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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

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studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

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External Research Associates Program Monograph

THE IMPACT OF

PRESIDENT FELIPE CALDERÓN’S WAR

ON DRUGS ON THE ARMED FORCES:

THE PROSPECTS FOR MEXICO’S 

“MILITARIZATION”

AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

George W. Grayson

January 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

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copyrighted.
ii

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be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

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ISBN 1-58487-557-7
iii

FOREWORD

Respondents to public opinion polls have long 

ranked the Army among Mexico’s most respected institutions, along with the Roman Catholic Church and 

universities. There has not been a president with a 

military background since 1946, no retired or active 

duty officers hold a governorship, and—above all—

the armed forces obey civilian leaders. Unlike many 

Latin American nations, Mexico has not suffered a 

coup d’état for nearly 100 years. 

In the absence of honest, professional civilian lawenforcement agencies, President Felipe Calderón assigned the military the lead role in his nation’s version of the “War on Drugs” that he launched in 2006. 

While the armed forces have spearheaded the capture 

and/or death of several dozen cartel capos, the conflict has taken its toll on the organizations in terms of 

deaths, corruption, desertions, and charges by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of hundreds of 

human rights violations. The nation’s Supreme Court 

has taken the first step in requiring that officers and 

enlistees accused of crimes against civilians stand trial 

in civil courts rather than hermetic military tribunals.

As if combating vicious narco-syndicates were not 

a sufficiently formidable challenge, the government 

has assigned such additional roles to the Army and 

Navy as overseeing customs agents, serving as state 

and municipal security chiefs, taking charge of prisons, protecting airports, safeguarding migrants, functioning as firefighters, preventing drug trafficking 

around schools, establishing recreational programs 

for children, and standing guard 24-hours a day over 

boxes of ballots cast in recent elections. Meanwhile, 

because of their discipline, training, and skill with fire-
arms, security firms are snapping up men and women 

who have retired from active duty. 

The sharp expansion of the armed forces’ duties 

has sparked the accusation that Mexico is being “militarized.” Contributing to this assertion is the Defense 

Ministry’s robust, expensive public relations campaign both to offset criticism of civilians killed in what 

the Pentagon would label “collateral damage” and to 

increase contacts between average citizens and military personnel, who often constituted a separate caste. 

This campaign is evident in recruiting videos, advertisements in Twitter, and the portrayal of combat 

successes on YouTube.

Creativity infuses the outreach programs, which 

are aimed at average people and often take place in 

connection with parades and other ceremonial extravaganzas. Obliging pilots encourage adults and children to hop into the seat of a recently-landed helicopter; other wide-eyed youngsters grasp the controls of 

anti-aircraft weapons; admiring onlookers are invited 

to shake hands and have photos taken with nationally 

prominent military athletes; in Veracruz and other 

ports, residents are given tours of ships, landing craft, 

and submarines. 

The Army has gone out of its way to tout opportunities for women, who traditionally filled posts as 

nurses, secretaries, translators, doctors, and dentists. 

Now the Defense Ministry has opened all of its instructional institutions, including the Heroic War College (Mexico’s version of West Point), to females.

Dr. George W. Grayson examines the ever wider 

involvement of the armed forces in Mexican life in 

addressing the question: “Is Mexican society being 

iv
v

‘militarized’?” If the answer is “yes,” what will be 

the probable impact on relations between the United 

States and its southern neighbor?

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GEORGE W. GRAYSON, who is the Class of 1938 Professor of Government Emeritus at the College of William & Mary, has made more than 200 research trips to 

Latin America. In addition, he is a senior associate at 

the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 

an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a board member at the Center for Immigration 

Studies, and a life member of the National Association 

for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 

Dr. Grayson lectures regularly at the U.S. Department 

of State, the National Defense University, the National 

Intelligence College, the Naval War College, the U.S. 

Northern Command, and at universities throughout 

the United States and Mexico. He served as a Democratic member of the Virginia state legislature for 27 

years. Besides preparing two dozen books and monographs for CSIS, he has written: The Executioner’s Men: 

Inside Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, 

and the Shadow State They Created (co-authored with 

Sam Logan, Transaction Publishers, 2011); The Threat 

Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico (Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011); La 

Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010); Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?

(Transaction Publishers, 2009); Mexico’s Struggle with 

Drugs and Thugs (Foreign Policy Association, 2009); 

Mexican Messiah (Penn State University Press, 2007); 

Mesías Mexicano (Random House-Mondadori, 2006); 

Mexico: the Changing of the Guard (Foreign Policy Association, 2001); Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches 

East (University Press of America, 1999); Mexico: From 

Corporatism to Pluralism? (Harcourt Brace, 1998); Oil 
viii

and Mexican Foreign Policy (University of Pittsburgh 

Press, 1988); The North American Free Trade Agreement: 

Regional Community and the New World Order (University Press of America, The Miller Center, University 

of Virginia, 1995); The United States and Mexico: Patterns of Influence (Praeger, 1984); and The Politics of 

Mexican Oil (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980). His 

articles have appeared in the Commonweal Magazine, 

the Harvard International Review, ForeignPolicy.com, 

Foreign Policy, Orbis, World Affairs, the Baltimore Sun, 

the Christian Science Monitor, the Houston Chronicle, the 

Globe and Mail, the Los Angeles Times, Newsday, Reforma

(Mexico City), the San Diego Union-Tribune, the Washington Post, the Washington Times, and the Wall Street 

Journal. He is a frequent commentator on the Cable 

News Network (CNN), National Public Radio (NPR), 

and NPR-affiliated stations. Dr. Grayson holds a J.D. 

from the College of William & Mary, and a Ph.D. from 

the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 

Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.
ix

SUMMARY

Poet and essayist Javier Sicilia, whose son was 

captured, tortured, and murdered by thugs in 2011, 

wrote an open letter “To Mexico’s Politicians and 

Criminals” in which he accused politicians of complicity in the criminal activities. “We cannot cry out,” he 

said, “because this government is the same as members of organized crime and can think only in terms 

of violence and the wish to militarize the country. . . .”

The problem lies in Mexico’s seldom if ever having 

had an effective, uncorrupted, and professional police 

force whose members knew their communities, could 

referee barroom fights and other minor disputes, and 

could gain the confidence of the citizenry to assist 

in fighting crime. In the 19th century, dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) relied on the brutal “Rurales” 

to repress opponents. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated the political system 

from 1929 to 2000, created some 3,000 municipal, state, 

and federal law-enforcement agencies, according to 

analyst Benjamin Reames. However, venality, extortion, poor training, incompetence, and low pay characterized most of the 350,000 elements in these units. 

PRI officials often deployed these policemen to spy 

on opponents, settle scores with foes, and operate as 

bagmen for payoffs from narco-traffickers and other 

denizens of the underworld.

As a result, Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-06) and 

Felipe Calderón (2006-12) relied heavily on the men 

and women in uniform to combat the cartels that import, store, process, sell at home, and export drugs. 

Although involved in drug eradication for 4 decades, 

soldiers are trained to pursue, capture, and kill—with 

little experience in urban settings. The violence asso-
x

ciated with these activities had taken more than 47,000 

lives by the time Enrique Peña Nieto was inaugurated 

on December 1, 2012. 

This monograph explores whether Mexico’s protracted drug war has “militarized” the country. In 

the United States, when politicians cannot resolve a 

thorny issue such as teenage pregnancies, drug abuse, 

obesity, poor nutrition, environmental awareness, 

latch-key youngsters, etc., they often assign responsibility to the public schools. Such is the case of Mexican leaders with respect to criminality. In many cases, 

they have either expanded existing functions carried 

out by the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) 

and the Navy Ministry (SEMAR) or thrust new tasks 

upon them.

Law-enforcement is a case in point. For years, retired officers have served as state and municipal public security officials or police chiefs—typically with 

the approval of the National Defense Secretary. The 

number of such appointments has mushroomed in recent years. The number of military men performing 

these roles in states and major cities has shot up from 

six in February 2009 to approximately 50 in mid-2012. 

Meanwhile, local officials who have purged contaminated police departments recruit military retirees 

to fill their places. After ousting half of the city’s 400 

policemen in Santa Catarina, a city in metropolitan 

Monterrey, the mayor made clear his determination 

to hire “elements with a military profile” to undertake patrol and surveillance duties. In essence, politicians have more confidence in men and women who 

have learned discipline, order, and team work in the 

armed forces. 

Formerly, there were limited contacts between civilians and the military except at the highest levels of 
xi

government and on ceremonial occasions. The fight 

against drug-inspired criminality has changed this 

situation. Now in Tijuana and Ensenada, Baja California, the Army and Navy regularly hold sessions with 

representatives of the state government and the tourism sector. In other areas, so-called “purple groups” 

have sprung to life to enable political and civic activists to meet regularly members of the Army, Navy, 

and Federal Police.

Private security firms that have mushroomed in 

number are increasingly reaching out to the military. 

In recruiting body guards, skilled drivers, technical 

experts, and consultants, private security firms often 

seek former military personnel not only because of 

their training and discipline, but also because they 

have the legal right to carry firearms.

The Army and Navy have ever more interaction with civilian functionaries who are vulnerable 

to being suborned. Recent presidents have sought 

to mitigate the corruption that flourishes within the 

Mexico’s Customs Administration—a Herculean challenge in view of princely payoffs. Enter the armed 

forces. In mid-August 2009, they took over functions 

of the Fiscal Police in 49 land ports along the northern border. For its part, the Navy began overseeing 

customs operations in seaports. Two years earlier, 

the Army assumed the inspection of passengers at the 

airport in Mexicali, capital of Baja California, because 

Federal Policemen were suspected of facilitating cocaine shipments by the notorious Sinaloa Cartel to the 

United States.

Military men have also been drawn into guarding 

and, in some cases, operating prisons. In mid-August 

2009, General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of 

the Fifth Military Zone, announced that troops would 
xii

replace civilian administrators and guards at the penitentiary in Aquiles Serdán. Officers also serve as directors of the penal facilities in the three largest cities 

in Quintana Roo even as they control access to three 

large Monterrey penal facilities. 

Abuses arising from the pursuit of drug lords may 

alter a tradition that dates to the Middle Ages; namely, 

trying Army and Navy personnel accused of crimes 

in military courts or fueros. Early in Calderón’s term 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) inveighed 

against the trampling of human rights, homing in on 

the 200,000-member Army. Mexico’s zealous National 

Human Rights Commission claimed to have received 

5,055 complaints, many against the military, while 

asserting that 5,300 people had disappeared amid assaults on crime families. 

The drum beat of international outrage finally 

grabbed the attention of Mexico’s brass, which created 

the position of General Director for Human Rights in 

its command structure in what one observer labeled 

“a milestone that passed relatively unnoticed by most 

media and analysts.” In response to freedom-of-information petitions, SEDENA has begun to shed light on 

judicial actions. In February 2012, it reported that 344 

members of the Army were behind bars, while others 

were either standing trial or under arrest. In August 

2012, newspapers carried front-page stories of the 

incarceration of five generals in the Almoloya highsecurity prison in Mexico State. In mid-2012, Mexico’s 

Supreme Court, or SCJN, was considering what cases, 

if any, involving members of the armed forces would 

be heard in civil tribunals.

In light of charges of wrongdoing by their members, SEDENA and the SEMAR have moved into 

the public relations arena. To herald both positive 
xiii

achievements and attract more volunteers, the Army 

began running advertisements on television, Twitter,

and YouTube, along with brief recruiting videos before 

the beginning of motion pictures. Outlays for this advertising soared to 46 million pesos (approximately 

$3.5 million) in 2011. 

An additional effort to close the chasm between 

the armed services and the population found Army 

and Navy personnel mixed with the crowds following 

the September 16 Independence Day marches. “Look, 

Papa!” shouted a 9-year-old boy, who sat proudly in 

an armored vehicle with both hands grasping the controls of an anti-aircraft weapon. 

SEDENA has also attempted to broaden its appeal 

to the citizenry and overcome its machista image by 

opening to females all of its 17 specialized schools, 

including those for combat instruction, basic and advanced military police training, preparation of sergeants, and the formation of officers for the Heroic 

War College. Greater chances for women spring from 

social and international pressure, the presence of more 

skilled women prepared to enter the armed forces, 

and the need to recruit more elements in an institution plagued by desertions. One leftist deputy even 

looked to the not-too-distant future when a woman 

could become secretary of defense—a will-o’-the-wisp 

for decades to come.

In a further endeavor to strengthen the esprit de 

corps and discourage desertions, SEDENA has raised 

salaries, initiated 21-gun salutes at burials, made certain that military bands were on hand to honor the 

fallen, provided a memorial flag to the wife, authorized a life pension for widows, and furnished broader insurance coverage. Furthermore, it has erected 

a monument to soldiers who died while serving 

their country.
xiv

The mayhem afflicting parts of the nation and the 

death of some 30 mayors has required more military 

participating in guaranteeing the security of elections. 

Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of the Federal 

Electoral Institute that organizes elections, formally 

invited the Army to help safeguard the mid-2012 balloting. So narrow was Calderón’s 2006 victory that 

the soldiers still guard the ballots cast in that bitter 

showdown.

Although completely loyal to civilian leaders, key 

officers have spoken out on political matters—a sign 

of their greater participation in national life. General Sergio Aponte Polito, a regional commander in 

northwest Mexico, publically excoriated the ubiquitous involvement of elected and appointed officials 

in drug trafficking in the Tijuana area. He claimed 

that the police were cooperating with migrant smugglers, bank robbers, and drug lords. “What he’s doing is completely unprecedented,” stated Roderic Ai 

Camp, an expert on the Mexican military at Claremont 

McKenna College. Aponte Polito’s persistent criticism upset the National Action Party administration 

in Baja California and led to his being transferred to 

Mexico City. 

At the same time, General Galván and his subordinates make no secret of their desire to amend the Code 

of Military Justice to unambiguously justify the military’s profound involvement in the drug war. Generals and admirals want protection against NGOs who 

have accused senior officers of war crimes before the 

International Court of Justice and other tribunals. If 

convicted, these officers would be unlikely to prosper 

and would prove an embarrassment to services proud 

of their reputations.
xv

The drug war and new tasks have expanded the 

Army’s budget, size, and stock of equipment. Regrettably, contact with the underworld has corrupted 

numerous enlistees and officers and questions have 

arisen over the acquisition of armaments. Such sensitive questions aside, Washington can assist Mexico’s 

crusade against crime syndicates at the margins—

with intelligence, training, equipment, and monetary 

oversight. Mutual security concerns will lead to more 

and closer contacts between the U.S. military and security agencies and their Mexican counterparts even 

as SEDENA and SEMAR reach out to Canada, Colombia, and other countries for training, specialized arms, 

intelligence, and instruction in cyber security. 

The U.S. Northern Command can also be helpful 

by furnishing language training, information, radars, 

night goggles, and other used surveillance equipment 

to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and other organizations such as the Texas Department of Public Security. The accelerated flow of drugs and drug-merchants across the 2,000-mile binational frontier and 

the southward cascade of weapon have multiplied the 

tasks of both agencies.

Ultimately, the key players have to be our neighbor’s political, economic, and social establishment. 

As things stand now, many of the privileged outside 

the country’s North live cocooned from much of the 

bloodshed, thanks to sophisticated security systems, 

trained drivers, skilled bodyguards, the resources to 

educate their youngsters abroad, and the wherewithal 

to move their families to Texas and other border states. 

The Mexican nomenklatura must comprehend that 

even if a miracle took place and narco-activities disappeared overnight, their nation would still be home 

to a deadly nether world whose ruthless inhabitants 
xvi

are adept at murder, torture, kidnapping, extortion, 

money laundering, loan-sharking, prostitution, human smuggling, and a score of other crimes. Above 

all, U.S. civilian and military decisionmakers must 

avoid hubris and recognize the severe limitation on 

ameliorating, much less solving, formidable problems 

in other countries unless local leaders challenge the 

miscreants in their midst.
1

THE IMPACT OF

PRESIDENT FELIPE CALDERÓN’S WAR

ON DRUGS ON THE ARMED FORCES:

THE PROSPECTS FOR MEXICO’S 

“MILITARIZATION”

AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

MEXICO’S MILITARIZATION?

Introduction.

President Felipe Calderón’s Mexican version 

of the “war on drugs” has unleashed criticism that 

he is “militarizing” the nation by deploying tens of 

thousands of troops against Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Anthropologist Abel Barrera 

Hernández, director of the Human Rights Center of 

Tlachinollan, has excoriated the “violence expressed 

in militarization and the seizure of land and natural 

resources” in impoverished, indigenous areas. Poet 

and essayist Javier Sicilia, whose son was captured, 

tortured, and murdered by thugs, has accused politicians of complicity in the criminal activities. “We cannot cry out,” he said, “because this government is the 

same as members of organized crime and can think 

only in terms of violence and the wish to militarize the 

country. . . .” Along the same lines, students in Cuernavaca formed the National Coordinating System 

against Militarization and sponsored a forum titled 

“Young People and the National Emergency.”1

Alexandro Poiré Romero, former technical secretary of the National Security Council and later Interior 

Secretary (Gobernación), denied any trend toward 

militarization. He insisted that most of their operations do not involve fighting criminal bands. Additionally, Poiré stated that: 
2

Neither the Army nor the Navy . . . is supplanting police 

agencies. At present the elements deployed, together 

with the Federal Police, are temporarily . . . assisting civilian authorities, not acting alone, he affirmed. The use 

of the Armed forces to combat organized crime will be 

less necessary when local police forces improve their 

professionalization and [achieve] certification.2

Improving the quality of local police is a slow process at best, a chimera at worst. Much of the political 

elite, often for self-serving reasons, fiercely oppose a 

national police force similar to those in Chile, France, 

and Spain, and young people recoil from a career in 

law enforcement. The lion’s share of governors and 

mayors remain adamantly against melding their own 

forces into a national structure. Members of the Army 

brass have quietly registered misgivings, fearing that 

(1) attempts to establish a first-rate national police 

force would reduce the armed forces budget, (2) military police would have to train the recruits, and (3) at 

the end of the process, corruption would remain ubiquitous and virulent.

The problem lies in Mexico’s seldom, if ever, having had an effective, uncorrupted, and professional 

police force whose members knew their communities, 

could referee barroom fights and other minor disputes, 

and could gain the confidence of the citizenry.3

 As a 

result, Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-06) and Calderón 

(2006-12) have relied heavily on the men and women 

in uniform to combat the cartels that import, store, 

process, sell at home, and export drugs. Although 

involved in drug eradication for 4 decades, soldiers 

are trained to pursue, capture, and kill—with little 

experience in urban settings. The violence associated 

with these activities, which took more than 47,000 

lives during the 6 years of his administration, appears 
3

destined to rise even higher under Enrique Peña Nieto, who donned the presidential sash on December 

1, 2012. This monograph (1) provides an overview of 

the military’s participation in Mexico’s version of the 

crusade against drugs, (2) focuses on the recruitment 

of military men to serve in traditionally civilian law 

enforcement posts, (3) indicates tasks that the armed 

forces have assumed or expanded in recent years, and 

(4) examines the longer term impact of the Army’s 

ever-enlarging role in the country’s affairs as a result 

of battling DTOs.

Overview of the Military’s Role in Drug War.

President Fox committed an average of 19,293 

troops annually to battling drug trafficking. This figure soared 133 percent to 45,000 during the Calderón 

sexenio. In 2009 alone, the Army assigned 48,750 men 

to combating narcotics syndicates—with approximately one-quarter of these cadres involved in joint 

operations with the Navy, the Federal Police, the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Homeland Security Department, and other agencies.4

 The 

emphasis on the military produced mixed results. 

The National Defense Ministry (SEDENA) announced 

that, between December 1, 2006, and late December 

2011, it had arrested 41,023 suspects, while killing 

2,321 criminals. 

In a separate report, SEDENA published an annual review of criminals whose lives it had taken: 2007 

(22), 2008 (78), 2009 (211), 2010, (734), and through 

December 20, 2011 (1,246).5

 As part of the government’s “Kingpin Strategy,” the military apprehended 

or killed several dozen important capos, whose names 

appear in Figure 1. The Navy (SEMAR), which has 
4

substantially increased its participation in battling 

narcos, came away with a collective red face in June 

2012 when it touted the arrest of the son of the nation’s 

most-wanted kingpin, Sinaloa Cartel head, Joaquín “El 

Chapo” Guzmán Loera. It turned out to be a case of 

mistaken identity, and they had taken a Felix Beltrán 

León, 23, an automobile salesman, into custody.6

 In 

all fairness, the two men bore a striking resemblance, 

and the Navy reported that Beltrán León had a large 

cache of weapons and money in his possession. Evercynical critics of the drug war claimed that these items 

were planted to justify the capture.

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2012

 Heriberto Lazcano 

Lazcan Commander of Los Zetas. Oct. 8; captured in Coahuila (COAH). Navy/Marines

Barajas, José 

Ricardo

Los Zetas (allegedly 

involved in the May 13, 

2012, massacre of 49 to 

60 innocents in Cadereyta, 

Nuevo León [NL]).

July 31; Santa 

Catarina, NL. Army

Guizar Cárdenas,

Mauricio “El 

Amarillo”

Los Zetas; assumed 

leadership in Tabasco 

(TAB), 

Veracruz VC), Chiapas 

(CHIS), 

Campeche (CAMP), and 

Quintana Roo (QR) after the

arrest of “Lucky” 

Lechuga in Dec. 2011. 

July 26; captured 

Huejotzingo, 

Puebla 

(PUE).

Navy 

Villarreal Barragán,

Sergio Enrique “El

Grande”

Beltrán Leyva 

Organization (BLO).

June 6; captured 

PUE. Navy

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed by the Army, 

Navy, and Federal Police from 2007 to mid-2012.
5

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2012 (cont.)

Elizondo Ramírez,

Daniel “El Loco” 

Los Zetas (allegedly

involved in the May 13, 

2012, massacre of 49 to 60

innocents in Cadereyta, 

NL).

May 18; captured 

Guadalupe, near

Monterrey, NL.

Army

Pérez Casanova, 

Luis

Alberto “Casanova”

Alleged chief of a group of 

bodyguards for Los Zetas 

in central VC.

May 3; captured 

Colonia Las 

Ánimas de 

Xalapa, VC.

Navy as part of the

coordinated 

operation 

called “Veracruz 

Seguro”

Cázares Zambada, 

Sergio and 

Zambada

Apodaca, Omar 

Israel

Sinaloa Cartel; nephews of 

Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada 

García, number two in the 

Sinaloa Cartel, headed

by the notorious

Joaquín “El Chapo”

Guzmán Loera.

April 24; Tijuana,

Baja California 

(BC).

Tijuana Municipal

Police and Army

Domínguez Vélez,

Romero “El 

Chaparro”

Los Zetas Plaza chief in 

Coatzacoalcos, Tamaulipas 

(TAMPS).

April 25; captured 

Coatzacoalcos, 

VC.

Army

Fragoso Martínez, 

José

Carmen “El 

Conchas”/

“El Comandante 

Reyes”

Activist for Los Zetas

in a dozen VC

municipalities; arrested

with several comrades.

April 18; captured 

Minatitlán, VC, 

along 

with the mayor of 

Chinameca and 

four accomplices.

Army

Medina Mejía, 

Francisco “El 

Quemado”

Zeta leader who masterminded the Aug. 25,

2011 fire-bombing of 

Monterrey’s Casino

Royale.

April 5: captured 

on the

border of TAMPS 

and NL.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
6

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2012 (cont.)

Serna Padilla, José 

Guadalupe or 

Hernández Muñiz, Oswaldo 

“El Zopilote” 

A leader of the New

Generation Jalisco

Cartel (CJNG).

March 18; 

captured

Zapotiltic, Jalisco 

(JAL),

along with Óscar

Pozos Jiménez.

Army 

Valencia Salazar, 

Eric

“El 85”

CJNG

March 9; captured

Zapopan, JAL. Army

Ramírez Cuenca, 

Valentín

“El Comandante 

Balón”

Los Zetas Plaza chief in 

La Comarca Lagunera.

March 7: captured

Gómez Palacio, 

Durango (DGO).

Army

Guerra Valdez, 

Gerardo “El 

Guerra”/

“Z-15”

Plaza chief in Nuevo

Laredo since Aug. 2,

2011 when he replaced

Jorge Luis de la Peña 

Brizuela, aka “Pompín,” 

who was killed.

March 1; killed 

Nuevo Laredo, 

TAMPS.

Army

Sarabia Ramón, 

José 

Luis “El Pepito”

Los Zetas ranking Zeta; 

Formerly Plaza chief in San 

Luis Potosí, which oversaw the killing of U.S. 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) Agent 

Jaime Zapata.

Jan. 11; captured 

on

border between 

Coahuila (COAH)

and NL.

Army

2011

Rodríguez Olivera,

Luis “El Güero”

Head of Los Güeros and 

supposedly linked to the 

Sinaloa Cartel.

Dec. 27; captured

Distrito Federal 

(DF) Airport

Federal Police

Cabrera Sarabia,

Felipe “El Inge”

Sinaloa Cartel

“El Chapo” lieutenant.

Dec. 23; captured 

 Culiacán, Sinaloa 

(SIN).

Army 

Hernández 

Lechuga,

Raúl “El 

Lucky”/“Z-16”

Los Zetas; member of 

original cadres; linked

to disappearance of 9

Navy personnel; 

regional leader for 

southeast part of the

country.

Dec. 12; captured 

Córdoba, VC. Navy

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
7

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2011 (cont.)

Cárdenas Rivera, 

Ezequiel “El Junior” 

Gulf Cartel; son of Leader 

Antonio Ezequiel “Tony 

Tormenta” Cárdenas

Guillén.

Nov. 29: captured

Matamoros, 

TAMPS.

Ramírez Morales, 

Santos “El Santo 

Sapo” 

Los Zetas Plaza chief in 

Chiapas and Tabasco. 

Nov. 24: capture 

announced 

Ocozocoautla, 

CHIS.

Army

Vega Pacheco, José

Augusto “El Pino”

Los Zetas; recruited police 

for Los Zetas in Hidalgo and 

linked to 8 murders.

Nov. 21; captured

Pachuca, Hidalgo

(HGO).

Hidalgo Public 

Security Police

Alemán Narváez, 

Alfredo “El 

Comandante 

Alemán” 

Los Zetas; active in San Luis 

Potosí.

Nov. 15; captured 

Fresnillo, 

Zacatecas (ZAC)

Army

Orozco Favela, Juan 

Gabriel “El Gasca” 

Knights Templars

Plaza chief in Morelia.

Nov. 13; captured

Morelia, 

Michoacán

(MICH).

Army 

Limón Sánchez, 

Ovidio Sinaloa Cartel Nov. 9; capturedCuliacán, SIN. Army

Sillas Rocha, Juan 

Francisco “El 

Sillas”/

“El Rueda”

Tijuana Cartel

Arellano Félix 

Organization (AFO);

key lieutenant to cartel

chief Fernando “El

Ingeniero” Sánchez 

Arellano.

Nov. 5; captured

Tijuana, BC. Army

Rodríguez Báez, 

Héctor Russell “El

Toro”

La Familia

Nov. 5; captured

Chalco, Mexico 

State

(EDOMEX).

Federal Police

Oliva Castillo, 

Carlos

“La Rana”

Los Zetas Oct. 12; captured 

Saltillo, COAH.

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
8

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2011 (cont.)

Salgueiro, Noel

“El Flaco Salgueiro” 

Founder of La Gente

Nueva (gang linked

to Sinaloa Cartel). 

Capture 

announced 

Oct. 5; Culiacán, 

SIN.

Army 

Solis Solís, Saúl

“El Lince”

Knights Templars;

cousin of one of 

organization’s top leaders, 

Enrique

Plancarte Solís. 

Sept. 19; captured 

Mújica, Nueva 

Italia,

MICH.

Army

Moreno Flores, 

José

Carlos or Héctor 

Adán Rubalcava 

Rivera “La 

Calentura”

Sinaloa Cartel chief 

operator in Guerrero.

Sept. 18; captured 

Tlalpan, DF. Army

Flores Borrego, 

Samuel “El Metro”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in 

Reynosa and ranking 

member of syndicate.

Sept. 2; Army 

announced 

finding the body;

killed by Los 

Zetas.

Los Zetas

Benítez Servín, 

Ricardo

“El Mudo”

BLO Lieutenant for 

Guerrero’s “Costa

Grande.”

Aug. 13; captured 

QR. Army 

De la Peña Brizuela,

Jorge Luis “El 

Pompín”

Los Zetas

Aug. 2; killed 

Nuevo 

Laredo, TAMPS.

Army

Quintanilla Soriano

Valdemar “El Adal” 

Los Zetas

financial operator

Aug. 2; captured

Saltillo, COAH. Army

Beltrán Coronel,

Martín “El Águila”

Guadalajara Cartel and

allied with Sinaloa

Cartel.

Capture 

announced

May 13; Zapopan, 

JAL.

Army

Manuel de Jesús

Palma Morquecho

Manuel de Jesús

“Macario”

Cártel del Pacifico;

specialized in drug

shipments in Sonora.

Plaza boss for Nogales,

Agua Prieta, Naco,

and Cananea.

July 28; captured

Agua Prieta, 

Sonora

(SON).

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
9

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2011 (cont.)

Abarte Arreaga, 

Javier

“La Jaiba” 

Los Zetas; believed to

have participated in the 

Aug. 2010 assassination of 

Santiago, NL, Mayior 

Edemiro Cavazos Leal.

Capture 

announced

July 10; Santiago, 

NL.

Army 

Mora Cortes, Sergio

Antonio “El Toto” Los Zetas 

Capture 

announced

Feb. 28; Saltillo, 

COAH.

Navy (Marines) 

Zapata Espinoza, 

Julián 

“El Piolín” or 

“Tweety Bird” 

Los Zetas; involved in 

attack on two agents of the 

U.S. ICE.

Feb. 23; captured 

San Luis Potosí, 

SLP,

Navy (Marines)

2010

Beltrán Leyva, 

Arturo

“El Barbas”

BLO

Dec. 16; killed

Cuernavaca, 

Morelos

(MOR).

Navy (Marines)

Cárdenas Guillén,

Ezequiel

“Tony Tormenta”

Gulf Cartel 

Nov. 5; killed

Matamoros, 

TAMPS.

Navy (Marines)

Poveda Ortega, 

Harold

Mauricio 

“El Cornejo”/“El 

Flaco” 

BLO;

link with Colombian

Norte de Valle cartel.

Nov. 5; captured 

DF. Federal Police 

Valdez Villarreal, 

Édgar “La Barbie”

Independent Cartel of

Acapulco (CIDA).

Aug.10; captured

near DF. Federal Police

Coronel Villarreal,

Ignacio “Nacho” 

Guadalajara Cartel and

allied with Sinaloa Cartel.

July 29; killed

Zapopan, JAL. Army

Villarreal Barragán,

Sergio Enrique 

“El Grande” 

BLO Sept. 12; captured

PUE. Navy (Marines)

Martínez López,

Erick Alejandro

“El Motokles”

Los Zetas

QR.

March 27: 

captured 

DF.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
10

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2010 (cont.)

Estrada Sánchez, 

José 

Antonio “El Cuevo” 

and

 Lara Hernández,’ 

Julio 

César “El Piñata”

Los Zetas

Palenque, CHIS.

March 14: 

captured

on highway 

between

Chancalá, CHIS, 

and

Emiliano Zapata, 

TAB. 

Army

Salazar Rodríguez,

Jesús Alejandro “El 

Tin”

Gulf Cartel; active in

Guanajuato; captured with

2 accomplices.

Feb. 3: captured 

Cancún, QR. Army

Simental García,

Teodoro "El Tio" Formerly Tijuana/AFO.

Jan. 2; captured 

La Paz, 

Baja California Sur 

(BCS).

Federal Police

2009

Carlos Beltrán 

Leyva BLO Dec. 30; capturedCuliacán, SIN. Federal Police

Amdaya Espinoza,

Floriberto and/or

García González,

José Luis “El 

Ricochet”

Gulf Cartel Auditor for 

San Luis Potosi (SLP), 

Aguascalientes, and

Zacatecas; captured with

three comrades.

Dec. 29; captured

Saltillo, COAH. Army

Acosta Saucedo, 

Julio 

Arturo Acosta 

Vargas,

Julio Arturo

Los Zetas; assassins of 

Marine Melquisedet Angulo 

Córdova.

Dec. 22; captured

Villahermosa, 

TAB.

Army

Rodríguez Trejo 

Emilio 

and/or Avendaño 

Rivera,

Pedro “El Pery”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in 

Coatzacoalcos, VC;

captured with 11

accomplices.

Dec. 10: captured

Coatzacoalcos, 

VC.

Army

Altuzar Cortez, Fred

“El Negro”

Gulf Cartel; active in 

Mexico-Guatemala frontier.

Oct. 29; captured

Chicomuselo, 

CHIS.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
11

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2009 (cont.)

Nava Valencia, 

Óscar 

Orlando “El Lobo”

Valencia Cartel; close to

Ignacio Coronel Villarreal.

Oct. 28; captured

Guadalajara, JAL. Army

Ramos Garza, 

Pedro

“El Güero"

N.A.

Oct. 5: captured

San Pedro Garza 

García, NL.

Army

Ruiz Tlapanco, 

Sergio

Enrique “El Tlapa” 

and

Domínguez Macías, 

Ana

Georgina “La Conta 

Gina”

Gulf Cartel

money handlers.

Sept. 8; captured

Coatzacoalcos, 

VC. Army

Hernández del Real,

Gerardo “El 

Moreno” 

Juárez Cartel/La

Línea gang.

Sept. 1; captured 

Ciudad (Cd.) 

Juárez, Chihuahua 

(CHIH).

Army

Carranco Salazar 

Juan 

Daniel “El Colosio” 

Gulf Cartel Aug. 8: captured

Cancún, QR. Federal Police/Army

Romo Alcaraz,

Guillermo “El 

Meme”

AFO July 25: captured

Tijuana, BC. Army

Jurado Zarzoza, 

Juan

Manuel “El 

Puma”/“El R”

Gulf Cartel Cancún Plaza 

chief captured with three

accomplices.

June 12: captured

Cancún, QR. Army

Parra Ramos, José

Filberto “La Perra” 

Ex-AFO; aligned with

Teodoro García Simental.

June 11: captured

Tijuana, BC. Army and Navy

Cárdenas Medina, 

Mario Alberto “El 

Betillo” 

Gulf Cartel; nephew of 

Osiel Cárdenas Guillén.

June 9; captured

Matamoros, 

TAMPS.

Army

Arteaga, Sergio 

Raúl

“El Cococho”

Gulf Cartel June 1; captured

Monterrey, NL. Federal Police/Army

Beltrán Burgos, 

Roberto “El Doctor”

 Sinaloa Cartel lieutenant 

in Culiacan.

May 29: captured

Culiacán, SIN. Army 

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
12

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2009 (cont.)

Camacho Pérez, 

Félix

Or Hernández 

González

José “El Boti”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief 

Cancún, QR.

May 26: captured

Cancún, QR. Army 

Garza Lozano, 

Nelson

“El Luchador”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in 

Cd. Victoria, TAMPS.

May 20: captured

Ciudad Victoria, 

TAMPS.

Tabasco 

Ministerial Police

Godoy Castro, Isaac

Manuel “Dany” or 

“Martín”

AFO captured with six

accomplices.

April 21: captured

Tijuana, BC.

Army: Assistant 

Attorney General's 

Office for Special 

Investigations on 

Organized Crime 

(SIEDO)

Granados Vargas,

Rubén “El Nene” BLO

April 13: captured

San Luís la Loma,

Guerrero (GRO).

Army

Carrillo Leyva, 

Vicente Juárez Cartel April 2: captured DF. Federal Police

Huerta Ríos, Héctor 

“La Burra”/“El 

Junior”

BLO; active in Monterrey. 

March 24: 

captured

Monterrey, NL.

Army Special Forces

Nájera Talamantes, 

Sigifredo “El 

Canicón”

Los Zetas

March 20: 

captured

Saltillo, COAH.

Army; SIEDO

Zambada Niebla,

Vicente “El 

Vincentillo”

 Sinaloa Cartel; son of 

Ismael Zambada García. 

March 18; 

captured

DF. 

Army

Mendoza Aguirre,

Napoleón de Jesús 

“El 

Napo” 

Gulf Cartel 

March 12: 

captured

Cancún, QR.

Federal Policy/Army

Farías Álvarez, Juan

José “El Abuelo” La Familia Michoacán

March 4; captured

Tepalcatepec, 

MICH.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
13

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2009 (cont.)

Almanza Morales,

Octavio “Gori 4” 

Narro 

López, Ashly 

“Comandante 

Bonbón”

Gulf Cartel Feb. 9: captured

Cancún, QR.

Rivera García, 

Adrián

“El Primo Rivera”

BLO

Jan. 6; captured 

Tlapa de 

Comonfort,

GRO.

Army

2008

Espinosa Barrón, 

Alberto

“La Fresa”

La Familia Michoacán Dec. 29; captured

Morelia, MICH Army

Romero de los 

Santos,

Luis Antonio “El 

Chavo” 

BLO; captured with several 

accomplices.

Dec. 23; captured

Zihuatanejo, GRO. Army

Díaz Ramón, Javier

“El Java Díaz” Gulf Cartel Dec. 22; capturedVeracruz, VC. Army

González Durán, 

Jaime

“El Hummer”

Los Zetas Nov. 7; captured

Reynosa, TAMPS. 

Grupo Especial 

De Operaciones 

(GOPES) Public 

Security Ministry 

(SSP)

Arellano Félix, 

Eduardo AFO Oct. 26; captured, 

DF. Army

Zambada Reyes, 

Jesús

“El Rey”

BLO Oct. 22; captured 

DF. Federal Police

Arellano Félix, 

Eduardo

“El Doctor” 

Tijuana Cartel/AFO Oct. 25; captured

Tijuana.

Federal Police and 

Army (Special 

Forces)

 Sánchez Arras, 

Pedro

“El Tigre” 

Juárez Cartel; important 

lieutenant.

May 17; captured 

DF. Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
14

Leader Cartel Date and Place 

Captured/Killed

Agency 

Responsible 

for the Take-Down

2008 (cont.)

Díaz Cellar, Rogelio 

or

Díaz Contreras 

Rogelio 

“El Rojo"/"El Roger”

Gulf Cartel

Plaza chief in Cd.

Victoria, TAMPS.

April 24; captured

Cd. Victoria, 

TAMPS.

Army/Federal Police

Peña Mendoza, 

Sergio

“El Concord” 

Gulf Cartel 

March 14; 

captured

Reynosa, TAMPS.

Federal Police 

Araujo Ávila, 

Alfredo

“El Popeye”

AFO Jan. 25; Tijuana, 

BC Army

Beltrán Leyva, 

Héctor 

Alfredo “El 

Mochomo” 

BLO Jan. 21; captured

Culiacan, SIN. Army/Federal Police 

2007

De la Cruz Reyna, 

Juan Carlos “JC” Los Zetas Aug. 28: captured DF. Army/SIEDO 

Reyes Enriquez, 

Luis

“El Rex”/”Z-12”

Los Zetas

June 16; captured 

Atotonilco El 

Grande, HGO.

Army/SIEDO

Gallegos Alemán,

Jorge Alberto de 

Jesús

Gulf Cartel Captured with

12 accomplices.

June 14: captured 

Torreón, COAH. Federal Police/Army

Colín Ortega, 

Alfredo

“El Gordo”

AFO June 8: captured 

La Paz, BCS. Army 

Vargas García, 

Nabor

“El Debora”

Los Zetas

April 18: captured 

Ciudad del 

Carmen, QR.

Army/SIEDO

Note: I am indebted to Nicole K. Shuman, a rising Senior at the 

College of William & Mary, for incredible assistance with this and 

other figures.

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
15

Sources: “Javier Torres Félix, Operaba en Sinaloa and está considerado al nivel del ‘Chapo’ Guzmán o ‘El Mayo Zambada’” 

(“Javier Torres Félix Operates in Sinaloa and is Considered at 

the Level of ‘Chapo’ Guzmán or ‘El Mayo Zambada’,”), Esmas, 

January 27, 2004; “Cae operador de Los Zetas en Tamaulipas” 

(“Zeta Operator Falls in Tamaulipas”), El Universal March 14, 

2009; “Los grandes capos del Narcotráfico que faltan por caer” 

(“The Large Narco-trafficking Capos Who Remain at Large”), El 

Universal, August 31, 2010; “Destaca 2010 como año productivo 

en caída de capos” (“2010 Stands Out as a Productive Year in the 

Fall of Capos”), El Universal, December 2, 2010; “Policías estatales 

detienen a presunto reclutador de ‘Zetas’ en Hidalgo” (“State Police Detain Suspected ‘Zeta’ Recruiter in Hidalgo”), CNNMéxico, 

November 22, 2011; “Capturados y presentadas” (“Captured 

and Arraigned, November of 2011”), Terra, November 25, 2011; 

“Detienen a Ezequiel Cárdenas Rivera ‘El Junior’,” hijo de ‘Tony 

Tormenta’” (“Ezequiel Cárdenas Rivera ‘El Junior,’ son of Tony 

Tormenta’ Detained”), Univisión Noticias, November 29, 2011; Los 

10 capos mexicanos que cayeron en el 2011” (“The 10 Mexican Capos Who Fell in 2011”), CNN en Español, December 31, 2011; “Cae 

capo; lo ligan a 50 muertes” (“Capo Falls Who Was Linked to 50 

Murders”), Reforma, January 13, 2012; and “Detienen a líderes, armament y droga” (“Leaders Arrested with Arms and Drugs”), Reforma, January 22, 2012; “Capturan a líder de Zetas en La Laguna” 

(“Zeta Leader in La Laguna” Captured”), Reforma, March 9, 2012; 

“El Ejército detiene al presunto líder del Cártel de Jalisco” (Army 

Captures Presumed Leader of Jalisco Carte”), CNNMéxico, March 

9, 2012; “Desata bloqueos captura de capo” (“Road Blocks Broken 

. . . Capo Captures”), Reforma, March 10, 2012; “Mexico: el Ejército detiene a jefe de Los Zetas en región del norte” (“Mexico: the 

Army Arrests Zeta Chief in Northern Region”), Infolatam, March 

11, 2012; “Capturan en Jalisco a otro líder del cártel” (“Another 

Cartel Leader Captured in Jalisco”), Reforma, March 19, 2012; 

“Achacan a golpe de suerte la caída de ‘El Quemado’” (“Lucky 

Break Leads to Fall of ‘The Burned One’”), Reforma, April 6, 2012; 

Rubén Mosso, “Aprende Marina a 10 ’matazetas’ en Veracruz” 

(“Marines Capture 10 ‘Zeta-Killers’ in Veracruz”), Milenio, April 

16, 2012; “Cae Edil panistas con jefe de zetas” (“PAN Mayor 

Falls with Chief of Zetas”), Reforma, April 19, 2012; Roberto Sosa, 

“Ejército detiene a jefe de sicarios” (The Army Detains Boss of 

Gunmen”), Diario Xalapa, April 25, 2012; “Detienen con droga a 

sobrinos del ‘Mayo,’” (“Nephews of del “Mayo” Captured with 

Drugs,” Reforma, April 27, 2012; “Captura Semar a jefe ‘Zeta’ en 
16

Veracruz” (“Navy Captured ‘Zeta’ Chief in Veracruz”), Reforma, 

May 4, 2012; Con captura de El Loco termina un reinado de terror 

en Cadereyta” (“The Arrest of El Loco Ends a Reign of Terror in 

Cadereyta”), Excélsior, May 12, 2012; Raúl Flores, “Cae El Chilango, zeta viculado a muerte de 4 marinos” (“Arrested Mexico City 

Resident Tied to Death of Four Marines”), Excélsior, May 12, 2012; 

Arrested “Detienen a capo rival de La Barbie”) “Capo Who Was 

La Barbie’s Rival Arrested”), Blureport, June 7, 2012; “Cae líder de 

Zetas en sureste del País” (“Zeta Leader in Southeast of Country 

Falls”), Reforma, July 27, 2012; and various press bulletins from the 

Attorney General of Mexico (PGR) and SEDENA.

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.

During the conflict, the Army has suffered kidnappings and deaths of its own elements, as reported in 

Figure 2.

Year Deaths Wounded Kidnappings

2011 22 (Through 

May 18)

59 (Through 

December 7)

2010 88 69

2009 44 34

2008 54 28

2007 22 6

Total 267 744 196

Source: Benito Jiménez, “Crecen levantones . . . pero de militaries” (“Kidnappings Increase . . . but of Military Personnel”), 

Reforma, January 2, 2012; “Mueren 18 sicarios por cada militar” 

(“18 Gunmen Killed for Each Member of the Military”), Reforma, 

December 20, 2011; Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (Estado 

Mayor).

Figure 2. Deaths, Woundings, and Kidnappings

of Army Personnel, 2007-December 2011.
17

Law Enforcement.

Various states and large cities have recruited exmembers of the armed forces to fill traditional civilian posts in law enforcement—appointments usually 

recommended and approved by National Defense 

Secretary Guillermo Galván Galván. Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon. The number of military men 

in these roles has risen from six in February 2009 to 36 

in April 2012, with six officers in charge of state police forces. Of the 12 governors elected in 2010, seven 

opted to install a general at the head of the State Security Ministry: Carlos Lozano de la Torre (Aguascalientes), Roberto Borge Angulo (Quintana Roo), Mario 

López Valdéz (Sinaloa), Egidio Torre Cantú (Tamaulipas), Mariano González Zarur (Tlaxcala), Javier Duarte de Ochoa (Veracruz), and Miguel Alonso Reyes 

(Zacatecas).

State/

Municipality Position Incumbent Date Appointed

Acapulco

(Guerrero)

Secretary of Public 

Security

Col. (Ret.) Manuel Paz Espinosa

Gen. (Ret.) Héctor Paulino 

Vargas López (took over after 

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Serafín 

Valdéz Martínez resigned on

Feb. 16, 2010)

Late July 2011

Aguascalientes

Secretary of Public 

Security 

Civilian 

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Rolando 

Eugenio Hidalgo Eddy

Oct. 6, 2008

Armería

Colima 

Director of 

Municipal Police

Capt. (Ret.) Jorge Mario 

Mercado Larios Feb. 3, 2011

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts 

as of January 1, 2012.
18

State/

Municipality Position Incumbent Date Appointed

Baja California

Director of State 

Ministerial Police

Brig Gen. Florencio Raúl

Cuevas Salgado; former commander 2nd Military Zone

headquartered in Tijuana

March 27,

2008

Director of State 

Preventative Police

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Eusebio Alecio 

Villatoro Córtez Feb. 20, 2009

Boca del Río

Veracruz Director of Transit Rear Adm. Saúl Cotarelo Díaz Jan. 23, 2012

Chiapas Secretary of Public 

Security 

Maj. Rogelio Hernández

de la Mata Dec. 30, 2010

Chihuahua Director General of 

Unified State Police

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Julián David

Rivera Bretón Oct. 3, 2010

Ciudad Juárez

Director of Public

Security Lt. Col. Julián Leyzaola Pérez* March 10, 2011

Police Chief Div. Gen. Julián David 

Rivera Bretón March 16,2009

Director of 

Security 

Operations

Col. (Ret.) Alfonso Cristóbal 

García Melgar March 16, 2009

Ciudad Victoria,

Tamaulipas 

Chief of Public 

Security

First Capt. Rafael Lomelí 

Martínez April 18, 2011

Chief of Public 

Security Gen. (Ret.) Ubaldo Ayala Tinoco Jan. 1, 2011

Coahuila

Director General of 

State

Investigative Police 

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Jesús Ernesto 

Estrada Bustamante Aug. 12, 2008

Undersecretary of 

Prevenion and 

Social 

Readaptation 

Gen. José Luis García 

Dorantes Feb. 24, 2009

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont. 
19

State/

Municipality Position Incumbent Date Appointed

Colima

Chief of the State 

Preventative Police

(Equivalent to 

Secretary

of Public 

Security)

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Raúl Pinedo

Dávila Dec. 6, 2010

Coordinator of 

Intelligence

in the Center of 

Control,

Command, 

Computation,

and Communications (C-4)

Adm. Andrés Humberto Cano Dec. 6, 2010

Ensenada, BC

Commissioner 

(in charge 

of security and 

Director 

of Municipal Police)

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Florencio Raúl

Cuevas Salgado 

Div. Gen. Juan Heriberto

Salinas Altés (Ret.); former

Army Chief of Staff

Sept. 21, 2011

April 1, 2011

Federal District Secretary of Public 

Security

Rear-Adm. Manuel Mondragón

Y Kalb (Physician)

Gómez Palacio

(Durango)

Director of 

Municipal

Public Security

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Antonio 

Horacio Ramírez Morales Feb. 14, 2008

Guadalupe

(Nuevo León)

Secretary of Public 

Security

Col. (Ret.) Enrique Alberto 

Sanmiguel Sánchez

April 6, 2011

Director of Police

First Sgt. (Ret.) Florencio Santos 

Hernández

Coordinator of C-4

Capt. (Ret.) Alejandro Almazán

Hernández

Coordinator of 

Recruitment,

Instruction, and 

Training

Paymaster (Ret.) Hermelindo Aquileo 

Sánchez Castellanos

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont. 
20

State/

Municipality Position Incumbent Date Appointed

Guanajuato

Secretary of Public

Security and Civil 

Protection

Civilian Ramón Almonte 

Borje, who promised to promote

tourism in by hiring 18- to 25-

year-old female cops dressed in

sexy uniforms for beach patrol

duties in Acapulco

April 1, 2011

Div. Gen. Juan Heriberto

Salinas Altés (Ret.)

April 1, 2005 

to April 1, 2011

Matamoros

(Tamaulipas)

Secretary of Public 

Security Lt. Col. Gabriel López Ordaz Jan. 18, 2011

Operations 

Director of 

Secretary of Public 

Lt. Rafael Antonio Huerta

Méndez Jan. 18, 2011

Security

Director of Transit Lt. Roberto Guerrero Roldán Jan. 18, 2011

Michoacán

Secretary of Public

Security

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Manuel 

García Ruiz Aug. 8, 2010

Coordinator of 

State

Preventative Police

Capt. (2nd) Manuel García 

Ruiz Oct. 26, 2010

Monterrey Gen. (Ret.) José Pablo Leonel 

Vargas Martínez Jan. 4, 2012.

Morelos Secretary of Public 

Security

Div Gen. (Ret.) Gilberto 

Toledano Sánchez** April 10, 2011

Div. Gen (Ret.) Gastón 

Menchaca Arias, former commander of 10th Military 

Region (Yucatán)

May 17, 2009

Nuevo Laredo Secretary of Public

Security

Brig. Gen. (Active) Manuel 

Farfán Carreola Jan. 1, 2011

Nuevo León Secretary of Public 

Security

Div. Gen. Jaime Castañeda

Bravo Feb. 3, 2011

Oaxaca Secretary of Citizen

Protection

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Javier Rueda 

Velásquez March 31, 2008

Puebla Secretary of Public

Security 

Div. Gen. Mario Ayón 

Rodríguez (Ret.); former

director-general of personnel 

for National Defense Ministry

March 1, 2005

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont. 
21

State/

Municipality Position Incumbent Date Appointed

Querétaro Secretary of Public

Security Capt. Adolfo Vega Montoto Oct. 4, 2009

Quintana Roo Secretary of Public

Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Carlos 

Bibiano Villa Castillo*** April 5, 2011

Vice Adm. Miguel Ángel Ramos

(Replaced Salvador Rocha Vargas

who was arrested on charges of

cooperating with drug traffickers)

Sept. 4, 2009

Rosarito, BC Secretary of Public 

Security

Maj. (Ret.) Magdaleno 

Vázquez Ruiz Nov. 26, 2010

Saltillo

(Coahuila)

Director General 

of the

Municipal 

Preventative

Police

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Marco 

Antonio Delgado Talavera Jan 29, 2009

San Luis Potosí Secretary of Public

Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Heliodoro 

Guerrero Jan. 15, 2011

Tabasco Acting Secretary of 

Public Security Maj. (Ret.) Sergio López Uribe Feb. 1, 2009

Tamaulipas Secretary of Public 

Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Ubaldo Ayala 

Tinoco Dec. 30, 2010

Tijuana, BC

Municipal 

Secretary of

Public Security

First Capt. (Ret.) Gustavo 

Huerta Martínez  Nov. 26, 2010

Tlaxcala Secretary of Public

Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Valentín

Romano López ** *** Jan. 15, 2011

Veracruz

Secretary of Public 

Security

Lt. Arturo Bermúdez Zurita

****** July 3. 2011

Director of Public 

Transit

Rear Adm. Rodolfo Pallares 

Herrán Feb. 23, 2012

Zacatecas

Secretary of Public 

Security Gen. (Ret.) Jesús Pinto Ortiz Sept. 11, 2010

Director of State 

Preventative Police

Gen. (Ret.) Víctor Manuel 

Bosque Rodríguez Nov. 3, 2010

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont. 
22

Notes:

* Leyzaola replaced Col. Laurencio Rodríguez.

** Replaced Div. Gen. (Ret.) Gastón Menchaca Arias (14 days 

after seven people were killed in the state, including the son of 

writer and social activist Javier Sicilia.

*** Bibiano replaced Vice-Adm. Miguel Ángel Ramos Real.

  Replaced Lt. Col. (Ret.) Julián Leyzaola Pérez, who became secretary of public security in Ciudad Juárez.

** *** Replaced Div. Gen. José Leopoldo Martínez González 

(Ret).

****** Replaced Div. Gen. Sergio López Esquer: former zone 

commander for the states of Coahuila, Baja California, Baja California Sur, and Veracruz.

Sources: Jésica Zermeño, “Toman generales mandos policiacos” 

(“Generals Assume Police Responsibilities”), Reforma, February 

15, 2009; Jésica Zermeño et al. “Optan estados por mando militar” 

(“States Opt for Military Leaders”), Reforma, February 15, 2009; 

"Encabezan los hermanos Ayón Rodríguez mandos policiacos en 

el país” (“Brothers Ayón Rodríguez Lead Military Posts in the 

Country”), E-consulta, February 15, 2009; “Gastón Menchaca, de 

Yucatán a Morelos, siempre en acción” (“Gastón Menchaca, from 

Yucatán to Morelos, Always in Action”), NotiSureste.com.mx, May 

17, 2009; Silvia Hernández, “Nombran a militar titular de SSP en 

Q. Roo” (“Military Man Named Head of Public Security Ministry in Quintana Roo), El Universal, September 5, 2009; Roberto 

Aguilar, “Torre Cantú nombra a general titular de la SSP” (“Torre 

Cantú Names General as Head of Public Safety Ministry”), El Universal.com.mx, December 31, 2010; Mauro de la Fuente, “Asume 

militares policía de Matamoros” (“Military Officers Take Control 

of Police in Matamoros”), Reforma.com, January 19, 2011; “Nombran a militar titular de policía de Armería, Colima” (“Military 

Man Named Head of Police in Armería, Colima”), Guerra Contra 

el Narco, February 4, 2011; Juan Cedillo, “NL: general asume cargo 

de titular de Seguridad” (“Nuevo León: General Assumes Head 

of Public Safety”), El Universal.com.mx, February 5, 2011; Óscar 

Guadarrama, “El gobernador de Morelos cesa al secretario de Seguridad pública” (“Morelos Governor Fires Secretary of Public 

Security”), CNN México, April 10, 2011; Andro Aguilar, “Militarización sin resultados” (“Militarization without Results”), Reforma (“Enfoque”), April 10, 2011 (the author relied heavily on 
23

this source); Édgar Ávila Pérez, “Arturo Bermúdez Zurita fue 

designado a la dependencia luego de la renuncia del general Sergio López Esquer” (“Arturo Bermúdez Zurita Was Designated 

as Head of Ministry after General Sergio López Esquer Stepped 

Down”), El Universal, July 3, 2011; and “Toma General mando 

de la Policía regia” (“General Takes Over Nuevo León Police”), 

Reforma, January 4, 2012; and “Asumen marinos Tránsito en Veracruz” (“Marines Assume Control of Transit in Veracruz”), Reforma, January 23, 2012. 

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, 

cont. 

Meanwhile, men with military backgrounds hold 

the position of the secretaries of public security in 36 

percent of the municipalities with the most homicides 

in the country, according to the National System of 

Public Security. Retired generals have assumed this 

role in the five cities that have registered the most killings: Acapulco, Chihuahua, Ciudad, Juárez, Culiacán, 

and Tijuana. On January 13, 2011, nine retired officers were named chiefs of nine municipalities in wartorn Tamaulipas: Altamira, Ciudad Victoria, Madero, 

Mante, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Río Bravo, and Tampico.

While by no means new to Mexico, this approach 

appeared to offer several advantages. First, the military men fill a void opened by the execution or resignation of 19 state and municipal security chiefs in dangerous posts. Three officials stepped down in Nuevo 

León municipalities: Allende, and Linares; another 

five civilians died at the hands of narco-traffickers. 

Second, many of the officers selected have commanded one or more of the Army’s 12 regions and/

or 45 zones, and boast years of experience struggling 

against drug mafias. Third, they are likely to have 
24

ties to—and the confidence of—current regional and 

zonal military chiefs with whom they often coordinate assaults on DTOs. Fourth, whether retired or on 

leave, military officers may be familiar with the tactics 

of Los Zetas, the original contingent of which served 

in the Army’s elite Special Forces Airmobile Group. 

General Rolando Eugenio Hidalgo Heddy, Public Security Secretary in Aguascalientes, headed these commandos. Nuevo León’s safety chief, Jaime Castañeda 

Bravo, had previously served on SEDENA’s general 

staff, headed armored regiments, and functioned as 

commander of the 38th and 43rd Military Zones.7

Fifth, generals, admirals, colonels, and majors have 

emerged from a culture of discipline that needs to be 

inculcated in civilian police.8

 Members of police forces 

have often acted in a venal, free-wheeling manner—to 

the point that thousands of serious kidnappings and 

other felonies go unreported because many citizens 

believe that the cops are in league with the miscreants. Even if military leaders cannot change behavior, 

they can oust incompetents and malefactors. For instance, General Salinas Altés removed 200 elements of 

Acapulco’s Municipal Preventive Police when he took 

over as security boss in Guerrero, a poverty-stricken 

state plagued by lawlessness. Soon after becoming 

security chief in Monterrey, General José Pablo Leonel 

Vargas Martínez arrested 106 policemen and prosecutors who were accused of “halconeo”—that is, acting as 

“falcons” or lookouts for cartels.9

Sixth, officers are in a good position to recruit 

active-duty or retired members of the armed forces 

as policemen in the jurisdictions that they serve. Seventh, every public-opinion survey shows that the 

armed forces enjoy a much better reputation than do 

the police. Such praise centers on their efforts in di-
25

saster relief, as well as their anti-crime missions. As 

one anonymous source indicated, “even if military security chiefs are as corrupt as their civic counterparts, 

they give a psychological lift to the public.” 

Finally, in light of the relatively low pensions received by retired officers, assuming a civilian post 

supplements their income and reduces pressure to 

increase retirement income. Overall security expenditures have sky-rocketed; and Mexico’s Finance Ministry reported that the military budget shot up 74.2 

percent between 2007 (MEX$ 32,200 billion) and 2012 

(MEX$ 55,610 billion).10

Preliminary Results.

How have the officers in mufti fared? Upon taking office, retired generals, colonels, or captains often 

clashed with local police forces, especially when they 

attempted to cleanse their ranks. In fact, as described 

in Figure 4, by November 2009, military units had 

clashed with local, state, or federal law enforcement 

agencies at least 65 times—up from two confrontations in 2008.11 After all, Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Cartel, 

the Knights Templars, and other cartels often demand 

the appointment of a “reliable” security chief in municipalities that lie along trafficking routes. Soon after reaching Tijuana to head the municipal police on 

March 10, 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Julián Leyzaola 

Pérez oversaw the dismissal or resignation of 600 law 

enforcement agents, including 84 who were arrested 

for allegedly cooperating with organized crime. Meanwhile, 2,325 people, among them 43 policemen, died 

during these 3 years. The crime rate did fall on his 

watch due to a confluence of factors: the city’s population is relatively compact; Governor José Guadalupe 
26

Osuna Millán (2007-13) cooperated in the fight against 

DTOs; and the increasing dominance of the Sinaloa 

Cartel, which supplanted the Arellano Félix Organization, contributed to stabilizing the sprawling border 

city. The drop in violence aside, the state human rights 

commission and the National Human Rights Commission charged the police chief with torture before 

the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. In 

addition, the nongovernmental organization (NGO), 

Human Rights Watch, criticized Leyzaola for 390 disappearances, including four young tiajuaneses.

Date/Place Police Agency MilitaryAgency Nature of Conflict Outcome

January 4, 2011

San Nicolás, NL

Municipal 

Police Army

Police officers helped members of crime

group escape by obstructing the 

military chasing the armed suspects.

Three military personnel were hurt; one 

civilian killed.

March 25, 2011

San Luis Potosí

Municipal 

Police Army

Mexican Army detained three police officers San Luis Potosí Direção-Geral dos 

Serviços Prisionais (DGSP) for involvement in a robbery of two civilians; police 

allegedly took 32,330,000 pesos.

Not Available

November 22, 

2010

Apodaca, NL

Municipal 

Police Marines Suspicious activities led Marines to investigate police officers. 

Three outlaws and 

four policemen were 

arrested.

October 26, 

2010

Monterrey, NL

Municipal 

Police Army

The Army stopped to investigate four 

policemen from Monterrey accused of 

following the military personnel of the 

Public Security Ministry and the Federal 

Investigative Agency.

Only one policeman 

was taken into custody 

because he was carrying illegal radio 

equipment.

October 3, 2010

Monterrey, NL

Municipal 

Police Army

Army investigated Guadalupe police 

for helping criminals escape after they 

threw a grenade into the city’s main 

plaza.

Twelve people hurt.

August 20, 

2010

Santiago, NL

Municipal 

Police

Police accused of spying on, kidnapping, and killing Mayor Edelmiro 

Cavazos Leal.

Six municipal police 

arrested.

July 29, 2010

Veracruz

Municipal 

Police Army

Federal judge in Veracruz ordered 

military to arrest 40 municipal police officers, 16 ministerial officers, and 6 former law enforcement officials suspected 

of involvement in organized crime.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes

between Military and Civilian Police.
27

Date/Place Police Agency MilitaryAgency Nature of Conflict Outcome

January 13, 

2010

Monterrey, NL

Municipal and 

State Police Army

Policeman arrested for supposed 

involvement in a kidnapping; after his 

incarceration, the suspected sought 

help from fellow officers, who stopped 

the Army from taking the detainee to a 

military facility.

After exchanging 

verbal insults and a 

nearly 5-hour traffic 

stoppage, state police 

allowed the municipal 

officer to be taken to 

the Attorney General’s 

Office (PGR); after the 

incident the, Nuevo 

León Secretary General Javier Treviño, 

claimed that the state 

police arrived to support the military.

August 31, 

2009

Monterrey, NL

Municipal 

Police Army

Municipal police accused of supporting 

criminal; Army detained an armed man 

with drugs; law enforcement officers 

interfered with troops transporting 

suspect to a military camp.

One police officer 

tried to flee the scene 

and was shot in the 

leg by a soldier and 

transported to military 

camp; three police officers arrested a couple 

of days later.

September 2, 

2009

Monterrey, NL

Municipal 

Police

State and 

Federal 

Army

After an incident in August, military 

inspected documents of law enforcement agent.

Municipal cop incarcerated for not having 

proper ID.

June 16, 2009

San Pedro de la

Garza, NL

Municipal 

Police Army

Army took away firearms from police 

employed by the local Public Security 

Ministry.

May 9, 2009

Cuernavaca, 

Morelos

Municipal 

Police Army

Army arrested 27 police officers from 

Yuatepec, including the secretary of 

Public Security; believed to be protecting drug sellers.

May 5, 2009

Aguascalientes

Municipal 

Police Army

Police officers and military officers 

found associated with the Gulf Cartel; 

the Assistant Attorney General for Specialized Investigation of Organized Crime 

(SIEDO) in DF stepped in to investigate 

the situation.

Six policemen and 12 

military men arrested.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes

between Military and Civilian Police, cont.
28

Sources: “Ejército detiene a tres policías de SLP” (“Army Detains 

Three Police in SLP”), El Universal, March 25, 2011; “Narcobloqueos en cuatro municipios de Nuevo León por la detención de 

un capo” (“Blockades by Municipal Police in Four Nuevo León 

Municipalities to Arrest Capo”), La Jornada, November 22, 2010; 

“Ejército Mexicano detiene a 27 policías en Morelos” (“The Mexican Army Detains 27 Police Officers in the State of Morelos”), Televisa, May 9, 2009; “Ejército retira armas a policías de San Pedro 

Garza, NL” (“Army Takes Firearms Away from Police Officers 

of San Pedro Garza, NL”), Televisa, June 16, 2009; “Ejército revisa 

armas de 500 policías en NL” (“Army Inspects Firearms of 500 PoDate/Place Police Agency MilitaryAgency Nature of Conflict Outcome

April 13, 2008

Municipal of 

Monterrey and 

Escobedo, NL

State Police Army

The local police sought to thwart an 

inquiry sparking a fight in Escobedo; 

on a different occasion, state police resisted an investigation and surrounded 

four military units in Monterrey.

Six injured; during the 

second encounter, 

four police suffered 

injuries; some state 

police were arrested; 

an arrangement allowed release of the 

police officers; as the 

military left the scene, 

police officers yelled 

insults. Police officers 

were later taken into 

custody and handed 

over to a military 

court.

April 8, 2008

Ciudad Juarez

Municipal 

police Army

Army shot at a police vehicle after it 

failed to stop for inspection; police 

were attending to an emergency; Army 

arrested municipal cop.

One police officer 

received a gun shot 

in the head and was 

in critical condition; 

the other two officers 

disappeared.

June 6, 2007

Mexicali, BC

international 

airport

PFP 

(Federal Preventive Police)Army

Military took control of the airport; PFP 

agents had allowed a smuggler to bring 

26 kilograms of cocaine into the country; 14 people were investigated.

The military arrested 

seven officials of the 

PFP and three agents 

of the National Migration Institute (INM); 

suspects turned over 

to SIEDO.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes

between Military and Civilian Police, cont.
29

lice Officers in NL”), El Universal, November 28, 2011; “Policías y 

Militares se enfrentan en Nuevo León” (“Police and Soldiers Confront each Other in Nuevo León”), El Universal, January 13, 2010; 

“‘Cacería’ de policías espías en la metrópoli” (“Hunt for Spying 

Police Officers in the City”), revistacodigo21 (magazine), October 

26, 2010; “Investigan a policías por narcoterrorismo en Guadalupe; se recuperan heridos en granadazo” (“Police Investigated 

for Narcoterrorism in Guadalupe, Injured Recover After Granade 

Explosion”), revistacodigo21 (magazine), October 3, 2010; “Confirman autoridades detención de 56 policías” (“Authorities Confirm 

Detention of 56 Officers”), El Mexicano, July 29, 2010; “Reportan 

balacera entre policías y militares en Nuevo León” (“Shootout between Police Officers and Military Soldiers Reported in Nuevo 

León”), El Informador, August 31, 2009; “Controlan los ‘Zetas’ a 

la policía de Aguascalientes,” (“The Zetas Control the Police in 

Aguascalientes”), Entre Lineas, May 5, 2009, “Enfrentamiento entre militares y policías en Monterrey deja seis heridos,” (“Confrontation Between Military and Police in Monterrey Leaves Six 

Wounded”), Chihuahua al Instante, April 13, 2008; “Militares balean a policías de Ciudad Juárez,” (“Military Shoot Police in Ciudad Juárez”), La Jornada, April 8, 2008; and “Arraigan a agentes 

federales adscritos al aeropuerto de Mexicali,” (“Federal Agents 

Assigned to Mexicali Airport Detained”), La Jornada, June 6, 2007.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes

between Military and Civilian Police, cont.

“The case of Julián Leyzaola is a rare mirage in 

which tough action in response to a security crisis has 

other costs: human rights’ abuses. He has transgressed 

the fundamental principle of democracy whereby civil 

authority must control the military,” stated Erubiel Tirado Cervantes, a security specialist at Mexico City’s 

IberoAmerican University.12 These accusations 

did not prevent the convulsed city of Ciudad Juárez 

from hiring Leyzaola as its public security secretary 

on October 10, 2011, in a latter-day example of a sheriff facing desperados at High Noon. In this office, he 

leads a force of 1,800 police, working in six crime-rid-
30

den districts where 456 murders had been recorded by 

June 1, 2011. Almost a year later, Calderón announced 

a 60 percent fall in homicides as drug-related deaths 

declined from 300 each month to 120 deaths as part 

of the “We are all Juárez” initiative, which involves 

economic, social, political, and safety elements.13 No 

deaths occurred in early December 2012.

Although conditions vary from state to state, overall the presence of military men in top security roles 

has not diminished the violence afflicting their areas 

of responsibility (see Figure 5). In view of venal police 

forces, governors and mayors may have had no choice 

other than to reach into the barracks for public safety 

czars. Such appointments also enable state and municipal executives to appear to be “tough on crime” 

even as they cut deals with cartels or turn a blind eye 

to illegal activities. One problem facing the retired officers is that they assume the civilian position without 

the benefit of the staff members who assisted them 

when they were on active duty. 

When troops attempted to stop a suspicious looking SUV that was being escorted through Monterrey, 

they found themselves under fire from state policemen, who enabled the suspects to escape. “The moment they shoot at us, get in our way, use their guns to 

protect criminals, they become criminals themselves,” 

said General Guillermo Moreno Serrano, the regional 

commander in Tamaulipas and Nuevo León, which 

lie along the Texas border.14

A WikiLeaks publication of a conversation between 

Galván and a U.S. official revealed the defense secretary’s attitude toward the law enforcement agencies. He complained about joint operations with the 

police because “leaks of planning and information by 

corrupted officials have compromised past efforts.”15
31

Source: Monthly reports of the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security (SESNSP) as compiled by Andro 

Aguilar, “Militarización sin resultados” (“Militarization without 

Results”), Reforma (“Enfoque”), April 10, 2011.

Figure 5. Crimes Committed in States

with Military Law Enforcement Chiefs.

Moreover, in Nuevo Laredo, the Los Zetas sadistic 

paramilitary cartel hire unofficial “police”—an estimated 3,000 young people—that far outnumber the 

regular force. These ubiquitous “spotters,” as local 

residents refer to them, prefer crew cuts, adorn themselves with gold chains and earrings, press cellphones 

to their ears, and wear shorts below their waists.16

State 

Percentage 

Change of 

Robberies

Percentage 

Change of 

Kidnappings

Percentage 

Change of 

Homicides

Raw Number of 

Executions

Aguascalientes 13 -54 1 85

Chiapas 20 92 -6 n.a.

Chihuahua 4 -39 -3 1,008

Coahuila n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Colima 18 518 73 n.a.

Guanajuato -7 -55 9 128

Michoacán 7 18 46 216

Morelos 7 160 15 433

Nuevo León 12 n.a. 27 n.a.

Querétaro 32 60 28 21

Quintana Roo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

San Luis Potosí n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Sinaloa -3 278 1 n.a

Tamaulipas -3 123 -9 n.a

Tlaxcala n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Veracruz -37 -100 -37 357

Zacatecas 3 27 17 18
32

Torreón’s muscular Public Security Director Carlos Bibiano Villa Castillo also believes in an ultra hard 

line toward law-breakers. A Pancho Villa descendent 

and one of 36 children, the retired general told a reporter that he preferred to kill members of organized 

crime rather than interrogate them. “I like to feel the 

flow of adrenaline. On patrol, when I capture a Zeta 

or Chapo, I kill him. Why interrogate him? Here we 

beat the hell out of a bad actor. I have no confidence in 

the Federal Police because they do not kill [suspects], 

only arrest them. The Army and Navy kill them,” 

he said 6 days after the March 2, 2011, confrontation 

with cartel gun men.17 Either because of or despite his 

stance, the mustachioed retired brigadier general was 

appointed secretary of public security by Quintana 

Roo’s new governor Roberto Borge Ángulo. 

Upon leaving Torreón, he emphasized his loyalty: 

“my father is the Army, my mother is the Patria,” he 

affirmed. He also claimed to have been “sleeping with 

the enemy . . . of the 1,100 elements under his command, 1,000 were corrupt; they sold uniforms; they 

sold gasoline; even when on patrol they carried out 

their dirty business everywhere,” he stated.18 Soon 

after arriving in Cancún, a “narco-message” threatened death to the general. It was signed by the “Zetas 

Special Forces.” 

Militarization Denied.

On May 6, 2011, the federal government launched 

a campaign to attract candidates for 422 positions in 

a new Accredited State Police (Policía Estatal Acredible [PEA]). “We believe that with your talent, your 

ethical integrity, you, young people . . . can contribute to this force that is so important to the Mexican 

State . . .” averred ex-Education Secretary and presi-
33

dential aspirant Alonso Lujambio Irazábal. The students explained their lack of interest in terms of 

“corruption,” “bad image,” “fat,” “drug addicts,” 

“danger,” and other pejoratives.19

Just as Los Zetas have relied on Guatemala’s 

tough-as-nails Kaibiles for training and support, the 

Mexican government has backed “Project Sparta,” 

which reportedly involves the L-3 MPRI paramilitary 

consortium based in Alexandria, Virginia. The respected Reforma newspaper indicated that the corporation has deployed ex-U.S. military personnel, who 

will establish 12 “Virtual Military Training Centers” 

where they will teach counterinsurgency, urban warfare, infantry tactics, and defense against improvised 

explosive devices. When contacted by telephone, Rick 

Kiernan, the company’s Senior Vice President of Strategic Communication, denied that his firm had an arrangement with Mexico and that: “There has been no 

contract awarded that I know of.”20

Street Patrols. 

In addition to naming former armed forces chiefs 

to top security posts, mayors and governors are sedulously recruiting new law enforcement officers from 

the ranks of military retirees. After purging half of 

the city’s 400 policemen in Santa Catarina, a city of 

260,000 in metropolitan Monterrey, Mayor Gabriel 

Navarro Rodríguez made clear his determination to 

hire “elements with a military profile” to undertake 

patrol and surveillance duties. In essence, politicians have more confidence in men and women who 

have learned discipline, order, and team work in the 

armed force.21
34

Informal Military-Civilian Groups. 

In several areas, local leaders have initiated combined civilian-military groups. For example, at the 

naval base in Tapachula, Chiapas, weekly meetings 

focused on combating drug crimes include the navy, 

army, state attorney general, and elements of the business community. Similarly, in Tijuana and Ensenada, 

Baja California, the Army and Navy regularly hold 

sessions with representatives of the state government and the tourism sector. Mexico State Governor 

Eruviel Ávila Villegas has penned an accord with the 

Secretary of Gobernación to establish a coordinating 

body formed by the commanders of Military Zones 1 

(Tacuba, DF), 22 (Santa María Rayón, Mexico State), 

and 37 (Santa Lucia, Mexico State), a representative of 

the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), a representative 

of Mexico’s version of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), the National Security and Investigation Center 

(CISEN), along with four state officials: the governor, 

secretary of citizen security, government secretary, 

and attorney general.22

In other areas, so-called “purple groups” have been 

formed, which strive to overcome “stove-piping” by 

scheduling regular gatherings of the Army, Navy, and 

Federal Police. At land crossings, the Army frequently 

cooperates with—or oversees the functions of—Mexican customs agents, who are often subjected to bribes. 

“Collateral Damage” and Human Rights Violations.

Professional policemen are taught to separate adversaries, listen to their complaints, negotiate, bargain, 

and compromise before using force against trouble-
35

makers. In contrast, soldiers learn to pursue, capture, 

and kill. The result is what the Pentagon euphemistically calls “collateral damage”—that is, the inadvertent wounding or killing of innocent civilians. Early 

in Calderón’s drug war, NGOs inveighed against the 

trampling of human rights in Mexico. They homed in 

on the 200,000-member Army, as well as the government’s indifference with respect to the approximately 

140,000 migrants apprehended at the country’s border in 2010, not to mention the tens of thousands who 

avoided capture. The Mexico’s zealous National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) claimed to have 

received 5,055 complaints, many against the military, 

during Calderón’s tenure. The same group asserted 

that 5,300 people disappeared in this period.23

A statement by the Washington Office on Latin 

America epitomized the ever more caustic invective: 

For years, organizations and shelters in Mexico 

have documented the abuses suffered by migrants 

traveling through the country. Every day along the 

principal transit routes, migrants, primarily Central 

Americans, are beaten, extorted, sexually abused, 

and/or kidnapped by criminal groups, at times with 

the direct participation or acquiescence of Mexican 

authorities.24

The drum beat of international outrage finally 

grabbed the attention of Mexico’s brass, who instituted human rights training for soldiers and opened the 

door a crack on tribunals before which members of the 

armed forces stand trial. In 2008, Mexico’s National 

Defense Ministry (SEDENA), created the position of 

General Director for Human Rights in its command 

structure, “a milestone that passed relatively unno-
36

ticed by most media and analysts.”25 In 2011 Mexican 

lawmakers approved a new statute that guarantees 

the rights of migrants, regardless of their immigration 

status. The legislation, whose purpose was to prevent 

misconduct toward foreigners, created a 180-day visa 

for illegal aliens. The law also called for a new borderpolice force to prevent crimes and conduct surveillance at airports, ports, bus terminals and frontier 

areas. How effective this statute will be remains to 

be seen.

Pollsters for the Reforma newspaper found that 

a majority of citizens (58 percent) and opinion leaders (67 percent) recognized that the Army committed human rights abuses. Indeed, 72 percent of the 

latter claimed to have known a crime victim. At the 

same time, average people (81 percent) and elites (64 

percent) favored deploying the armed forces against 

criminal organizations.26

Public Relations: Outreach.

Even though the populace backs its fight against 

DTOs, the Army suffered a slight decline in support 

for this role—from 83 percent in 2009 to 80 percent 

in 2010. In early 2012, 70 percent of respondents to 

a Consulta Mitofsky survey favored the military’s continuing to pursue criminal organizations, and 78 percent supported incorporating soldiers into the police. 

The results bristled with irony inasmuch as 49 percent 

of interviewees called Calderón’s anti-cartel policy 

a “failure.”27

Among institutions combatting drug cartels, respondents to a September 2011 National Survey of 

Victimization and Perception of Public Security, expressed the greatest confidence in the Navy (51 per-
37

cent), followed by the Army (46 percent), the Federal 

Police (19 percent), state police (13 percent), the judiciary (11 percent), prosecutors (10 percent), municipal police (8 percent), and transit police (7 percent). 

Figure 6 indicates the perceived effectiveness of 

these institutions. 

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), reported in “La perception de la inseguridad en México aumentó en 

2010: INEGI, (“Perception of Insecurity in Mexico in 2010: INEGI”), CNN México, September 20, 2011. 

Figure 6. Effectiveness of Government Agencies

Fighting the Cartels.

As shown in Figure 7, in mid-2012, the Pew 

Research Center found that four out of five Mexicans backed using the Mexican Army again DTOs, 

although a slight majority (49 to 47 percent) believed 

that the government was either losing ground or 

making no progress. Those interviewed favored U.S. 

training police and military (75 percent) and Washington’s provision of money and weapons (61 percent). 

Yet only a third of respondents endorsed the deployment of U.S. troops in their country.28 The Americans 

Institution Effectiveness %

Navy 47

Army 43

Federal Police 15

Judiciary 11

Ministerial/Judicial Police 9

State Prosecutors 8

Municipal Preventative Police 5

Transit Police 4
38

came out well in areas of cooperation. Enrique Peña 

Nieto, candidate of the once-dominant Institutional 

Revolutionary Party (PRI), is now Mexico's new chief 

executive. Late in the campaign, he named a tough-asnails Colombian as his security adviser. The selection 

of General (Ret.) Oscar Naranjo Trujillo, nemesis of 

the Medellín and Cali Cartels and ex-director general 

of the Colombian National Police (2007-12), was met 

with silence in SEDENA. However, Josefina Vázquez 

Mota, candidate of Calderón’s National Action Party, 

emphasized her faith in Mexico’s armed forces and 

underlined that the country did not require “foreigners” in public safety posts.29

Source: Pew Research Center, “Mexicans Back Military Campaign 

against Cartels,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 20, 2012. 

Figure 7. Mexican Attitudes about Drug War.

To preserve its approval rating, SEDENA and 

SEMAR (Navy Ministry) have sought to curry favor 

with the population. After the September 16, 2009, Independence Day parade, naval personnel mixed with 

the crowd, with la Calle de Sevilla between Reforma 

and Avenida Chapultepec in downtown Mexico City 

Use of Mexican Army to Fight Drug Traffickers 2011

Percent

2012

Percent

Support 83 80

Oppose 14 17

Don’t Know 3 3

Campaign again Drug Traffickers is . . .

Making Progress 45 47

Losing Ground 29 30

Same as Past 25 19

Don’t Know 1 3
39

becoming a “gigantic photography studio.” A mob 

of children, men, women, tourists, and whole families 

clamored to have their pictures taken with some 200 

obliging members of the armed forces and their 40 vehicles. “Look, Papa!” shouted a 9-year-old boy, who 

sat proudly in an armored vehicle with both hands 

grasping the controls of an anti-aircraft weapon. 

What may have begun spontaneously now forms 

an integral part of the annual march through the heart 

of the capital when the armed services show off their 

precision drills, new equipment, and recently acquired 

technology. Some youngsters even color their faces 

with combat grease and clamp on helmets. During 

the bicentennial of independence in 2010, the president announced that the armed forces would present 

miniature Mexican flags to every household in the 

country to symbolize their unity with the people.30 

In early February 2011, the Army and Air Force 

again attempted to win friends and influence people. 

They sponsored an exposition of “The Great Force of 

Mexico” at the old Military College at Popotla, outside of Mexico City. At this event, children and adults 

strapped on parachutes, stepped into the cockpits of 

helicopters, and mounted Humvee personnel carriers. Some youngsters darkened their faces with cream 

worn by soldiers in jungle combat, wriggled into field 

jackets, rappelled a low wall, and even took target 

practice. “The lack of confidence serious faces inspire 

that usually characterizes contacts between civilians 

and the military disappeared. Little boys like Fernando enjoyed being made up and being called ‘soldiers.’ 

Smiles were the common denominator,” according to 

a journalist on the scene.31
40

In 2011, paratroopers cradling automatic weapons 

dropped from 10,000 feet to land in the Plaza of the 

Constitution, which is surrounded by the National 

Palace; the Finance Ministry; the Antiguo Palacio del 

Ayuntamiento, or mayor’s office; hotels; and small 

shops. Early in the same year, the Defense Ministry 

opened the Campo Militar Número 1 to bicyclists 

during the first three Sundays each month. Located 

in Mexico City, the expansive facility is headquarters 

to the Armed Parachute Brigade, Special Forces, the 

Infantry, a tank unit, an Armored Brigade, Military 

Police, and the Motorized Cavalry. The facility also 

houses the Military Region’s Military Prison, which 

had 420 inmates.32 On February 10, 2011, the Air 

Force, an arm of the Army, invited spectators to observe from outside its Santa Lucia headquarters, north 

of Mexico City, some 71 aircraft. Their pilots planned 

to perform aerial acrobats, fly close wing-to-wing formations, and launch air-to-ground missiles. President 

Calderón was invited to a luncheon for 2,500 guests 

to celebrate the service’s 97th anniversary. Inclement 

weather forced cancelation of the exercise, which was 

rescheduled.33

To promote both their achievements and recruitment, the Army has hired Servicios Profesionales y 

Asistencia Creativa, a Mexico City public relations firm 

headed by Alejandro Fernández Carrillo, and McCann 

World Group, whose clients include multinational 

corporations such as Coca-Cola and the U.S. Army. 

As a result, it is running television advertisements, 

trumpeting achievements on Twitter and YouTube, and 

airing brief recruiting videos before the beginning of 

motion pictures. In 2007, SEDENA earmarked 111,246 

pesos (approximately $11,000) for promotional activities in the media—with most of the funds dedicated to 
41

videos and TV and radio commercials. Moreover, the 

polling firm of Beltrán y Asociados has conducted survey research. Outlays for these advertising soared to 

46 million pesos in 2011 (approximately $3.5 million), 

as evidenced in Figure 8. 

Source: Luis Brito, “La SEDENA invierte más en publicidad 

para mejorar imagen ante ciudadanos” (“SEDENA Invests 

More in Publicity to Improve its Popular Image”), CNN México, 

September 7, 2011. 

Figure 8. SEDENA’s Expenditures on Publicity.

Acclaimed director Rafael Lara is making a film 

depicting the valor of the soldiers in the May 5, 1862, 

Battle of Puebla in which General Ignacio Zaragoza

Seguín led the Mexican Army to an unlikely triumph 

over the French. SEDENA is assisting the venture 

with guidance, vintage uniforms, and extras.34 They 

have also publicized athletic achievements of men 

and women in uniform: Corporal Marisol Guadalupe 

Romero Rosales (2011 Panamerican Games; runner); 

Horacio Nava Reza (2011 Panamerican Games; runner); José Layver Ojeda (2011 Panamerican Games; 

runner); and Uriel Avigodor Adriano Ruiz (Tae 

Kwon Do).35

Year Outlays on Publicity 

(in Pesos)

%

Increase

2007 111,246

2008 47,000,000+ 421.49

2009 43,138,000 (8.95)

2010 14,688,000 (193.70)

2011 46,000,000 213.18
42

These efforts appeared to have succeeded when 

spontaneous applause greeted soldiers who marched 

in the September 2011 Independence Day parade. 

Earlier in the year, Cardinal Norberto Rivera, the 

Archbishop of Mexico City, invited worshippers to 

pray for the generals, chiefs, officials, and troops of 

the Mexican army, reaffirming their vocation of peace 

and assistance to a society that they serve with honor 

and loyalty. Meanwhile, he excoriated those who had 

“negated the love of God by abusing and mistreating 

boys and girls. . .”36

SEDENA’s public relations have not been limited 

to the Mexico City area. On October 21, 2011, it opened 

a large exposition called “Mexico’s Great Force” (“La 

Gran Fuerza de México”), which showed off the daily 

activities of the Army and Air Force. Visitors were 

especially attracted to an exhibit demonstrating how 

trained dogs and horses participate in Plan DN-III-E 

disaster relief.

As part of the DN-III-E initiative, launched in 1966, 

Army units in the North are rebuilding houses, rendering medical care, and providing dental services. 

On a given day in a northern city, Army professionals register 397 medical check-ups, conduct 110 dental examinations, and distribute 847 pharmaceutical 

drugs. They also carry out projects involving masons 

(112), plumbing (38), electricity (21), carpentry (524), 

and haircuts (962). A SEDENA spokesman indicated 

that they “instruct 148 youngsters in military music” 

so they inspire “love in our national symbols.”37

The military also hosted a 1-month long interactive 

museum, known as “El Trompo Mágico” or “Magic 

Tub” in three major cities. The exhibition drew large 

crowds in Mexico City (283,956), Monterrey (425,621), 

and Puebla (330,428).38 Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas, 
43

Puebla’s state governor, said: “When the Mexican 

Army and the Mexican people are together and put 

aside ideological and political differences in favor of 

the interests of the Patria, no enemy can triumph.”39

General Raymundo Balboa Aguirre co-chairs an 

organization called Unidad de Vinculación con la 

Ciudadania (UNIVIC) or Citizens Relations Unit. Officially, this body, which includes former Social Alternative Democratic Party Deputy Marina Arvizu Rivas 

(an acquaintance of General Galván), seeks to bolster 

collaboration between the Army and civilians, promote respect for human rights, and resolve conflicts 

arising from the drug war. In fact, it sprang to life to 

dampen criticism of the military after a fragmentation 

grenade killed two youngsters, aged 5 and 9, aboard 

a pick-up truck in a confrontation between the Army 

and cartel members on the Guerrero-Ciudad Mier 

highway in Tamaulipas on April 3, 2010. A human 

rights activist claimed that soldiers reconfigured the 

scene in an effort to absolve themselves of responsibility for the deaths.40 Incidents such as this may explain 

why no folk ballads—the so-call corridos that often 

extol the merits of traffickers—have circulated that 

laud the armed forces. In all fairness, UNIVIC has 

made reparations to victims, paid for funeral expenses, covered medical expenses, and funded psychological therapy.41

INCREASING ROLE OF WOMEN IN MEXICO’S 

ARMED FORCES

This ceremony also provides an opportunity for 

the military to showcase the ever-greater visibility of 

women in uniform. Only in 1938 did the Army admit 

women and then just to the Military Nursing School—
44

followed by the Military Medical School (1973) and 

the Military Odontology School (1976). For years, assignments were limited to the medical arts, secretaries, 

translators, drivers, communications specialists, and 

other support personnel. Females gained admission 

to the Colegio Heroico Militar, Mexico’s version of West 

Point, for the first time in 2007 when, of 537 general 

officers, only five were women.42 As seen in Figure 9, 

the Defense Ministry claims that opportunities have 

increased substantially. 

Source: “Pide diputada una mujer al frente del Ejército mexicano” (“Deputy Asks for a Woman to Head the Mexican Army”), 

El Universal, December 16, 2008; Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, 

Fourth Annual Report, 2010; “Exaltan labor de mujeres militares” 

(“Work of Female Military Personnel Praised”), Reforma, March 6, 

2012; and “Impulsan sin plazas a mujeres militares” (“Few Posts 

Open for Women”), Reforma, April 23, 2012.

Figure 9. Women in the Mexican Army 

in Recent Years.

Under SEDENA’s “Equal Opportunities Program 

for Women and Men, 2008-2012,” distaff members 

may enroll in all of the army’s 17 schools, including 

Year Number of Women 

in the Army

Total Number in 

Army Percent Females

2006 6,309 196,767 3.21

2007 6,831 196,710 3.47

2008 7,980 202,355 3.94

2009 8,714 206,013 4.23

2010 10,234 206,013 4.97

2011 10,301 206,013 5.00

2012 11,810 211,000 5.60
45

those for combat instruction, basic and advanced 

military police training, preparation of sergeants, and 

the formation of officers for the Heroic War College. 

The Defense Ministry has also organized conferences, 

seminars, and courses to raise the consciousness of 

troop with respect to gender equality. 

On December 16, 2011, the military launched a 

magazine titled Observatorio para la Igualidad entre Mujeres y Hombres en el Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos

to highlight the steps taken to advance the careers of 

female members of the armed forces and to eradicate 

violence and discrimination against them.43 Greater 

chances for women in the machista Army spring from 

social and international pressure, the presence of more 

skilled women prepared to enter the armed forces, 

and the need to recruit more elements in an institution 

plagued by desertions. Leftist Deputy Maricela Contreras Julián even looked to the not-too-distant future 

when a woman could become secretary of defense—a 

will-o’-the-wisp for decades to come.44

Female recruits and officers still face discrimination. While recognizing the advances accomplished by 

them, Colonel Clementina Espíndola Zetna, who entered the military medical school in 1973, stated: “The 

atmosphere was extremely difficult . . . [and] hostile. 

In the beginning, we were soundly rejected: ‘women 

[should] remain in the home and wash dishes’ . . . ‘you 

belong in the kitchen,’ but as time went by integration 

[of women into the military] progressed.”45

The Army has had a difficult time placing women, 

and only six females, five of whom have retired, number among the institution's 541 generals. The National 

Defense Ministry attributes the slow mobility to the 

military’s lack of expansion. Spokesman General Ricardo Trevilla Trejo emphasized that distaff soldiers 

and officers must wait until men leave the service to 
46

obtain assignments and promotions. As a result, it took 

8 months to incorporate 1,852 trained women into the 

ranks, and the objective, announced in 2007, of doubling 

the number of females in uniform by the end of 2012 

remains illusory.46

Few reports have surfaced about sexual harassment, a headache for the U.S. Armed Forces. The 

small number of women in combat and fear of turning 

in abusers may explain the situation. Human rights 

organizations regularly report that Mexican soldiers 

humiliate, strip, grope, and have sexual relations with 

vulnerable females, especially migrants and indigenous girls. The Foreign Relations Ministry asserts 

that there a few such transgressions. In late July 2012, 

50 military personnel, including a captain, sergeants, 

and corporals, participated in a group marriage ceremony in the southern states of Chiapas and Tabasco. 

Volunteer coordinator Yolanda Martínez explained 

that the mass wedding would ensure that the brides 

would enjoy the benefits to which military families 

were entitled.47

In a somewhat related subject, the status of gays in 

uniform is in limbo. Homosexuality is not considered 

a crime, and the Army follows a “Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell” policy. In the past, openly gay soldiers and officers faced dismissal and, no doubt, taunts and worse 

from macho comrades.48 

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN 

COURTS

NGOs have long complained that trials of Army 

and Navy personnel in military tribunals are secret, 

the punishment lenient, and the results often unknown. Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution specifically provides for military jurisdiction over all 
47

military crimes and indiscipline; military tribunals 

execute jurisdiction over military personnel in accord 

with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 

At the same time, Article 129 stipulates that “in peace 

time military authority can discharge only functions 

that are directly connected to military discipline.” In 

July 2011, Mexico’s Supreme National Court of Justice 

(SCJN) ruled that such members of the armed services accused of torture, extrajudicial killing, and other 

abuses should be tried in civilian courts. “This is a 

very significant advance,” said Andrés Díaz, a lawyer 

for the Migue Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center in Mexico City. “It creates very clear principles for 

Mexican judges.”49

Enacting a law or rendering a judicial finding does 

not ensure resolution of the problem at hand. A cause 

celébré involved Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Bravo 

Alcaraz, who on March 19, 2009, opened fire with a 

sub machine gun on a vehicle carrying two civilians, 

one of whom died. When the survivor tried to escape, 

the colonel asked why a lieutenant had failed to shoot 

him, saying, "Fucking mothers! Why are you bringing him in alive? Take him over there and kill him,” 

which the subordinate did.50 The SCNJ’s ruling aside, 

Bravo Alcaraz remains incarcerated in a military prison under an arraigo or detention order. With respect 

to the case, SEDENA issued the following statement: 51

The Defense Ministry assures society in general that it 

will in no form tolerate actions contrary to the military 

laws and regulations, and when one of its members 

fails to conform to the Law, his behavior will be investigated . . . and he will be punished according to 

the strict application of the law without regard to his 

rank, assignment, or commission without impunity 

nor opaqueness.
48

At the early February 2012 “Loyalty March,” a 

military ceremony, General Galván admitted that the 

armed forces had made mistakes during the drug war 

even as he praised the chief executive as “an intelligent, brave, honest commander who has identified 

himself with the troops.” At the same time, defense 

minister urged clarification of the legal framework in 

which troops battled organized crime. Article 129 of 

the 1917 Constitution, which specifies that: No military authority may, in time of peace, perform any functions 

other than those that are directly connected with military 

affairs,” has cast doubt on the legality of the military’s 

involvement in fighting criminal organizations. No 

doubt Galván and other top brass are concerned lest 

their critics seek legal action to embarrass them now 

that the Calderón administration has left office. 

In late November 2011, Netzai Sandoval, a Mexican human rights lawyer, filed a complaint with the 

International Criminal Court in The Hague, urging an 

investigation of the deaths of hundreds of civilians at 

the hands of the military and drug traffickers. The 

petition, signed by 23,000 Mexican civilians, named 

Calderón, Sinaloa Cartel boss Guzmán Loera, Public 

Security Minister, Genaro García Luna, and the commanders of the Army and Navy.52 Activists’ pleas 

aside, legislators from the PRI have blocked reform 

of the Code of Military Justice that would transfer 

jurisdiction over alleged crimes against civilians by 

members of the armed forces to civil courts. In late 

April 2012, the chairman of the Justice Committee in 

the Senate claimed that SEDENA does not want the 

change, and that his incredibly influential PRI colleague, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, posed the most formidable obstacle to change.53
49

In response to freedom-of-information petitions, 

SEDENA has begun to shed light on judicial actions. 

In February 2012, it reported that 344 members of 

the Army were behind bars, while others were either 

standing trial or under arrest. This figure, which did 

not include deserters, embraced five generals, two 

colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and five majors. General Manuel de Jesús Moreno Aviña was convicted 

after subordinates testified that he had ordered the 

execution of civilians, their torture, and clandestine 

burials. He committed these crimes, along with collaboration with narco-traffickers, when commanding 

the military garrison in Ojinaga, Chihuahua, between 

April 2008 and August 2009.54 Thirty-one other members of the Army were convicted because of links to 

organized crime, and 19 of these were tried in response to recommendations from the CNDH. Several generals joined their ranks. In mid-March 2011, 

military authorities arrested Pedro “El Guacho” Toga 

Lara in Saltillo, where he reportedly served as Los 

Zetas’ number two in the city. He and 16 colleagues 

were incarcerated when their names were found on 

the payroll or “narcolista” of Los Zetas. In addition 

to the chief of the General Staff for the military zone, 

those taken into custody included Sargent Evencio “El 

Batman” Castillo, a former member of the Special Airborne Forces Group (GAFES), from which the original 

Zetas deserted. Reportedly, El Batman recruited for 

Los Zetas who, in return for information about troop 

movements, received 3,000 pesos or more every two 

weeks at an OXXO convenience store, a 7-Eleven, or 

a WalMart. The prisoners alleged that they confessed 

only after being tortured.55 Figure 10 portrays notable 

cases of military personnel arrested, charged, or convicted of crimes.
50

Individual Date 

Arrested Crime/Alleged Crime Trial Court Current Status

General Ricardo Escorcia 

Vargas (commander of 

24th Military Zone in 

Morelos) and Lt. Col. 

Silvio Hernández Soto.

May 18, 

2012

Provided information to 

the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) in late 2007 

when they were allies of 

the Sinaloa Cartel. 

Military (Yet to stand 

trial)

Incarcerated in 

Almoloya highsecurity prison 

in Mexico State 

on July 31, 

2012.

Retired Div. Generals 

Ricardo Escorcia Vargas 

and Tomas Ángeles Dauahare (formerly Number 

Two in SEDENA); Brig. 

General Roberto Dawe 

González; commanded an 

elite unit assigned to the 

20th Military Zone headquartered in Colima.*

May 15,

2012

Provided information to 

the BLO in late 2007 when 

they were allies of the 

Sinaloa Cartel. 

Military (Yet to stand 

trial); Ángeles Dauahare has produced 

documents indicating 

he was in Germany at 

the time of the alleged 

crime.

Incarcerated in 

Almoloya highsecurity prison 

in Mexico State

on July 31, 

2012.

Gen. Manuel de Jesús 

Moreno Aviña; excommander of garrison 

in Ojinaga, CHIH on the 

Texas border.

Jan. 30, 

2012

Collaboration with narcotraffickers in torture, 

execution,

and clandestine

burials of civilians.

Military Pending

Brig. Gen. Rubén Pérez 

Ramírez N.D. Aiding narco-traffickers Military Imprisoned

Maj. Iván Reyna Muñoz 

(represented Mexico in 

Panamerican Games in 

1991 and 1993.)

Nov. 

2011

Extortion; accused by 

Édgar “La Barbie” Valdez 

Villarreal of cooperating 

with the BLO.

Military

A captain, four lieutenants, and two sergeants.

MidOct., 

2011

The Army accused them 

of warning the BLO of 

pending military operations against the cartel in 

Morelos.

Military

Confessed and 

were confined 

in the federal 

prison in Villa 

Aldama, VC.

Carlos Fidel Ábrego 2011

Altering the scene where 

soldiers, working with 

Nuevo León police, killed 

an innocent young man, 

Jorge Otilio Cantú on 

April 18.

Civilian court placed 

him under the jurisdiction of a military 

tribunal.

Seeking amparo 

from Mexico’s 

Supreme Court 

(SCJN).

Sgt. Evencio “El Batman” 

Castillo; ex-member of 

GAFES special forces.

March 

17, 2011

The only GAFES soldier 

captured in connection 

with safeguarding Los 

Zetas in COAH; he allegedly received 3,000 pesos 

($240) every 2 weeks for 

reporting troop 

movements.

Military Imprisoned

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel Accused, Arrested, 

Charged, or Convicted of Crimes.
51

Note: *Major Iván Reyna Muñoz, subordinate of Escorcia Vargas, 

was convicted for the same crime and imprisoned in Querétaro; 

Defense Secretary Galván, who was unaware of the investigation 

into Dawe’s activities, had planned to promote the general.

Sources: Gustavo Castillo García, “Militares acusados de ejecutar

a 7 en Chihuahua buscan apoyo de SCJN” (“Officers Accused 

of Executing 7 in Chihuahua Seek Support of SCJN”), La Jornada, 

May 20, 2012; Benito Jiménez, “Suman 290 militares presos por 

abusos” (“Total of 290 Military Prisoners Charged with Abuses”), 

Individual Date 

Arrested Crime/Alleged Crime Trial Court Current Status

Pedro “El Gaucho” Toga 

Lara

March 

12, 2011

Recruited 21 military 

personnel, including a 

general in the 6th Military 

Zone in Saltillo, COAH, to 

protect Los Zetas in return 

for generous bribes.

Military Imprisoned

Retired military officers 

Francisco Ortega Zamora 

and Juan Carlos Cruz 

Espinoza who served, 

respectively, as police 

chief and assistant police 

chief in Tijuana, BC.

Feb. 

2010

Allegedly protected notorious killers and traffickers 

José Manuel “El Teo” 

García Simental and 

Raydel “El Muletas”/“The 

Crutches” López Uriate.

N.A. (Retired officers 

still come under the 

jurisdiction of military 

tribunals).

N.A.

Major Elfego José Luján 

Ruiz; commander 35th 

Infantry Battalion in 

Nuevo Casas Grandes, 

CHIH.

March 

2010

Eye Witnesses claimed 

that he ordered two 

deserters smothered and 

their bodies burned.

Military; seeking an 

amparo or injunction 

from SCJN.

Imprisoned in 

military penitentiary in DF.

Lt. Col. Alfredo Bravo 

Alcaraz: subcommander 

of 35th Infantry Battalion 

in Nuevo Casas Grandes, 

CHIH.

March 

10, 2010

Committed atrocities 

against civilians.

Military; seeking an 

amparo from SCJN on 

the grounds that he 

was following orders; 

case under consideration.

Imprisoned in 

military penitentiary in DF.

Sgt. José Félix Flores 

Camacho 2007

Killing three people while 

driving a military vehicle 

in EDOMEX.

Seeking an amparo 

from SCJN. Pending

Silvia Hernández Tamari 

(military nurse) N.D. Sexual abuse of a minor. Military (after a PGR 

investigation). No information

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel Accused, 

Arrested, Charged, or Convicted of Crimes cont.
52

Reforma, May 12, 2012; Benito Jiménez, “Tienen en prisión a cinco 

Generales” (“Five Generals are in Prison”), Reforma, February 19, 

2012; “Pagaba a General narco en Coahuila” (“Narco-traffickers 

Paid a General in Coahuila”), Reforma, February 18, 2012; “Ordenó 

quemar a dos desertores” (“Two Deserters Ordered Burned”), El 

Heraldo de Chihuahua, February 15, 2012; Randal C. Archibold, 

“Mexican General Is Charged in Killings and Abuses,” New York 

Times, February 1, 2012; Abel Barajas, “Planeaba Sedena ascender 

a Dawe” (“Defense Ministry Planned to Promote Dawe”), Reforma, July 28, 2012; and Víctor Fuentes, “Prevé Corte acotar el fuero 

militar” (“Court Indicates That It Will Set Boundaries for Military 

Tribunals,” Reforma, July 28, 2012); and Benito Jiménez, “Transladan a Generals a penal” (“Generals Transferred to Prison”), Reforma, July 31, 2012. 

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel

Accused, Arrested, Charged, or Convicted of 

Crimes, cont.

While moving slowly to put its house in order, the 

Army still encompasses senior brass who have at least 

one foot, if not two, planted in the past. This was evident when SEDENA held a ceremony in the Distrito 

Federal’s Military Camp No. 1 to pay homage to General Mario Acosta Chaparro, who died at the hands 

of an assassin in Mexico City on April 20, 2012. During 45 years in the military, the deceased retiree had 

commanded parachutists, infantry battalions, the 27th 

Military Zone in Guerrero, and the Judicial Military 

Police. Still, his career was tainted by persistent accusations that he had protected the enormously powerful drug-trafficker Amado “Lord of the Skies” Carrillo 

Fuentes. He was also linked to the disappearance in 

Guerrero of 143 alleged subversives during the “dirty 

war” of the 1970s. A colonel who had served under 

Acosta spoke at his memorial service and stated that: 

“I wish that many generals were like him.”56
53

Apart from brutal killings and collaboration with 

the enemy, the Army has been cited for the mismanagement of funds. The Superior Auditor of the Federation (ASF), Mexico’s version of the U.S. General 

Accounting Office, has charged a SEDENA agency 

that handles $64 million with letting large no-bid contracts. In addition, the Defense Ministry paid Russia 

approximately $1 million to void an order to repair 

five helicopters. A Ukrainian firm received $1.6 million to transport the aircraft, but cancelled the agreement without paying a penalty. In 2009 the Army 

purchased 54 Humvees, which had been used only 

two times as of July 2010.57

Invoking national security, the Defense Ministry 

rejected a request from the Mexican Academy of Science to test the GT200, a molecular detector purchased 

from the United Kingdom’s Global Technical LTD. 

The Army (738) and other security agencies have purchased 940 of these devices, known as the “Devil’s 

Ouija” at a cost of $28 million for use in anti-narcotics 

operations. Physicist Dr. Luis Mochán Backal asserted that proponents were only describing the GT200’s 

positive qualities, while omitting its “failures.”58

(See Figure 11.)

To strengthen the esprit de corps and discourage 

desertions, SEDENA has initiated 21-gun salutes at 

burials, made certain a military band was on hand 

to honor the fallen, provided a memorial flag to the 

wife, authorized a life pension for widows, and furnished broader insurance coverage. Furthermore, it 

has erected a monument to soldiers who died while 

serving their country.61
54

Figure 11. Military Budgets and Desertions.

Notes:

* Juan Arvizu and Andrea Merlos, “Este año van 18 mil: 

diputados,” El Universal, December 4, 2008.

** Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “A la baja, reclutamiento para 

Ejército mexicano,” El Universal, February 8, 2009.

*** Desertions between December 1, 2000 and August 31, 

2008: the number between January 2007 and June 2011 was 40,179, 

according to “Con mejor salario baja deserción en fuerzas armadas,” Milenio.com, September 11, 2011; of this number, 17,758 

were soldiers, 119 officers,59 and eight “jefes” (ranking officers); 

see “Más de 100 mil soldados han desertado en siete años, dice el 

Ejército” (“The Army Says that More than 100 Thousand Soldiers 

have Deserted in Seven Years”), Diario Las Americas.com, January 23, 2008, available from www.diariolasamericas.com/news; and 

January 1 through November 27, 2008; Benito Jiménez, “Refuerza 

Ejército plan de reclutamiento” (“Army Reinforces Recruitment 

Plans”), Reforma, February 7, 2008. 

Year Budget

(Millions of Pesos)

Increased Pay for 

Combat Troops No. of Desertions

1997 28.456 11,122

1998 27,435 18,861

1999 30,311 19,849

2000 20,375 22,205

2001 22,424 15,870

2002 22,705 15,503

2003 22,831 14,744

2004 23,332 18,267

2005 25,002 20,224

2006 26,031 4,000 pesos 16,405

2007 32,200 26.9% 16,641

2008 34,861 41.2% 8,280

2009 43,632 68.6% 6,879

2010 43,632 92.2% 4,398

2011 50,039 118.5% 

(8,000 pesos)

1,394 

(Through May 31)

2012 55,610 N.A. N.A.
55

**** Between 1995 and September 2008, 1,559 GAFES deserted; between March 2009 and March 2011, some 121 Special Forces 

went absent without leave (AWOL) between January 2007 and 

November 30, 2011, 92.43 percent of the 69,315 deserters were 

common soldiers, many of whom had no idea of the rigors of 

military life.60

Sources: www.sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2007/marzo_2007.pdf; www.

sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2011/febrero-2011.pdf; www.infomexorg.mx/

gobiernofederal/moduloPublico/rMedioElectP.action?idFolioSol

=0000700017811&idTipoResp=6#; www.sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2011/

junio-2011.pdf; “Recompensan a militares” (“Compensation of 

Military Men”), Reforma, February 19, 2012.

Figure 11. Military Budgets and Desertions, cont.

To compensate for desertions, the Army has also 

reached out to young peasants, who have been devastated by their country’s sluggish economic growth 

amid a recession in the United States. Although training may be rigorous and assignments challenging, 

campesinos from extremely poor states like Oaxaca, 

Guerrero, and Chiapas experience a better quality of 

life in the military. “There is recruitment throughout 

the Republic, principally in marginal and economically vulnerable areas to take advantage of the human 

resources necessary for integrating the [recruits] into 

the Army as soldiers,” said Brigadier General Sergio 

García Vera, subdirector general of personnel at SEDENA. He reported recruiting 80,808 elements during 

the first 4 1⁄2 years of Calderón’s administration.62 (See 

Figure 12.)
56

Figure 12: Composition of Mexico’s Armed Forces.

*A partial breakdown of personnel is 115,095 soldiers (regular soldiers); 8,506 corporals, 757 second sergeants, 283 first sergeants, 661 second lieutenants, 462 first lieutenants, 52 second 

captains, 40 first captains, 32 majors, and 10 lieutenant colonels.

 ** Tentative Figures.

Year Total Personnel Number of Members 

of the Army*

Number of Members 

of the Navy

1980 102,975 102,975 N.A.

1985 158,661 124,497 34,164

1990 192,994 151,178 41,816

1991 198,955 155,218 43,737

1992 203,829 157,147 46,687

1993 210,241 162,169 48,072

1994 216,943 168,773 48,170

1995 225,080 171,952 53,128

1996 232,166 179,038 53,128

1997 236,575 182,328 54,247

1998 235,894 182,328 53,566

1999 237,301 182,329 54,972

2000 237,552 182,329 55,223

2001 234,308 185,143 49.165

2002 238,169 188,143 50,026

2003 238,447 191,143 47,304

2004 236,459 191,143 47,316

2005 238,787 191,143 47,644

2006 244,238 196,767 47,471

2007 246,742 196,710 50,032

2008 254,035 202,355 51,680

2009 258,992 206,013 52,979

2010 259,237 206,013 53,224

2011 259,237** 206,013 53,224

2012 259,630** 206,013 53,617
57

Sources: Secretaría de Defensa Nacional; Secretaría de Marina; 

and Presidencia de la República, Quinto Informe, Anexo: “Recursos Humanos and Profesionalización de los Miembros de Las 

Fuerzas Armadas” (Fifth State of the Nation Address, Annex: 

Human Resources and Professionalization of Members of the 

Armed Forces).

Figure 12: Composition of Mexico’s Armed 

Forces, cont.

SEDENA has not followed César Duarte Jáquez’ 

recommendation that it draft so-called “Ni-Nis”—

the roughly 7.5 million young Mexicans who neither 

work nor study, but live aimless, sometimes violent, 

lives. In making this proposal, Chihuahua’s governor 

asserted that these youngsters were “easy marks to be 

recruited by organized crime. . . .” Former Secretary 

of Education Alonso Lujambio quickly rejected the 

idea, stating that there were only 285,000 such young 

people and stressing the importance that these individuals pursue educational opportunities.63

Security firms in Mexico are doing a brisk business. In recruiting body guards, skilled drivers, technical experts, and consultants, they often look to former members of the military not only because of their 

training and discipline but also their legal right to carry firearms. Ricardo de León Dorantes, president of 

the National Council of Public Security (CNSP), which 

embraces 200 firms, estimated that 40 percent of body 

guards hired by private parties are former members of 

the armed forces, while half are ex-policemen. In late 

2008 their salaries ranged from 12,000 pesos ($1,200) 

to 20,000 pesos ($1,667) per month. In 2010, outlays on 

private security increased 11 percent over the previous year nationwide—with a 33 percent rise in states 

along the U.S.-Mexican border.64 Although security 
58

providers are supposed to register with authorities, 

hundreds of such corporations ignore this requirement, which gives them greater flexibility to hire cashiered cops and soldiers.

On a day-to-day basis, average citizens often hand 

over modest sums to informal attendants. These 

franeleros, who often use sidewalks as parking places,

keep an eye on their vehicles while they are running 

errands, shopping, or dining.

MANUFACTURING 

The Army has expanded its manufacturing of 

munitions, uniforms, shoes, and other items. In August 2010, a SEDENA spokesman indicated that the 

military was 90 percent self-sufficient in the output of 

much of its equipment. In addition, the SEDENA Military Factories in Mexico City produce, under license, 

the Heckler and Koch family of small arms and light 

weapons. They have begun turning out the FX-05 

Xiuhcóatl assault rifle, as well as moving away from 

the 7.62 mm G-3 to smaller and more effective caliber 

weapons. The factories are also assembling the Oshkosh SandCat protected patrol vehicle, a 4x4 armored 

truck renowned for its speed and maneuverability.65 

If it is not already doing so, SEDENA will produce 

its own version of a homemade armored tank, nicknamed El Montruo 2011, employed by Los Zetas for 

urban warfare. The steel-plated “Monster,” also referred to as the “Batimóvil,” operates at up to 68 miles 

per hour, carries a dozen shooters, and provides small 

openings through which they can fire high-powered 

weapons. “El Monstruo 2011 is a homemade armored 

tank, the latest weapons innovation from Los Zetas, 

one of Mexico’s largest and most brutal drug trafficking organizations.”66
59

In mid-2012 El Universal reported that the ministry 

signed a contract for $5,000 million pesos ($379 million) to purchase state-of-the-art communication interception equipment from Security Tracking Devices, 

a Jalisco-based firm. The agreement raised questions 

because of its secrecy, the potential for the Army to 

eavesdrop on innocent civilians, and the inability of 

journalists to find the contractor’s alleged office in 

Mexico City.67 

POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Although Mexico’s generals have obeyed rather 

than deliberated, the absence of coups d’état does not 

mean that the Army is indifferent to political decisions. Traditionally, they have expressed their views 

to the president or secretary of interior behind closed 

doors. Such sub rosa contacts ended during the Fox 

administration (2000-06) when Defense Secretary de 

la Vega formally presented the activities of SEDENA 

to a congressional committee. Rather than visit Congress, General Galván has invited legislators to meet 

with him on military installations.

Key officers have spoken out on political matters. 

General Sergio Aponte Polito, commander of the Second Military Region in northwest Mexico, publically 

excoriated the ubiquitous involvement of elected and 

appointed officials in drug trafficking in the Tijuana 

area. He claimed that the police were cooperating 

with migrant smugglers, bank robbers, and drug lords. 

“The jowly, silver-haired 64-year-old general speaks 

in severe tones and writes as if he’s inscribing his epitaph,” observed a seasoned journalist. “What he’s doing is completely unprecedented,” stated Roderic Ai 

Camp, an expert on the Mexican military at Claremont 
60

McKenna College.68 Aponte Polito’s persistent criticism upset the National Action Party administration 

in Baja California and led to his being transferred to 

Mexico City. 

Three years later, another commander of the Second Military Region was less reticent to condemn unprofessional behavior. After the September 16, 2011, 

Independence Day celebration, General Alfonso Duarte Múgica publically upbraided Government Secretary Cuauhtémoc Cardona Benavides. At a gathering 

organized by the military, Duarte said “I do not want 

to see [Cardona] in any military installation, he is an 

ugly and disrespectful drunk.” Both Governor Osuna 

Millán and a television camera crew observed this 

contretemps.69

President Fox’s defense secretary, General Gerardo Clemente R. Vega García (2000-2006), followed 

the practice of civilian cabinet members by appearing 

before a congressional committee to discuss his ministry’s interests, goals, and performance. In contrast, 

General Galván shuns the public sessions for private 

meetings with legislators from various parties in his 

headquarters. He has not shied away from upbraiding politicians on their performance. “I understand 

that political power is complex and involves various 

forms, objectives, and interests. Nevertheless, at all 

times and under all circumstances [elected officials] 

the national well-being must take precedence,” he 

said after the 2010 Loyalty March celebration.70

PENITENTIARIES 

The government euphemistically calls a number of its prisons “Centers of Social Readaptation” 

(CERESOs). Wardens, their subordinates, and guards 
61

nominally control Mexico’s penitentiaries, especially 

the nine high-security federal facilities. In reality, 

pay-offs by inmates to their keepers, combined with 

the proliferation of organized gangs behind bars, give 

well-heeled convicts unparalleled influence. Wealthy 

“deluxe prisoners” grease the palms of guards, who—

for the right price—will permit them to exit the facility 

for a few hours to conduct business, love-making, or 

criminal ventures. They will use every tactic to include 

fear, intimidation, money, sex, etc., to compromise the 

prison staff and the administration.71

Inmates sometimes settle scores with adversaries behind bars—most notoriously exemplified in 

the 2004 murders of El Chapo’s brother, Arturo “El 

Pollo”/”The Chicken” Guzmán Loera (December 31) 

and his associate Miguel Ángel “Ceja Güera”/White 

Eyebrow” Beltrán Lugo (October 6) inside La Palma 

prison. At the same time, drug lords carry on negotiations behind bars. The late Assistant Attorney General José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos acknowledged that 

Los Zetas’ patron, Osiel, cut a deal to cooperate with 

Tijuana Cartel honcho, Benjamín Arellano Félix, to 

decimate the Sinaloa Cartel while both were “locked 

up” in La Palma prison near Mexico City.72

In January 2005 gangsters seized six employees of 

the Matamoros penitentiary and handcuffed, blindfolded, and shot them, leaving their cadavers in a 

white sport utility vehicle parked opposite the facility. 

This savagery may have been a response to the siege 

6 days earlier of La Palma prison by 750 Federal Police and military. Clearly, drug dealers had corrupted 

the guards and were overseeing violent networks 

from inside. In early December 2008 enemies are believed to have executed two Zetas in the Mazatlán 

detention center.73
62

Thanks to widespread access to cell phones, prisoners find it easy to engage in extortion. A committee 

of the Chamber of Deputies estimated that convicts 

had extorted 186,620 million pesos from 2001 to 2007. 

The equipment installed in 2007 to block telephone 

signals in 11 prisons fell into disrepair and no longer 

functions.74 This situation prompted Mexico State to 

invest 10 million pesos (roughly $770,000) to block 

telephone signals in its four largest penitentiaries, Neza-Bordo (Nezahualcóyotl), Barrientos (Tlalnepantla), 

Chiconaultla (Ecatepec), and Almoloya de Juárez 

(Santiaguito).75

Just as in the United States, drugs flow freely inside Mexico’s prison walls. Of the 37,000 inmates in 

Mexico City’s penal institutions, an estimated 25,900 

are addicts. Authorities admit that the availability of 

the substances, which may generate 15.5 million pesos a month, represents a convenient way to minimize 

melees and curb other violent outbursts. As a prison 

official told a city councilman: “Sir, if I cut off the flow 

of drugs, there will be a mutiny the next day.”76 In late 

2008, authorities discovered 51 packets containing 119 

kilograms of marijuana covered with sacks of toilet 

paper and boxes of soft drinks aboard a truck seeking to enter the capital’s Reclusorio Sur.77 So ubiquitous were drugs in the Detention Center (CEDES) of 

Reynosa that it gained fame as a “narcopenal,” which 

was run by the convicts. “La Suburban,” a gang linked 

to Los Zetas, not only handled the intramural drug 

trade, but extorted money from their foes who lived 

in an adjoining structure known as “the Sinai” in the 

two-building compound.78

Overcrowding accentuates turmoil. Of Mexico’s 

439 federal, state, and local penal institutions, 228 are 

stuffed with an excessive number of inmates. In Mex-
63

ico City’s Reclusorio Oriente, 70 prisoners occupy one 

six-by-five square meter cell. They must sleep standing up, lie in hallways, vie for green spaces to stretch 

out, or pay for access to a bunk.79 Exacerbating the 

crisis is that 80 percent of federal prisoners (34,952) 

are in state prisons—with the remainder (9,494) in 

federal institutions. In 2010 Mexico had 222,771 men 

and women behind bars, according to the Ministry of 

Public Safety.80

In Zacatecas on May 16, 2009, an especially brazen 

escape occurred, and all of it is available for public 

viewing on YouTube. Before dawn, 30 or more heavily armed thugs believed to be Zetas, riding in trucks 

adorned with AFI logos, stormed into the Cieneguillas penitentiary as one of their helicopters whirred 

overhead. In the blitzkrieg assault, they extricated 

53 prisoners, including Zetas, members of the Beltrán 

Leyva crime family, and other narco-felons. State and 

federal authorities immediately began apprehending 

escapees even as they investigated the director and 

his 50 subordinates to determine who fostered the escape.81 One of several recaptured was Osvaldo “The 

Vampire” García Delgado, a kidnapping specialist 

whose Los Cotorros gang coordinates activities with 

Los Zetas in the state of Hidalgo.

When incarcerated, Los Zetas threaten to beat 

other convicts if they do not fork over 5,000 pesos or 

more. In addition, the paramilitaries provide women, 

drugs, and food to these inmates who are forced to 

pay off debts incurred behind bars by working for Los 

Zetas even after they have completed their sentences. 

“There are few cases when men exit prisons clean,” 

explained one expert. “I can assure you that practically no one under 30 does so.”82 
64

In October 2009, actions of Los Zetas precipitated 

a riot in the Topo Chico prison in Nuevo León that 

the state police had to put down. Some 100 Zetas virtually controlled the 400 other inmates in the facility 

through extortion and shake downs for protection. Before the uprising, PRI Governor Natividad González 

Parás had brushed off friction in the penitentiary as: 

“A squabble between one group of friends against 

another group of friends over personal problems.”83

As in other facilities, Los Zetas practice virtual “selfgovernance” in the federal prison in Apodaca, Nuevo 

León (Cereso), where they attack members of the Gulf 

Cartel and other foes.84

Such conditions have prompted the government 

to dispatch Army units to conduct searches in penitentiaries and sometimes take control of the institutions. Examples abound: in early June 2009, elements 

of the Army and Federal Police riding in small tanks, 

armored vehicles, and troop transports swept into 

Xalapa’s Ignacio Allende prison, one of the oldest detention centers in Veracruz. The authorities did not 

disclose how many of the serious felons were moved 

to other facilities. 

In mid-August 2009, General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of the Fifth Military Zone, announced 

that troops would replace civilian administrators and 

guards at Cereso of Aquiles Serdán, located in the heart 

of Chihuahua state. This action followed the resignation of the warden after three of his bodyguards were 

killed. During the night of August 29, 2010, units of 

the 24th Military Zone took charge of Morelos’ Atlacholoaya Cereso after a series of violent incidents that 

took the life of the facility’s director. Soldiers also assumed control of district jails in Cuautla, Jojutla, Jonacatepec, Telecala, and Pueten de Istia.85 
65

Military men now serve as directors of the penal 

facilities in the three largest cities in Quintana Roo. In 

late April 2011, General Carlos Bibiano Villa Castillo, 

the state’s secretary of public security, placed officers 

in charge of the Cereso in Chetumal (Captain José de 

Jesús Moreno Abad), the Cereso in Cancún (General 

Eulalio Rodríguez Valdivia), and the jails in Playa del 

Carmen (Second Captain José Luis y Peniche Novelo) 

and Cancún (Captain Higinio Sánchez Baltazar). The 

state director of prisons is a civilian attorney, Ricardo 

Tejada de Luna.86

Army personnel now control access to the principal entrances to three Monterrey area penitentiaries—

Topo Chico, Cadereyta and Apodaca—inside of which 

more than 50 killings have taken place.87 Military police have also taken over security duties for the PGR’s 

Center of Federal Investigations in Mexico City where 

some 250 suspects were being held in mid-2012.88

In a volt-face, Defense Secretary Galván ordered 

52 soldiers held prisoner at the Campo Militar 1-J be 

transferred to a federal penitentiary in Villa Aldama, 

Veracruz, in April 2011. He feared that their underground allies might attempt to free the inmates from 

the SEDENA prison in Mexico City.89

CUSTOMS

In recent years, presidents have sought to fight 

corruption among customs agents—a Herculean challenge that they have lost because of the lucrative payments to officials who either close their eyes to smuggling or take part in the crime. In mid-August 2009, 

the armed forces took over the functions of the fiscal 

police in 49 land ports across the northern border. 

For its part, the Navy has begun overseeing customs 
66

operations in seaports. Two years earlier, the Army 

assumed the inspection of passengers at the Rodolfo 

Sánchez Taboada airport in Mexicali because of suspicion that seven Federal Preventative Police agents 

were facilitating cocaine shipments to the United 

States.90

GUARDIANS OF ELECTIONS

The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), a citizen-run 

body that registers voters, organizes the balloting, 

and announces the preliminary results, formally requested that the Army guarantee the security of elections in 2012, as it has done in previous balloting. 

Not only did the presidential showdown take place 

on July 1, but all 500 federal deputies and 64 of 128 

senators were chosen on that date. In addition, there 

will also be gubernatorial and city council contests 

in 14 states—with a local election in Coahuila set for 

October 21.91 Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of 

the IFE, stated that conditions appeared favorable in 

Mexico City, but that “a very complex situation” existed in Chihuahua, Guerrero Monterrey, Michoacán, 

and Tamaulipas. The military has provided security 

for past elections, but given the violence afflicting the 

nation, it sent more troops into the streets last year, 

especially in the vicinity of polling places.92 So narrow was Calderón’s 2006 victory that the Army still 

guards cast ballots night and day, 7 days per week, in 

the nation’s 300 voting districts. In Querétaro alone, 

21 soldiers fulfill this assignment.93

The vulnerability of politicians to narco-assassins 

became evident in the mid-2010 contest for governor 

in Tamaulipas, a state highlighted by fighting between 

Los Zetas and a group of syndicates supporting the 

Gulf Cartel. In the run-up to the July 4 election for the 
67

statehouse, Los Zetas executed PRI candidate Rodolfo 

Torre Cantú as he was traveling to the Ciudad Victoria airport on his final campaign swing. Although 

any politician may be targeted, the syndicates are especially eager to influence the voting in municipalities 

in which they store, process, and transport drugs.94

During Calderón’s administration, 28 serving mayors 

have died at the hands of cartels. PRI Federal Deputy 

Francisco Moreno Merino, whose constituency service office in Cuernavaca was fired upon and burned 

in March 2010, has requested that the military protect 

him and his family.95

FIREFIGHTERS

On August 25, 2011, a group of Los Zetas set fire 

to the Casino Royale in Monterrey. The conflagration 

took 53 lives. In the aftermath of the tragedy, SEDENA 

announced the formation of a brigade of fire fighters. 

Although the Army has long acted in accordance with 

its DN-III strategy of disaster relief, these efforts have 

typically focused on floods, volcanic eruptions, forest 

fires, tropical storms, earthquakes, and other catastrophes. The tragedy in Monterrey produced a broader 

view of this function, and involved activating an Immediate Response to Disasters and Emergencies Team 

(ERIED), composed of seven officers and 45 enlisted 

volunteers, which was formed in the aftermath of the 

September 1985 earthquakes that struck Mexico City 

and adjoining areas.96

SOCCER SOLDIERS

The Army and Federal Police were on hand to 

ensure the safety of players, officials, and fans when 

Torreón’s Santos Laguna (Lagoon Saints) and Mon-
68

terrey Rayados (Rays) competed in the Mexico’s Soccer Finals on May 2012. The tight security enabled 

the Torreón team to win 2 to 1—with no the only 

disturbances coming from disgruntled Monterrey 

aficionados.97

CONCLUSIONS

Several observations flow from this analysis. First, 

President Calderón gave the Mexican military an assignment for which it lacked proper training, preparation, and equipment. The more than 47,000 drug-related deaths during the previous chief executive’s tenure 

are more an indictment of dirty, incompetent civilian 

police agencies than of the armed forces, which have 

managed to capture dozens of important traffickers. 

The drug war and new tasks have expanded the Army’s budget, size, and stock of equipment. Regrettably, contact with the underworld has corrupted 

numerous enlistees and officers, while using security 

concerns to justify the purchase of a new presidential 

airplane at twice the cost of Air Force One.

Second, as it amplifies current functions, the Army 

(and, to a lesser extent, the Navy) will have greater 

contact with civilians. While military personnel may 

not socialize widely with men and women outside the 

barracks, it is likely that their status as a caste marginal from the rest of society will diminish. 

Third, Peña Nieto has unveiled a six-point security 

initiative. The document is ripe with shibboleths about 

“transparency,” “cooperation,” and “accountability.” 

More important is his plan to shift the primary focus of 

Mexico’s drug wars from that of hunting down cartels 

and their capos to preventing and curbing murders, 

kidnappings, and extortion. His Gobernación Secre-
69

tary, Miguel Osorio Chong, argued that Calderón’s 

“kingpin” approach failed miserably—with abductions soaring 83 percent, violent robberies 65 percent, 

and extortion 40 percent during the past six years. To 

improve anti-crime efforts, the new government has 

announced the creation of a paramilitary “National 

Gendarmerie (GN),” initially composed of 10,000 elements with the possibility of boosting the number 

to 40,000 civilians and military. This force, which is 

analogous to Chile’s Carabineri or Spain’s Guardia 

Nacional, will be deployed in hotspots where violence 

and instability are the greatest. The Ministry of Public 

Security (SSP) will be folded into Gobernación, which 

will spearhead the new version of the war on drugs. It 

will oversee intelligence collection and add 15 units to 

the Federal Police to concentrate solely on kidnapping 

and extortion. The government will continue to upgrade the quality of law-enforcement personnel—61 

percent earn just over $300 a month and nearly twothirds have only a elementary school education, according the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Such forces are anathema to shady politicians such 

as governors and mayors who want to preserve their 

grip on cops in their jurisdictions. Although the 10,000 

elements mentioned initially for the National Gendarmerie appear formidable, the number of men and 

women available at any given time shrinks when taking into consideration eight-hour shifts, illnesses, vacations, training exercises, and desertions. It remains 

to be seen whether SEDENA will supply its best and 

brightest to a force that it doesn’t control. Meanwhile, 

Mexico’s leaders will have no alternative but to depend heavily on the armed forces in combating DTOs 

for the next few months.
70

Fourth, Peña Nieto seeks to return thousands of 

soldiers to the barracks—a move that SEDENA is likely 

to applaud in light of NGO criticism of human rights 

abuses and corruption, as well as the prevalence of 

mental illness among troops.98 At the same time, the 

involvement of the Navy and the Support Forces of 

the Federal Police could grow in light of their success 

in fighting criminals. The future of the Federal Police 

Support Forces, also known as GOPES is uncertain. 

Under Calderón, this agency was headed by General 

(Ret.) Rodolfo Cruz López within the SSP and did a commendable job providing “assistance to civil authorities 

to combat organized crime and threats to the security of 

the nation.” 

Fifth, if the past is prologue to the future, strengthening Gobernación, creating the GN, and reconfiguring police functions will engender friction between 

and among these agencies and the Defense Ministry. 

Such tensions militate against amending the Constitution to place a single secretary over the Army and 

the Navy. Nor is it likely that the Army and Navy 

will configure a joint general staff. At the same time, 

the military will renew its effort in Congress to amend 

the Code of Military Justice to unambiguously justify 

the military’s profound involvement in combatting 

cartels. The armed forces want protection from NGOs 

who have accused senior officers of war crimes before the International Court of Justice and other 

tribunals—as has already occurred with charges 

against President Calderón.

Sixth, no matter which agency leads in fighting 

narco-criminals, the next Mexican chief executive will 

be under pressure to rely less on boots on the ground 

and more on informants, wire-taps, drones, surveillance cameras, computer analysis of communications, 
71

more rigorous gathering and examination of intelligence, and monetary oversight. There is a creative 

element to interservice rivalry, which finds the Army 

improving its intelligence gathering, analytic capability, and professionalism.

Seventh, domestic and international groups will 

force the armed forces to increase transparency and 

proclaim their firm opposition to human rights abuses—to the point of possibly allowing civil courts to try 

military personnel accused of certain crimes against 

non-combatants. 

Eighth, in the same vein, the Army and Navy will 

continue to publicize the ever-more visible presence 

of females in the armed services even as machismo remains alive. Little or no future growth in SEDENA’s 

numbers means that distaff officers and enlistees must 

still scramble for positions and promotions.

Ninth, the military will pursue its public relations 

campaign to downplay the corruption arising from 

interaction with cartels. The services will continue to 

employ media advertisements, survey research, and 

special events to ingratiate themselves with the public, which supports the men and women in uniform 

despite highly publicized bribetaking, thefts, misallocation of funds, and human rights violations.

Tenth, the northward flood of Central American 

emigrants and the southward thrust of Los Zetas and 

the Sinaloa Cartel make it crucial for Mexico to accept 

the difficult task, sometimes akin to herding cats, of 

coordinating social and anti-crime policies with its 

southern neighbors. 

Eleventh, mutual security concerns will lead to 

more numerous and closer contacts between the U.S. 

military and security agencies and their Mexican 

counterparts even as SEDENA and SEMAR reach out 
72

to Canada, Colombia, and other countries for training, specialized arms, intelligence, and instruction in 

cyber-security. 

Twelfth, Peña Nieto’s appointment of General 

Oscar Naranjo as his security guru could signal that 

DTOs that maintain a low profile, avoid eye-catching 

sadistic acts, and refrain from attacking citizens might 

become a low priority for pursuit and capture. Rather 

than throwing large units at the enemy as Calderón 

did, the Colombian four-star favors well-trained, 

highly mobile, relatively small squads.99

The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), 

headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado 

and better known as NORTHCOM, can also be helpful 

by furnishing language-training, information, radars, 

night goggles, and other used surveillance equipment 

to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and 

other organizations such as the Texas Department of 

Public Security. Both agencies’ responsibilities have 

mushroomed with the accelerated flow of drugs and 

drug-merchants across the 2,000-mile binational frontier, and the southward cascade of weapons. 

Operation NIMBUS, supervised by NORTHCOM, 

epitomized an effective Joint Task Force initiative. In 

mid-February 2012, active-duty soldiers from Fort 

Hood and Fort Bliss deployed to southern New Mexico and Arizona to bolster CBP’s security efforts.100

In the past, National Guard units have successfully 

bolstered protection of porous, vulnerable areas. Operation JUMP START, which involved a 2-year assignment of guardsmen to the Yuma Arizona sector, won 

praise from then-governors Arnold Schwarzenegger (California), Bill Richardson (New Mexico), and 

Janet Napolitano (Arizona), who wanted the 

mission extended.101
73

Finally, Washington can assist Mexico at the margins with intelligence, training, equipment, and vigilance of money flows. Ultimately, the key players 

have to be our neighbor’s political, economic, and social establishment. As things stand now, many of the 

privileged outside the country’s north live cocooned 

from much of the violence thanks to sophisticated security systems, trained drivers, skilled bodyguards, 

the ability to educate their youngsters abroad, and the 

wherewithal to move their families to, and run their 

enterprises from, Texas and other border states. As 

indicated earlier, far too many governors either collaborate with cartels or close their eyes to crimes. 

Mexico’s nomenklatura must comprehend that 

even if a miracle took place and narco activities disappeared overnight, their nation would still be home to 

a deadly nether world whose unscrupulous denizens 

are adept at murder, torture, kidnapping, extortion, 

money laundering, loan-sharking, prostitution, human smuggling, and a score of other crimes. In contacts with Mexican interlocutors, U.S. civilian and 

military officials must avoid hubris and recognize the 

severe limitation on ameliorating, much less solving, 

formidable problems in other countries unless local 

leaders challenge the miscreants in their midst.

ENDNOTES 

1. “Critican militarización de zonas indígenas” (“Criticism 

of Militarization of Indigenous Zones”), Reforma, December 17, 

2011; “Lanza Sicilia condena a guerra” (“Sicilia Launches Condemnation of War”), Reforma, September 16, 2011; and “Repudian 

jóvenes militarización del País” (“Young People Repudiate the 

Militarization of the Country”), Reforma, April 29, 2011.

2. Quoted in Antonio Baranda, “Niega Poiré militarización” 

(“Poiré Denies Militarization”), Reforma, June 7, 2011.
74

3. Colonel (Ret.) Eric Rojo, an expert on security who is 

managing director of Magination Consulting International, remembers that in the 1950s, when he was a child in Mexico City, 

the population got along well with local police, known as the 

“Azules” (“Blues”) or “Teocolotes” (“Owls”); later, Police Chief Arturo “El Negro” Durazo Moreno thoroughly corrupted the force 

by creating a sweeping racketeering network that involved arms 

dealing, extortion, and murders. He was imprisoned from 1986 

to 1992; Colonel Rojo, Interview with author, March 15, 2012, 

Washington, DC.

4. Roderic Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges,” Eric L. Olson, Donald A. 

shirk, and Andrew Selee, eds., Shared Responsibilities, Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Trans-Border Institute, University of San 

Diego, 2010. 

5. Doris Gómora, “Sedena: 5 años, 41 mil detenidos” (“Defense Ministry: 5 Years, 41 Detained”), El Universal, December 28, 

2011; and “Abate más criminals el Ejército” (“Army Takes Down 

More Criminals”), Reforma, January 21, 2012. 

6. Luisa Kroll, “Son of World’s Richest Drug Dealer Was Not 

Man Arrested, According to New Reports,” Forbes, June 23, 2012; 

and “The Son of ‘Chapo’: What Went Wrong,” Huffington Post,

June 28, 2012.

7. Juan Cedillo, “General toma posesión en SSP de Nuevo 

León” (“General Assumes SSP Post in Nuevo León”), El Universal, 

February 4, 2011.

8. Lest this point be overstated, American military personnel 

who have taken courses at Mexican Army institutions have told 

the author, off the record, that administrators and faculty condone cheating on the grounds that it forges an esprit de corps.

9. “Caen en NL 106 policías por narco” (“Narcos Kill 106 Police in Nuevo León”), Reforma, January 22, 2012.
75

10. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, “Proyecto de 

Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacíon para el Ejercicio Fiscal” 

(“Projected Spending in Federal Budget”).

11. Olga R. Rodriguez and Julie Watson, “Mexican Soldiers 

Wary of Often Corrupt State Police,” The Monitor, November 

9, 2009.

12. Quoted in Andro Aguilar, “Militarización sin resultados” 

(“Militarization without Results”), Reforma (“Enfoque”), April 

10, 2011.

13. “Caen 60% los homicidios en Juárez, estima Calderón” 

(“Homicides Fall 60% in Juárez, Calderón Estimates”) Informador.

com.mx, May 21, 2012.

14. Quoted in Rodriguez and Watson, “Mexican Soldiers 

Wary of Often Corrupt State Police.”

15. Quoted in William Booth, “WikiLeaks Discuss Notorious 

Mexican Drug Lord,” The Star, Toronto), December 26, 2010. 

16. Alfredo Corchado, “Drug Cartels Taking over Government Roles in Parts of Mexico,” Dallas Morning News, May 4, 2011; 

for an examination of Los Zetas, see George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal, Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 2012. 

17. Quoted in Sanjuana Martínez , “Si agarro a un zeta lo mato; 

¿para qué interrogarlo?: jefe policiaco,” (“We Kill Any Zeta We 

Capture; Why Interrogate Them?”), La Jornada, March 13, 2010.

18. Quoted in “Por ordenes militares, Villa Castillo dejará Torreón” (“Villa Castillo Left Torreón because of Military Orders”), 

La Jornada, March 15, 2011.

19. Henia Prado, “Rehúsen jóvenes empleo de policía” 

(“Youngsters Refuse to Work as Policemen”), Reforma.com, May 

23, 2011.
76

20. “Entrenan mercenaries a soldados en País” (“Mercenaries 

Train Soldiers in the Country”), Reforma.com, April 6, 2011; and 

Bill Convoy, “U.S. Private Sector Providing Drug-War Mercenaries to Mexico,” The Narcosphere, April 3, 2011. 

21. Verónica Ayala, “Quiere Santa Catarina Policía militar” 

(“Santa Catarina Wants Military Police”), Reforma, January 1, 2012. 

22. “Solicitan apoyo al Ejército” (“Army’s Support Is Sought”), 

Reforma, May 21, 2012.

23. Quoted in Randal C. Archibold, “Rights Groups Contend 

Mexican Military Has Heavy Hand in Drug Cases,” New York 

Times, August 2, 2011. 

24. Quoted in Maureen Meyer, with contributions from 

Stephanie Brewer, “A Dangerous Journey through Mexico: Human Rights Violations against Migrants in Transit,” Washington 

Office on Latin America, December 2010. 

25. Quoted in Iñigo Guevara Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2011, p. 12.

26. Alejandro Moreno and María Antonia Mancillas, “Encuesta/Respaldan labor de Fuerzas Armadas” (“Poll Backs Work of 

the Armed Forces”), Reforma, December 1, 2011. 

27. “Encuesta: ocho de cada 10 mexicanos respondan al Ejército en las calles” (“Poll Shows that Eight in Ten Mexicans Want 

Army in the Streets”), CNN México, August 31, 2011; and “Mexicanos ven al Ejército como la ‘única fuerza para enfrentar narco’” 

(“Mexicans View Army as the ‘Only Force with which to Confront Narco-traffickers’”), El Debate, January 5, 2012.

28. Pew Research Center, “Mexicans Back Military Campaign 

against Cartels,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 20, 2012, p. 4.

29. Horacio Jiménez, “PRI, autoritario y corrupto: Josefina” 

(“Josefina [Vázquez] Blasts PRI as Authoritarian and Corrupt”), 

El Universal, June 18, 2012.
77

30. Jorge Ramos, “Ejército regalará banderas por Bicentenario” (“The Army Will Give Flags for the Bicentennial”), El 

Universal, June 21, 2010. 

31. Quoted in Francisco Gómez and Doris Gómora, “Juegan 

a ser soldados” (“They Play at Being Soldiers”), El Universal, 

February 5, 2011. 

32. Benito Jiménez, “Abren Campo Military a paseos ciclistas” 

(“Military Camp Opened for Cyclists”), Reforma, February 3, 2012. 

33. Doris Gómora, “Prepara celebración de Fuerza Aérea” 

(“The Air Force Prepares a Celebration”), El Universal, February 

8, 2012. 

34. “Participará Ejército en película histórica” (“The Army 

Will Participate in Historical Film”), Reforma, April 1, 2012. 

35. Cristina Pérez Stadelmann, “El Ejército, impusor de 

grandes medalistas” (“The Army Publicizes its Best Athletes”), El 

Universal, November 20, 2011. 

36. Quoted in Nurit Martínez Carballo, “Oran en Catedral por 

el Ejército Mexicano” (“They Pray for the Mexican Army in the 

Cathedral”), El Universal, February 20, 2011.

37. “Realiza Ejército labor social en Juárez” (“The Army Performs Social Work in Juárez”), Reforma, January 20, 2012. 

38. Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, “La magna exposición ‘La 

Gran Fuerza de Mexico’ se presenta al público en Guadalajara, 

Jal” (“The Super Exposition ‘The Grand Force of Mexico’ Is Presented to the Public in Guadalajara, Jal”), Comunicado de Prensa, 

October 20, 2011. 

39. Quoted in Xóchitl Rangel “Ejército inaugural exposición 

en Puebla” (“Army Exposition Opened in Puebla”), El Universal, 

August 5, 2011. 

40. “Ejército fatigada por lucha antinarco” (“The Army is 

Weary from Fighting Narco-Traffickers”), El Universal, October 
78

16, 2011; Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, “Unidad de Vinculación 

Ciudadana,” October 28, 2011; and “Las contradicciones del Ejército y Derechos Humanos en el caso Almanza” (“Contradictions 

of the Army and Human Rights in the Almanza Case”), CNN 

México.com, June 22, 2010. 

41. Guevara Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing 

under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11, p. 14.

42. “Ejército Mexicano, la batalla de las mujeres” (“The Mexican Army; the Battle of Women”), El Siglo de Torreón, October 

8, 2007.

43. “Se crea el Observatorio para la Igualdad entre Mujeres 

y Hombres en el Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos” (“The Observatory Created for the Equality of Women and Men in the 

Mexican Army and the Air Force”), Noneventagrados, November 

28, 2011. 

44. “Pide diputada una mujer al frente del Ejército mexicano” (“A Deputy Proposes a Woman at the Head of the Mexican 

Army”), El Universal, December 16, 2008; and Jennifer Juárez, 

“’Adelitas’ en el Ejército Mexicano” (“‘Adelitas’ in the Mexican 

Army”), CNN México, September 19, 2010. 

45. Henia Prado, “Admiten brecha de género en el Ejército” 

(“Gender Friction in Army Admitted”), Reforma, March 8, 2012.

46. “Impulsan sin plazas a mujeres militares” (“Few Posts 

Open for Women”), Reforma, April 23, 2012.

47. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2011: Mexico,” 

available from www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/mexico; Silvia Otero, 

“Violaciones del Ejército son casos aislados: SRE” (“Abuses by the 

Army Are Isolated Cases: SRE”), El Universal, August 18, 2009; 

and “Realizan militares boda massiva” (“Members of the Military 

Take Part in a Mass Wedding”), Reforma, July 28, 2012.

48. Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “Homosexualidad y Ejército” 

(“Homosexuality [and the] Army”), Offnews.info, October 21, 2010. 
79

49. Quoted in Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico High Court Rules 

Civilian Courts Should Handle Alleged Military Abuses,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2011. 

50. Corporal Vicente Ramírez Márquez quoted in Víctor 

Fuentes and Benito Jiménez, “Va military a Corte por ejecución” 

(“The Military Goes to Court for the Execution”), Reforma, 

February 9, 2012. 

51. Quoted in Ibid. 

52. “Activists accuse Mexican president of war crimes in drug 

crackdown,” The Guardian, November 26, 2011. 

53. “Justifica PRI freno a reforma militar” (“PRI Justifies Halting Military Reform”), Reforma, April 29, 2012. 

54. Benito Jiménez, “Tienen en prisión a cinco Generales” 

(“Five Generals are in Prison”), Reforma, February 19, 2012. 

55. “Pagaba a General narco en Coahuila” (“Narco-traffickers 

Paid a General in Coahuila”), Reforma, February 18, 2012. 

56. “Rinde el Ejército honores a Acosta” (“The Army Pays 

Tribute to Acosta”), Reforma, April 22, 2012.

57. Andrea Merlos, “Detecta ASF errores en fondo de Sedena” 

(“ASF Detects Errors in SEDENA Fund”), El Universal, February 

18, 2011. 

58. Ricardo Gómez and Horacio Jiménez, “Sedena se niega a 

analyzar detector” (“Defense Ministry Opposes Analyzing Detector”), El Universal, October 14, 2011.

59. Guevara Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing 

under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11, p. 17.

60. Raúl Rodríguez Cortés, Gran Angular [column], “Rambos 

desertores” (“Rambos Deserters”), El Universal, November 19, 

2006; emorales, “Desertaron en 10 años 1,680 soldados de élite” 

(“1,680 Elite Soldiers Desert in 10 Years”), Milenio.com, March 7, 

2011; Benito Jiménez, “Tienen en prisión a cinco Generales” (“Five 

Generals Are in Prison”), Reforma, February 19, 2012.
80

61. President Calderón has continually lauded the armed 

forces and provided them with higher salaries and more benefits, 

which can be found at the Defense Ministry’s website, available 

from www.sedena.gob.mx; see also, “El gobierno mexicano anuncia 

aumentos en salarios y prestaciones de los soldados” (“The Mexican Government announces increases in salaries and benefits of 

the soldiers”), Terra, February 19, 2011; and “¿Que prestaciones 

tiene los soldados del ejercito mexicano?” (“What benefits do 

Mexican Army soldiers receive?”), available from mx.answers.

yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20091202083835AA7pUwO.

62. Benito Jiménez, “Recluta Ejército a campesinos ‘El Norte’” 

(“The Army Recruits Peasants ‘El Norte’”), México, July 3, 2011. 

63. Quoted in “El gobernador de Chihuahua plantea servicios 

militar pagado para ‘ni-nis’” (“Chihuahua’s Governor Proposes 

Paid Military Service for ‘Ni-Nis’”), CNN México, March 28, 2011; 

“Gobierno prefiere que ‘ni-nis’ estudien a que vayan al servicio 

militar” (“Government Prefers that ‘Ni-Nis’ Study Rather than 

Enter Military Service”), CNN México, March 30, 2011. 

64. “En México se incrementa el gasto en sistemas de seguridad” (“Cost of Security Systems Increasing in Mexico”), America 

Economía, October 14, 2010.

65. Guevara Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing 

under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11, pp. 20-21.

66. Quoted in Grace Wyler, “The Mexican Drug Cartel’s Purpose-Built Tank,” Business Insider, May 11, 2011.

67. “Paga Sedena 5 mmmdp por equipo para espiar” (“Sedena spends 5 billion pesos on spying equipment”), El Universal, 

July 16, 2012.

68. Quoted in Elliot Spagat, “Outspoken Mexican General 

Loses his Tijuana Post,” USA Today, August 8, 2008; the text of 

Aponte Polito’s letter to the Baja California attorney general appears in Julieta Martínez, “Carta íntegra del comandante Sergio 

Aponte Polito” (“Entire Letter of Commander Sergio Aponte Polito”), “El Universal, April 23, 2008. 
81

69. Quoted in “Alto mando militar regaña a secretario de gobierno de BC por borracho” (“High Military Official Scolds BC 

Secretary of Government for Drunkenness”), La Crónica de Chihuahua, September 20, 2011. 

70. Quoted in Benito Jiménez, “Regaña Ejército a partidos” 

(“Army Scolds Parties”), Reforma, February 10, 2010. 

71. William Sturgeon “The Evolution of Security Threat 

Groups into the Twenty-First Century,”Corrections.com, October 

15, 2009. 

72. “Mexican Army Urged to Take Over Prisons,” USA Today, 

August 1, 2005.

73. “Executan a ‘zetas’ en cárcel in Mazatlán” (“Zetas Executed in Mazatlán Jail”), Reforma, December 14, 2008. 

74. Daniel Venegas, “Diputados exigen alto a la extorsión desde cárceles” (“Deputies Demand Halt to Extortion from Jails”), 

Milenio, October 19, 2008.

75. “Inhiben señal de celular en 4 cárceles” (“Celular Signal 

Blocked in Four Jails”), Reforma, December 31, 2008. 

76. Quoted in Henia Prado, “Toleran autoridades drogas 

en penales” (“Authorities Tolerate Drugs in Prisons”), Reforma, 

November 16, 2008. 

77. Icela Lagunas, “Detectan 119 kilos de mariguana en 

aduana del Reclusorio Sur” (“119 Kilos of Mariguana Discovered 

in Customs of Reclusorio Sur Prison”), El Universal, December 

15, 2008. 

78. Arturo Rodríguez García, “Tamaulipas: la massacre del 

narcopenal”(“Massacre in Narco-prison”), Proceso, October 

29, 2008.

79. “Llevan cárteles a penales guerra por territorios” (“Cartel 

Turf War Takes Place in Prisons”), El Universal, October 18, 2008; 

and Claudia Bolaños, “Cárceles, infierno de pobres” (“Prisons, 

Hell for the Poor”), El Universal, May 16, 2009. 
82

80. Rolando Herrera, “Saturan a estados con reos federales,” (“They Saturate States with Federal Defendents”), Reforma, 

October 25, 2010.

81. Luis Brito, “Amotina el narco penales” (“Mutiny in Narcoprisons”), Reforma, May 24, 2009. 

82. “Reclutan cárteles en cárceles de NL” (“Cartels Recruit in 

Prisons in NL”), Reforma, February 27, 2012.

83. Arturo Rodríguez García, “Los Zetas, génesis de los conflictos en Topo Chico” (“Los Zetas Spark Conflicts in Topo Chico”), Proceso, October 8, 2009. 

84. Juan Cedillo, “Indagan ‘atentado’ en muerte de 14 internos” (“Crime Investigated in Death of 14 Inmates”), El Universal.

com.mx, May 21, 2011. 

85. “Édgar Ávila Pérez,” (“Ejército y PF toman penal de Veracruz” (“Army and PF Take Control of Veracruz Prison”), El Universal, June 9, 2009; “Ceresos bajo control: Ejército” (“Cereso Prisons Under Control: Army”), El Ágora, August 17, 2009; and “El 

Ejército asume el control de centros Penitenciarios en Morelos” 

(“Army Takes Control of Penitentiaries in Morelos”), Diariocrítico

de México, August 31, 2010.

86. Sergio Caballero, “Nombran a militares en penales de 

QR” (“Military Men Named to Control Prison Facilities in QR”), 

Reforma.com, April 26, 2011.

87. Patricia Salazar, “Asumen militares seguridad externa en 

penales de NL” (“Military Assumes External Security of Prisons 

in NL”), El Universal, October 24, 2011. 

88. “Cuidan militares centro de arraigo” (“Military Guards 

Holding Center”), Reforma, May 26, 2012. 

89. Víctor Fuentes, “Teme Sedena narcoescapes en su 

prisión” (“Sedena Fears Narco-escapes from its Prison”), Reforma, 

February 27, 2012.
83

90. Rosa María Méndez, “Mexicali: Ejército toma el control 

del aeropuerto” (“Mexicali: Army Takes Control of the Airport”), 

El Universal, June 12, 2007. 

91. The gubernatorial elections will take place in Chiapas, 

the Federal District, mayor), Guanajuato, Morelos, Tabasco, 

and Yucatán.

92. “IFE pide apoyo a militares para garantizar seguridad en 

comicios del 2012” (“IFE Seeks Help of Military in Guaranteeing 

the Security of the 2012 Elections”), CNN México.com, January 

3, 2012.

93. “Gastan en vigilar ¡boletas de 2006!” (“Cost of Guarding 

Ballots Cast in 2006!), Reforma, June 24, 2012. 

94. “Rodolfo Torre Cantú, asesinado en Ciudad Victoria” (“Rodolfo Torre Cantú Assassinated in Ciudad Victoria”), 

Univisión Noticias, June 28, 2010.

95. “Pide diputado protección militar” (“Deputy Asks for 

Military Protection”), Reforma, March 20, 2010; he made the request to officials at the 24th Military Zone, which is notorious for 

cooperating with drug cartels, especially the Beltrán Leyva Organization; Mayolo López, “Alerta FCH amenaza del narco” (“FCH 

Sounds Alert for Threat of Narco-traffickers”), Reforma, March 

1, 2012. 

96. “Capacitan Sedena a brigada de rescate” (“Sedena Trains 

a Rescue Brigade”), ABC de Monterrey, September 18,2011. 

97. “Santos Beats Monterrey 2-1 to Win Mexican Title,” MySA, 

San Antonio, May 20, 2012.

98. The military has recognized post-traumatic stress disorder among soldiers at least since 2005; see Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “El Ejército detecta trastornos por estrés en soldados” (“The 

Army Detects Mental Disturbances in Soldiers”), El Universal, 

October 17, 2005.

99. Peña Nieto and Naranjo insisted that all cartels would be 

treated equally; see, Jill Langlois, “Colombian Ex-Police Chief to 

Advise on Mexico Drug War,” Global/Post, June 15, 2012.
84

100. Staff Sargent Keith Anderson, “JTF-North Deploys Soldiers to Support Border Patrol in N.M., Ariz.” Border Narcotics, 

March 18, 2012.

101. Sean Holstege, “Region’s Governors Want 2-Year Mission Extended,” Arizona Republic, June 12, 2008.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. George W. Grayson

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil