the indication is that for the timing, the intention is to do so, those 

lines get very muddied in the discourse there. 

I think that we do our foreign policy a disservice when we don’t 

realize the extent to which these vitriolic, venomous, and really 

poisonous attitudes seep into and characterize the lens through 

which they view relations with Israel. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Is that anti-Semitism programmatic? In other 

words, are there specific elements of anti-Semitic platform, like for 

instance, let us say terminating the Camp David agreements? Or 

is it simply a manifestation of emotion and hatred and very little 

beyond that? 

40

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I think manifestations of emotions of hatred 

rarely are confined and rarely don’t have spillover effects in terms 

of the policies of nations. So again, I think it is accurate to say that 

programmatically, no party has come out and said we want to destroy Israel, we are going to wipe it off the face of the map, we are 

going to abrogate the peace treaty. But the discourse is saturated 

with dialogue that is problematic and creates a climate in which 

as the Arab street, if you will, as the population becomes increasingly frustrated with the lack of delivery on the dreams they hoped 

for, it becomes a dangerous possibility that that old playbook is 

brought into action. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And the other parties, what is their position? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. There isn’t a lot of specificity on this, 

frankly. I think it is opportunism more than anything. Right now, 

the priorities of the Egyptian people are jobs, education, and 

healthcare. But if governments aren’t able to deliver, parties can’t 

deliver on those core needs, then the temptation to populism gets 

much, much stronger. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you, all. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. Dr. Yoho 

of Florida is recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you guys. I appreciate the input. This is something that just fascinates me. You 

know, back in the 1800s, de Tocqueville came to the United States 

to see how our country was succeeding and growing so well. And 

when he went back and reported, he said, ‘‘Rarely could I find anybody that did not understand the Constitution.’’ And then when 

Anwar Sadat got assassinated, the question was will the people 

pick somebody according to the constitution and the interviewer 

says the people of Egypt don’t know and don’t understand their 

constitution, so whoever is in charge of the military and that was 

Hosni Mubarak. 

And now we are going through another change, another evolution 

as Dr. Swett, you brought up. They have been evolving for thousands of years and we are going through another one and we are 

at a situation where we put a lot of money into that to help build 

stability in the Middle East which I think is important. I think we 

will agree to that. 

I hear all of you saying how we need to make sure they have 

open elections. We need to have free speech, open democratic elections, extend religious freedoms, and personal freedoms and women’s rights. But what we are doing and correct me if I am wrong 

is we are passing on Western ideology to a country, to a religion, 

and a political system that doesn’t accept it. I feel personally that 

is why we are seeing such an upheaval of that in the Middle East. 

My question at this point is with the Morsi government, is it 

even stable enough to receive, and I am going to call it the cookie, 

that America has? And that cookie is foreign aid. That cookie is a 

stable government that they can become a partner with. Are they 

stable enough to receive that in lieu of the fact that we have got 

these tanks and the airplanes going over there? And the people in 

my district aren’t real happy about this and they want it stopped, 

until we can come back and say yes, we have a very stable government and these are the things they are going to follow, the 1970 

41

peace accord, Camp David Peace Accord. And we want to make 

sure those things—I just want to hear your thoughts on that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would say Congressman, this is a period of transition in which they are fighting it out and we hope they will fight 

it out at the ballot box rather than in the streets. But when you 

say, for example, you know, they don’t accept our standards, they 

actually are pledged to those standards. They have signed up to the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and so forth. So they have said 

they would. And as we said, that was a close election. Morsi won 

51 to 48. There are millions and millions and millions of Egyptians 

who are angry, for example, about the treatment of women in the 

last few months in the streets of Egypt, about the lack of law and 

order. So I think the critical thing is that we don’t walk away from 

this, that we let the people who are fighting for the kind of human 

rights standards that we believe in know we hope they win. 

Mr. YOHO. I hope so. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Politically, morally, and through our aid program, 

we should be on their side. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, one of my questions, too, is you said that they 

signed those agreements, but I also know a man convinced against 

his will is of the same opinion still, you know. People will say and 

do something to get a reward, but do they follow through? It is like 

you are saying we have propped up the Mubarak regime and there 

was a lot of human rights abuses going on in that and you were 

saying we are giving money, but yet we knew that was going on, 

but we kind of turned a deaf ear to it. 

Mr. ABRAMS. We did and I think it was a mistake. And we see 

that mistake now. He crushed the center. He crushed the liberals, 

the moderates, and he let the Muslim Brotherhood basically play 

around so that when he fell, the opposition is completely divided, 

except for the Brotherhood which is very well organized and takes 

power. So we pay a price for this now, too. 

But I think there are a lot of Egyptians who would like to see 

us take a kind of political and moral lead in saying these are the 

standards that Egypt and Egypt over decades has pledged itself to 

and should meet. And we will hold Egypt responsible if it fails to 

meet this. 

The problem from the point of many Egyptians is they think we 

are walking away from it. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I would just say based on the many, many 

meetings we had with a wide variety of interlocutors that the viewpoint of most of the reformers, again, the people we would feel that 

we have most common cause with, right now is very pessimistic. 

They are not optimistic about the direction things are going. And 

they are highly suspicious and skeptical of the underlying motives 

of the Muslim Brotherhood government. They do not feel comfortable with it and the actual concrete markers, this flawed constitution and a variety of other markers, the impunity, the failure 

to prosecute those who have launched violent attacks against Coptic Christian communities. These markers do not give them encouragement. 

So the people on the ground with whom we met for the most part 

were worried, were concerned, and felt that things were going in 

42

a very troubling direction. The government officials with whom we 

met said this is complicated. This is hard. We are trying. We think 

we are going to get it right. And where the full truth lies is hard 

to know. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate it. We are out of time. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Congresswoman Frankel is recognized. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the panel. 

I want to talk about unintended consequences. I think everybody 

here probably agrees that there is a lot of troubling aspects of the 

Morsi regime. My question to you and especially as it relates to the 

security of Israel and the stability of the Middle East, what are the 

unintended consequences of us having—withdrawing aid now or 

having conditions that could not be met? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. I think one reason why we haven’t seen 

significant change in the aid relationship is because things are uncertain. Responding tactically in the initial follow on to dramatic 

events makes sense. I think that the way the Gaza crisis in November was resolved demonstrates that this Egyptian Government 

understands the importance not only to the United States, but to 

its own interests and its own priorities taking power, keeping 

power and governing, of keeping stability with its neighbors and 

particularly with Israel. 

So at the sort of practical, functional level, I think we have 

achieved our objective. The question is how do we ensure that we 

are creating an environment where the security of Israel and the 

sustenance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty will be maintained 

over the long term. And that gets to some of these societal issues 

that we have been discussing. But it also gets to the fact that the 

Egyptian people have priorities that are domestic priorities. And 

they know that they need trade with the world. They need tourism 

from the world. They need investment from the world. And they 

are not going to get that in an environment of chaos or an environment of conflict with their neighbors. 

So the maintenance of peace with Israel is fundamentally in the 

interest of the Egyptian Government, the Egyptian military, and 

the Egyptian people. And part of the role that we can play, I think, 

is to help make that case across Egyptian society and in all our engagement with Egyptian political actors. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I agree with everything that Dr. Wittes said. 

I would just add that interestingly, President Morsi is now something of a moderate within his government and I think we need to 

be mindful of the fact that he is being pulled in even more extreme 

directions by some of the Salafist elements within his own government and his party. So he does not enjoy full support and stability 

for this somewhat more moderated, if you will, and stability-oriented posture that he has taken. So the evolving nature and the 

inherent instability and uncertainty of what we are facing there 

makes policy decisions very, very difficult. And you refer to the law 

of unintended consequences, it is a great fear of every policy 

maker. You may be doing the right thing, but will you get the right 

result for doing the right thing. 

Mr. ABRAMS. One of the things I worry about is the deterioration 

in the Israeli-Egyptian military relationship. It has been good, alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:12 Apr 29, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\022613\79578 HFA PsN: SHIRL
43

though largely hidden for political reasons in Egypt. It has been 

good for a very long time. What we have seen in the case of Turkey 

which was a terrific relationship, Israel-Turkey military, it is pretty much gone. And it is not the Turkish military that did that. It 

is the Turkish political leadership. That is something that we 

should be worried about. I think I would say the mil-mil relationship between Israel and Egypt has deteriorated significantly since 

Mubarak left. The question is how to maintain what is still there. 

Mostly that, of course, is not our job. It is the job of the Israelis 

and the Egyptians. But I think it is something that we should talk 

to the government of Egypt about because it is set against this 

background. It is harder and harder to do if the overall discourse 

is anti-Israel and anti-Semitic in a very great degree. But I think 

that is something to watch for. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Weber of Texas 

is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This is for Mr. 

Abrams to start with. You said in your opening comments that you 

didn’t think sending F–16s to Egypt was a good idea, and I don’t 

remember exactly, it is not in your prepared remarks that we have, 

that perhaps they need APCs, which I took as Armored Personnel 

Carriers, and a couple of other things that you listed, like training. 

And yet, you do say that they have a bad record in human rights 

violations. 

So what makes you think that they won’t take those military assets that we send them and use them against their own people? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is a terrific question. 

Mr. WEBER. I am glad you think so. 

Mr. ABRAMS. It is absolutely right and you know, I can remember 

days in Latin America in the Reagan administration when we were 

happy to give people in those days F–5s because we knew that they 

couldn’t use them against their own populations, so we wouldn’t 

have a human rights problem in that way. 

There is absolutely no guarantee. 

We do know that the F–16s are not going to be useful to address 

the security concerns that ought to be theirs and certainly are our 

concerns, for example, the Sinai. The only thing you can do, I 

think, is put some kind of conditionality on it and let the Egyptian 

political and military leadership know that this is temporary and 

it is going to be cut off if this continues which is what we do in 

a lot of countries. But it is a great worry because the relationship 

between in Sinai, for example, the Egyptian military and police on 

the one side and the Bedouin on the other is bad enough already. 

So the likelihood that there would be human rights abuses is very 

real. 

Mr. WEBER. Then you go on to say we have sent four F–16s, if 

I remember your comments correctly. How many more do we lack, 

and what is the time frame? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There were four on January 28 and the whole package I believe is 16. I believe it is 16 over the next 11⁄2 years. 

Mr. WEBER. So are you concerned that those will be eventually 

used with all of the rhetoric that is going on against Israel, or are 

you concerned that those will be used against Israel in the near future? 

44

Mr. ABRAMS. No, I am not because I think it is so clearly against 

the national interest of Egypt and against this government’s. I 

think it would be a piece of insanity. One can worry about what 

happens 5 years down the road if this government collapses and is 

replaced by a Salafi, a worse government, but for this government, 

I think they will not do something that could lead to the collapse 

of the regime. And a conflict with Israel which they would lose in 

potentially humiliating fashion, could lead to the collapse of the regime. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, and then Dr. Swett, I am going to let you answer that question you didn’t get to earlier. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Oh, you are very kind. You know, I did sort 

of address it in response to—well, actually, Congressman Grayson 

didn’t let me say it. You are right. I simply was intending to make 

the point that if Egypt is not able to succeed, if they are not able 

to fulfill the economic and domestic needs of their people, it is very 

hard to imagine this Muslim Brotherhood government just sort of 

willingly turning over power to a more secular, a more moderate, 

a more Western-oriented, if you will, government through democratic processes. And I worry that the virulent anti-Semitism and 

just unending avalanche of hatred toward Israel and the Jews 

could become a pretext, in fact, for scapegoating and for turning attention away from the domestic failures by provoking confrontation, maybe not all out military conflict. 

Mr. WEBER. Pardon me for interrupting, but if and when that 

happens, then what Mr. Abrams said goes out the window, because 

they will indeed use those assets in such a fashion——

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Or will permit terror from their side of the 

border. 

Mr. WEBER. State-sponsored terrorism. Does that really exist? 

Who knew. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Impunity is really the way many governments operate, that things are permitted to happen and not 

stopped. And so that would be, I think, a very real concern from 

my perspective. 

Mr. WEBER. So, back very quickly to Mr. Abrams, if you had your 

druthers, you would shut down the rest of those F–16s? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, and how about you, Dr. Swett? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. You know, I am here talking about religious 

freedom and tolerance and human rights and so I think I probably 

better stick to my area of expertise on that one. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank God you recognize that. Dr. Wittes? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Very briefly, I will say I would like to see 

more of our military-to-military engagement involve training, involve counterterrorism missions, involve the kind of engagement 

that allows us to continue socializing the Egyptian military toward 

professionalization, toward norms of human rights and toward the 

rule of law as a tool for security and stability. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Connolly, my 

friend from Virginia, is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to 

our panel. Ambassador Abrams, you mentioned twice that Morsi 

45

only got 51 percent and 48 percent voted against him. What is your 

point? 

Mr. ABRAMS. My point is that he should recognize in ruling 

Egypt that he is not a dictator, that there is going to need to be 

widespread public support including in the Parliament among the 

other parties to do the hard things that this new Government of 

Egypt has to do. So far, he has acted as if he had 99 percent of 

the population——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Abrams, you will forgive me for observing, 

you served in an administration that came into power with a Supreme Court ruling 5 to 4 when the other guy got more votes than 

your guy. So I mean I wish the Bush administration had followed 

your advice in terms of that——

Mr. ABRAMS. I think we did because we had people in Congress. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don’t think Democrats felt that was the case. 

I think it is very dangerous business, frankly, when we question 

the legitimacy or implicitly question the legitimacy of an election. 

There may have been irregularities. The fact of the matter is Morsi 

won an election, whether it was 51 percent or 80 percent, he won. 

And we have to deal with it. I think we are in dangerous grounds 

when we question the legitimacy of it and especially when we have 

had our own problems, frankly, in our country. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I didn’t use the word legitimacy, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. 

Mr. ABRAMS. And I would compare Tunisia where they also won 

an election, but have had a coalition government in an effort to 

reach out to other parties. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you made a very good point from my point 

of view which was that for 30 something years, we supported the 

Mubarak government and in doing so we sort of were complicit in 

turning a blind eye to the creation of any alternative political 

space. And now we are faced with a Muslim Brotherhood government which was inevitable if there was no political space since it 

was the only group that could network, albeit sometimes illegally, 

but it did it. 

The real question to me, I was in Egypt in May, and I met with 

the Muslim Brotherhood. It was before Morsi’s election. To me, the 

real question is can the Muslim Brotherhood evolve to some level 

of acceptable democratic governance that respects the rights of minorities, especially—Dr. Swett, you talked a lot about anti-Semitism, but we haven’t talked about Coptic Christians and the respect 

for that very substantial minority in Egypt and what rights are 

they going to have in this new constitution that got forced through 

the legislative body? So to me, that is the question and I wonder 

if you agree is that the question? And what’s the proper role of the 

United States in trying to help them with that? 

It seems to me a sledge hammer is not going to help. They have 

got their own domestic politics and if it looks like they are caving 

to our pressure that is rather crude. I don’t think politically that 

is going to work. So in the time that is left, I wonder if you would 

care to comment? 

Dr. Wittes? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Thank you. I think we have a lot of cards 

to play. As I said, I think they care about our recognition. They 

46

care about the seal of approval, if you will, from Western governments. It is why President Morsi was so eager to continue with his 

trip to Germany, even though he was facing massive protests in 

the cities of the Suez. And he didn’t get the full-throated support 

of the German government in the way that he wanted because of 

the human rights problems in his country. 

So I think that we need to continue to think about that kind of 

leverage. 

Also, ultimately, what will compel the Muslim Brotherhood to behave in a way that can make them a constructive democratic actor? 

Competition. We need to ensure that this is going to be a pluralist 

political system. That means rights need to be protected and it 

means we need to help the other parties get their act together and 

ensure that not only these next elections, but the ones after and 

the one after that are free and fair. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. You know, Mark Twain once said that ‘‘history doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.’’ And in responding to your 

question about can the Muslim Brotherhood evolve and change, I 

just am having a deja vu moment when I remember when Putin 

came to power in Russia. And the discussion at that time was can 

a KGB guy be trusted with Russian democracy? And a lot of people 

were nervous about it, including myself. And as that verdict is coming in, it is not actually a very positive verdict. Count me skeptical 

on that question. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can we just allow Mr. Abrams to answer? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. I wanted to say I agree completely with 

Dr. Wittes. The answer I think is competition. If they think they 

will lose power in a free election, they will begin to move. So anything we can do to promote, free debate, free elections will help. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Cotton is recognized. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I agree with my 

colleague from Virginia that structural constitutionalism is very 

important to freedom and it works very well here in the United 

States, so I would like to explore how it works in Egypt. There has 

been plenty of talk about freedoms that we enjoy under our Bill of 

Rights, religion, speech, assembly, press, freedoms of women, minorities, due process in criminal cases, rights of property, rights of 

contract. As Madison said, those are only parchment barriers. If 

you don’t have things like what we have in the articles of our Constitution, separated powers and independent judiciary and prosecutor, judicial review, fair, regularly scheduled, impartial elections, I would like the witnesses to comment on the status of those 

kind of structural protections in Egypt. And also whether our Government is prioritizing those as opposed to simply prioritizing elections? 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Well, I will start. I think there are two 

structural features that I would highlight. The first is within the 

Constitution itself, the section that lays out the rights of individual 

citizens is structurally subsumed to the rights and privileges of the 

state. So that is an architectural problem. And it is the reverse of 

what we have with our Bill of Rights. In fact, it is the reverse of 

our whole structure. 

47

The other issue I would highlight and one reason why I think we 

have seen such troubling indicators over the last 9 months or the 

last 11⁄2 years is that essentially, we have had an executive ruling 

unconstrained. There hasn’t been a functioning Parliament in 

Egypt to check that executive’s power. The judiciary is compromised for a variety of reasons, a lot of holdovers from the previous regime, questions about its independence. 

So without institutional checks on executive power, without effective opposition parties to check the power of the ruling party, 

where does accountability come from? The only place left is civil society. And I have to say that Egyptian civil society organizations 

have been doing an incredible job of trying to hold this President 

accountable. Transparency measures, giving information in public, 

documenting abuses, challenging proposed laws, but they can’t do 

it themselves. They need external support. They need our partnership. And they need those institutions to be built. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I would say from the religious freedom perspective there are, as I indicated earlier, a number of problematic 

provisions. The one thing that was brought to our attention repeatedly is that one of the provisions in this new constitution seems to 

give a religious body, Al-Azhar, the authority to interpret the constitution and this was of enormous concern again to secular and reformist groups. They were adamant that only a court, a supreme 

judicial court, should have that authority. And we heard just repeated worries on the part of a variety of people and not just 

secularists, but certainly the Coptic minority, that Egypt was moving in the direction of becoming a religious Islamist state. And that 

relates to a whole slew of fundamental architectural issues about 

how you are going to protect that range of rights that you referred 

to earlier. So through the religious freedom lens, really problematic 

aspects of the constitution are of grave concern. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Nothing to add. I think that is really quite right. 

Well, one thing to add. We do have a role here to play. Whether 

we like it or not, if we are silent about these issues, we weaken 

the side that really we are on in those debates in Egypt. 

Mr. COTTON. So if I can synthesize what I have heard, some of 

the provisions that we might call the Bill of Rights are troublesome, some of the architectural designs are more troublesome yet. 

Do you think that our State Department, our Government, is doing 

enough to emphasize the need for those kind of structural protections of individual liberties? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I don’t think so, Congressman. It appears that 

human rights and democracy activists in Egypt don’t think so and 

that is an important issue. I fear that we are lapsing back into the 

way we mostly over 30 years handled the Mubarak regime which 

was to go along with the occasional statement. And frankly, the occasional statement from the State Department spokesmen or the 

Embassy spokesmen won’t cut it. It really has got to come from the 

President or Secretary of State if it is going to have any impact. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I would agree with that. I think the default 

position is always to be quietly critical and publicly passive. And 

I just don’t think that cuts it. I don’t. 

48

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. I will just say we said that we would stand 

up for a set of principles in the course of supporting democratic 

transition and we need to do that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. Mr. 

Schneider of Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you and thank you for joining us today. 

Ambassador Abrams, you talked about the importance of mil-mil 

relationship between Egypt and Israel. And I would like to explore 

a little bit beyond the personal relationships across the board, both 

Egyptian-Israeli, Egyptian-United States. As we look at Egypt and 

as it seems to be moving on a path toward more extremism, similar 

to what you described in Turkey, how do we decide when to push 

forward on relationships to stay engaged to maybe look for an alternate detour route for those relationships and when to stay silent? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think it is very difficult, of course, to make those 

decisions. One way to do it, I think, is to be talking to the people 

who are fighting for the things that we believe in, the standards 

we believe in, in Egypt, the democracy, the human rights activists, 

who are feeling let down right now. They will have an important 

view of whether more statements by the United States would help 

or hurt and what is a good symbolic act to take. I think we should 

also be talking to some of the other Embassies in Egypt. Some are 

active on human rights issues. Many are not. But you know, you 

have in a sense to rely to some degree on your diplomats, too. 

The problem I think has been that diplomats in Cairo over the 

years have tended to have far closer relationships with the Government of Egypt, whatever that government is, and to want to succor 

that relationship and not make trouble for that relationship by 

having others outside the government with groups that whatever 

the government is it views as troublemakers. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Wittes. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. Thank you. I will tell you a few of the 

things I have heard from activists on the ground because I think 

Elliott is right, we need to listen to them. They have said please 

don’t cut off economic aid. We are in desperate straits, but hold our 

Government accountable. They have said please don’t invite President Morsi to Washington until he has dealt with the political facts 

he needs to deal with here at home. And they have said please 

speak out on the principles that you articulated as the foundation 

for your support of democracy in the region. 

And we have said repeatedly, in fact, from the beginning of the 

Obama administration that parties that want to participate in 

democratic politics need to respect equality of all, including women 

and minorities. We have said that they need to respect the rules 

of the election after the election as well as before. 

So the precedents are all there, but we need to be consistent 

about applying them. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But occasionally desperation can be the enemy 

of accountability, especially for diplomats. How do we make sure as 

we are holding, trying to hold Egypt to our standards that we are 

not pushing them in the wrong direction, that we hold to the accountability while maintaining the support that they require? 

49

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. You know, one thing that I think we need 

to bear in mind is we are not holding them to our standards. We 

are holding them to international standards to which they have 

subscribed. We are holding them to treaty obligations that they 

freely undertook which they are not being accountable to. So you 

know, it sometimes is important to keep that distinction in mind. 

Certainly, in the work that we do at UCIRF, we do not seek to hold 

other countries to America’s standards on religious freedom which 

in some ways are not entirely identical to international standards. 

We seek to hold them to international standards. And I think that 

that needs to be emphasized in our dealings because then it is perhaps less offensive in terms of how we deal with other countries. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. If I may just make one more point? I think 

there are politics here, too. A lot of the persuasion involves helping 

them recognize that adhering to these standards is in their own interest. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. 

Ms. COFMAN WITTES. A lot of Coptic Christians voted for Mohammad Morsi in the hope that he could bring along some more conservative forces to recognize that Egypt had to be an Egypt for all 

its citizens. And when he was inaugurated and spoke those words 

they had hope. He promised to appoint Coptic Christians to his 

cabinet. And he has reneged on a lot of those promises. But there 

is a constituency there. Egyptian politics doesn’t have to be dictated by sect or by religious identity. It has a strong national identity. And if we can help Egyptian politicians see how they could 

benefit, then I think we will be farther along. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Just one quick remark. You do not need to worry 

that Secretary of State Kerry is going to be getting memos from the 

Near East Bureau that says break off from Egypt. Let us just cut 

them off. I think we need to worry that the memos from the Bureau and the cables from Embassy Cairo are going to be go slow, 

go soft, it is difficult here, let us not make trouble, let us be careful, 

let us nurture the relationship. I think they are going to go far over 

in that direction. It is built into the system. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Congressman Deutch and I 

agree, excellent panelists. Thank you very much and this subcommittee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcomittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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[NOTE: Responses from Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., to the questions submitted 

for the record by Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy III, were not received prior to printing.]

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