[Cite as In re L.S., 2023-Ohio-3634.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE L.S. :

: No. 112822

A Minor Child :

:

[Appeal by K.S., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 5, 2023 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case No. AD23902429

Appearances:

Dawn Snyder, Attorney at Law, LLC, and Dawn Snyder, 

for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Zachary J. LaFleur, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

Appellant K.S.(“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order that 

terminated her parental rights and granted permanent custody of her minor child, 

L.S. (d.o.b. 7/26/2022), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family 

Services (“the agency” or “CCDCFS”). The child’s alleged father, T.P. (“Father”), is 
not a party to the appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

judgment.

Factual and Procedural History

At the time of his birth on July 26, 2022, L.S. tested positive for 

fentanyl and cocaine and was treated for two months in the hospital for withdrawal 

symptoms and other medical concerns. On August 24, 2022, the agency filed a 

complaint for abuse and temporary custody of L.S. to the agency (“initial 

complaint”). Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD22908412. On August 31, 2022, Mother 

executed a contract whereby she agreed to participate in the Family Recovery Court. 

On September 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing and committed L.S. to 

the emergency care and custody of the agency. On the same date, the hospital 

discharged L.S. and the agency placed L.S. in foster care for two months.

In September and October 2022, Mother submitted two drug screens 

to the agency that were positive for illicit drugs. The trial court referred Mother to 

at least two treatment programs during that same timeframe, but she did not 

complete the programs.

In November 2022, the agency conducted kinship caregiver 

(“KCAR”) investigations to locate an acceptable home where L.S. could be placed. 

The agency investigated Mother’s mother, but found she was not qualified due to 

prior criminal history and agency involvement. The agency subsequently approved 

placement of L.S. with friends of Father’s aunt and referred to the placement as a 
fictive kinship placement. L.S. remained in the care of his fictive kinship placement 

throughout the duration of the case.

Because the initial complaint was not resolved within the statutory 

timeframe, the agency filed a second complaint on November 21, 2022, for abuse 

and temporary custody of L.S. to the agency.1 Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD22911952 

(“second complaint”). In November 2022, the trial court discharged Mother from 

the Family Recovery Court — and the case was returned to the court’s regular docket 

— due to Mother’s noncompliance with the program.

The second complaint again was not resolved within the statutory 

timeframe, and therefore, the agency filed a third complaint regarding L.S. on 

February 24, 2023 (“third complaint”).2 Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD22908412. The trial 

court’s resolution of the third complaint — specifically, the court’s grant of 

permanent custody to the agency — is the basis for this appeal.

The third complaint alleged that L.S. was an abused child and sought 

permanent custody to the CCDCFS. The complaint alleged that at the time of his 

birth, L.S. tested positive for fentanyl and was treated for withdrawal symptoms 

stemming from Mother’s drug use. The complaint alleged Mother suffered from a 

substance abuse disorder related to cocaine, fentanyl, and alcohol that prevented 

her from providing a safe home for L.S. The complaint alleged Mother was 

1 The initial complaint filed in Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD22908412 was dismissed 

without prejudice on December 15, 2022. 

2 The second complaint filed in Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD22911952 was dismissed 

without prejudice on February 17, 2023.
recommended for residential drug treatment but she failed to comply and was not 

engaged in a treatment program at the time the complaint was filed. The complaint 

alleged Mother’s older child, A.J., was removed from her care and committed to the 

legal custody of the child’s father in part due to Mother’s substance abuse issues. 

Cuyahoga J.C. No. FA19108009. The complaint further alleged that Mother was 

recently charged in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-672475-B for corrupting another with 

drugs, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3).

The complaint alleged Father had a substance use disorder that 

prevented him from providing a safe home for L.S. and that Father was convicted of 

attempted having weapons while under disability and sentenced to community 

control. Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-673188-A. The complaint alleged that Father 

was ordered into residential treatment after he twice violated community-control 

sanctions, and Father had multiple felony convictions dating back to 2017 and 2019. 

Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-17-622997-A, CR-19-646347-A, CR-19-641371-A, and 

CR-19-639013-A. The complaint also alleged that Father failed to establish 

paternity of L.S. and failed to support, visit, or communicate with L.S. since the 

child’s birth.

On February 27, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the 

agency’s motion for predispositional custody of L.S. The court heard testimony from 

Terri Fulton (“Fulton”), an extended social worker with the agency. Mother did not 

participate at the hearing; the agency was informed prior to the hearing that she was 

“taking care of a warrant in Medina County.” Feb. 27, 2023 hearing, tr. 7. Father 
did not participate in the hearing since he was incarcerated at the time, and L.S.’s 

paternity had not been established. On the date of the hearing, the trial court 

committed L.S. to the emergency temporary care of the agency.

On March 20, 2023, an Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 

case plan was completed. The plan indicated Mother tested positive for cocaine and 

fentanyl at the time of L.S.’s birth. The plan stated Mother completed an alcohol 

and other drug assessment and was awaiting the results. The plan stated that 

Mother denied a substance abuse problem; Mother claimed she used drugs during 

pregnancy due to her nausea and appetite; and Mother was willing to complete 

random urine screens. The plan indicated Mother and Father could benefit from 

parenting classes to learn the importance of a sober caregiver for a child and to gain 

general parenting knowledge and parenting skills. The plan included establishing 

L.S.’s paternity, and it was noted that Mother was granted supervised visits with L.S. 

in his fictive kinship home.

On the same date in March 2023, the trial court appointed Thomas 

Kozel as guardian ad litem (“G.A.L.”) for L.S. On April 24, 2023, the trial court 

issued an order that stated Father was imprisoned at a community-based 

correctional facility in Cleveland, Ohio.

On May 8, 2023, the trial court conducted an adjudication and 

disposition hearing at which the following individuals attended: the G.A.L., Father, 

counsel for Father, counsel for Mother, CCDCFS social worker Fulton, and counsel 

for CCDCFS. Mother did not attend the hearing nor was any explanation provided 
for her absence. Father admitted to the allegations in the amended complaint that 

applied to him and agreed to permanent custody to the agency. Fulton testified on 

behalf of the agency.

Fulton testified that the agency received a referral for L.S. when he 

was born due to the presence of fentanyl and cocaine in his system. Fulton testified 

that the agency’s concerns stemmed from Mother’s substance abuse as evidenced by 

the drugs present in L.S.’s system and Mother’s admission to intravenous drug use 

the night before she delivered L.S. 

Fulton testified that the agency developed a case plan that was 

reviewed with both parents. Mother did not express any objections to the case plan, 

but agreed to the terms and signed the document. The case plan required Mother’s 

completion of drug tests but Mother was unwilling to cooperate:

FULTON: We’ve been encouraging [Mother] to do drug screens, which 

at this point is our only case plan objective for [Mother.] She would tell 

us that she would go and do drug screens for us. However, she 

wouldn’t. We would speak to her about her not doing them, and she 

would just always have some type of excuse as to why she wasn’t able 

to go and submit the screen for us.

May 8, 2023 hearing, tr. 22. Fulton testified that Mother completed only two 

random drug tests over the past nine months in September and October 2022 —

both testing positive for illicit drugs — although the agency requested she submit to 

drug tests almost every week. In September 2022, Mother tested positive for 

fentanyl, cocaine, alcohol, and norfentanyl, and in October 2022, Mother tested 

positive for fentanyl, cocaine, and the prescription medication Suboxone. Mother 
“would just give [the agency] different random excuses as to why she couldn’t 

comply with our requests.” May 8, 2023 hearing, tr. 29. Fulton testified that Mother 

was initially referred to Recovery Court at the juvenile court where Mother 

participated for a brief period of time. Due to Mother’s lack of participation, she was 

unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Fulton testified that the agency also 

referred Mother to a few treatment programs, including Ethan’s Crossing, Women’s 

Recovery Center, and Action Recovery, where Mother was unsuccessfully 

discharged after minimal engagement.

Fulton testified that Mother is currently involved with MetroHealth’s 

Medication-Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) Clinic where Mother submits to drug tests 

at appointments scheduled two weeks in advance. Fulton testified that Mother last 

tested positive for fentanyl at the MAT Clinic on February 11, 2023, and all 

subsequent tests were negative. Fulton testified that in contrast with the agency’s 

random drug testing, Mother has prescheduled appointments with the MAT Clinic 

where she can ensure she does not have any drugs in her system at the time of those 

appointments. Fulton testified that the agency did not refer Mother to the MAT 

Clinic but she learned of the program during her prenatal care. Fulton testified that 

Mother also received counseling at the MAT Clinic. Fulton testified that she does not 

believe Mother benefitted from the agency-referred programs or the MAT Clinic. 

Fulton’s opinion was based upon Mother’s failure to comply with agency services or 

requests for drug screens and the lack of any documented sobriety.
Fulton testified that Mother recently pleaded guilty to a charge of 

corrupting others with drugs.3 Fulton also testified that in a prior custody action 

between Mother and the father of her eight-year-old daughter, A.J., the court 

designated A.J.’s father the legal custodian and residential parent of the child and 

granted Mother supervised visitation.

Fulton testified that Mother regularly participated in weekly 

supervised visitation with L.S. over the past seven months. During visitation, 

Mother was engaged and interacted appropriately with L.S. and the infant 

responded positively to Mother. Fulton testified that Mother resided with her 

Father and was employed as a house cleaner.

Fulton testified that L.S. currently resided with the same fictive 

kinship caregivers with whom he was placed in November 2022. Fulton testified 

that she observed very positive interactions between L.S. and his fictive kinship 

caregivers. Fulton stated that L.S. interacted with his fictive kinship caregivers as if 

they were his mother and father and the fictive kinship caregivers provided more 

than just L.S.’s basic needs. Fulton testified that the fictive kinship caregivers were 

interested in the adoption of L.S. if the agency was granted permanent custody. 

3 A review of the docket in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-672475 demonstrates that on 

April 20, 2023, the trial court stayed all proceedings in Mother’s criminal case in which she 

was charged with corrupting others with drugs and granted Mother’s motion for 

intervention in lieu of conviction. On May 10, 2023, Mother submitted a drug test to the 

probation department that tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and fentanyl. On June 22, 

2023, Mother absconded from inpatient treatment at Ethan Crossing after spending only

24 hours at the facility. On June 26, 2023, the trial court issued a capias for Mother that 

was pending at the time of this opinion.
Fulton testified that L.S. needed a legally secure placement but Mother was unable 

to provide a safe and stable permanent home due to her substance abuse issues.

The G.A.L. drafted a report on April 30, 2023, in which he 

recommended permanent custody to the agency due to Mother’s lack of progress in 

addressing her substance use disorder. The G.A.L. maintained that 

recommendation at the time of the custody hearing.

Pursuant to the trial testimony and exhibits, the trial court 

adjudicated L.S. to be abused. The trial court further found L.S. could not be placed 

with either parent pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), (4), and (16) and found it was in 

L.S.’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency. On May 16, 

2023, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry that terminated its prior order 

committing the child to the agency’s temporary custody and granted the agency’s 

motion for permanent custody, thereby terminating the parental rights of Mother 

and Father.

On June 6, 2023, Mother filed a timely appeal presenting a sole 

assignment of error for our review:

Assignment of Error 1: The trial court erred and abused its discretion 

in finding by clear and convincing evidence that it would be in the best 

interest of L.S. to permanently terminate the parental rights of Mother 

and place him in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.

Legal Analysis

Mother argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion

when it granted permanent custody of L.S to the agency.
A parent has a fundamental interest in the care and custody of his 

children. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20. 

However, parental rights are not absolute: “‘The natural rights of a parent are 

always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or 

controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, 

¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 

1034 (1979). “By terminating parental rights, the goal is to create ‘a more stable life’ 

for dependent children and to ‘facilitate adoption to foster permanency for 

children.’” In re R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, ¶ 21, 

quoting In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, citing In re 

Howard, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 5 

(Aug. 1, 1986).

A. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)

On a motion for permanent custody, a juvenile court must satisfy the 

two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and 

grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence that any one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) 

through (e) apply and that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent 

custody to the agency. In re R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108537, 2020-Ohio-3032, 

¶ 19-20.

Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or 

degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not 
to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal 

cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or 

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 

2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 

120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 

one of the following five conditions applies under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1):

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children service agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) 

of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the 

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the 

child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who 

are able to take permanent custody.

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve 

or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child 

has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children 

services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more 

months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in 

division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was 

previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another 

state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents 

from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated 
an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions 

by any court in this state or another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

Here, the juvenile court addressed the first prong of the statutory test 

by finding that L.S. could not or should not be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). To support a finding that a child 

cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, the trial court 

looks to R.C. 2151.414(E)’s 15 enumerated factors. The trial court in the instant case 

found the presence of (E)(1), (E)(4), and (E)(16) factors supported its decision. R.C. 

2151.414(E) states, in pertinent part:

(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this 

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the 

Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent 

within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the 

parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held 

pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division 

(A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the 

following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a 

finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home 

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts 

by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that 

initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent 

has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the 

conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. 

In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied 

those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of 

medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made 

available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental 

conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the 

child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the 

child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an 

unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

 

In support of the (E)(16) factor, the trial court stated the following in its May 16, 

2023 judgment entry: “The alleged father made a knowing and voluntary agreement 

that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.”

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. The 

agency sought emergency custody of L.S. due to Mother’s substance abuse. 

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), Mother did not substantially remedy the conditions 

that resulted in L.S.’s removal from her custody. Prior to filing the third complaint, 

Mother demonstrated minimal participation in court-ordered treatment and 

agency-requested drug testing and provided two positive drug tests. In accordance 

with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), L.S. entered the agency’s temporary custody under the 

third complaint on November 7, 2022. The testimony related to Mother’s actions

from November 7, 2022, through the date of the permanent custody hearing on 

May 8, 2023, demonstrates that Mother never submitted to an agency-requested 

drug test during that timeframe despite repeated requests for her to do so. On an 

unspecified date during that timeframe, Mother either resumed or began 

participation in the MAT Clinic, and the last positive drug test submitted by Mother 

in that program was in February 2023. However, the drug testing associated with 

the MAT Clinic was unacceptable to the agency. According to Fulton, Mother knew 
in advance the date of the MAT Clinic’s scheduled drug tests and could potentially 

plan her drug use in conjunction with those appointments to ensure any illicit drugs 

were not in her system when she submitted to the tests. The agency required 

Mother’s compliance with their random drug testing to monitor her drug use but 

Mother failed to submit to those tests. Mother’s actions supported the juvenile 

court’s finding that Mother continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially 

remedy the conditions that caused L.S.’s removal.

The juvenile court also found L.S. could not or should not reasonably 

be placed in Mother’s and Father’s care because the R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) and (E)(16) 

factors applied. Because the court need find only one R.C. 2151.414(E) factor 

applies, we will not address the additional factors. In re Glenn, 139 Ohio App.3d 

105, 113, 742 N.E.2d 1210 (8th Dist.2000), citing In re Shanequa H., 109 Ohio 

App.3d 142, 146, 671 N.E.2d 1113 (6th Dist.1996). Our review presents clear and 

convincing evidence that L.S. could not or should not be placed with his Mother

within a reasonable time.

B. Best Interest of the Child

Once the trial court found that one of the enumerated R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) factors was present, the court then conducted an analysis of the 

child’s best interest. The juvenile court had to find by clear and convincing evidence 

that it was in the child’s best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency. In 

re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 36. On appeal, the court 

reviews a trial court’s best interest analysis for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 37. 
The term abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 

N.E.2d 1140 (1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 

N.E.3d 463. Such broad discretion applies in a permanent custody hearing. In re 

A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-Ohio-3373, ¶ 25.

Mother argues that the record does not demonstrate placement of 

L.S. with the agency was in his best interest. Specifically, Mother argues that the 

evidence showed her consistent weekly visitation with L.S. over the prior seven 

months and her bond with the child. Mother argues she wants L.S. to be returned 

to her care and she will be able to provide a legally secure and permanent placement 

for the child at the conclusion of the agency’s temporary custody. The agency 

contends there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that it was 

in L.S.’s best interest to be placed in the agency’s permanent custody.

To determine the best interest of a child, the trial court considers all 

relevant factors including, but not limited to, those listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-

(e):

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home 

providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through 

the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the 

child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of 
a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in (D)(1) of 

section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the 

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 

apply in relation to the parents and child.

Not one factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) is given greater weight than any other 

factor and only one of the statutory factors needs to be found in favor of the award 

of permanent custody. In re L.W. at ¶ 39, quoting In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 

498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. The focus of a best interest 

determination is the child, not the parent. In re R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, at ¶ 28, citing In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 

2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59; In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th 

Dist.1994).

The record reflects that in November 2022, L.S. was placed in the care 

of his fictive kinship caregivers where he remained throughout the pendency of this 

case. The record shows that L.S. bonded with his fictive kinship caregivers and was 

doing very well under their care. The testimony was that the fictive kinship 

caregivers — a working father and stay-at-home mother — wished to adopt L.S.

L.S. was only four months old when he was placed with his fictive 

kinship caregivers and nine months old at the time of the custody hearing. A 
juvenile court properly considers a G.A.L.’s recommendation on a permanent 

custody motion — and specifically as part of a best interest analysis — where the 

child is too young to verbalize his wishes. In re R.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110541, 

2021-Ohio-4126, ¶ 52, quoting In re B/K Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190681, 

2020-Ohio-1095, ¶ 45. At trial, the G.A.L. recommended the court grant permanent 

custody of L.S. to the agency. 

The record also shows that L.S. was in the agency’s custody for almost 

all of his life at the time of trial. “A child’s best interests require permanency and a 

safe and secure environment.” In re Holyak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78890, 2001 

Ohio App. LEXIS 3105, 10 (July 12, 2001). L.S. deserved a legally secure, permanent 

placement where he could be safe, thrive, and have all his needs met. Such a 

placement could not be accomplished with Mother, who had evaded compliance 

with the agency’s services.

We recognize that Mother maintained regular supervised visitation 

with L.S. and included her older daughter and her own father and mother at some 

of the visits. Yet, these acts were not sufficient to establish it was in L.S.’s best 

interest to be placed with Mother.

We find the record provided the trial court with clear and convincing 

evidence to find permanent custody to the agency, rather than Mother, was in L.S.’s 

best interest.

The record demonstrates that the juvenile court complied with the 

statutory requirements of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D) when it determined 
(1) the evidence showed that L.S. could not or should not be placed with Mother 

within a reasonable time, and (2) it was in L.S.’s best interest to be placed in the 

permanent custody of the agency. The juvenile court’s findings are supported by 

clear and convincing evidence.

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, J., and

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR