alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DeWAYNE WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2510 FCD DAD P

vs.

BEAMS, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER FOR PAYMENT

 / OF INMATE FILING FEE

To: The Director of the California Department of Corrections, 1515 S Street, Sacramento,

California 95814:

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is obligated to

pay the statutory filing fee of $150.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is

obligated to make monthly payments in the amount of twenty percent of the preceding month’s

income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. The California Department of Corrections is

required to send to the Clerk of the Court payments from plaintiff’s account each time the

amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the statutory filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

 In accordance with the above and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

Case 2:04-cv-02510-FCD-DAD Document 11 Filed 08/22/05 Page 1 of 2
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1. The Director of the California Department of Corrections or a designee shall

collect monthly payments from plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and shall

forward those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds

$10.00 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) until a total of $150.00 has been collected and

forwarded to the Clerk of the Court. The payments shall be clearly identified by the name and

number assigned to this action. 

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order and a copy of

plaintiff's in forma pauperis affidavit on Director, California Department of Corrections, 1515 S

Street, Sacramento, California 95814.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on the Financial

Department of the court.

DATED: August 22, 2005.

DAD:4

wash2510.cdc

Case 2:04-cv-02510-FCD-DAD Document 11 Filed 08/22/05 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4640 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4640

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
       To strengthen trafficking victim assistance grant funding.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Supporting Victims of Human 
Trafficking Act''.

SEC. 2. GRANTS TO ASSIST VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING.

    Section 107(b)(2) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
(22 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking 
                ``shall'' and insert ``may'';
                    (B) in clause (i), by striking ``three percent'' 
                and inserting `` up to 7 percent'';
                    (C) in clause (ii)--
                            (i) by striking ``5 percent'' and inserting 
                        ``up to 10 percent''; and
                            (ii) by inserting ``and strengthening 
                        program administration and budgeting'' after 
                        ``activities''; and
                    (D) in clause (iii), by striking ``one percent'' 
                and inserting ``up to 1 percent''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (C), strike ``75 percent'' and insert 
        ``95 percent''.

            Passed the Senate December 19 (legislative day, December 
      16), 2024.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 4640

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

       To strengthen trafficking victim assistance grant funding.
```
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLAS TRUJILLO,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2368 MCE GGH P

vs.

D. LORUSSO,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

On February 28, 2005, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants’ answer. On

April 26, 2005, plaintiff filed a letter requesting information regarding the status of his

opposition.

An opposition to an answer is not a pleading permitted by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s

February 28, 2005, opposition to defendants’ answer is disregarded. 

DATED: 5/23/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

tru2368.dis

Case 2:04-cv-02368-MCE -GGH Document 19 Filed 05/23/05 Page 1 of 1
#### Leroy Gibson, Jr., Respondent, v Victory Memorial Hospital, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[633 NYS2d 398]

—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant Victory Memorial Hospital appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bellard, J.), dated April 26, 1994, as denied its motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) and granted the plaintiff leave to serve a late complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the appellant’s motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) is granted, and the plaintiffs motion for leave to serve a late complaint is denied.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to timely serve a complaint after a demand for the complaint has been made pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b), a plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint and that he has a meritorious cause of action *(Innerarity v County of Westchester,*144 AD2d 645).

The plaintiff in this case failed to demonstrate that he has a meritorious cause of action. In support of his motion for leave to serve a late complaint and in opposition to the appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit by a physician who had examined him. The affidavit, however, does not indicate that the appellant departed in any way from accepted medical standards or that any such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Thus, the appellant’s motion to dismiss the action should have been granted *(see, Daponte v Weber,*134 AD2d 319; *cf, Adams v Agrawal,*187 AD2d 886; *Dorgan v Dunda,*165 AD2d 949),

*504and the plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve a late complaint should have been denied. Mangano, P. J., Miller, Santucci and Hart, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5013 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 5013

To make certain modifications to the repayment for the Arkansas Valley 
                   Conduit in the State of Colorado.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 10, 2024

Mr. Bennet (for himself and Mr. Hickenlooper) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To make certain modifications to the repayment for the Arkansas Valley 
                   Conduit in the State of Colorado.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Finish the Arkansas Valley Conduit 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ARKANSAS VALLEY CONDUIT, COLORADO.

    Public Law 87-590 (76 Stat. 389) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (c) of the first section (76 Stat. 390; 
        123 Stat. 1320), in the second sentence--
                    (A) by inserting ``, without interest,'' before 
                ``in an amount'';
                    (B) by striking ``that is comprised of revenue 
                generated by payments'' and inserting ``, which payment 
                shall only consist of funding provided during 
                construction from any person other than the 
                Secretary'';
                    (C) by inserting ``of'' before ``revenue that''; 
                and
                    (D) by inserting ``over a period of 100 years'' 
                after ``project facilities''; and
            (2) in section 2(b)(3)(A) (76 Stat. 390; 123 Stat. 1321)--
                    (A) by striking ``plus interest''; and
                    (B) by striking ``this section'' and inserting 
                ``subsection (c) of the first section''.
                                 <all>
```
Case No. 9,808.

#### MORGAN v. TAPSCOTT et al.

[5 Ben. 252.] 1

District Court, E. D. New York.

June. 1871.

Admiralty Jurisdiction — Possessory Action by Mortgagee op Vessel.

Owners of a majority interest in a ship gave a mortgage on it to M. to secure advances. The *mortgage*having become due; M. took possession of the interest mortgaged, and claimed to hold the ship as majority owner. Thereupon S., the master, who, was a part owner in the vessel, and T., another part owner, ejected M., and he thereupon filed a possessory libel against them and the vessel, to recover possession of the ship. *Held,*that the court had no jurisdiction of the action.

[Cited in The Grand Republic, 10 Fed. 399.]

This was a libel [by William D. Morgan,] to recover possession of the ship William Tapscott, and was filed against her and against James F. Tapscott, owner of eight forty-eighths of the ship, and James H. Spencer, master, owner of six forty-eighths of her. The libel alleged that James B. Bell, being the owner of thirty-three forty-eighths of the ship Wm. Tapscott, and being indebted to the firm of E. E. Morgan’s Sons, on June 4, 1869, mortgaged that interest to the libellant to secure that indebtedness; that on April 19, 1871, the moneys secured by the mortgage had become due, and the libellant on that day took possession of the mortgaged interest, and became the absolute owner thereof, and majority owner of the ship, and entitled to hold the ship and the possession thereof against every one; and that on the 24th of April, the respondents violently ejected him from the ship. The respondents, claiming to be owners of thirty-three forty-eighths of the ship, besides answering to the merits, took an exception to the jurisdiction of the court, and the cause was heard on this exception alone.

Beebe, Donohue & Cooke, for libellant.

R. D. Benedict and James K. Hill, for respondents.

1

 [Reported by Robert D. Benedict, Esq., and here reprinted by permission.]

BENEDICT, District Judge.

I am of the opinion that the decision of the supreme court of the United States, in the case of The John Jay, 17 How. [58 U. S.] 399, is decisive of this case. According to the reasoning of the case of The John Jay, such an action as the present cannot be maintained in the admiralty. The principle of the two cases is the same, and I am bound therefore to apply here the rule laid down by the supreme court, and pronounce against the jurisdiction.

The same effect was given to the decision of the case of The John Jay [supra], in a case similar in many aspects to the present, by the learned Judge Ware. The Wm. D. Rice [Case No. 17,691]. The exception to the *762jurisdiction of the court, is, therefore, sustained, and the libel dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
No. 64190.

protests 295434-K, etc. (Laredo).

#### L. H. Graves et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Mollison, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of carrizo baskets the same in all material respects as those the subject of *Chester K. Stoner*v. *United States*(42 Cust. Ct. 178, C.D. 2083), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2001.

      --------------------------------------------------------------------


In connection  with the Annual  Report of PARK HILL CAPITAL I  CORPORATION  (the
"Company")  on Form  10-KSB for the year ended May 31,  2004,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Francis
Mailhot , Principal Accounting Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2001, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  October 28, 2005

                                    /s/ Francis Mailhot
                                    -----------------------------
                                    Francis Mailhot
                                    Principal Accounting Officer
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13A-14(A) AND 15D-14(A),AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Roger L. Fidler, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-QSB of Global Agri-Med Technologies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)):

     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

         Date: September 1, 2005

 

 /s/ Roger L. Fidler------------------------------------Roger L. Fidler,Chief Executive Officer
#### Juan Taveras et al., Respondents, v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant. (And Third-Party Actions.)

[633 NYS2d 32]

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Stanley Green, J.), entered December 27, 1994, which, *inter alia,*denied defendants’ motions to strike plaintiffs’ supplemental bills of particulars, responses to requests for expert information, and note of issue and certificate of readiness, and to preclude plaintiffs from offering into evidence the results of certain tests administered to the injured plaintiff as well as evidence of injuries as to which medical exchange had not been provided pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.17 (h), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly exercised its discretion in declining to strike the note of issue and the supplemental bills of particulars, despite plaintiffs having served the supplemental bills after filing their note of issue and certificate of readiness *(see,*CPLR 3042 [g]). Since all of the new injuries set forth were withdrawn by plaintiffs’ counsel or precluded by the court, the new allegations and the related medical exchange are no longer in issue. While the theories of liability regarding the allegedly mislevelling, gapping and improperly installed elevator were set forth for the first time in the supplemental bills, the court properly recognized that such should not be treated as impermissible amendments, since defendant Otis never sought a more definite statement of the original bills’ general allegations of negligent repair and maintenance. Under the circumstances, the supplemental bills provided more in the way of amplification than variance. With respect to the supplemental claim of negligent installation, any information with respect to liability under such theory would be in Otis’ possession, and thus it is not prejudiced by the addition. As with the new injuries, the expert information with which defendants find fault was stricken, the court directing service of revised expert information. Therefore, this issue is also academic. We have considered the parties’ other claims for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
No. 54696.

#### Amertrade, Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 124367-K (A), etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of synthetic stones the same in all material respects as those the subject of *S. Nathan & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(37 C. C. P. A. 99, C. A. D. 426), the claim at 10 percent under paragraph 1528 was sustained.
#### Derrick Exum, Appellant, v Young C. Kim et al., Respondents.

[633 NYS2d 408]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Golden, J.), dated July 12, 1994, as granted the motion of the defendants Young C. Kim and Eunshin Kim for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff was allegedly injured when he was a patron at a restaurant. The defendants Young C. Kim and Eunshin Kim are the out-of-possession landlords. The deposition testimony of the tenant and the affidavit of Young C. Kim indicated that the Kims had no involvement in the maintenance of the premises once the tenant took occupancy *(see, Marchese v Fresh Meadows Assocs.,*207 AD2d 871). The plaintiff also failed to submit any credible evidence of the duration of the alleged defect. Thus, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the Kims had actual or constructive notice of the defect or whether they retained sufficient control over the premises that liability could be imposed upon them *(see, Marchese v Fresh Meadows Assocs., supra).*Therefore, the defendants Young C. Kim and Eunshin Kim established their entitlement to summary judgment. Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Universal Food & Beverage Company (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Ralph M. Passino, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



(signed) Ralph M Passino

Ralph M. Passino

Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

March 31, 2005