2023 UT App 125

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHRISTOPHER LAKER,

Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER CARAS, DIRECTOR OF THE DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20220557-CA

Filed October 19, 2023

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robert P. Faust

No. 220901408

Jason A. Schatz, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Andrew Dymek,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY

concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Laker was arrested on suspicion of drunk 

driving. Later, after an administrative hearing, the Driver License 

Division determined that Laker had refused the arresting officer’s 

request that he submit to a chemical test to determine his blood 

alcohol level, and therefore revoked his driver license for a period 

of 18 months. The district court reached that same conclusion after 

a trial de novo. Laker now appeals, challenging the court’s finding 

that he refused a chemical test. We conclude, however, that the 

court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence, and

therefore affirm. 
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BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in November 2021, a Salt Lake City police officer 

(Officer) was called to the scene of an automobile accident.1 Laker 

was identified as the driver of the vehicle. Upon his arrival at the 

scene, Officer noted the odor of alcohol coming from Laker and 

observed that Laker had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes and 

was unsteady on his feet. Laker admitted to Officer that he had 

been drinking. After Laker exhibited what Officer believed to be 

an inordinate number of clues during field sobriety testing, 

Officer arrested Laker and transported him via patrol car to the 

police station. 

¶3 After arriving at the station, but while Laker was still inside 

the patrol car, Officer asked Laker to submit to a chemical test to 

determine his blood alcohol level. Officer made this request using 

a prepared form, and he read the request “verbatim off the form.” 

Specifically, Officer informed Laker that he was under arrest on 

suspicion of drunk driving, and Officer asked Laker to “submit to 

a chemical test to determine the alcohol and/or drug content of 

[his] body”; Officer also warned Laker that a positive test result 

could “result in denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification 

of [his] driving privilege.” Laker refused Officer’s initial request.

¶4 Following protocol, Officer then began to read Laker a 

second warning, again using a prepared form that law 

enforcement personnel use in situations in which an arrestee 

initially refuses a request to submit to a chemical test; this warning 

is known as the “refusal admonition.” Before reading the

admonition, Officer informed Laker that once the admonition had 

been read, it would be Laker’s decision “to submit or not submit 

to the chemical test,” and he would ask Laker for his “response, if 

1. It is unclear from the record what type of accident Laker was 

involved in, whether another vehicle was involved, or who 

reported the accident to the police.
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any,” but he thereafter would not “continue” to ask Laker what 

his position was. Officer then read Laker the following 

admonition, again doing so “verbatim” from the form:

If you refuse the test or fail to follow my 

instructions, I must warn you that your driving 

privilege may be revoked for 18 months if age 21 or 

older, or for 2 years, or until age 21 if you are under 

the age of 21; or 36 months, or until age 21 if it is a 

second or subsequent license withdrawal for an 

alcohol or drug related driving offense, with no 

provision for limited driving. You may be subject to 

criminal prosecution. In addition, you will be 

prohibited from driving with any measurable or 

detectable amount of alcohol in your body for a 

period of five or ten years, depending on your prior 

driving history, and you will be prohibited from 

driving a vehicle without an ignition interlock 

device installed for a period of three years. I will 

make the test results available to you, if you take the 

test.

¶5 After receiving the refusal admonition, Laker did not 

immediately agree to submit to a test. Instead, he responded by 

expressing confusion and concern about the test, and by 

requesting to call his mother.2 In response, Officer commented to 

2. Much of Officer’s interaction with Laker on the evening in 

question was captured on Officer’s body camera, and a recording 

of the relevant video was played for the district court during the 

trial de novo. However, that video is not contained in the 

appellate record presented to us. Our understanding of the 

contents of the video, then, comes from the descriptions of it 

offered by Officer and by the district court itself. As regards 

Laker’s apparent “confusion” following the admonition, the court 

(continued...)
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Laker, while still in the patrol car outside the station, that the 

decision about whether “to submit or not to submit” was 

“completely up to him,” but that this decision needed to be made 

“within a reasonable amount of time.” Officer then explained that 

he was going to “take [Laker’s] seatbelt off” and take him into the 

station and “lock [him] into” an “Intox room,” events that would 

give Laker a few minutes to consider his decision. 

¶6 Once inside the Intox room, Officer “secured [Laker] to the 

bench” and then stood “in front of” Laker “for probably two 

minutes, waiting for” Laker to offer a “yes or a no” to the test 

request. Laker offered no response. At that point, Officer 

informed Laker he was “going to be in the other room” but would 

still be able to see and hear Laker, so if Laker “need[ed] anything 

or if [he] ha[d] any further questions” to let Officer know. Without 

making any further statements to Laker, Officer marked Laker as 

a “refusal” and began drafting a search warrant for a blood draw. 

While Officer was away, Laker was “on his phone.”

¶7 By the time Officer returned, he had obtained a warrant to 

have Laker’s blood drawn for testing and informed Laker that 

they just needed to wait for the phlebotomist who would be 

performing the blood draw. Altogether, the intake process lasted 

between two and two and a half hours, during which time Laker 

never once stated that he would agree to submit to a chemical test.

¶8 Some weeks later, Laker was notified that the Driver 

License Division (the Division) intended to revoke his license for 

18 months because “a peace officer had reasonable grounds to 

believe that [Laker] refused to submit to a chemical test after being 

requested and warned by a peace officer.” Following an 

remarked, after viewing the video, that it “couldn’t quite hear 

from the audio [Laker’s] explanation of what it is that he wasn’t 

understanding.” We therefore do not know what Laker was 

confused about. 
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20220557-CA 5 2023 UT App 125

administrative hearing, the Division determined that Laker “did 

not submit to the [chemical] test” and therefore revoked Laker’s 

driving privileges for 18 months.

¶9 Laker then sought judicial review of the Division’s 

determination. The district court held a trial de novo to consider 

the matter; at that trial, Officer was the only witness to testify. At 

the end of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement.

¶10 Later that day, the court issued a written ruling denying 

Laker’s petition for relief. The court found that Laker had indeed 

refused to submit to a chemical test upon request, noting that “the 

law require[s] an immediate request to have the test,” which 

immediate consent Laker had not given, and stating that it could 

“not find” that Officer’s “waiting for several minutes before 

finding a refusal occurred was unreasonable.” Accordingly, the 

court declined to disturb the Division’s 18-month revocation of 

Laker’s driver license.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Laker now appeals, and challenges the court’s finding that 

Laker “refused” to submit to a chemical test. “Our review of a trial 

de novo on a driver license suspension is deferential to the 

[district] court’s view of the evidence unless the [district] court 

has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly against 

the weight of the evidence.” Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, ¶ 9, 

180 P.3d 778 (quotation simplified). In particular, “[t]he 

determination that [an arrestee’s] failure to respond to the officer 

or to take the test amounts to a refusal is a factual finding which 

we will not disturb when supported by substantial evidence.” Lee 

v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
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20220557-CA 6 2023 UT App 125

ANALYSIS

¶12 Under governing Utah law, “every person who chooses to 

drive a vehicle on Utah’s roadways is deemed to have given 

implied consent, for driver license purposes, to a chemical test of 

their ‘breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids’ for the purpose of 

determining their impairment level.” Gukeisen v. Department of 

Public Safety, 2020 UT App 32, ¶ 8, 461 P.3d 1146 (quotation 

simplified) (quoting Utah Code § 41-6a-520(1)(a)); see also Beck v. 

Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1979) (observing that Utah 

statutory law “provides that a driver is deemed to have given his 

consent” to a chemical “test as a condition to using the highways” 

(quotation simplified)). The implied consent statute requires any

officer who, after an arrest, asks a motorist to submit to a chemical 

test to “warn [the motorist] that refusal to submit to the test . . .

may result in . . . revocation of the [motorist’s] license to operate a 

motor vehicle.” Utah Code § 41-6a-520(2)(a). 

¶13 Our law is clear that, once this warning has been given, a 

driver must “immediately request” that the officer administer the 

test. Seeid. § 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 

766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (“[A] driver must affirmatively 

agree to submit to a test immediately following clear warning of the 

consequences of refusal.” (emphasis added)). A driver who, after 

receiving the warning, does not immediately consent to a 

chemical test will be deemed to have “refused” the test. See Lee, 

722 P.2d at 767 (stating that “refusal is presumed” in the absence 

of immediate consent); Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738 

(Utah 1984) (stating that “refusal is conclusively presumed” 

absent immediate consent). 

¶14 Moreover, the immediate consent must be clear and 

unequivocal. Indeed, “a motorist can ‘refuse’ a chemical test in 

any number of ways, and . . . may be considered to have refused 

the test even without actually saying ‘no’ or ‘I refuse.’” Gukeisen, 

2020 UT App 32, ¶ 9. A motorist cannot dodge a request for a 
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20220557-CA 7 2023 UT App 125

chemical test “by temporizing, equivocating, or simply remaining 

silent,” or even by asking for an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (quotation 

simplified); see also Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979)

(stating that the “whole statutory scheme” of the implied consent 

law “could be subverted by one who equivocates or remains 

silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take 

the test”). Our law requires motorists asked to submit to a 

chemical test to provide the requesting officer with an immediate, 

direct answer; officers in this situation are not “required to persist 

and continue to repeat the request until such time as the driver 

believes that he has achieved a degree of sobriety sufficient to pass 

the test.” See Beck, 597 P.2d at 1337. 

¶15 In this case, Laker does not contest that Officer had 

grounds to request a chemical test. Rather, he challenges the 

district court’s finding that Laker’s actions constituted a refusal to 

submit to a test. Laker’s argument rests almost entirely on 

Officer’s statement that Laker would be afforded a “reasonable 

time” to decide whether to submit to a test. Laker also asserts that

Officer was obligated to inform him that a “refusal” included 

anything other than immediate consent. The district court rejected 

Laker’s position, and so do we, for the following reasons. 

¶16 First, Laker had already “refused” the chemical test before 

Officer said anything about a “reasonable time.” A motorist who 

does not immediately request a test after being provided the 

refusal admonition has refused the test. See Utah Code § 41-6a520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. And here it is undisputed 

that Laker did not immediately request a test after receiving the 

refusal admonition. Instead, he expressed confusion and asked to 

contact his mother. At that point, Officer hadn’t yet said anything 

to Laker about any entitlement to a “reasonable time,” and 

therefore that comment cannot serve to erase or nullify Laker’s 

failure to provide immediate consent to a chemical test following 

the admonition. We therefore agree with the State that Laker “was 

conclusively presumed to have refused the test before [Officer] 
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20220557-CA 8 2023 UT App 125

made the ‘reasonable time’ statement.” On that basis alone, 

Laker’s petition is infirm. 

¶17 But even assuming, for purposes of the discussion, that 

Officer’s “reasonable time” statement3 did somehow operate to 

give Laker a reasonable time to make his decision, the district

court’s finding—that Laker actually had a reasonable time to 

make a decision and still did not offer his consent—is supported 

by substantial evidence. 

¶18 Officer made the “reasonable time” statement while Laker 

was still in the patrol car, parked outside the police station. After 

the statement, Officer unbuckled Laker, escorted him inside the 

station to the Intox room, and secured him to a bench there. It is 

unclear from the record submitted to us exactly how long this 

process took, but it was undoubtedly a few minutes. Then, after 

Officer finished securing Laker to a bench in the Intox room, he 

stood “in front of” Laker “for probably two minutes, waiting for” 

Laker to offer a “yes or a no” to the test request. Still, Laker offered 

no response. At that point, Officer informed Laker he was “going 

to be in the other room” but would still be able to see and hear 

Laker; thus, any request for a chemical test made during this 

period of time would have been visible and audible to Officer. But 

Laker did not make any request for a test during the time Officer 

was in the other room preparing a warrant for a blood draw.

¶19 Due to the absence of the body camera video from our 

appellate record, we do not know exactly how long all of this took. 

3. In our view, Officer’s “reasonable time” statement—however 

well-intentioned—was ill-advised. As noted, it is inaccurate: 

motorists must provide an immediate response after receiving the 

refusal admonition. In that situation, our law does not provide 

motorists with a “reasonable time” to consider whether to submit 

to a test. We therefore discourage officers from complicating these 

situations by making statements inconsistent with the law. 
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But the district court had the opportunity to view the video, and 

therefore had better evidence than we do on this point. “It is an 

appellant’s responsibility to include in the record a transcript of 

all evidence relevant to a finding or conclusion that is being 

challenged on appeal.” In re A. Dean Harding Marital & Family

Trust, 2023 UT App 81, ¶ 85 (quotation simplified). “When an 

appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we 

presume the regularity of the proceedings below, and when 

crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing 

portions are presumed to support the action of the [district]

court.” Id. (quotation simplified). Thus, we must presume that the 

video supports the district court’s finding; under these 

circumstances, we are simply not in a position to second-guess the 

court’s finding that Officer afforded Laker a reasonable time to 

make a decision about submitting to a chemical test. 

¶20 Nevertheless, Laker resists these conclusions by asserting 

that his due process rights were violated.4 In support of his 

argument, Laker relies on our supreme court’s statement, given in 

Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), that “[f]airness and due 

process require that a person threatened with the loss of his 

driver[] license should be afforded an opportunity to make a 

4. The State contends that Laker failed to preserve a due process 

claim, and it therefore should not be considered on appeal. See 

State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443 (“When a party fails 

to raise and argue an issue in the [district] court, it has failed to 

preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach 

that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.”). A review of 

the trial transcript shows that Laker’s argument relied heavily on 

Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), and he urged the court 

to rely on the principles outlined therein, particularly those 

concerning “fairness and due process.” After considering Laker’s 

argument from the trial in its entirety, we are satisfied that he 

raised his due process claim sufficiently for us to address it.
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20220557-CA 10 2023 UT App 125

choice based on a fair explanation of his rights and duties.”5 Id. at 

1334. According to Laker, due process principles required Officer 

to specifically explain to Laker that anything other than an 

immediate expression of consent would be considered a refusal. 

But here, Laker has not borne his burden of demonstrating a 

violation of a constitutional right. 

¶21 “At its core,” procedural due process guarantees two 

things: “reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.” In re 

adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 16, 356 P.3d 1215. As we understand 

it, Laker’s contention is that he was not given fair “notice” that his 

failure to immediately consent to a chemical test would be 

considered a refusal under the law.6 We reject this argument 

5. Laker states that Holman “dealt specifically with the substantive 

Due Process rights of a driver” under the implied consent law. 

But, as the State points out, the issues raised by Laker implicate 

procedural due process, not substantive due process. This 

distinction is semantic here, however, because we reject Laker’s 

claim no matter the label used to describe it. 

Moreover, we note that the Holman court was addressing

potential confusion between the requirements of the implied 

consent statute and the rights enumerated under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Holman, 598 P.2d at 1332–33.

Following the Holman decision, officers now have at the ready an 

additional admonition that is given whenever a motorist attempts 

to invoke a right to an attorney following the refusal admonition.

But here, Laker did not attempt to invoke a right to an attorney, 

and therefore the concerns at issue in Holman are not implicated. 

6. We do not perceive Laker as asserting that he was not afforded 

an adequate opportunity to be heard. After all, Laker participated 

in two evidentiary hearings in this matter, one at the 

administrative level and another in the district court. We therefore 

do not further address any such argument. 
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20220557-CA 11 2023 UT App 125

largely because citizens are generally presumed to know what the 

law is, and because procedural due process principles generally 

do not require law enforcement officers to notify citizens of what 

the law is before taking action against them for violation of it. 

¶22 It is a “well-accepted maxim that ignorance of the law is no 

excuse.” State v. Stewart, 2019 UT 39, ¶ 37, 449 P.3d 59 (quotation 

simplified). While “due process places some limits on [the] 

exercise” of this general rule, see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 

228 (1957), our supreme court has noted that only in very limited 

situations are government officials required to explain the law to 

citizens, see Stewart, 2019 UT 39, ¶ 38 (identifying examples of 

such situations, including Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 

And these rare situations “are exceptions that prove the rule,” 

which is that “[u]nless and until the law expressly requires open 

announcement and express waiver, we presume an 

understanding of the existence of rights guaranteed by the 

constitution—and charge parties with the duty of asserting their 

rights, while imposing the consequence of forfeiture if they fail to 

do so at the time and in the manner required” under the law. Id.; 

see also, e.g., United States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir. 

2000) (stating that “due process does not require” that a person

have had “actual knowledge of” the requirements of a particular 

statute before being convicted of violating it); United States v. 

Coccia, 249 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D. Mass. 2003) (“[D]ue process does 

not require a defendant to have knowledge of the prohibitions 

embodied in [a] federal statute because ignorance of the law does 

not excuse criminal liability.”). 

¶23 Laker makes no effort, in his appellate briefs, to grapple 

with this general rule or to explain why, in this particular 

situation, he was entitled to a specific explanation of the meaning 

of the term “refusal.” After all, our law—in both statutes and case 

law—has for decades defined “refusal” as including anything 

other than an “immediate request” for a chemical test. See Utah 

Code § 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. Laker cites 
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no authority supporting his argument that he was constitutionally 

entitled to specific notice of what “refusal” means under the law, 

over and above the notices he already received regarding the 

law’s provisions that, if he refused Officer’s request to submit to 

a chemical test, there could be consequences.7

¶24 Finally, in connection with his due process argument, 

Laker again points to Officer’s “reasonable time” comment, and 

asserts that Officer’s incorrect statement of the law had a negative 

effect on his due process rights. But as already noted, even if we 

were to assume, for purposes of any discussion, that Laker should 

have been given a reasonable time within which to make his 

decision, the district court found—supported by substantial 

evidence—that he was given a reasonable time. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot see how Officer’s comment had any 

appreciable impact on Laker’s due process rights. 

CONCLUSION

¶25 The district court did not err in determining that Laker had 

refused Officer’s request for a chemical test. And the court’s 

7. The implied consent statute itself requires law enforcement 

officers to “warn” motorists that “refusal to submit” to a request 

for a chemical test may have negative consequences, including 

revocation of motorists’ driver licenses. See Utah Code § 41-6a520(2)(a). But neither that statute, nor any other of which we are 

aware, requires officers to further explain what “refusal” means. 

In our view, it may be a good idea to add language to the typical 

refusal admonition designed to make clear that anything other 

than an “immediate request” for a chemical test constitutes a 

“refusal.” We encourage law enforcement entities to consider 

such an addition. But for the reasons discussed herein, Laker has 

not demonstrated that any such addition is constitutionally or 

statutorily required. 
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finding, in the wake of Officer’s incorrect “reasonable time” 

statement, that Laker had been afforded a reasonable time to 

make his decision was supported by substantial evidence. Finally, 

Laker has not borne his appellate burden of demonstrating a 

violation of his constitutional due process rights. 

¶26 Affirmed.