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i 

76–217 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–156] 

Y–12 INTRUSION: INVESTIGATION, 

RESPONSE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, September 13, 2012, Y–12 Intrusion: Investigation, Response, and 

Accountability ....................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, September 13, 2012 ............................................................................... 9 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

Y–12 INTRUSION: INVESTIGATION, RESPONSE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 4 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Miller, Hon. Neile L., Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration (Ms. Miller did not provide an opening statement during the unclassified portion of the hearing.) ......................................................

Poneman, Hon. Daniel B., Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department 

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Poneman, Hon. Daniel B. ................................................................................. 20 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 17 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 13 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 33 

(1) 

Y–12 INTRUSION: INVESTIGATION, RESPONSE, AND 

ACCOUNTABILITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 13, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I think you are all aware that votes are going to 

be called soon on the House floor. 

I think everyone is aware that the structure of today’s hearing 

is we are going to have opening statements from myself and my 

ranking member, Loretta Sanchez, and then we will be going into 

closed session for the questions and answers. And so we will both 

then commence to offer our opening statements. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the recent 

security breach at the Y–12 National Security Complex. 

As we all know from the press accounts, in the predawn hours 

of Saturday, July 28, three nuclear disarmament activists trespassed onto the grounds of the Y–12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The activists, including an 82-year-old Catholic nun, who is 

present with us today, cut through several fences and entered the 

high-security ‘‘Protected Area’’ surrounding the Highly Enriched 

Uranium Materials Facility, HEUMF. The activists defaced an exterior building with spray paint, human blood, posters, crime scene 

tape, and other items before eventually being stopped and detained 

by members of the protective force. Reportedly, even once on the 

scene, the initial protective force member apparently did not respond with appropriate urgency. 

This level of intrusion in the perimeter of a supposedly highly secure nuclear weapons facility is unprecedented, and it is absolutely 

unacceptable. It is outrageous to think that the greatest threat to 

the American public from weapons of mass destruction may be the 

incompetence of DOE [Department of Energy] security. 

I want to say that again. 

Because I have had hearing after hearing—I have participated 

both on this committee and with the Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee where we have raised the issue repeatedly of 

the security at these facilities. There is no margin for error for security at these facilities, and it is outrageous to think that the 
2 

greatest threat to the American public from weapons of mass destruction may actually be the incompetence of DOE security to be 

unable to keep these facilities secure. 

Now I have just recently thanked one of the protesters for bringing this to light, to thank God that we did not have the security 

threat that could have been. If the facility had actually been under 

attack and all of these systems had failed, we would have had an 

absolute catastrophe. Instead, we have an embarrassment, but, 

thank God, an exposure of the issues and the problems of DOE 

that I know Members of Congress have been complaining about for 

a decade, because I have been one of them. 

Let me be clear: I rank this failure alongside the Air Force’s unauthorized shipments of nuclear weapons to Barksdale Air Force 

Base in 2007 and nuclear weapons components to Taiwan, which 

was reported in 2008. 

From our oversight of these incidents, the subcommittee is intimately familiar with how systemic failures—coupled with a lack of 

leadership attention—can lead to massive failures in a business 

with room for none. 

The 2007 Air Force incident revealed deep and systemic flaws 

throughout the Air Force enterprise that allowed that incident to 

occur. It also revealed that both on-the-ground personnel and senior leaders in the Air Force had taken their eyes off the ball when 

it came to nuclear weapons. Tellingly, we saw Secretary of Defense 

Gates take strong action to hold these people accountable and fix 

the system. 

As the Y–12 investigations proceed, I expect to see similarly 

strong actions with regard to the July 28 incident and the leadership, management, and oversight failures that enabled it to occur. 

I have deep reservations regarding NNSA’s [National Nuclear 

Security Administration] nuclear weapons security posture going 

back many years. Some of my first direct encounters with nuclear 

weapons occurred in the early 2000s. A visit to Y–12’s old nuclear 

facilities and a ride-along with NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation left me deeply concerned that we were not paying sufficient 

attention to the security of our nuclear weapons, and my concerns 

have been borne out by what we saw in this incident. 

And let’s remember, it was because of massive security problems 

and mismanagement at DOE that led this committee to create 

NNSA in 1999. This Y–12 incident is just one more indicator that 

the creation of NNSA has not fixed the problem. Twelve years later 

and the entire nuclear weapons enterprise, from the budget process 

to facilities construction and now even basic security, is fundamentally broken. 

Ranking Member Sanchez and I spoke earlier, and we agreed 

that the system is broken. The ranking member and I have pledged 

to conduct a subcommittee investigation and ensure we get to the 

root causes of this failure. 

We both want strong and effective Federal oversight of the nuclear enterprise, and we want the responsible Federal and contractor officials to be held accountable. This must never happen 

again. We must make it clear that these failures cannot be repeated and those responsible are held accountable. Ms. Sanchez 

and I will demand it. 
3 

Perhaps most troubling to me is that we have heard that there 

were many indicators of problems with Y–12 security prior to July 

28 that include sky-high false- and nuisance-alarm rates, cameras 

that were broken for 6 months, and huge maintenance backlogs of 

security critical equipment. 

Some of these indicators go back several years, and many of 

them were reported to NNSA’s Y–12 site office on a daily or weekly 

basis. But no one reacted. No one at the contractors, NNSA, or 

DOE followed up on these indicators and forced corrective action. 

I am simply shocked by the failure to recognize a near meltdown 

of critical security lapses that were known well before this incident 

occurred. And, again, thank God that it wasn’t an actual attack on 

the facility. 

It appears that the Federal overseers were focused on the wrong 

things. There was plenty of paperwork but no recognition of or action on these problems. This is mind-boggling and may be the new 

textbook definition of ‘‘missing the forest for the trees.’’ 

Here are some basic questions: 

Who knew that these cameras were out for so long? 

Who knew that the false alarm rates were so high? 

Who knew about the huge backlog of security maintenance and 

the overreliance on compensatory measures? 

Who should have known these things who did not? 

And did anyone do anything to fix them? 

And, if they haven’t, have they been fired and why not? 

As far as I can tell, the only individual who has been fired is the 

Y–12 protective force officer who initially, if belatedly and incompetently, responded to the alarms. And he may get rehired as part 

of a union protest. 

Others at both contractors and NNSA have been reassigned or 

allowed to retire. This does not fit my definition of accountability 

and certainly does not follow the example set 4 years ago by Secretary Gates. 

Some more complex but equally important problems involve the 

bifurcation of responsibility and accountability for security at Y–12. 

Shortly after the July 28th incident, NNSA decided the dual prime 

contracts at Y–12—one for the protective force and one for the 

broader management of Y–12—resulted in less effective security. 

Two contractors were responsible for security, and they didn’t communicate or coordinate like they needed to. NNSA fixed this problem immediately after the incident by making one a subcontract to 

the other. 

However, this bifurcation of responsibility and accountability for 

security also exists on the Federal side. Both DOE and NNSA have 

security offices responsible for setting security policies, conducting 

oversight, and ensuring effective security is in place. So far, we 

have yet to see NNSA and DOE recognize the problems in their 

own house, even though they immediately recognized it in their 

contractors. 

Instead, I am seeing a lot of bureaucratic finger pointing between 

NNSA, DOE, and the two contractors at Y–12. This bureaucratic 

backstabbing is also now playing out in the Washington Post, with 

details of supposedly classified reports being leaked to the press. 

That leaking alone is deeply troubling, and I expect our witnesses 
4 

to tell us what they are doing to track down where this was leaked 

from and end it. All of this is just another indication that the system is broken. 

There is something deeply and fundamentally wrong with the 

culture in the Forrestal building. If this type of bureaucratic warfare had erupted at DOD after the Minot and Taiwan incidents, 

Secretary Gates would have had those people terminated immediately. 

I am going to place the remaining portion of my opening statement in the record so that I can make certain my ranking member 

has sufficient time to enter hers. 

I just want to conclude with this. 

This is outrageous, unacceptable, and absolutely has to be fixed. 

The American public expects that we would have the highest level 

of security. There is a staff member on this committee who opined 

that the day-care center on Capitol Hill may be more protected 

than our nuclear weapons were on that night at Y–12. It is unacceptable. There are people who had responsibility for it, and they 

should be held accountable. And, the system needs to be fixed. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 13.] 

Mr. TURNER. I turn to my ranking member, Loretta Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you before 

us. 

Since our last hearing to examine NNSA management and the 

risks for nuclear safety and security, we had this intrusion of Y– 

12 and the inadvertent spread of technetium at one of our nuclear 

weapons laboratories. These are but two recent occurrences that 

highlight the continued need and the importance of closely examining safety and security reforms, and we need to address what 

risks are there. 

I’d like to thank Chairman Turner for consistently, over this past 

year in particular, focusing this committee on the oversight issues 

as they relate to what we are going to discuss today. Because, I do 

believe that we have clearly an unacceptable problem with respect 

to management of security and safety. And, we need to fix these 

problems. 

I join the chairman in welcoming Deputy Secretary Dan 

Poneman and Deputy Administrator Neile Miller to help us take a 

closer look at the recent security breach at Y–12. I thank DOE Inspector General Gregory Friedman; DOE’s Chief Health, Safety 

and Security Officer Glenn Podonsky; and Acting Chief and Associate Administrator for the Office of Defense Nuclear Security at 

NNSA Jeff Harrell, who are here and available for questioning but 

not necessarily sitting right in front of us. 

So I think it is pretty historical, this issue that happened on July 

28. Thank God it was peace activists, and thank God it was Sister 

Rice who was coming through these fences—four perimeter 

fences—at what most of us would expect to be one of the most secure sites in the world. 
5 

This is a problem. Not only did they penetrate the security, but 

once they were able to reach the central storage facilities for nuclear weapons grade uranium, the security response didn’t know 

what to do and wasn’t very good at taking a look at what was going 

on and following procedures, most importantly, that weren’t as laid 

out as all of us thought they would be and, of course, nonfunctioning equipment, communication deficiencies, all sorts of problems that we now are going to take a look at. 

It is clear that taxpayers in particular and even just from a safety standpoint Americans need much more than what we saw on 

that night. So, as Chairman Turner emphasized, we are extremely 

concerned about the deficiencies that came to light. 

First, the contractor’s poor performance is inexcusable. From the 

Department of Energy Inspector General Report, we know that one 

of the cameras had been left out of service for approximately 6 

months. And what we learned yesterday, in the testimony given 

yesterday, that some of the cameras actually worked, but they were 

simply turned off and that people who were coming to be the safety 

net didn’t know which cameras were on or that even cameras were 

off. That’s a major problem. 

On top of these glaring deficiencies, reports last week revealed 

possible cheating by the contractor on the security inspection tests 

that had been ordered as part of the DOE response to the Y–12 

intrusion. 

Secondly, the abysmal failure by the contractors, I am concerned 

about a weakening of the Federal oversight process that appears to 

have promoted a ‘‘hands-off’’ approach. 

At the NNSA level, it appears that site officials knew about several of these deficiencies and yet did not force the contractors to 

take the much-needed corrective actions. The DOE–IG [Department of Defense Inspector General] report notes with reference to 

over-reliance at Y–12 on the use of compensatory measures to address equipment failures that directly impacted security readiness. 

Moreover, as baffling as the deficiencies brought to light by this 

intrusion are, last year’s performance evaluation of B&W [The Babcock & Wilcox Company] Y–12—the draft of which is written by the 

contractor and merely reviewed by the NNSA officials—gave B&W 

Y–12 a stellar review. More specifically, B&W Y–12, responsible for 

delaying the repair cameras for months and failing to do the required maintenance that would have reduced the rate of false 

alarms, received as a rating of excellent for its safeguards and security work, contributing to B&W Y–12 receiving $51 million in incentive fee for fiscal year 2011. 

Last year, in an initiative to address concerns of excessive and 

overly burdensome oversight, the Department of Energy streamlined and eliminated many DOE safety and security directives despite questions about the impact that would have. Questioning this 

initiative, the GAO [Government Accountability Office] noted in 

April of 2012 ‘‘that the benefits of this reform are unclear because 

the DOE did not determine if the original directives were in fact 

burdensome and the reform did not fully address the safety 

concerns.’’ 
6 

Mr. Chairman, we have votes on the floor. You and I both know 

that. I would like to put forward the rest of my statement for the 

record. 

But, truly, we have to take a look at what happened here. I think 

there is a lot of blame to go around, and we need to correct these 

issues. And if somebody is not doing their job, we need to figure 

out how to get it right. 

So I thank you for having this hearing. We have the responsibility, and now we have the chance to get this right. We cannot fail 

the American people. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 17.] 

Mr. TURNER. I thank my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez. 

She has reiterated that Members of Congress for a long time 

have had no confidence in DOE and NNSA in providing security for 

these facilities, but we had only a feeling, no proof. We now have 

proof. So this is an issue that has to be addressed. 

Secretary Poneman, I am going to give you 3 minutes to summarize an opening statement. We will then return after votes with the 

remainder of the subcommittee with us and go into a classified 

briefing to receive additional details. 

Secretary Poneman, 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL B. PONEMAN, DEPUTY 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary PONEMAN. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, with your permission, I will summarize and submit my 

full statement for the record. 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before you here today to 

discuss this very, very important issue. We appreciate the interest 

and engagement of this committee, and we recognize the important 

oversight role that you fulfill. We share your commitment to ensure 

that all of our offices and operations are delivering on our mission 

safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible manner. 

As the recent incident at Y–12 demonstrates, the Department 

has fallen short of our own expectations and faces continuing challenges in our goals of continuous improvement. The recent incident, 

as Secretary Chu has made clear, is unacceptable; and we have 

taken swift and decisive action to identify and address the problems it revealed across the DOE complex. 

Regarding physical protection, we have taken the following immediate steps to improve security: Cameras have been repaired 

and tested, guard patrols increased, security policies have been 

strengthened, the number of false and nuisance alarms have been 

greatly reduced to provide more confidence in the intrusion detection system. 

We have addressed leadership issues. The top six leaders at the 

management and operating contractor and protective force contractor were either allowed to retire or relieved of their duties at 

Y–12. Five members of the protective force were fired, demoted, or 

suspended without pay. 

On the Federal side, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security for 

the NNSA at headquarters has been reassigned pending the out-
7 

come of a review. We have also reassigned the most senior Federal 

security official who was at the site at the time, also pending the 

outcome of our internal reviews. 

We have taken steps to deal with the problems that were revealed in our contracts at Y–12. Security functions at the Y–12 site 

have been brought under one contract, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, to ensure continuity of operations and line of command. 

A formal show cause letter was issued to the contractor that covers the entire scope of operations at Y–12, including security. This 

is a first step toward potentially terminating the contracts for both 

the management and operations site contractor and the security 

subcontractor. Past performance, including these deficiencies and 

terminations, will be considered in the awarding of future contracts. 

When it comes to the protective forces, we immediately acted to 

improve the security culture at Y–12. The entire site workforce was 

required to undergo additional security training. Nuclear operations at the site were suspended until retraining was complete. 

The former head of security from Pantex moved to Y–12 to lead the 

effort to reform the security culture at the site. 

Site managers at all DOE facilities with nuclear material were 

directed to provide their written assurance that all nuclear facilities are in full compliance of the Department’s security policies and 

directives, as well as internal policies established at the site level. 

We will continue to investigate. We will leave no stone unturned, 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sanchez, as we investigate 

what led to this unacceptable incident at Y–12; and we will aggressively review security across all our sites. We can go into the details of those reviews when you come back. I know you have to 

vote. 

In conclusion, the series of personnel and management changes 

that I have just described were made to assure the highest level 

of security at the site and across the DOE complex. To manage this 

transition, we have brought some of the best security experts from 

our enterprise to Y–12 to act quickly to address the security shortcomings at the site. We are also working to make the structural 

and cultural changes required, appropriately, to secure the facility. 

The Secretary and I intend to send a clear message: Lapses in 

security will not be tolerated. We will leave no stone unturned to 

find out what went wrong, and we will take the steps necessary to 

provide effective security at this site and across our enterprise. 

And I thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Poneman can be found in 

the Appendix on page 20.] 

Mr. TURNER. We will be adjourned for our classified briefing. 

[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned and entered a closed briefing.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

(13) 

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Y–12 Intrusion: Investigation, Response, and Accountability 

September 13, 2012 

Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing on the recent security breach at the Y–12 National Security Complex. 

As we all know from the press accounts, in the predawn hours 

of Saturday, July 28, three nuclear disarmament activists trespassed onto the grounds of the Y–12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The activists, including an 82-year-old Catholic nun, cut 

through several fences and entered the high-security ‘‘Protected 

Area’’ surrounding the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility 

(HEUMF). The activists defaced an exterior side of the building 

with spray paint, human blood, posters, crime scene tape, and 

other items before eventually being stopped and detained by members of the protective force. Reportedly, even once on the scene the 

initial protective force member apparently did not respond with appropriate urgency. 

This level of intrusion into the perimeter of a highly secure nuclear weapons facility is unprecedented—and it is completely unacceptable. It is outrageous to think that the greatest threat to the 

American public from weapons of mass destruction may be the incompetence of DOE security. 

Let me be clear: I rank this failure alongside the Air Force’s unauthorized shipments of nuclear weapons to Barksdale Air Force 

Base in 2007 and nuclear weapons components to Taiwan, which 

was reported in 2008. 

From our oversight of those incidents, this subcommittee is intimately familiar with how systemic failures—coupled with a lack of 

leadership attention—can lead to massive failures in a business 

with room for none. 

The 2007 Air Force incident revealed deep and systemic flaws 

throughout the Air Force enterprise that allowed that incident to 

occur. It also revealed that both on-the-ground personnel and senior leaders in the Air Force had taken their eyes off the ball when 

it came to nuclear weapons. Tellingly, we saw Secretary of Defense 

Gates take strong action to hold these people accountable and fix 

the system. 

As the Y-12 investigations proceed, I expect to see similarly 

strong action with regard to the July 28 incident and the leadership, management, and oversight failures that enabled it to occur. 

I have had deep reservations regarding NNSA’s nuclear weapons 

security posture going back many years. Some of my first direct en-
14 

counters with nuclear weapons security in the early 2000s—a visit 

to Y–12’s old nuclear facilities and a ride-along with NNSA’s Office 

of Secure Transportation—left me deeply concerned that we were 

not paying sufficient attention to the security of our nuclear weapons. 

And let’s remember: it was because of massive security problems 

and mismanagement at DOE that led this committee to create 

NNSA in 1999. This Y–12 incident is just one more indicator that 

creation of NNSA hasn’t fixed the problems—12 years later and the 

entire nuclear weapons enterprise, from the budget process to facilities construction and now basic security, is fundamentally broken. 

Ranking Member Sanchez and I spoke earlier, and we agreed 

that the system is broken. The Ranking Member and I have 

pledged to conduct a subcommittee investigation and ensure we get 

to the root causes of these failures. 

We both want strong and effective Federal oversight of the nuclear enterprise, and we both want the responsible Federal and 

contractor officials to be held accountable. This must never happen 

again. We must make it clear that these failures cannot be repeated and those responsible are held accountable. Ms. Sanchez 

and I will demand it. 

Perhaps most troubling to me is that we have heard that there 

were many indicators of problems with Y–12’s security prior to 

July 28. These include: 

• Sky-high false- and nuisance-alarm rates; 

• Cameras that were broken for 6 months; and 

• Huge maintenance backlogs of security critical equipment. 

Some of those indicators go back several years, and many of 

them were reported to NNSA’s Y–12 site office on a daily or weekly 

basis. But no one reacted. No one at the contractors, NNSA, or 

DOE followed up on these indicators and forced corrective action. 

I am simply shocked by the failure to recognize a near meltdown 

of critical security lapses that were known well before this incident 

occurred. 

It appears that the Federal overseers were focused on the wrong 

things. There was plenty of paperwork but no recognition of—or action on—these problems. This is mind-boggling, and may be the 

new textbook definition of ‘‘missing the forest for the trees.’’ 

Here are some basic questions: 

• Who knew that these cameras were out for so long? 

• Who knew that the false alarm rates were so high? 

• Who knew about the huge backlog of security maintenance 

and the overreliance on compensatory measures? 

• Who should have known these things? 

• Did they do anything to get it fixed? 

• Have they been fired? 

As far as I can tell, the only individual that has been fired is the 

Y–12 protective force officer who initially—if belatedly and incompetently—responded to the alarms. And he may get rehired thanks 

to his union’s protest. 

Others at both contractors and NNSA have been ‘‘reassigned’’ or 

allowed to retire. This does not fit my definition of accountability, 
15 

and certainly does not follow the example set 4 years ago by Secretary Gates. 

Some more complex but equally important problems involve the 

bifurcation of responsibility and accountability for security at Y–12. 

Shortly after the July 28 incident, NNSA decided the dual prime 

contracts at Y–12—one for the protective force and one for the 

broader management of Y–12—resulted in less effective security. 

Two contractors were responsible for security, and they didn’t communicate or coordinate like they needed to. NNSA fixed this problem immediately after the incident by making one a subcontract to 

the other. 

However, this bifurcation of responsibility and accountability for 

security also exists on the Federal side: both DOE and NNSA have 

security offices responsible for setting security policies, conducting 

oversight, and ensuring effective security is in place. So far, we 

have yet to see NNSA or DOE recognize this problem in their own 

house—even though they immediately recognized it in their contractors. 

Instead, I’m seeing a lot of bureaucratic finger-pointing between 

NNSA, DOE, and the two contractors at Y–12. This bureaucratic 

backstabbing is also now playing out in the Washington Post, with 

details of supposedly classified reports leaked to the press. That 

leaking alone is deeply troubling and I expect our witnesses will 

tell us what they are doing to track that down and put an end to 

it. All of this is just another indication that the system itself is broken. 

There is something deeply and fundamentally wrong with the 

culture in the Forrestal building. If this type of bureaucratic warfare had erupted at DOD after the Minot and Taiwan incidents, 

Secretary Gates would have had those involved terminated immediately. 

Continuing with the status quo—doing more of the same—isn’t 

going to resolve the root causes of NNSA and DOE’s long history 

of security failures. Dozens of reports and other indicators show the 

system itself is broken, in addition to leadership, management, and 

personnel failures. 

As one example, an independent study of NNSA security conducted by Admiral Rich Mies back in 2005 found that many of the 

problems their study identified, ‘‘are not new; many continue to 

exist because of a lack of clear accountability, excessive bureaucracy, organizational stovepipes, lack of collaboration, and unwieldy, 

cumbersome processes.’’ 

As the sole authorizing committee with jurisdiction for the nation’s nuclear security activities, we take this incident very seriously. We must understand the details of what actually happened 

during this incident and the failures that allowed it to happen. We 

must also understand what corrective actions are being taken, who 

is being held accountable, and the ongoing investigations. And, as 

I mentioned, the Ranking Member and I are in lock-step about 

this. There are no politics here. 

To enable this in-depth discussion, we must get beyond the press 

accounts and discuss sensitive details. Therefore, with agreement 

of the Ranking Member, after opening statements from the witnesses we are going to immediately transition into a classified ses-
16 

sion. We want a full and vigorous discussion—and this can only 

take place in a closed session. The subcommittee will continue to 

conduct rigorous oversight of this matter in the months ahead, and 

we anticipate further subcommittee oversight activities in the future. 

Today, we have two of the senior officials responsible for ensuring nuclear security at DOE facilities. They are: • The Honorable Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy; and • The Honorable Neile L. Miller, Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today—we look forward to your testimony and the detailed discussion during the subsequent briefing. I know we all want to make sure this doesn’t happen again—because next time it may not be an 82-year-old nun. 

I’d like to note that during a recent office visit with Deputy Secretary Poneman, he agreed that DOE, NNSA, and its contractors 

would fully cooperate with the subcommittee’s investigation. I 

thank him for that commitment and look forward to our continuing 

discussion. 
17 

Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Y–12 Intrusion: Investigation, Response, and Accountability 

September 13, 2012 

Since our last hearing to examine NNSA management and the 

risks for nuclear safety and security, we have had the intrusion at 

Y–12 and the inadvertent spread of technetium at one of the nuclear weapons laboratories. These are but two recent occurrences 

that highlight the continued importance of closely examining what 

safety and security reforms are warranted and what risks must be 

addressed. I would like to thank Chairman Turner for focusing our 

Subcommittee on these important oversight issues this year and for 

the opportunity to delve into what have become clearly unacceptable management problems that have plagued a broken system. 

I join the Chairman in welcoming Deputy Secretary Dan 

Poneman and Deputy Administrator Neile Miller to help us take a 

closer look at the recent security breach at Y–12. I thank Department of Energy Inspector General Gregory Friedman; DOE’s Chief 

Health, Safety and Security Officer Glenn Podonsky; and Acting 

Chief and Associate Administrator for the Office of Defense Nuclear Security at the NNSA Jeff Harrell, for being available to answer our questions in the closed briefing that will follow this open 

hearing. 

On July 28, a historically unprecedented intrusion whereby three 

peace activists, including an 82-year-old nun, were able to penetrate, without being intercepted, four perimeter fences, at what is 

expected to be one of the most secure sites in the world. Not only 

did they penetrate the security zone but were able to reach the 

country central storage facility for nuclear weapons-grade uranium, 

as the security response was inexplicably hampered by nonfunctioning equipment, communication deficiencies, and numerous failures to follow prescribed procedures for responding to alarms and 

security breaches. 

It is clear that we owe the taxpayers and the security of our 

country stronger oversight and stricter accountability on nuclear 

safety and security. 

As Chairman Turner emphazised, we are extremely concerned 

about the deficiencies that came to light and about whether security readiness is ready for prime-time given the serious gaps in contractor implementation and Federal oversight. 

First, the contractor’s poor performance is inexcusable. From the 

Department of Energy Inspector General Report, we know one of 

the broken cameras had been left out of service for approximately 

6 months. Some cameras as was revealed in yesterday’s congressional hearing were inoperable simply because the switch was 

turned off. Security guards were not aware of which cameras were 

nonoperational at the time they assumed their post. The false 

alarm rate was on the order of hundreds of false alarms a day. 
18 

On top of these glaring deficiencies, reports last week revealed 

possible cheating by the contractor on a security inspection test 

that had been ordered as part of the DOE response to the Y–12 intrusion. 

Second, beyond the abysmal failure by the contractors, I am concerned about a weakening of the Federal oversight process that appears to have promoted a ‘‘hands-off’’ approach: 

At the NNSA level: It appears NNSA site officials knew about 

several of these deficiencies and yet did not force the contractors 

to take much-needed corrective actions. The DOE IG report notes 

with reference to overreliance at Y–12 on the use of compensatory 

measures to address equipment failures that directly impacted security readiness, ‘‘federal officials [stated] that with the advent of 

NNSA’s contractor governance system (Contractor Assurance System), they could no longer intervene . . . to address growing maintenance backlogs.’’ This raises serious questions about competency, 

and about whether there has been a growing trend of relegating 

much decisionmaking authority to the contractor despite glaring 

performance failures that underlay a lack of security readiness. 

Moreover, as baffling as the deficiencies brought to light by this 

intrusion are, last year’s performance evaluation of B&W Y–12— 

the draft of which is written by the contractor and merely reviewed 

by NNSA officials—gave B&W Y–12 a stellar review. More specifically, B&W Y–12, responsible for delaying the repair of cameras for 

months and failing to do the required maintenance that would have 

reduced the rate of false alarms, received an a rating of ‘‘excellent’’ 

for its Safeguards and Security work, contributing to B&W Y–12 

receiving $51 million in incentive fee for FY 2011. 

With regard to DOE: Last year in an initiative to address concerns of excessive and overly burdensome oversight, the Department of Energy streamlined and eliminated many DOE safety and 

security directives despite questions about the impact. Questioning 

this initiative, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) noted 

in April 2012 ‘‘that the benefits of this reform are unclear because 

the DOE did not determine if the original directives were in fact 

burdensome and the reform did not fully address safety concerns.’’ 

As another example, in a revised executive order (DOE Order 

227.1) last year loosening contractor accountability, DOE reduced 

the requirements on the contractors for implementing corrective actions to address deficiencies identified by the independent Health 

Safety and Security Office. 

Furthermore, GAO has noted that the DOE directives reform effort gave ‘‘the NNSA site offices, rather than DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight staff, responsibility for correcting problems identified in independent assessments.’’ 

Third, and a final point: Independent oversight remains crucial 

to ensuring security readiness that is up to the task of protecting 

weapons-usable material. 

We have heard the refrain in previous hearings this year that 

Federal oversight was overly burdensome. And the authors of the 

NAS report testified before our Subcommittee that ‘‘A great deal of 

work that has been accomplished over the years in safety and security has required extensive effort by the NNSA and the laboratories. We believe these efforts have been strengthened to the point 
19 

where they no longer need the current level special attention to assure high quality results in laboratory operations.’’ 

However, as brought to light in the Washington Post yesterday, 

it was independent oversight by the Department of Energy 2 years 

ago that sounded the alarm on lax security at Y–12, and found that 

‘‘security cameras were inoperable, equipment maintenance was 

sloppy and guards were poorly trained.’’ 

I remain deeply concerned about efforts that could weaken Federal safety and security oversight, including controversial provisions on nuclear safety and security in the FY 2013 House National 

Defense Authorization bill. The recent IG report noted that an 

NNSA official stated that ‘‘they had been instructed not to evaluate 

and report on ‘how’ the contractors were conducting business, but 

to focus instead on ensuring that the mission was accomplished.’’ 

This incident should inject urgency in the need to ensure that 

Federal officials have direct access to the contractors in charge of 

security. It is also the latest indicator that overseeing how security 

is provided remains crucial to avoid another potentially more serious accident. 

This will require strong leadership, access to the contractor and 

independent expertise. 

The silver lining in this appalling event at Y–12 is that these 

were not terrorists bent on attacking the facilities, that the new 

HEUMF facility is extremely robust, as opposed to the nearby 60- 

year-old 9212 facility, and finally that we did not have a triggerhappy guard mistakenly kill an 82-year-old nun. 

But this is a wake-up call about the serious deficiencies in safety 

culture and woeful gaps in oversight that allowed this situation to 

occur. 

We have the responsibility—and now the chance—to get this 

right. We cannot afford to fail again. 
20 

Statement of 

Hon. Daniel B. Poneman 

Deputy Secretary 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Armed Services Committee 

U.S. House of Representatives 

September 13,2012 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's oversight of 

the nuclear weapons complex and the recent security incident at the Y-12 National Security 

Complex (Y-121. We appreciate the interest and engagement ofthis Committee and recognize 

the important oversight role that you fulfill. We also share the Committee's commitment to 

assure that all of our offices and operations are delivering on our mission safely, securely, and 

in a fiscally responsible manner - from Washington, DC, to California, from every naval reactor 

to every warhead, from production to clean-up, from deterrence to nonproliferation. 

Introduction 

Dating back to its origins in the Manhattan Project during World War II, DOE and its 

predecessor organizations have consistently pursued the development of atomic energy for 

peaceful and defense purposes, while also safeguarding the health, safety, and security of the 

public. The Department remains committed to this goal and is deeply informed by its historical 

legacy, including decades defending the nation through our critical national security 

responsibilities to sustain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent while combating the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons to foes and terrorists. We are also committed to fulfill our 

obligation to clean up the legacy of the Cold War at Environmental Management sites across 

the country. Thus, nuclear safety and security have been integral to our vital and urgent 

mission from its inception. We continuously seek to improve our performance in those areas. 

As the recent incident at Y-12 demonstrates, the Department has at times fallen short of our 

own expectations and faces continuing challenges in our journey of continuous improvement. 

This recent incident, as the Secretary has made clear, is unacceptable, and we have taken and 

will continue to take steps not only to identify and correct issues at Y -12, but across the DOE 

complex. I will address this incident, and our response, in more detail later in this testimony. 

1 
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Since its creation in 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has served as a 

separately-organized entity within the U.S. Department of Energy, entrusted with the execution 

of our national nuclear security missions. Living up to the challenging demands of executing 

our mission safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible manner requires daily management 

through strong, effective, and efficient relationships with our Management and Operating 

(M&O) contractors. Congressional oversight, in conjunction with oversight by the DOE Office of 

Health Safety and Security (HSS), our internal, independent oversight body, as well as that of 

the DOE Inspector General, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), and the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), contribute to the safety and security of DOE facilities. 

The protection of all Department of Energy (DOE) assets - our people, technology, and 

physical assets, including both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities and other resources - is of 

integral importance to our mission. The Secretary and I know that, and understand our 

responsibilities to that mission, in its entirety. Indeed, we have reflected our commitment 

through our Management Principles, which provide that: 

• We will treat our people as our greatest asset; 

• We will pursue our mission in a manner that is safe, secure, legally and ethically sound, 

and fiscally responsible; and 

• We will succeed only through teamwork and continuous improvement. 

The Secretary has expressed a consistent, unwavering commitment to maintain safe and secure 

work environments for all Federal and contractor employees. In that spirit, we are determined 

to assure that the Department's and contractors' operations do not adversely affect the health, 

safety, or security of workers, the surrounding communities, or the Nation. 

DOE's mission includes diverse operations, involving a variety of nuclear materials and 

processes. We recognize our unique obligations as a self-regulated agency to establish and 

meet exacting standards for nuclear safety, to maintain robust nuclear safety performance, and 

to provide rigorous and trustworthy oversight and enforcement of those nuclear safety 

standards. We must also maintain a safety culture that values and supports those standards, 

and assures that individuals can freely step forward to voice their concerns related to our safe 

execution of our mission. Indeed, we encourage them to do so. Only through these actions can 

we provide adequate protection of our workers, the public, and the environment, while 

sustaining the public trust and confidence crucial to our ability to fulfill the mission. 

To achieve our mission, DOE must strive to excel simultaneously as a self-regulator, as an 

owner, and as an operator of the facilities in our national security complex. Each of these roles 

is vital and must be executed with integrity. 

Roles and Responsibilities for Nuclear Safety and Security within DOE 

The Secretary and I bear ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety and security at DOE facilities. 

Under our direction, line managers have the authority and the responsibility for establishing, 

2 
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achieving, and maintaining stringent performance expectations and requirements among all 

Federal and contractor employees, at DOE labs and other facilities. 

line management is reinforced by the DOE Central Technical Authorities (CTAs), who are 

responsible for implementing nuclear safety requirements effectively and consistently, 

providing authoritative nuclear safety guidance, and establishing goals and expectations for 

subordinate personnel and contractors. 

The Department's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has three discrete functions. First, 

HSS, in close collaboration with CTAs and line management, is responsible for the development 

of DOE nuclear safety policy, Federal Rules, Orders, and the associated standards and guidance, 

as well as for reviewing safety issues complex-wide. The second HSS function is to develop and 

assist in the implementation of safeguards and security programs that provide protection to 

national security and other vital national assets entrusted to DOE. The third function is to 

conduct independent oversight and regulatory enforcement that is independent from line 

management. On behalf of the Secretary, HSS independently and regularly evaluates 

contractor and Federal personnel safety and security performance and recommends needed 

improvements. HSS has broad enforcement authorities in the areas of nuclear safety, worker 

safety and information security, to include issuance of Notices of Violation and imposition of 

civil penalties, for contractor violations of Departmental regulations in those areas (for NNSA 

contractors, HSS recommends enforcement actions to the NNSA Administrator for action). The 

independence of HSS, which reports directly to the Office of the Secretary, affords HSS the 

autonomy to exercise its oversight and regulatory role without potential conflicts of interest 

with those line managers who are subject to its oversight. 

By statute, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board also plays a pivotal role in providing 

recommendations as well as oversight of safety issues for the Department. The Board makes 

recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary takes the recommendations 

fully into account whenever making decisions regarding matters under the Board's jurisdiction. 

Safety through Standards, Managing Risk, and Integrated Safety Management 

The Department's approach to nuclear safety is founded on a demanding set of standards that 

capture knowledge and experience in designing, constructing, operating, deactivating, 

decommissioning, and overseeing nuclear facilities and operations. DOE applies validated 

national and international standards to the maximum extent possible, because these standards 

reflect broad input from a large and diverse group of experts. As our management principles 

state: "We will apply validated standards and rigorous peer review." 

Our management principles also require that we "manage risk in fulfilling our mission." This is 

essential to a robust safety culture, as demonstrated by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 

which vividly demonstrated the inadequacy of a mere "check-the-box" mentality when it comes 

to smart decision-making in a complex and hazardous operational environment. Since DOE 

expects scrupulous compliance with its requirements, managers and workers must recognize 

3 
23 

and embrace their personal accountability to meet safety standards, while avoiding a tendency 

for rote compliance with requirements. In some cases, it may be necessary to raise a hand and 

ask if another approach could offer a smarter way to assure safety. This questioning attitude 

must be encouraged. 

Integrated Safety Management (ISM) serves as the touchstone of our nuclear safety program. 

DOE policy requires the Department systematically to integrate safety into management and 

work practices at all levels so that missions are accomplished while protecting the public, the 

workers, and the environment. 

Contract and Project Management 

The Secretary and I are also dedicated to strengthening contract and project management. 

Indeed, we cannot succeed in advancing our goals for the Department if we fall short in this 

effort. And, to be clear, safety and security are integral to effective contract management. 

Safety and security are key performance standards and elements of every contract and extensive 

oversight is required to ensure stewardship as well as legal and regulatory requirements are met. 

When we have a safety or security problem, we must fix it, which may lead to increased costs 

and delays. So building safety and security into the fabric of our programs and our projects 

from the start and continuously monitoring adherence to safety standards is not just the right 

thing to do from a moral perspective, and not just the necessary thing to according to our 

governing laws and regulations" but it is also the smart thing to do, as stewards of our 

responsibilities to the Nation and its taxpayers. Our recent experience at the Hanford Waste 

Treatment Plant bears this view out, and shows that we must pay particular attention to ensure 

technical and safety issues are promptly reported and resolved, as contract mechanisms and 

project management actions there may have created circumstances where nuclear safety issues 

were not appropriately managed. 

Pursuant to a request within the Conference Report accompanying Fiscal Year 2012 

appropriations legislation, DOE has conducted reviews of five nuclear facility construction 

projects that each have estimated total project costs in excess of one billion dollars, to 

determine if they are being managed in a way that could pressure managers or contractors to 

meet project performance objectives at the expense of adherence to nuclear safety 

requirements. In that report, submitted in May 2012, we reviewed our acquisition policies and 

processes to determine if there are systemic issues that might hinder technical and safety issue 

resolution. 

The review found that over the last four years the Department has taken important steps to 

improve its project management processes, fortifying the foundation for implementing a strong 

nuclear safety culture at hazardous projects. While the Department has already implemented a 

number of project management and safety integration improvements, we recognize the 

importance of proactively seeking additional improvements, such as continuing to strengthen 

the capability and technical expertise of our federal and contractor staff responsible for project 

4 
24 

implementation and execution. We identified several other areas for further improvement, 

which are detailed in the report. 

Y-12 Incursion Incident 

On Saturday, July 28, 2012 at 4:30AM three individuals trespassed onto the Y-12 National 

Security Complex and defaced a building at NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee. The intruders traversed Y-12's Perimeter Intrusion Detection and 

Assessment System (PIDAS). The intruders' movement was detected, but initially went 

unchallenged. The Protective Force's delayed response allowed the intruders to vandalize the 

outer wall of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF). Following the initial 

delay, the Y-12 Protective Force detained the intruders. The intruders were later transported 

offsite. 

This incursion and the poor response to it demonstrated a deeply flawed execution of security 

procedures at Y-12. In response to the incident, we acted swiftly to identify and address the 

problems it revealed. 

These actions - either directly or through the contract for the site - included the following 

immediate steps to improve security: 

• The former head of security from Pantex moved to Y-12 to lead the effort to reform the 

security culture at the site 

Security functions at the Y-12 site have been brought into the M&O contract to ensure 

continuity of operations, and moving toward an integrated model going forward; 

The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security for NNSA has been reassigned pending the outcome 

ofa review; 

Six of the top contractor executives responsible for security at the Y-l2 site have been 

removed - including the president and acting president of Wackenhut's Oak Ridge 

Division; 

The leadership of the guard force has been removed, and the guards involved in this 

incident have been removed or reassigned; 

The Plant Manager and Chief Operating Officer retired 12 days after the incident; 

5 
25 

Nuclear operations at the site were suspended until re-training and other modifications 

mentioned above were completed; 

The entire site workforce was required to undergo additional security training; 

Cameras have been repaired and tested, guard patrols increased, security policies have 

been strengthened, and all personnel have been retrained on security procedures; 

The number of false and nuisance alarms have been greatly reduced, to provide more 

confidence in the intrusion detection system; 

The Department's Chief of Health, Safety and Security was directed to deploy a team to Y12 in support of NNSA's efforts; 

Site managers at all DOE facilities with nuclear material were directed to provide their 

written assurance that all nuclear facilities are in full compliance with Department security 

policies and directives, as well as internal policies established at the site level; 

A formal "Show Cause letter" was issued to the contractor that covers the entire scope of 

operations at Y-12, including security. This is the first step toward potentially terminating 

the contracts for both and the site contractor and its security subcontractor. Past 

performance, including deficiencies and terminations, will be considered in the awarding of 

future contracts; 

A senior federal official was deployed to ensure oversight over contractor security 

operations; 

An assessment was initiated led by Brigadier General Sandra Finan to review the oversight 

model and security organizational structure at NNSA headquarters; 

An independent HSS inspection ofY-12 was ordered; and 

HSS was directed to lead near-term assessments of all Category I sites to identify any 

systemic issues, enhancing Independent Oversight performance testing program to 

incorporate no-notice or short notice security testing, and conducting comprehensive 

Independent Oversight security inspections at all Category I sites over the next 12 months, 

using the enhanced program of performance testing. 

The series of personnel and management changes I have just described were made to provide 

the highest level of security at the site and across the DOE complex. To manage this transition, 

we have brought some ofthe best security experts from our enterprise to Y-12 to act quickly to 

redress the security shortcomings at the site. We are also working to make the structural and 

cultural changes required to appropriately secure this facility. The Secretary and I intend to 

6 
26 

send a clear message: lapses in security will not be tolerated. We will leave no stone unturned 

to find out what went wrong and will take the steps necessary to provide effective security at 

this site and across our enterprise. 

The initial review of this event has resulted in the identification of multiple issues, collectively 

indicating that systemic failures and a security culture of complacency directly led to the series 

of events leading up to the protester incursion. Many of these problems and issues should 

have been known or corrected by officials at the site, NNSA, and according to the Inspector 

General, those responsible for approving and implementing the Contractor Assurance System. 

Chief among these problems include the following: 

Maintenance of critical security systems for the protection of Special Nuclear Materials 

(SNM) was not conducted as a priority to accomplish mission needs; 

The alarm response expectation of the on-duty Protective Force supervisor were 

inconsistent with written response plans and post/patrol instructions; 

Protection of SNM competed with other priorities; i.e., new construction projects; 

Appropriate communication protocols were not followed and the response to the intrusion 

detection alarms were poorly executed; and 

Management oversight of contractor's performance was inadequate. 

HSS is revamping its testing protocols for security systems with regard to frequency and 

notice. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the security of our Nation's nuclear material is a central responsibility of the 

Department. We must always remain vigilant against error and complacency and have zero 

tolerance for security breaches at our Nation's most sensitive nuclear facilities. The incident at 

Y-12 was unacceptable, and it served as an important wake-up call for our entire complex. As a 

result, NNSA will use this event to review the security at all of our NNSA sites. The Department 

is taking aggressive actions to ensure the reliability of our nuclear security programs, and will 

continue to do so. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, safety and security are integral to 

the Department's mission. DOE embraces its obligation to protect the public, the workers, and 

the environment. We continuously strive to improve upon our safety and security standards 

and policies to guide our operations, and we hold line management - and ourselves -

accountable. We seek to foster an open and supportive safety and security culture, where we 

7 
27 

actively seek opportunities to enhance the safety and quality of our operations. We depend on 

our highly-trained workforce to identify errors and opportunities for improvement, and we 

strive to integrate safety and security at all levels within our organization. We support a 

vigorous and active advisory, oversight, and enforcement effort through organizations outside 

of line management, such as HSS and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, to provide 

further assurance that we are protecting the public, the workers, and the environment. 

We view these commitments as central to our core mission in support of the President and to 

the Nation. We feel the weight of the history of so many distinguished Americans whose 

stewardship of our nuclear enterprise contributed greatly to our success in deterring aggression 

throughout the Cold War, and continue to defend our freedoms and oppose our potential 

adversaries to this day. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions from the members of the Subcommittee. 

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28 

DANIEL B. PONEMAN 

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

Daniel B. Poneman was nominated by President Obama to be Deputy 

Secretary of Energy on April 20, 2009, and was confirmed by the 

United States Senate on May 18, 2009. Under the leadership of 

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Mr. Poneman also serves as Chief 

Operating Officer of the Department. 

Mr. Poneman first joined the Department of Energy in 1989 as a White 

House Fellow. The next year he joined the National Security Council 

staff as Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control. 

From 1993 through 1996, Mr. Poneman served as Special Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export 

Controls at the National Security Council. His responsibilities included 

the development and implementation of U.S. policy in such areas as 

peaceful nuclear cooperation, missile technology, space-launch activities, sanctions determinations, 

chemical and biological arms control efforts, and conventional arms transfer policy. During this time, he 

also partiCipated in negotiations and consultations with govemments in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 

America, and the former Soviet Union. 

After leaving the White House, Mr. Poneman served as a member of the Commission to Assess the 

Organization of the Federal Govemment to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

a number of other federal advisory panels. 

Prior to assuming his responsibilities as Deputy Secretary, Mr. Poneman served as a principal ofThe 

Scowcroft Group for eight years, providing strategic advice to corporations on a wide variety of 

international projects and transactions. Between tours of government service he practiced law for nine 

years in Washington, D.C. - first as an associate at Covington & Burling, later as a partner at Hogan & 

Hartson - assisting clients in regulatory, policy and transactional matters, international arbitration, 

commercial real estate financing, export controls, and sanctions and trade policy. 

Mr. Poneman received A.B. and J.D. degrees with honors from Harvard University and an M.Utt. in 

Politics from Oxford University. He has published widely on national security issues and is the author of 

Nuclear Power in the Developing World and Argentina: Democracy on Trial. His third book, Going Critical: 

The First North Korean Nuclear CriSiS (coauthored with Joel Wit and Robert Gallucci), received the 2005 

Douglas Dillon Award for Distinguished Writing on American Diplomacy. Mr. Poneman is a member of the 

Council of Foreign Relations. 

Mr. Poneman lives in Virginia with his wife, Susan, and their three children. 
29 

Neile L. Miller 

Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

Neile L. Miller is the Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA). Her nomination by President Obama was 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate on August 5,2010. 

As Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer, she focuses on 

matters of management and policy across the NNSA enterprise to define a 

coherent vision for achieving the President's nuclear security agenda. 

Ms. Miller started her career at the Congressional Research Service working 

on nuclear nonproliferation issues. She later joined the White House Office 

of Management and Budget as the program examiner for the Department of 

Energy's radioactive waste management programs and for the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. She subsequently returned to OMB to serve as a senior program examiner in 

the National Security Division of OMB, where she was responsible for overseeing NNSA programs and 

the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 

Prior to her appointment, Ms. Miller held several key leadership positions within DOE, including the 

Department's Budget Director from 2007 to 2010. Earlier in her career she was the Associate Director for 

Resource Management in the Office of Nuclear Energy, and the Associate Director of International 

Nuclear Cooperation in the Office of Nuclear Energy. 

In the private sector, Ms. Miller worked for Cogema, Inc. and as a consultant, with clients that included 

DOE, Sandia National Laboratory, and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. She also 

served as policy and communications officer in the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. 

Ms. Miller earned her undergraduate degree in political science from Vassar College and her Masters 

degree in International Affairs from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. 

She lives in Chevy Chase, Maryland with her husband, Dr. Werner Lutze, and their two sons, Max and 

Daniel. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

(33) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the past few years, NNSA issued security directives (NAPs) that 

replace DOE directives. The NAPs were intended to allow more flexibility in implementing security requirements and reduce the costs of security; they provided less 

rigorous requirements in certain areas such as maintenance of alarm systems and 

gave more authority to lower level managers to accept risks. Meanwhile, NNSA has 

favored a system with less independent oversight and instead relied more on the 

contractor self-assessments and the contractors ability to establish effective safety 

and security programs and manage risk. 

Our House NDAA bill also gives more authority to NNSA, blocking independent 

on safety and security. We heard from several laboratory directors about burdensome regulations and excessive oversight were hindering productivity at the laboratories. 

• Is it your view that NNSA sites conduct effective oversight? 

• Do contractors have too little independent oversight, or too much? 

• Do you believe that the incident is the result of overly burdensome security requirements, as some have claimed? 

• Do you think that NNSA has gone too far in delegating responsibility for making security decisions to its contractors? 

• In light of the Y–12 incident, are you concerned that new NAPs may be inconsistent or have fewer requirements than DOE regulations? Will you direct 

NNSA to rescind these NAPs or allow them to go forward? 

• Should independent oversight be strengthened? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The Y–12 incident and subsequent Office of Health, Safety 

and Security (HSS) Independent Oversight inspection identified numerous examples 

of inadequate Federal oversight by line management and ineffective contractor assurance systems. For example, we learned that NNSA Federal oversight and assessment activities did not effectively evaluate all safeguards and security areas, and 

the ensuing analyses did not provide an adequate basis to conclude that Departmental assets were being protected at the required levels. We also learned that 

NNSA performance measures (used to help influence decisions regarding contractor 

award fees) did not accurately depict actual contractor performance. Self-assessments conducted by both site contractors generally provided more information about 

the status of processes than of the actual effectiveness of security measures that 

were in place ‘‘on the ground.’’ Contractor self-assessment reports often contained 

insufficient information regarding security program implementation, failed to identify deficiencies, or lacked the analyses to support conclusions. Consequently, reports did not accurately inform NNSA and contractor line management of the effectiveness of existing security programs to support decisions regarding future security 

activities. Weaknesses in contractor, site office, and NNSA Headquarters Defense 

Nuclear Security oversight and assurance systems essentially presented NNSA senior management with an inaccurate picture of the overall health of the protection 

program at Y–12, thereby missing the opportunity to identify early indicators of 

problems that might have mitigated the security breach. While these deficiencies 

were especially pronounced at Y–12, HSS Independent Oversight reviews at other 

sites have also concluded that contractor assurance systems have not sufficiently 

matured and that weaknesses persist in NNSA Federal line management oversight. 

We believe that rigorous, performance-based, independent oversight is a critical 

element of DOE’s approach to self-regulation, particularly for high consequence facilities and activities such as nuclear operations and nuclear security. The Government remains responsible for these facilities and for the potentially dramatic adverse consequences of failures in nuclear safety and nuclear security, and the Government provides our contractors billions of dollars of indemnification for nuclear 

accidents. Consequently, we have an obligation to ensure that those contractors are 

operating these facilities safely and securely. While DOE (including NNSA) line 

management has the primary responsibility for managing and overseeing contractor 

performance, our HSS Independent Oversight office has no responsibility for the 

mission and activities being reviewed. Consequently, HSS is able to provide the Secretary and me, along with line management, objective and unbiased feedback on 
34 

performance. We believe that our contractors currently receive an appropriate level 

of independent oversight. 

No, the Y–12 incident was not at all the result of overly burdensome security requirements. Over the period of 2009–2010, the Department went through a systematic review to reform all of its safety and security directives. The outcome of that 

effort was the development of a more concise set of non-duplicative requirements 

and directives that produce effective protection and efficient operations. Our safety 

and security regulations and directives identify the necessary requirements to protect workers, the public, the environment, and national security assets. They also 

provide contractors the flexibility to meet the requirements in the most efficient 

manner, and are streamlined through consolidation or elimination of duplicative or 

unnecessary provisions. 

The Y–12 incident was partly the result of overly broad delegation of inherently 

governmental risk acceptance authority to the contractor, which was made without 

effective Federal review. This inappropriate delegation of responsibility to the contractor was enabled by inappropriate and/or ambiguous provisions in NNSA Policy 

documents (NAPs). At Y–12, the contractor ‘‘cognizant security authority’’ appeared 

to be unconstrained, with Federal officials deferring to the contractor for most decisions impacting the site security mission. 

A number of concerns were identified with security NAPs. In some cases, they 

provided a less rigorous standard of protection than Departmental directives or were 

not consistent with Governmentwide security requirements. In other cases, they 

provide for an inappropriate degree of delegation of risk acceptance authority to contractors. The Secretary and I believe, and the NNSA Administrator agrees, that 

there should be a single set of DOE security directives governing all Departmental 

operations, including those of the NNSA. The Administrator will rescind the security NAPs so that they will no longer be applied as a substitute for Departmental 

requirements. A revised version of NAPs may be utilized to provide additional implementing instructions, consistent with Departmental directives, to NNSA sites. 

Yes. The Secretary has re-emphasized the importance of HSS Independent Oversight as a critical element of the Department’s governance approach, and past GAO 

reviews have pointed to the importance of and need to strengthen independent oversight. The Secretary has also directed HSS Independent Oversight to undertake 

more rigorous inspections, to include force-on-force performance testing of the protection of special nuclear material at all Category I sites over a 12 month period. 

For many years, HSS Independent Oversight has implemented a rigorous force-onforce performance testing program that has been regarded by the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System staff as a model for Federal agencies with nuclear security missions. The Secretary has also directed HSS Independent Oversight to further enhance that program by expanding the scope and variety of performance testing methods utilized to assess the readiness of DOE/NNSA site protection systems 

against a broader spectrum of threats and adversary capabilities. Performance testing methodologies will include no-notice and limited notice testing to obtain a more 

realistic assessment of site response capabilities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As GAO asked, why does HSS not have the power to enforce its 

own recommendations? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The role of the HSS Independent Oversight office is to conduct appraisals to evaluate the performance of DOE line organizations and contractors, and to identify deficiencies where they are detected. HSS Independent Oversight may also provide recommendations to DOE line management on approaches 

to addressing the deficiencies. DOE line management and its contractors are required by Departmental directive to evaluate deficiencies identified by HSS Independent Oversight, including identifying the reasons for the deficiencies, and to develop and implement corrective actions plans for problems identified as ‘‘significant 

deficiencies’’. Our DOE field offices and contractors are accountable to the head of 

their respective program offices, such as the NNSA Administrator, and ultimately 

to the Secretary and me for ensuring that problems are adequately and promptly 

addressed. HSS Independent Oversight has the authority to monitor implementation of those corrective measures and to report back to senior program office officials 

and to me if there are any concerns as to responsiveness or effectiveness of actions. 

This arrangement appropriately places the responsibility and accountability for corrective actions with DOE line management, with HSS Independent Oversight serving to monitor the effectiveness of actions on behalf of the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Please provide any report or analysis that Department of Energy/ 

NNSA may produce on whether security should be transferred to the Department 

of Defense, including costs, legal issues, and whether the deficiencies that led to the 

failures would/could be avoided if security was shifted to the military? 
35 

Secretary PONEMAN. The Department of Energy (including the NNSA) has not 

produced any report or analysis on the subject of transferring responsibility for security to the Department of Defense. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How would the House National Defense Authorization provisions 

impact Federal oversight of security operations? What are the benefits and risks of 

these provisions? Please provide your views on these provisions. 

Secretary PONEMAN. The Department of Energy, including the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA), strongly oppose certain sections of the bill because 

they would unduly restrict the authority of the Secretary of Energy, weaken safety 

standards, and/or fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between the 

Department and its contractors. 

Sections 3113 and 3133 would excessively restrict the authority of the Secretary 

of Energy to oversee the management and operations of the NNSA. They would restrict the Secretary’s ability to select the most appropriate oversight mechanism for 

its contractors. While we recognize that performance-based standards are an effective tool and may be sufficient for some low hazard/consequence activities, we believe that the Department must retain the ability to select the oversight mechanism 

that best protects national security interests for a given project, particularly for high 

hazard/consequence activities, such as operation of nuclear facilities or protection of 

special nuclear materials. The bill hampers our ability to tailor our approach to the 

needs of the Government. Limiting the Department’s ability to oversee contracts as 

appropriate may lead to more inefficiency and waste, not less. The fact that the Department’s mandate is to provide adequate protection for its workers and the public 

while managing unique hazards as it conducts high-consequence activities, such as 

nuclear safety and security, makes it particularly important that the Department 

retain the ability to use all necessary tools to fulfill its mission. We believe that 

independent oversight of safety and security standards, by an organization outside 

the line management chain that does not have conflicting priorities, is an important 

protection for the health and safety of our workers and the public. Given the nature 

and complexity of its mission, and, in particular, its obligation to preserve and protect America’s national nuclear safety and security, the Department must address 

a number of unique, complex safety and security issues. We believe that it is essential for the Department to retain flexibility to safeguard against those unique risks, 

using all of the tools that science and our experience in this area afford. The proposed bill limits our ability to determine how best to execute the Department’s mission safely, securely, and effectively. 

Section 3115 would mandate that the NNSA alone establish and oversee health, 

safety and security at its facilities. Independent oversight of safety and security is 

an important protection for the health and safety of our workers and the public. The 

provision would also exempt the NNSA from the Department’s existing process to 

enforce and ensure accountability for meeting safety and security requirements. 

Similarly, the bill would restrict the Department’s ability to prescribe health and 

safety regulations regarding non nuclear activities that are more stringent than Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, by requiring waivers to 

permit use of more stringent standards. While we believe in the importance of 

streamlining regulatory burdens, we believe that the Department must be able to 

prescribe a safety regime that meets its unique needs without having to use waivers 

to do so. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. NNSA knew about the alarm rate, the broken cameras, and the 

overreliance on compensatory measures. 

• Why did site officials not intervene to fix these failures in a timely manner? 

• Why were compensatory measures allowed to become in effect an indefinite solution? 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA did not know all the details of the situation. Please see answers below. 

Site officials did not intervene because they lacked perspective on the impact that 

broken PIDAS cameras and an excessive number of compensatory measures would 

have on overall system effectiveness. They were involved in neither setting maintenance priority for the PIDAS cameras nor the approval of compensatory measures 

because local implementation of the NNSA directives in effect at the time placed 

those decisions with the contractor. 

From the contractor’s perspective, compensatory measures were often less expensive and the incentive to repair was not sufficiently high to require immediate action. From a site office perspective, the contractor was viewed as following a process 

in line with NNSA policy and expectation. At the same time, the site vulnerability 

analysis team was used to assign case specific compensatory measures and did not 

look at the broader implications of individual decisions. 
36 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the past few years, NNSA issued security directives (NAPs) that 

replace DOE directives. The NAPs were intended to allow more flexibility in implementing security requirements and reduce the costs of security; they provided less 

rigorous requirements in certain areas such as maintenance of alarm systems and 

gave more authority to lower level managers to accept risks. Meanwhile, NNSA has 

favored a system with less independent oversight and instead relied more on the 

contractor self-assessments and the contractors ability to establish effective safety 

and security programs and manage risk. 

Our House NDAA bill also gives more authority to NNSA, blocking independent 

on safety and security. We heard from several laboratory directors about burdensome regulations and excessive oversight were hindering productivity at the laboratories. • Is it your view that NNSA sites conduct effective oversight? • Do contractors have too little independent oversight, or too much? • Do you believe that the incident is the result of overly burdensome security requirements, as some have claimed? • Do you think that NNSA has gone too far in delegating responsibility for making security decisions to its contractors? • In light of the Y–12 incident, are you concerned that new NAPs may be inconsistent or have fewer requirements than DOE regulations? Will you direct 

NNSA to rescind these NAPs or allow them to go forward? • Should independent oversight be strengthened? 

Ms. MILLER. The Y–12 incident and subsequent Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) Independent Oversight inspection identified numerous examples of inadequate Federal oversight by line management and ineffective contractor assurance 

systems. For example, we learned that NNSA Federal oversight and assessment activities did not effectively evaluate all safeguards and security areas, and the ensuing analyses did not provide an adequate basis to conclude that Departmental assets 

were being protected at the required levels. We also learned that NNSA performance measures (used to help influence decisions regarding contractor award fees) did 

not accurately depict actual contractor performance. Self-assessments conducted by 

both site contractors generally provided more information about the status of processes than of the actual effectiveness of security measures that were in place ‘‘on 

the ground.’’ Contractor self-assessment reports often contained insufficient information regarding security program implementation, failed to identify deficiencies, or 

lacked the analyses to support conclusions. Consequently, reports did not accurately 

inform NNSA and contractor line management of the effectiveness of existing security programs to support decisions regarding future security activities. Weaknesses 

in contractor, site office, and NNSA Headquarters Defense Nuclear Security oversight and assurance systems essentially presented NNSA senior management with 

an inaccurate picture of the overall health of the protection program at Y–12, thereby missing the opportunity to identify early indicators of problems that might have 

mitigated the security breach. While these deficiencies were especially pronounced 

at Y–12, HSS Independent Oversight reviews at other sites have also concluded that 

contractor assurance systems have not sufficiently matured and that weaknesses 

persist in NNSA Federal line management oversight. 

We believe that rigorous, performance-based, independent oversight is a critical 

element of DOE’s approach to self-regulation, particularly for high consequence facilities and activities such as nuclear operations and nuclear security. The Government remains responsible for these facilities and for the potentially dramatic adverse consequences of failures in nuclear safety and nuclear security, and the Government provides our contractors billions of dollars of indemnification for nuclear 

accidents. Consequently, we have an obligation to ensure that those contractors are 

operating these facilities safely and securely. While DOE (including NNSA) line 

management has the primary responsibility for managing and overseeing contractor 

performance, our HSS Independent Oversight office has no responsibility for the 

mission and activities being reviewed. Consequently, HSS is able to provide the Secretary and me, along with line management, objective and unbiased feedback on 

performance. We believe that our contractors currently receive an appropriate level 

of independent oversight. 

No, the Y–12 incident was not at all the result of overly burdensome security requirements. Over the period of 2009–2010, the Department went through a systematic review to reform all of its safety and security directives. The outcome of that 

effort was the development of a more concise set of non-duplicative requirements 

and directives that produce effective protection and efficient operations. Our safety 

and security regulations and directives identify the necessary requirements to protect workers, the public, the environment, and national security assets. They also 

provide contractors the flexibility to meet the requirements in the most efficient 
37 

manner, and are streamlined through consolidation or elimination of duplicative or 

unnecessary provisions. 

The Y–12 incident was partly the result of overly broad delegation of inherently 

governmental risk acceptance authority to the contractor, which was made without 

effective Federal review. This inappropriate delegation of responsibility to the contractor was enabled by inappropriate and/or ambiguous provisions in NNSA Policy 

documents (NAPs). At Y–12, the contractor ‘‘cognizant security authority’’ appeared 

to be unconstrained, with Federal officials deferring to the contractor for most decisions impacting the site security mission. 

A number of concerns were identified with security NAPs. In some cases, they 

provided a less rigorous standard of protection than Departmental directives or were 

not consistent with Governmentwide security requirements. In other cases, they 

provide for an inappropriate degree of delegation of risk acceptance authority to contractors. The Secretary and I believe, and the NNSA Administrator agrees, that 

there should be a single set of DOE security directives governing all Departmental 

operations, including those of the NNSA. The Administrator will rescind the security NAPs so that they will no longer be applied as a substitute for Departmental 

requirements. A revised version of NAPs may be utilized to provide additional implementing instructions, consistent with Departmental directives, to NNSA sites. 

Yes. The Secretary has re-emphasized the importance of HSS Independent Oversight as a critical element of the Department’s governance approach, and past GAO 

reviews have pointed to the importance of and need to strengthen independent oversight. The Secretary has also directed HSS Independent Oversight to undertake 

more rigorous inspections, to include force-on-force performance testing of the protection of special nuclear material at all Category I sites over a 12 month period. 

For many years, HSS Independent Oversight has implemented a rigorous force-onforce performance testing program that has been regarded by the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System staff as a model for Federal agencies with nuclear security missions. The Secretary has also directed HSS Independent Oversight to further enhance that program by expanding the scope and variety of performance testing methods utilized to assess the readiness of DOE/NNSA site protection systems 

against a broader spectrum of threats and adversary capabilities. Performance testing methodologies will include no-notice and limited notice testing to obtain a more 

realistic assessment of site response capabilities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. NNSA announced a return to incorporating security operations 

within one prime contract that would also cover operations. 

• Please provide a copy of the analysis that preceded this decision. 

• How will the change to the contracting structure fix these problems? What 

risks, challenges or uncertainties does it create? 

• Will the prime be allowed to sub-contract security operations? Why not? 

• How will the new contracting structure allow for strengthened Federal oversight over security operations? 

• Will NNSA/DOE be able to have access to the security contractor? 

• Are there any expected cost savings? How much? 

Ms. MILLER. The decision to assign the WSI contract under B&W at Y–12 until 

the new contract is awarded was made to promptly address issues at the site. 

The change in contract structure will ensure full integration of all aspects of the 

safeguards and security program under a single management structure. The July 

28, 2012, security breach at Y–12 exposed weaknesses in integrating critical security functions where the separate incumbent contractors shared responsibilities for 

the overall safeguards and security program. 

The prime contractor will not be allowed to sub-contract security operations in the 

combined Y–12/Pantex contract. This restriction was made to ensure that NNSA has 

direct oversight of the entire breadth of Security operations. 

Consolidating security work with plant operations will facilitate more streamlined 

and focused Federal oversight by eliminating the need for the Government to manage multiple contracts that require integrated activities at one site. 

Yes, the decision to preclude subcontracting Security operations was done to ensure that NNSA has direct access to the entire breadth of Security operations. 

Previous NNSA analysis has indicated that enveloping security services within 

the M&O contract will likely result in increased costs to the Government; however, 

the potential risks associated with a diversified contractual approach in the current 

Y–12 environment required an immediate remedy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Please provide any report or analysis that Department of Energy/ 

NNSA may produce on whether security should be transferred to the Department 

of Defense, including costs, legal issues, and whether the deficiencies that led to the 

failures would/could be avoided if security was shifted to the military? 
38 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA has not produced any report or analysis regarding the subject 

of transferring responsibility for security to the Department of Defense. This effort 

would require collaboration between both organizations to properly address and respond appropriately to the question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How would the House National Defense Authorization provisions 

impact Federal oversight of security operations? What are the benefits and risks of 

these provisions? Please provide your views on these provisions. 

Ms. MILLER. The Administration strongly opposes sections 3202, 3115, 3113, and 

3151. These provisions severely hamper external, independent oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; move regulatory authority from independent 

offices and agencies to the NNSA Administrator; require a weaker standard of contractor governance, management, and oversight; and eliminate DOE’s flexibility to 

determine the appropriate means of assessing the unique risks that it confronts in 

its facilities. By lowering safety standards for the nuclear weapons complex and reducing requested funding for health, safety, and security, these provisions would 

weaken protections for workers and the general public. 

Sections 3113 would excessively restrict the authority of the Secretary of Energy 

to oversee the management and operations of the NNSA. This section would restrict 

the Secretary’s ability to select the most appropriate oversight mechanism for its 

contractors. 

The term ‘‘performance-based standards’’ is referenced under section 3113, states 

with respect to a covered contract, means that contract includes the use of performance work statements that set forth contact requirements in clear, specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes. The definition listed in section 3113, does 

not accurately reflect the NNSA performance-based approach, which is being implemented to include a comprehensive and detailed method with performance testing 

evaluation of specific security operations and activities to determine security program effectiveness. Additionally, NNSA must retain the ability to select the best 

oversight mechanism given its high security hazard/consequence activities, such as 

operation of nuclear facilities and protection of special nuclear materials. The fact 

that the NNSA’s mandate is to provide adequate protection for its workers and assets while managing unique hazards as it conducts high-consequence activities (e.g., 

nuclear security) makes it particularly important that the NNSA retain the ability 

to use all necessary tools to fulfill its mission. The proposed bill limits our ability 

to determine how best to execute the NNSA’s mission securely and effectively. 

Within the NNSA, we recognize a need for a Headquarters security assessment 

element between the site level and the independent oversight provided by the Office 

of Health, Safety, and Security. NNSA is establishing a Performance Assessment 

Division within the Office of Defense Nuclear Security for security assessment of 

contractors and Federal field organization performance, including no-notice and/or 

short notice evaluations. The division will also assess training effectiveness, policy 

implementation, and the proper execution of vulnerability assessments. This entity 

will be used to verify that security programs are properly implemented and provide 

a nuclear security enterprise viewpoint to NNSA senior leadership. 

Section 3115 would mandate that the NNSA alone establish and oversee health, 

safety, and security at its facilities, which would deprive NNSA of an essential function provided by the HSS Office of Independent Oversight. The Office of Independent Oversight is an important independent element, which assists in the inspection process of our facilities and assets. The provision would hamper existing 

function to enforce and ensure accountability for meeting security requirements. 

Similarly, the bill would restrict the NNSA’s ability to prescribe health and security 

regulations regarding non-nuclear activities that are more stringent than Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards by requiring waivers to permit 

use of more stringent standards. We believe that the NNSA must be able to prescribe a regime that meets its unique needs without having to use waivers. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What was the cost of shutting down Y–12 site following the incident, and was there any impact on schedule for programs? 

Ms. MILLER. The actual cost accounted for by Y–12 was approximately $2.9M primarily for the fully burdened labor rates of those people who could not perform their 

primary/alternative duties during the shutdown. B&W Y–12 made up any schedule 

challenges created during the security shutdown and completed all primary 

deliverables scheduled for the year. While they made up the schedule using overtime as needed, the overtime costs for the year were considerably less than programmed for the year in the rates. This was accomplished by the contractor reducing overtime throughout the year in an effort to create savings. When the security 

event happened, they were executing at less than 50% overtime compared to 
39 

planned rates based on prior years. The overtime needed to get back on schedule 

did not exceed planned annual overtime rates. 

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