CMH Pub 75–9

Cover: Detail from Victorious Advance of Genl. Sykes (regulars) May 1st 

(Library of Congress)
by

Bradford A. Wineman

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2013

The

Chancellorsville

Camp ign

January – May 1863

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART

 Chief Historian
The Chancellorsville Campaign

Janaury–May 1863

The battle of Chancellorsville, fought in the spring of 1863 in 

Virginia’s Piedmont region, pitted a powerful Union Army under its 

newly appointed commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, against a 

significantly smaller but well-led Confederate force under General 

Robert E. Lee. Hooker had refit and reorganized his 130,000 men 

into a potent fighting force over the winter following the Union 

Army of the Potomac’s bloody defeat at Fredericksburg, Virginia, 

in December 1862, under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. After 

Hooker had replaced Burnside, he developed a plan to hold Lee’s 

60,000 ill-supplied Confederates at Fredericksburg with a small 

part of the Army of the Potomac, and march most of his troops in 

a wide flanking maneuver to the west to attack Lee’s flank and rear. 

Hooker hoped this daring move would either crush Lee’s Army of 

Northern Virginia or force it to retreat toward Richmond, Virginia. 

Either way, he anticipated a glorious victory for his Federals over 

the fabled Confederate commander.

In the end, it was Lee and his chief subordinate, Maj. Gen. 

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, who achieved what many historians have called the South’s greatest victory during the American 

Civil War. Once Hooker got the bulk of his bluecoats over the river 

and in a position to move against Lee’s lines at Fredericksburg, the 

Union commander hesitated, gathered his forces into a defensive 

position at Chancellorsville, and waited for Lee to attack. Lee 

7
8 

seized the initiative, made several risky tactical moves, and drove 

the Federals from the field after three days of intense fighting. The 

armies of Lee and Hooker suffered more than 30,000 casualties, 

including the “Mighty Stonewall,” the loss of whom tarnished Lee’s 

crowning victory.

Strategic Setting

The Union Army sat at Falmouth, Virginia, on the north bank 

of the Rappahannock River on 26 January 1863, forlorn and demoralized. In early December 1862, the army’s commander, General 

Burnside, had marched the Army of the Potomac from its position 

outside of Warrenton, Virginia, southward to Fredericksburg to 

threaten the Confederate capital of Richmond. Upon reaching the 

river opposite the town, Burnside discovered that the pontoon 

boats he had expected to use to cross the Rappahannock had 

not yet arrived, forcing him to wait two precious weeks. During 

this delay, the Confederates fortified their side of the river and 

waited for the Federals to make 

their way across. Burnside 

had obliged them on 11–12 

December, sending his forces 

over the Rappahannock on 

three pontoon bridges under 

heavy fire from Southern sharpshooters. The next day, he had 

nearly broken through Lt. Gen. 

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 

corps, but could not exploit the 

initial breakthroughs. Burnside 

had then ordered a series of large 

infantry assaults across an open 

plain west of Fredericksburg 

to take a position manned by 

Southern riflemen behind a 

chest-high stone wall on a ridge 

known as Marye’s Heights. 

These unsuccessful frontal 

attacks had resulted in staggeringly high casualties among 

the blue-coated rank and file. 

General Burnside

(Library of Congress)
9

Finally, a frustrated and embarrassed Burnside had withdrawn 

back across the Rappahannock on the night of 15 December, 

ending a disastrous campaign for the Army of the Potomac. 

The debacle at Fredericksburg sent reverberations throughout 

the ranks of the Army of the Potomac and the Northern home 

front. Officers, politicians, and citizens alike lambasted Burnside. 

Eager to redeem his reputation, on 20 January 1863, Burnside 

initiated a new campaign against the Confederates to dislodge 

them from their positions around Fredericksburg. He attempted 

to move west along the north bank of the Rappahannock, cross 

the river, and get behind the Southerners. The operation met with 

adversity almost immediately. On the first night, a heavy winter 

rain poured down on the marching soldiers turning the roads 

into rivers of mud. The soggy conditions paralyzed the army as 

soldiers, horses, artillery pieces, and wagons became mired in 

the muck, all the while being taunted by amused Confederates 

observing the fiasco from the opposite side of the river. Burnside 

called off the operation and returned his frustrated brigades to 

their camps. The infamous “Mud March” lowered Federal morale 

even further, creating great discontent within the officer corps 

against its commander. 

Infuriated by this operation’s lack of success and the subsequent criticism of his leadership, Burnside drafted general 

orders condemning ten of his subordinate officers and calling 

for their dismissal from the army. The troubled general traveled 

to Washington and demanded that President Abraham Lincoln 

either approve the order or accept his resignation. To avoid a 

revolt among the officer corps, Lincoln removed Burnside from 

command and placed him in charge of the Department of the 

Ohio. He also reassigned two of the army’s Grand Division 

commanders, sending Maj. Gens. William B. Franklin and 

Edwin V. Sumner to Louisiana and Missouri, respectively. On 26 

January 1863, Lincoln designated the remaining Grand Division 

commander (and the chief target of Burnside’s ire), Maj. Gen. 

Joseph Hooker, as Burnside’s replacement to lead the Army of 

the Potomac.

Hooker was a 49-year-old, hard-drinking soldier from 

Massachusetts. He had graduated from the U.S. Military 

Academy in 1836 in the middle of his class and had served 

with distinction in the Mexican War. In 1853 he had resigned 

his commission to make money in post-gold rush California. 
10 

From his days as a cadet, Hooker had earned a reputation as 

being irascible, obstinate, and egomaniacal. Having failed in his 

California ventures, he had found new prospects for advancement with the onset of the Civil War. After some initial difficulties securing a commission due to his prewar conflicts with the 

Army’s commanding general, Winfield Scott, Hooker had eventually convinced Lincoln to appoint him a brigadier general of 

U.S. Volunteers in May 1861. He soon had earned a reputation 

as an aggressive combat leader, rising through the ranks to 

command one of the Army of the Potomac’s Grand Divisions in 

1862. It was at this last post during the battle of Fredericksburg 

that Hooker had run afoul of Burnside, openly condemning 

his commanding officer for his costly attacks against Lee’s 

entrenchments. Hooker had not stopped there, criticizing 

all of the nation’s senior military and civilian leadership and 

suggesting that the “Army and Government needed a dictator” 

to bring order and direction to the war effort. Although wary of 

this declaration, Lincoln nevertheless gave Hooker command 

of the Army of the Potomac. 

Lincoln remarked to Hooker 

that “only those generals who 

gain successes can set up 

dictators. What I now ask of 

you is military success, and I 

will risk the dictatorship.” 

Fortunately for both Lincoln 

and the Army of the Potomac, 

Hooker counterbalanced his 

already infamous reputation for 

self-serving bravado and stubbornness with empathy and pragmatism. After taking command 

he spent the remainder of the 

winter reinvigorating the Army 

of the Potomac. He immediately 

improved morale by addressing 

the poor living conditions in 

camp and by ensuring that the 

soldiers received several months 

of back pay. He instituted more 

rigorous sanitation measures, 

General Hooker 

(Library of Congress)
11

improved the quality of food, and enforced these initiatives by regularly inspecting the camp himself. 

As for the structure of the army, General Hooker dismantled 

Burnside’s Grand Divisions and reconfigured the Army of the 

Potomac into seven infantry corps, each led by a major general: 

John F. Reynolds (I Corps), Darius N. Couch (II Corps), Daniel E. 

Sickles (III Corps), George G. Meade (V Corps), John Sedgwick 

(VI Corps), Oliver O. Howard (XI Corps), and Henry W. Slocum 

(XII Corps). Additionally, Hooker created a single cavalry corps 

under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman. The newly reformed corps, 

totaling just over 130,000 men, would also wear new corps badges, 

giving each corps its own symbol and each division its own color. 

The distinctive emblems helped instill a sense of unit pride and 

facilitated the identification of units on the battlefield and of stragglers and deserters in the rear. General Hooker also redistributed 

most of the artillery battalions among the subordinate units to 

give frontline commanders more control over the guns, of which 

he had over seventy batteries. Lastly, he enhanced his intelligence 

gathering capabilities by creating a Bureau of Military Information 

under his deputy provost marshal, Col. George H. Sharpe. Sharpe’s 

mission was to discern the enemy’s intentions through secret 

agents and the interrogation of prisoners. By spring, morale had 

improved markedly, with one corps commander noting that 

Hooker had “infused new life and discipline into the Army.”

On 8 April the army put its new spirit on full display during 

a grand review for President Abraham Lincoln and his family 

near Falmouth. Lincoln always enjoyed parades and lauded the 

refreshed look of the army, but his primary purpose for visiting 

the cantonment was to urge General Hooker to begin a new offensive against the enemy. After the debacles of the past year, the 

president wanted an aggressive operation that would reinvigorate 

the nation’s flagging political support for the war. He reinforced 

this point eleven days later when he returned to Falmouth in the 

company of the General in Chief of the U.S. Army, Henry W. 

Halleck. Halleck enjoined Hooker that the destruction of Lee’s 

Confederate army, and not the capture of Richmond, should be 

the object of the upcoming campaign. 

General Hooker needed no prompting, for he had already set 

matters in motion. On 13 April, just a few days after the president’s 

first visit, he had dispatched Stoneman’s cavalry corps on a circuitous march intended to bring it behind Lee’s position. Hooker had 
12 

explained to Stoneman, “throw your command between him [Lee] 

and Richmond, and inflicting on him every possible injury which 

will tend to his discomfiture and defeat.” Cutting Lee’s supply line 

back to Richmond had to be done with speed and boldness, with 

Hooker telling his cavalry commander, “Let your watchword be 

fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight.” 

Next, Hooker planned to have part of his army, I Corps under 

Reynolds and VI Corps under Sedgwick, cross the Rappahannock 

directly in front of Fredericksburg to fix the Confederates in place. 

With Lee cut off to his rear by Stoneman and distracted by the 

demonstration to his front, Hooker would personally lead the 

main body of his army on a long, westward flanking march. Once 

the main army was in position, he would hammer Lee’s army 

against Sedgwick’s anvil outside of Fredericksburg. Lee would 

be trapped, he explained, and “must either ingloriously fly, or 

come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own 

ground, where certain destruction awaits him.” In either case, the 

Confederates would be defeated and forced to retreat southward 

toward Richmond where they would run into Stoneman’s cavalry 

waiting to strike the final blow. In short, Hooker’s plan was an 

improved version of the operation that Burnside had attempted 

during the Mud March in January. This time, however, the Union 

would prevail. Brimming with confidence, Hooker boasted, “My 

plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out, may God 

have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.” 

More than just strategy motivated the timing of Hooker’s 

offensive. The enlistments of over 35,000 Union soldiers would 

expire in April, May, and June. Army officials expected some of 

these men to reenlist, but only after they had returned to their 

homes for several weeks and reaped the benefits of recruiting 

bonuses. The earlier the Army of the Potomac could take the 

field, the stronger it would be and the less internal disruption it 

would face. 

Across the river from the Federal camp at Falmouth, 

General Lee had cause for concern. If the Confederate Army of 

Northern Virginia had performed brilliantly in 1862, the winter 

of 1862–1863 had not been kind. The army suffered from shortages of food, forage, firewood, and other vital supplies. By the 

spring, Lee faced a logistical crisis. The extended encampment 

in and around Fredericksburg had stripped the area of provisions, and his army could not sustain itself for much longer if it 
13

remained in place. As conditions worsened, desertions had risen 

as well, particularly among the conscripts. To ease his burdens, 

Lee had dispatched one of his two corps commanders, Lt. Gen. 

James Longstreet, with two of his divisions to the southern 

part of Virginia to forage for supplies. This left him with just 

one infantry corps, that of General Jackson, as well as the two 

remaining divisions of Longstreet’s corps—those of Maj. Gen. 

Lafayette McLaws and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson—to man 

the fortifications at Fredericksburg. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart 

augmented Lee’s infantry with two brigades of cavalry. At best, 

Lee could muster only about 60,000 troops at Fredericksburg to 

face Hooker’s 130,000 men. 

The Army of Northern Virginia had to move to obtain fresh 

supplies—but where? Ideally, Lee wanted to invade the North 

again, but he dared not initiate such a campaign with Longstreet 

and his two divisions away from the main army. He contemplated 

relocating to the Shenandoah Valley where he could re-provision 

his troops and hope that Hooker would give chase, but that 

would leave Richmond dangerously exposed. He could also 

pursue the more prudent course of action, given his vast numerical disadvantage, and fall 

back to a new line of defense 

closer to Richmond. This, 

however, would surrender the 

territorial and psychological 

advantages the Confederates 

had gained over the previous 

year. Lastly, he could maintain 

his solid defensive position 

at Fredericksburg and hope 

to lure the Yankee forces 

into attacking as they had in 

December. Supply problems 

notwithstanding, this plan 

would forfeit the initiative 

to the enemy, a concept that 

contradicted the essence of 

Lee’s aggressive nature. But at 

the time, it seemed he had little 

choice than to wait and react to 

the Union Army’s next move. 

General Lee 

(Library of Congress)
14 

Operations

Fate did not treat the opening moves of the Union offensive 

kindly. No sooner had Stoneman reached Kelly’s Ford on the 

Rappahannock River twenty miles upriver from Falmouth than a 

torrential rain flooded the river, forcing him to pull back about a 

dozen miles and wait for better weather. The storms continued for 

nearly two weeks and it was not until 28 April that the bedraggled 

Union cavalry could finally cross the Rappahannock. Hooker’s 

intent to cut Lee’s communications with Richmond prior to the 

start of the main offensive was now no longer possible. In fact, 

mired roads and sick horses so delayed General Stoneman on the 

rest of his journey that he would not strike his first blow against 

Lee’s communications until the campaign was virtually over. The 

first element of Hooker’s grand design would go for naught.

The weather likewise interfered with the rest of Hooker’s 

plan. Not wanting to repeat the blunders of the Mud March, he 

postponed the flank march by the main body of the army until the 

skies had cleared and the roads had begun to dry. The army finally 

began to move on 27 April. The movement was a masterpiece of 

efficiency and deception. Hooker took great care to shroud the 

operation in secrecy, even keeping the details from his own corps 

commanders. Knowing that Confederate observers would be 

fixated on the forces directly across the Rappahannock River from 

Fredericksburg, he ordered the units farthest from the enemy’s line 

of sight to move first, while those at Falmouth remained in place, 

thereby shielding the movement of the army from Confederate 

pickets opposite the river. The V, XI and XII Corps, encamped 

several miles northeast of Falmouth, moved first without detection. The troops departed camp in light marching order, traveling 

with minimal baggage and logistical train, so as to facilitate the 

advance. While on the march, they left guards at local houses 

to sequester the inhabitants to prevent them from warning the 

Confederates on the Union Army’s movements.

The secrecy seemed to have an effect. Lee was uncharacteristically confused and nervous about his enemy’s actions. He 

knew the Union Army was stirring but had no indication of 

Hooker’s intent. It took Lee nearly twenty-four hours to learn that 

the Federals were on the move, when he received reports from 

his cavalry commander, Stuart, of enemy activity several miles 

upstream from Falmouth. Even then, Lee had no idea of Hooker’s 
15

final destination. He received piecemeal reports of sizable Union 

forces crossing upstream, yet he also received word that the enemy 

was preparing to cross the Rappahannock River immediately to 

his front at Fredericksburg. Where would the main blow fall? 

As Lee studied the situation, Hooker continued to execute 

his plan (Map 1). On the night of 28 April the three infantry corps 

that had been the first to march crossed over the Rappahannock 

River at Kelly’s Ford using pontoon bridges prepared by the 

engineers. The next day, XI and XII Corps crossed the Rapidan 

River at Germanna Ford while V Corps made its crossing at 

Ely’s Ford a few miles to the east, catching the handful of Rebel 

pickets at the crossings by surprise. Likewise, I Corps crossed the 

Rappahannock at Fitzhugh’s Crossing and VI Corps crossed at 

Franklin’s Crossing early on 29April. Farther east, both Reynolds’ 

and Sedgwick’s corps, with III Corps under General Sickles on the 

north bank in support, gained a foothold on the Fredericksburg 

side of the river. The distraction of this crossing allowed II Corps 

to begin marching toward the United States Ford to join the other 

flanking corps. 

By 29 April Lee had gathered 

enough information to inform 

Confederate President Jefferson 

Davis that the Federals’ “intention, I presume, is to turn our 

left, and probably to get into our 

rear,” and he asked Davis for reinforcements. In the meantime, he 

sent General Anderson’s division 

to investigate reports that enemy 

troops were behind and to 

the west of his position on the 

Orange Turnpike, the primary 

route connecting Fredericksburg 

to Confederate supply depots at 

Culpeper, Virginia. Anderson 

responded by sending the 

infantry brigades of Brig. Gens. 

Carnot Posey, William Mahone, 

and Ambrose Ransom Wright to 

positions west of Chancellorsville 

to block the roads that led from 

General Jackson 

(Library of Congress)
A N D E R S O N

STUAR T

M EA

DE ( V )

M EADE ( V )

M EADE ( V )

CO UCH (I I)

HOWARD ( XI)

S LO CU M ( XI I)

H O WARD ( X I )

H O WARD ( X I )

S LO C U M ( X I I)

S LO CU M ( XI I)

Rapidan River

Rappahannock River

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d 

U.S. Ford

Germanna Ford

Ely’s Ford

Kelly’s Ford

O R A N G E

P L A N K R O A D

C U L P E P E R

P L A N K R O A D

O R A N G E T U R N P I K E

Wilderness

Church

Mt. Holly

Church

Wilderness

Tavern

Chancellorsville

Todd’s Tavern

Somerville

Map 1
JACK S O N

M c L A W S

E A R L Y

H O WA R D ( X I )

H OWARD ( X I )

S I C K L E S (I I I)

M EADE ( V )

CO UCH ( I I )

S I C K L E S ( I I I )

S LO CU M ( XI I)

REYNOLDS (I)

S E D G W I C K

(VI)

Rappahannock River

Ri chmond, Freder i cksburg & Poto m ac Rai l road

Scott’s Ford

Banks’ Ford

Fitzhugh’s

Crossing

Franklin’s

Crossing

P L A N K R O A D

Hartwood

Church

Tabernacle

 Church

Zoan Church

Salem Church

Falmouth

Staord Courthouse

FREDERICKSBURG

27–30 April 1863

HOOKER’S FLANKING MARCH

0 4

Miles
18 

the river fords to the Orange Turnpike. On the morning of 30 April, 

Anderson reassessed the situation and decided that his dispositions 

were vulnerable, particularly in the dense thickets of the Wilderness 

where rebel artillery could provide only limited support to his infantry. 

He therefore pulled his troops back to open ground near the Zoan 

Church on the Orange Turnpike, three miles east of Chancellorsville, 

where his men dug in and waited for the Federal advance. 

Lee also reassessed his position on the morning of 30 April.

Seeing that the two Federal corps that had crossed the river 

below Fredericksburg were making no effort to move beyond 

their bridgehead, he decided that the real threat was to his west 

and conferred with his trusted subordinate, “Stonewall” Jackson, 

about their options. After their conference, Lee made the first 

of several audacious decisions that he would make during the 

campaign. He chose to leave only a small force of approximately 

9,000 troops under Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early to hold the defenses at 

Fredericksburg and ordered Jackson to march the remainder of his 

corps westward to reinforce Anderson. As he would throughout 

the campaign, Lee divided his 

force in the face of Hooker’s 

superior numbers in order to 

seize the initiative.

While Lee was making 

this fateful decision, Union 

troops were converging on 

Chancellorsville, a solitary 

manor house in a crossroads 

clearing along the Orange 

Turnpike that had served as an 

inn for travelers for decades. 

General Meade and his V Corps 

arrived at Chancellorsville in 

the late morning of 30 April 

and deployed east of the 

property. Howard’s XI Corps 

arrived shortly after and spread 

along the turnpike west of 

the house. Slocum placed his 

troops just southwest of the 

home by midafternoon, in a 

clearing known as Hazel Grove. 

General Slocum 

(Library of Congress)
19

Here Meade met Slocum in excitement, reporting how they had 

successfully compromised Lee’s flank and expressing his enthusiasm to continue to press forward. Slocum awkwardly informed 

his colleague that he was supplanting Meade as the ranking officer 

on the field and that their revised orders from Hooker were to 

form defensive positions around Chancellorsville until the rest 

of the army had consolidated there. Hooker arrived about 1800 

and made the Chancellor house his headquarters. He reiterated to 

his subordinates the necessity of their pause as II Corps was still 

making its way across the Rappahannock at United States Ford and 

Sickles’ III Corps was only beginning its march from Falmouth to 

reinforce the main army. Although frustrated by the halt, the U.S. 

Army commanders still had confidence in Hooker’s plan. 

Hooker awoke early on the morning of 1 May emboldened 

with the same confidence he had been exuding since leaving 

Falmouth three days beforehand. He issued orders to continue 

the push eastward toward Fredericksburg. Union forces moved in 

three separate columns from Chancellorsville. Maj. Gen. George 

Sykes’ division of Meade’s V Corps marched east on the Orange 

Turnpike, supported by a division from Couch’s II Corps and one 

from III Corps which stayed in reserve at Chancellorsville. Meade 

and the remainder of V Corps proceeded along the River Road 

north of the turnpike to secure Banks’ Ford. South of the turnpike 

Slocum’s XII Corps, followed by Howard’s XI Corps, marched 

east along the Orange Plank Road toward the Tabernacle Church 

where Hooker planned to establish his new headquarters. Two 

divisions of II Corps would be in reserve at Chancellorsville, and 

the remaining division would move to Todd’s Tavern to secure 

the southern flank. Hooker appreciated the defensive advantages 

Chancellorsville offered, but wanted to get his long columns out 

of the difficult terrain of the Wilderness where he could maneuver 

and destroy Lee in open ground. 

Meanwhile, on the western outskirts of Fredericksburg, 

General Anderson’s Confederate division awoke early and began 

fortifying their position against the Union force they anticipated 

would approach them from the west. All through the previous 

night, units from McLaws’ division had arrived to reinforce them. 

As Anderson surveyed his troops constructing hasty breastworks, 

he was met by General “Stonewall” Jackson. Jackson chose not to 

wait for a Federal attack. Emboldened by Lee’s guidance to “make 

arrangements to repulse the enemy,” he ordered Anderson and 
20 

McLaws to stop digging and to advance westward to engage the 

oncoming Union Army. 

The opposing forces made initial contact about 1100 on 

the Orange Turnpike just west of the Zoan Church. Skirmishers 

from the 12th Virginia deployed in front of Mahone’s brigade and 

engaged with dismounted troopers from the 8th Pennsylvania 

Cavalry who were screening General Sykes’ advancing Federal 

division. The Virginians quickly scattered the Federals but soon 

found themselves confronted by Col. Sidney Burbank’s brigade of 

U.S. regulars from V Corps on the turnpike about a mile west of the 

Zoan Church. Mahone quickly dispatched the rest of his brigade 

into the fight as another brigade of V Corps regulars under Brig. 

Gen. Romeyn B. Ayers fell in on Burbank’s left flank north of the 

turnpike. The Battle of Chancellorsville had begun. (See Map 2.)

As his troops clashed with U.S. Army forces on the turnpike, 

McLaws sent word back to Jackson of the surprisingly large 

number of enemy troops to his front. In response, Jackson ordered 

McLaws to hold his ground while he took the rest of his corps and 

the divisions of General Anderson and Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes 

west along the Orange Plank Road in an attempt to get around the 

Union right flank. They pushed about a mile and half forward of 

McLaws’ position before they encountered the pickets of Slocum’s 

XII Corps near the Aldrich farm. Not taking any chances, Slocum 

deployed all six of his brigades, 13,000 men in total from the divisions of Brig. Gens. John W. Geary and Alpheus S. Williams, in a 

line of battle extending on both sides of the Plank Road. The rough 

underbrush impeded the progress of men and field artillery alike. 

The fighting along the Orange Turnpike, meanwhile, 

became more intense. After Sykes’ two brigades successfully 

repulsed the Confederate skirmishers, they found themselves 

in a perilous position as they battled rebel reinforcements from 

the rest of McLaws’ division around the Lewis farm. With the 

brigades of Brig. Gens. Paul J. Semmes and Joseph B. Kershaw on 

Mahone’s left south of the turnpike, and then those of Brig. Gens. 

William T. Wofford and Edward A. Perry deployed to the north 

of the road on his right, the Confederates enjoyed a rare advantage in numbers and soon threatened both flanks of the isolated 

U.S. regulars. Sykes sent a message to inform the commanding 

general of his increasingly precarious situation, assuming that 

Hooker would send reinforcements. Instead, Hooker ordered 

him to withdraw. 
21

Meanwhile, General Meade with the rest of V Corps had 

been marching all morning along the River Road about two miles 

north and parallel to the turnpike. Although the terrain was nearly 

impassable, they met surprisingly little Confederate resistance, 

coming across only small bands of pickets and abandoned enemy 

positions from the previous day. By early afternoon, Meade was 

less than a mile from the crucial river crossing at Banks’ Ford 

over the Rappahannock. If the Union Army could control this 

ford, he thought it could further hem in the enemy by pushing 

them eastward. No sooner had he considered this prospect than 

he received an unexpected order from General Hooker to fall 

back to the Chancellor house, where Meade had begun his march 

earlier that morning. Confused and frustrated, Meade reportedly muttered to an aide, “If we can’t hold the top of the hill, we 

certainly can’t hold the bottom of it.”

Little did Meade know that this order was part of a larger 

directive from Hooker to all of the army’s three advanced elements 

to pull back to their original positions and assume a defensive posture. Each of the three corps commanders received the 

message to “at once have their 

commands established on the 

lines assigned them last night, 

and have them put in condition 

of defense without moment’s 

delay. The major-general 

commanding trusts that a 

suspension in the attack to-day 

will embolden the enemy to 

attack him.” Meade was not 

the only one bewildered by 

the decision. Both Slocum and 

Couch personally confronted 

Hooker, but to no avail. Couch 

would later recall, “I retired 

from his presence with the 

belief that my commanding 

general was a whipped man.” 

Historians have identified 

Hooker’s action as the most 

crucial decision of the battle, for 

by withdrawing he forfeited the 

General Meade

(Library of Congress)
A N D E R S O N

J

S L O C U M

( X I I )

S Y K E S

C O UCH

(II)

HOWARD

HOOKER

( XI)

(I I I) S I C

K

L

E

S

Rapidan River

Mott’s Run

Popular Run

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d

U.S. F

to Culpeper to Orange

E l y ’ s F o r d R o a d

U . S . F o r d R o a d

C a t h a r p i n R o a d

Furnace Road

Furnace R o ad

O R A N G E

T U R N P I K E

Aldrich

Hazel Grove

Wilderness Church

Hawkins

Dowdall’s

Tavern Chancellorsville

Bullock

Wellford

Catharine

 Furnace

Fairview

Map 2
J

A

C

K

S

O

N

M c L A

W

S

R O D E S

M E A D E

( V )

n

Rappahannock River

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d

Scott’s Ford

Banks’ Ford

Ford

P L A N K R O A D

M i n e R o a d

M i n e R o a d

O R A N G E P L A N K R O A D

River Road

Tabernacle

Church

Zoan

Church

Salem Church

Lewis

1 May 1863

L ATE MORNING

0 1 2

Miles
24 

initiative to the enemy. These assertions often refer to a comment 

Hooker allegedly made after the battle, in which he said that he 

had “lost confidence in Hooker.” General Hooker, however, had a 

rationale for his decision. Having witnessed the U.S. Army’s bloody 

and fruitless assault against well-defended Southern positions on 

Marye’s Heights six months earlier, he hoped to turn the tables 

by luring Lee into making the same mistake as General Burnside. 

Messages that Hooker sent to his corps commanders and his 

chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, that afternoon reveal 

that he anticipated, and even welcomed, a Confederate attack 

on his position at Chancellorsville. As he explained, “the enemy 

will be emboldened to attack me. I . . . feel certain of success. If 

his communications are cut, he must attack me. I have a strong 

position.” Hooker also began to receive the reports from Colonel 

Sharpe’s interrogations of Confederate prisoners that Longstreet’s 

two divisions were marching to reinforce Lee. Hooker’s decision 

to pull his forward troops back to their original defensive positions was thus partly a reaction to the changing conditions and his 

assumption that Lee would suffer a grave reverse if he attacked the 

entrenched Federals. 

Regardless of Hooker’s rationale, Confederate forces took full 

advantage of the Union army’s pause. Jackson pressed forward along 

the Orange Turnpike and the Plank Road toward Chancellorsville. 

By 1800 his lead columns had pushed within less than a mile of 

the Chancellor house, contending only with the fighting retreat of 

Slocum’s and Couch’s forces. Around the house they met the main 

line of the Union defenses and halted their advance. Jackson made 

one last effort to pressure the Union flank by sending Wright’s 

Georgia brigade to penetrate the Federal position at Hazel Grove, 

just over a mile southwest of the house. Wright encountered stiff 

resistance from Williams’ division of XII Corps that was dug in 

north of the grove, and he suspended the assault. 

As night fell, General Lee rode to the intersection of the 

Plank and Furnace roads, in woods just south of the Orange 

Turnpike. There he met Jackson, who had spent the evening gathering information on Union dispositions from staff members and 

cavalry reports. The two discussed their options for the next day. 

Jackson posited that the hasty Federal withdrawal that afternoon 

indicated that Hooker would retreat across the river by morning. 

Lee disagreed, arguing that the Union force was too large and its 

movement too deliberate to be a feint or a probe. Both agreed 
25

to maintain the initiative they had gained that day. Noting that 

Hooker had firmly anchored the left of his line on the Rapidan 

River and had heavily fortified his center around the Chancellor 

house, Lee believed that attacking Hooker’s right flank was the 

only viable option for the morning. 

Reports received from Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, whose rebel 

cavalry was operating unfettered on the battlefield due to the absence 

of Stoneman’s horsemen, confirmed that the Union left flank was 

indeed vulnerable, or, as the cavalryman put it, “hanging in the air.” 

The Federals of XI Corps were spread thinly westward along the 

turnpike with their flank unsecured. Jackson’s chaplain, Reverend 

Beverly Tucker Lacy, had relatives in the immediate area and knew 

of a local resident who could suggest a way to get to the Union flank. 

Lacy and Jackson’s cartographer, Maj. Jedediah Hotchkiss, recruited 

the services of Charles Wellford, the owner of Catharine Furnace, a 

little more than a mile south of Chancellorsville. Wellford knew the 

paths and trails through this part of the Wilderness and presented 

Lacy and Hotchkiss with a route around the Federal lines that would 

allow Jackson’s troops to move undetected as they approached 

Hooker’s exposed flank. The two officers relayed this suggestion to 

Lee and Jackson that evening. 

Armed with this local intelligence, Generals Lee and Jackson 

met in the early hours of 2 May to finalize their plans. Accounts of 

this informal conference are imprecise, but the most reliable source, 

Major Hotchkiss, dramatically recounted the famous exchange. Lee 

asked Jackson, “What do you propose to do?” Jackson responded, 

“I propose to go right around there,” tracing the route on the map 

with his finger, around the Union right. When Lee asked how 

many troops Jackson planned to use for this maneuver, his subordinate replied, “My whole command.” Lee then asked him, “What 

will you leave me here to hold the Federal Army with?” With a 

bold plan in mind, Jackson answered, “the divisions of Anderson 

and McLaws.” After a pause, Lee said, “Well, go ahead.” Jackson’s 

column would number 33,000 men, leaving Lee with about 15,000 

men to face Hooker’s army east of Chancellorsville.

The flank march that would bring General Jackson immortality began inauspiciously. Jackson had not informed his subordinates of his intentions, so that when dawn broke on 2 May many of 

his soldiers were cooking their breakfasts and not ready to march. 

Jackson’s lead unit, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt’s Georgia brigade, 

did not start moving until 0700. Once the entire corps was on the 
26 

road, the column stretched for over ten miles, men marching three 

or four abreast on dusty, backwoods tracks. The procession was to 

move to Catharine Furnace, then southwestward on the Furnace 

Road, until it reached the Brock Road. Here Jackson would turn 

north to strike the westernmost flank of the Federal line arrayed 

along the Orange Plank Road. (See Map 3.) 

The daring march of Jackson’s corps that morning was never 

a secret to the Union Army. As early as 0800, scouts from Brig. 

Gen. David B. Birney’s division of III Corps reported that a large 

Confederate force was moving to the west. Indeed, Jackson’s entire 

column exposed itself to enemy observation as it passed near the 

clearing of Hazel Grove, just south of the Chancellor house. The 

question was, how to interpret the movement—was it a feint, a 

retreat, a repositioning, or an attack? Having fought Lee and Jackson 

before, General Hooker instinctively assessed the march as a flanking 

maneuver against his right. At 0930, he dispatched warnings to 

Howard and Slocum, the two corps commanders on his right, to 

prepare for the enemy to “throw” themselves against their flank. 

Feeling that he had done enough to protect the right of his line, he 

chose to take no further action 

until he had a better understanding of Lee’s intentions. 

The III Corps commander, 

General Sickles, found Hooker’s 

relatively passive response 

intolerable. He pleaded with the 

army commander to allow him 

to harass Jackson’s column as it 

moved across his front. Hooker 

wavered, questioning his own 

initial appraisal. Perhaps, he 

mused, the Confederates were 

not bent on attacking his right, 

but were withdrawing westward 

toward their depots at Orange 

and Gordonsville, Virginia. Or 

perhaps the movement was a 

maneuver meant to draw Union 

reserves away before the rebels 

launched a real attack on the 

Union left. After wrestling with 

General Howard

(Library of Congress)
27

these possibilities, Hooker finally capitulated to Sickles’ cajoling 

and allowed him to attack the Confederate column by pushing 

south from Hazel Grove. 

Sickles deployed Birney’s division for the assault and readied 

the rest of his corps to follow in support. U.S. Army artillery at 

Hazel Grove opened fire on the exposed enemy column just before 

it disappeared into the woods and out of range—Hooker’s indecisiveness had meant that the Federal attack would be launched at 

what was now the rear of Jackson’s column. Jackson had left behind 

the 23d Georgia near Catharine Furnace to deter such an action, 

but the advancing Federals quickly overwhelmed the Georgians. 

Over 250 rebels surrendered, an embarrassment that would lead a 

Confederate court-martial to convict the regimental commander, 

Col. Emory Best, for cowardice later in the war. 

Sickles followed up his initial success by pursuing Jackson’s 

column down the Furnace Road, calling for more reinforcements. His aggressive action that afternoon would have two 

crucial effects on the fight to come later that day. First, Hooker’s 

decision to shift brigades from the II, XI, and XII Corps to reinforce Sickles left a noticeable gap between Howard’s XI Corps on 

the far Union right and the main body around the Chancellor 

house. Secondly, as Sickles watched the rear of Jackson’s column 

disappear back into the woods beyond the Hazel Grove clearing, 

he noted the distinctly southern turn in the direction of march. 

This observation convinced him that the enemy’s intention was 

indeed to retreat south and west, most likely to the Confederate 

supply depots in Orange or Gordonsville, rather than to attack 

the Union right. Sickles passed this news to Hooker’s headquarters in midafternoon. 

Meanwhile, Jackson continued his lengthy march, closing 

in on the intended stopping point at the intersection of the 

Brock and Orange Plank roads. Near here, Jackson and his staff 

reached a hill on Burton’s farm where he could see the XI Corps 

stretched out along the turnpike but could not discern exactly 

where the line ended. The force in front of them, while unsuspecting, was dug in with no assailable flank within view. Jackson 

would have to move his attack farther west. This would take time, 

which he could ill afford, as it was already midafternoon and his 

troops had been marching since morning. Frustrated, Jackson 

continued his column along the Brock Road until it arrived at 

the Orange Turnpike some two miles west of the Union right 
R O D E S

A . P . H I L L

C O L S T O N

2 3 Ga

STUART(-)

STUART(-)

J

A

C

K

S

O N

SICKLES

(III)

S 

H O W

A

R

D ( XI)

B I R N E Y

HOOK

Popular Run

Wilde r n ess Run

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d

O R A N G E P L A N K R O A D

O R A N G E

T U R N P I K E

Furnace Ro a d

B ro c k Road

B rock Road

Hazel G

Wilderness Church

Hawkins

Dowdall’s

Tavern

Wilderness

Tavern

Luckett

Burton

Wellford

Catharine

Furnace

Todd’s Tavern

2 May 1863

EARLY EVENING

0 1 2

Miles

Map 3
LEE

M c L

A

W S

A

N

D

E

R S O N

C OUCH

(II)

( V )

M

E

A

D

E

( X I I )

L O C U M

ER

Mott’s Run

Rappahannock R

O R A N G E

P L A N K R O A D

O R A N G E

T U R N P I K E

M i n e R o a d

U . S . F o r d R o a d

C a t h a r p i n R o a d

Furnace Road

River Road

Aldrich

Grove

Chancellorsville

Bullock

Zoan Church

Lewis

Fairview
30

flank. The lead division, under the command of General Rodes, 

reached the turnpike about 1500 and began deploying in the 

woods for the attack. Arranging the corps for the assault proved 

just as challenging as the flank march itself. Commanders had to 

displace a column of fifteen brigades that was nearly two miles 

long and four men abreast into a line of battle perpendicular to 

the Orange Turnpike in heavily thicketed terrain. The dispositions had to be done quietly to avoid alerting the nearby Federal 

troops. It took nearly two and half hours for Jackson’s men to 

deploy in three echelons spanning over a mile just west of the 

Luckett farm. There were still a few brigades that had not yet 

arrived, but Jackson could no longer wait. Daylight and opportunity were diminishing rapidly. 

Fortunately for the rebels, the men of the Federal XI Corps 

had done little to ready themselves for a potential attack on their 

position. Blame for the unpreparedness of Howard’s men still 

remains a matter of debate. There is clear evidence that Hooker 

sent Howard orders to prepare for an attack on his flank, but 

sources differ on exactly how the commanding general’s intent 

was conveyed to his corps commander. Regardless, that afternoon 

Howard made only cursory efforts to adjust his line, perhaps 

because he considered the dense Wilderness itself as a deterrent 

to an attack. He faced two of his regiments to the west, but the 

rest remained positioned on the turnpike facing south. He also 

deployed a detachment of signalmen to give warning. In the end, 

Howard never seriously heeded Hooker’s order or the warnings 

delivered by his scouts. Preoccupied by the action around 

Catharine Furnace, Hooker never personally rode out to the 

XI Corps position to insure the troops were properly deployed. 

Reports that Lee’s army was withdrawing westward, capped by a 

circular letter issued by Hooker that afternoon that instructed the 

army to prepare to pursue the enemy at first light the next day, only 

further reinforced Howard’s complacency. 

At 1730, Jackson ordered Rodes to attack. After stumbling 

through several hundred yards of underbrush and thickets, the 

Confederates smashed into the unsuspecting Federals. The only 

two U.S. Army regiments facing westward—the 54th New York 

and 153d Pennsylvania—had little time to react and fled their positions having fired one volley. Many other Federal soldiers joined 

them. Union Army staff officer Washington Roebling described 

the scene as “all the world like a stampede of cattle, a multitude 
of yelling, struggling men who had thrown away their muskets, 

panting for breath, their faces distorted by fear, filled the road as 

far as the eye could reach.” 

The next ninety minutes proved most desperate for the XI 

Corps and eventually the entire Union Army. Jackson’s attack 

pushed too relentlessly for the Federals to mount a coherent 

defense. Any resistance that did occur was sporadic and uncoordinated. Only a handful of infantry units such as those in 

Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz’s 3d Division around the Hawkins farm 

held their ground to stem the tide of the enemy advance before 

retreating in good order. Shortly afterward, Howard’s frightened 

stragglers rallied around the brigade of Col. Adolphus Buschbeck, 

who had thrown up a hasty defensive position at Dowdall’s 

Tavern, to become known as the “Buschbeck line.” Here Federal 

units slowed the enemy assault, at least for a few moments. These 

daring but futile actions were mostly the inspiration of small-unit 

commanders as the leadership on the brigade, division, and corps 

level struggled to bring order to the mob that an hour before had 

been the right flank of the Union Army. General Howard, who had 

just returned from escorting one of his brigades to the fighting at 

Catharine Furnace, attempted his own heroic efforts to halt the 

rout. The one-armed general grabbed a unit standard and galloped 

31

Staying Jackson’s advance, Saturday evening, 2 May, 

with artillery placed across the Plank Road, 1863

(Library of Congress)
32 

down the Orange Turnpike, encouraging his men to rally. Other 

bold but reckless efforts, such as the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry’s 

impromptu charge into the heart of Rodes’ line, bought time for 

the reeling Union soldiers to reconstitute their defenses and to 

redirect the artillery at Hazel Grove toward the advancing wave of 

gray-clad soldiers. 

General Hooker was initially unaware of the collapse of his 

right flank. Due to an atmospheric irregularity, he could not hear 

the sound of the cannon and musket volleys that were only a 

mile from his position at the Chancellorsville crossroads. He first 

became aware of the calamity when men from Howard’s broken 

units came streaming past his headquarters at the Chancellor 

house. Startled into action, he set to work organizing a new defensive line just west of the crossroads, pulling in reinforcements 

from different units and rallying the panicked soldiers. For all of 

his carelessness in permitting the conditions for his left flank to 

falter, he partially redeemed his mistake by restoring order. By 

sunset, the Confederate attack had lost momentum due to its rapid 

advance, the chaos of the fighting, the brokenness of the terrain, 

and the steadiness of Hooker’s new line. As darkness fell over the 

battlefield, Jackson’s attack ground to a halt. 

As the firing died down, General Jackson rode up and down 

the Orange Turnpike urging his men to press forward. Many of the 

brigades from Rodes’ and Brig. Gen. Raleigh E. Colston’s divisions 

had become so disorganized that they pulled back to Dowdall’s 

Tavern to regroup. Jackson seethed while observing this withdrawal, as the two miles he had gained that evening shrank to only 

half a mile. From the rear he called up Brig. Gen. James H. Lane’s 

brigade of North Carolinians from Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill’s division 

and ordered them to continue the drive against the Federals. 

Lane obediently deployed his troops both north and south of the 

turnpike but then hesitated, barely inching forward. It was now 

past 2000 and completely dark. Neither side had any idea of where 

their enemy was or the size of his force just yards from their respective fronts. Fearful that the advantages gained that evening would 

be gone by the next morning if they halted, Jackson impatiently 

rode out in front of the Confederate picket line with his staff to 

observe the disposition of the Union line. The edgy men of the 

18th North Carolina had not been informed of Jackson’s reconnaissance, and when then heard horses to their front, they fired 

two volleys in the dark, assuming they were shooting at Federal 
33

cavalry. Jackson was hit in three places, and several members of 

his staff were killed or wounded, before the shooters understood 

that they were firing into their own troops. Jackson’s most severe 

wound was in his upper left arm, which required amputation. His 

medical staff removed him from the battlefield and transported 

him to a field hospital at Wilderness Tavern, and then to a more 

permanent recuperation location at Guinea Station, after a twentyseven mile ambulance ride from Chancellorsville. Many in the 

ranks of both armies would not learn of his wounding until well 

into the next day. 

The result of the day’s battle was bittersweet for the 

Confederates. By their daring gamble they had smashed an entire 

U.S. Army Corps and rolled up the Federal right flank to the 

doorstep of Hooker’s headquarters. Yet these successes had come 

at a terrible price. The attack cost Lee’s army nearly 1,000 casualties, but it was the loss of “Stonewall” Jackson which proved the 

costliest. When Lee learned of the wounding, he wrote Jackson, 

“I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled 

in your stead.” In spite of his concern, Lee still had to press on to 

finish the job of defeating the enemy that his wounded subordinate had started that evening. 

With Jackson’s wounding, corps command fell to Hill, 

who was soon thereafter wounded by Union artillery fire, then 

to Rodes, who thought it inadvisable to continue the attack at 

night. Hill, remaining on the battlefield, sent for General Stuart 

to assume command. 

In fact, the rebels were in a precarious position. As a 

result of the flanking maneuver, Jackson’s corps was now separated from the rest of Lee’s army southeast of Chancellorsville 

by almost an entire day’s march with the Union army between 

them. To remedy the situation, Lee appointed General Stuart to 

assume command of Jackson’s corps and ordered him to resume 

the offensive at dawn the next day with the daunting objective of 

linking the two parts of the divided army. Lee’s instructions were 

clear: “keep the troops well together, and press on, on the general 

plan, which is to work by the right wing, turning the positions of 

the enemy, so as to drive him from Chancellorsville, which will 

again unite us.”

While Stuart re-formed his new command wearied and 

disorganized by the day’s events, the Federals labored feverishly 

through the night to reinforce their position. They built breast-
34 

work defenses, three lines deep, to the west of Chancellorsville and 

shifted fresh units to these positions to repel the assault that they 

assumed would begin the next day. Maj. Gen. John Reynolds’ I 

Corps also arrived late that night to reinforce Hooker, giving the 

Union Army an 80,000 to 40,000 advantage in manpower on the 

field. The Federal defense now comprised a large “U” consisting 

of I, V, and XI Corps from west to east stretching on either side 

of United States Ford. Federal troops erected a smaller, more 

circular formation around the Chancellor house with about a mile 

diameter, III Corps facing west, XII facing south and II Corps 

oriented eastward. The only imperfection to this circular arrangement was a portion of Sickles’ III Corps that jutted out to the 

southwest to cover the high ground at Hazel Grove. 

Given the Union’s advantage in numbers, the separation of 

the Confederate forces, and the Federals’ surprising resilience, 

the situation demanded that Hooker counterattack. The Union 

commander, however, remained cautious. His only aggressive 

action entailed having Sedgwick’s VI Corps, which had crossed 

the Rappahannock in front of Fredericksburg on 29 April to tie 

General Sickles

(Library of Congress)

General Stuart

(Library of Congress)
35

down its defenders, advance to threaten Lee’s rear. As for the main 

army, Hooker’s caution led him to order Sickles to abandon his 

salient at Hazel Grove, one of the few clear, elevated locations on 

the battlefield that offered advantageous fields of fire for artillery. Sickles protested but eventually obeyed the command and 

pulled his troops back at 0600. Confederate artillery officer Col. 

E. Porter Alexander would later comment on the abandonment 

of Hazel Grove: “There has rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a 

battlefield.”

At 0700 on 3 May, as Sickles was completing his withdrawal from Hazel Grove, Confederate Brig. Gen. Henry Heth 

(who replaced division commander General Hill, wounded 

the previous night) attacked. Confederate Brig. Gen. James J. 

Archer moved his brigade to the base of Hazel Grove, where his 

men met stout resistance from Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham’s 

brigade of Pennsylvanians. Archer did not know at the time 

that he was actually engaging Sickles’ rear guard as it covered 

III Corps’ withdrawal to Fairview. To the left of Archer, the 

Southern brigades of Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan and Lane 

drove the Union defenders back to the edge of Fairview but had 

pushed forward unsupported and with their flanks exposed. The 

Federals regrouped and repelled both enemy brigades in fierce 

fighting. North of the turnpike, Brig. Gen. Dorsey Pender’s 

troops assaulted the Union position held by Maj. Gen. Hiram G. 

Berry. After several bloody charges, Pender’s North Carolinian’s 

overran the Federal earthworks, killing Berry and capturing 

Brig. Gen. William Hays in the fighting. The U.S. Army position 

might have been compromised were it not for a bold counterattack by Maj. Gen. William H. French’s division of II Corps, which 

hurled Pender’s units back to their original positions. South of 

the road, Union General Williams pressed forward against Lane’s 

shattered regiments. McGowan’s South Carolina brigade arrived 

and did its best to stem the tide of the counterattack, but the 

Confederate line wavered (Map 4). 

Overall, General Heth’s troops had succeeded in pushing 

through two of the Federals’ three defensive lines both north and 

south of the Orange Turnpike, but the attack was falling apart. Stuart 

sent Colston’s division forward along the turnpike in support of the 

struggling Confederate offensive, but Colston’s forces stalled, with 

several of his regiments refusing to move forward, either from fear 

or from the heavy casualties suffered heretofore. The casualties in the 
A N D E R S O

N

M c L

A

W

S

C O L S T O N

H E T H

S

T U A R T

R O D E S

(XI)

H

O

W

A

R D

( V )

M

E

A

D

E

( I )

R

E

Y

N

O

L

D S

C O UCH

(II)

SICKLES

(III)

( X I I )

S L O C U

M

Rapidan River

Mott’s Run

Rappahannock River

Popular Run

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d

U.S. Ford

Blind Ford

O R A N G E

P L A N K R O A D

O R A N G E

T U R N P I K E

E l y ’ s F o r d R o a d

U . S . F o r d R o a d

Furnace Road

Aldrich

Hazel Grove

Wilderness

Church

Hawkins

Dowdall’s

Tavern Chancellorsville

Bullock

Wellford

Catharine

 Furnace

Fairview

3 May 1863

EARLY MORNING

0 1

Miles

Map 4
37

back and forth struggle were horrific, with the “Stonewall” Brigade, 

led by Brig. Gen. Elisha F. Paxton, losing over half its men in a matter 

of minutes. Fearing that the entire assault would falter, Stuart called 

forward Rodes’ weary division, his last available reserve. Led by the 

bold Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur, Rodes’ men threw themselves 

into the Union breastworks. Union soldiers repulsed Ramseur twice, 

but eventually the rebels breached the Federal defenses, fracturing the 

Union line. 

The Federal position was now in crisis. U.S. Army artillery 

batteries at Fairview were running critically low on ammunition, 

as Confederate brigades moved to surround them. Several guns 

limbered up and moved to the rear to avoid being captured. Sickles 

sent his aide to army headquarters to plead with Hooker for reinforcements. As Hooker stood on the porch of the Chancellor 

house to receive Sickles’ message, a Confederate cannonball struck 

the pillar next to him, knocking the commanding general senseless to the ground. His staff gathered around his body, for a time 

believing him dead. He soon regained consciousness, and in an 

effort to show his troops that he had not been harmed, he mounted 

his horse and rode toward the front lines. Hooker, most likely 

suffering from a concussion, proceeded only a few paces before 

Gen. Hooker’s headquarters at the Chancellorsville house, by Edwin Forbes

(Library of Congress)
38 

the effects of the blow took their toll. He dismounted and lay down 

on a blanket where he sipped brandy to aid his recovery. 

The Federal position at Fairview could no longer hold as more 

infantry and artillery units pulled back to the clearing around the 

Chancellor house. Attacking Confederates pushed within 500 

yards of the Union headquarters. Still dazed from his head injury, 

Hooker handed control of the army to General Couch, instructing 

him to retreat to a new position north of Chancellorsville. Couch 

did his best to coordinate the withdrawal. He placed Maj. Gen. 

Winfield S. Hancock’s division from II Corps in charge of holding 

off the Confederates as the remnants of III and XII Corps withdrew 

to the Bullock house. Although Hancock’s men endured heavy 

artillery fire from several directions, they successfully allowed the 

rest of the army to regroup. 

As Stuart’s Confederates pressed forward toward Fairview 

and Chancellorsville, Lee moved the 18,000 men under his 

direct command against the Federal positions from the east and 

southeast. After bitter fighting against the U.S. Army’s XII Corps 

through the early morning, Lee’s leftmost brigade under Brig. Gen. 

Edward Perry linked with Archer’s right flank on Hazel Grove. By 

1000, both wings of the Confederate army had united and Lee 

ordered all of his subordinates to continue to press the attack. 

When he learned that his forces had taken the Chancellorsville 

crossroads area, Lee rode down the turnpike from Hazel Grove 

to the Chancellor house, now ablaze from artillery fire, his troops 

cheering him along the way. In what was perhaps the greatest 

moment in his career, Lee had smashed a Union army twice the 

size of his own and driven it from its headquarters. His aide, Maj. 

Charles Marshall, described the scene as Lee, “sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of—triumph; and I looked upon 

him, in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, 

courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that 

it must have been from such a scene that men in ancient times 

rose to the dignity of gods.” The elation of the success lasted for 

only a few moments. A courier met Lee with disheartening news: 

Sedgwick had taken the Confederate positions at Fredericksburg 

and was moving toward Chancellorsville. 

Sedgwick’s operation had begun inauspiciously. After I and 

VI Corps had crossed the Rappahannock River on 29 April they 

had done little over the next three days against the Confederates, 

in part because they had received vague and conflicting guidance 
39

from Hooker. After Reynolds’ I Corps left to join Hooker on 2 May, 

Sedgwick had been left with his own VI Corps and Brig. Gen. John 

Gibbon’s division, about 24,000 men. On the morning of 3 May, 

he arrayed his four divisions extending north and south in front 

of the town and prepared to advance. The opposing force, under 

Early, counted 12,000 troops over a five mile front from Taylor’s 

Hill to Hamilton’s Crossing. Sedgwick advanced against the very 

same stone wall on Marye’s Heights that had been the scene of the 

Union disaster five months earlier. 

After repulsing two Union assaults, the Confederates 

permitted a temporary truce to allow Union soldiers to remove 

their wounded from in front of the stone wall. While doing so, 

Union officers astutely observed how few enemy soldiers actually 

defended Marye’s Heights. The Northern units regrouped and 

attacked the position again, stacking ten regiments in column 

formation to overwhelm the thin line of defenders on the heights. 

General Early hastily withdrew his forces south on the Telegraph 

Road, away from the fighting. The road to Chancellorsville was 

now open, but for reasons that still remain unclear, Sedgwick 

was slow to press his advantage. He methodically regrouped his 

forces creating a delay that gave Lee time to react. The Confederate 

commander sent McLaws’ division east on the turnpike to halt 

Sedgwick’s advance. About four miles west of Fredericksburg 

at Salem Church, Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox’s brigade of 

Alabamans joined McLaws, giving the Confederates about 10,000 

men to oppose the oncoming Federals. The lead elements of VI 

Corps reached Salem Church about 1600 on 3 May. The rebel line 

held, as Sedgwick sent only one of his divisions under General 

William Brooks into the fray. As darkness fell, the opposing forces 

camped on the battlefield. 

General Lee then made his next daring gamble of the 

campaign. He removed Anderson’s division from its position 

facing Hooker’s left flank and deployed it eastward to join McLaws’ 

troops at Salem Church. He also ordered Early’s division to assist 

McLaws. This would leave the Confederates with only 25,000 men 

in front of Hooker’s 75,000 troops. Lee based his bold decision on 

the assumption that Hooker would be unable to shake free from 

the defensive mindedness he had exhibited during the battle so far 

(Map 5). 

Rather than stay at Chancellorsville, Lee left the main army 

to take command of the force at Salem Church. He arrived on the 
C O L S T O N

R O D E S

H E T H

S

T

U

A R T

R E Y N O L D S ( I ) M E A D E ( V )

SICKLES

(III)

C O U C H ( I I )

H O WA R D ( X I )

S LO C U M ( X I I )

Rapidan River

Mott’s Run

Rappahannock 

Popular Run

U n  n i s h e d R a i l r o a d

U n  n i s h 

U.S. Ford

M i n e R o a d

E l y ’ s F o r d R o a d

U . S . F o r d R o a d

C a t h a r p i n R o a d

Furnace Road

Furnace Road

River Road

B rock Road

O R A N G E

P L A N K R O A D

O R A N G E

T U R N P I K E

Aldrich

Hazel

Grove

Wilderness

Church

Hawkins

Dowdall’s

Tavern

Chancellorsville

Bullock

Zoan Church 

Wellford

Catharine

 Furnace

Lewis

Todd’s Tavern

Fairview

Map 5
A N D E R S O N

M c L A

W

S

E

A R L Y

SEDGWICK

( VI )

ck River

Hazel Run

h e d R a i l r o a d

Scott’s Ford

Banks’ Ford

M i n e R o a d

Te legraph Road

P L A N K R O A D

Tabernacle Church

Salem

Church

Taylor

Marye

Falmouth

FREDERICKSBURG

4 May 1863

L ATE AFTERNOON

0 1 2

Miles

A N D E R S O N

M c L A

W

S

E

A R L Y

SEDGWICK

( VI )

ck River

Hazel Run

h e d R a i l ro a d

Scott’s Ford

Banks’ Ford

M i n e R o a d

Te legraph Road

P L A N K R O A D

Tabernacle Church

Salem

Church

Taylor

Marye

Falmouth

FREDERICKSBURG

4 May 1863

L ATE AFTERNOON

0 1 2

Miles
42 

battlefield at 0900 on 4 May. The 20,000 men he had gathered there 

matched Sedgwick’s command, which the Union commander 

had aligned in a defensive, U-shaped formation anchored on the 

west by Banks’ Ford and on the east by Taylor’s Hill. Lee deployed 

around the Union position with McLaws to the west, Anderson 

to the south, and Early to the east. Getting the three divisions in 

position for an attack took most of the day, and not until 1700 did 

Early launch two of his brigades, those of Brig. Gens. Robert Hoke 

and Harry Hays, against the Federal left. Early’s troops gained 

some ground after fierce fighting, but Anderson’s and McLaws’ 

assaults never achieved any momentum due to difficult terrain, 

poor communications, and the fading sunlight. Lee fumed over 

the failure to crush the isolated VI Corps. He intended to finish the 

job on 5 May, but Sedgwick withdrew across the Rappahannock 

under cover of darkness. 

General Hooker spent 4 May awaiting news of Sedgwick’s 

progress. He had heard little from VI Corps since learning of its 

breakthrough at Marye’s Heights and the initial contact with the 

enemy at Salem Church. Uncertain as to the situation, he opted 

to do nothing. When word finally arrived at 2300 that Sedgwick 

had been stymied at Salem Church and had decided to withdraw 

across Scott’s Ford to the north side of the Rappahannock, 

Hooker’s heart sank. He had placed all of his hopes on VI Corps 

advancing to catch Lee in a vise, and now that possibility had 

vanished. At 2400, he called his five corps commanders to his tent 

outside of the Bullock house, although Slocum did not reach the 

meeting until after it had adjourned. He asked them whether the 

Army of the Potomac should attack the next morning or withdraw 

across the river and conclude the campaign. He then left, allowing 

the generals to discuss the matter among themselves. Three—

Meade, Reynolds, and Howard—voted to attack Lee, while only 

two—Couch and Sickles—supported a withdrawal. When Hooker 

returned to the meeting, he announced his decision to move the 

army back across the Rappahannock and return to Falmouth. 

The Union Army would concede victory to the Confederates. The 

decision bewildered Hooker’s commanders. Reynolds commented 

afterwards, “What was the use of calling us together at this time of 

night when he intended to retreat anyhow?”

On the morning of 5 May, U.S. Army forces began withdrawing over the pontoon bridges at United States Ford. By 

evening a heavy rain drenched the long columns of tired Union 
43

soldiers as they tramped northward. Lee attempted to exploit the 

withdrawal by attacking the Union rear guard, but the exhaustion 

of his men and the rough underbrush impeded the effort. By the 

time Lee had deployed his men, Hooker and his army were gone. 

Analysis

The Chancellorsville Campaign took a heavy toll on both 

armies, with over 30,764 men killed, wounded, or missing 

during three days of fighting. The Confederates lost fewer men, 

1,724 killed, 9,233 wounded, and 2,503 missing and captured, 

compared to the Union Army’s 1,694 killed, 9,672 wounded and 

5,958 missing and captured, but suffered a higher percentage of 

casualties than Hooker’s command: 22 percent to 13 percent of 

total force. At this point in the war, the South could not easily 

make up losses of that magnitude. It would be even more difficult to replace the key leaders lost in the battle. Jackson survived 

the amputation but succumbed to pneumonia a week later. The 

Army of Northern Virginia also lost seven brigade commanders 

and over forty regimental commanders on the morning of 3 May 

alone. Federal losses were not evenly distributed throughout the 

army. Units such as I, II, and V Corps had hardly engaged in the 

battle, leaving the remaining four corps to do the majority of the 

fighting and thus to absorb the larger percentage of the losses. 

The III, VI, XI, and XII Corps each lost about 20 percent of their 

men at Chancellorsville. 

Although touted as Lee’s greatest victory, the immediate 

results of the campaign were ambiguous at best. Lee had thwarted 

Hooker’s grand plan, successfully fought off two separate portions 

of the Union Army while being outnumbered nearly two to one, 

and forced them both back across the river. The morale of the 

Federal army, however, was relatively unshaken by the defeat, 

as its troops were more confused by the retreat than demoralized. Moreover, Lee had very little to show for his “masterpiece” 

at Chancellorsville. As the Union forces returned to Falmouth 

where they began their campaign, the Confederates also moved to 

their original positions around Fredericksburg. Lee lamented, “At 

Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild 

with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after 

Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we had gained not 

an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued.” 
44 

Across the Rappahannock, disaffection within the officer 

corps of the Army of the Potomac rose to new heights. Some 

officers lambasted Hooker’s foolish bravado; others hinted that 

his drinking had contributed to the failure. When Lincoln visited 

the army after the battle, he was cornered by a pair of corps 

commanders, Couch and Reynolds, who pleaded with the president to remove Hooker. For his part, Hooker kept a positive tone 

in his public pronouncements. He praised the soldiers of the Army 

of the Potomac for their performance and made vague promises 

about starting a new offensive against the Confederates. In his 

opinion, the debacle was the result of the shortcomings of others 

rather than his own. He blamed three people in particular for the 

defeat—Stoneman, for not cutting Lee’s line of communication; 

Howard, for not properly protecting the army’s flank on 2 May; 

and Sedgwick, for his abortive effort to attack Lee in the rear. 

Hooker summed up his view thusly: “The trust I had reposed in 

commanders was not executed in a manner satisfactory to myself, 

and in a way that it would have been done could I have given the 

operations of these commanders my personal supervision.” 

General Hooker survived his critics, as Lincoln opted to 

keep him in command. More trouble, however, was coming 

their way. If Lee was frustrated by not having crushed the Union 

Army at Chancellorsville, the victory had at least opened the door 

for him to pursue his strategic goal of invading the North. On 

14 May he ordered his troops forward into Maryland and then 

Pennsylvania. In early July, the Army of Northern Virginia would 

once again meet the Army of the Potomac in battle, this time at 

the sleepy town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Here, one of the 

most decisive battles of the American Civil War would be fought. 

Chancellorsville’s greatest legacy, therefore, was that it set the stage 

for this most dramatic event. But while Chancellorsville’s fate was 

to be overshadowed by the battle that was to come, it still has a lot 

to teach us about generalship, strategy, tactics, courage, and the 

challenging conditions under which the men of both sides fought 

the epic struggle that was the American Civil War. 
45

The Author

Bradford A. Wineman is an associate professor of military 

history at the United States Marine Corps Command and 

Staff College. He earned his doctorate in history at Texas A&M 

University and has published several essays on the Civil War in 

Virginia. His current research focuses on military education in the 

antebellum and Civil War South. 
46

Further Readings

Bigelow, John. The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and 

Tactical Study. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 

1910.

Furguson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave. 

New York: Knopf, 1992.

Gallagher, Gary W. Chancellorsville: The Battle and Its Aftermath.

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Keller, Christian B. Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, 

Ethnicity, and Civil War Memory. New York: Fordham 

University Press, 2007.

Longacre, Edward G. The Commanders of Chancellorsville: The 

Gentlemen vs. The Rogue. Nashville, Tenn.: Rutledge Hill 

Press, 2005. 

Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 

1996.

Stackpole, Edward J. Chancellorsville: Lee’s Greatest Battle.

Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1958.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
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PIN : 103167–000

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