[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10676

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CHRISTOPHER RYAN LESLIE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00512-CLM

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Leslie disagrees with the Commissioner of 

Social Security’s determination that he is not disabled. His 

applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits,

and supplemental security income were denied and the district 

court affirmed. Leslie now argues that the administrative law 

judge (ALJ) who presided over his hearing gave insufficient weight 

to the opinion of Dr. June Nichols, Psy.D, and that the ALJ’s finding

that Leslie had residual functional capacity to perform a full range 

of work with no exertional limitations was not supported by 

substantial evidence. He also argues that the district court gave a 

post hoc rationalization for the ALJ’s decision. Because Leslie has 

failed to show that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by

substantial evidence, we affirm. 

I. 

 Leslie applied for benefits in February 2017, claiming that his 

epilepsy and depression had made him unable to work since 

October 12, 2016. He previously worked at a restaurant, a lumber 

yard, and Walmart, but he testified that he stopped working after 

he started having seizures at work. 

In April 2017, Leslie was referred by Disability 

Determination Services to Dr. Nichols, who conducted a disability 

determination evaluation of Leslie. The evaluation provided 

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22-10676 Opinion of the Court 3

mixed evidence on Leslie’s mental and emotional capabilities. On 

the one hand, Dr. Nichols noted many things that suggested that 

Leslie retains significant mental and emotional capacity. For 

example, Leslie presented as neat and clean, he described visiting 

with friends, and he successfully completed several tasks showing 

basic concentration and memory skills, such as counting from 20 

to 1 in 20 seconds, spelling “world” backward, performing addition 

and subtraction, recalling three objects after a ten-minute period, 

and providing his personal story in detail. On the other hand, Dr. 

Nichols detailed Leslie’s self-described history of depression, abuse, 

and struggles with formal education. She opined that Leslie’s 

anxiety, depression, and learning disabilities would impair his 

“ability to respond to supervision, to coworkers and to work 

pressures in a work setting” and that he would struggle to 

“remember, understand, and carry out work related functions.” 

Dr. Teresa Moran, M.D., then reviewed the record and gave her

opinion that Leslie could work with some limitations in May 2017. 

Leslie’s application was denied in May 2017, and he 

requested and received a hearing before an ALJ. In February 2019, 

after a hearing, the ALJ determined that Leslie was not disabled and 

denied his application. The ALJ cited Leslie’s medical records 

showing many normal physical functions; evidence showing that 

Leslie could perform some multistep activities; evidence from 

Leslie’s daily life about his ability to maintain friendships, prepare 

meals, and care for himself; the opinion of Dr. Moran; elements of 

Dr. Nichols’s examination; and other evidence in the record. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

The ALJ concluded that “the overall evidence of the record 

is inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations of totally 

incapacitating symptomatology.” The ALJ instead determined that 

Leslie had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range 

of work at all exertional levels with several nonexertional 

limitations. These nonexertional limitations included a finding that 

Leslie cannot be exposed to hazardous machinery or drive 

commercially, a finding that Leslie can perform simple and 

repetitive tasks but not detailed or complex tasks, and a finding that 

Leslie can tolerate occasional contact with coworkers and the 

public but should deal primarily with things and not people. Based 

on Leslie’s residual functional capacity and limitations, the ALJ 

determined that Leslie could adapt to work as a dishwasher, a 

cleaner, or a cook helper. 

As part of his evaluation of the medical and non-medical 

evidence of Leslie’s mental impairments, the ALJ discussed the

opinions of Drs. Moran and Nichols. The ALJ considered and gave 

partial weight to Dr. Moran’s opinion, agreeing with some but not 

all of her proposed limitations on Leslie’s ability to work. And the 

ALJ considered and gave little weight to Dr. Nichols’s opinion, 

determining that her opinion was “broad” and did not “note 

specific function-by-function limitations.” 

The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s 

determination. That brought Leslie to the district court, which 

affirmed the ALJ. This is Leslie’s appeal. 

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22-10676 Opinion of the Court 5

II. 

Because the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s 

decision, we review the ALJ’s ruling as the final decision of the 

Commissioner. Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 

1313 (11th Cir. 2021). When the Commissioner denies benefits, we

ask whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, with de novo review of conclusions of law. 

Id. at 1313–14. “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, 

but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Nevertheless, 

substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla.” Id. at 1314 

(quotations omitted). Under this limited standard of review, we 

will not make factual findings or credibility determinations in the

first instance or re-weigh evidence. Id.

A claimant must be disabled to be eligible for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income. See 

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2).1 Social Security 

regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use to 

determine whether a claimant is disabled, with an intermediate 

step that determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Like the district court, we think

that this five-step process is easiest to understand with a chart:

1 Supplemental security income is also available for the aged and blind, but 

Leslie does not claim to be either aged or blind. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

The 5-Step Test 

Step 1 Is the claimant engaged in 

substantial gainful activity?

If yes, claimant is not 

disabled.

If no, proceed to Step 2.

Step 2 Does the claimant suffer from a 

severe, medically-determinable 

impairment or combination of 

impairments?

If no, claimant is not 

disabled.

If yes, proceed to Step 3.

Step 3 Does the Step-2 impairment 

meet the criteria of an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appx. 1?

If yes, claimant is disabled.

If no, proceed to Step 4.

*Determine Residual Functional Capacity*

Step 4 Does the claimant possess the 

residual functional capacity to 

perform the requirements of his 

past relevant work?

If yes, claimant is not 

disabled.

If no, proceed to Step 5.

Step 5 Is the claimant able to do any 

other work considering his 

residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience?

If yes, claimant is not 

disabled.

If no, claimant is disabled.

See id.; see also Viverette, 13 F.4th at 1312–13; Leslie v. Kijikazi, 

2022 WL 19648, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 2022). 

As part of the ALJ’s evaluation, the ALJ considers medical 

opinions about the claimant from acceptable medical sources. 

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22-10676 Opinion of the Court 7

“The ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different 

medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Buckwalter v. Acting 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2021) 

(quotation omitted). To meet this standard, the ALJ need not “cite 

every piece of evidence in the record” but must demonstrate that 

he “considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.” Id. at 

1326. The ALJ must “state with at least some measure of clarity 

the grounds for his decision.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, ALJs are to treat the 

opinions of treating physicians (who have an ongoing medical 

relationship with the claimant) and non-treating physicians (who 

provide one-off consultative opinions about the claimant)

differently.2 For these claims, a treating physician’s opinion is 

entitled to “substantial or considerable weight unless there is good 

cause to discount” it. Simon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 F.4th 

1094, 1104 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). But a nontreating physician’s opinion based on a single examination is “not 

2 In 2017, the Commissioner of Social Security eliminated the distinction 

between treating and non-treating physicians. Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844, 5,853

(Jan. 18, 2017)). But these amendments did not apply to any claims filed before 

March 27, 2017. See id.; 82 Fed. Reg. 16,869, 16,869 (Apr. 6, 2017). Because 

Leslie applied for his benefits in February 2017, this opinion describes the pre2017 regulations. We do not address the standard under the new regulations.

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

entitled to great weight.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363

F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. 

At the intermediate step of the disability determination 

process, the ALJ found that Leslie had the residual functional 

capacity to do a full range of work at all exertional levels with 

nonexertional limitations. Leslie disputes this finding for two 

reasons. First, Leslie argues that the ALJ erred by giving little 

weight to the opinion of Dr. Nichols, the Commissioner’s 

consulting physician. Second, Leslie argues that the ALJ’s finding 

that he could work at full capacity without exertional limitations 

was not supported by substantial evidence. We address these two 

arguments in turn. 

A. 

Leslie’s primary argument that the ALJ gave Dr. Nichols’s

opinion too little weight relies on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 

Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1995). In Wilder, the 

Seventh Circuit applied a “degree of suspicion to the administrative 

law judge’s decision to go against the only medical evidence in the 

case” when that evidence was “the only direct testimony 

concerning the critical issue.” Id. at 337. Leslie argues that this 

Court should likewise apply a “degree of suspicion” to the ALJ’s 

decision to give little weight to Dr. Nichols’s opinion, especially 

given that Dr. Nichols’s opinion was the “only evidence by an 

examining mental health professional.” 

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22-10676 Opinion of the Court 9

Dr. Nichols’s opinion was not entitled to the deference that 

Leslie asserts. Dr. Nichols was a non-treating physician.3 This 

Circuit has held that the opinions of non-treating physicians based 

on a single examination are “not entitled to great weight.” 

Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1160. Of course, the ALJ’s decision to 

discount the opinion must still be supported by substantial 

evidence. But under Crawford, we do not apply elevated scrutiny 

to the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Nichols’s opinion. 

And even if Wilder were the law in this Circuit, we doubt that it 

would apply here, where the physician’s opinion is not “the only 

medical evidence in the case.” Wilder, 64 F.3d at 337. 

Leslie appears to make three other arguments that the ALJ’s 

decision to give little weight to Dr. Nichols’s testimony was not 

supported by substantial evidence: (1) He argues that the ALJ failed 

to state with at least “some measure of clarity” the grounds for 

repudiating the examining physician’s opinion; (2) He argues that 

the ALJ substituted his judgment for Dr. Nichols’s medical 

expertise; and (3) He argues that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. 

Nichols for clarification about the basis of her opinion before giving

it little weight. 

3 Leslie cites some cases interpreting the treating physician rule rather than 

the non-treating physician standard described by this Court in Crawford. See, 

e.g., Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1986). These cases do 

not apply to the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Nichols, a non-treating physician, and we do not consider them. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

We are not persuaded by any of these arguments. After 

documenting record evidence about Leslie’s mental and emotional 

capabilities, the ALJ explained that he considered and gave little 

weight to the opinion because it was “broad” and did “not note 

specific function-by-function limitations” before finding the 

“overall evidence of the record” to be “inconsistent with the 

claimant’s allegations of totally incapacitating symptomatology.” 

Although Leslie repeatedly asserts that the ALJ’s explanation failed 

to provide “some measure of clarity,” he never explains what is

unclear about that analysis. To the contrary, we conclude that it is 

appropriately clear.

Likewise, while we agree with Leslie that an ALJ may not 

take on the role of doctor, the “final responsibility for deciding” the 

residual functional capacity is “reserved to the Commissioner,” not 

an examining physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1546(c) (giving the ALJ responsibility for assessing residual 

functional capacity); Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169, 1172 (11th 

Cir. 1984) (discussing how an ALJ necessarily must resolve 

conflicting medical evidence). By weighing conflicting evidence, 

the ALJ stayed within his role. 

And while Leslie provides several non-precedential cases in 

which ALJs were admonished to investigate evidence further 

rather than accept a seemingly anomalous conclusion, he provides 

no support for the idea that an ALJ must follow up with every nontreating physician’s opinion before giving that physician’s opinion 

little weight—nor does he attempt to reconcile that proposition 

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22-10676 Opinion of the Court 11

with Crawford’s holding that non-treating physicians’ opinions are 

“not entitled to great weight.” 363 F.3d at 1160. We do notsecondguess the ALJ’s decision to rely on the evidence that was already in 

the record. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b) (stating that the 

Commissioner might, but also might not, recontact medical 

sources if there is insufficient existing evidence to make a disability 

determination).

B. 

Leslie also claims that the ALJ’s finding that he had the 

residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels was not supported by substantial evidence. Here, 

we interpret Leslie as making two distinct arguments. First, Leslie 

claims that the ALJ’s finding is contradicted by both the ALJ’s own 

determination that Leslie cannot perform past work and by Dr. 

Nichols’s evaluation. Second, Leslie claims that the ALJ erred 

because he did not find that Leslie would be able to hold onto a job. 

Again we are not persuaded. Leslie cites evidence in the 

record that would have provided some support for a finding that 

he is disabled. But he does not engage with the ALJ’s nonexertional

limitations on Leslie’s residual functional capacity—such as a 

finding that Leslie cannot be exposed to hazardous machinery and 

commercial driving, a finding that Leslie can perform simple and 

repetitive tasks but not detailed or complex tasks, and a finding that 

Leslie can tolerate occasional contact with coworkers and the 

public but should deal primarily with things and not people. Nor 

does Leslie engage with the evidence of his capacity to continue 

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10676

working—like his medical records showing many normal physical 

functions; the evidence showing that Leslie could perform some 

multistep activities; and the evidence from Leslie’s daily life about 

his ability to maintain friendships, prepare meals, and care for 

himself—all of which contributed to the ALJ’s determination that 

“the overall evidence of the record is inconsistent with the 

claimant’s allegations of totally incapacitating symptomatology.” 

The record shows conflicting evidence, and the ALJ grappled with 

that evidence to reach a nuanced determination. 

Leslie may think that the ALJ should have weighed the 

evidence differently, but we are reviewing the ALJ’s determination 

for whether it is supported by substantial evidence. We cannot 

reweigh the evidence under this deferential standard. See 

Viverette, 13 F.4th at 1314. 

As for Leslie’s argument that the ALJ failed to determine that 

Leslie could keep a job, Leslie only relies on out-of-circuit 

authority. See Singletary v. Bowen. 798 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1986). 

And in any event, the circuit in question has since clarified that an 

ALJ’s finding that a claimant can work is generally presumed to 

include a finding that the claimant can keep his job. See Frank v. 

Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619 (5th Cir. 2003).4

4 If Leslie instead intended to argue that—even if a factual finding that Leslie 

had the residual functional capacity to get a job would be supported by 

substantial evidence—a factual finding that Leslie could keep a job would not 

be, then he never developed that argument and therefore abandoned it. See 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014). 

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IV 

Leslie independently argues that the district court provided 

an impermissible post hoc justification for the ALJ’s decision in 

violation of the rule that agency actions must be supported by the 

rationale given at the time of the agency’s decision. See generally

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). This argument 

misunderstands this Court’s role. Our “review is the same as that 

of the district court,” so we “neither defer to nor consider any 

errors in the district court’s opinion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). In 

other words, we directly review the Commissioner’s decision; we 

do not evaluate the reasoning of the district court. Regardless, the 

district court correctly noted that the ALJ explained his discounting 

of Dr. Nichols’s opinion and that the ALJ evaluated the medical 

evidence in the record, including Dr. Nichols’s opinion. 

* * *

Leslie has failed to show that the ALJ’s discission was not 

supported by substantial evidence. We therefore AFFIRM the 

judgment of the district court.

Perhaps medical evidence would show that Leslie’s seizures prevent him from

keeping full-time work, as Leslie’s counsel appeared to suggest when asking a 

hypothetical of the vocational expert during the hearing. But Leslie

abandoned that argument by not briefing it to this Court or the district court, 

so we do not consider it. 

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