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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. RAYMOND NAVARO BOWMAN, Appellant No. 577 MDA 2014 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3 , 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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- 0004042

- 2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2014 Appellant, Raymond Navaro Bowman, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration, imposed after he pled guilty to possession wi th intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of person not to possess a firearm. Appellant essentially seeks to argue on appeal that his plea counsel provided him with incorrect information and deceived him into pleading guilty. Additionally, Appellant’s current counsel, Christopher P. Lyden, Esq., seeks permission to withdraw his representation of Appellant pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as elucidated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon , 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and amended
in Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After carefulJ

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review, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the above st ated offenses on March 3, 2014. 1 He was sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement to an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a post

- sentence motion. On March 6, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea.” Therein, he stated that he wished to appeal because (1) his plea counsel “deceived him” during the plea process, (2) counsel failed to help “him form a more solid decision” regarding whether to plead guilty, (3) Appellant “was not given inf ormation that could have [aided] him if in fact he chose to go forward with a trial[,]” (4) Appellant was not provided with “sound counsel,” and (5) his plea counsel “played on [Appellant’s] ignorance [in] the law and misinformed him about search warrants and how they are to be applied and carried out.” Motion to Appeal, 3/6/14, at 1

- 2 (unnumbered). Attorney Lyden was thereafter appointed to represent Appellant and he filed a timely notice of appeal on March 26, 2014. 2 However, Attorney Lyden subsequentl y filed a

____________________________________________ 1 At the same time, Appel lant pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia in an unrelated case, docketed at 4437 of 2012. He was sentenced in that case to an aggregate term of incarceration of two to four years, which was imposed to run c oncurrently with the sentence imposed in the instant case, docketed at 4042 of 2011.

2 Attorney Lyden only filed a notice of appeal in the case docketed at 4042 of 2011, not in the case docketed at 4437 of 2012.J

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petition to withdraw and Anders brief with this Court, claiming that an appeal on Appellant’s behalf is utterly frivolous. “When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first pas sing on the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas , 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith , 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). In Santiago , our Supreme Court altered the requirements for counsel to withdraw under Anders . Thus, pursuant to Anders/Santiago , in order to withdraw from an appeal, counsel now must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably s upports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statute s on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Daniels , 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361). “Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.” Commonwealth v . Orellana , 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2014). Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems wo rthy of the court[']s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”J

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Commonwealth v. Nischan , 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied , 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40 (2007). Orellana , 86 A.3d at 880. Once we are satisfied that counsel has met these technical requirements, this Court must then conduct its own review of the record and independently determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Daniels , 999 A.2d at 594. Instantly, Attorney Lyden’s Anders brief substantially complies with the above

- stated requirements for withdrawal. While Attorney Lyden provides few citations to the record or pertinent legal authority, he does provide an adequate summary of the procedural history of Appellant’s case and a brief discussion of the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea.” Ultimately, Attorney Lyden concludes that Appellant’s issues, and any other claims regarding the validity of his guilty plea, must be framed as ineffective assist ance of counsel claims and raised on collateral review pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grant , 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). Accordingly, Attorney Lyden asserts that a direct appeal on Appellant’s behalf is frivolous. Additionally, Attorney Lyden attached to his p etition to withdraw a copy of a letter he sent to Appellant advising him that he has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se , and/or raise any issues he deems worthy of this Court’s examination. Because Attorney Lyden substantially complied with t he requirements for withdrawal, we will now independently review Appellant’s claims, and also determine whether there are any other issues he could arguably present on appeal. See Daniels , 999 A.2d at 594.J

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Initially, we agree with Attorney Lyden that th e arguments Appellant raised in his pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea” are properly construed as challenges to the adequacy of his plea counsel’s representation. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Holmes , 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Grant that, absent certain circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be deferred until collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541

- 9546. Holmes , 79 A.3d at 576. While the Court did identify specific circumstances under which ineffectiveness claims may be addressed on direct appeal, such circumstances are not present in the instant case. See id. at 577

- 78 (holding that the trial court may address claim(s) of ineffectiveness where they are “both meritorious and apparent from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted,” or where the appellant’s request for review of “prolix” ineffectiveness claims is “accompanied by a knowing, voluntary, and express wai ver of PCRA review”). Accordingly, the claims Appellant raised in his pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea” may only be presented in a PCRA petition after the conclusion of this appeal. Additionally, our review of the guilty plea/sentencing transcript rev eals no other issues that Appellant could raise on direct appeal. Appellant’s plea counsel did not object to the validity of Appellant’s plea during the oralJ

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colloquy or in a post

- sentence motion. Thus, Appellant has not preserved any challenge to the va lidity of his plea for our review. 3 Moreover, Appellant entered a negotiated plea agreement, and the court imposed the agreed

upon sentence. Thus, Appellant has waived his right to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Dalberto , 648 A.2d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Reichle , 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Where the plea agreement contains a negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no authority to pe rmit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.”)). Finally, we ascertain nothing illegal about the sentence Appellant received. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

____________________________________________ 3 See Pa.R.A.P . 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth Lincoln , 72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2013) (indicating challenges to the validity of a guilty plea “must be raised by motion in t he trial court in order to be reviewed on direct appeal”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rush , 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008)).J

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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2014