J-S27003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RICHARD ERIC BOWMAN-DIX,

Appellant No. 1070 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004378-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN and DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2016

Appellant, Richard Eric Bowman-Dix, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County on April 20, 

2015.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 To the extent Appellant purports to appeal from the June 12, 2015 order 

denying his post-sentence motion, we note that in a criminal context, an 

appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence, not an order denying 

post-sentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 

1125 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (in a criminal action, appeal properly 

lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of a postsentence motion). The caption correctly reflects that the appeal is taken 

from the April 20, 2015 judgment of sentence. 
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In the late evening hours of May 24, [2014], Corporal 

Sean Taylor of the Pennsylvania State Police came into contact 

with a 2000 Audi A6 during a routine stop at a DUI checkpoint 

on the I-83 Business Loop in York City. When approached by 

Corporal Taylor, the driver, later identified as the Appellant, 

rolled his window down approximately 2 inches and refused to 

open it further. Corporal Taylor struggled to see into the 

vehicle. Corporal Taylor opened the driver side door and 

instructed the Appellant to exit the vehicle. When the Appellant 

refused to comply, Corporal Taylor reached into the vehicle and 

attempted to unbuckle the Appellant’s seatbelt in order to 

forcibly remove him. The Appellant used his elbow to push 

Corporal Taylor out of the vehicle.

Several other troopers surrounded the vehicle. Trooper 

Jeremy Corrie utilized his Taser to drive stun the Appellant in his 

thigh. A struggle ensued and Trooper Corrie deployed Taser 

probes into the Appellant’s torso. The Appellant’s brother, 

seated in the passenger seat, reached over and removed the 

probes from the Appellant. Trooper Timothy Schwartz then 

deployed his Taser probes into the Appellant’s torso. The 

troopers forcibly removed the Appellant from the vehicle and 

took him into custody.

On March 18, 2015, the [trial court] denied the Appellant’s 

Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress. A jury trial was held from 

March 18 to March 20, 2015. The jury found the Appellant guilty 

of resisting arrest1and disorderly conduct.2 The jury found the 

Appellant not guilty of disarming a law enforcement officer.3  On 

June 12, 2015, the [trial court] denied the Appellant’s PostSentence Motion requesting a judgment of acquittal or a new 

trial. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. 5104.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. 5503(a)(4).

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. 5104.0(a)(1).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/15, at 1-2 (internal citations omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 22, 2015. Both the 

trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
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1. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence to the point that the verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice?

2. Whether the Commonwealth’s evidence supported the 

jury’s verdicts finding the Appellant guilty of Resisting Arrest and 

Disorderly Conduct?

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s 

Omnibus Pretrial Motion?

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

When an appellant raises both a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue and

a suppression issue, we address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the conviction first, and we do so without a diminished record:

[W]e are called upon to consider all of the testimony that was 

presented to the jury during the trial, without consideration as to 

the admissibility of that evidence. The question of sufficiency is 

not assessed upon a diminished record. Where improperly 

admitted evidence has been allowed to be considered by the 

jury, its subsequent deletion does not justify a finding of 

insufficient evidence. The remedy in such a case is the grant of 

a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Sanford, 863 A.2d 428, 431–432 (Pa. 2004) (emphasis 

in original). Thus, we begin by addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, as 

“[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a defendant’s conviction has 

been overturned because of insufficient evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Mullins, 918 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we 

address Appellant’s second issue first. 

In it, Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was not 

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Appellant guilty of resisting 
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arrest and disorderly conduct. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant further 

explains his position as follows:

Specifically, [Appellant] contends that the Commonwealth 

presented insufficient evidence that [Appellant] created a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to the state police troopers, or 

employed means justifying or requiring substantial force by the 

police to overcome the any [sic] resistance offered by 

[Appellant], or that [Appellant], intending to cause a public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, created an illegitimate 

hazardous or physically offensive condition and continued in this 

unlawful conduct after reasonable warning to stop.

Id. 

The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder[’s]. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943–944 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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As noted, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. Those crimes are defined 

in the Crimes Code as follows:

§ 5104. Resisting arrest or other law enforcement

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, 

with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a 

lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone 

else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force 

to overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

§ 5503. Disorderly conduct

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of disorderly conduct 

if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:

* * * 

(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive 

condition by any act which serves no legitimate 

purpose of the actor.

* * *

(c) Definition.--As used in this section the word “public” means 

affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public 

or a substantial group has access; among the places included 

are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment 

houses, places of business or amusement, any neighborhood, or 

any premises which are open to the public.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503. 

With regard to Appellant’s resisting arrest conviction, the evidence 

presented at trial reflects the following series of events that occurred on the 
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evening of May 24, 2014. Corporal Sean Taylor testified that a checkpoint 

was established on the I-83 Business Loop in York County, near York 

hospital. N.T., 3/18/15, at 116-118. Appellant drove into the DUI 

checkpoint and was approached by Corporal Taylor. Id. at 121. Corporal 

Taylor testified that the windows of Appellant’s car were tinted, and the 

driver’s side window was rolled down approximately two to three inches. Id. 

Because Corporal Taylor could not see into the car well, he directed 

Appellant to roll down his window. Id. Appellant refused to wind down the 

window. Id. As a result, Corporal Taylor opened Appellant’s car door. Id. 

Appellant asserted that Corporal Taylor was not allowed to open Appellant’s 

car door, and proceeded to pull the door shut, pulling the door closed on 

Corporal Taylor. Id. 

Corporal Taylor then directed Appellant to provide his identification. 

Id. at 121. Appellant refused, claiming that he was not required to provide 

the identification as directed by Corporal Taylor. Id. at 122. Corporal 

Taylor advised Appellant that he was required to produce it because he was 

at the sobriety checkpoint and directed Appellant to step out of the vehicle. 

Id. at 122. In explaining why he asked Appellant to exit the car, Corporal 

Taylor testified:

What peaked [sic] my interested was his lack of 

cooperation. I worked a number of DUI checkpoints. I’ve never 

encountered anybody like this in my time as a patrolman. I deal 

with a lot of people. 
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Surprisingly, a lot of people don’t realize we do now more 

drug DUI’s than alcohol DUI’s. You can be arrested for under 

the influence – the section is under the influence of alcohol or 

controlled substance.

So a lot of times we arrest a lot of people that are under 

the influence of prescription medicines or illegal drugs.

* * *

At this point in time I didn’t know if he was under the 

influence of a controlled substance. He wouldn’t provide me with 

identification.

First he didn’t roll down the window, so I couldn’t do my 

DUI investigation. If he had just rolled down the window, 

handed me his ID, he would have been in and out and on his

way.

N.T., 3/18/15, at 122-123.

Appellant responded that he was not drunk, and as a result, did not 

need to step out of the vehicle. N.T., 3/18/15, at 122-123. Corporal Taylor 

testified that he asked Appellant to exit the vehicle several times, but 

Appellant consistently refused to do so. Id. at 125. In response to 

Appellant’s assertion that he was not drunk, Corporal Taylor testified that he 

told Appellant that he did not think that Appellant was drunk, but because 

Appellant was acting erratic and irrational, he needed Appellant to get out of 

the vehicle so that he could look at Appellant’s eyes for purposes of 

continuing his investigation. Id. at 125. Appellant continued to refuse to 

exit the vehicle. Id. Corporal Taylor asked Appellant if there was anything 

that he could do to get Appellant out of the vehicle before he would be 

required to use force to remove Appellant from the vehicle. Id. at 125-126. 
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After receiving no response from Appellant, Corporal Taylor reached into the 

car to unbuckle Appellant’s seatbelt. Id. at 127. At that point, Appellant 

used his elbow to push Corporal Taylor out of the vehicle. Id. at 127. 

Upon observing the commotion, other troopers at the checkpoint 

approached Appellant’s vehicle. N.T., 3/18/15, at 128, 167-168, 182. 

Appellant continued to refuse to exit the vehicle. Id. at 128-129. Because 

other means of force, including pepper spray and hands-on tactics, were not 

appropriate given the circumstances, Trooper Jeremy Corrie used the Taser 

in “drive stun” mode2against Appellant. Id. at 130-133. Appellant grabbed 

Trooper Corrie’s Taser and attempted to pull it away from him. Id. at 133. 

Trooper Corrie was able to pull away from Appellant and then proceeded to 

place the Taser cartridge in the Taser and shoot the probes into Appellant. 

Id. at 133-134. At that point, Appellant’s brother, who was in the front 

passenger seat, grabbed the probes and pulled them from Appellant’s chest. 

Id. at 134. Another trooper at the scene, Trooper Timothy Schwartz, then 

effectuated his Taser with probes on Appellant. Id. at 134. While Appellant 

was under power of the Taser, Troopers Tristan Bennett and Harold Fleming 

____________________________________________

2

 Corporal Taylor explained that using the Taser in this way was consistent 

with using it as a pain compliance tool. In “drive stun” mode, the probes are 

removed from the Taser, and the Taser is used like a stun gun and can be 

placed on a specific part of the body. The individual being tased feels pain 

only where the Taser is touching the individual’s body. As explained by 

Corporal Taylor: “And on our use of force array, the Taser without the 

probes in it is the lowest use of force other than escort techniques.” Id. at 

132. 
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forcibly pulled Appellant from the vehicle. Id. at 136, 183. Once out of the 

vehicle and on the ground, Appellant continued to struggle against the 

troopers and refused to put his arms behind his back. Id. at 183-184. 

Trooper Fleming testified that after applying a substantial amount of force, 

he and Trooper Bennett were able to handcuff Appellant. Id. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence 

supports the conclusion that Appellant acted with the intent of preventing a 

public servant from effecting a lawful arrest3and did so by engaging in 

actions that required troopers to use “substantial force to overcome” his 

resistance. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to 

support Appellant’s conviction of resisting arrest.

Furthermore, the record reflects evidence sufficient to support 

Appellant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Appellant’s actions created a 

hazardous and physically offensive condition for the troopers, himself, and 

the occupants of Appellant’s vehicle, including a young girl Appellant 

identified as his niece. N.T., 3/18/15, at 125-126. Appellant’s actions also 

caused a backlog of vehicles attempting to proceed through the DUI 

checkpoint, thereby creating a public inconvenience. Id. at 128. As noted, 

Appellant’s actions occurred in a public place: at a DUI checkpoint on the 

____________________________________________

3

 We note that Appellant does not contend that this was an unlawful arrest. 

In fact, Appellant concedes that “Pennsylvania State Police are granted the 

authority to conduct an arrest based on a violation of a request to produc[e] 

identification.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. 
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Business Loop of I-83 in York County. Id. at 116-118. Thus, the evidence 

supports the conclusion that Appellant acted with intent to, or recklessly

created a risk of causing a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, by 

creating “a hazardous and physically offensive condition” by his actions 

which served no legitimate purpose. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4). Accordingly, 

we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there was sufficient evidence 

supporting Appellant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Thus, Appellant’s 

claim lacks merit.

Next, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, arguing that the jury’s verdict 

finding him guilty of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct was against the 

weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant contends that the 

trial court employed the wrong standard in evaluating whether the jury’s 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence by relying on the jury’s 

credibility determination to avoid a weight of the evidence analysis. Id. at 

12. 

With respect to a weight claim, we apply the following standards:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is 

sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is 

under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge 

must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and 
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allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were 

a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth 

juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–752 (Pa. 2000) (citations, 

footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact 

who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court 

cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. 

Thus, we may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 289 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

The Commonwealth introduced ample evidence of Appellant’s 

culpability with regard to the challenged convictions, and the jury was free 

to weigh the evidence as it did. We cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s weight challenge, and the 

verdict does not shock our sense of justice. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751–752; 

Serrano, 61 A.3d at 289.

Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

omnibus pretrial motion. Appellant’s Brief at 20. In his omnibus pretrial 

motion, Appellant asserted that he complied with the DUI checkpoint by 

stopping his vehicle and lowering his driver’s side window an adequate 

amount to interact with the state police, that his vehicle’s windows were not 
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too darkly tinted for the state police to view the interior of his vehicle, and 

that the state police violated his rights by forcefully removing him from his 

vehicle without any reasonable suspicion or indicia of DUI or other criminal 

offense. Id. at 21. As a result, Appellant avers that the additional 

investigation conducted by the troopers was unwarranted. Id. at 22. Thus, 

Appellant maintains, the state police violated his right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 25. 

With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our 

Supreme Court has stated the following:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing 

the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the 

evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of 

the record. . . . Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse 

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations 

omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to 

pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 

2006). Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to 

the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re 

L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the following with 

regard to sobriety checkpoints:

Although the stopping of a motor vehicle at a sobriety 

checkpoint constitutes a seizure for constitutional purposes, such 

checkpoint stops are not per se unreasonable, and hence are not 

per se unconstitutional under either the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. . . . [T]he United States Supreme 

Court concluded that sobriety checkpoints do not offend the 

Fourth Amendment because they are a reasonable means of 

advancing a vital public interest, involving only a modest 

intrusion on the privacy and liberty of motorists. Similarly, we 

have held that systematic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary 

checkpoints do not offend the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Worthy, 957 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. 2008) (internal 

citations omitted).

Furthermore, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) provides:

(b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is

engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers 

or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is 

occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request 

or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,

proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or 

engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).

Moreover, this Court has explained the following with regard to a 

warrantless arrest:

An officer has probable cause to make a warrantless arrest when 

the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge 

and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information 

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the 
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person to be arrested. Probable cause justifying a warrantless 

arrest is determined by the totality of the circumstances. . . . 

Furthermore, probable cause does not involve certainties, but 

rather the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 

which reasonable and prudent persons act.

Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “[P]robable cause for a warrantless 

arrest exists when criminality is one reasonable inference; it need not be the 

only, or even the most likely, inference.” Commonwealth v. Romero, 673 

A.2d 374, 377 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis in original).

Here, Appellant approached a lawful DUI checkpoint. N.T., 3/18/15, at 

7. Corporal Taylor attempted to conduct the systematic program of 

checking drivers approaching the checkpoint by engaging with Appellant.

Id. at 8-10. The evidence reflects that Appellant refused to comply with 

Corporal Taylor’s requests that would allow for the minimal intended 

interaction with Appellant as a driver to ensure that Appellant was not 

operating the vehicle while under the influence. Appellant’s evasive and 

irrational behavior, coupled with his refusal to comply with Corporal Taylor’s 

request to roll the window down or exit the vehicle, gave Corporal Taylor 

reason to suspect that Appellant was under the influence of a controlled 

substance and that further investigation was warranted. Id. at 9-11. 

Appellant’s subsequent actions in resisting the officers provided support for a 

determination of probable cause to arrest Appellant. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not err in denying Appellant’s omnibus pretrial suppression motion. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.

Judge Dubow files a Concurring Statement in which P.J.E. Stevens 

joins.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2016