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A DECADE AFTER 9/11 COULD AMERICAN FLIGHT 

SCHOOLS STILL UNKNOWINGLY BE TRAINING 

TERRORISTS? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 18, 2012 

Serial No. 112–106 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois, Vice Chair 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ......... 1 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33 

The Honorable Danny K. Davis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Illinois ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Mr. Steven M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

Mr. Kerwin Wilson, General Manager for General Aviation, Office of Security 

Policy and Industry Engagement, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. John P. Woods, Assistant Director, National Security Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Jens C. Hennig, Vice President of Operations, General Aviation Manufacturers Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Mr. Douglas Carr, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Business 

Aviation Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

APPENDIX

Questions for Kerwin Wilson From Chairman Mike Rogers ............................... 49 

Questions for John P. Woods From Chairman Mike Rogers ................................ 50 

(1) 

A DECADE AFTER 9/11 COULD AMERICAN 

FLIGHT SCHOOLS STILL UNKNOWINGLY BE 

TRAINING TERRORISTS? 

Wednesday, July 18, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Walberg, Cravaack, 

Walsh, Turner, Thompson, and Davis. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine GAO’s recent findings 

about flaws that exist in the process forbidding foreign nationals 

taking flight training. 

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses for being here, and 

everyone in attendance. I know the witnesses have a lot of things 

they could be doing. Preparing for hearings, not one of their favorite. But it really is helpful for us to have these kind of hearings 

to talk about these important issues. So I appreciate your time and 

testimony. 

Today’s hearing is a sobering reminder that we cannot afford to 

let down our guard, or become complacent about security. It is completely unacceptable that a decade after 9/11, GAO has uncovered 

weaknesses in our security controls that were supposed to be fixed 

a decade ago. 

GAO’s findings are clear, and those are, not all foreign nationals 

who train to fly airplanes inside the United States have been properly vetted. The Department of Homeland Security does have a program to make sure foreign nationals are vetted, but the program 

has significant weaknesses. 

First, let me say this is extremely disturbing. According to the 

GAO, the main cause of the problem is that TSA needs stronger 

internal controls, and better coordination with ICE. 

Here is what amazes me. We have TWIC program that charges 

$130 to every American trucker for a security background check to 

drive to a port. We have cancer patients, Iraq War veterans, and 

Nobel Prize winners, all forced to undergo rigorous security checks 

before getting on an airplane. 
2 

At the same time, 10 years after 9/11, there are foreign nationals 

in the United States training to fly, just like Mohammed Atta and 

the other 9/11 hijackers did. Not all of them are necessarily getting 

a security background check. 

Is that risk-based security? I don’t think so. Two years ago at a 

Boston-area flight school, ICE discovered 25 illegal immigrants 

were enrolled and taking lessons. 

That is not the worst of it. The owner of the flight school was 

also here illegally. But surprisingly, individuals had been—but surprisingly, the individuals had been approved by TSA to take flight 

lessons, despite their illegal immigration status. 

So the same department that gave 25 foreign nationals a green 

light to take flight lessons ended up investigating those 25 for 

being here illegally. Some improvements were made after the Boston incident, but there are still big gaps in the GAO report. 

According to GAO, some foreign nationals who should not get approved do, as the Boston case I just mentioned proves. Some circumvent the vetting process all together. If foreign nationals don’t 

go through the program, TSA and ICE don’t know who is flying. 

I have no doubt that the majority of people in DHS, and those 

who operate flight schools in the United States, are dedicated to security, and are doing the best that they can. But the fact is, we 

have got to do better. I expect the Department of Homeland Security to provide a concrete time line today for implementing GAO’s 

recommendations. The Department needs to be smarter about security. I believe this is just one of many examples that we need to 

deal with. 

I now recognize Mr. Davis, who is standing in for the Ranking 

Member, who is not available today. I recognize him for 5 minutes 

to make his opening statement. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

take this opportunity to indicate, as you have already done so, that 

Congresswoman Jackson Lee will not be here today. She is attending the funeral of a friend of hers, Federal Protective Service Officer, Inspector Phillip Preta. 

Inspector Preta started his career as security officer, and served 

as the assistant chief of police services for the Veterans Administration, Central Texas Police Division. In 2008, Inspector Preta 

joined the Federal Protective Service at DHS, and maintained an 

active role in a number of associations empowering law enforcement personnel. 

In her absence, I will now read Congresswoman Jackson Lee’s 

opening statement, and ask that it be inserted into the record. 

‘‘I want to first of all thank the witnesses for being here today. 

General aviation accounts for about 54 percent of all civil aviation 

activity in the United States. According to GAO, general aviation 

is the source of 1.3 million jobs, and contributes approximately 

$100 billion to the U.S. economy. 

‘‘Because G.A. includes such a diverse array of operations, general aviation encompasses a wide spectrum of aircraft personnel 

and pilots. Today, GAO is releasing a report that outlines TSA’s efforts to address G.A. security. 

‘‘I look forward to discussing GAO’s findings today, and identifying solutions to complex questions. Today’s hearing, however, ap-
3 

pears to focus only on one aspect of general aviation, and that is 

the vetting of foreign nationals seeking to enroll in flight training 

school. 

‘‘I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to note that 

the threat to G.A. expands beyond the vetting of foreign nationals 

enrolled in flight training programs. 

‘‘A most recent example of this took place on February 2010, 

when a disgruntled individual flew his private one-engine plane 

into an IRS building in Austin, Texas. This incident killed two people, and hurt many innocent people who were caught up in the fire 

after the crash. 

‘‘Today we will hear from TSA and industry about increased collaboration between TSA and industry, and some of the concrete examples that point to enhanced security across the G.A. community 

because of these efforts. I think today’s hearing will lay important 

markers about general aviation security, and how DHS can more 

efficiently harness its resources, particularly that of information 

sharing, and access to accurate information databases. 

‘‘Today’s hearing will also afford us the opportunity to learn more 

extensively about the steps taken by TSA and ICE to address the 

vulnerabilities identified by the GAO. Since GAO’s findings were 

released, TSA and ICE have embarked on key problematic changes 

that enhance G.A. security. 

‘‘First, TSA and ICE have formalized their cooperation. Second, 

TSA and ICE are in the midst of enhancing an extensive vetting 

project of all foreign nationals enrolled in flight schools, pilots and 

crew members, and personnel at repair stations. 

‘‘And finally, ICE and TSA have improved information-sharing 

efforts that impact the mission and operations of both agencies in 

GSA. There is no doubt that GAO’s report provided clarity to TSA 

and Congress on the vulnerabilities present in general aviation. 

‘‘However, we cannot ignore that there is more to G.A. security 

than just vetting foreign nationals. The department’s approach 

must continue to evolve to embrace a comprehensive analysis of 

risk. 

‘‘I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back to look forward to 

hearing the witnesses.’’ 

[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA JACKSON LEE

JULY 18, 2012 

General Aviation [GA] accounts for about 54% of all civil aviation activity in the 

United States. According to GAO, general aviation is the source of 1.3 million jobs 

and contributes approximately $100 billion to the U.S. economy. Because GA includes such a diverse array of operations, general aviation encompasses a wide spectrum of aircraft, personnel, and pilots. 

Today, GAO is releasing a report that outlines TSA’s efforts to address GA security. I look forward to discussing GAO’s findings today and identifying solutions to 

complex questions. 

Today’s hearing, however, appears to focus only on one aspect of general aviation: 

The vetting of foreign nationals seeking to enroll in flight training school. I would 

be remiss if I did not take this opportunity note that the threat to GA expands beyond the vetting of foreign nationals enrolled in flight training programs. 

A most recent example of this took place on February 2010, when a disgruntled 

individual flew his private one-engine plane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas. 

This incident killed two people and hurt many innocent people who were caught up 

in the fire after the crash. General aviation encompasses aircraft of virtually every 
4 

size that perform a wide variety of missions, from crop-dusting to large passenger 

charters. 

Further, international inbound general aviation accounts for about 400 flights per 

day. Most—about 75%—are from Canada and Mexico, and the remainder are from 

a variety of countries. 

Today, we will hear from TSA—and industry—about increased collaboration between TSA and industry and some of the concrete examples that point to enhanced 

security across the GA community because of these efforts. 

I think today’s hearing will lay important markers about general aviation security 

and how DHS can more efficiently harness its resources—particularly that of information sharing and access to accurate information in databases. 

Today’s hearing will also afford us the opportunity to learn more extensively 

about the steps taken by TSA and ICE to address the vulnerabilities identified by 

GAO. Since GAO’s findings were released, TSA and ICE have embarked on key programmatic changes that enhance GA security: First, TSA and ICE have formalized 

their cooperation. Second, TSA and ICE are in the midst of enhancing an extensive 

vetting project of all foreign nationals enrolled in flight schools, pilots and crew 

members, and personnel at repair stations. Finally, ICE and TSA have improved information-sharing efforts that impact the mission and operations of both agencies 

in GA. 

There is no doubt that GAO’s report provided clarity to TSA and Congress on the 

vulnerabilities present in general aviation. However, we cannot ignore that there is 

more to GA security than just vetting foreign nationals. The Department’s approach 

must continue to evolve to embrace a comprehensive analysis of risk. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman advises other 

Members that their opening statements may be submitted to the 

record. 

We are pleased to have five distinguished witnesses before us 

today on this important topic. We appreciate our Government witnesses agreeing to testify alongside non-Government representatives. I recognize this is deviation from standard practice, but I do 

appreciate it. Also, let me remind the witnesses their entire written 

statements will appear in the record. 

Our first witness today is Mr. Steve Lord. Mr. Lord is GAO executive responsible for directing numerous engagements on aviation 

and service transportation issues, and regularly testifies before 

Congress. 

Mr. Lord, as always, we appreciate your appearing before the 

committee, and your important work that your office does. The 

Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lord for 5 minutes to summarize his 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Davis, 

other Members of the committee. I am really excited to be here 

today to discuss the findings of our general aviation security report, 

which we are releasing today to coincide with the hearing. 

This is obviously an important issue. Not only do you have over 

200,000 general aviation aircraft operating more than 19,000 facilities in this country, but as the Chairman remarked, 9/11 hijackers 

learned to fly at U.S. flight schools. 

Today, I would like to discuss two issues in parallel with the 

issues in our report. First, I would like to describe some steps TSA 

has taken in conjunction with industry to enhance general aviation 

security. No. 2, I would also like to discuss the TSA vetting process 

to ensure that foreign nationals coming to this country for flight 
5 

school training are properly vetted before completing the training, 

and moving on to get their FAA airman certificate, i.e., pilots’ licenses. 

Regarding the first point, we found that TSA has taken a number of positive steps to work with industry to develop voluntary 

guidelines to help enhance security at general aviation facilities. 

They also indicated that an updated version of these guidelines will 

be issued later this year. In 2008, TSA also developed a proposed 

rule that would have imposed new security requirements on aircraft weighing over 12,500 pounds, thereby subjecting them to increased security requirements and inspections. 

However, to their credit TSA agreed to revise the proposal after 

it encountered significant industry opposition and now plans on 

issuing a new rule, either later this year or early next year. Industry officials we interviewed as part of this engagement generally 

gave TSA good marks for conducting outreach with them. 

The second point I would like to discuss today is we found several weaknesses in TSA’s process for conducting security threat assessments, that is, background checks on foreign nationals signing 

up for flight training, and in DHS’ process for identifying students 

who may be in the country illegally. 

Under current program requirements, foreign nationals seeking 

flight training must undergo a TSA security threat assessment before flight training. To test whether this actually occurs in practice, 

we downloaded the FAA database of everybody who has a pilot’s 

license and compared it to the TSA database, which is maintained 

separately, of everyone who has completed a background check. So 

in a perfect world, the two databases should match. 

But we were surprised to find that some—the exact number is 

designated sensitive security information, so I can’t tell you the 

exact number—but some of the foreign nationals holding pilots licenses were not in the TSA’s database, indicating that some foreign 

nationals had not been vetted before receiving flight training, and 

ultimately receiving pilot’s licenses. 

Thus, in our report we are recommending that TSA strengthens 

its controls of the vetting process to ensure this doesn’t take place 

again. Although DHS agreed with our recommendation and indicated they are moving out on this, we still have a lot of questions 

about how this is actually going to occur in practice, as some of the 

steps are preliminary in nature. 

Another weakness we found is that a foreign national can be approved for flight school training after entering the country illegally. 

For example, as the Chairman noted, 25 foreign nationals who 

were investigated by ICE at a Boston area flight school in March 

2010 had been approved through the TSA process to begin flight 

school training. However, eight of these individuals were in socalled ‘‘entry without inspection status,’’ EWIS, meaning that they 

had entered the country illegally. 

Three of them had obtained pilots licenses; 17 of them, 17 of the 

25 foreign nationals were in so-called overstay status, meaning 

they had overstayed their authorized period of admission into the 

United States. 

This concerned us, because as part of the vetting process, you are 

supposed to have an immigrations check. We assumed if the immi-
6 

1GAO, General Aviation Security: Weaknesses Exist in TSA’s Process for Ensuring Foreign 

Flight Students Do Not Pose a Security Threat, GAO–12–875 (Washington, DC: July 18, 2012). 2General aviation includes nonscheduled aircraft operations such as air medical-ambulance, 

corporate aviation, and privately-owned aircraft—generally, aircraft not available to the general 

public for transport. 3GAO–12–875. 

grations check was performed properly this wouldn’t occur. Although DHS agreed to take some corrective action to address this 

issue, which is the good news, we still have a lot of questions about 

how it is going to work out in practice. 

Again, a lot of this is preliminary in nature. In fact, one of the 

agreements—arrangements agreed to—we were just notified of last 

night, which I was a little surprised about, given that we have 

spent 15 months looking at this. 

Anyway, in closing we have identified a number of weaknesses 

in TSA’s and DHS’s process for vetting foreign nationals before 

they begin flight school training we think deserves immediate departmental attention. Typically, we give agencies several months to 

implement our recs, but I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, given the 

significance we think they should take immediate action to address 

them. 

The good news is they have already announced a series of measures to do that. 

In closing, I look forward to working with this committee to conduct additional oversight on this issue. 

Thank you very much for inviting me to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

JULY 18, 2012 

GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY.—TSA’S PROCESS FOR ENSURING FOREIGN FLIGHT

STUDENTS DO NOT POSE A SECURITY RISK HAS WEAKNESSES

GAO–12–900T

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the committee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the findings of our report assessing the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to address general aviation security.1

Altogether, more than 200,000 general aviation aircraft—from small aircraft with 

minimal load capacities to business jets and larger aircraft such as privately operated Boeing 747s—operate at more than 19,000 facilities.2 U.S. Government threat 

assessments have discussed plans by terrorists to use general aviation aircraft to 

conduct attacks. Further, analysis conducted on behalf of TSA has indicated that 

larger general aviation aircraft, such as midsized and larger jets often used for business purposes, may be able to cause significant damage to buildings and other structures. Also, the terrorists responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks learned 

to fly at flight schools in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota. TSA, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has responsibilities for general aviation security, 

and developed the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) to help determine whether 

foreign students enrolling at flight schools pose a security threat. 

My testimony this morning will address the key findings from the general aviation security report that we are issuing today.3 Specifically, my statement will address: (1) TSA and general aviation industry actions to enhance security and TSA 

efforts to obtain information on these actions, and (2) TSA efforts to ensure foreign 

flight students do not pose a security threat. 

For the report, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and policies, as well as 

documentation provided by TSA on its oversight of general aviation security, including procedures for conducting security threat assessments of AFSP candidates. In 

addition, we interviewed 22 general aviation operators—including 5 private operators, 7 private charter companies that also perform as private operators, and 10 

flight schools—located at eight selected airports to observe and discuss security ini-
7 

4Originally established in 1988, following the 1988 Pan American World Airways Flight 103 

bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee was developed to 

allow all segments of the population to have input into aviation security considerations. The 

committee’s charter expired in 2010, but was subsequently reestablished by TSA in November 

2011. 5See 49 C.F.R. § 1544.101(d). See also Pub. L. No. 107–71, § 132(a), 115 Stat. 597, 635–36 

(2001). 

tiatives implemented. We selected these airports based on their geographic dispersion, types of general aviation operations present, and size of aircraft based at each 

airport. We also interviewed representatives from six aviation industry associations. 

Further, we reviewed TSA analysis comparing Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) data from January 2006 to September 2011 on foreign nationals applying for 

airman certificates (pilot’s licenses) with AFSP data. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology can be found in our published report. 

TSA AND AIRCRAFT OPERATORS HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO SECURE GENERAL AVIATION; 

TSA OBTAINS INFORMATION THROUGH OUTREACH AND INSPECTIONS

TSA and aircraft operators have taken several important actions to enhance general aviation security, and TSA is working with aviation industry stakeholders to 

develop new security guidelines and regulations. Among other measures, TSA 

worked with members of the General Aviation Working Group of its Aviation Security Advisory Committee in 2003 and 2004 to develop recommended guidelines for 

general aviation airport security, and TSA expects the group to issue updated guidelines later this year.4 In addition, pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA established and oversees implementation of a security program in 

which aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or charter service 

that carry passengers or cargo or both, and that do not fall under another security 

program, must implement a ‘‘Twelve-Five’’ standard security program.5 Aircraft operators implementing a Twelve-Five security program must include, among other 

elements, procedures regarding bomb or air piracy threats. TSA obtains information 

directly from aircraft operators that fall under Twelve-Five through its review and 

approval of the security programs developed by these operators and through periodic 

inspections to determine the extent to which operators comply with their security 

programs. TSA inspectors are responsible for conducting these periodic inspections 

and determining whether operators are in compliance with program requirements 

or whether a violation has occurred. Independent of regulatory requirements, operators of private general aviation aircraft not covered under existing security programs we spoke to indicated that they implement a variety of security measures to 

enhance security for their aircraft. For example, 7 of the 12 operators that perform 

as private operators that we interviewed stated that they park their aircraft in 

hangars to protect them from possible misuse or vandalism. 

TSA has also conducted outreach to the general aviation community to establish 

a cooperative relationship with general aviation stakeholders. TSA officials we spoke 

to stated that the agency does not have a systematic mechanism to collect information on the security measures implemented by other general aviation aircraft operators that do not fall under TSA security programs. Rather, the agency has developed 

informal mechanisms for obtaining information on security measures enacted by 

these operators, such as outreach conducted by TSA inspectors, and has contacted 

general aviation industry associations to obtain this information. 

In 2008, TSA developed a proposed rule that would have imposed security requirements on all aircraft over 12,500 pounds, including those not currently covered 

under existing security programs, thereby subjecting them to TSA security requirements and inspections. However, industry associations and others expressed concerns about the extent to which TSA obtained industry views and information in 

the proposed rule’s development. They also questioned the security benefit of the 

proposed rule and stated that it could negatively affect the aviation industry given 

its broad scope. In response to these concerns, TSA officials said the agency is revising the proposed rule and plans to issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2012 or early 2013. Officials from all six industry associations we 

spoke with stated that TSA has reached out to gather industry’s input, and three 

of the six associations stated that TSA has improved its efforts to gather input since 

the 2008 notice of proposed rulemaking. 
8 

6See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115(c). 7 Information in the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated database of known or suspected 

terrorists—the Terrorist Screening Database—is used for security-related screening of foreign 

nationals applying to AFSP. TECS, an updated and modified version of the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is an information-sharing platform that allows users to access different databases relevant to the antiterrorism and law enforcement mission of numerous 

other Federal agencies. 8For its analysis, TSA used a software tool that performs ‘‘fuzzy matching’’ of data such as 

names, dates, or telephone numbers. The specific number is deemed sensitive security information and is therefore not included in this report. 

WEAKNESSES EXIST IN PROCESSES FOR CONDUCTING SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENTS

AND FOR IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL IMMIGRATION VIOLATIONS

TSA vets foreign flight student applicants through AFSP, but weaknesses exist 

in the vetting process and in DHS’s process for identifying flight students who may 

be in the country illegally. In our July 2012 report, we recommended two actions 

that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns. 

Under AFSP, foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States must 

receive a TSA security threat assessment before receiving flight training to determine whether each applicant is a security threat to the United States. According 

to TSA regulations, an individual poses a security threat when the individual is suspected of posing, or is known to pose, a threat to transportation or National security, a threat of air piracy or terrorism, a threat to airline or passenger security, 

or a threat to civil aviation security.6 According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to AFSP to obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by 

the foreign national—such as name, date of birth, and passport information—to conduct a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist Screening Database, 

and a review of the Department of Homeland Security’s TECS system.7

According to TSA officials, most foreign nationals taking training from a U.S. 

flight training provider will apply for an FAA airman certificate (pilot’s license) once 

their flight training is completed. Information obtained by FAA as part of this application for certification is placed in the airmen registry. From January 2006 through 

September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals had applied for FAA airman certificates, 

indicating they had completed flight training. We provided data from FAA’s airmen 

registry to TSA so that the agency could conduct a matching process to determine 

whether the foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in TSA’s AFSP database and the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through the AFSP 

database. The results of our review of TSA’s analyses are as follows: 

• TSA’s analysis indicated that some of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA 

airmen registry were not in the TSA AFSP database, indicating that these individuals had not applied to the AFSP or been vetted by TSA before taking flight 

training and receiving an FAA airman certificate.8

• TSA’s analysis indicated that an additional number of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were also in the TSA AFSP database but 

had not been successfully vetted, meaning that they had received an FAA airman certificate but had not been successfully vetted or received permission from 

TSA to begin flight training. 

Since 2009, TSA has continuously vetted all new and existing FAA airman certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database, which would include the foreign nationals identified through TSA’s analysis. However, this vetting does not 

occur until after the foreign national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign nationals obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm, such as three of the 

pilots and leaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks, could have already obtained 

the training needed to operate an aircraft before they received any type of vetting. 

In our report, we recommended that TSA take steps to identify any instances where 

foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment and examine those instances so that TSA can identify the 

reasons for these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent future occurrences. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA signed a memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012 to exchange data. The memorandum, which FAA signed in March 2012, outlines a process for FAA to provide 

certain data from its airmen registry on a monthly basis and authorizes TSA to use 

the data to ensure flight training providers are providing TSA with information to 

conduct the appropriate background check prior to flight instruction. This is an important first step toward addressing our recommendation, provided that TSA uses 

the data to identify instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment, identifies reasons 
9 

9We recently reported on issues related to ICE’s oversight of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). Specifically, ICE certifies schools to accept foreign nationals on student 

visas in academic and vocational programs, including those that provide flight training. SEVPcertified flight schools are a relatively small percentage of schools Nation-wide that offer flight 

training to foreign nationals. See GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to 

Assess Security Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Schools, GAO–12–572 (Washington, DC: June 

18, 2012). 

for these occurrences, and strengthens controls to prevent future occurrences, as we 

recommended. 

Another weakness that we identified is that AFSP is not designed to determine 

whether a foreign flight student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national 

can be approved for training through AFSP after entering the country illegally. In 

March 2010, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigated a Boston-area flight school after local police stopped the flight school owner for a traffic 

violation and discovered that he was in the country illegally. In response to this incident, ICE launched a broader investigation of the students enrolled at the flight 

school. ICE found that 25 of the foreign nationals at this flight school had applied 

to AFSP and had been approved by TSA to begin flight training after their security 

threat assessment had been completed; however, the ICE investigation and our subsequent inquiries revealed the following issues, among other things: 

• Eight of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by TSA to begin flight 

training were in ‘‘entry without inspection’’ status, meaning they had entered 

the country illegally. Three of these had obtained FAA airman certificates: 2 

held FAA private pilot certificates and 1 held an FAA commercial pilot certificate. 

• Seventeen of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by TSA to begin 

flight training were in ‘‘overstay’’ status, meaning they had overstayed their authorized period of admission into the United States. 

• In addition, the flight school owner held two FAA airman certificates. Specifically, he was a certified Airline Transport Pilot (cargo pilot) and a Certified 

Flight Instructor. However, he had never received a TSA security threat assessment or been approved by TSA to obtain flight training. He had registered with 

TSA as a flight training provider under AFSP.9

As a result, TSA and ICE jointly worked on a pilot program for vetting names 

of foreign students against immigration databases, but have not specified desired 

outcomes and time frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program. Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and assigning 

individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program could help TSA 

and ICE better identify and prevent potential risk. We recommended that TSA and 

ICE develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility 

and accountability for assessing the results of their pilot program to check TSA 

AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status to help 

detect and identify violations, such as overstays and entries without inspection, by 

foreign flight students, and institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA will prepare a plan 

by December 2012 to assess the results of the pilot program with ICE to determine 

the lawful status of the active AFSP population. The plan is to include specific details on time frames and accountability and recommendations for next steps. We believe that these are positive actions that could help TSA address the weaknesses 

identified in our report and we will continue to work with TSA to monitor progress 

on the proposed solutions as the agency proceeds. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the committee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to responding to any questions 

that you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. That may be good news. The bad news is it took 

them 10 years to do it. 

Thank you, Mr. Lord. 

Our next witness is Mr. Kerwin Wilson. Mr. Wilson serves as 

general manager of general aviation at TSA. He assumed that position in July. Prior to that, he served as assistant general manager 

of general aviation at TSA. A veteran of the U.S. Air Force as an 

officer, Mr. Wilson has over 20 years experience in air traffic control and airport management, with a background in security in for-
10 

mulating aviation policy and procedures with various government 

agencies and foreign countries. 

Chairman now recognizes Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes to summarize his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF KERWIN WILSON, GENERAL MANAGER FOR 

GENERAL AVIATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. WILSON. Good morning, Chairman Mr. Rogers, Mr. Davis, 

and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I want to thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today concerning the TSA’s alien 

flight student program. 

TSA employs risk-based intelligence-driven operations to prevent 

terrorist acts and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our goal is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of air commerce. 

TSA security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we 

use, how specific security procedures are carried out, and how vetting is conducted. The mission of the of AFSP is to ensure that foreign students seeking new or recurrent training at flight schools in 

the United States do not pose a threat to aviation or National security. 

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 

which terrorists trained at U.S. flight schools, Congress, in the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act in 2001, and later in the 

FAA Reauthorization Act of 2003, directed TSA to determine 

whether an alien, as defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act, presented a risk to aviation or National security before 

that individual could train in an aircraft having a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more. 

Subsequently, TSA issued an interim final rule to implement 

these statutory requirements. Under the program, non-U.S. citizens 

seeking to undergo FAA-certificated flight training are required to 

submit a background check that includes a name-based terrorism 

check, a name-based immigration check, a fingerprint-based criminal history records check, submittal of security documents including passport copies and specific information about their desired 

training events. 

The program also requires their flight training provider to send 

a digital picture of the student within 5 calendar days after the 

student initiates training. Flight training providers regulated 

under this program are prohibited from providing flight training to 

aliens until a security threat assessment has been successfully conducted by TSA. These flight training providers offer four different 

categories of training for students applying for the AFSP. Detailed 

definitions of each of those categories are within my written testimony. 

TSA defines general aviation as all aviation operations other 

than regularly scheduled passenger flights, cargo operations, and 

military aviation. The general aviation community consists of ap-
11 

proximately 19,000 airports, 200,000 aircraft, 630,000 certificated 

pilots, and 7,000 flight training providers. 

These flight training providers are an important business in the 

aviation industry, and continue to work with properly vetted aliens 

as an economic benefit to the United States. In general, the general 

aviation community accounts for roughly 1.2 million U.S. jobs and 

contributes $150 billion to the U.S. economy each year. 

From March 2011 to June 2012, the GAO assessed TSA’s and the 

general aviation industry’s actions to strengthen security, as well 

as efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not pose a security 

threat. TSA concurred with all four of GAO’s recommendations. In 

fact, TSA self-identified three of the four recommendations that 

GAO pointed out. 

Because portions of the GAO report contain sensitive security information, I cannot fully comment on many of the recommendations today. To ensure that the subcommittee is kept informed of 

TSA’s actions to address these recommendations as noted in the 

GAO report, the agency did provide the Chairman and the Ranking 

Member with a letter dated July 16 which outlined the current status of the implementation reports’ recommendations. 

TSA continues to fully vet foreign flight school students so that 

U.S. flight schools remain a world leader in flight training, while 

ensuring that only advocates who satisfy the security threat assessment receive such training. 

Chairman Rogers, Mr. Davis, I thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today and I look forward to answering your 

questions. I also recognize Senator Thompson, as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KERWIN WILSON

JULY 18, 2012 

Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today about the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP). TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to 

prevent terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce. 

TSA’s security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security 

that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our security approach by examining the 

procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures are carried 

out, and how screening is conducted. The mission of the AFSP is to ensure that foreign students seeking new or recurrent training at flight schools in the United 

States do not pose a threat to aviation or National security. 

FULFILLING A CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, where terrorists trained 

at U.S. flight schools in preparation for the attacks, Congress included in the ‘‘Aviation and Transportation Security Act’’ (ATSA) a provision that required the Attorney 

General to determine whether an alien, as defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act, presented a risk to aviation or National security before that individual 

could train in the operation of any aircraft having a maximum certified takeoff 

weight (MTOW) of 12,500 pounds or more. 

The ATSA gives TSA broad responsibility for securing the Nation’s civil aviation 

system, which includes general aviation operations. The ‘‘Vision 100—Century of 

Aviation Reauthorization Act,’’ (Pub. L. No. 108–176) was signed into law on December 12, 2003, and Section 612 of Title VI, ‘‘Aviation Security’’ transferred the responsibility of vetting foreign flight student applicants from the Department of Justice 
12 

to TSA, and included provisions distinguishing between training on aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds and training on aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or 

less. Subsequently, TSA issued an Interim Final Rule to implement these statutory 

requirements. AFSP is a fee-based program that collects approximately $5 million in annual fees 

and represents an added layer of security to protect our Nation’s transportation networks. Under the program, non-U.S. citizens seeking to undergo Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA)-certified flight training are required to submit to a rigorous 

background screening that includes a name-based terrorism check, a name-based 

immigration check, a fingerprint-based criminal history records check, submittal of 

security documents including passport copies, and specific information about their 

desired training events. The program also requires that flight training providers 

send a digital picture of the student within 5 calendar days after the student initiates training. Flight training providers regulated under AFSP are prohibited from 

providing flight training to aliens until a Security Threat Assessment (STA) has 

been successfully conducted by TSA. 

THE ALIEN FLIGHT STUDENT PROGRAM

Flight schools are an important business in the aviation industry and continue to 

welcome properly vetted aliens as an economic benefit to the United States. General 

aviation includes more than 200,000 aircraft operating at more than 19,000 facilities 

in the United States for the purposes of such tasks as air medical-ambulance, corporate aviation, and private charters. As a result of this demand, TSA receives an 

average of 48,000 AFSP applications per year (4,000 per month). 

Given the diversity of the general aviation landscape, there are four different categories under which students can apply to the AFSP, depending on the type of flight 

training they seek: 

• Category 1—training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW of more than 

12,500 pounds, but not fitting into Category 2. 

• Category 2—training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW of more than 

12,500 pounds for individuals who demonstrate certain preliminary indications 

of reliability such as: A candidate employed by a foreign air carrier that operates under 14 C.F.R. Part 129 and that has an approved security program 

under 49 C.F.R. Part 1546; a student who holds unescorted access authority to 

a secured area of an airport; a flight crew member who has successfully completed a criminal history records check in accordance with appropriate regulations; or a student who holds an airman’s certificate from a foreign entity that 

is recognized by the FAA or appropriate U.S. military agency and that permits 

the student to operate a multi-engine aircraft with a MTOW of more than 

12,500 pounds. 

• Category 3—training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW of 12,500 pounds 

or less for Single Engine Land, Instrument Rating, and/or Multiengine Land 

events. 49 U.S.C. 44939(c). 

• Category 4—recurrent training for operation of all aircraft for individuals who 

are current and qualified on the aircraft for which they are requesting training. 

Since 2001, the AFSP has vetted over 350,000 applications of approximately 

125,000 unique individuals. 

GAO STUDY ON STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN THE GENERAL AVIATION ENVIRONMENT

From March 2011 to June 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed TSA’s and the general aviation industry’s actions to strengthen security as 

well as efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not pose a security threat. These 

efforts include vetting foreign flight student applicants through AFSP. GAO found 

that TSA has taken steps to enhance communications with general aviation industry stakeholders and improve the vetting of foreign nationals enrolling in U.S. flight 

schools. GAO also found weaknesses in the vetting process and in the Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS) process for identifying flight students who may be in 

the country illegally. 

TSA concurs with the GAO recommendations on identifying how often and why 

foreign nationals are not vetted under AFSP. The GAO also recommends that TSA 

work with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to check TSA AFSP data 

against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status. 

TSA concurs with all of the recommendations identified in the report and is in 

the process of preparing the 60-day update to be submitted to GAO by August 10, 

2012. TSA will also provide this subcommittee with a 90-day status update as requested. Because portions of the GAO report contain sensitive security information, 

I cannot fully comment on all the recommendations and TSA’s responses in this 
13 

statement. To ensure that the subcommittee is informed of the actions TSA undertakes to address the recommendations noted in the GAO report, the agency provided 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member with a letter dated July 16, 2012, which 

outlined the current status of implementation of the report’s recommendations. 

GAO’s first recommendation asked that TSA take steps to identify any instances 

where foreign nationals receive pilot certificates without first undergoing a TSA 

STA and examine the reasons for these occurrences in order to strengthen controls 

and prevent future occurrences. On February 21, 2012, TSA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the FAA to receive a monthly dataset of foreign nationals who received their first FAA airman private, sport, or recreational pilot certificate. The dataset includes the certificate holder’s full name, date of birth, certificate 

level and type ratings, date of issuance, certificate number, citizenship, responsible 

Flight Standards District Office, recommending Certified Flight Instructor, physical 

address, and flight school number if applicable. This information is a subset of the 

information that TSA receives daily for recurrent vetting and is tailored for AFSP 

use. TSA utilizes this information to cross-check it against the current AFSP database to identify individuals who may have circumvented the AFSP STA requirements. 

GAO also asked that TSA, in collaboration with ICE, ‘‘develop a plan with time 

frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing 

the results of a pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS 

has on applicants’ admissibility status.’’ In November 2010, TSA began working 

with ICE to mitigate the identified concern and conducted the first recurrent lawful 

status check in May 2011. This pilot program was with ICE’s Counterterrorism and 

Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) and the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) and 

laid out a process to detect and identify AFSP applicants who are in violation of 

U.S. immigration laws. With positive results assessed during the pilot, TSA moved 

forward with a new process to check active alien flight students against the US– 

VISIT ADIS database to identify whether the individual may have overstayed the 

terms of their admission, and providing the results to CTCEU to take appropriate 

immigration enforcement action. If CTCEU identifies any issues, they notify TSA 

for action with respect to aviation security. In addition, TSA entered into an information-sharing Memorandum of Agreement on February 21, 2012, allowing ICE to 

access the AFSP database to aid in their investigations. By the end of this year, 

TSA plans to further automate this process by interfacing with US–VISIT ADIS 

through their new web services platform. In the mean time, TSA will continue to 

conduct the above-described manual vetting process through US–VISIT ADIS to 

mitigate the issue identified by GAO. 

CONCLUSION

TSA continues to fully vet foreign flight school students so that U.S. flight schools 

remain a world leader in flight training while ensuring that only those applicants 

who satisfy our STA requirements receive such training. Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Our next witness is Mr. John Woods. Mr. Woods is assistant director for national security investigations at ICE. His division is responsible for programs that target trans-national security threats 

stemming from illicit travel, trade, and financial enterprises. Mr. 

Woods has served in this position since 2009. He has 26 years of 

distinguished experience in law enforcement. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Woods for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND 

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

Mr. WOODS. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Davis, and 

Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to appear before 

you to discuss our efforts to identify, address vulnerabilities, and 
14 

prevent the exploitation of our visa systems by terrorists and/or 

criminals. 

Today, I would like to focus on the role and responsibility of our 

counter-terrorism and criminal exploitation unit, or the CTCEU, 

and the opportunities we see to collaborate with TSA to improve 

the vetting process of the alien flight student program and the 

alien flight student population. 

The CTCEU is the first and only National program dedicated to 

the enforcement of non-immigrant visa violations. It is part of 

ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations National Security Investigations Division. The unit prevents terrorists and other criminals 

from exploiting the Nation’s immigration system through fraud. It 

investigates the non-immigrant visa holders who violate their immigration status and places a high priority on scrutinizing the activities of known or suspected terrorists and those associated with 

terrorists. 

It also prevents criminal exploitation of our student visa system. 

Since its creation in 2003, the CTCEU have had analysts resolve 

more than 2 million such records using automated and manual review techniques. ICE opens approximately 6,000 investigative cases 

annually and assigns them to our HS–ICE special agents in the 

field for further investigation. 

These investigations result in approximately 1,800 administrative arrests and 35 criminal arrests annually. In 2010 HS–ICE special agents investigated TJ Aviation, a flight school in Boston, 

whose flight students consisted primarily of visa overstays and illegal aliens. This investigation drew attention to the alien flight 

training in the United States and the vulnerabilities that persisted 

after nearly a decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 

Shortly after the TJ Aviation investigation, HS–ICE has worked 

with TSA to help refine the alien flight school program policies and 

procedures. The CTCEU has assigned resources to the alien flight 

school program and to assist in the review of HSI and TSI procedures and processes involving alien flight students and the schools 

that train them. 

Since the enhancement of this relationship with TSA, several significant changes have been implemented to enhance National security of the alien flight school program. One significant change is 

that TSA conducts checks of active alien flight students against 

US–VISIT’s arrival and departure information system to identify 

whether an individuals may have overstayed the terms of their 

mission and provides results to the CTCEU to take enforcement action. 

Another significant change is TSA has been refining their operating procedures to include having TSA inspectors talk to alien 

flight students and physically inspect their documents and log 

books. Additionally, we are conducting these inspections with them 

on weekends where a majority of the flight training takes place. 

In December 2011, CTCU developed and implemented Operation 

Clipped Wings. This is a three-phase enforcement operation aimed 

at mitigating the vulnerabilities identified in Alien Flight School 

Program, and the critical infrastructure areas associated within 

aviation. 
15 

The first phase consists of HSI’s special agents focusing on investigative efforts on those foreign nationals who have been identified 

in the AFSP database, having received flight training in the United 

States, and who have overstayed the terms of their admission. 

The second phase will be centered on conducting proper immigration checks of all Federal aviation certified pilots and crew members. The final phase will focus on employees at repair stations, locations that are certified by the FAA to repair aircraft. 

To date, Operation Clipped Wings has identified over 30 investigative leads for HSI special agents to follow up on, and has led 

to four criminal—four administrative arrests. 

These are just a few examples of how ICE is committed to promoting National security in working with our DHS counterparts in 

identifying and preventing terrorists from exploiting our visa process. I thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today, and 

I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS

JULY 18, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify and address vulnerabilities 

in, and prevent the exploitation of, our visa system by terrorists and criminals. In 

June 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report entitled, 

‘‘General Aviation Security: Weaknesses Exist in TSA’s Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students Do Not Pose a Security Threat.’’ In response to the report and 

its recommendations, ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is working in collaboration with 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on a pilot to determine lawful 

status of the active Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) population. By December 

31, 2012, TSA will prepare a plan, with specific details on time frames and accountability, to assess the results of the pilot including recommendations for future steps. 

Visa overstays and other forms of status violation bring together two critical areas 

of ICE’s mission—National security and immigration enforcement. We cannot overstate the importance of determining who to allow entry into the United States and 

ensuring compliance with the conditions of such entry. We are proud of the good 

work we have done over the last 10 years to protect the integrity of our visa system. 

My testimony will focus on the role and responsibility of the CTCEU, our successes 

and the opportunities we see to collaborate with TSA to improve the vetting process 

for the AFSP population. 

The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

The CTCEU is the first and only National program dedicated to the enforcement 

of non-immigrant visa violations. It is part of ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) National Security Investigations Division. The unit prevents terrorists 

and other criminals from exploiting the Nation’s immigration system through fraud. 

It investigates non-immigrant visa holders who violate their immigration status and 

places a high priority on scrutinizing the activities of known or suspected terrorists 

and terrorist associations. It also combats criminal exploitation of the student visa 

system. 

Today, through the CTCEU, ICE analyzes and recommends leads for investigation 

from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and the United 

States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) program. 

SEVIS is the internet-based system that maintains information on Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)-certified schools and international students who 

come to the United States on F (academic) or M (vocational) visa status to study 

at those schools, as well as the students’ dependents. SEVIS also maintains information on U.S. Department of State-designated exchange visitor sponsors and J visa 
16 

1Three of the 9/11 hijackers attended flight schools while bearing visas that did not permit 

flight training. 

exchange visitor program participants and their dependents. US–VISIT owns two 

systems: The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and the Arrival 

and Departure Information System (ADIS), which house biometric and associated 

biographic data on foreign nationals who have entered or applied to enter the 

United States. IDENT and ADIS maintain data on foreign nationals such as students, tourists, and temporary workers, present in the United States at any given 

time (including flight students and foreign students) and those who have overstayed 

or otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their admission. 

Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of non-immigrants who may have violated their terms of admission or visa status, based on data 

received from SEVIS, US–VISIT, and other sources. These records are resolved by 

further identifying potential Federal violations that would warrant field investigations, establishing compliance with their terms of admission, or establishing departure dates from the United States. Since the creation of the CTCEU in 2003, analysts have resolved more than 2 million such records using automated and manual 

review techniques. ICE opens approximately 6,000 investigative cases annually, and 

assigns them to our special agents in the field for further investigation. These investigations result in over 1,800 administrative arrests and approximately 35 criminal 

arrests per year. 

ICE furthers its counterterrorism mission by initiating or supporting high-priority 

National security initiatives based upon specific information from the intelligence 

community. The practice is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting 

specific risk factors, including international travel from specific geographic locations 

to the United States, and in-depth criminal research and social network link analysis. 

A critical component of the CTCEU is the SEVIS Exploitation Section, which combats exploitation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program by analyzing SEVIS 

data and referring school fraud criminal investigations to the field for further investigation. The SEVP is part of the National Security Investigations Division and is 

responsible for: Certifying schools to accept international students; administering 

SEVIS; and collecting, maintaining, analyzing, and providing information so only legitimate foreign students or exchange visitors gain entry to the United States. 

For instance, in November 2011, the CTCEU Group in Los Angeles arrested 

Karena Chuang of Wright Aviation Academy for encouraging the illegal entry of 

aliens for private financial gain. On February 6, 2012, Ms. Chuang pleaded guilty 

to two counts of this crime. Wright Aviation Academy, a non-SEVP-certified flight 

school, was suspected by ICE’s Visa Security Program of fraudulently recruiting and 

training foreign flight students from Egypt. As a result of ICE’s investigation—representative of ICE’s layered enforcement approach that works to identify and disrupt visa fraud overseas, with a focus on dismantling supporting transnational organizations committing such fraud, and prosecuting the alleged perpetrators in the 

United States—Chuang is alleged to have applied to SEVP-certified schools, posing 

as a foreign student, for the sole purpose of obtaining valid Forms I–20 (Certificates 

of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student). The students, in turn, allegedly used the 

fraudulently obtained Forms I–20 to get M–1 (vocational) visas to enter the United 

States to attend Wright Aviation Academy. This investigation successfully upheld 

the integrity of the SEVP program through ICE’s layered enforcement approach— 

identifying and disrupting visa fraud overseas, dismantling the transnational organization, and prosecuting the perpetrators in the United States. 

In 2010, ICE HSI special agents investigated TJ Aviation, a flight school in Boston, whose flight students consisted primarily of visa overstays and illegal aliens. 

This investigation drew attention to alien flight training in the United States and 

the vulnerabilities that persisted nearly a decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.1

Shortly after the TJ Aviation investigation, TSA requested an HSI liaison to help 

refine the AFSP policies and procedures. The CTCEU assigned a National Program 

Manager/special agent to the AFSP who is currently working to review HSI and 

TSA procedures and processes involving alien flight students and the schools that 

train alien flight students. 

After reviewing TSA procedures and processes, the CTCEU’s Liaison identified 

several areas of systemic vulnerabilities. ICE and TSA have identified and are discussing several ways to alleviate these issues by: 

• Sharing AFSP data with ICE and SEVIS information with TSA; 

• Implementing ways for TSA Transportation Security Inspectors to review but 

not make determinations of legal presence of alien flight students during their 
17 

2 A ‘‘STRIKE’’ is an operational activity involving TSA compliance personnel from multiple locations surging at one particular location to conduct inspections. 

semi-annual inspections of AFSP flight training providers and record this information in a historical database; 

• Implementing a system for ICE and TSA to cooperatively conduct lawful presence checks on aliens in TSA databases; 

• Implementing joint HSI/TSA outreach to flight training providers that train 

alien flight students and local airport officials; and 

• Providing additional assistance and support while investigating flight schools 

and flight students. 

During the tenure of the CTCEU liaison at TSA, several significant changes have 

been implemented to enhance the National security of the AFSP. One significant 

change is that TSA AFSP conducts checks of active alien flight students against 

US–VISIT’s ADIS database to identify whether the individual may have overstayed 

the terms of their admission and provides the results to CTCEU to take appropriate 

action. This allows HSI to potentially target the immigration violator without TSA 

alerting the individual. The CTCEU liaison has access to TSA’s AFSP database and 

has provided several accounts for HSI special agents throughout the United States. 

Additionally, the CTCEU liaison has participated in TSA Special Emphasis STRIKE 

Operations,2 which has resulted in TSA refining their operating procedures to include having TSA inspectors talk to alien flight students and physically inspecting 

their documents and logbooks and conducting these inspections on the weekends 

when the majority of flight training occurs. 

In December 2011, the CTCEU developed and implemented ‘‘Operation Clipped 

Wings,’’ an enforcement operation aimed at mitigating the vulnerabilities identified 

in the AFSP and the critical infrastructure areas associated with aircrafts. This operation will be implemented in three phases. In the first phase, HSI is focusing its 

investigative efforts on those foreign nationals who have been identified in the 

AFSP database as having received flight training in the United States and overstayed their terms of admission. The second phase will be centered on conducting 

proper immigration checks on all Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-certified 

pilots and crew members. The final phase will be focused on employees at repair 

stations—locations that are certified by the FAA to repair aircraft. To date, Operation Clipped Wings has identified over 30 HSI investigative leads and led to four 

administrative arrests. 

CONCLUSION

ICE is committed to promoting National security and has made significant 

progress in identifying and preventing terrorists from exploiting the visa process. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Woods. Our next witness is Mr. 

Jens Hennig. Mr. Hennig is vice president of operations for the 

General Aviation Manufacturers Association. 

Mr. Hennig joined GAMA as the manager of operations in 2003, 

and in advance to vice president of operations. Prior to joining 

GAMA, he served as manager of flight operations at Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Hennig for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JENS C. HENNIG, VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. HENNIG. Chairman Rogers, Congressman Davis, Ranking 

Member Thompson, I am Jens Hennig, and I am vice president of 

operations for the General Aviation Manufacturers Association. I 

appreciate you convening this hearing to examining the TSA’s 

Alien Flight Student Program. 
18 

GAMA represents over 75 companies, the world-leading manufacturers of general aviation products. Our members are also involved 

with the service and support of the industry and our flight-training 

providers in 2011, and accounted for 16,000 of the individual 

checks conducted by the TSA, including 56 percent of the checks 

conducted for recurrent training. 

Today’s hearing specifically focuses on GAO’s recommendations 

on ways to strengthen the program with respect to visa adherence 

and data sharing between different governing agencies. GAMA 

views the GAO’s recommendations are targeted and appropriate to 

strengthen a specific part of the framework of the Alien Flight Program. 

GAMA, however, believes there are some additional securing enhancements that also need to be implemented. These enhancements will better target TSA’s limited resources by aligning the required security threat assessment for foreign nationals with other 

security programs. 

The United States is a global leader in pilot training. There are 

currently 944 FAA-certified pilot schools. According to the FAA, approximately 22 percent of the airmen tests administered last year 

were to foreign citizens. 

Pilot training is also essential for a healthy manufacturing industry. When GAMA members sell new aircraft to a customer, it 

is often accompanied by training for the pilot and the crew. 

The current Alien Flight Student Program was created after 

9/11, and the program was transferred from the Department of 

Justice to TSA in 2003, with the requirements established with an 

interim final rule published late 2004. 

As an interim final rule, the program was not subject to public 

review and comment. This was a result in a number of areas needing policy interpretations. 

As an example, for many years, there was uncertainty between 

TSA and industry about what constituted recurrent training vetting. Recurrent training received specific attention both by Congress, and in the rule, for how to create a proportional set of requirements to people who are already pilots, and pose less risk for 

training events from a threat scenario. 

The lack of clarity resulted in an overly-cautious approach by 

TSA and industry, in vetting people for training activities that 

awarded no additional flying privileges. 

The TSA worked with industry, and in 2010, published new policy that drew clear lines as to what is captured by the required 

check. The TSA showed industry how to comply with a regulation 

without redundant checks of the same individual. The policy is one 

of several issued by the TSA over the past 4 years. 

GAMA welcomes this engagement by TSA with industries to develop clear compliance guidance. There are, however, several unclear areas and inefficiencies that cannot be addressed without 

changing the framework of the regulation. 

The primary inefficiency is the requirement that a foreign national for each stand-alone training event, certificate, or rating that 

they hold. I have provided some examples in my written testimony. 

In short, the typical situation is a fully-certified pilot who is employed by a foreign commercial airline, and approved to operate 
19 

1 49 CFR Part 1552 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security 

Awareness Training for Flight School Employees; Interim Rule. 

multiple different types of aircraft. If that airline elects to contract 

with an FAA training center, the alien flight regulation is structured to require the pilot to be subject to a security threat assessment for each type rating that they hold. 

This training, and the multiple—often occur within a period of 

just a couple of weeks. This approach clearly does nothing to add 

to enhanced security, but it wastes Government and industry resources in the conduct of the multiple vets of the same person. 

GAMA believes that the TSA should shift the approach for the 

STA, and approach—to the approach taken by other programs. Basically, we believe that the TSA should shift from an event-based 

STA to one that is time-based. 

Based on these concerns, GAMA, in April 2011 petitioned the 

TSA for a rewrite of the program. We did this in response to the 

administration’s call for a regulatory review of all agencies. 

In August of last year, DHS accepted our proposal for the rewrite. At the same time, outlined the TSA’s plan to establish a 

streamlined procedure for the vetting of the foreign national, implement new information technology, and shift the STA to have a validity of 5 years. We believe these changes will benefit both the 

TSA and the students. 

Chairman Rogers, Congressman Davis, thank you for providing 

me the opportunity to discuss with the subcommittee the need to 

make changes to the program. GAMA believes the changes will 

streamline the program, increase Government efficiencies, and provide a more effective vetting of foreign nationals seeking flight 

training in the United States. 

At the same time, the rewrite of the program will also lend itself 

to the enactment of the GAO’s recommendations, and establish a 

clear regulatory framework for industry. The TSA has been a good 

partner within industry, and we look forward to working with them 

to fully implement the changes. 

Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hennig follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENS C. HENNIG

JULY 18, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee; my name is Jens Hennig and I am the vice president of operations 

for the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA). GAMA represents over 

75 companies who are the world’s leading manufacturers of general aviation airplanes, rotorcraft, engines, avionics, and components. Our member companies also 

operate airplane fleets, airport fixed-based operations, as well as pilot training and 

maintenance facilities world-wide. 

On behalf of our members, I appreciate your convening this hearing to examine 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security program for flight 

schools; often referred to as the alien flight student program.1

GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

Today’s hearing specifically focuses on recommendations by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on ways to strengthen the alien flight student program. 

GAMA understands the recommendations of the GAO are two-fold: (1) To strength-
20 

2GAMA petitioned the Department of Homeland Security in response to its notice Reducing 

Regulatory Burden; Retrospective Review under Executive Order 13563, see Volume 76 Federal 

Register at 13526. 3Pub. L. 107–71, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Section 113 introduced a prohibition against flight training providers from providing flight training to aliens and 

certain designated individuals pending the Attorney General not notifying the training provider 

within 45 days that the candidate presented no threat to aviation or National security. 4The impact of the DOJ program for vetting for aliens seeking flight training in the United 

States was discussed by GAMA in testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee 

on Commerce, Science & Transportation of the U.S. Senate, Hearing on Aviation Security, on 

February 5, 2003. 5 Vision 100 Century of Aviation Act, Section 612. 

6The term ‘‘dry lease’’ refers to a flight training provider leasing its training facilities and 

devices to an airline which then conducts its training at the flight training provider’s facilities 

using its equipment. 7 A number of other policy clarifications were developed or identified by industry including requirements for U.S. Government employees; requirements for U.S. Government-sponsored employees that are foreign nationals; and handling of fingerprints. 

en the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) interactions to ensure adherence to visa requirements; and 

(2) Improving data sharing between TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) about FAA-certified pilots. 

GAMA views the GAO’s recommendations as targeted and appropriate for 

strengthening specific parts of the framework of the alien flight program. If implemented these recommendations will clarify the requirements placed upon flight 

schools for identifying trainees and further define record-keeping requirements 

about students. 

GAMA believes additional program enhancements need to be implemented in 

other areas. We applaud action taken by TSA over the past several years to continue to improve the program, but we have also made recommendations in response 

to the administration’s regulatory review 2 that we believe will further streamline 

the program based on risk. These changes, if implemented, will better target the 

TSA’s limited resources using risk consideration by aligning the required Security 

Threat Assessment (STA) for foreign nationals with other TSA security programs. 

GAMA is encouraged by the TSA’s engagement with industry over the past 4 years 

to clarify the requirements and applicability of the program and consider a riskbased approach to vetting foreign nationals who elect to obtain flight training from 

companies certificated by the FAA. 

HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF THE PROGRAM

The regulatory framework in place today originated after September 11, 2001. The 

program was originally administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ),3 but in 

2003 Congress transferred the authority over background checks for flight training 

to the TSA.4 5 GAMA welcomed this shift in authority because the background check 

process under DOJ had effectively halted the U.S. flight training industry’s ability 

to train foreign nationals, further exacerbating the effects of the 2000–2001 recession. The TSA established the requirements of the current program through the 

publication of an interim final rule in September 2004. 

The interim final rule introduced four different categories to vetting foreign nationals based on the type of flight training that they would undertake where Category 1 or 2 is required for large aircraft; Category 3 is required for small aircraft; 

and Category 4 applies to recurrent flight training on an aircraft. 

Due to its status as interim final regulation, however, the TSA program was not 

subject to the typical regulatory review and comment that allows work between an 

agency and the industry to establish an effective program that ensures security concerns are addressed without unnecessarily burdening industry as well as providing 

for a clear process for regulatory compliance. 

During the last 4 years the TSA worked with industry through a cross-section of 

policies, clarifications, and interpretations to define today’s alien flight student program requirements. Examples of issues that industry identified as needing new policy or clarification within the framework of the existing regulation include: 

• What is defined as ‘‘recurrent training’’? 

• Who holds responsibility for ensuring compliance with the program when ‘‘dry 

leasing’’6 a simulator? 

• With respect to oversight of the program, does the TSA have responsibility to 

ensure that the foreign national is in the United States on a valid visa?7

The TSA’s policy clarifications about the program greatly improved the processing 

time for a foreign national seeking flight training. Our members have seen the proc-
21 

8Organizations certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR Part 141 typically conduct primary 

training which is regulated by the TSA under Category 3 while organizations certificated under 

14 CFR Part 142 typically conduct aircraft type-specific training and are regulated by the TSA 

under Category 1, 2, and 4 of the 49 CFR Part 1552. 9See, FAA analysis of airman certification knowledge exams in response to GAMA request 

July 12, 2012. 10See, TSA analysis of 2011 alien flight activity in response to GAMA request received July 

13, 2012 identified Category 1 (3,930), Category 2 (4,095), Category 3 (19,219), and Category 

4 (20,407) for a total of 47,651 checks. 11See, 2012 Pilot and Technician Outlook, Boeing, July 11, 2012 at www.boeing.com/ 

commercial/cmo/pilotltechnicianloutlook.html. 12 Congress specifically separated the requirements for recurrent training, that is pilots who 

already know how to competently and safely operate and aircraft, when transferring the authority to the TSA as it is widely recognized that STAs of a pilot who is in the United States to 

undertake recurrent training exposes the aviation system and National security to de minimis 

risk. Congress, however, in 2009 expanded the requirements of the alien flight student program 

in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Appropriations Act of 2009), which amends 6 U.S.C. 469, and requires the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to: (1) Establish a process to determine that an alien who takes recurrent flight training is properly identified and does not pose a threat to aviation or National 

Continued 

essing time for recurrent flight training reduced to approximately to 1–2 days as 

compared to 3–6 days as recently as a couple of years ago. Additionally, the TSA’s 

staff is directly engaged with industry and through their ‘‘help desk’’ function provide necessary support to achieve regulatory compliance for individual pilots and 

flight training providers. 

Industry does, however, face a compilation of regulatory interpretations, policy 

letters, and frequently asked questions when determining how to comply with the 

program. The core remaining concern of industry is the requirement that a foreign 

national seeking to undertake flight training in the United States submit to an STA 

prior to starting each training course. 

ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE FLIGHT TRAINING INDUSTRY AND ROLE OF THE PROGRAM

The United States is the global leader in pilot training. There are currently 688 

active 14 CFR Part 141 FAA-certificated flight schools and 256 active 14 CFR Part 

142 certificated training centers;8 many of which involve multiple locations and dozens of aircraft or simulators. Additionally, there is training conducted at many 

schools under 14 CFR Part 61. According to the FAA, approximately 22 percent of 

airman tests administered in 2011 were to foreign citizens.9

The economic importance of the foreign individuals seeking flight training in the 

United States cannot be understated. In 2011, the TSA conducted 47,651 individual 

checks of foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States including 

20,407 for Category 4 recurrent trainees.10

The future need for commercial, business, and general aviation pilots continues 

to grow. In a forecast released just last week, the predicted need for commercial airline pilots will be 460,000 pilots world-wide through 2031.11 This figure does not include the tens of thousands of pilots needed by operators outside commercial aviation such as business and general aviation. 

The TSA’s alien flight program is at the center of commerce both for the companies that are in the business of pilot training, but also of great importance to manufacturers of commercial and general aviation aircraft and their operators. The impact on the manufacturing industry is indirect, but for each export of an aircraft 

to a foreign customer, the aircraft manufacturers will as part of the sales contract 

include the training of the customer’s pilots. Without the ability to effectively train 

pilots to safely operate aircraft, the aviation manufacturing and operator industry 

would be grounded. The U.S.-based flight training and aircraft manufacturing industry supports tens of thousands of high-paying jobs. 

GAMA’s members worked with the TSA to facilitate the vetting of 16,683 customers’ individual checks in 2011 including 56 percent of the Category 4 checks. 

Training is conducted by GAMA members in numerous flight training centers across 

the United States and the world in hundreds of simulators and aircraft. 

GAMA’S PETITION FOR REGULATORY REVIEW

GAMA began work with the TSA in 2009 to address several policies that we believe were either unclear or not addressed when the requirements for vetting foreign 

nationals were established. TSA had recognized the issues that existed with the program and worked cooperatively with industry to develop guidance. One example was 

the uncertainty about what the TSA viewed as constituting ‘‘recurrent training’’12
22 

security; and (2) impose reasonable fees to recoup the cost of checking recurrent training candidates. 13TSA Docket No. TSA–2004–19147, Interpretation of ‘‘Recurrent Training’’ and Changes to 

Security Threat Assessment Process for Recurrent Training, September 13, 2010. 

which had the troublesome effect of the same person being subject to not one STA, 

but often several STAs for different programs over the course of just a few weeks. 

There were also different interpretations applied to flight training providers as to 

what activity would require the trainee to undergo another Category 4 recurrent 

check. 

TSA published a new policy 13 that provided clarity about recurrent training in 

2010. The TSA’s new policy identified what types of courses are subject to STA 

using common aviation terminology. This policy has had the positive impact of reducing the number of times that the same person is vetted by the TSA in a short 

period of time. This efficiency has greatly enhanced the competitiveness of FAA-certified flight training providers and was achieved without reducing security since all 

foreign nationals are still subject to the same STA, but without the duplication. 

The TSA, working jointly with industry during 2009 through 2011, successfully 

implemented a number of other policy clarifications for the alien flight program that 

resulted in shorter threat assessment review times and reductions in the number 

of times one person is vetted by the TSA within a short period of time. The program, 

however, in its current status as an interim final rule remains difficult to understand for applicants and still includes several inefficiencies. As a result, numerous 

policy clarifications have been necessary and the TSA was prompted to post a Frequently Asked Question section on its website. The flight training industry is also 

experiencing some confusion in the field when subject to TSA audits since the current program looks quite different from the requirements in 49 CFR Part 1552. 

The primary inefficiency remaining is the requirement to vet a foreign national 

for stand-alone training courses for new certificates or ratings. There are two common problems. 

(1) Persons who are not pilots, but come to the United States to become commercial pilots, (so called ab initio training). A training program to become a 

commercial pilot covers 4–5 separate FAA certificates or ratings which are typically taken by the student over the course of 1 year. Currently, the TSA program requires that the foreign national submit to the alien flight program STA 

for each individual certificate or rating course with the result that the TSA conduct multiple vets of the same person within 1 year for a corresponding fee for 

each vetting. 

(2) Professional pilots that hold multiple type ratings which each permit that 

pilot to fly a unique aircraft. The pilots with multiple type ratings that elect 

to do recurrent type rating training in the United States must submit to the 

STA for each type rating they hold. This means that a foreign national in the 

United States doing three type ratings within a couple of weeks must submit 

their information to an STA three times prior to starting training. 

These practices raise costs, create confusion, and they do not enhance security. 

It is GAMA’s belief that the intent of Congress and the regulation was not to vet 

the same person on multiple occasions simultaneously or with high frequency, but 

instead ensure that each person that receives FAA flight training is vetted one time 

prior to the start of training and that the TSA has an understanding of who is taking flight training. If not, the TSA wastes scarce Federal resources when checking 

the same person multiple times, sometimes on the same day. At the same time, industry is subject to duplicative and redundant requirements at direct cost through 

the payment of the STA fee and indirectly through the requirement to submit the 

same personal identifiable information multiple times. 

GAMA believes that the TSA should shift its approach to Security Threat Assessment of foreign nationals seeking flight training to the approach in other TSA programs. For example, instead of having the STA be event-based (that is, when a person elects to do a certain activity), it could be time-based (that is, the person be required to submit to an STA with a certain frequency and allow the agency to maintain the information about the individual to conduct constant vetting of that person’s name and information against appropriate threat lists and the flight training 

provider notifying the TSA that additional training is about to commence with that 

person.) 

On April 13, 2011, GAMA petitioned the TSA to rewrite the alien flight student 

program in response to the administration’s call for a regulatory review of all agencies. In our petition, we identified several areas that need further policy clarifications and proposed that the TSA shift to require foreign nationals to be vetted no 

more frequently than annually. GAMA also proposed the removal of the four cat-
23 

14See, TSA Docket No. DHS–2011–0015: DHS Retrospective Review. 15See, TSA Docket No. DHS–2011–0015; AOPA Letter Dated April 12, 2011. 16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Final Plan for the Retrospective Review of Existing 

Regulations, August 22, 2011. 

egories in the existing program and the sunset of recurrent training as a separate 

requirement in favor of a single consistent process where the flight training provider 

and the TSA ensure foreign nationals are subject to an STA within the prescribed 

time frame.14 GAMA’s petition was formally endorsed by the Aircraft Owners and 

Pilots Association (AOPA), the main association representing the general aviation 

pilot community.15

In its final plan for executing the regulatory review, the Department of Homeland 

Security accepted GAMA’s proposal.16 At the same time, DHS identified the TSA’s 

plan to introduce a streamlined procedure for students; implement new information 

technology infrastructure to better administer the program; make the STA valid for 

5 years; and sunset the four categories for training in the existing program. We believe these changes will benefit both TSA and students and that the rewrite of the 

program would lend itself to incorporate those recommendations by the GAO that 

are applicable to regulated entities. GAMA also expects noticeable savings to the 

TSA through a reduced volume of STAs; more targeted oversight through a more 

efficient program; and enhanced competitiveness of U.S.-based flight schools when 

catering to the growing world-wide pilot training market. 

NEXT STEPS

GAMA, in cooperation with other associations and our member companies, have 

worked with the TSA since 2011 to further refine the new regulatory framework of 

the alien flight student program. GAMA met as recently as February with the TSA 

to respond to questions on specific ways to enhance the program including new information technology. We continue to encourage the TSA to prioritize the rewrite 

internally and to advocate consideration by the Department of Homeland Security 

so that the rulemaking process can conclude. 

While the agency has been a willing partner for the alien flight program, its inability to complete other rulemaking continues to impede our manufacturing competitiveness and the DHS’s rulemaking pipeline remains a concern to GAMA. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me the opportunity to discuss with the 

subcommittee an overview of the necessary changes to the alien flight student program. GAMA believes that these changes will streamline the program, increase Government efficiencies, and provide a more effective execution of vetting of foreign national seeking flight training in the United States. At the same time, the restructuring of the program will also lend itself to the enactment of GAO’s recommendations in a new, clear regulatory framework that industry and Government can build 

upon in a safe and secure manner. 

Thank you and I would be glad to answer any question that you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Hennig. Our last witness is Mr. 

Douglas Carr. Mr. Carr is the National Business Aviation Association’s vice president for safety, security operations, and regulations. 

He is responsible for leading the association’s efforts on business 

aviation safety and security, and has oversight of NBAA’s regulatory activity involving business aviation, aircraft equipment mandates, operations, and security. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Carr for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS CARR, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION 

Mr. CARR. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Thompson, Mr. 

Davis, thank you very much for the opportunity and the invitation 

to speak before you today. As the Chairman mentioned, my name 

is Doug Carr. I am the vice president for safety, security, and regulation at the National Business Aviation Association. 
24 

NBAA’s over 9,000 members represent a wide variety of companies who all operate business aircraft to support their travel needs, 

or are involved in the support of the business aviation industry. 

In my role at NBAA, I have had the opportunity to work with 

TSA since its early days as an agency, and have served in a number of advisory capacities. That includes currently serving as the 

co-chairman of the TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee, 

General Aviation’s subgroup. 

Let me start by reaffirming the general aviation’s community to 

working with our Government leaders to improve security for our 

transportation system. We continue to seek productive and innovative ways to partner with the Federal Government to develop reasonable and effective security regulations, policies, and programs 

that ensure our National security while facilitating general aviation operations. This includes the Alien Flight School Program. 

Business aviation, as you have heard earlier, is a vital portion of our National economy. With over $100 billion worth of economic 

output each year, and over 1 million employees involved in the industry, it is a vital part of our economy. 

The operations conducted by business aviation are wide and diverse, including firefighting, EMS operations, agricultural, to law 

enforcement, non-profit, and business operations of all shapes and 

sizes. 

Many small and rural communities are connected to the broader 

transportation system by business aviation aircraft. These companies that utilize these aircraft also recognize the value of giving 

back to their local citizens through participation in charity, and 

charitable organizations such as the Corporate Angel Network, the 

Veterans Airlift Command, and Angel Flight, that provide free 

transportation to cancer patients, to military veterans and their 

families, and to others needing medical assistance. 

As has been mentioned earlier, the general aviation community 

has been very proactive in working with TSA and other Government agencies in the development of a number of security enhancements for our community. These include the development of a tollfree hotline to report suspicious activity at general-aviation airports; a recommendation to issue Government-issued, tamper-proof 

identification for pilots; financial transaction monitoring improvements; and TSA guidelines for aircraft, for general aviation aircraft, and airport operators. 

The focus of today’s hearing being the Alien Flight School Program, is one of TSA’s programs that affect many people beyond our 

borders. It is important, I think, that we look at some of the improvements that have been made in the program since its early 

days. 

Initially, the program required a foreign flight-training candidate 

to come to the United States to initiate that clearance process, and 

often then wait here for 30 to 45 days as that clearance process 

took place. 

Today, the candidate no longer is required to come to the United 

States, and that clearance process takes only a few days. That has 

significantly improved the system for the flight-training candidate, 

and for the flight schools who have to schedule a number of simulators, classrooms, instructors, and aircraft. 
25 

But as with any program, there is always room for improvement. 

We look forward to working with TSA following this hearing to address many of the issues raised by the GAO report. 

Some of the things that we have addressed with TSA that will 

come as no surprise to them, in terms of areas of improvement, include the area identified by Mr. Hennig, dealing with focusing the 

clearance on the candidate, as opposed to the training event. We 

believe that will allow TSA to focus its resources in areas that will 

have a dramatic improvement. 

In addition, we believe that increased guidance and regulatory 

support for helping flight schools identify exactly what they need 

to do to comply with the rules, will eliminate much of the ambiguity and variability that exists today across the flight-school community in complying with the Alien Flight School Program. 

In addition to improving guidance related to a unique situation, 

dealing with dry-leasing of full flight motion simulators, the U.S. 

flight-training industry, we believe, is the best in the world. These 

flight schools produce students that are well qualified to fly in both 

private and commercial environments throughout the world. Thousands of U.S. jobs are supported by the U.S. flight-training industry. 

We should ensure that our regulations and policies not only 

eliminate and prevent the opportunity for terrorists to exploit that 

system, but also to ensure that our flight-training industry remains 

the best in the world. Thank you for the opportunity to be here 

today, and I look forward to answering any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carr follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS CARR

JULY 18, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of the more than 9,000 members of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), we appreciate this opportunity to provide our views at this important hearing on general aviation security and American flight schools. 

I am Doug Carr and I serve as vice president for safety, security, and regulation 

at the National Business Aviation Association based here in Washington, DC. NBAA 

represents over 9,000 diverse companies with one thing in common—they all depend 

on general aviation aircraft for the conduct of their business. In this position, I have 

worked with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) since its first days 

as a Government agency and have served in several advisory capacities, which include currently serving as co-chairman of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

(ASAC) General Aviation Subgroup. 

The general aviation community is committed to the security of our National 

transportation system. We continue to seek productive ways to partner with the 

Federal Government on developing reasonable, workable, and effective regulations 

that simultaneously ensure security and facilitate general aviation operations. This 

includes the TSA’s Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP). 

FACTS ABOUT BUSINESS AVIATION

From creating growth opportunities and global connectivity for America’s small 

towns and rural areas to supporting the Nation’s productivity, business aviation is 

an important economic engine, creating jobs and investment, while contributing to 

the world’s leading aviation system. Business aviation is absolutely essential as U.S. 

companies work to compete in a global marketplace. Simply put, business aviation 

is a vital part of the Nation’s economy and transportation system. 

Business aviation is defined by the FAA as the use of any general aviation aircraft (piston or turbine) for a business purpose. NBAA was founded 67 years ago 

to represent companies that utilize general aviation aircraft as a tool for meeting 

some of their transportation challenges. While NBAA member companies purchase 
26 

billions of dollars per year in commercial airline tickets, there are critical situations 

where the use of a general aviation aircraft is indispensible. For U.S. companies to 

be successful in these challenging economic times, every business tool must be available—including general aviation aircraft. General aviation is an essential economic generator, contributing more than $150 

billion to annual U.S. economic output, and employing more than 1 million people. 

Most general aviation aircraft operating around the world are manufactured and/ 

or completed in the United States, and our industry is continuing to build a strong 

American manufacturing and employment base that contributes positively to our 

National balance of trade. 

General aviation includes diverse operations, with business uses that range from 

agriculture, to law enforcement, to fire and rescue services, to varied Government, 

educational, nonprofit organizations and businesses of all sizes. Servicing and supporting these organizations are FBO’s, maintenance technicians, suppliers, and 

service providers. 

Business aviation is not only an economic lifeline for thousands of our Nation’s 

smaller communities; it also supports people and communities in times of crisis in 

the United States and around the world. 

General aviation has snapped into action when there’s a need to confront floods 

in the Midwest, fires in the West, or a whole host of other natural disasters. The 

business aviation community—working mostly on a volunteer basis—has always 

been quick to help assess damage, rescue those affected by these disasters, and 

carry in lifesaving support and supplies to the affected regions. 

In addition, hundreds of GA operators carried thousands of passengers and over 

a million pounds of supplies to and from Haiti after the devastating earthquake 

there. In fact, Congress passed a resolution commending general aviation for its response to the crisis. 

The people who rely on a general aviation aircraft for business are also dedicated 

to helping provide life-saving flights to the communities in which they live and 

work. Operations like the Corporate Angel Network arrange free air transportation 

for cancer patients traveling to treatment using the empty seats aboard business 

airplanes. Angel Flight America’s seven member organizations and 7,200 volunteer 

pilots arrange flights to carry patients to medical facilities. 

The Veterans Airlift Command uses business airplanes and unused hours of fractional aircraft ownership programs to provide free flights for medical and other purposes for wounded service members, veterans, and their families. Veterans Airlift 

finds volunteers in the business aviation community to fly missions on request and 

contribute the full cost of their aircraft and fuel for the missions flown. 

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING BUSINESS AVIATION

Unfortunately, the people and businesses in general aviation, like other industries, are weathering one of the worst economic storms anyone has ever seen. The 

impact of the flagging economy on the companies and communities that rely on general aviation is visible in all parts of the country. 

Over the past few years, we saw business aviation flying decrease by as much as 

35 percent in some locations—which unfortunately led to thousands of layoffs across 

the industry and country. While we have seen some uptick in flight activity in recent months, activity is still below the 2008 levels and experts agree that the recovery will be slow and gradual over the next several years. 

TSA’S ALIEN FLIGHT STUDENT PROGRAM (AFSP)

Since the events of 9/11, NBAA and indeed the entire general aviation community 

has been very proactive in enhancing security by developing and implementing a 

large number of workable and effective security measures. 

The general aviation community has worked closely with several Government 

agencies including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and this partnership approach has produced 

tangible results. The security measures we have implemented include the creation 

of a toll-free general aviation security reporting hotline for any suspicious activity 

at an airport, the monitoring of aircraft financing transactions, a new requirement 

for Government-issued, tamper-proof photo IDs for pilots, and guidelines for security 

at general aviation airports and an AOPA Airport Watch program. In addition, 8 

years ago, NBAA members in the NY area voluntarily initiated a pilot program to 

design a security program specifically for operations in that area. 

The Alien Flight School Program (AFSP) represents one of TSA’s programs that 

affect many people beyond our borders. The goal of the program, we believe, is vital 

in protecting our National security. While the program initially created a substan-
27 

tial burden for foreign citizens seeking flight training in the United States, recent 

program changes and continued feedback from the flight training industry have produced improvements not only in the program, but also for foreign flight training 

candidates. 

It is important that we note the improvements made in the Alien Flight School 

Program since its inception. When the program began, it was common for a flight 

training candidate to come to the United States for processing, only to then wait 

an additional 30–45 days for a review and approval to then begin training. These 

days, processing takes only a few days and does not require the candidate to come 

to the United States in advance. The improvements made to the clearance process 

have reduced the uncertainty of securing a clearance while improving the flight 

school’s ability to schedule classroom, simulator, and aircraft training. 

These improvements resulted from on-going and collaborative feedback from the 

flight training industry and is an example of how we can work together to overcome 

challenges. NBAA looks forward to partnering with DHS and TSA in working to address concerns raised by the recent GAO report. This hearing today will be extremely beneficial in this effort. 

We continue to work with the TSA on other areas of the AFSP that need improvement. These include: • Assigning a security clearance to an individual, not a training event.—Currently, a flight school must submit an individual for clearance for every training 

event he or she attends, regardless of how many training visits this entails. We 

believe that one candidate-centric review should suffice for a defined period of 

time, perhaps 5 years, regardless of the number of training events. 

• Improving regulatory guidance.—Flight schools still face a wide variety of interpretation regarding various, sometimes basic elements of the program. More 

standardized guidance to flight schools about the program would assist with 

compliance and oversight. 

• Dry leasing of simulators.—Current guidance requires both the simulator owner 

and simulator lessor to submit candidates for clearance. This seems duplicative 

and does not appear to enhance security. Updating TSA’s guidance on who 

should submit names for clearance would greatly reduce the burden on both the 

Government and the industry in the clearance process. 

We strongly believe that the U.S. flight training industry is the best in the world. 

Students leave U.S. flight schools very well prepared to deal with the challenges of 

private and commercial flying regimes throughout the world. Thousands of jobs in 

the United States are supported directly from the flight training industry and our 

policies and regulations should not only ensure that flight candidates do not represent a security threat to our Nation, but also continue to appropriately support 

the United States as the preeminent flight training location in the world. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and Members of the subcommittee, 

the general aviation community is grateful for the tremendous leadership this committee has provided as we collectively work to address these vital homeland security 

issues. 

We would like also to note the efforts of this committee to support the inclusion 

of the GA community in the TSA ASAC process—including most recently in Ranking Member Thompson’s ‘‘Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act’’ (HR 

1477)—which passed the House on June 28. On behalf of NBAA, I would like to reiterate our appreciation to the committee for your continued support for general aviation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Carr. The Chairman now recognizes 

himself for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. Lord, isn’t it true that, based on your report, the Transportation Security Administration cannot assure the American people 

that foreign terrorists are not in this country learning how to fly 

airplanes? Yes or no? 

Mr. LORD. At this time, no. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I thought. Mr. Wilson, who bears responsibility for that? 

Mr. WILSON. Ultimately, the Transportation Security Administration is responsible for the Alien Flight Student Program. During 

Mr. Lord’s testimony in the GAO report, what was not noted was 

that there is an additional Federal agency that has the autonomy 
28 

to allow Alien Flight students to also begin training. That was not 

captured during the testimony. 

When he spoke of several weaknesses, and there was a disconnect between the FAA’s registry information and TSA’s AFSP 

database, no one really looked into the other Federal agency to see 

how many of those were vetted through that particular agency. 

Mr. ROGERS. But shouldn’t the TSA know—shouldn’t they be 

working in coordination with Immigration and Customs Enforcement and other Federal agencies to know who is being vetted and 

approved and who is not? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. As you have heard before from all these 

panel members before me today, you have heard that TSA has done 

a tremendous job in the collaboration with our stakeholders, as 

well as other Federal agencies. 

We have increased our—treaty engagement very greatly in the 

last 24 months. This panel here recognizes that TSA is making its 

best effort to ensure that we address the inefficiencies in all of our 

problems, not just the Alien Flight Student Program, as well as addressing all of the vulnerabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Wilson, I beg to differ with you. The only thing 

that TSA has done a tremendous job of is losing the American people’s confidence. GAO identified this, Mr. Wilson. GAO identified 

examples where foreign nationals were rejected by TSA but somehow managed to complete flight training anyway. How is that possible? 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Rogers, I don’t recall seeing that in the 

GAO report. What I do recall seeing is that there are individuals 

that were still being adjudicated through the vetting process that 

hadn’t been allowed to conduct flight training. 

As I said earlier in my testimony, sir, the first line of defense in 

order to prevent these individuals from protecting flight training is 

our flight training providers. Flight training providers are not supposed to allow these individuals to begin in training until they 

have received information from TSA that these individuals have 

undergone and completed a successful—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What about if a certain time period lapses without 

the TSA making a determination? Are they allowed to go ahead 

and start their training? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes sir, they are. 

Mr. ROGERS. So they can get trained without TSA? 

Mr. WILSON. They can begin training, but within a certain period 

of time we continuously vet these individuals until we can determine whether or not that they are suited to begin flight training 

or not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Lord, you heard my question a minute ago 

about the foreign nationals who were rejected by TSA somehow 

managing to get flight training anyway. Is that not in your report? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, that is the second example we provide under the 

vetting process. We didn’t use the word rejection. We said they initiated the vetting process, but did not receive an affirmative response from TSA yet they were still able to go on and take flight 

training. 

For the record, I would like to respond to one comment Mr. Wilson made. The one agency he indicates we did not mention, it is 
29 

fully discussed in the SSI version of our report. So I just want to 

be clear. We have a full understanding of the vetting process and 

all the various Government agencies involved. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I agree, and nobody’s hands are clean. Mr. 

Woods, obviously this committee is concerned about this report and 

its finding. Are you concerned about it? 

Mr. WOODS. We are concerned, and we are working closely with 

our DHS counterparts with TSA to ensure that their procedures in 

vetting these Alien Flight students goes the right way. We have 

been working with them for over a year now, and as I used in my 

opening statement, in correcting the processes they use in the vetting process. They were previously using for immigration checks 

the database that would not necessarily determine an immigration 

status. So we are making sure they use the right database, and we 

are working with the program to ensure that they determine the 

right status before they give that clearance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. You learned about these report’s findings preliminarily 2 months ago. Have you already started programs or 

processes to remedy these problems? 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely, previous to even the report being issued 

based on the—as I said, the TJ aviation investigation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell this committee a time certain in which 

you think that those remedies will be completely in place and satisfactorily operating? 

Mr. WOODS. From what I understand, TSA plans to issue a report by December outlining their new policies and procedures. 

Mr. ROGERS. Goodness gracious. We have got to wait until December to find out what you all are going to do to fix this? I mean, 

surely you can tell us that you have remedied these problems, Mr. 

Wilson, without having to wait to December. 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Rogers, we have remedied the situation. 

What we were talking about and we are providing in December is 

a report based on the activities that we recover from the time 

frame that we complete this process up until December. We do 

have a plan in place. We are working very closely with ICE in 

terms of automating the process to ensure that TSA is also checking for immigration status, as well as the terrorist screening database. 

The individuals that are being vetted today are undergoing a 

TSDB check. They are undergoing the—criminal history check, as 

well as the tax check. We also discussed immigration concerns with 

ICE. When there is an individual that is identified as having immigration issues, we immediately prevent them from taking training 

and discuss it with ICE. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. My time is expired. The Chairman now 

recognizes Mr. Davis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Wilson, 

GAO’s report states that TSA has not ensured that all foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States have been vetted through the Alien Flight Student Program prior to beginning 

training. 

Further, it states that TSA has not established controls to help 

verify the identity of individuals seeking flight training who claim 

U.S. citizenship. What responsibility does a flight training school 
30 

have to ensure that a foreign national seeking flight training has 

been vetted through the Alien Flight Student Program prior to 

training beginning? 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Davis. As I stated earlier, flight 

training providers, as regulated under this program, are required 

to wait for TSA to tell them that these individuals have completed 

a security threat assessment. Our first line of defense in preventing 

these individuals from flying is the flight school. It is the flight 

training providers. 

The second thing: TSA does inspections yearly, sir. We do approximately 7,000 inspections of the flight training providers. We 

have a 96 percent compliance rate. That is a very high percentage, 

96 percent. When we talk about whether or not these individuals 

haven’t been vetted or processed through TSA’s program, once 

again, no one has really addressed that there is another Federal 

agency that also vets these individuals prior to them starting flight 

training. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, does TSA have any process in place to verify the 

citizenship of persons who self-certify as U.S. citizens? 

Mr. WILSON. Sir, in regards to that particular question, the information—I can’t go into great details about that information. It is 

SSI. 

But I will tell you that issue is a Government-wide issue in 

terms of verifying the U.S. citizenship, not only within the general 

aviation community but through various other transportation sectors and other communities as well. We do understand it is an 

issue. We do understand it is a concern. We are taking the necessary steps to look at some technology that will be applicable to 

certain activity. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Woods, let me ask you: How can ICE support 

TSA’s on-going process to vet foreign nationals prior to training at 

a flight school? 

Mr. WOODS. Representative Davis, thank you. We have been for 

the past year vetting TSA’s Alien Flight School population. We 

have vetted over 19,200 individuals for them for their immigration 

status. As I said in my oral statement, we have identified 30 possible individuals that were here unlawfully or overstayed their 

visa, and we sent those leads out to the field under Operation 

Clipped Wings to initiative investigations. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Wilson, according to your testimony, since 2001 

the Alien Flight Student Program has vetted over 350,000 applications of approximately 125,000 unique individuals. What would 

cause the same individual to be vetted multiple times, and is there 

a more efficient system that could be put in place to prevent this? 

Mr. WILSON. Senator Davis, yes sir. Mr. Hennig to my left here 

brought that issue up during his oral testimony. 

When an individual applies for training, whether it is Category 

1, Category 2, or Category 3 or 4, each time that individual applies 

for training, he or she must go through that same vetting process 

again. The program itself is set up that way. It has become an 

issue in the industry, and the industry has identified that this is 

costly, and at times is sometimes as well as burdensome. 

As Mr. Hennig said earlier, in order for TSA to really address 

this issue and this concern, it is going to take rulemaking. I have 
31 

sat down with our leadership to discuss the applicable tool in order 

to address the concerns of the AFSP. But we have gotten a tremendous amount of support and input from our stakeholders, training 

providers, as well as Mr. Hennig’s association. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I see my time 

is about to expire. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. What was that thing you 

said? In order for us to be successful, we are going to have to have 

what? 

Mr. WILSON. In what terms? I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right at the end of your statement, you said in 

order for us to be successful we are going to have to have, and I 

missed that word. 

Mr. WILSON. I am sorry. We will have to conduct rulemaking. 

Mr. ROGERS. Rulemaking. Okay. All right. Thank you. I just 

couldn’t hear it. All right. The Chairman will now recognize Mr. 

Cravaack for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the panel 

for being here today. You know, it is kind of a personal note here 

is that Moussaoui was actually flying the same simulators I flew 

at Northwest Airlines. So this is kind of a personal issue with me. 

Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for your service in the Air 

Force. Appreciate your service to this great country of ours. From 

important testimony, it appears that not all—my understanding is 

not all flight attendees are actually going through the screening before they actually start flight training. Did I hear you say that correctly? 

Mr. WILSON. What I said earlier, sir, there is a percentage of individuals that do not process through the TSA AFSP. There is an 

additional Federal agency that we will not discuss today because 

that information is SSI that has its own process. That is what I 

said, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. So just to make sure I am clear on this, 

before anybody steps into any type of training, they have to be totally—the promise is everyone is cleared if everybody is doing their 

job at the flight training schools? 

Mr. WILSON. That is correct, sir. If everyone is doing their job, 

a flight training provider is not permitted to allow anyone to conduct training, unless cleared by TSA or the additional—or the 

other agency that we cannot speak about today. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Roger that. Okay. Mr. Lord, can you comment on 

that? 

Mr. LORD. Yes. What he said is technically accurate, but I just 

want to clarify something. Again, we did—we compared the two 

databases. We found the discrepancy. We asked them, we asked 

TSA what percent is doing to—you know, for legitimate reasons as 

allowed by this other agency he is referencing, and we could not 

get any granularity beyond that. 

We found a discrepancy, but TSA couldn’t explain what portion 

of the discrepancy was contributed by this one other Government 

agency Mr. Wilson is referring to. So we think they need to do 

some more work and figure that out. 

People aren’t getting vetted. We want to know, is it because it 

is this other Government agency, or is it for some other reasons? 
32 

That is what our recommendation is intended to accomplish. We 

think that is where they need to do some more homework. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. I understand that. Mr. Wilson, I guess you 

have taken that for action? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Cravaack. We have already been in active engagement, that other agency, to ensure that the information 

that they collect on the students that they are endorsing is shared 

with TSA—training. 

So what you will see is in the next month or so is that that particular issue has been addressed and the mitigation plans are underway. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. With this other agency, are you finding compliance and cooperation? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, we are. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Excellent. That is what we need to hear. 

Now, Mr. Wilson, do you go back, and do you go ahead and you— 

I think you said the percentage was 96 percent. You go back, and 

you ensure that there is some type of audit being done, that there 

is no one slipping through the cracks. Would that be a correct 

statement? 

Mr. WILSON. That is correct, sir. In 2011—well, let me go back 

first. We normally implement one comprehensive inspection per 

year for our 7,000 flight-training providers. 

In 2011, we actually inspected each flight-training provider twice 

with the 96 percent compliance rate, and 4 percent of non-compliance rate. We talk about non-compliance, we are talking about administrative issues, not something very egregious. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. That was the last time you did, in 2007. 

Are you planning to do it again, or are you doing annually, or—— 

Mr. WILSON. I am sorry, sir. Say it again? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. You said in 2007—— 

Mr. WILSON. No, sir, 2011, we actually—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. 2011. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. 2011, we conducted two inspections per 

flight-training provider. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Sorry, I am a half-deaf helicopter pilot. Mr. Lord, 

on page 27 of the report, you say that the TSA has only afforded 

the same level of access to FBI databases that a private company 

doing a background check would be. 

In your report, you say that the FBI and the TSA were collaborating on options, but had not identified the extent which the potential security risk may exist under the current process, and the 

cost of benefits pursuing alternate—alternatives to provide additional access. 

What is the likelihood in your opinion of allowing a terrorist in, 

because the TSA is not having a higher level access to the FBI systems? 

Mr. LORD. That is difficult to answer directly. But we studied 

this issue in great detail. I should mention it is not unique to the 

Alien Flight School Program. It is a Government-wide issue. 

TSA has limited access to the FBI database because they are 

considered a non-criminal justice agency, and the searches they are 

running are considered for non-criminal-justice purposes. 
33 

So we, in our prior report, we recommended TSA and FBI get together to explore options for giving them greater access. If you do 

a criminal history records check, there is a lot of information, especially at the State and local level, that they don’t have visibility 

over. 

So we think that would improve their vetting process. But again, 

it is a Government-wide issue, and TSA’s constraint on multiple 

fronts in running criminal-history records checks because of this. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord, Mr. Wilson. My time is expired. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Chairman now recognizes 

Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. Mr. Thompson, you have 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to have my written statement entered into the record. 

[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 18, 2012 

The issue of General Aviation security has long been of great interest to the 

Democratic Members of this committee. I am pleased the subcommittee is turning 

its attention to this issue today. At the outset, I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. 

In particular, I would like to thank the Government Accountability Office for their 

diligent work on the report on general aviation security they are releasing today. 

GAO undertook this report as a result of a joint request by both the Chair and the 

Ranking Members of the full committee and the subcommittee. We made the request because of our shared interests in identifying areas where TSA’s policies affecting a large segment of the aviation community are working and need increased 

attention. 

Before focusing on the challenges highlighted by the report, I would like to commend TSA for enhancing its collaboration with the general aviation community. In 

passing legislation that I introduced this Congress to statutorily authorize the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, this Congress has indicated its desire that TSA 

and the General Aviation industry cooperate to improve the security of the General 

Aviation sector. 

I look forward to hearing from both TSA and the stakeholders before us today on 

how increased collaboration has and will continue to enhance security. Turning to 

the challenges identified by GAO, TSA must answer for its shortfalls in identifying 

whether non-U.S. citizens obtaining flight training represent a threat. 

We cannot allow loopholes exploited by the 9/11 hijackers to be exploited again. 

However, we cannot ignore that violent domestic extremists can also pose a threat 

to our aviation security. 

The last individual to fly a plane into a building and kill innocent civilians in this 

country was not a foreign national or ‘‘Islamist extremist,’’ it was a United States 

citizen with an extremist and violent ideology regarding the Internal Revenue Service. 

I look forward to hearing from TSA about the measures they have employed to 

ensure that such a scenario does not occur again and our current capacity to identify persons who may pose a threat. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony this 

morning. One of the concerns I have is between TSA and ICE’s coordination role. Are we to understand that there exists a memorandum of agreement between the two agencies to coordinate? Mr. 

Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Thompson, that is correct, sir. We have 

a memorandum of agreement in place, where we are sharing information with ICE, as well as ICE is sharing information with us. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Woods, is that your testimony, too? 
34 

Mr. WOODS. We do share information under the informationsharing agreements, all through DHS. I am not aware of an incident of our specific memorandum. We do share information on a 

regular basis. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Lord, were you able to get a copy of that 

agreement? 

Mr. LORD. I notice, there appears to be some confusion on what 

the nature of this agreement is. Is it in fact an MOU, or does it 

take up some other form? But this again, we have a copy of the 

MOU between TSA and FAA. Whatever this other agreement is, 

we were just alerted to this yesterday in fact. 

So we are going to follow up on this. I would like to know a little 

bit more about it. Is it an MOU, or does it take some other form? 

What are they going to do with the information once they get it? 

I think that is just as important, if not more important. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you see from a policy perspective, if we are 

trying to create a law that makes sense, at least the agencies who 

are tasked with the responsibility. One says yes. One says maybe. 

Another says, ‘‘Well, I just heard about it yesterday.’’ 

You know, training goes on every day. So we have a problem. In 

addition to that, Mr. Wilson, can you provide me with the copy of 

whatever agreement you reference? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. I will get that to you today. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Woods, can you provide the committee with 

whatever agreements that you understand we operate under—— 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely. 

Mr. THOMPSON [continuing]. With respect to this? Now, Mr. Wilson, would a U.S. citizen on the no-fly list be able to obtain flight 

training without undergoing a security threat assessment? 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Thompson, that is correct. But keep in mind, 

the way the program is set up, there are—there is layered security 

put in place. You are right. 

Initially, a U.S. citizen who is on the no-fly list could commence 

flight training. But once the individual receives a flight certificate, 

an FAA certificate, that individual is bounced against the various 

databases as well, perpetually vetted, meaning that individual was 

vetted once a day, once a week. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess my concern is, the last time we had 

somebody do something wrong, it was a U.S. citizen who flew into 

an Internal Revenue building in Texas a couple years ago. 

But if we train them, and the only thing we don’t do is provide 

a license, then we have created a problem at that moment. I don’t 

think somebody who wants to do harm is going to not do harm because they don’t have a license. We have trained them to do it. 

That is my concern. 

If flight training is the public policy question for this committee, 

why do we have a policy for training U.S. citizens, and a policy for 

training non-U.S. citizens, and the same schools are training the 

same people? Mr. Lord, you want to try that? 

Mr. LORD. I think you are raising a good policy question. I am 

just an auditor, and that is probably best left to Congress to decide, 

whether the scope of the program should be expanded. 

Mr. Wilson is correct. If you are a U.S. citizen, you are not subject to this Alien Flight School vetting process. It is—that is—— 
35 

Mr. THOMPSON. The point is, is that we could—the last time we 

had an incident since 9/11 using an airplane, it was a U.S. citizen. 

I think if we are going to look at one segment of the threat, let’s 

look at the entire segment of the threat, and see if we can fix the 

whole threat. That is the public policy question. 

Mr. LORD. Yes. This question as to what extent do you want to 

vet people against a terrorist watch list, regardless if they are a 

U.S. or not, I think that is a question you are answering. 

Under the current process described by Mr. Wilson, once you get 

an airman certificate, once you learn to fly, get a pilot’s license, you 

are perpetually vetted. But in some respects, that may be too late. 

The person has already learned to fly an aircraft. 

So if I hear you correctly, you are suggesting they move that vetting process up earlier. But again, there would be some administrative regulatory costs, I am sure, are associated—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. I just think the reasonable approach is to say 

you can apply for the training. But until you are vetted, you don’t 

receive the training. Now, I don’t understand how difficult that is. 

I mean, how much would that cost? 

Mr. LORD. I don’t have that information. Perhaps Mr. Wilson 

would have some more information on this. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. It is mind-blowing. Mr. Walberg is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses to be here today with us. 

Mr. Hennig, what responsibilities do flight-school operators, instructors, have in reducing security vulnerabilities? 

Mr. HENNIG. Well, the way that regulation is structured, there 

are really three. There is adherence-to-visa policy, which is going 

through ICE. There is adherence to the Alien Flight Student Program specifically on the vetting of any foreign nationals taking 

training. Then of course, there is also requirement of—it is part of 

the same rule, which is focused on training the employees, so the 

flight school to be aware of security. 

This predates the ‘‘See Something, Say Something,’’ which is a 

big program here at DHS discussing today. But ever since this rule 

was put in place in 2004, every employee of that flight school is 

told to look for things that are suspicious. 

So within the flight-training community, we have one of the most 

involved training process, to just raise the awareness about things 

to look for. 

Mr. WALBERG. Is there anything that Congress, TSA, ICE, FAA, 

any other Federal entities that are involved, could do to help the 

industry carry out these requirements and these responsibilities? I 

would ask Mr. Carr as well to respond to that. 

Mr. HENNIG. Well, for our members, whatever rule we are talking about, give us a clear framework that we can comply with. As 

I discuss in my testimony, what we have struggled with over the 

past several years is that the rule was written very quickly. It was, 

you know, just a couple of years after 9/11 and there was not 

enough time to really structure a good framework. 

Give us a clear framework for how to comply with TSA rules and 

ICE rules and the flight schools will do their utmost to do so. When 
36 

you look at the GAO’s recommendations specifically, what I see as 

a good benefit is the data flow, especially within agencies of the Department of Homeland Security. As industry, I hate duplicative activities. 

So if I am providing some data to ICE, if I am supplying some 

data to TSA, I am in the hope that they are sharing data with each 

other. So those kind of things between the clear regulatory framework and then the Government just working with itself to share 

any data because we don’t see that obviously as industry. 

Mr. WALBERG. You are not certain that they are sharing this. 

That is my common concern. 

Mr. HENNIG. My understanding of the briefing on the GAO report that I have received is that one of the shortfalls, at least a few 

years ago, was the data sharing about visa status between ICE and 

the TSA. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Carr, additional? 

Mr. CARR. I would like to support what Mr. Hennig has mentioned in terms of greater clarity in terms of the requirements that 

flight schools are required to comply with. 

As is common across Government, when it comes to regulatory 

guidance and compliance, better guidance, better clarity from the 

Government on exactly what is required to not only comply with 

the rule, but to then show compliance has always aided the private 

industry in ensuring that not only are we meeting our requirements to comply with the rule in letter but also in spirit, so that 

when we are faced with an audit or an inspection, it is pretty clear 

to demonstrate that I either am or am not meeting the requirements. 

Mr. WALBERG. In your organization’s view, how effective is the 

AFSP program? How effective is it working for you? 

Mr. HENNIG. Especially in the past several years, it has gotten 

a lot better. Our—one of the biggest problems early on was the 

timeliness of the vets. These are businesses trying to compete for 

contracts to train pilots. Early on, we were—we were signing up 

contracts. We were scheduling training times, and we would be— 

we would be bringing people over here and put them up in a hotel 

down in Florida waiting for the TSA vet. 

That has changed drastically. TSA is doing a great job lately. For 

the vast majority of vets that we are looking to have done on foreign nationals arriving in the United States, it is done within 24 

to 48 hours. It is predictable, and that is very useful for our members. 

Mr. WALBERG. It is predictable, but you said the vast majority. 

Why aren’t—why isn’t it the majority? Why isn’t it the full majority? 

Mr. HENNIG. It is actually the system working the way it is supposed to. The vast majority of the people who are not in any way 

a concern to the TSA or others are cleared within 24 to 48 hours. 

The person that requires some additional attention experiences 

longer times. It may be a name that is very similar to another 

name. It may be something else that raises a concern. 

So from the framework of how the system should work, I think 

where the TSA has gotten us, where 24 to 48 hours for most people 
37 

and then if there is attention maybe a few more days, it is predictable and we know what to expect. 

Mr. CARR. If I could add to Mr. Hennig’s statement, the notion 

that coming to the United States to receive your flight training because it is so good is I think something very positive. We should 

look to the U.S. flight training industry. It is significant. It is very 

robust, and the world looks to us to train pilots. 

The improvements that TSA has made over the past several 

years in the program I think have changed a trend where we have 

flight training going elsewhere, going to other countries where this 

kind of program is not in place. These improvements are really 

helping to restore the United States to its preeminence as the 

world’s leader in flight training. 

The—the vast majority of people that are coming to the United 

States do not pose the kinds of threats that I believe we are concerned about. However, where they do, the program absolutely is 

effective in at least raising that awareness. 

But I think what we have seen with GAO is that there are lots 

of opportunities for improvement, and we definitely want to work 

with TSA to help close those loopholes so we are not exploited and 

the flight schools aren’t exploited in doing something they shouldn’t 

be. 

Mr. WALBERG. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is expired. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lungren from California for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carr, 

I think you made a good point. We are preeminent in the world, 

or have been, in terms of flight training. Might have something to 

do that manned flight started here, and hopefully we keep that up. 

If I am flying on a foreign carrier, I would certainly feel better 

about it in most cases if a pilot was trained under our standards. 

I think we ought not to lose sight of that. 

Let me ask you this: There has been raised the question of doing 

checks on American citizens, American residents, as well as aliens. 

Mr. Hennig, Mr. Carr, do you see any problem with that? 

Mr. CARR. Let me offer maybe just some perspectives, in that the 

applications that are required to be completed to begin your flight 

training process, which often begins with an FAA airman medical 

certificate and then follow on your FAA pilot certificate, there is a 

lot of information that is required in those applications that I think 

give the Government access to other sources of data that would 

allow a realistic assessment of the threat posed by an individual. 

The data that is available to non-U.S. citizens is, in our view, a 

little harder to get. The U.S. Government doesn’t always have access to the same data sets for foreign citizens that they for U.S. 

citizens. I think that is where the vetting process has real value 

to bring that visibility to non-U.S. citizens who are training in the 

United States where, for our own citizens, we have hopefully a better data set that we can make some realistic determinations with. 

Mr. HENNIG. I think there is a risk approach that lends itself to 

this. About 1 in 20 people trained are holding an FAA airman certificated as a foreign national. If we were to expand that to U.S. 

citizens as well, TSA would have to expand its resources by 20 

times. I have certainly appreciated the focus of TSA to, so to say, 
38 

reduce the size of the haystack. It is terminology we often hear 

from the administrator. 

So if we want to look at a broader scope, as long as risk and especially data sharing of what already exists within the FAA and 

what already exists within other agencies about these individuals, 

maybe the first step to explore before you expand the program by 

orders of magnitude. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would it make sense to you or would it seem logical or illogical to you that we might look at the no-fly list for those 

people who are wanting to become pilots? 

Mr. HENNIG. When we look at other TSA programs that have 

supplied to general aviation, the vetting that those pilots who are 

flying those types of aircraft, we are talking about regulated programs that are already in place, some of them established by Congress, the no-fly list is certainly one of the vets that the person 

goes through specifically, but it is also criminal history, record 

check, and other things that are subject to those pilots. 

But again, in those cases it is based on what the pilot is able to 

fly, so there is a risk discussion about what actually the threat and 

the consequences would be from the event. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Carr, you mention in your written testimony 

that we could have some better operations of the program that currently exists, the AFSP program, and you say that assigning a security clearance to an individual is not a training event. Can you 

tell us exactly what you mean by that? 

Mr. CARR. Certainly. As Mr. Hennig mentioned earlier in his testimony, and one which we completely agree with, today’s process 

for vetting is triggered any time a candidate presents themselves 

for training, regardless of how many times that candidate comes 

for training. 

Aviation—the aviation industry requires a lot of regular training 

and checking to ensure compliance with the regulations. Our view 

is that repetitive training cycles should not necessarily be the focus 

of the vetting. The individual should be the focus of the vetting. 

If we are able to develop a construct that allows an individual 

to be vetted once and allow that clearance to be valid for a period 

of time, perhaps as much as 5 years, that would allow the individual to return to training as often as is needed without involving 

duplicative additional processes that are technically the same. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What if the training is of a higher level? Would 

not it be good information for the vetting agency to know that 

someone who may have just started out at one level of ability is 

now seeking another level? 

Mr. HENNIG. What we have proposed is today you have four different types of vetting that the TSA makes the person subject to 

based on the size of the aircraft. The proposal, which we believe 

TSA has endorsed publicly, is for a single, standardized vet applying to everybody. Then, in combination with that, a reporting back 

to TSA when any type of training occurs. So we actually bring everybody up to the highest level of check, and then—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Then you would report each time they come for 

training and that would go to TSA. Then it would be on TSA’s 

shoulders to utilize that information as we direct them or as they 

see fit in the program. 
39 

Mr. HENNIG. Yes, sir. We will comply with providing the data, 

and it is for them to do the appropriate checks on that individual. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Walsh of Illinois for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel. Comment for me on whether this following statement is true: As things 

are today, a person who would not be allowed to board a commercial plane as a passenger, as policy is today would be allowed to 

receive training to fly that commercial plane. Mr. Carr, Mr. Wilson, 

let’s start there. As things are today, a typical person who would 

not be allowed to board a plane as a passenger would be allowed 

to receive training to begin to fly that commercial plane. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Walsh, this is going back to the similar question that Mr. Thompson asked earlier about individual U.S. citizens who are considered no-flies is basically what you are talking 

about. Yes, in theory, yes, they would be allowed to conduct—— 

Mr. WALSH. They would not be allowed to board a plane as a 

passenger. 

Mr. WILSON. Right. They would not be allowed to board an airplane as a passenger, but they could engage and enter flight training. Now keep in mind, when you talk about—you just said something about the individual being allowed to fly the same aircraft 

that he or she is being prevented from getting on. It takes a very 

long time for the individual to get to that type of rating. 

The individual will start off in a Category 1 status, which would 

mean that once they get their airman certificated under Cat 1, that 

individually is perpetually vetted. Once they receive that first certificate, they are perpetually vetted. It is going to take several 

hours before they work their way up to a multi-engine aircraft. 

Mr. WALSH. Right. It may take time, but they can’t set—that 

person couldn’t set foot on that plane as a passenger, yet they can 

begin to receive training to fly that plane no matter how long it 

takes. 

Mr. WILSON. Correct. That is correct. 

Mr. WALSH. Does that make sense? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, as we said earlier, what you are posing is that 

we are looking—we should be looking at anyone and everyone that 

wants to take training regardless of their status, whether it is a 

U.S. citizen or it is an alien. As Mr. Hennig and Mr. Carr testified 

here, there may be some additional costs involved. There is something that we can look at, and I could take that back to our administrator, Administrator Pistole, and take a look at that. But we 

have to realize that we are going from a very larger population. 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Woods, quick question on flight schools. Outside 

of that Boston-area flight school, have there been any other schools 

that ICE has investigated? 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. We have investigated several other schools. We 

have investigated a school in California that was taking students 

that were lawfully brought—coming to take other flight-school 

training, and went to a different flight school for a cheaper price, 

unlawfully violating the status. So we do investigate flight schools 

as they come to our attention. 

Mr. WALSH. You have found some problems elsewhere? 
40 

Mr. WOODS. We do find some problems, yes. 

Mr. WALSH. Somewhat related, in the news this morning, a bipartisan group of Senators just released what they called a disturbing GAO report, revealing that hundreds of non-certified sham 

colleges and universities were awarding student visas to foreign 

nationals at an alarming rate. 

Of special concern to us was their finding that 167 of the 434 

U.S. flight schools were not accredited by the FAA, but they still 

awarded student visas like those given to two of the 9/11 terrorists. 

Mr. Hennig and Mr. Carr, any comment on that? 

Mr. HENNIG. I will take first stab at it. I think there is—if you 

look at the framework that we have for flight training in the 

United States, there are several different approaches to doing the 

training. 

In the mid 1990s, I believe it was, the FAA established requirements to become a flight school, so-called Part 141 or 142. For decades before that, the FAA had established regulations to teach people how to fly. This is called Part 61. 

So the FAA doesn’t go out and necessarily certify the latter 

schools. This may be individual persons that our flight instructor 

said do certain types of training. These may be businesses for 

whom the type of training they do, becoming an FAA-certified 

school doesn’t make sense. They just comply with the regulations. 

At the same time, and I will lean on Mr. Woods here with respect 

to ICE, ICE has processes providing visa for the students, whether 

they are 141, 142, or 61. So there is the compliance with the rules. 

There is the difference between being a certified school versus 

something else. 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Woods, quick comment. 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. I am familiar with that GAO report that was 

released yesterday. ICE right now has certified 469 schools that 

are CFIT-certified to bring in students for flight training. Of those 

schools, 153 were a question of the GAO report. We have done a 

drill-down on that where we identify several of these schools lapsed 

their 141 certificate. It is apparently a very expensive process to 

maintain. They reverted back to a 61 certificate. 

Several schools utilized subcontractors in violation of their CFIT 

certification. They are under compliance review now. Additionally, 

we have identified some—several schools have completely closed, 

and no longer provide flight training as part of their curriculum, 

but there was still—due to that. 

So I don’t think it is that alarming as the GAO report made it 

out to be. But at the same time, we are looking at it on a compliance level to ensure that schools that are certified to bring students 

in to fly do have their 141, 142 certificate. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Chairman now recognizes 

himself for a second round of questions. 

I think it is fair to say, Mr. Wilson, that I am shocked to hear 

that somebody on the no-fly list can be approved for flight lessons 

in this country. I think the people watching this hearing are, too. 

You don’t have to worry about bringing it to Mr. Pistole’s attention. 

I am going to take care of that. 
41 

Mr. Lord, prior to this report coming out, if the 9/11 hijackers 

had applied to take flight training in the United States as they did 

in 2000, do you think they could have been approved for flight lessons? 

Mr. LORD. I am sorry. I couldn’t hear you because of the door 

slamming. Sorry. 

Mr. ROGERS. We will wait until they sit down. If the 9/11 hijackers had applied—goodness gracious. 

If the 9/11 hijackers had applied for flight training, as they did 

in 2000, in this country today, or up until this report was released, 

do you think they would have been approved? 

Mr. LORD. That is a real difficult one to answer directly. We have 

a lot of questions about how to process as working, and whether 

or not they would have been—I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. There are 

a lot of unknowns right now. I just don’t know. 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you think, Mr. Woods? 

Mr. WOODS. Based on the information I have, I would agree with 

Mr. Lord, that it would be difficult to make that determination. 

These individuals are checked for criminal history. They are 

checked to see if they are on the terrorist-screening database, and 

checked for their immigration status. 

In those individuals that were trained prior to 9/11, if they fell 

into any of those categories in violation, they would not receive 

training today. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. I piggyback on Mr. Woods’ response. He is exactly 

correct. Before these individuals could start flight training, they 

would have to undergo the AFSP process, which would include a 

terrorist-screened database check, a TECS check, as well as a fingerprint base—records check. 

Mr. ROGERS. If a foreign national goes to flight school part-time, 

does that person still have to be vetted? Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Chairman Rogers, regardless of whether they go part-time or full-time, before an individual can conduct flight training as an alien, the individual must 

undergo a security threat assessment. 

Mr. ROGERS. So the standards are the same, whether they are 

part-time or full-time? 

Mr. WILSON. Whether you are part-time or full-time, sir. If you 

are starting training, you have to undergo that security threat assessment. 

Mr. ROGERS. In your opinion, do you think more legislative or 

regulatory authority is—or changes are going to need to be made 

by us for you to be able to better do your job? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it depends on the recommendations we are 

discussing. There was a particular recommendation by GAO that 

would require significant rule-making that TSA hasn’t considered. 

We do need to talk about that in the very near future. Based on 

the technological concerns that we may have there, that is one. 

As far as our regulatory authority with the existing programs 

that we have now, we have pretty good authority in order to accomplish the necessary measures we need to in order to address the 

vulnerabilities identified. I think the panel here has recognized 
42 

that we have been collaborating with them, ensuring that we are 

able to meet our 60-day notice to GAO. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Woods, do you agree that if the part-time student applies, has to go through the same vetting standards as a 

full-time student? 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. I would think even our aviation partners, this 

is what they want—it is event-based. So every time they attend 

training, they have—whether it is part-time or full-time—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I was informed by my staff that ICE had told my 

staff that it is 18 hours of training or less, they didn’t have to be 

vetted. Is that not accurate? 

Mr. WOODS. I don’t think it is whether they do 18 hours or less. 

I think it is whether, if they are training, there is going to be a 

flight training, it has to go through AFSP. The 18-hour rule pertains to their visa type, many times, what type of visa they are allowed to do training on. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Lord, you talked a little bit about this in your 

opening statement. What do you in your estimation view as a reasonable amount of time to give TSA and ICE to fully remedy these 

shortcomings? 

Mr. LORD. Well, there are a lot of questions here. They have discussed the new data they are going to be sharing. But again, they 

still haven’t figured out why some of these individuals weren’t vetted to begin with. Mr. Wilson keeps talking about the STA process, 

where they do the three checks. 

But as our report shows, you could be out of status on the immigration side of the house, yet successfully pass the TECS check. So 

we don’t quite understand why the TECS check doesn’t pick up 

these people in overstay status that ICE, you know, provided us 

data that clearly showed there was a conflict in the system. 

So there are some kinks in the system. It is going to take a while 

to figure out. I think 3 months is reasonable amount of time. We 

are not talking about a cutting-edge technology. A lot of it is just 

management attention and priority. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. My time is expired. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Davis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Chairman, I would ask 

unanimous consent to switch times with the Ranking Member. He 

has an appointment he needs to keep. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank the gentleman from Chicago for allowing 

me to ask the question. Mr. Woods, would you provide the committee with the statistics of people who have applied through your 

various programs for flight training, and a number who have been 

denied? Do you have those statistics available? Not Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. I am sorry, sir. You said ‘‘Woods.’’ 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. Well, first of all, it is Mr. Wilson’s program that 

does the Alien Flight School Program. We have cooperated and vetted them for immigration purposes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. I am going to get to him. 

Mr. WOODS. Very good. We have vetted 18,900 individuals at an 

Alien Flight School Program. Of those, 9,700 came up initially to 
43 

automated databases to be in status, and lawfully here to take 

flight training. 

Nine thousand two hundred we had to drill down on, and look 

at—and do manual checks on. Of those—and I can go through all 

the numbers all the way down to how many were in compliance, 

how many had already departed the United States, all the way 

down to 30 cases, like I said, that we identified there were possible 

visa violators that needed to—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Went from 18,000 to—— 

Mr. WOODS. Thirty. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thirty. They were denied? 

Mr. WOODS. Those individuals are under investigation right now 

for overstaying their visa. This is going back through the database 

of people that have applied for—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Wilson, can you elaborate on the statistics 

that your department reflects? 

Mr. WILSON. Ranking Member Thompson, I do not have specific 

numbers in front of me. But we do have very few individuals that 

are denied flight training because of various issues; one of them 

being the immigration status. That is something we have worked 

out recently with ICE. 

Other issues may be information that has not been supplied to 

TSA, which we will put through in a vetting-process status, meaning that they haven’t been cleared, and they haven’t been denied. 

Mr. THOMPSON. All right. They haven’t been cleared, haven’t 

been denied. They can still receive training? 

Mr. WILSON. No, sir. They cannot begin training until they 

have—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, if they are ICE people, they—but in—if 

they are American citizens, they can be. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. If they are U.S. citizens, they do not go 

through any track. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. Mr. Carr, on a public policy side, do you 

see any problems with vetting American citizens before the training commences on a no-fly list, or whatever? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I guess, if we take a quick look at the history 

of this program, it quickly came into place after 9/11 as part of the 

Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001. The focus of that program was clearly on foreign citizens coming to the United States 

for training, which we identified as a source of problems on 9/11. 

I think, when we look at vetting U.S. citizens for flight training, 

we have—we would have to take a broader look. Because I think 

there are a number of training activities, beyond just flight training, where additional vetting might be viewed as valuable. I don’t 

think flight training is a unique activity when we look at complex 

operating requirements. 

So while flight training has been viewed as one area that should 

possibly receive some additional scrutiny, I think there could be 

others as well that we should take a holistic look at and determine 

if there is really value in doing this check against U.S. citizens who 

are seeking to enjoy this type of privilege. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman recognizes 

Mr. Cravaack of Minnesota for 5 minutes. 
44 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I think, in just listening to some of the conversation, I think everybody here wants to do the right thing. We want 

to make sure that a person doesn’t step inside of an aircraft that 

has mal intentions. 

Also, they should be attending a ground school without having— 

with the same type of intentions. So those are just some of the 

comments in listening to what I have heard today. 

What I would like to just encourage everyone to do is to ensure 

that the end goal is not lost, in making sure that we protect the 

United States. We never want to have a Moussaoui being able to 

take flight training, being able to go to that extent and be able to 

fly an aircraft into a building. We never want that, and nobody on 

this panel wants that to occur as well. 

We also understand, coming from the commercial industry, we 

have a viable business in the United States in making sure that 

people without mal intent want to come to the United States to become one of the best pilots in the world. 

So I would just encourage everyone on this panel and, Mr. Wilson, unfortunately, a lot of it falls upon your shoulders, to ensure 

the safety of the general public in ensuring that no one, including 

those in the United States that never step in an aircraft—now— 

I remember taking, you know, there was some of what are the 

mental background that had to be taken a look at as well. 

We don’t want to—we want to make sure that nobody flies into 

an IRS building who has mal intent, but we will never have 100 

percent security. That just won’t happen. Somebody that is perfectly normal one day can flip because of whatever he or she are 

under. 

So my comment is just make sure that everybody here works 

very closely together in ensuring a common-sense solution to this 

problem, to ensure that we never, ever have a 9/11 again. With 

that, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman and I recognize Mr. Davis 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Woods, in your testimony, you described five actions TSA 

and ICE intend to take to mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the 

procedures and processes associated with the Alien Flight Student 

Program. 

Has a time table been established for the implementation of 

these action items? 

Mr. WOODS. A time table has not been established, but we are— 

some of these items are already in effect that we are working on. 

We are working cooperatively, doing the alien checks of the TSA 

databases already. We are sharing our ICE data with them. We are 

working on sharing the CFIUS data with them in the near future. 

We are working already on their strike teams with doing the inspections. 

So some of these have already been implemented. We will continue to move forward on others. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Wilson, both of the stakeholders appearing before the committee today have praised TSA’s interaction 

with the general aviation community over the past 2 years. What 
45 

is being done by your office to ensure that this progress will continue and is sustained? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, sir, in my current position—I assumed this 

position last year—I put together a plan for the next 3 years to ensure that certain items have been addressed within the general 

aviation realm. 

Back in January 2012, I laid out my plan of action for the general aviation community. It included the Alien Flight Student Program. It included the large aircraft security program. It included 

the repair station role. It included South Capitol Street Heliport. 

It included the Maryland Three. 

It included a vetting process, an automated vetting process for 

general aviation aircraft operating within the Private Charter 

Standard Security Program and the Twelve Five Standard Security 

Program. 

So as you can see, that long laundry list that I put together will 

keep us busy for a very long time. 

One additional item that I did not mention was access to temporary flight restrictions by general aviation aircraft. We have done 

a tremendous lot of work with the industry, as well as our Federal 

partners, to allow increased access to these temporary flight restrictions in the last 24 months. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Woods, how confident are you that individuals out of status 

are not receiving flight training in the United States today? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, with the new process TSA has in checking the 

automated arrivals and departure information system, ADIS, 

through US–VISIT, I feel much more comfortable that we are identifying those individuals on the front end that may be out of status 

before they take any training. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Lord, do you believe that establishing the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the General Aviation Working Group and statute, as Ranking Member Thompson’s bill H.R. 

1447 proposes—do you think this would help stabilize the relationship between TSA and the general aviation community? 

Mr. LORD. Personally, I think it is important to have a stable 

ASAC process, whether you do it through legislative means or not. 

Again, that is not my call. That is Congress’ call. But, again, we 

were concerned about the lapse in observations, and now we are 

encouraged to see, you know, it is functioning again. It seems to 

be very active. 

But the particular way you establish it, I mean, obviously, that 

is something for Congress to consider, not us. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lungren for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Just to follow up on Mr. Davis, I would ask Mr. 

Lord and Mr. Wilson and Mr. Woods, is there anything that has 

been suggested here about cooperation, about considering doing 

more vetting of non-aliens, Americans, or of the information that 

is allowed to be transferred among the various Government agencies, including the unnamed Government agency here? 
46 

Is there anything that either—that any of the three of you would 

believe requires legislative authority? 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Lungren, yes, sir, in regard to the vetting of 

U.S. citizens prior to them starting training, yes, I think that 

would require some type of mandate in order for them to be required to submit certain information prior to pilot training. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. I would defer to Mr. Wilson on this, but I think—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am not asking for the administration’s position. 

What I am asking for is an answer to some of our questions here, 

there have been some suggestions about more action being taken 

and so forth, and I am just trying to find out whether that would 

require us to legislatively authorize it or mandate it or is that 

within the ambit of jurisdiction that is already allowed to the various of aspects of DHS? 

Mr. WOODS. I am not clear if it is within TSA’s authority to mandate U.S. citizens to be vetted for flight training. I am aware of the 

Alien Flight Training Program and I worked for Immigration Customs Enforcement so I am very familiar with the alien rules of taking flight training at any school in the United States. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay, well, there was one question that was 

brought up about the incongruity of having a no-fly list which 

would’t allow somebody to get on a commercial aircraft but not 

being checked when they are beginning the training for learning 

how to pilot aircraft. 

I guess one of my questions is: If you could state it on the record, 

if you know, is the impediment—is there an impediment to that 

legislatively or is that something that could be considered by TSA 

in carrying out its responsibility as already authorized? 

Mr. WOODS. Again, I would have to defer to—— 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Sir, not off-hand whether our existing authorities 

are that broad. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But maybe you can get back to us on that. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, I will. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. I would argue that ATSA provides TSA broad authority to do a number of things. So that is the question: Could they 

do that within the current legislative conferred by ATSA? It is a 

question the lawyers would probably answer for you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We always blame it on the lawyers. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LORD. But they do have broad authority now to identify any 

individual posing a threat to the U.S. aviation systems, so perhaps. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you all for testifying. We appreciate the work that you are 

doing, the cooperation that you have exhibited and being forthright 

in your comments here with us at this subcommittee hearing today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

A couple of things. Mr. Lord mentioned he thought 90 days was 

a reasonable amount of time for you all to be able to make these 

corrections. Mr. Wilson, do you agree with that? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, I concur. 
47 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Woods, do you agree with that time frame? 

Mr. WOODS. I concur. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Mr. Wilson or Mr. Woods, has there been a 

U.S. citizen on the no-fly list that has actually gone through training, to your knowledge? 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Rogers, I am not aware of that, and I will 

have to get back with you on that, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. I am not aware of anyone. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. I do, Mr. Woods, want to point out that 

the staff still seems confused with what your Department has told 

us about the part-time students, so we want to get your question 

for the record, and if you could go back and check with the Department on this part-time status and see if there is any differential 

at all for somebody who may be in the country as a tourist, maybe, 

and once they get here decide they want training. 

Go ahead, Mr. Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. As I said earlier, you brought up a strong point. A 

person that comes in as a tourist to take training incidental to 

their arrival as opposed to a person who comes as a student to the 

United States on a student visa, on an F–M visa, they are allowed 

to take a certain amount of training incidental—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, so they can come in as a tourist and get 

training without being vetted? 

Mr. WOODS. I think the thing that they are unvetted for is, when 

they are coming to the United States on a student visa or F or M 

visa. You are allowed to take a certain amount of training incidental. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay so they can’t come in as a tourist and get 

training without being vetted? 

Mr. WOODS. The thing that they are not vetted for is coming to 

the United States, but what the purpose of their visit is and we can 

take enforcement action against them for taking their training in 

violation of their status. What we would be looking for is clarification and legislation of who is allowed to take—— 

Mr. ROGERS. That goes back to Mr. Lungren’s question. You may 

need some regulatory or legislative authority. 

Mr. WOODS. Who is allowed to come to the United States and 

take training or under what visa class and categories? Whether it 

is a visitor, as a non-immigrant worker or whether it is as a student itself? Currently the interpretations are varied through the 

Federal agencies where you may have a visitor who can take on his 

visit to the United States to go to Disneyland, can take incidental 

training. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. All right, well I want to thank the witnesses 

for, as Mr. Lungren said for a frank, eye-opening discussion here. 

I want to remind all of the witnesses that some of the Members 

of the committee that couldn’t be present, may have questions and 

so we will leave the record open for 10 days. I would ask you if 

there are any questions that are submitted to you, that you get 

those back to us in written form within that 10-day period of time. 

With that, this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FOR KERWIN WILSON FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS

Question 1a. In your written statement, you indicate that TSA has moved forward 

with a new process to check active alien flight students against the US–VISIT ADIS 

database to identify whether an individual may have overstayed the terms of his 

or her admission and provide the results to ICE’s CTCEU to take appropriate immigration enforcement action. However, as of July 18, ICE program officials characterized this information-sharing effort as being in the ‘‘testing phase.’’ 

At what point in the AFSP process will TSA check ADIS? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 1b. In addition to identifying whether an individual may have overstayed the terms of his/her admission, will the check of ADIS allow TSA to determine whether someone may have entered the country illegally (‘‘entry without inspection’’)? If not, what additional checks will TSA do to determine this? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 1c. What controls has TSA put in place to ensure that information is 

provided to ICE for enforcement action? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. As part of its compliance inspections of flight schools participating in 

AFSP, TSA inspectors check for documentation that the school received approval 

from TSA before training a foreign national. Yet GAO found instances where foreign 

nationals completed flight training without receiving approval from TSA. 

What specific actions has TSA taken to determine why TSA’s inspections of flight 

school compliance with AFSP did not identify the problems GAO raised in its report 

(i.e., that foreign nationals could complete training at U.S. flight schools without applying to AFSP, or after their applications were denied or canceled in AFSP)? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3a. The February/March memorandum of understanding between FAA 

and TSA to share certain data on foreign pilots was signed by the TSA officials responsible for overseeing flight school compliance inspections, but not officials responsible for completing security threat assessments. 

Does this effort involve the TSA officials who are responsible for the AFSP security threat assessment process as well? If so, how? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3b. How do you think FAA and TSA can work more collaboratively to 

ensure that foreign nationals are being properly vetted by TSA before receiving 

flight training and an airman’s certificate? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4a. FAA officials indicate that they began sending data to TSA in March. 

How, specifically, has TSA used the FAA data to help ensure that all foreign 

flight students have received the appropriate background checks? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4b. How many foreign nationals has TSA identified through this process 

that did not successfully complete AFSP security threat assessments? How many of 

those were required to complete AFSP security threat assessments? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4c. What specific actions has TSA taken to address any weaknesses identified through the data matching process? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Now that TSA is receiving data from FAA on foreign nationals with 

pilot’s licenses, has TSA discovered any foreign nationals with commercial or airline 

transport pilot licenses who did not receive approval to begin training through 

AFSP? If so, what actions have TSA and FAA taken to resolve these issues? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
50 

Question 6. Do TSA inspectors issue violations if a flight training school does not 

maintain the required documentation? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7a. Can you provide some examples of when a flight training provider 

would be deemed non-compliant and what penalties it could face? 

How often do you re-inspect a provider that has failed inspection? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7b. Have there been any instances where an applicant was denied by 

TSA because of the individual’s country of origin? If so, which country(s)? Does TSA 

have a prohibited list of countries from which it will not accept students into AFSP? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FOR JOHN P. WOODS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS

Question 1. If a foreign-national arrives in the United States on a student visa 

or F or M visa and then decides to enroll in a flight school part-time, does that person get vetted against terrorist watch databases? Do you think there needs to be 

clarification throughout the Federal Government of what type(s) of visa allows for 

an individual to take flight training? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. In May 2011, TSA provided ICE with the identification of 142 potential overstays that were in TSA’s AFSP database. After further vetting ICE reduced 

the list of possible overstays to 22. 

Can you share the results of the investigations? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2b. How many of the 22 individuals had completed flight training when 

you began your investigation? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2c. Were any of the foreign nationals deported? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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