FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NANUBHAI M. PATEL; 

LALITABEN N. PATEL; VIMAL 

NANU PATEL; VIMAL, INC., a 

California corporation, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a 

municipal corporation; LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S 

DEPARTMENT; DOES, 1 through 

10, inclusive, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-55294 

D.C. No. 

8:21-cv-01707-

DOC-KES 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 8, 2023*

Pasadena, California

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Filed July 11, 2023

Before: Susan P. Graber and John B. Owens, Circuit 

Judges, and John R. Tunheim,** District Judge.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY***

42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Pre-Seizure Notice

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment 

dismissing for failure to state a claim a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

action in which plaintiffs alleged that the Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department violated their constitutional 

rights by failing to provide pre-seizure notice.

The Sheriff’s Department seized $98,000 from Plaintiffs 

pursuant to a state court judgment.

The panel concluded that the district court correctly held 

that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of 

procedural due process. The panel considered the Mathews 

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), factors: the competing 

interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation under 

existing procedures, and the value of substitute 

procedures. First, the competing interests strongly weighed 

** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

against a conclusion that plaintiffs’ procedural due process 

rights were violated. The City as creditor had a clear interest 

in collecting the money judgment because it prevailed before 

the California trial court and on appeal, and plaintiffs did not 

allege that the funds were exempt or were needed for 

subsistence. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation under 

California’s procedures was small because the procedures 

required the clerk of the court only to transcribe the amount 

of the money judgment and take account of statutory 

defenses like the exemptions asserted by a judgment 

debtor. Finally, given the small risk of erroneous 

deprivation, the value of the substitute procedure proposed 

by plaintiffs did not outweigh the strong interests of the 

City. The judgment put plaintiffs on notice to apply for 

exemptions, which plaintiffs did not do. In addition, courts 

have largely rejected the suggestion that pre-deprivation 

notice is constitutionally required.
4 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

COUNSEL

Frank A. Weiser, Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser, Los 

Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Amber A. Logan, Logan Mathevosian & Hur LLP, Los 

Angeles, California; Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City 

Attorney; Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney; 

Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney; Office of the Los 

Angeles City Attorney; Los Angeles, California; Henry P. 

Nelson, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, California; for 

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs Nanubhai M. Patel, Lalitaben N. Patel, Vimal 

Nanu Patel, and Vimal, Inc., timely appeal from the district 

court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for failure 

to state a claim. After the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) seized $98,000 

from Plaintiffs pursuant to a state court judgment, Plaintiffs 

brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the failure 

to provide pre-seizure notice violated their constitutional 

rights. Reviewing de novo the dismissal, Bolden-Hardge v. 

Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 

2023), we affirm.

I. Background

In May 2018, the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) 

brought an action against Plaintiffs for abatement, unfair 
PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

competition, and public nuisance regarding their ownership 

of a motel. After contested proceedings, the state court 

entered judgment in the City’s favor in November 2019, 

issued injunctive relief, and required Plaintiffs to pay the 

City $98,318.71. The California Court of Appeal dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied 

review in March 2021. At no time did Plaintiffs file for an 

exemption.1

On September 22, 2021, at the request of the City, a state 

court issued a writ of execution in the amount of the 

judgment. About six days later, the Sheriff’s Department 

executed the writ against Plaintiffs’ personal and business 

bank accounts at Bank of America and seized approximately 

$98,000. 

Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the 

City, the Sheriff’s Department, and the County of Los 

Angeles (the “County”) on October 14, 2021. A month later, 

Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, the operative 

complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the seizure of funds without 

notice violated their procedural due process and other 

constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss, holding in relevant part that Defendants’ 

execution of the writ in compliance with California’s postjudgment collection procedures did not violate Plaintiffs’ 

due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 to review this timely appeal.

1 Under California law, judgment debtors may file to exempt certain 

essential funds from execution of a judgment. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 703.030(a).
6 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

II. Due Process Analysis

The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to 

state a claim for a violation of procedural due process.2 To 

determine whether there has been a due process violation, 

we consider the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),

factors, which “include the competing interests at stake, the 

risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures, and 

the value of substitute procedures.” Duranceau v. Wallace, 

743 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The competing interests strongly weigh against a 

conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights 

were violated. “The fact that the creditor has obtained a 

judgment establishing the monetary liability of the debtor 

gives it a strong interest in a prompt and inexpensive 

satisfaction of the debt.” Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 

58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc); see also Duranceau, 743 F.2d 

at 711 (reasoning that states have a general interest in “the 

effective enforcement of judgments”). In this case, the City 

as creditor has a clear interest in collecting the money 

judgment because it prevailed before the California trial 

court and on appeal. Although a judgment debtor has a 

strong interest in protecting statutorily exempt funds,

especially those needed for subsistence, e.g., Betts v. Tom, 

431 F. Supp. 1369, 1375–77 (D. Haw. 1977), Plaintiffs have 

not alleged—in either the original complaint or the first 

amended complaint—that the funds are exempt or are 

2 We reject the City’s argument that we should dismiss the appeal as 

defective because Plaintiffs copied and pasted sections of their district 

court brief. Although Plaintiffs repeat verbatim some of the arguments 

that they made to the district court, those arguments are relevant to our 

court as well. Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure nor any 

other binding legal authorities require that we dismiss the appeal.
PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

needed for subsistence. In these circumstances, the City’s 

interest in retaining the funds outweighs Plaintiffs’. See, 

e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Invs., 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 1985) 

(“The debtor’s interest in preserving non-exempt property 

for his or her own use is of course subservient to the 

creditor’s judgment.”). 

The risk of erroneous deprivation under California’s 

procedures is small because the procedures require the clerk 

of the court only to transcribe the amount of the money 

judgment and “take account of statutory defenses like the 

earnings exemptions asserted by [a judgment debtor].” 

Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 712 (noting, in similar 

circumstances, that “the sources of error are few”); Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 699.510(a) (outlining the procedure for the 

issuance of a writ of execution); Civ. Proc. § 699.520(f)–(g). 

Further, under California procedures, certain property is 

exempt automatically, without action by the debtor. See, 

e.g., Civ. Proc. § 704.080 (deposit accounts that receive 

public benefit or social security payments); Civ. Proc. 

§ 704.120 (unemployment benefits); Civ. Proc. § 704.170 

(aid payments from charitable organizations); Civ. Proc. 

§ 704.220 (money in a deposit account equal to a minimum 

standard of living).

Given the small risk of erroneous deprivation, the value 

of the substitute procedure proposed by Plaintiffs does not 

outweigh the strong interests of the City. Plaintiffs contend 

that no safeguards prior to seizure exist in California and 

suggest that they must receive notice before execution of the 

writ to protect exempt property. But the value of predeprivation notice—the substitute procedure—is de minimis 

because Plaintiffs already had a contested court proceeding 

that resulted in entry of the judgment. The judgment put 

Plaintiffs on notice to apply for exemptions. See Civ. Proc. 
8 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

§§ 703.020(b)(1), 703.030(a) (indicating that the judgment 

debtor may claim exemptions and the time and manner to do 

so); see also Phillips v. Bartolomie, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 62 

(Ct. App. 1975) (noting that a judgment debtor could file an 

exemption “immediately after the judgment is entered”). 

Moreover, as mentioned above, California has several 

automatic exemptions that apply without action by the 

debtor. Plaintiffs did not invoke these statutory safeguards, 

assert that their funds are exempt, or state that the funds are 

necessary for subsistence. Additional notice prior to 

execution of the writ would therefore not reduce the risk of 

erroneous deprivation.

In addition, courts have largely rejected the suggestion 

that pre-deprivation notice is constitutionally required. E.g.,

McCahey, 774 F.2d at 550; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of 

Duval, 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976); but see Betts, 

431 F. Supp. at 1377–78 (holding a Hawaii statute 

unconstitutional because it permitted garnishment of a bank 

account containing funds from an aid grant without predeprivation notice). Because the City’s interests outweigh 

Plaintiffs’, the risk of erroneous deprivation is small, and the 

value of the substitute procedure is minimal, we join those 

courts in holding that the lack of pre-deprivation notice did 

not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights in this particular 

situation. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“[D]ue process is 

flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 

particular situation demands.” (cleaned up)).
PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth and Fifth Amendment3 and Equal Protection claims.4 

We need not reach the remaining issues.5

AFFIRMED.

3 Plaintiffs briefly challenge the dismissal of their Fourth and Fifth 

Amendment claims on the basis of a due process violation, but those 

claims fail because there was no due process violation.

4 Plaintiffs rest their equal protection claim on a comparison between 

pre- and post-judgment debtors. However, this comparison is misplaced: 

post-judgment debtors clearly differ from pre-judgment debtors because 

post-judgment debtors already have had a judicial proceeding. See 

Brown, 539 F.2d at 1366; Wyshak v. Wyshak, 138 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812–

13 (Ct. App. 1977) (emphasizing the different due process concerns of 

pre-judgement and post-judgment debtors). Because the distinction is 

rational, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim cannotsucceed on this ground. 

5 Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief does not mention the First Amendment, so 

they have forfeited any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of that 

claim. See Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874, 880 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2021). They also do not argue “specifically and distinctly” that the 

district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend, so we do 

not review that issue. Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 

1994). Nor do we reach whether the Sheriff’s Department and the 

County have immunity.