UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. 

BRADLEY ANDREE MARTINEZMORA, 

Defendant.

Case No. 1:23-cr-00043-5 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Earlier this year, a jury convicted Bradley Andree Martinez-Mora of two criminal 

charges: Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO 

Conspiracy”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping 

Resulting in Death (“Kidnapping Conspiracy”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c). 

Now Martinez-Mora asks for a new trial. He argues the Court should have severed him 

from his co-Defendants and given him a separate trial. He also argues that the Court should have 

given a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. The Court previously ruled on each of these 

issues. Neither warrant a new trial. So the Court denies Martinez-Mora’s motion. 

I.

In February, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Martinez-Mora and 

nine co-conspirators with RICO Conspiracy and Kidnapping Conspiracy. See Superseding 

Indictment, ECF No. 141. The RICO Conspiracy charge alleged that Defendants participated in 

racketeering enterprise known as the “18th Street” gang through a pattern of racketeering activity 

that included murder, robbery, and firearms trafficking. Id. ¶¶ 1–22. The Kidnapping 

Conspiracy charge alleged that Defendants conspired to kidnap Carlos Ramos Martinez (known 
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to the gang as “Fire”), resulting in his death. Id. ¶ 26. The Indictment charged additional crimes 

against some Defendants. Id. But all Defendants had these two charges in common. Id. 

For logistical reasons, the Court divided Defendants into two groups for trial. See Minute 

Order (June 12, 2023); Govt’s Resp., ECF No. 78. The first group included Martinez-Mora and 

five co-Defendants. 

Martinez-Mora moved to sever. See Def.’s Mot. Sever, ECF No. 111. He argued that the 

Superseding Indictment improperly joined him as a Defendant. Id. at 3–4.1 And he argued that a 

disparity in evidence and charges among Defendants in his trial group would unfairly prejudice 

him. Id. at 4–5. After briefing and argument, the Court orally denied Martinez-Mora’s motion. 

See Minute Order (Feb. 23, 2024). 

In April, the Court empaneled a jury, and the Government tried its case against MartinezMora and his co-Defendants. At the close of evidence, Martinez-Mora proposed a jury 

instruction on multiple conspiracies. It read:

Bradley Martinez-Mora contends that the government must show the existence of 

the two conspiracies charged in the indictment. Whether there exists 2 such 

agreements, or other such agreements, or indeed no agreement at all, is a question 

of fact for you, the jury, to determine in accordance with the instructions I have 

provided to you. Multiple conspiracies exist when there are separate unlawful 

agreements to achieve distinct purposes. Proof of several and independent 

conspiracies is not proof of the two overall conspiracies charged in the indictment. 

If you find that the conspiracies charged in the indictment did not exist, you cannot 

find the defendant guilty of either of the two conspiracies charged in the indictment. 

If you find Bradley Martinez-Mora was a member of another conspiracy, and not 

the two charged in the indictment then you must acquit Bradley Martinez-Mora of 

the conspiracy charge. 

Proposed Jury Instructions at 9, ECF No. 196. Martinez-Mora argued this instruction would 

ensure the jury would not convict him of RICO Conspiracy if it found that he engaged in a 

1

 The Court’s page citations refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF. 
3 

conspiracy to assault and rob two victims in Sterling, Virginia. Trial Tr. at 125:1–14 (May 2, 

2024). 

The Government objected. It explained that the Sterling robbery was an overt act of 

RICO Conspiracy, not a separate conspiracy to commit robbery. Id. at 128:12–16. In the 

Government’s view, the jury instructions adequately addressed the only two conspiracies 

charged in the Superseding Indictment (RICO Conspiracy and Kidnapping Conspiracy). Id. at 

128:20–129:3. 

After hearing these arguments, the Court declined to adopt Martinez-Mora’s proposed 

instruction. The Court reasoned that its instruction on multiple defendants and multiple counts—

coupled with the charge-specific instructions on RICO Conspiracy and Kidnapping 

Conspiracy—addressed Martinez-Mora’s concern and avoided confusing the jury. Id. at 129:21–

130:13. 

 Following nearly four days of deliberations, the jury found Martinez-Mora guilty of both 

charged counts. See Verdict Form at 13–14, ECF No. 222. On the RICO Conspiracy count, the 

jury also found that Martinez-Mora agreed to a pattern of racketeering activity that included 

murder, kidnapping, robbery, narcotics crimes, and firearms trafficking. Id. 

Martinez-Mora now asks for a new trial. Def.’s Mot. New Trial, ECF No. 245. His 

motion is ripe. 

II.

“Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial.” United States v. 

Wheeler, 753 F.3d 200, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The standard comes from Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 33(a). But it is flexible: “[T]he court may vacate any judgment and grant a 

new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) (emphasis added). “The 
4 

rules do not define ‘interests of justice’ and courts have had little success in trying to generalize 

its meaning.” Wheeler, 753 F.3d at 208 (cleaned up). But the D.C. Circuit has “held that 

granting a new trial motion is warranted only in those limited circumstances where ‘a serious 

miscarriage of justice may have occurred.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 

213 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 

III.

Martinez-Mora says he should receive a new trial for two reasons: (1) the Court denied 

his motion on joinder and severance, and (2) the Court declined to give a jury instruction on 

multiple conspiracies. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

A.

First, Martinez-Mora asks the Court to reconsider its pretrial ruling on joinder and 

severance. See Minute Order (Feb. 23, 2024). The standard for joinder stems from Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It says that an “indictment or information may charge 2 or 

more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the 

same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be 

charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in 

each count.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). 

The D.C. Circuit has consistently recognized that this standard is “generally . . . 

construed liberally in favor of joinder.” United States v. Gooch, 665 F.3d 1318, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). Rule 8(b) merely requires a “logical relationship between the acts or transactions within 

the series.” United States v. Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1984). “In conspiracy cases, 

joinder is presumptively proper,” and in fact, “joinder is preferred.” United States v. Eiland, 406 

F. Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C. 2005). This is because a conspiracy charge provides the “common 
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thread that ties all of the defendants and charges together.” United States v. Edelin, 118 F. Supp. 

2d 36, 39 (D.D.C. 2000). 

The Superseding Indictment properly joined Martinez-Mora. All Defendants, including 

Martinez-Mora, were charged with the same RICO Conspiracy and Kidnapping Conspiracy 

charges. See Superseding Indictment at ¶¶ 1–22, 26. So on two fronts, Martinez-Mora and his 

co-Defendants were “alleged to have participated in the same . . . series of acts or transactions, 

constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). 

Now for severance. Rule 14 supplies the standard: “If the joinder of offenses or 

defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a 

defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ 

trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a) (emphasis added). 

The permissive language that “the court may” sever “makes clear that severance is not 

required even if prejudice is shown.” United States v. Tucker, 12 F.4th 804, 825 (D.C. Cir. 

2021). For this reason, “[s]everance is the exception rather than the rule.” Id. It “is required 

only when there is ‘a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one 

of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 

innocence.’” Id. (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). But even “where 

the risk of prejudice is high, ‘less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will 

suffice.’” Id. (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). 

Disparate evidence against different defendants rarely warrants severance. Indeed, that 

scenario only “requires severance ‘when the evidence against one defendant is far more 

damaging than the evidence against the moving party.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 651 

F.3d 30, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). But unequal evidence “will not require severance 
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in a conspiracy trial when there is ‘substantial and independent evidence of each defendant’s 

significant involvement in the conspiracy.’” Id. (cleaned up). “Absent a dramatic disparity of 

evidence, any prejudice caused by joinder is best dealt with by instructions to the jury to give 

individual consideration to each defendant.” Id. (cleaned up). And just because different 

members of a conspiracy played different roles does “not render joint trial inappropriate as long 

as the jury can reasonably compartmentalize the substantial and independent evidence against 

each defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam)). 

Judicial economy also cuts against severance. Indeed, there is an “especially strong” 

preference for joint trials “when the respective charges require presentation of much the same 

evidence, testimony of the same witnesses, and involve . . . defendants who are charged . . . with 

participating in the same illegal acts.” Id. at 824 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 

1015 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (cleaned up). In sum, severance is a strong medicine best used 

“sparingly.” Id. at 825. 

Martinez-Mora has not proven his entitlement to severance, nor has he shown any 

“prejudice resulting from a failure to sever.” Gooch, 665 F.3d at 1336. Indeed, a joint trial was 

most appropriate. Martinez-Mora and his co-Defendants were all charged as members of a 

RICO conspiracy centered on the same enterprise—the 18th Street gang. See Superseding 

Indictment at ¶¶ 1–22. And they were all charged as members of a conspiracy to kidnap Fire that 

ultimately resulted in his death. See id. ¶ 26. Because “[t]he evidence and the charges were 

substantially overlapping,” Martinez-Mora was not entitled to a separate trial. United States v. 

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Nor would it have made any sense to force the 
7 

Government, the Court, the witnesses, and the victims to endure multiple trials involving 

substantially similar charges and substantially similar evidence. See Tucker, 12 F.4th at 824. 

Martinez-Mora claims he was “immensely prejudiced” by a joint trial. Def.’s Mot. New 

Trial at 16. Not so. The Court had a front row seat to the trial. And it witnessed “substantial 

and independent evidence of [Martinez-Mora’s] involvement in the” charged conspiracies. 

Tucker, 12 F.4th at 825 (cleaned up). For instance, the Government’s evidence included: 

• testimony on Martinez-Mora’s presence at gang meetings where members 

discussed issues with Fire, e.g., Trial Tr. at 101:3–102:10 (Apr. 22, 2024 PM); 

• evidence showing that Martinez-Mora was a leader of an 18th Street clique 

during the life of the conspiracy, id. at 13:2–4; 

• cooperator testimony that Fire’s attempt to lure a gang member away from 

Martinez-Mora’s clique endangered Martinez-Mora’s leadership position, id. at 

10:4–13:25; 

• communications with a gang leader in Guatemala who scolded Martinez-Mora 

over Fire’s death, Trial Tr. at 40:17–41:17 (Apr. 24, 2024 AM); and

• cell site location information that placed Martinez-Mora at the gang meeting 

where members voted to remove Fire from Washington, D.C., Trial Tr. at 79:6–

81:1 (Apr. 23, 2024 PM). 

Martinez-Mora ignores this evidence. Rather, Martinez-Mora says that two cooperators 

testified that he was not present when his co-Defendants kidnapped and killed Fire. See Def.’s 

Mot. New Trial at 5–13. So, Martinez-Mora concludes, “spillover prejudice” must have caused 

his convictions. See id. 

This strains credulity. Martinez-Mora overlooks the fact that both cooperators he cites 

identified him as a leader of an 18th Street clique. See Trial Tr. at 31:4–15 (Apr. 25, 2024 AM) 

(Luis Argueta-Gomez); Trial Tr. at 8:21–23 (Apr. 22, 2024 PM) (Felix Gomez). And both 

cooperators testified that Martinez-Mora knew Fire and disapproved of his attempt to help a gang 

member defect from Martinez-Mora’s clique. See Trial Tr. at 47:14–48:22 (Apr. 25, 2024 AM) 
8 

(Luis Argueta-Gomez); Trial Tr. at 9:14–11:2 (Apr. 22, 2024 PM) (Felix Gomez). This 

testimony, coupled with the other evidence outlined above, constitutes “substantial and 

independent” proof of Martinez-Mora’s guilt. Tucker, 12 F.4th at 825 (cleaned up). 

At any rate, the Court mitigated “any potential risk of prejudice” by providing a “limiting 

instruction[]” on separate defendants and separate counts. Id. It read: 

Each count of the indictment charges a separate offense. Moreover, each Defendant 

is entitled to have the issue of his guilt as to each of the crimes for which he is on 

trial determined from his own conduct and from the evidence that applies to him as 

if he were being tried alone. 

You should, therefore, consider separately each offense and the evidence which 

applies to it and you should return separate verdicts as to each count of the 

indictment as well as to each Defendant. 

The fact that you may find any one Defendant guilty or not guilty of any one count 

of the indictment should not influence your verdict with respect to any other count 

of the indictment for that Defendant, nor should it influence your verdict with 

respect to any other Defendant as to that count or any other count in the indictment. 

Thus, you may find any one of the Defendants guilty or not guilty on any one or 

more counts of the indictment and you may return different verdicts as to different 

Defendants and as to different counts. 

Trial Tr. at 177:14–178:8 (May 2) (emphasis added). This instruction specifically warned 

against “spillover prejudice” resulting from other Defendants’ conduct. Cf. Tucker, 12 F.4th at 

826 (“The district court cured any potential prejudice . . . with limiting instructions[.]”). And 

indeed, the jury rendered not guilty verdicts on certain counts for another Defendant. See 

Verdict Form at 8–9. This confirms that the jury not only received but understood the Court’s 

instruction to treat each Defendant “as if he were being tried alone.” Trial Tr. at 177:18–19 

(May 2). 

In the end, the joint trial does not entitle Martinez-Mora to a new trial. 
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B.

Next, the multiple conspiracies instruction. “As with any other theory-of-defense 

instruction, a multiple conspiracies instruction is in order if there is sufficient evidence from 

which a jury could find for the defendant on his theory.” United States v. Cross, 766 F.3d 1, 4 

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). 

While Martinez-Mora’s proposal appeared to address “the two conspiracies charged in 

the indictment,” he wanted to use the instruction for another purpose. Proposed Jury Instructions 

at 9, ECF No. 196. Again, the Superseding Indictment charged two distinct conspiracies: RICO 

Conspiracy and Kidnapping Conspiracy. Superseding Indictment at ¶¶ 1–22, 26. Yet MartinezMora wanted to use the instruction to address the Sterling robbery. In his view, “even if [the 

jury] conclude[d] that there was a conspiracy to harm” the Sterling robbery victims, “that does 

not mean that [Martinez-Mora] is guilty of the conspiracies charged in the indictment.” Trial Tr. 

at 126:5–9 (May 2). 

But that is not quite right. The Superseding Indictment described the Sterling robbery as 

an overt act within the RICO Conspiracy count. See Superseding Indictment at ¶ 18(e). It did 

not charge the robbery as a separate conspiracy. So the robbery was simply one overt act, among 

many, that together established a pattern of racketeering activity. Framed this way, MartinezMora’s participation in the Sterling robbery directly impacted his liability on the RICO 

Conspiracy count; if the jury found he participated in the robbery, it could then find (but was not 

bound to find) that he committed an overt act in furtherance of the RICO Conspiracy. So telling 

the jury to disentangle the two would have been confusing at best, and legally erroneous at worst. 

See Trial Tr. at 130:1–6 (May 2) (Court: “I . . . find this multiple conspiracy proposed instruction 

confusing[.]”). 
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Nor has Martinez-Mora shown that the lack of a multiple-conspiracies instruction 

prejudiced him. See Cross, 766 F.3d at 5 (declining to give multiple-conspiracies instruction 

subject to harmless error review). Indeed, the Government introduced “sufficient evidence for 

the jury to convict [Martinez-Mora] of the conspirac[ies] charged in the indictment.” Id. at 6; see 

supra Section III.A (discussing the “substantial and independent evidence” of Martinez-Mora’s 

membership in the charged conspiracies). So the lack of a multiple-conspiracies instruction did 

not prejudice Martinez-Mora. 

That said, the Government did have to prove the existence of the two charged 

conspiracies. But the Court gave instructions on each of these conspiracies, Trial Tr. at 183:18–

199:18 (May 2) (RICO Conspiracy); id. at 211:20–219:23 (Kidnapping Conspiracy), plus an 

instruction telling the jury to “consider separately each offense and the evidence which applies to 

it,” id. at 177:14–178:8. Together, these instructions “address[ed Martinez-Mora’s] concern” 

without adding another instruction that “would [have] just confuse[d] the jury.” Id. at 130:7–11. 

IV. 

For these reasons, it is hereby 

ORDERED that Defendant’s [245] Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: September 20, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.