MAJOR AUTOMATED 

INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS 

Selected Defense 

Programs Need to 

Implement Key 

Acquisition Practices 

Report to Congressional Addressees

March 2013 

GAO-13-311 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-311, a report to 

congressional addressees 

March 2013 

MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Selected Defense Programs Need to Implement Key 

Acquisition Practices

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2011, DOD allotted at least $5.6 

billion for designated MAIS programs, 

which are intended to help the 

department sustain its key operations. 

The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that 

GAO select and assess DOD MAIS 

programs annually through March 

2018. This report discusses the results 

of GAO’s first annual assessment. The 

act directed GAO to (1) describe the 

extent to which selected MAIS 

programs have stayed within planned 

cost and schedule estimates and met

performance targets, (2) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to 

manage risks, and (3) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS 

programs used key information 

technology acquisition best practices.

To do so, GAO selected 14 of the 48 

DOD MAIS programs based on several 

factors, including size of total life-cycle 

costs, and summarized the results of 

analyses of cost, schedule, and 

performance across the programs. 

Further, GAO selected 3 of the 14 

programs (one Army, one Air Force, 

and one Navy) and analyzed their risk 

management actions and assessed 

them against best practices for 

requirements management and project 

monitoring and control. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD direct the 

Army program to address weaknesses 

in its risk management and IV&V 

practices. DOD concurred with these 

two recommendations and provided 

additional information that removed the 

need for a third potential 

recommendation regarding leadership 

on the Air Force program.

What GAO Found

Of the 14 selected Department of Defense (DOD) major automated information 

system (MAIS) programs, 9 had stayed within their planned cost estimates, while 

5 did not (with cost increases ranging from 3 to 578 percent); 5 programs 

remained on schedule, while 9 experienced delays (ranging from 6 months to 10 

years); and 8 programs met their system performance targets, while 5 did not

fully meet their targets, and 1 did not have system performance data available.

Looking at these areas collectively, 3 programs stayed within their planned cost 

and schedule estimates and met their system performance targets, and 2 

programs experienced shortcomings in all of the areas—cost, schedule, and 

performance. 

The three selected programs demonstrated mixed results in effectively defining 

and managing risks of various levels. Specifically, Navy’s Consolidated Afloat 

Networks and Enterprise Services had implemented key practices for risk 

management, including identifying risks that could negatively affect work efforts.

In contrast, the Air Force’s Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management 

System’s risk reports were out of date and not regularly updated to include the 

current status of mitigation actions. To its credit, the program had recently taken 

steps to improve its risk management process, such as establishing a risk and 

issues working group. These recent steps should help the program effectively

identify and manage program risks going forward. Finally, Global Combat 

Support System-Army had developed program risks and mitigation plans, but the 

program was using multiple risk management systems that contained 

inconsistent data. Until the program establishes a risk management system that 

includes a comprehensive and up-to-date log of all current threats to the

program, it will lack assurance that it is appropriately mitigating all identified risks. 

The three selected programs demonstrated mixed progress in implementing key 

requirements management and project monitoring and control best practices. 

Specifically, the Navy and Army programs had implemented key requirements 

management best practices. However, while the Air Force program had also 

implemented selected practices, it had not traced all of its lower-level 

requirements to its desired higher-level system capabilities—which is 

inconsistent with requirements management best practices. Program officials 

stated that they expect this mapping to be completed by the fourth quarter of 

fiscal year 2013. Regarding project monitoring and control practices, the Navy 

program had implemented key best practices, while the Air Force and Army 

programs lacked certain practices. For example, while the Air Force program 

regularly communicated with its stakeholders, it had not ensured stable 

leadership—having four program managers in the past 4 years. DOD 

commented that it supports tenure agreements, with the first two program 

managers each completing 3-year terms. While the third and fourth program 

managers did not complete 3-year tenures, DOD stated that it expects the 

current program manager to do so. Further, while the Army program also met 

with stakeholders, it did not effectively use its independent verification and 

validation (IV&V) function to monitor its program. Until the Army program

specifies the roles and responsibilities of the IV&V agent to ensure that it 

maintains its independence from the risk management processes that it reviews, 

the program jeopardizes its ability to fully monitor and control the program.

View GAO-13-311. For more information, 

contact Valerie C. Melvin at (202) 512-6304 or 

melvinv@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Letter 1 

Background 4

Large Variations Exist among Selected Programs in Staying within 

Cost and Schedule Estimates and Meeting System Performance 

Targets 16

Selected Programs Demonstrated Mixed Results in Effectively 

Defining and Managing Risks of Various Levels 26

Selected Programs Showed Varied Progress in Applying IT 

Acquisition Best Practices 31

Conclusions 41

Recommendations for Executive Action 42

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47 

Appendix II Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 53 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 82 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables 

Table 1: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and Performance Results for 

the Selected Programs 17

Table 2: Changes in Selected Programs’ First APB Estimates and 

Latest Planned Total Life-cycle Cost Estimates 21

Table 3: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Slippages Compared to 

First APB Schedules 23

Table 4: Causes for Schedule Slippages Among Nine Selected 

Programs 24

Table 5: System Performance Problems among the Five Programs 26

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Figures 

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure 5

Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Management System Framework 7

Figure 3: Business Capability Life-cycle Acquisition Model 9

Abbreviations 

APB acquisition program baseline 

CAC2S Common Aviation Command and Control System 

CANES Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 

CMMI-ACQ Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

DCGS-N Distributed Common Ground System-Navy 

DEAMS Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System 

DOD Department of Defense 

ECSS Expeditionary Combat Support System 

FIRST Financial Information Resource System 

GCCS-A Global Command and Control System-Army 

GCSS-Army Global Combat Support System-Army 

GCSS-J Global Combat Support System-Joint 

IT information technology 

ITS Information Transport Services 

IV&V independent verification and validation 

MAIS major automated information system 

MPS Mission Planning Systems 

Navy ERP Navy Enterprise Resource Planning 

TMC Tactical Mission Command 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 28, 2013 

Congressional Addressees 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest and most 

complex organizations in the world. To meet its mission, it relies heavily 

on the use of information technology (IT). In this regard, according to 

DOD’s IT investment portfolio for fiscal year 2011, the department allotted 

approximately $36.6 billion for its IT investments.1

 Of this amount, at least 

$5.6 billion was allotted for major automated information system (MAIS) 

programs, which are intended to help the department sustain its key 

operations.2

DOD IT investments that fall within one of the following categories are 

designated as MAIS programs: (1) program costs in any single year 

exceed $32 million, (2) total program acquisition costs exceed $126 

million, or (3) total life-cycle costs exceed $378 million.3

 The Secretary of 

Defense can also use discretion to designate a program as a MAIS if it 

does not meet these cost thresholds. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that GAO select and assess DOD MAIS programs annually through 

March 2018.4

 Our objectives for this first assessment were to (1) describe 

the extent to which selected MAIS programs have stayed within planned 

cost and schedule estimates and met performance targets, (2) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to manage risks, and (3) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS programs have used key IT acquisition 

best practices. 

 

1

DOD’s IT investment portfolio identifies all of its IT investments and associated costs 

within the department and its components. 

2

The $5.6 billion represents the amount that DOD allotted in fiscal year 2011 for 42 of 48 

2011 MAIS programs. Budget information was not available for the remaining 6 programs. 

3

10 U.S.C. § 2445a(a). 

4

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1078 (2011) requires that we report on these assessments no later 

than March 30 of each year from 2013 through 2018. In November 2011, prior to the 

enactment of this law, the Chairman and former Ranking Member of the Senate Armed 

Services committee requested that we begin an assessment of DOD MAIS programs. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

To accomplish the first objective, we selected 14 of the 48 MAIS 

programs listed in DOD’s 2011 MAIS annual reports for evaluation, since 

these were the most recent reports available at the time we started this 

review.5

 To select these programs, we first identified programs that met 

several criteria, including those that had an acquisition program baseline 

(APB),6

 were not using firm fixed-price contracts for the majority of 

development work, had the largest planned total life-cycle costs, and 

represented multiple DOD components. This analysis resulted in a 

selection of 10 programs. Next, we selected two additional programs that 

had the largest planned total life-cycle costs and met all of the above 

selection criteria except they were using firm fixed-price contracts. The 

final two programs were selected based on the fact that they had been 

without APBs for the longest periods of time. 

To determine the extent to which each of the 14 programs had stayed 

within their planned cost and schedule estimates, we compared the cost 

and schedule estimates established in the first APB to the latest planned 

total life-cycle cost estimates (in then-year dollars) and schedule 

estimates.7

 In order to determine whether the programs experienced 

significant or critical deviations in their cost and schedule estimates, we 

compared any deviations to thresholds established by statute.8

Specifically, according to the statute, a program is considered to have 

undergone a “significant” change when it has (1) experienced a schedule 

 

5

The 14 MAIS programs included in our review were: Air Force’s Defense Enterprise 

Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) Increment 1, Expeditionary Combat 

Support System (ECSS) Increment 1, Financial Information Resource System (FIRST), 

Information Transport Services (ITS) Increment 1, and Mission Planning Systems (MPS) 

Increment 4; Army’s Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-Army); Global 

Command and Control System – Army (GCCS-A) Block 4; and Tactical Mission 

Command (TMC); Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) Global Combat Support 

System – Joint (GCSS-J) Increment 7 and Teleport Generation 3; and Navy’s Common 

Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) Increment 1, Consolidated Afloat 

Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES), Distributed Common Ground System – Navy 

(DCGS-N) Increment 1, and Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (Navy ERP). 

6

A program’s APB contains the life-cycle cost estimate, schedule estimate, and 

performance parameters that were approved for that program by the milestone decision 

authority. The first APB is established after the program has assessed the viability of 

various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the most appropriate 

technology solution that demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. 

7

An estimate in then-year dollars includes the effects of economic inflation. 

8

10 U.S.C. § 2445c. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

change that will cause a delay of more than 6 months but less than a 

year; (2) experienced an estimated development or full life-cycle cost 

increase of at least 15 percent, but less than 25 percent, over the original 

estimate; or (3) experienced a significant, adverse change in the 

expected performance of the system. A program is considered to have 

undergone a “critical” change” when it has (1) experienced a schedule 

change that will cause a delay of 1 year or more; (2) experienced an 

estimated development or full life-cycle cost increase of 25 percent or 

more over the original estimate; (3) failed to achieve a full deployment 

decision within 5 years after the milestone A decision for the program or, 

if there was no milestone A decision, the date when the preferred 

alternative was selected for the program; or (4) experienced a change in 

the expected performance of the system or major IT investment to be 

acquired under the program that will undermine the ability of the system 

to perform the functions anticipated.9

Additionally, to determine whether system performance targets were met, 

we analyzed each program’s system performance targets against actual 

performance data, and reviewed the results of operational assessments 

and program evaluations conducted on the systems. We then aggregated 

and summarized the results of our cost, schedule, and performance 

analyses across the 14 programs, as well as developed individual 

program profiles, which are presented in appendix II. 

To address the second objective, we selected 3 of the 14 programs from 

the first objective based on two criteria, including two programs that had 

the highest planned total life-cycle costs and one program that had been 

without a baseline for the longest period of time.10 To assess each 

program’s actions to manage risks, we identified key risk management 

practices from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity 

Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ), and assessed each of 

the three programs against these criteria. Specifically, for each of the 

three selected programs, we analyzed risk management documentation, 

such as risk logs and mitigation plans, to identify levels of risks and 

determine the status of each program’s key risks and the actions that 

were taken to manage these risks. Additionally, we interviewed program 

officials about the risks and risk management practices that they used. 

 

9

A milestone A decision authorizes acquisition of the program. 

10The three selected MAIS programs are CANES, DEAMS, and GCSS-Army. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

To address the third objective, we selected the same three programs as 

in objective two to determine the extent to which each program was 

implementing (1) requirements management and (2) project monitoring 

and control best practices, as defined by CMMI-ACQ. We also assessed 

these programs against key best practices for employing independent 

verification and validation (IV&V).11 To determine the extent to which each 

program’s acquisition practices were consistent with these best practices, 

we assessed program management and systems documentation, such as 

program requirements and program management reports. We also 

interviewed program officials to obtain additional information on each 

program’s IT management processes in these areas. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to March 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more 

detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

DOD is a massive and complex organization. It includes the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, 

numerous defense agencies and field activities, and various unified 

combatant commands that contribute to the oversight of DOD’s 

acquisition programs. Figure 1 presents a simplified depiction of DOD’s 

organizational structure. 

 

11GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its Independent Acquisition 

Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011). 

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure 

a

The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as the DOD Chief Management Officer, who has 

responsibilities, under statutes and department guidance, related to improving the efficiency and 

effectiveness of business operations. 

b

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesperson for the commanders of the 

combatant commands, particularly for the operational requirements of the commands. 

In support of its military operations, DOD performs an assortment of 

interrelated and interdependent business functions, such as logistics 

management, procurement, health care management, and financial 

management. As we have previously reported, the DOD systems 

environment that supports these business functions is overly complex and 

error prone, and is characterized by (1) little standardization across the 

department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the 

same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be 

entered manually into multiple systems.12 According to DOD’s IT 

investment portfolio, for fiscal year 2011, the department allotted 

approximately $36.6 billion to operate, maintain, and modernize its IT 

systems. We have designated DOD’s business systems modernization 

 

12GAO, Business Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve Institutional 

Approach, but Further Steps Needed, GAO-06-658 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006) and

DOD Financial Management: Implementation Weaknesses in Army and Air Force 

Business Systems Could Jeopardize DOD’s Auditability Goals, GAO-12-134 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012). 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

program as high risk for the past 17 years, due to challenges in 

modernizing the department’s business systems environment.13

Of the $36.6 billion allotted for DOD IT investments for fiscal year 2011, 

based on DOD’s IT investment portfolio, at least $5.6 billion was for MAIS 

programs. The MAIS programs include a range of systems, such as 

communications systems, business systems (e.g., logistics management 

and financial management systems), and command and control systems, 

which are intended to provide department and component officials with 

easy access to information to effectively organize, plan, direct, and 

monitor mission operations. 

MAIS programs must comply with one of two DOD acquisition 

frameworks. The first framework—referred to as the defense acquisition 

management system framework—was last updated in December 2008 

and applies to all DOD IT acquisition programs except business system 

modernization programs that exceed $1 million in total costs.14 The 

second framework—referred to as the business capability life-cycle 

acquisition model—was released in June 2011 and applies to all business 

system modernization programs with total costs exceeding $1 million.15

The business system modernization programs are required to use this 

framework instead of the defense acquisition management system 

framework in an effort to address challenges previously experienced 

when implementing business systems, such as implementing solutions 

without fully understanding business needs. 

The defense acquisition management system framework establishes the 

steps that programs should take as they plan, design, acquire, deploy, 

operate, and maintain their systems. Specifically, it consists of five program 

life-cycle phases and five related decision points, which are shown in figure 

2 and described following the figure. The milestone decision authority for 

programs that comply with this framework is either the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the DOD component 

head; a component acquisition executive; or when authorized, a designee. 

 

13GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011). 

14DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

15Directive-Type Memorandum 11-009, Acquisition Policy for Defense Business Systems 

(DBS) (June 23, 2011). 

DOD’s Acquisition 

Guidance for MAIS 

Programs 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Management System Framework 

 Materiel solution analysis: Refine the initial system solution 

(concept) and create a strategy for acquiring the solution. A decision 

is made at the end of this phase to authorize acquisition of the 

program—referred to as milestone A. 

 Technology development: Determine the appropriate set of 

technologies to be integrated into the system solution while 

simultaneously refining user requirements. A decision is made at the 

end of this phase to authorize product development based on welldefined technology and a reasonable system design plan—referred to 

as milestone B. An APB is first established at the milestone B decision 

point.16 A program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost 

estimate, schedule estimate, and performance parameters that were 

approved for that program by the milestone decision authority. The 

first APB is established after the program has assessed the viability of 

various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the 

most appropriate technology solution that demonstrates that it can 

meet users’ needs. 

 Engineering and manufacturing development: Develop a system 

and demonstrate through developer testing that the system can 

function in its target environment. A decision is made at the end of this 

phase to authorize entry of the system into the production and 

 

16An APB reflects the threshold and objective values for the minimum number of cost, 

schedule, and performance attributes that describe the program over its life cycle. 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

deployment phase or into limited deployment in support of operational 

testing—referred to as milestone C. 

 Production and deployment: Achieve an operational capability that 

satisfies the mission needs, as verified through independent 

operational test and evaluation, and to implement the system at all 

applicable locations. 

 Operations and support: Operationally sustain the system in the 

most cost-effective manner over its life cycle. 

In addition to the three milestone decision points included in this 

framework (milestones A, B, and C), the framework also includes two 

other decision points: (1) materiel development decision, which 

authorizes officials to conduct analyses to assess the potential solutions 

that can satisfy the program’s requirements, and (2) full deployment 

decision, which authorizes the system to be deployed to all remaining 

locations beyond limited fielding locations.17

In March 2009, the Defense Science Board reported that DOD’s 

acquisition process for IT systems was too long, ineffective, and did not 

accommodate the rapid evolution of IT.18 As such, the Board 

recommended that DOD develop new acquisition and requirements 

development processes for IT systems that would be agile, incremental, 

and allow requirements to be prioritized based on need and technical 

readiness. Subsequently, DOD developed a new framework—the 

business capability life-cycle acquisition model—that outlines the key 

steps that programs should take through the life cycle of acquisition of 

each major business system. This framework is intended to allow for 

more flexible acquisition processes that may be tailored to specific 

programs. Additionally, the framework is intended to address challenges 

that have previously impacted the delivery of IT business capabilities, 

such as programs lacking well-defined, strategically linked requirements, 

and transitioning too quickly from identifying a perceived business 

problem to implementing a specific solution. Specifically, this model 

 

17Limited fielding is the deployment of a capability to a limited number of users to test the 

capability in an operational environment. 

18Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 

Technology (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

consists of seven program life-cycle phases and five milestone decision 

points, as shown in figure 3. The milestone decision authority for 

programs that are required to comply with this framework can either be 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; the Deputy Chief Management Officer; the DOD Chief 

Information Officer; a component acquisition executive; or when 

authorized, a designee. 

Figure 3: Business Capability Life-cycle Acquisition Model 

Of these seven life-cycle phases, six are consistent with or similar to the 

five phases in the defense acquisition system framework (one of the 

phases in the defense acquisition system framework—production and 

deployment—corresponds to two phases in the business capability lifecycle model—limited fielding and full deployment). The seventh phase in 

the business capability life-cycle model is called business capability 

definition and occurs at the start of a program. The purpose of this phase 

is to analyze a perceived business problem or capability gap. This model 

also includes the five decision points included in the defense acquisition 

management framework—milestones A, B, and C, materiel development 

decision, and full deployment decision. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

In addition to adhering to one of two DOD acquisition frameworks, MAIS 

programs must also comply with annual and quarterly reporting 

requirements identified in statute.19 In this regard, each calendar year, 

DOD must submit to Congress a report on each MAIS program, including 

information on the cost, schedule, and performance of the program.20

Specifically, DOD must report, among other things, on each program’s 

development and implementation schedules and development and full 

life-cycle cost estimates; and provide a summary of the key performance 

parameters for each program. It must also provide a summary of any 

major changes for each MAIS program. 

Moreover, on a quarterly basis, the program manager for each MAIS 

program is required to provide the senior DOD official responsible for the 

program a report that identifies any variance in the program’s cost, 

schedule, or performance.21 Depending on the determination after 

reviewing the variance identified in the quarterly report, the senior DOD 

official must notify the congressional defense committees of any 

programs that have experienced either a significant or critical change, as 

described below: 

 Significant change. A significant change must be declared if the 

program has experienced a schedule delay of more than 6 months but 

less than a year; estimated costs for the program have increased by 

at least 15 percent, but less than 25 percent; or there has been a 

significant adverse change in the expected performance of the 

system. If such an event occurs, the senior DOD official must notify 

the congressional defense committees in writing no later than 45 days 

after receiving the quarterly report from the program manager. 

 Critical change. A critical change must be declared if the program 

failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years after the 

milestone A decision or, if there was no milestone A decision, the date 

when the preferred alternative was selected for the program; 

experienced a schedule delay of more than 1 year; experienced an 

estimated development or full life-cycle cost increase of 25 percent or 

more over the original estimate; or experienced a change in the 

 

1910 U.S.C. §§ 2445b and 2445c. 

2010 U.S.C. § 2445b. 

2110 U.S.C. § 2445c. 

Statutory Requirements for 

MAIS Programs 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

expected performance of the system that will undermine the ability of 

the system to perform as intended. If such an event occurs, the senior 

DOD official must carry out an evaluation of the program and submit a 

report to the congressional defense committees no later than 60 days 

after receiving the quarterly report from the program manager. 

For programs that declare a critical change, the evaluation must assess 

the projected cost and schedule for completing the program if current 

requirements are not modified; assess the projected cost and schedule 

for completing the program based on a reasonable modification of 

requirements; and assess the rough order of magnitude of the cost and 

schedule for any reasonable alternative system or capability. 

Entities such as the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon 

University have developed best practices to help guide organizations to 

effectively plan and manage their acquisitions of major IT systems, such 

as the MAIS programs.22 Our prior reviews have shown that proper 

implementation of such practices can significantly increase the likelihood 

of delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget.23

These practices include, but are not limited to: 

 Risk management: A process for anticipating problems and taking 

appropriate steps to mitigate risks and minimize their impact on 

program commitments. It involves identifying and documenting risks, 

categorizing them based on their estimated impact, prioritizing them, 

developing risk mitigation strategies, and tracking progress in 

executing the strategies. 

 Requirements management: Requirements establish what the 

system is to do, how well it is to do it, and how it is to interact with 

other systems. Effective management of requirements includes 

developing criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of requirements, 

 

22Software Engineering Institute, CMMI-ACQ, version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Penn., November 

2010). 

23See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Foundational Steps Being Taken to 

Make Needed FBI Systems Modernization Management Improvements, GAO-04-842 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004) and Information Technology: FBI Is Implementing Key 

Acquisition Methods on Its New Case Management System, but Related Agencywide 

Guidance Needs to Be Improved, GAO-08-1014 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2008). 

Best Practices for 

Managing IT Acquisition 

Programs 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

obtaining commitments to requirements, and controlling requirements 

changes over the course of the program. It also ensures that 

requirements are validated against user needs and that each 

requirement traces back to the business need and forward to its 

design and testing. 

 Project monitoring and control: Provides an understanding of the 

project’s progress, so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken 

if performance deviates from plans. Effective practices in this area 

include monitoring program performance against the program plan, 

monitoring stakeholder involvement throughout the life of the program, 

and managing corrective actions to closure. 

 Independent verification and validation: A process whereby 

organizations can reduce the risks inherent in system development 

and acquisition efforts by having a knowledgeable party who is 

independent of the developer determine that the system or product 

meets the users’ needs and fulfills its intended purpose. 

We have previously reported and made recommendations on DOD’s 

efforts to implement certain MAIS programs.24

 In July 2007, we reported that the Army lacked certain processes to 

support oversight of its modernization of selected business systems.25

For example, we noted that the Army did not have reliable processes, 

such as an IV&V function, to help support its oversight of the Global 

 

24GAO, DOD Financial Management: Implementation Weaknesses in Army and Air Force 

Business Systems Could Jeopardize DOD’s Auditability Goals, GAO-12-134 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight of 

Business System Modernization Efforts Needed, GAO-11-53 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 

2010); DOD Business Systems Modernization: Navy Implementing a Number of Key 

Management Controls on Enterprise Resource Planning System, but Improvements Still 

Needed, GAO-09-841 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2009); DOD Business Systems 

Modernization: Important Management Controls Being Implemented on Major Navy 

Program, but Improvements Needed in Key Areas, GAO-08-896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

8, 2008); DOD Business Transformation: Air Force’s Current Approach Increases Risk 

That Asset Visibility Goals and Transformation Priorities Will Not Be Achieved,

GAO-08-866 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2008); and DOD Business Transformation: Lack 

of an Integrated Strategy Puts the Army’s Asset Visibility System Investments at Risk,

GAO-07-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2007). 

25GAO-07-860. 

GAO Previously Reported 

on DOD’s Challenges in 

Implementing Certain 

MAIS Programs 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Combat Support System (GCSS-Army) program. As a result, we 

recommended that the department establish an IV&V function for 

GCSS-Army that reports to Army management outside of the program 

office. DOD agreed with this recommendation and, in August 2009, 

awarded a contract to carry out an IV&V function for the GCSS-Army 

program. 

 We also reported in August 2008 that the Air Force had not fully 

implemented best practices related to risk management and system 

testing for the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management 

System (DEAMS) and Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) 

programs.26 Specifically, we found that program risks were monitored, 

overseen, and managed independently by various groups or activities 

within each of the programs without adequate visibility at the program 

management level. Additionally, DEAMS program officials 

acknowledged that nonstandardized computer desktop configurations 

represented a potential risk for system testing because the system 

might function differently in operating environments that were not the 

same as those in which the system was tested. We recommended 

that the program offices for DEAMS and ECSS (1) ensure that risk 

management activities at all levels of the program are identified and 

communicated to program management to facilitate oversight and 

monitoring, and (2) test their systems on relevant computer desktop 

configurations prior to deployment at a given location. DOD concurred 

with the recommendations and both program offices took appropriate 

action to address these recommendations. 

 In September 2008, we reported that DOD had implemented key IT 

management controls on its Navy Enterprise Resource Planning 

(Navy ERP) program, but needed to make improvements in key 

areas.27 We recommended that the department, among other things, 

take action to (1) increase the quality of the program’s integrated 

master schedule, (2) improve the reliability of Navy ERP’s cost 

estimates, and (3) improve Navy ERP’s management of program 

risks. Further, in September 2009, we noted that the program still 

needed to improve key management controls.28 At that time, we 

 

26GAO-08-866. 

27GAO-08-896. 

28GAO-09-841. 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

recommended that the department take steps to (1) improve its 

change control process and (2) increase the value of the Navy ERP 

IV&V function. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations in 

both reports and took actions to implement the recommendations. 

 We also found that the cost and schedule estimates for DEAMS, 

ECSS, and GCSS-Army did not fully follow best practices for 

developing reliable cost and schedule estimates, as highlighted in our 

October 2010 report.29 As a result, we recommended that the ECSS 

and GCSS-Army program offices update their cost estimates to 

include best practices, such as using actual costs and preparing a 

sensitivity analysis. Further, we recommended that the DEAMS, 

ECSS, and GCSS-Army program offices develop integrated master 

schedules that fully incorporate best practices, such as capturing and 

sequencing all activities. In addition to these program-specific findings 

and recommendations, we reported that DOD lacked a 

comprehensive set of performance measures to assess these 

systems and their contributions to transforming business operations. 

We therefore recommended that DOD’s chief management officer and 

the chief management officers for each military department establish 

performance measures based on quantitative data that would enable 

the department to assess whether each respective military service’s 

modernization efforts are providing the intended business capabilities 

to the system users. DOD concurred with our recommendations and 

stated that it planned to take action to implement them, where 

applicable. Subsequently, the DEAMS program updated its integrated 

master schedule. A separate GAO review is ongoing to determine the 

reliability of this schedule. Additionally, at the end of 2012, the GCSSArmy program completed updating its integrated master schedule. In 

2013, we plan to conduct a study to, among other things, determine 

the reliability of this updated schedule. 

 In February 2012, we reported on deficiencies in the capabilities of 

ECSS, DEAMS, and GCSS-Army to perform essential functions as 

intended.30 We noted, among other things, that independent 

assessments of each system had identified operational problems with 

these systems. Accordingly, we recommended that the milestone 

decision authorities for these programs ensure that future system 

 

29GAO-11-53. 

30GAO-12-134. 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

deficiencies identified through independent assessments be resolved 

or mitigated prior to further deployment of the systems. DOD officials 

subsequently stated that the Air Force was aggressively working to 

resolve DEAMS’s deficiencies. Additionally, we reported that certain 

users of DEAMS were having difficulties in using the system to 

perform their day-to-day operations. Thus, we recommended that the 

Air Force establish time lines and monitor the status of the corrective 

actions to help ensure the issues identified by these users were 

resolved in a timely manner. DOD officials stated that they had also 

taken steps to address this recommendation, such as implementing 

oversight bodies to ensure all issues are identified and resolved or 

mitigated in a timely manner. 

 We also reported in October 2012 that DOD’s chief information officer 

rated DEAMS and GCSS-Army as low or moderately low risk on the 

Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard from July 2009 

through March 2012,31 even though we reported that both programs 

had experienced cost increases and schedule delays.32 As such, we 

recommended that DOD ensure that its chief information officer 

ratings reflect available investment performance assessments. DOD 

concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update 

its chief information officer ratings process to better report risk and 

improve timeliness and transparency. 

 

31GAO, Information Technology Dashboard: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency 

and Oversight of Investment Risk at Select Agencies, GAO-13-98 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

16, 2012). The IT Dashboard is a public website that provides detailed information on 

federal agencies’ major IT investments, including assessments of actual performance 

against cost and schedule targets. 

32GAO, DOD Financial Management: Reported Status of Department of Defense’s 

Enterprise Resource Planning Systems, GAO-12-565R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2012) 

and GAO-11-53. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Among the 14 MAIS programs selected for our study, there were large 

variations in the extent to which programs were staying within cost and 

schedule estimates and meeting system performance targets. Specifically, 9 

stayed within their planned cost estimates, while 5 did not; 5 programs 

remained on schedule, while 9 experienced delays; and 8 programs met 

their system performance targets, while 5 did not fully meet their targets and 

1 did not have system performance data available. When looking at the data 

collectively, 3 programs—Air Force’s Financial Information Resource System 

(FIRST), Information Transport Services (ITS) Increment 1, and the Defense 

Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) Global Combat Support System-Joint 

(GCSS-J) Increment 7—stayed within their planned cost and schedule 

estimates and met their system performance targets. Two of the 14 

programs—Navy ERP and Air Force’s ECSS—experienced shortcomings in 

all three of the areas—cost, schedule, and performance. Program profiles 

with cost, schedule, and system performance details on each of the selected 

programs are included in appendix II. Table 1 provides a summary of the 

cost, schedule, and performance results for the 14 selected programs. 

Large Variations Exist 

among Selected 

Programs in Staying 

within Cost and 

Schedule Estimates 

and Meeting System 

Performance Targets 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Table 1: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and Performance Results for the Selected Programs 

Component/ 

Program 

Stayed within 

planned cost 

estimate 

Exceeded 

planned 

cost 

estimate 

Stayed within 

planned 

schedule 

estimate 

Exceeded 

planned 

schedule 

estimate 

Met system 

performance 

targets 

Did not fully 

meet system 

performance 

targets 

Air Force 

DEAMS Increment 1   

ECSS Increment 1 a a 

FIRST   

ITS Increment 1   

Mission Planning Systems 

(MPS) Increment 4   

Army 

GCSS-Army   

Global Command and Control 

System – Army (GCCS-A) 

Block 4 

  

Tactical Mission Command 

(TMC)   

DISA 

GCSS-J Increment 7   

Teleport Generation 3b   

Navy 

Common Aviation Command 

and Control System (CAC2S) 

Increment 1 

  

Consolidated Afloat Networks 

and Enterprise Services 

(CANES) 

  c

Distributed Common Ground 

System – Navy (DCGS-N) 

Increment 1 

  

Navy ERP   

Total 9 5 5 9 8 5 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. 

a

ECSS had not established an APB. As such, we compared its latest cost and schedule estimates 

against its initial estimates. 

b

As of December 2012, Teleport Generation 3 was in the early stages of implementation and had not 

fully implemented any terminals; as such, there were no system performance data available. 

c

CANES conducted performance tests in a lab environment prior to milestone C. According to 

program officials, known limitations of the tests were documented and will be evaluated in 

subsequent testing prior to a full deployment decision. 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Nine of the 14 selected programs stayed within their planned total lifecycle cost estimates. Specifically, when comparing these programs’ latest 

total life-cycle cost estimates to their first APB estimates, 8 of these 9 

programs reduced their cost estimates and 1 remained consistent. 

 Six of the nine programs reduced their planned total life-cycle cost 

estimates due to lower than expected contract costs, implementation 

of new technology that cost less, program budget cuts, or transferring 

costs to another DOD program. For example, as of September 2012, 

the latest life-cycle cost estimate for Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 1 

program had decreased about 10 percent from its first APB estimate 

(from approximately $1.43 billion down to about $1.28 billion) due, in 

part, to lower than expected costs associated with software 

development. Additionally, as of November 2012, the latest life-cycle 

cost estimate for the Air Force’s ITS Increment 1 program had 

decreased about 10 percent (from approximately $3.8 billion down to 

about $3.4 billion). ITS officials attributed the decrease primarily to 

contractors’ proposals being about 40 percent lower than what the 

program office expected based on past proposals. Further, as of 

September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for DISA’s GCSS-J 

program had decreased about 17 percent from the program’s first 

APB estimate (from about $210 million down to approximately $173 

million) due to program budget cuts. Program officials stated that the 

program’s incremental development approach had enabled them to 

absorb the budget cuts because the approach allowed requirements 

to be reprioritized and developed based on available funding. 

 Two of the nine programs—the Air Force’s MPS Increment 4 and 

FIRST—experienced decreases in their planned total life-cycle cost 

estimates due to significant reductions in scope or functionality. For 

example, the planned total life-cycle costs for MPS decreased 53 

percent when the program terminated originally planned 

developments and upgrades for 10 of the 18 aircraft. According to 

program officials, this decision was made because the program was 

experiencing significant schedule slippages and the Air Force had 

other funding priorities. Additionally, the planned total life-cycle costs 

for FIRST decreased about 19 percent because only one legacy 

system was replaced, rather than the three that were originally 

planned. Specifically, program officials stated that a gap analysis 

conducted after the award of FIRST’s development contract revealed 

that the requirements baseline was missing key functions needed to 

replace the two additional legacy systems. 

Nine of the Selected 

Programs Stayed within 

Their Planned Total Lifecycle Cost Estimates, 

While the Remaining 

Five Did Not 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 Lastly, as of September 2012, the total life-cycle cost estimate for the 

Air Force’s DEAMS was consistent with its first APB estimate of $1.4 

billion, which was recently established in February 2012. However, it 

is important to note that the program spent approximately $334 million 

and took 9 years before it established its APB. In other words, the 

program had been underway for almost a decade before it had 

developed a robust estimate for how much the program was expected 

to ultimately cost. DEAMS officials attributed the delays in developing 

the APB, in part, to the complexity of reengineering business 

processes; evolving technical requirements; and designing, 

developing, and testing the software. 

Five of the 14 selected programs experienced increases in their planned 

total life-cycle cost estimates ranging from 3 to 578 percent. 

 The latest life-cycle cost estimate for the Navy’s CAC2S Increment 1 

program increased 578 percent from its first APB estimate of $347 

million in August 2000 to $2.4 billion as of September 2012. Program 

officials attributed the cost increase to the addition of new 

requirements for two additional Navy command and support centers, 

which also required the development of additional systems, and 

related costs that were added to the program in 2002. 

 The latest life-cycle cost estimate for Navy ERP increased about 31 

percent from the program’s first APB estimate of approximately $2.0 

billion in August 2004 to $2.6 billion as of September 2012. Program 

officials attributed this program’s cost increases to schedule slippages 

that occurred in September 2009 and August 2011, an increase in 

demand for on-site support and stabilization activities during system 

deployments, and the need to add requirements to support business 

process reengineering and improve financial management 

information. 

 The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of September 2012) for the 

Army’s TMC program had increased 6 percent from the program’s first 

APB estimate of about $1.97 billion in February 2008, to $2.1 billion. 

Program officials attributed the cost increase, in part, to several scope 

increases that the Army made, including the addition of new 

technology into the program baseline. 

 The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of September 2012) for DISA’s 

Teleport Generation 3 program increased nominally by 3 percent from 

its first APB of $563.7 million in September 2010 to about $581.2 

million. Teleport officials attributed this increase, in part, to a more 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

rigorous and accurate projection of operations and maintenance costs 

and a 3-year extension of the program’s planned operations and 

maintenance phase. 

 The fifth program that experienced an increase in its cost estimate 

was the Air Force’s ECSS.33 The program’s initial cost estimate from 

June 2005 (which was based on limited information about the 

program’s requirements and the viability of technologies available to 

meet the program’s needs) was $3 billion, while the program’s latest 

life-cycle cost estimate as of February 2011 (also based on limited 

program information) was about $3.2 billion—an approximately 7 

percent increase. In December 2012, the Air Force decided to cancel 

ECSS due to its significant schedule delays, poor system and 

contractor performance, and changing requirements. 

Table 2 provides a summary of the percent of cost increase or decrease 

from each selected program’s first APB estimates to their latest planned 

total life-cycle cost estimates. 

 

33ECSS had not established an APB. As such, the 7 percent represents the increase from 

the program’s initial estimate (as of June 2005) to its latest estimate (as of February 2011). 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Table 2: Changes in Selected Programs’ First APB Estimates and Latest Planned 

Total Life-cycle Cost Estimates 

Component Program 

Percent change in life-cycle cost 

estimate since first APB (%)

Air Force DEAMS Increment 1 0%

ECSS Increment 1  7a

 FIRST  19

ITS Increment 1  10

MPS Increment 4  53

Army GCSS-Army  1

GCCS-A Block 4  43

 TMC  6

DISA GCSS-J Increment 7  17

Teleport Generation 3  3

Navy CAC2S Increment 1  578

 CANES  7

DCGS-N Increment 1  10

 Navy ERP  31

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. 

a

ECSS had not established an APB. As such, the 7 percent represents the increase from the 

program’s initial estimate (as of June 2005) to its latest estimate (as of February 2011). 

The latest schedule estimates for 5 of the 14 selected programs remained 

consistent with each program’s respective first APB schedule estimates. 

Specifically, each of the key milestones established in the first APBs for 

the Air Force’s DEAMS, FIRST, and ITS; the Army’s TMC; and DISA’s 

GCSS-J had not changed when compared to the milestone dates in these 

programs’ latest schedules. For example, TMC’s latest schedule (as of 

September 2012) estimated that the program would be fully deployed in 

September 2018, which is consistent with the program’s first APB. While 

the DEAMS program had not experienced a schedule slippage from its 

first APB—recently established in February 2012—as previously 

mentioned, the program took almost 9 years to establish its first APB. 

Nine of the 14 selected programs had experienced slippages in their 

planned schedule estimates, ranging from a few months to 10 years. One 

of the 9 programs—CANES—had experienced a significant slippage in its 

schedule, with an 11-month delay in meeting its planned date to obtain 

approval to begin limited deployment of the system (referred to as 

Five of the Selected 

Programs Stayed within 

Their Schedule Estimates, 

While the Remaining Nine 

Experienced Schedule 

Slippages 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

milestone C). Six programs had experienced critical slippages of more 

than 1 year.34 For example, 

 CAC2S experienced a 10-year slippage in its full deployment date—

currently scheduled for September 2018. Program officials attributed 

this delay, in part, to the addition of new requirements in 2002 and 

problems with one of its contractors, which the CAC2S program office 

determined was unable to develop a solution that met the program’s 

requirements. 

 MPS experienced a 3-year slippage in its full deployment decision 

date—currently scheduled for May 2013. Program officials stated that 

the slippage was due, in part, to the complexity of developing, 

integrating, and testing mission planning capabilities. 

 Compared to its first APB schedule, GCSS-Army experienced a 10-

month slippage in its full deployment decision date—which occurred in 

December 2012. GCSS-Army officials attributed the slippage to the 

discovery of configuration problems related to scalability of the 

system, which resulted in the need to make design corrections. 

GCSS-Army also experienced a 2-year slippage in its full deployment 

date—currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017. 

Officials attributed this delay to a change in scope to include both 

tactical and installation warehouses to support DOD’s statutory 

requirement for auditability by fiscal year 2017. 

 Although ECSS had not established an APB schedule before it was 

canceled, the program had experienced multiple slippages compared 

to its initial schedule. For example, its planned date to obtain approval 

to begin development of the system (referred to as milestone B) had 

slipped 5 years—from the end of fiscal year 2007 to December 

2012—when the program was canceled. 

 

34Thresholds for significant and critical change designations were established in 10 U.S.C. 

§ 2445c. 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Table 3 provides a summary of the slippages experienced by the selected 

MAIS programs when compared to each program’s first APB. 

Table 3: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Slippages Compared to First APB 

Schedules 

Component Program 

Schedule slippage since first 

APB (slipped milestone) 

Air Force DEAMS Increment 1 None 

ECSS Increment 1 5 years (milestone B)a

 FIRST None 

ITS Increment 1 None 

MPS Increment 4 3 years (full deployment decision) 

Army GCSS-Army 2 years (full deployment) 

GCCS-A Block 4 3 years (full deployment) 

 TMC None 

DISA GCSS-J Increment 7 None 

Teleport Generation 3 6 months (full deployment decision) 

Navy CAC2S Increment 1 10 years (full deployment) 

CANES 11 months (milestone C) 

DCGS-N Increment 1 6 months (limited deployment 

decision) 

Navy ERP 2 years (full deployment) 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. 

a

ECSS did not establish an APB before it was canceled in December 2012. Therefore, the 5-year 

delay in achieving milestone B represents a comparison of the program’s initial schedule estimate to 

its latest estimate. 

As reflected in table 4, program officials attributed the schedule slippages 

for the nine programs to numerous causes, ranging from increased scope 

to contractor performance problems. 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Table 4: Causes for Schedule Slippages Among Nine Selected Programs 

Program 

Increased 

scope 

Unanticipated 

requirements 

or unplanned 

work 

Dependence 

on other 

DOD 

programs 

System 

performance 

problems 

Contractor 

performance 

problems 

Bid 

protest 

Underestimating 

software 

development 

complexity 

Delay in 

fiscal 

year 2011 

budget 

CAC2S 

Increment 1   

CANES  

DCGS-N 

Increment 1  

ECSS 

Increment 1   

GCCS-A Block 4   

GCSS-Army   

MPS Increment 4    

Navy ERP   

Teleport 

Generation 3  

Total 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. 

Further discussion of the specific causes for schedule slippages among 

the nine programs is included in appendix II. 

Eight of the 14 selected programs reported meeting their system 

performance targets. These programs were the Air Force’s FIRST and 

ITS; the Army’s GCCS-A, GCSS-Army, and TMC; DISA’s GCSS-J; and 

the Navy’s CAC2S and DCGS-N. For example, TMC reported that it met 

all three of its key performance parameters in fiscal year 2012, which 

include supporting net-centric military operations and displaying unified 

information on subject matters, such as friendly forces and enemy forces. 

Additionally, as of September 2012, the ITS program reported that it was 

meeting all four of its performance measures related to interoperability, 

availability, support, and reliability. In another example, in June 2012, the 

Army’s Test and Evaluation Command reported that GCSS-Army release 

1.1 was operationally effective, operationally suitable, and survivable 

against cyber threats. One program—Teleport—did not have system 

performance data available because, as of December 2012, the program 

was in the early stages of implementation and no terminals were fully 

implemented. 

Eight of the Selected 

Programs Reported 

Meeting System 

Performance Targets, 

While Five Did Not Fully 

Meet Targets, and One Did 

Not Have System 

Performance Data 

Available 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

On the other hand, 5 of the 14 selected programs reported experiencing 

system performance problems, which resulted in these systems not 

performing as intended and reducing the value of the systems. These 

performance problems included the existence of many defects in an 

operational system; not meeting system interoperability, maintainability, 

or processing time targets; and an inability to demonstrate that system 

requirements were met. For example, a 2010 operational assessment of 

DEAMS identified 350 must-fix deficiencies that impaired this system’s 

ability to perform essential functions at its deployed sites and diminished 

the system’s efficiency and effectiveness in accounting for business 

transactions and reporting reliable financial information. A follow-up 

operational assessment by the Air Force’s Test and Evaluation Center in 

2012 identified 210 new deficiencies in DEAMS and 15 repeat 

deficiencies from 2010. Also, as of October 2012, for DEAMS’s 38 

performance metrics, the program had identified 11 as needing attention 

and 12 that had significant concerns. 

Additionally, in 2011, operational testing of MPS by the Air Force’s Test 

and Evaluation Center identified significant system defects in one of the 

program’s aircraft developments and upgrades, which impaired MPS’s 

ability to perform certain system functions. Subsequently, the program 

developed patches intended to address many of the deficiencies. In 

November 2012, program officials stated that the Air Force’s Test and 

Evaluation Center was conducting operational tests to determine whether 

the previously identified deficiencies had been corrected. As of December 

2012, the results of these tests were not yet known. Additionally, in 

September 2010, a significant number of system deficiencies were 

identified in the Navy ERP system. As of December 2012, certain 

deficiencies had been resolved. However, Navy ERP officials reported 

that 560 system defects remained open and that the program was 

continuing to address those deficiencies. 

Further, in July 2012, performance tests that were conducted on CANES 

in a lab environment showed that 23 of 69 system requirements could not 

be fully demonstrated in the development model. According to the test 

report, these requirements were not fully met primarily due to: (1) 

constraints of testing in the laboratory environment, which could not 

simulate certain conditions required on vessels, such as wireless 

connectivity, which was not available in the lab due to security concerns; 

(2) testing on a development model, which did not represent the final 

production model; (3) a limited schedule—the test period was 343 hours, 

but the reliability threshold is 495 hours; and (4) testing with only two 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

hosted applications while CANES is expected to host many applications. 

Table 5 identifies the system performance problems for the five programs. 

Table 5: System Performance Problems among the Five Programs 

Types of performance problems 

Component Program System deficiencies 

Unmet system 

performance measures 

Certain system 

requirements not fully 

demonstrated 

Air Force DEAMS Increment 1   

ECSS Increment 1  

MPS Increment 4  

Navy CANES 

 Navy ERP   

Total 4 2 1 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. 

According to CMMI-ACQ, an effective risk management process identifies 

potential problems before they occur, so that risk-handling activities may 

be planned and invoked, as needed, across the life of the project in order 

to mitigate adverse impacts on achieving objectives. Specifically, key risk 

management practices include: 

 identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts; 

 evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority; 

 developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and 

 monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. 

Selected Programs 

Demonstrated Mixed 

Results in Effectively 

Defining and 

Managing Risks of 

Various Levels 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

The Navy had implemented these practices as part of its risk 

management for CANES. 

 Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The CANES program had identified risks, 

threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. In 

particular, as of November 2012, key risks as identified by the 

program office included: the possibility of uncovering significant 

integration issues during application integration testing due to 

insufficient testing time and test equipment, and the possibility of 

missing the full deployment decision date in December 2013 due to 

schedule slippage in testing. 

 Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its risks based on probability and impact. 

For example, the program reported that the first key risk above had a 

“medium” exposure rating (meaning it may cause some increase in 

cost, disruption of schedule, or degradation of performance) and that 

the second risk had a “high” exposure rating (meaning it is likely to 

cause a significant increase in cost, disruption of schedule, or 

degradation of performance). 

 Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. CANES had 

developed mitigation plans to proactively reduce the potential impact 

of risk occurrence. For example, risk mitigation plans for the two 

aforementioned key risks included extending the application 

integration testing work schedule to 6 days per week to provide more 

sufficient testing time and purchasing additional testing equipment to 

eliminate the need to reconfigure the test equipment after its initial 

usage; and working with the testing community to expedite test 

reporting time lines prior to full deployment decision. 

 Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. The program monitored its risks 

and documented the status of risk mitigation actions that had been 

taken, as well as new mitigation steps that had been developed since 

the prior month. For example, in May 2012, CANES had identified 

seven mitigation steps for one of its risks. In September 2012, the 

program had completed one of the mitigation steps and removed it 

from the mitigation plan. 

CANES 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

In taking these actions, the CANES program had established and utilized 

effective risk management practices. Doing so should better position the 

program to mitigate adverse impacts from potential problems before they 

occur. 

The Air Force had taken steps to implement certain risk management 

practices for DEAMS, but it had not periodically monitored the status of 

each risk and the program’s risk reports were out of date and had not 

been regularly updated to include the current status of actions taken to 

mitigate risks. However, the program office recently took steps to update 

its risks and associated mitigation plans. 

 Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The DEAMS program had identified risks, 

threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. 

However, the program’s risk reports were out of date, and risks and 

associated mitigation plans were not always assessed on a monthly 

basis. According to DEAMS program officials, in 2012 the program 

office diverted attention from other program management activities, 

including risk management, in order to fix a significant number of 

deficiencies identified during a 2010 operational assessment of the 

system. As a result, the program’s approach to managing and 

mitigating risks became reactive, rather than proactive. In May 2012, 

a new DEAMS program manager was hired and directed the program 

to revamp its approach to risk management. Specifically, program 

officials reassessed and validated the risks, and developed new plans 

for mitigating them—which was recently completed in December 

2012. Additionally, in September 2012, the program initiated a risk 

and issues working group that was to be responsible for approving 

and executing risk response plans. At the conclusion of our study, 

DEAMS provided its revalidated program risks and mitigation plans, 

as of December 2012. Collectively, these actions should help ensure 

that the program is properly identifying and managing its program 

risks. 

 Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its identified risks. However, as stated 

previously, these risks were out of date and the program had recently 

taken steps to reassess and validate its risks. 

DEAMS 
 

Page 29 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. The program had 

developed mitigation plans for its identified risks. However, as stated 

previously, these risks and mitigations plans were out of date, and the 

program had recently taken steps to develop new mitigation plans for 

its risks. 

 Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. As stated previously, as of 

November 2012, the program’s risks were out of date, and the 

program had recently taken steps to improve its risk management 

process, including reassessing and validating its risks. 

The Army also had implemented key risk management practices for 

GCSS-Army, but the program was using multiple risk management 

systems that contained inconsistent data. 

 Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The GCSS-Army program had identified risks, 

threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. 

However, the program lacked a centralized risk management system 

that maintained an up-to-date log of all current and relevant risks. 

Instead, the program’s key risk management entities—including the 

GCSS-Army government program office, Army Enterprise Systems 

Integration Program office,35 the system integrator contractor, and the 

IV&V contractor—each maintained separate risk management 

systems. Program officials stated that they only synchronize the risks 

from each of these sources on a quarterly basis. This approach was 

identified as problematic in September 2011 and again in October 

2012 by GCSS-Army’s IV&V contractor. Specifically, the contractor 

stated that the program’s risk management process included multiple 

sources for tracking and managing risk information, and that these 

sources did not exchange information with each other. For example, 

as of December 2012, one of the top GCSS-Army risks that was 

presented at the December 2012 Risk Management Board meeting 

was not included in the GCSS-Army government program office’s risk 

log that was provided to us. In discussing this omission, GCSS-Army 

 

35The Army Enterprise Systems Integration Program integrates business processes and 

systems for the Army’s logistics and financial ERP business systems, including GCSSArmy, the General Fund Enterprise Business System, and the Logistics Modernization 

Program. 

GCSS-Army 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

officials stated that this was an oversight by the program management 

office and that the risk should have been included in the government 

program office’s risk log. However, errors are more likely to occur 

when managing to multiple inconsistent risk management systems. 

GCSS-Army officials stated that they did not want to implement a risk 

management process that would use a single system to track risks 

because the government and system integrator have separately 

identified risks with sensitive information that they do not 

communicate with each other. However, managing to multiple sets of 

inconsistent risk data can be counterproductive and increases the 

likelihood that risks are not being appropriately mitigated. Until GCSSArmy establishes a risk management system which ensures that the 

program has at least one comprehensive risk log that maintains an 

aggregation of all up-to-date risks and associated mitigations plans, 

GCSS-Army will lack assurance that it is appropriately mitigating all 

program risks and avoiding the likelihood that those risks materialize 

into program issues. 

 Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

categorized and prioritized its risks. Specifically, GCSS-Army 

assessed the likelihood and consequence of its risks based on criteria 

defined in its risk management plan, and ranked these risks in order 

of priority. For example, in the system integrator’s September 2012 

risk log, 3 of the top 10 risks were categorized as high risk, 3 were 

categorized as medium risk, and 4 were categorized as low risk. 

 Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. GCSS-Army had 

developed and implemented risk mitigation plans for its risks. 

Specifically, the program office’s risk log, the Army Enterprise 

Systems Integration Program office’s risk log, and the system 

integrator’s risk log each outlined mitigation steps for their associated 

risks. 

 Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. In its monthly risk logs, the 

program documented the mitigation steps for each risk listed, the 

status of any actions taken to implement the steps, as well as any 

new mitigation steps developed since the prior month. However, as 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

stated earlier, the program lacked a centralized risk management 

system to maintain an up-to-date log of all current mitigation plans. 

CANES, DEAMS, and GCSS-Army demonstrated varied progress in 

implementing IT acquisition best practices for requirements management 

and project monitoring and control. Specifically, CANES and GCSS-Army 

were implementing requirements management best practices. However, 

while DEAMS was implementing many requirements management best 

practices, the program did not trace all of its lower-level requirements to 

its higher-level system capabilities. The program’s plan to map the 

remaining requirements by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 should 

help address this deficiency. Regarding project monitoring and control, 

CANES had implemented effective best practices in this area. However, 

while DEAMS and GCSS-Army had implemented selected project 

monitoring and control best practices, DEAMS had experienced frequent 

turnover in its program manager position and GCSS-Army was not 

appropriately using its IV&V contractor. Until DEAMS and GCSS-Army 

address the gaps in their acquisition management practices, these 

programs may be at risk of not meeting planned cost and schedule 

milestones, and may implement systems that do not fully meet user 

needs. 

Requirements management is the process for ensuring that the system 

requirements are traceable, verifiable, and controlled. Traceability refers 

to the ability to follow a requirement from origin to implementation and is 

critical to understanding the interconnections and dependencies among 

the individual requirements and the impact when a requirement is 

changed. According to CMMI-ACQ, key practices in managing 

requirements include: 

 establishing criteria for identifying appropriate requirements providers; 

 establishing objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements; 

 assessing the impact of requirements on existing commitments; 

Selected Programs 

Showed Varied 

Progress in Applying 

IT Acquisition Best 

Practices 

CANES and GCSS-Army 

Had Implemented the 

Requirements Management 

Best Practices; DEAMS 

Had Implemented Most of 

Them, and Had Plans to 

Address Requirements 

Mapping Deficiencies 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 reviewing project plans, activities, and work products to ensure that 

they are consistent with the defined requirements; and 

 ensuring traceability between the requirements and work products.36

The Navy had implemented CMMI best practices for managing CANES 

requirements. 

 Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. The program had established criteria for identifying 

appropriate requirements providers. Specifically, the program’s 

requirements management plan identified specific roles and 

responsibilities for the entities that were to identify and maintain 

requirements. 

 Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. CANES had established a checklist of criteria for 

evaluating and accepting new requirements. The checklist included, 

for example, specifications for how a requirement must be worded 

before it would be accepted. 

 Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments.

The program had assessed the impact of requirements on existing 

commitments. For example, the program had evaluated and 

documented how CANES’s costs, schedule, and performance might 

be impacted by changes to requirements. 

 Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements. The 

program reviewed project plans, activities, and work products to 

ensure that they were consistent with the defined requirements. For 

example, in May 2012, the program updated its plan for installing the 

CANES system on ships based on the program’s progress to date 

and vessel availability. 

 Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. The program maintained traceability between its 

requirements and work products. For example, the program had 

 

36CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.3 (November 2010). 

CANES 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

traced each requirement in its requirements traceability matrix to the 

program’s desired capabilities and technical baselines. 

As a result, the CANES program had established effective requirements 

management practices, which should increase the likelihood that the 

program delivers a system that contains functionality that meets users’ 

needs. 

While the Air Force had implemented a number of requirements 

management best practices for DEAMS, it did not maintain complete 

traceability of all of its requirements and work products. Program officials 

stated that they plan to complete the mapping of DEAMS’s outstanding 

requirements by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

 Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. DEAMS had established criteria for distinguishing 

appropriate requirements providers. Specifically, the program’s 

requirements management plan identified roles and responsibilities for 

the entities that were to identify and maintain requirements. 

 Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. DEAMS had established criteria for evaluating and 

accepting requirements. Specifically, prior to accepting a new 

requirement, program officials were expected to evaluate the 

requirement based on potential impacts to the business or operation, 

technical baseline, schedule, security, and finances. 

 Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments.

DEAMS assessed whether new requirements would impact existing 

commitments. For example, during a system requirements review, the 

system integrator determined that the program contained more 

requirements than originally planned, and that, as a result, the 

program may be challenged to meet the program’s schedule. 

 Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements. The 

program had reviewed its project plan and work products to ensure 

consistency with requirements. For example, the program’s system 

requirements document identified changes and additions made to the 

requirements. 

DEAMS 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. The program did not maintain complete traceability of all of 

its requirements and work products. Specifically, while the program 

had mapped each of its higher-level capabilities to its associated 

lower-level requirements, the program had not completed its mapping 

of each of its lower-level requirements to a higher-level capability. As 

such, the program was unable to ensure that all of the 1,998 

requirements that were included in the system during its technology 

demonstration would be included in the upcoming releases of the 

system. Program officials stated that they expect this mapping to be 

completed by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. The planned 

complete mapping of all of DEAMS’s lower-level requirements to its 

higher-level capabilities should help ensure that the system is 

deployed with all of the intended functionality. 

The Army had implemented requirements management best practices for 

the GCSS-Army program. 

 Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. GCSS-Army had established criteria for identifying 

appropriate requirements providers. Specifically, program officials 

identified criteria that specified five main sources of new 

requirements, including that the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

Financial Management and Comptroller is to provide financial 

management requirements. 

 Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. The program established criteria for the evaluation 

and acceptance of its requirements. For example, in evaluating and 

accepting new requirements, GCSS-Army’s Configuration Control 

Board reviewed change request documentation, which included, 

among other things, a description of the change, the reason for the 

change, and potential impacts (e.g., organizational, technical) to the 

program. 

 Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments. 

GCSS-Army assessed the impact of requirements on existing 

commitments. Specifically, requests to make changes to requirements 

included an impact analysis that identified how the change may 

impact existing commitments. 

 Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements. The 

program ensured that project plans and work products were 

GCSS-Army 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

consistent with requirements and changes made to them. For 

example, when GCSS-Army added new requirements to meet the 

mandate for auditability by fiscal year 2017, it extended its schedule to 

accommodate those requirements. 

 Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. GCSS-Army ensured traceability between its requirements 

and work products by tracing its approved requirements (capabilities) 

from the program’s Capability Production Document to the associated 

test procedures that were used to validate whether a developed 

capability performed as required. 

By taking these steps, the GCSS-Army program demonstrated that it had 

established essential requirements management practices, which should 

increase the likelihood of the program delivering a system that contains 

functionality that meets users’ needs. 

According to CMMI-ACQ, an effective project monitoring and control 

process provides oversight of the program’s performance, in order to 

allow appropriate corrective actions if actual performance deviates 

significantly from planned performance. Key activities in tracking the 

program’s performance include: 

 determining progress against the project plan, 

 communicating to stakeholders the status of assigned activities, 

 documenting significant deviations in performance, and 

 taking corrective actions to address issues when necessary.37

Additionally, as we have previously reported, the implementation of IV&V 

is a best practice for large and complex system development and 

acquisition programs, and can provide important information to help 

 

37CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.3 (November 2010). 

CANES Implemented 

Project Monitoring and 

Control Practices, While 

DEAMS and GCSS-Army 

Lacked Certain Practices 
 

Page 36 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

program officials monitor and control their programs.38 To be effective, 

IV&V activities should be performed by an entity that is independent of 

the management processes and products that are being reviewed. 

The Navy had implemented the key project monitoring and control 

practices for CANES. 

 Determine progress against the project plan. The program office 

regularly monitored progress of its prime contractor against the 

program schedule. For example, the program maintained an 

integrated master schedule and an integrated master plan to track 

progress against scheduled activities. 

 Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities. 

The program regularly communicated the status of assigned activities 

and work products to stakeholders. For instance, the program 

reported on its progress at weekly and monthly program office 

meetings that included, among others, the program manager, 

integrated product teams, contractor staff, and representatives from 

other program offices. 

 Document significant deviations in performance. The program 

had reported significant deviations from its project planning 

parameters. For instance, in August 2012, the program reported to 

Congress an 11-month deviation from its schedule for the start of its 

production and deployment phase. 

 Take corrective actions to address issues. CANES had taken 

corrective actions to address program issues. For example, in May 

2012, the program updated its plan for installing the CANES system 

on ships after program officials determined that the schedule did not 

align with ship availability. 

 Utilize an IV&V agent. The program used an IV&V agent to conduct 

operational testing to determine the viability of the system 

configuration. Program officials stated that they also planned to use 

 

38GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

Program Planning and Execution Improvements Needed, GAO-09-96 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 12, 2008) and Information Technology: Actions Needed to Fully Establish Program 

Management Capability for VA’s Financial and Logistics Initiative, GAO-10-40 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2009). 

CANES 
 

Page 37 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

an IV&V agent to conduct application integration testing in January 

2013 and to conduct the initial operational test and evaluation 

scheduled for the fall of 2013. 

As a result, CANES had established and utilized effective project 

monitoring and control practices, which should enable the program to 

maintain an understanding of the program’s progress. Doing so should 

better position the program to take appropriate corrective actions when 

program performance deviates significantly from planned performance. 

The Air Force had implemented selected practices for DEAMS’s project 

monitoring and control, but its ability to monitor progress against the 

project plan was limited because the program had not developed an 

integrated master schedule that was consistent with scheduling best 

practices, and the program had not appropriately managed corrective 

actions to closure. 

 Determine progress against the project plan. While DEAMS 

program officials were measuring progress against the program’s 

integrated master schedule, the program’s integrated master schedule 

was not reliable. Specifically, as we previously reported in October 

2010, the program’s integrated master schedule did not fully 

incorporate best practices, such as capturing all activities in the 

schedule.39 While the program recently developed an updated 

integrated master schedule, the extent to which it followed scheduling 

best practices was unclear. We currently have another study 

underway that is assessing the reliability of this updated integrated 

master schedule. 

 Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities.

The program regularly communicated the status of its assigned 

activities and work products to relevant stakeholders. For example, in 

June 2012, the program held a design review with key stakeholders, 

such as representatives from the DEAMS Financial Management 

Office; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; and the Program Executive Office, to 

review the preliminary design of the system that would be fielded 

during releases 1 and 2. 

 

39GAO-11-53. 

DEAMS 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 Document significant deviations in performance. The program 

took steps to document significant deviations in performance. For 

instance, in 2010, the program documented the significant schedule 

delays that DEAMS had experienced in a critical change report, 

because the program had not achieved a full deployment decision 

within 5 years of funds first being obligated in April 2005. 

 Take corrective actions to address issues. DEAMS did not take 

appropriate corrective actions to address issues. Specifically, in 2010, 

an early operational assessment of the system conducted by the Air 

Force identified 350 must-fix deficiencies in DEAMS. As a result, the 

system had a significant number of defects that required substantial 

manual intervention to keep the system working as intended at the 

two test sites at which it had been deployed, and there was high user 

dissatisfaction with the system. In February 2012, we recommended 

that the Air Force ensure that future system deficiencies identified 

through independent assessments were resolved or mitigated prior to 

further deployment of the systems.40 However, the program did not 

take appropriate corrective actions to address these issues. Although 

program officials stated that they had addressed all of these issues, 

the Air Force conducted a follow-up assessment from May to June 

2012 and found 210 new and 15 repeat “must-fix” deficiencies from 

2010. In September 2012, the program developed an action plan to 

address the deficiencies, and while the program had addressed 172 

deficiencies, the remaining 53 “must-fix” deficiencies had not been 

resolved by the time the Deputy Chief Management Officer authorized 

the deployment of DEAMS to a third test site. According to program 

officials, despite not addressing all of the deficiencies, they deployed 

to the third test site in order to test certain functionality and validate 

that the 172 deficiencies had been corrected. However, as 

demonstrated by the deployment of the system to the first two test 

sites which contained a substantial number of defects, the system did 

not perform as planned and resulted in high user dissatisfaction with 

the system. Implementing our prior recommendation to resolve or 

mitigate system deficiencies prior to future deployments should help 

ensure that the deployed system performs as it was intended. 

 Utilize an IV&V agent. The program had assigned an IV&V agent to 

assess topics of concern that were identified by the DEAMS program 

 

40GAO-12-134. 
 

Page 39 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

office. For example, in 2012, an IV&V assessment was conducted on 

the system’s configuration management and requirements 

management processes, and the IV&V contractor made several 

recommendations to improve these processes. As of August 2012, 

the program management office was taking steps to implement the 

recommendations. 

Additionally, our prior work has stressed the importance of stable 

leadership during times of organizational transformation. We have 

reported that productivity often decreases during an organizational 

change (such as turnover in the program manager position) because 

attention can become concentrated on critical and immediate integration 

issues and diverted from longer-term mission issues.41 However, DEAMS 

has not maintained consistent leadership in the program, which has 

compounded multiple problems—significant system deficiencies, 

outdated risk management processes, and taking almost 9 years to 

establish an acquisition program baseline. In particular, the program has 

had frequent turnover in the program manager position, with four different 

program managers in the past 4 years. Specifically, the tenures of 

DEAMS’ last four program managers were: (1) April 2007 to May 2010, 

(2) May 2010 to May 2011, (3) May 2011 to May 2012, and (4) May 2012 

to present (as of March 2013). 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Air Force 

supports tenure agreements for individuals in key leadership positions. In 

this regard, the department stated that the original program manager and 

his successor completed 3-year tenures. The department also offered an 

explanation as to why there had been such frequent turnover in the 

DEAMS program manager position—stating that the Air Force had, in one 

instance, used an interim manager until a new program manager could be 

assigned and, in another instance, had reassigned a program manager 

based on prevailing needs of the Air Force, prior to completion of his 

tenure. The department added that it expects the current DEAMS 

program manager to complete a 3-year term. 

Similar to DEAMS, the Army had implemented best practices for GCSSArmy project monitoring and control, but the program’s ability to monitor 

progress against the project plan was limited because it also had not 

 

41GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformation, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 

GCSS-Army 
 

Page 40 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

developed an integrated master schedule that was consistent with 

scheduling best practices, and it was not effectively using its IV&V 

function to properly monitor its program. 

 Determine progress against the project plan. While GCSS-Army 

program officials were measuring progress against the program’s 

integrated master schedule, we previously reported that the integrated 

master schedule was unreliable. Specifically, we reported in October 

2010 that the schedule did not fully incorporate scheduling best 

practices and recommended that the Army conform with best 

practices to improve the schedule.42 At the end of 2012, the program 

completed updating its integrated master schedule. In 2013, we plan 

to conduct a study to, among other things, determine the reliability of 

this updated schedule. 

 Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities.

GCSS-Army regularly communicated status on assigned activities and 

work products to stakeholders. Specifically, the program held weekly 

and monthly meetings with various stakeholders to review GCSSArmy’s progress and performance. 

 Document significant deviations in performance. The program 

documented significant deviations from project plans. For example, 

GCSS-Army reported a 10-month delay in its schedule for achieving 

full deployment decision, originally planned for February 2012. The 

program achieved full deployment decision in December 2012. 

 Take corrective actions to address issues. GCSS-Army took 

corrective actions to address its issues. For example, according to 

program officials, in the second quarter of fiscal year 2012, the 

program identified a configuration issue with the system and took 

steps to correct it; the issue was resolved in the fourth quarter of fiscal 

year 2012. 

 Utilize an IV&V agent. Although GCSS-Army had implemented an 

IV&V function to assist with monitoring and controlling the program, it 

was not using this function effectively because the IV&V contractor was 

not independent. Specifically, the contract for IV&V services was issued 

by the program office and, as such, the contractor reported directly to 

the program office. Although copies of the IV&V reports were provided 

 

42GAO-11-53. 
 

Page 41 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

to Army’s Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems in 

addition to the program office,43 the IV&V contractor was responsible 

for evaluating the performance of the same entity that awarded the 

contract. This introduced the potential risk that the contractor may not 

want to be overly critical in order to encourage the program office to 

continue to do business with it. Additionally, the IV&V contractor had 

been embedded within the program. Specifically, it was actively 

involved in identifying risks to the program, managing those risks, and 

managing risks identified by the system integrator—as opposed to 

acting as a third party to verify and validate risks that the program office 

and system integrator had identified and were managing. For example, 

the IV&V contract specifically stated that the contractor was to maintain, 

update, and manage the risk system that the program uses. In 

December 2012, in response to our concerns, GCSS-Army officials 

stated they plan to establish a new contract in early 2013 that will 

require the IV&V agent to report to DOD’s Program Executive Office 

Enterprise Information Systems, rather than the program office. While 

this action is a step in the right direction, the program had not yet 

articulated the specific roles and responsibilities of the IV&V agent in 

acting as a third party that validates and verifies the risks that the 

program office and system integrator identify. Until the program 

specifies the roles and responsibilities of the IV&V agent to ensure that 

it maintains its independence from the risk management processes that 

it reviews, the program jeopardizes its chances of getting the intended 

value of an IV&V function, thus hindering its ability to fully monitor and 

control the program. 

Three of the 14 selected programs stayed within their cost and schedule 

estimates and system performance targets, while 11 of the selected 

programs experienced cost increases, schedule slippages, and/or system 

performance problems. As such, these 11 programs were either costing 

more than planned, taking longer than planned to deliver, and/or had not 

performed as intended. 

 

43GCSS-Army is one of the program offices included in the Army’s Program Executive 

Office Enterprise Information Systems office, which is intended to enable information 

dominance by developing, acquiring, integrating, and deploying enterprisewide, networkcentric information management and communications to meet the Army’s current and 

future mission requirements. 

Conclusions 
 

Page 42 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

While a number of best practices for risk management, project monitoring 

and control, and requirements management have been implemented for 

the CANES, DEAMS, and GCSS-Army programs, DEAMS and GCSSArmy lacked certain key practices that were essential to appropriately 

managing program risks and effectively acquiring the systems. Specifically, 

with regard to GCSS-Army, the program’s lack of a risk management 

system that ensures the program has access to a comprehensive, up-todate log of all current and relevant risks and associated mitigation plans 

reduces assurances that GCSS-Army has appropriately mitigated all 

program risks. Further, until the program specifies the roles and 

responsibilities of the IV&V agent to ensure that it maintains its 

independence from the risk management processes that it reviews, the 

program jeopardizes its chances of getting the intended value of an IV&V 

function, thus hindering its ability to fully monitor and control the program. 

In addition, DOD (in commenting on our draft report) attributed frequent 

turnover in the DEAMS program manager position to the use of an interim 

program manager and to the reassignment of another program manager 

before completion of his tenure. The department stated, however, that the 

Air Force supports tenure agreements for individuals in key leadership 

positions. DOD’s tenure agreement and its stated intent to have the current 

DEAMS program manager complete a 3-year term should help to ensure 

more continuous leadership and overcome past performance problems. 

To better ensure that GCSS-Army implements effective risk management 

and project monitoring and control practices, we are recommending that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the 

GCSS-Army program office to take the following two actions: 

 establish a comprehensive risk log that maintains an aggregation of 

all up-to-date risks and associated mitigation plans, and 

 specify the roles and responsibilities of the IV&V agent to ensure that it 

acts as a third party that validates and verifies the risks and mitigation 

plans developed by the program office and system integrator. 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from DOD’s 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). The comments are reprinted 

in appendix III. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 43 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

In its comments, the department concurred with two of our three 

recommendations and partially concurred with one of our 

recommendations. Specifically, the department concurred with our 

recommendations that the GCSS-Army program establish a 

comprehensive risk log that maintains an aggregation of all up-to-date 

risks and associated mitigation plans, and that the program specify the 

roles and responsibilities of its IV&V agent to ensure that it acts as a third 

party that validates and verifies the risks and mitigation plans developed 

by the program office and system integrator. 

The department partially concurred with our recommendation to examine 

the causes for the frequent turnover in the DEAMS program manager 

position, and take steps to address the causes to prevent such frequent 

turnover in the future. In its comments, DOD provided an explanation for 

the turnover—stating that the turnover had, in one instance, resulted from 

the use of an interim program manager until a new program manager could 

be assigned and, in another instance, from the reassignment of a program 

manager based on prevailing needs of the Air Force. The department 

added that the Air Force supports tenure agreements for individuals in key 

leadership positions, and that the original program manager and his 

successor completed 3-year tenures. The department said it expects the 

current DEAMS program manager to complete a 3-year term. Having the 

program manager serve out his tenure will be critical to helping ensure the 

success of DEAMS; as such, our decision to make this recommendation 

was based on the fact that program officials did not previously provide an 

explanation for the frequent turnover in this position. The department’s 

explanation and its stated intent to have the current program manager in 

place for 3 years support our recommendation. Accordingly, we have 

revised our discussion of this matter, as appropriate, and we have removed 

the recommendation from the final report. 

In addition, we received technical comments via e-mail from a program 

analyst in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. 
 

Page 44 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on information discussed in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6304 or melvinv@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Valerie C. Melvin 

Director 

Information Management 

 and Technology Resources Issues
 

Page 45 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

List of Addressees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Coburn 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Dick Durbin 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John McCain 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 

Chairman 

The Honorable Adam Smith 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa 

Chairman 

The Honorable Elijah Cummings 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 
 

Page 46 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable Pete Visclosky 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 47 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that GAO select and assess Department of Defense (DOD) major 

automated information system (MAIS) programs annually through March 

2018.1

 This report is the first in our series of annual assessments. Our 

objectives were to (1) describe the extent to which selected MAIS 

programs have stayed within planned cost and schedule estimates and 

met performance targets, (2) assess selected MAIS programs’ actions to 

manage risks, and (3) assess the extent to which selected MAIS 

programs used key information technology (IT) acquisition best practices. 

To address the first objective, we established the following criteria for 

selecting a sample of the 48 DOD MAIS programs that were included in 

DOD’s 2011 MAIS annual reports: 

 at least 50 percent of the planned fiscal year 2011 budget was for new 

development; 

 a program baseline had been established; 

 the program had not been fully implemented or recently terminated; 

 the majority of development work was not being developed using firmfixed price contracts; 

 at least one enterprise resource planning system was included in our 

review;2

 at least two programs from each of the Departments of the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy, and the Defense Information Systems Agency were 

included in our review; and 

 the programs had the largest planned total life-cycle costs when 

factoring in the above criteria.3

 

1

Pub. L. No. 112-81 § 1078 (2011). 

2

An enterprise resource planning system is an automated system using commercial offthe-shelf software consisting of multiple, integrated functional modules that perform a 

variety of business-related tasks, such as general ledger accounting, payroll, and supply 

chain management. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 48 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Relying on these criteria, we made an initial selection of 10 programs. 

Next, we selected 2 additional programs that had the largest planned total 

life-cycle costs and met all of the above criteria except that they were 

using firm fixed-price contracts. The criterion we used to select the final 2 

programs was that they had to be without an acquisition program baseline 

(APB) for the longest periods of time. 

The 14 selected programs were: 

 the Air Force’s 

 Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System 

(DEAMS) Increment 1, 

 Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) Increment 1, 

 Financial Information Resource System, 

 Information Transport Services Increment 1, and 

 Mission Planning Systems Increment 4; 

 the Army’s 

 Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-Army), 

 Global Command and Control System – Army Block 4, and 

 Tactical Mission Command; 

 the Navy’s 

 Common Aviation Command and Control System Increment 1, 

 Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES), 

 Distributed Common Ground System – Navy Increment 1, and 

 

3

During the course of our review, the Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System 

(ECSS) Increment 1 program was terminated in December 2012.The number of MAIS 

programs dropped from 48 programs in 2011 to 42 in 2012, due to programs being fully 

deployed, reclassified, or terminated. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 49 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 Navy Enterprise Resource Planning; and 

 the Defense Information Systems Agency’s 

 Global Combat Support System – Joint Increment 7 and 

 Teleport Generation 3. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed and compared each selected 

program’s first APB cost estimate to the latest life-cycle estimate to 

determine the extent to which planned program costs had changed. Since 

the Air Force’s ECSS had not established an APB estimate, we compared 

its initial life-cycle cost estimate to its latest cost estimate. Similarly, to 

determine the extent to which these programs stayed within planned 

schedule estimates, we compared each program’s first APB schedule to 

the latest schedule. We relied on the thresholds established by statute to 

describe the amount of any deviation (i.e., significant or critical) that each 

program’s latest life-cycle cost and schedule estimates experienced from 

the first APB.4

To determine whether the selected programs met their performance 

targets, we compared program and system performance targets against 

actual performance data in test reports and program management 

briefings. We reviewed the results of operational assessments and 

program evaluations conducted on the systems. We also reviewed 

additional information on each program’s cost, schedule, and 

performance, including program documentation, such as DOD’s MAIS 

annual and quarterly reports; information from the Office of Management 

 

4

10 U.S.C. § 2445c(c), (d). With regard to schedule and cost deviations, a program is 

considered to have undergone a “significant” change when it has (1) experienced a 

schedule change that will cause a delay of more than 6 months but less than a year; (2) 

estimated its life-cycle costs to have increased by at least 15 percent, but less than 25 

percent, over the original estimate; or (3) experienced a significant, adverse change in the 

expected performance of the system. A program is considered to have undergone a 

“critical” change when it has (1) experienced a schedule change that will cause a delay of 

1 year or more; (2) estimated its life-cycle costs to have increased by 25 percent or more 

over the original estimate; (3) failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years 

after the milestone A decision for the program or, if there was no milestone A decision, the 

date when the preferred alternative is selected for the program; or (4) experienced a 

change in the expected performance of the system or major IT investment to be acquired 

under the program that will undermine the ability of the system to perform the functions 

anticipated. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 50 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

and Budget’s IT Dashboard;5 DOD’s fiscal year 2012 exhibit 300s;6 APBs; 

monthly status briefings; system test reports; and our prior reports. We 

also interviewed program officials from each of the selected MAIS 

programs to obtain additional information on cost, schedule, and 

performance. We provided our assessments to the program management 

offices of each selected program for comment. We aggregated and 

summarized the results of these analyses across the programs, as well 

as developed individual profiles for each program (see appendix II). 

To address the second and third objectives, we selected 3 of the 14 

programs included in the first objective for an in-depth review. 

Specifically, we selected the 2 programs that had the highest planned 

total life-cycle costs—CANES and GCSS-Army—and 1 program that had 

been without a baseline for the longest period of time—DEAMS. 

To address the second objective, we reviewed risk management 

documentation from the three selected programs and compared it to key 

risk management best practices identified in the Software Engineering 

Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMIACQ).7

 These key practices included: 

 identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts; 

 evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority; 

 developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and 

 

5

The Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard is a public website that provides 

detailed information on federal agencies’ major IT investments, including assessments of 

actual performance against cost and schedule targets. 

6

An exhibit 300 is also called the Capital Asset Plan and Business Case. It is used to 

justify resource requests for major IT investments and is intended to enable an agency to 

demonstrate to its own management, as well as to the Office of Management and Budget, 

that a major project is well planned. 

7

Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

(CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (November 2010). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 51 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implement the risk 

mitigation plan, as appropriate. 

Specifically, we analyzed program risk documentation, including monthly 

risk logs and reports, risk-level assignments, risk management plans, risk 

mitigation plans, and risk board meeting minutes. Additionally, we 

interviewed program officials to obtain additional information about their 

risks and risk management practices. 

To address the third objective, we analyzed each selected program’s IT 

acquisition documentation and compared it to certain key requirements 

management and project monitoring and control best practices—including 

CMMI-ACQ practices and independent verification and validation 

practices—to determine the extent to which the programs were 

implementing these practices.8

 In particular, the key requirements 

management best practices were: 

 establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements providers; 

 establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements; 

 assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments; 

 review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure that they 

are consistent with the defined requirements; and 

 ensure traceability between the requirements and work products. 

Additionally, the key project monitoring and control best practices were: 

 determine progress against the project plan, 

 communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities, 

 document significant deviations in performance, 

 take corrective actions to address issues when necessary, and 

 

8

CMMI-ACQ and GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its Independent 

Acquisition Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

 utilize an independent verification and validation agent. 

Specifically, we analyzed program management plans, acquisition 

strategies, concepts of operations, development contracts, milestone and 

baseline review documentation, independent verification and validation 

reports, significant and critical change documentation, system 

requirements documentation, requirements management plans, 

requirements change requests, system test and defect reports, and 

technical performance measures. Further, we interviewed program 

officials to obtain additional information on each program’s management 

processes in these key IT acquisition areas. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to March 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS 

Programs 

Page 53 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

This section contains profiles of the 14 selected MAIS programs. Each 

profile presents data on the program’s purpose and status, its latest cost 

and schedule estimates compared to the first APB for cost and schedule, 

as well as system performance data, where available. 

The first page of each two-page profile contains a description of the 

program’s purpose and a figure that provides a comparison of the 

program’s first APB schedule to the program’s latest schedule.1

 The first 

page also provides (1) essential program details, such as the name of the 

prime contractor, as well as the total number of contractors—which 

includes the prime contractor, as well as any other contractors (and in 

some cases subcontractors) supporting the program; (2) program costs, 

comparing the program’s latest life-cycle cost estimate (broken down into 

acquisition and operations and maintenance costs) to its first APB; (3) 

deployment details, such as the number of expected users and locations 

the system will be deployed to; and (4) a summary of the cost, schedule, 

and performance of each program, which is further discussed on the 

second page of the profile. 

The second page of each two-page profile provides detailed information 

on each program’s status, costs, schedule, and performance. In the 

status section, we discuss recent and upcoming milestones and events 

for each program. In the cost section, we identify the extent to which the 

program’s life-cycle cost estimate has changed from its first APB, as well 

as the causes for any changes identified. In the schedule section, we 

discuss the extent to which the program’s schedule has changed from its 

first APB, and the causes for any schedule changes identified. Finally, in 

the performance section, we identify the extent to which each program 

has met its established measures, as well as discuss the results of 

system performance tests. 

 

1

A program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost estimate, schedule estimate, 

and performance parameters that were approved for that program by the milestone 

decision authority. The first APB is established after the program has assessed the 

viability of various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the most 

appropriate technology solution that demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. 

Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS 

Programs 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 54 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) Increment 1

The Navy’s CAC2S is intended to be a scalable and flexible command, control, and communications system of 

systems that can be deployed via humvees, helicopters, airplanes, amphibious ships, and landing craft within 

24 hours of receiving a movement order, to effectively command, control, and coordinate aviation operations. It 

is intended to replace existing aviation command and control equipment from 12 legacy systems. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Navy 

Program owner: Program Executive Officer Land Systems 

(United States Marine Corps) 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics 

Total number of contractors: 5 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $84.1 million

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 220 of 1592 

Current number of total expected locations: 7 of 11 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 12 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $36.7 million 

Number of system interfaces: 9 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APBa 

(08/2000) 

Latest Estimateb

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $347.0 $2,352.9 

Acquisition 173.4 869.8 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

173.6 1,483.1 

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$453.2

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Exceeded planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 

a

The first APB estimate included the design, development, testing, and fielding of four systems to meet Tactical Air Operations Center requirements. b

The latest estimate included an increased program scope to design, develop, test, and field 70 systems to meet Tactical Air Operations Center, Direct 

Air Support Center, and Tactical Air Command Center requirements.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 55 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

CAC2S Increment 1 

Program Status 

CAC2S Increment 1 is being developed and deployed in two phases. In October 2011, a full deployment 

decision was made to authorize CAC2S to begin fielding the first phase, which program officials stated 

consisted of 20 of CAC2S’s 70 total systems. As of October 2012, program officials reported that these Phase 

1 systems had been fielded to 7 of its 11 locations. In September 2012, the program awarded its development 

contract for Phase 2 (which is expected to consist of the remaining 50 systems) and plans to work on 

developing the system until January 2015. Initial operational testing for Phase 2 is scheduled for the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

Exceeded Planned Cost Estimate 

CAC2S experienced a critical cost estimate increase due to a large scope increase. Specifically, as of 

September 2012, CAC2S’s life-cycle cost estimate was $2.35 billion, which was about a 578 percent increase 

from its first APB estimate, established in August 2000. Program officials attributed the increase in the cost 

estimate to the fact that the program’s first APB estimate only included the design, development, testing, and 

fielding of four systems to meet Tactical Air Operations Center requirements. However, subsequent to 

establishing the first baseline, the program’s scope was significantly increased to include Tactical Air 

Command Center and Direct Air Support Center requirements, as well as 66 additional systems. In March 

2009, the program underwent a critical change and restructure. Subsequent to the program restructuring, 

program officials reported that CAC2S operated under budget in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

CAC2S experienced a critical schedule slippage, but met its rebaselined milestones. Program officials expect 

Increment 1 to be fully deployed in September 2018, about 10 years behind its first APB schedule. Several 

factors led to this delay. Specifically, in addition to the requirements added to the scope, as discussed above, 

the program determined that one of its contractors was unable to develop a solution that met the program’s 

requirements. Program officials also determined that the program had insufficient contract controls (e.g., cost, 

schedule, and metrics) and risk controls in place and that the program office was understaffed. As a result, in 

March 2009, the program reported to Congress that it had experienced a critical schedule change and had 

restructured, as previously discussed. In November 2010, the program was rebaselined and, as of October 

2012, had met its rebaselined milestones to date. In this regard, Phase 1 fielding was on schedule and the 

Phase 2 development contract had been awarded in September 2012, with fielding expected to commence in 

fiscal year 2016. 

Met System Performance Targets 

The 2011 initial operational testing and the 2012 limited user evaluations determined that Phase 1 was 

operationally effective and suitable. Additionally, in June 2012, the program office reported that CAC2S was 

meeting the targets for its two key performance metrics related to supporting DOD’s integrated system 

architectures and displaying a common picture of real-time and non-real-time air operations data. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 56 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES)

The CANES program was designed to consolidate and standardize the Navy’s existing network infrastructures 

and services. This system is intended to, among other things, reduce and eliminate existing standalone afloat 

(i.e., surface ships and submarines) networks, provide a technology platform that can rapidly adjust to 

changing warfighting requirements, and reduce the hardware footprint on 259 afloat and maritime operations 

center platforms. 

a

This date represents the funds first obligated date. According to program officials, milestone A was not required because the CANES program is a 

network consolidation, modernization, and integration effort that has no new technology development. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Navy 

Program owner: Program Executive Office for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman 

Total number of contractors: 12 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $408.3 million

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of ~49,000 

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of 259 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 602 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $14.2 million 

Number of system interfaces: 6 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(10/2010) 

Latest Estimate

(10/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $12,740.9 $11,823.2 

Acquisition 3,977.2 4,050.6 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

8,763.7 7,772.6 

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$274.8

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate

» Did not fully meet system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 57 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

CANES 

Program Status 

In March 2010, the program began system development for CANES. The program completed operational 

testing in a lab environment in September 2012 and began its production and deployment phase with its first 

installation of CANES aboard a Fleet Destroyer in December 2012. Initial operational testing and evaluation 

performance tests are expected to be completed in October 2013. By December 2013, the Navy plans to 

decide on whether and how CANES will proceed into full production. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of October 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for CANES was approximately $11.8 billion, which 

represented about a 7 percent decrease from CANES’s first APB cost estimate (approximately $12.7 billion). 

Program officials reported that the decrease was primarily a result of (1) the Navy’s competition for the CANES 

prime contractor, which resulted in a lower than initially estimated cost for developing the CANES solution; and 

(2) the transfer of shipbuilding and conversion installation costs to other Navy programs. The officials projected 

that these actions will result in cost savings of $720.8 million (from fiscal years 2012 to 2018) and $166.2 

million, respectively. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

CANES had accelerated its full deployment date, but experienced a recent delay in an interim milestone. As of 

December 2012, the program estimated that CANES would be fully deployed by 2020, which was a 1-year 

acceleration from the program’s first APB estimate of 2021. Officials attributed the acceleration to reinvesting 

some of the cost savings from the procurement competition in order to increase the rate and number of 

installations aboard vessels. However, more recently, the planned start of the production and deployment 

phase was delayed by 11 months—from January 2012 to December 2012—which resulted in the program 

deferring network installations on three ships. Officials primarily attributed this delay to the fiscal year 2011 

continuing resolution, which delayed the program by 6 months, and to a protest of the Navy’s selection of the 

contractor for system development and demonstration, which delayed the program by approximately 1 month. 

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets 

Performance tests that were conducted in a lab environment in July 2012 showed that 23 of 69 CANES 

requirements could not be fully demonstrated in the development model. These requirements were not fully 

met primarily due to the following reasons: (1) constraints of testing in the laboratory environment, which could 

not simulate certain conditions required on vessels, such as wireless connectivity, which was not available in 

the lab due to security concerns; (2) testing on a development model, which did not represent the final 

production model; (3) limited schedule—test period was 343 hours, but the reliability threshold is 495 hours; 

and (4) testing with only two hosted applications, while CANES is expected to host many applications. The 

remaining 46 CANES requirements were fully demonstrated in the development model. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 58 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) Increment 1

The DEAMS Increment 1 program is intended to provide 60 percent of the Air Force with the entire spectrum of 

financial management capabilities, including collections; commitments and obligations; cost accounting; general 

ledger; funds control; receipts and acceptance; accounts payable and disbursement; billing; and financial reporting. 

DEAMS is also intended to be a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable financial statements 

by September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.1 

1

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1003(a) (2009) requires a plan that includes descriptions of actions and costs associated with ensuring that DOD financial 

statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. 

a

Prior to milestone B, the program was complying with the defense acquisition management system framework. Following milestone B in February 2012, 

the program began complying with the business capability life-cycle acquisition model. The program's revised acquisition strategy was also approved in 

February 2012. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force 

Program owner: Assistant Secretary for Financial 

Management and Comptroller 

Prime contractor: Accenture 

Total number of contractors: 24 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $119.5 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: at least 1,200 of 

18,400

Current number of total expected locations: 3 of 76 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 8 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $56 million 

Number of system interfaces: 84 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(02/2012) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,434.3 $1,434.3 

Acquisition 853.2 853.2 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

581.1 581.1 

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$369.9

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Stayed within planned schedule estimate 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 59 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

DEAMS Increment 1 

Program Status 

In July 2007 and May 2010, the Air Force began demonstrating certain DEAMS capabilities at two test 

locations: Scott Air Force Base and Defense Finance and Accounting Service Limestone, respectively. 

However, in May 2010, due to schedule delays (discussed below), the program underwent a critical change, 

which resulted in restructuring the development of DEAMS from two major releases to four. In February 2012, 

the program was restructured again to include six major releases that are to be deployed incrementally. 

Additionally, in February 2012, the program received approval to begin system development of release 1. In 

October 2012, it deployed release 1 to McConnell Air Force Base. The first release is scheduled to be fully 

deployed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of September 2012, the program had not experienced a cost estimate increase since its first APB, which 

was established in February 2012. However, the program spent approximately $334 million and 9 years (see 

below) before establishing its first APB and developing a robust estimate for how much DEAMS was expected 

to ultimately cost. 

Stayed within Planned Schedule Estimate 

DEAMS had not experienced a schedule slippage since establishing its first APB, but it experienced a critical 

delay in establishing this APB. Specifically, the program was initiated in 2003 and the first APB was 

established in February 2012. Thus, the program had been underway for almost a decade before it developed 

a robust estimate for how long it was going to take to develop and implement DEAMS. Program officials 

attributed the delay, in part, to the complexity of reengineering business processes; evolving technical 

requirements; and designing, developing, and testing the software. 

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

DEAMS had experienced many system performance defects and a majority of its performance measures 

needed attention or raised significant concerns. Specifically, in January 2011, Air Force’s Test and Evaluation 

Center reported, among other things, that 350 must-fix deficiencies existed in the system. In August 2012, the 

Air Force’s Test and Evaluation Center reported in its second operational assessment that 225 must-fix 

deficiencies existed in the system. Consequently, the Test and Evaluation Center recommended, among other 

things, that the program stabilize the system before proceeding further. In September 2012, program officials 

reported that they had resolved 172 of the 225 deficiencies, and as a result, the Deputy Chief Management 

Officer authorized DEAMS to be deployed at McConnell Air Force Base. Additionally, as of October 2012, for 

DEAMS’s 38 performance metrics, the program had rated 15 green (i.e., normal), 11 yellow (i.e., needs 

attention), and 12 red (i.e., significant concerns). 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 60 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Distributed Common Ground System – Navy (DCGS-N) Increment 1

DCGS-N Increment 1 is intended to provide integration of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

targeting support capabilities to the Navy’s commanders on vessels and ashore to increase their battlespace 

awareness. It is intended to merge three existing Navy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems 

into a single system. The program is being developed and deployed in two blocks—block 1 is intended to 

provide new hardware and software applications and decouple them from their existing computing 

environments, and block 2 is expected to move remaining applications to a new common computing 

environment for the Navy, which includes the CANES network. 

a

This date represents the funds first obligated date. The program entered the acquisition life-cycle at milestone C. b

This milestone includes the date provided in the updated baseline from April 2010. It was originally not specified in the first program baseline. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Navy 

Program owner: Program Executive Office for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems 

Total number of contractors: 3 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $26.6 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: Unknowna

Current number of total expected locations: 20 of 34 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 3 

Annual cost of legacy systems: The cost of one legacy 

system is $2.2 millionb

Number of system interfaces: 13 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(08/2009) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,434.3 $1,283.7 

Acquisition 432.2 385.8 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

1,002.1 897.9 

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$387.31

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 

a

Program officials did not provide the total population of possible users, but reported that the total number of expected workstations is 543. b

According to program officials, operations and sustainment costs of the remaining legacy systems were either not specified in program documentation 

or were not detailed enough to be provided.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 61 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

DCGS-N Increment 1 

Program Status 

According to program officials, DCGS-N Increment 1, block 1 hardware and software is currently being 

deployed to certain vessels that have been designated as early adopters. As of December 2012, 20 block 1 

systems were installed. In October 2012, the program initiated integration and testing efforts for block 2. 

Officials plan to reach a limited deployment decision for block 2 in April 2013 and operational testing for block 2 

is scheduled for completion in October 2014. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate was approximately $1.28 billion, which represented 

about a 10 percent decrease from the program’s first APB estimate of $1.43 billion. Program officials reported 

that key factors contributing to the cost estimate decrease were a reduction in program funding; greater 

knowledge about block 2, which reduced certain program risks; and lower-than-expected costs associated with 

software development. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

As of October 2012, DCGS-N Increment 1’s estimated full deployment date was November 2014, which 

represented a schedule slip of 5 months from the program’s first APB schedule. Additionally, the estimated 

limited deployment decision for block 2 was delayed 6 months—from October 2012 to April 2013. Program 

officials reported that this delay was attributed to DCGS-N’s block 2 dependency on the CANES network to 

operate—which had experienced delays (see CANES profile). Specifically, the fielding and testing plans for 

block 2 were closely tied to the deployment schedule for CANES. For example, according to program officials, 

the CANES network infrastructure needs to be available on a vessel before DCGS-N can begin the installation 

of block 2 applications on that vessel. The officials stated that, in April 2013, the program plans to decide if 

block 2 is ready to be deployed on a limited basis. 

Met System Performance Targets 

In December 2009, Navy reported after its initial operational test and evaluation that DCGS-N Increment 1, 

block 1 was operationally effective, operationally suitable, and ready for introduction into the Navy’s fleet. The 

report noted that the system met or exceeded all of the expected performance metrics. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 62 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) Increment 1

ECSS was intended to provide the Air Force with a single, integrated logistics system—including 

transportation, supply, maintenance and repair, engineering, and acquisition. ECSS was also intended to 

provide financial management and accounting functions. ECSS was to be a key component of the DOD plan 

for achieving fully-auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. However, the program was canceled in December 2012. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force 

Program owner: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 

Installation, and Mission Support Headquarters 

Prime contractor: Computer Sciences Corporationa

Total number of contractors: 12 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $187.9 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of 54,500 

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of 225 

Legacy systems that were to be replaced: 11 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $79.8 million 

Number of system interfaces: ~265 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

Initial Estimateb

(06/2005) 

Last Estimate

(02/2011) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $3,000 $3,197.3 

Acquisition 1,800 2,270.5 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

1,200 926.8 

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$1,029.1

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Exceeded planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets 

a

The contract with Computer Sciences Corporation was terminated in March 2012. 

b

The program, which was initiated about 9 years ago, never established an APB. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Milestone A

Milestone B

Critical

change

Critical

change

Program 

cancelled

Program

restructure

Milestone C

Initiation

Full 

deployment 

decision

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Actual schedule as of December 2012

Last reported schedule as of February 2011

Materiel solution analysis Technology development Engineering and manufacturing development Production and deployment

Actual Planned
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 63 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

ECSS Increment 1 

Program Status 

In December 2012, DOD canceled the ECSS program due to numerous problems. Specifically, in early 2009, 

the Air Force determined that it had underestimated the size and complexity of ECSS and restructured the 

program into four increments, with the first to include three pilot efforts. In October 2010, ECSS increment 1 

declared its first critical change because it had not reached a full deployment decision within 5 years from 

funds initially being obligated in August 2005. ECSS officials attributed this critical change to schedule delays 

(discussed below). After that critical change, increment 1 was restructured to include four pilots and the 

program increased the length of time for its system integrator to complete one of the initial pilots. In February 

2012, the program underwent its second critical change because it had not established an APB and had not 

begun the engineering and manufacturing development phase in April 2011, as planned. Program officials 

attributed this to contractor performance issues (discussed in the performance section below). During the 

second critical change, the Air Force determined that ECCS was no longer a viable option for meeting the 

statutory requirement for financial auditability by 2017, since the scope of the program continued to decrease 

while costs increased and the schedule slipped.1

Exceeded Planned Cost Estimate 

Prior to ECSS’s cancelation, the program’s cost estimate increased by 7 percent. As of February 2011, the 

reported life-cycle cost estimate was about $3.2 billion, which represented about a $200 million (approximately 

7 percent) increase from the program’s initial estimate of $3 billion. Program officials attributed the cost 

increase to schedule delays from the 2009 program restructure, two bid protests, and the refinement and 

addition of new requirements—such as financial and data requirements—into ECSS in 2008. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

ECSS experienced a critical schedule slippage. Specifically, prior to canceling the program, ECSS had 

experienced a 5-year slip in its planned date for achieving milestone B (authorizes a program to begin system 

development), which was initially scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. Similar to the cost 

overruns, ECSS officials attributed the 5-year slip to the 2009 program restructure, two bid protests, and 

contactor performance issues (discussed below). 

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets 

Poor system and contractor performance contributed to the cancelation of ECSS. Specifically, in April 2010, 

the Air Force’s Test and Evaluation Center reported that the initial pilot had a limited scope, which impacted its 

ability to determine whether ECSS was on track to deliver desired performance. Additionally, the Test and 

Evaluation Center’s interviews with subject matter experts and analysis of the limited data identified several 

system performance deficiencies, such as data quality issues. Moreover, program officials stated that, despite 

the extra time that the program office gave to the system integrator to fully develop and deploy one of the initial 

pilots, the system integrator was unable to complete the pilot. The contractor also was unable to meet the 

system performance requirements. As a result, in March 2012, the program terminated the system integrator’s 

contract, and, as stated above, subsequently canceled the entire program.

 

1

As of December 2012, the Air Force was in the process of developing a plan to modify its legacy systems in order to meet the 2017 

financial auditability requirement. Air Force officials expected the plan to be completed by February 2013. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 64 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Financial Information Resource System (FIRST) 

The Air Force’s FIRST maintains an inventory of the department’s force structure (i.e., organizations, weapons 

systems, and flying hours), and enables users to perform functions such as allocating aircraft vehicles and 

forecasting future aircraft attrition. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force 

Program Owner: Financial Management and Comptroller 

Prime contractors: Accenture Limited Liability Partnership and 

Lockheed Martina

Total number of contractors: 3 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $700,000 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 45 of 45

Current number of total expected locations: 2 of 2

Legacy system replaced: 1 

Annual cost of legacy system: $450,000 

Number of system interfaces: 3 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(03/2011) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $281.7 $227.0 

Acquisition 181.8 167.5 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

99.9 59.5

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$180.77

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Stayed within planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 

a

These were the primary contractors during software development. The system was fully developed and deployed by September 2011. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 65 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

FIRST 

Program Status 

In September 2011, the Air Force completed its deployment of FIRST and the system is currently in an 

operations and maintenance status. However, while the program was initially intended to replace three legacy 

systems, in July 2010, the Air Force decided to replace only one legacy system—the Program Data System.1

As a result, FIRST was not able to conduct budget formulation functions as originally intended. The system is 

currently scheduled to be retired in July 2013—less than 2 years after being fully deployed. DOD officials 

stated that the Air Force has decided to implement a new program that is intended to provide the remaining 

capabilities initially planned for FIRST.2

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

The program had experienced a cost estimate decrease due to reductions in scope and functionality. 

Specifically, as of September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate (about $227 million) was about $54.7 

million less than the program’s first APB estimate of $281.7 million (about a 19 percent decrease). This 

decrease is primarily due to: (1) a decrease in the scope of the program’s sustainment effort, since only one 

legacy system was replaced rather than the three that were originally planned (as discussed above); and (2) a 

reduction in the hardware required to maintain FIRST. 

Stayed within Planned Schedule Estimate 

The program did not experience schedule slippage against its first APB that was established in March 2011. 

Specifically, consistent with the program’s first acquisition baseline schedule, full deployment decision occurred 

in July 2011. 

Met System Performance Targets 

In March 2011, an operational test and evaluation determined that the system was operationally effective and 

operationally suitable, but identified limitations in information assurance and interoperability. In August 2012, 

FIRST officials stated that these limitations were addressed prior to full deployment in September 2011. 

 

1

Program Data System was a legacy system that managed the department’s force structure, flying hours, and attrition model 

capabilities. 

2

Program and Budget Enterprise Service is a software development effort intended to support the budget formulation and force 

programming process. Once deployed, this system is intended to result in the retirement of two legacy systems previously planned to 

be replaced by FIRST. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 66 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Global Combat Support System - Army (GCSS-Army) 

GCSS-Army is intended to provide all active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve tactical units worldwide 

with the capability to track supplies, spare parts, and organizational equipment. It is also to be used to track 

unit maintenance, total cost of ownership, and other financial transactions related to logistics for all Army units. 

Additionally, GCSS-Army is intended to be a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable 

financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010. GCSS-Army is to be fielded in two waves—the first is to include releases 1.0 and 1.1 of the system, 

and is to provide warehouse and finance capabilities; and the second wave is to include release 1.2, which is 

to provide property book and maintenance capabilities. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Army 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman 

Total number of contractors: 8 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $298.4 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 2,314 of 160,800 

Current number of total expected locations: 7 of 379 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 5 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $92 million 

Number of system interfaces: 127 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(10/2008) 

Latest Estimate

(10/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $3,968.9 $3,931.6 

Acquisition 1831.9 1,955.8 

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

2,137.0 1,975.9

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$1,138.1

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 67 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

GCSS-Army 

Program Status 

In December 2007, the program began testing release 1.0 of the GCSS-Army system with users at Fort Irwin, 

California. In August 2010, the program began conducting a limited user test of release 1.1 of the system at 

Fort Irwin. In August 2011, the program began operational testing of the system with users at Fort Irwin and at 

Fort Bliss, Texas. According to program officials, in November 2012, the program fielded release 1.1 of the 

system to five additional sites and continues to conduct validation testing at those sites. In December 2012, the 

program achieved full deployment decision, which allowed the program to deploy the system to all remaining 

locations. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of October 2012, GCSS-Army’s latest life-cycle cost estimate was about $3.93 billion, which was about a 1 

percent decrease from its first APB estimate of approximately $3.97 billion—established in October 2008. 

Program officials attributed this decrease, in part, to renegotiating the cost of the contract for fielding the 

system. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

As of September 2012, GCSS-Army had experienced a 2-year slip in its full deployment date when compared 

to its first APB schedule—from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017. 

Officials attributed this delay to a change in the program’s scope that was made to include both tactical and 

installation warehouses to support DOD’s statutory requirement for auditability by fiscal year 2017. More 

recently, the program had experienced a 10-month slip in achieving the full deployment decision that was 

originally planned for February 2012. In November 2012, the program reported this significant delay to the 

congressional Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. In doing so, program officials attributed the 

delay to the discovery of configuration problems related to the scalability of the system, which resulted in the 

need for design corrections. Program officials reported that the corrections have since been implemented. 

Met System Performance Targets 

Based on limited testing of 545 users (less than 1 percent of the 160,800 planned users at full deployment), in 

June 2012, Army’s Test and Evaluation Command reported that GCSS-Army release 1.1 was operationally 

effective, operationally suitable, and survivable against cyber threats. While it did not prevent the system from 

passing the evaluation test, the assessment report noted that the system did not reflect scaling for the 

projected number of users. According to program status documentation, during January 2012 through August 

2012, the system’s availability was 99.98 percent or greater each month. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 68 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Global Combat Support System – Joint (GCSS-J) Increment 7

The Defense Information Systems Agency’s GCSS-J is a system that utilizes web-based technology to support 

military logistics operations by providing military personnel with the information about supplies that they need 

to accomplish their missions. The system combines data, such as the location of a particular resource (e.g., 

fuel), from multiple systems and analyzes the data to provide information needed by logistics decision makers 

at the Combatant Commands to ensure the right personnel, equipment, supplies, and support are in the right 

place at the right time and in the correct quantities. 

a

According to program officials, the overall GCSS-J program was approved in September 1995 and Increment 7 was initiated at milestone B. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Defense Information Systems Agency 

Program owner: Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman 

Total number of contractors: 6 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $36.8 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 134 of 999 (or less) 

Current number of total expected locations: 7 of 7 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0

Annual cost of legacy systems: $0 

Number of system interfaces: 25 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(12/2007) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $209.6 $173.4 

Acquisition 148.4 125.4

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

61.2 48.0

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$127.6

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Stayed within planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 69 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

GCSS-J Increment 7 

Program Status 

In October 2008, GCSS-J Increment 7 entered the production and deployment phase. Since April 2010, the 

program has been developing and deploying increments of functionality (referred to as releases) approximately 

every 6 months. Its latest release (7.3.2) was deployed in October 2012, and provided capabilities such as the 

ability to view worldwide munitions inventory and trend charts for fuel levels. The program is currently 

developing capabilities for its final major release (7.4), which is intended to refresh the system infrastructure 

and enable users to customize their web-based view of various logistics data sources, thus allowing users 

more flexibility to display only the information relevant to their mission. Currently, GCSS-J is operating at seven 

Combatant Command locations. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate was approximately $173.4 million, which is about a 17 

percent decrease from GCSS-J Increment 7’s first APB estimate of $209.6 million—established in December 

2007. Program officials attribute the decrease to budget cuts that have reduced the number of engineering 

hours available to develop system capabilities. The officials stated that the total scope of the program has not 

changed because the program’s incremental development approach allowed the requirements to be 

reprioritized and developed based on available funding. 

Stayed within Planned Schedule Estimate 

As of September 2012, GCSS-J officials reported that it was on track to achieve Increment 7’s full deployment 

decision in March 2013, as planned. In addition, the program expects to reach full deployment in March 2014. 

Met System Performance Targets 

The program office reported that, as of March 2012, GCSS-J Increment 7 (through release 7.3.1) had fully met 

five of six key performance metrics, including system availability and responsiveness to asset data queries. 

The system had partially met its metric regarding responsiveness of joint decision support tools. According to 

program officials, full compliance with this metric was deemed inappropriate until GCSS-J and its counterpart 

GCSS systems within other military branches have achieved full operational capability.1

 In addition to its key 

performance metrics, program officials stated that user satisfaction with Increment 7 has improved since 

release 7.2. For example, most users were reported to be satisfied with the system’s mapping capability, which 

allows users to visualize where commodities are located and determine their status. 

 

1

Other GCSS systems include GCSS-Army and GCSS-Marine Corps. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 70 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Global Command and Control System – Army (GCCS-A) Block 4 

The Army’s GCCS-A Block 4 includes hardware and software products that are to provide command and 

control capabilities that support the Army and Joint Commander's need for a fused, real-time, true picture of 

the battlespace and the ability to command, control, and coordinate the information necessary to accomplish a 

mission within the battlespace. GCCS-A is to interface with various DOD systems to share operational 

information and data between strategic commanders and staff in combat areas. 

a

Milestone C was not included in the first APB schedule. The release of version 4.0 was included in both the first APB schedule and the latest schedule. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Army’s Strategic Mission Command 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin 

Total number of contractors: 19 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $25.4 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: Unknowna 

Current number of total expected locations: 91 of 116 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $0 

Number of system interfaces: 36 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(09/2003) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $837.8 $474.9 

Acquisition 462.5 365.5

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

375.3 109.4

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$353.9

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 

a

The program only tracks the number of hardware procurements, not the number of users. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 71 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

GCCS-A Block 4 

Program Status 

In October 2006, GCCS-A Block 4 released version 4.0—the first of four planned software releases. In October 

2008, the program began fielding the second release—4.1. The Army decided not to pursue the final two 

releases and to instead replace GCCS-A with a new DOD-wide command and control system, called NetEnabled Command Capability. However, in November 2009, Net-Enabled Command Capability was canceled 

due to challenges experienced in developing and managing requirements from the different military branches. 

Thus, the Army now plans to deliver the remaining desired functionally in another program. Currently, GCCS-A 

is maintaining version 4.1 and developing software patches, as necessary, as well as continuing to field 

GCCS-A hardware to users worldwide. Program officials expected to have Block 4 fully deployed by October 

2013. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for GCCS-A was $474.9 million, which is a 43 percent 

decrease from the program’s first APB estimate of $837.8 million. This decrease was primarily due to a 

reduction in the planned operations and maintenance costs, which program officials attributed, in part, to 

evolving technology changes that enabled the program to use a virtual operations and maintenance 

environment. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

GCCS-A had experienced a significant 3-year slippage in its full deployment date compared to its first 

complete APB schedule. Specifically, program officials planned to fully deploy the system by October 2010; 

however, as of September 2012, the program estimated that the system would be fully deployed in October 

2013. The project manager reported that this slip was due, in part, to the cancellation of Net-Enabled 

Command Capability, which required the Army to continue fielding GCCS-A beyond the originally identified 

units and continue maintaining version 4.1 longer than originally planned. Additionally, GCCS-A experienced 

over a 2-year slip in the release of version 4.0 and a nearly 4-year slip in the release of version 4.1, which 

program officials attributed to adhering to new Army requirements mandating that it align its schedule to other 

DOD command and control systems to ensure interoperability. 

Met System Performance Targets 

GCCS-A was meeting its system performance measures. In this regard, an Army facility tested the GCCS-A 

system in July 2011 and determined that it was performing as intended. Specifically, the system met its 

performance measures in areas such as system interoperability and information assurance compliance 

requirements. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 72 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Information Transport Services (ITS) - Increment 11

The Air Force’s ITS Increment 1 program is intended to provide the core network infrastructure, such as 

network cables and servers, for over 150 active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard bases. 

Specifically, the program is to update the fixed local area network and all necessary information transport 

infrastructure in order to support current and future communications needs of the Air Force and Joint 

Command warfighter. Prior to becoming a standalone MAIS program, these capabilities were originally 

planned to be provided by the Combat Information Transport System program, but in April 2009, this program 

was restructured into two smaller programs—ITS and Air Force Intranet.2 

1

In December 2012, program officials stated that the program’s name was changed to Base Information Transport Infrastructure. 

2

The Combat Information Transport System program portfolio was intended to provide the information infrastructure, network management, and network 

defense capabilities to meet the multimedia information transport needs of Air Force bases. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force 

Program owner: Commander, Air Force Space Command 

Prime contractor: Varies by installationa 

Total number of contractors: 9 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $32.5 million 

System Deployment Details (as of March 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 1,061,568 of 

1,239,132 

Current number of total expected locations: 139 of 178 

Legacy systems to be replaced: not applicableb

Annual cost of legacy systems: not applicableb

Number of system interfaces: not applicableb 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(11/2010) 

Latest Estimate

(11/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate 3,789.9 $3,399.5 

Acquisition 1,417.7 1,254.6

Operations and 

maintenance

2,372.2 2,144.9

Amount spent to date 

(as of November 2012)

$1,100

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Stayed within planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 

a

The program uses a multiple award contract that includes several contractors. For each installation, one contractor is selected to complete the 

infrastructure upgrades at that installation. 

b

This is a hardware replacement effort. Future installations have not yet been surveyed. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 73 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

ITS Increment 1 

Program Status 

In June 2010, funds were first obligated to ITS Increment 1. As of March 2013, program officials reported that 

the infrastructure upgrades had been completed at 139 of the 178 locations planned for Increment 1. The 

program was working on upgrading the infrastructure at 39 remaining locations. In December 2012, program 

officials stated that the program name had been changed to Base Information Transport Infrastructure. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

As of November 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for ITS Increment 1 was approximately $3.4 billion, 

which was about a 10 percent decrease from the program’s first APB estimate of about $3.8 billion in 

November 2010. ITS officials stated that the decrease in program costs was mainly due to contractors 

submitting proposals for the infrastructure upgrades at each installation that were approximately 40 percent 

lower than what the program office expected based on past proposals. However, in March 2013, program 

officials reported that hardware refresh cycles are projected to extend from 6 years to 10 years based on the 

current fiscal year 2013 funding levels. This is expected to result in increased sustainment costs for end-of-life 

equipment that will need to be maintained longer. ITS officials stated that they plan to work with Air Force 

officials to try to restore funding to the 6-year refresh cycle. 

Stayed within Planned Schedule Estimate 

As of November 2012, ITS Increment 1 had not experienced schedule slippages and ITS officials stated that 

they were on track to meet the September 2017 full deployment date. This date is consistent with the full 

deployment date identified in the program’s first APB estimate. In September 2012, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense reported that current funding levels may affect the program’s ability to meet the September 2017 

full deployment date. To mitigate this funding issue, program officials stated that the program office has 

changed its funding strategy to allow infrastructure upgrades to be completed using funding from 2 fiscal years, 

rather than 1. 

Met System Performance Targets 

As of September 2012, the program was meeting all four of its performance measures related to 

interoperability, availability, support, and reliability. For example, data transfer tests and router redundancy 

tests were performed and passed at locations prior to government acceptance. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 74 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Mission Planning Systems (MPS) Increment 4

The Air Force’s MPS Increment 4 program is a collection of individual programs that is intended to provide 

flight and weapons delivery planning. MPS Increment 4 is to migrate legacy mission planning aircraft 

capabilities to a collaborative, single multiservice system. This system is intended to support the development 

of detailed flight plans and improve effectiveness by enabling the exchange of threat, target, terrain, weather, 

and aircraft performance capability information between warfighters, aircrews, and operational planners. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force 

Program owner: Air Combat Command 

Prime contractor: not applicablea

Total number of contractors: 29 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $7.9 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 2,975 of 3,580 

Current number of total expected locations: 87 of 100 

Legacy system to be replaced: 1 

Annual cost of legacy system: $12.5 million 

Number of system interfaces: 26 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(07/2008) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $639.9 $303.8 

Acquisition 326.5 252.1

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

313.4 51.7

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$242

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Stayed within planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets 

a

The government has taken on the responsibility of managing each of the contractors that support the MPS program. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 75 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

MPS Increment 4 

Program Status 

In September 2009, due to schedule delays and other funding priorities (discussed below), MPS Increment 4 

was restructured and 9 of 18 planned developments and upgrades to aircraft were canceled. The program also 

changed from replacing three legacy systems, as originally planned, to replacing one legacy system. In 

February 2012, another planned development was canceled because of cuts to the program’s fiscal year 2013 

budget. As a result, the program’s scope was reduced to modernizing the mission planning capabilities on a 

total of eight aircraft. As of November 2012, the mission planning capabilities for six of the aircraft had been 

deployed and the capabilities for one of the aircraft were being tested. The design and development of the 

capabilities for the eighth aircraft are not expected to be complete until fiscal year 2014. 

Stayed within Planned Cost Estimate 

The planned life-cycle cost estimate for MPS Increment 4 had decreased due to scope and functionality 

reductions. Specifically, as of September 2012, the latest life-cycle cost estimate (about $303.8 million) was 

approximately 53 percent less than the program’s first APB cost estimate (about $639.9 million). Program 

officials reported that the decrease in costs was due to the termination of the planned development and 

upgrade activities for 10 of the 18 aircraft originally included in Increment 4, and a lower estimate for 

operations and maintenance costs because of this reduced scope.1

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

The program has experienced about a 3-year critical schedule slip in the planned date for full deployment 

decision. Program officials reported that schedule delays were due, in part, to the complexity of developing, 

integrating, and testing mission planning capabilities, and incorporating unplanned development work in order 

to integrate with the Air Force’s new operating system. The program also experienced schedule delays due to 

additional time needed to address system performance problems (discussed in detail below). The full 

deployment date for MPS Increment 4 had not yet been determined; program officials expected it to be 

established at the program’s full deployment decision review, currently scheduled for May 2013.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets 

In 2011, operational testing identified significant deficiencies with MPS Increment 4 capabilities for one of the 

aircraft. The program has since developed patches to address many of the deficiencies. In November 2012, 

program officials stated that the Air Force’s Test and Evaluation Center was conducting operational tests to 

determine whether the previously identified deficiencies had been corrected; however, as of December 2012, 

the results of these tests were not known. Operational tests that have been conducted on the mission 

capabilities for six other aircraft determined that these aircraft were operationally effective and suitable. 

 

1

Program officials also stated that certain capabilities that were terminated from MPS are now expected to be delivered in two other Air 

Force modernization programs that were initiated in April 2012—Air Mobility Command Transition and Mobility Air Forces Automated 

Flight Planning Service. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 76 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)

Navy ERP is intended to replace segregated legacy systems with a single integrated software system that 

provides an end-to-end supply chain solution for receiving, processing, and fulfilling requests for resources; 

integrated financial management; workforce management; inventory management; material operations; and 

rapid response to logistical needs of operating forces. 

a

According to program officials, the Navy ERP initiation date was August 2004, and the July 2003 initiation date reported in GAO-11-53 represented the 

date that the Navy ERP program received its acquisition category designation. b

According to program officials, the Navy ERP program was created on the convergence of four pilot programs, which resulted in accomplishing 

milestones A and B on the same date. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Navy 

Program owner: Chief of Naval Operations

Prime contractors: IBM, Deloitte, iLuMina Solutions, Herren 

Associates 

Total number of contractors: 28 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $136.4 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: ~72,000 of ~72,000 

Current number of total expected locations: 108 of 108 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 89 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $103 million 

Number of system interfaces: 48 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(08/2004) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,992.7 $2,601.5 

Acquisition 679.2 1,046.4

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

1,313.5 1,555.1

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$1,449.0

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Exceeded planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 77 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Navy ERP 

Program Status 

As of November 2012, program officials reported that Navy ERP had been fielded to all 108 locations and 

72,000 users. Its most recent deployments occurred in October 2012 to the Office of Naval Research and 

Strategic Systems Program. While the system has been fully fielded, the program has been working to stabilize 

the system (see performance discussion below) in order to achieve full deployment, planned for August 2013. 

Towards that end, officials stated that they were planning to begin the final operational test and evaluation of 

the supply solution management functionality in January 2013. 

Exceeded Planned Cost Estimate 

As of September 2012, the life-cycle cost estimate for the program was approximately $2.6 billion, which 

represented a cost increase of 31 percent from its first APB cost estimate of about $2.0 billion. In this regard, 

the program reported to Congress in August 2011 that it had experienced a significant change in its life-cycle 

cost estimate. Program officials attributed the life-cycle cost increases to schedule slippages, an increase in 

demand for on-site support and stabilization activities during system deployments, and adding requirements to 

support business process reengineering and improved financial management information. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Slippage 

Navy ERP is expected to be fully deployed in August 2013—more than 2 years behind its first APB estimate of 

June 2011. This delay is the result of several changes in the program, such as a September 2009 critical 

change to remove certain maintenance requirements from the program. Additionally, in August 2011, the 

program underwent a significant change in its schedule due to the identification of a substantial number of 

system deficiencies during supply solution initial testing, and, as a result, the program failed to achieve its full 

deployment decision in September 2010, as planned. Full deployment decision was later achieved in June 

2011. Program officials also attributed the delay to changes that were implemented based on lessons learned 

from an earlier deployment, including adding data conversion resources because the cleansing of legacy data 

required more effort than anticipated; and adding additional time for each deployment to reduce risk and fully 

support transitions. Additionally, final operational testing and evaluation were delayed from April 2012 to 

January 2013 due to the need for additional time to mitigate system deficiencies (see below). 

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets 

Navy ERP had partially met its system performance measures and substantial system deficiencies remained. 

Specifically, as of September 2012, program officials reported Navy ERP was meeting one of its two key 

performance metrics. In December 2012, program officials reported that the performance measure that it did 

not meet (related to processing time) may not be related to the Navy ERP system and that root causes would 

be further identified during the final operational testing and evaluation scheduled to begin in January 2013. In 

addition, while the program had been working to address a significant number of system deficiencies that were 

identified in September 2010, officials reported as of December 2012 that 560 system defects remained open. 

The officials stated that they continued to address those deficiencies and that the critical mission performance 

deficiencies were scheduled for mitigation by the second quarter of fiscal year 2013.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 78 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Tactical Mission Command (TMC)

TMC is a suite of products—including both hardware and software—that are intended to provide Army and joint 

community commanders and their staffs with improved battle command capabilities, such as real-time 

situational awareness and displays of unified information on subject matters, such as friendly forces and 

enemy forces (referred to as the common operational picture). TMC products have been fielded worldwide and 

are intended to support decisionmaking, planning, rehearsal, and execution management. One key 

component—known as Command Post of the Future—is to provide an executive-level decision support 

capability with real-time collaboration tools. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Project Manager Mission Command, 

Program Executive Office Command, Control, and 

Communications-Tactical 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics 

Total number of contractors: 193 

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $127.6 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 17,932 of 24,483 

Current number of total expected locations: 404 of 682 

Legacy system to be replaced: 0 

Annual cost of legacy system: not applicable 

Number of system interfaces: 32 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(02/2008) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,969.0 $2,095.3 

Acquisition 1,852.5 1,971.9

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

116.5 123.4

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$1,155.87

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Exceeded planned cost estimate 

» Exceeded within planned schedule estimate 

» Met system performance targets 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 79 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

TMC 

Program Status 

All of the products included in TMC are post development and in production. The program is currently working 

to sustain deployed versions of TMC hardware and software, as well as to develop new versions that are 

intended to add additional features, improve scalability, and enhance performance. Additionally, the program is 

currently fielding products to additional Army units and fielding a technical refresh to other required units. 

Exceeded Planned Cost Estimate 

TMC's planned total life-cycle cost estimate has increased by 6 percent from the program’s first APB estimate 

of approximately $1.97 billion. Specifically, as of September 2012, the life-cycle cost estimate was 

approximately $2.1 billion. Program officials reported that the increased costs were due, in part, to the impact 

of several scope increases that the Army made, including the addition of new Mission Command Collapse 

requirements into the TMC baseline, such as the development of an architecture that provides for global 

scalability of Command Post of the Future’s collaborative environment;1

 the implementation of previously 

deferred requirements; and the addition of a technology developed by the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Administration, called Personalized Assistant that Learns (which enables units to automate staff 

procedures and tasks). The program is in the process of updating its APB, but as of January 2013, program 

officials were uncertain when it would be approved. 

Stayed within Planned Schedule Estimate 

TMC is expected to be fully deployed in September 2018, which is consistent with the program’s first APB 

schedule estimate. In January 2009, the program received approval to fully field TMC’s Command Post of the 

Future product to the Army, which it achieved 1 year ahead of schedule. Program officials stated that this early 

fielding was a result of a new approach of releasing products on a more frequent basis. 

Met System Performance Targets 

TMC met all three of its key performance parameters in fiscal year 2012, including supporting net-centric 

military operations and displaying the common operational picture. While the program did not collect objective 

performance metrics to gauge the system’s reliability and operational effectiveness, program officials stated 

that use of the Command Post of the Future product in the battlefield since 2006 has served to demonstrate 

the operational effectiveness and reliability of the system. 

 

1

The Mission Command Collapse initiative is intended to consolidate the Army’s mission command systems into a single mission 

command solution with an open architecture that produces a collaborative framework for the full range of warfighting functions, such as 

conducting intelligence operations. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 80 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Teleport Generation 3

The Defense Information System Agency’s Teleport Generation 3 is intended to enable deployed forces that 

do not have ground-based communication systems to use various radio frequency satellite communications 

systems to interconnect with other forces and to access data, voice, and video communication services on the 

Defense Information Systems Network. Specifically, deployed forces worldwide are to be able to use various 

radio frequencies to connect to terminals that communicate with satellites to access the Defense Information 

Systems Network. 

Program Essentials (as of December 2012)

DOD component: Defense Information Systems Agency 

Program owner: Program Executive Office - Communications 

Prime contractors: (1) Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command and (2) Defense Communications and Army 

Transmission Systemsa

Total number of active contractors: 9

Fiscal year 2013 funding requested: $43.1 million 

System Deployment Details (as of December 2012)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of unknownb

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of 9 

Legacy system to be replaced: 1 

Annual cost of legacy system(s): Unknown 

Number of system interfaces: 5 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

First APB

(09/2010) 

Latest Estimate

(09/2012) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $563.7 $581.2 

Acquisition 262.5 255.6

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________ 

301.2 325.6

Amount spent to date 

(as of September 2012)

$113.6

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary 

» Exceeded planned cost estimate

» Exceeded planned schedule estimate 

» Unavailable system performance data

a

These are government entities. 

b

Defense Information Systems Agency officials indicated that the number of expected users of the Teleport system was unable to be determined. The 

system is intended to serve tactical users operating in every combatant command area of responsibility between 65 degrees North and 65 degrees 

South latitudes. 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 

Page 81 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Teleport Generation 3 

Program Status 

Teleport Generation 3 is to be implemented in three phases. In September 2010, the program received 

approval to begin procuring communication terminals for phase 1 and, in July 2012, the program began 

installing the first of the phase 1 terminals. Additionally, in June 2012, the program began preparations for 

installing the first of the phase 2 terminals; however, due to delays in the testing of these terminals (discussed 

in more detail below), program officials were uncertain when installation of the first phase 2 terminal would 

begin. The program planned to request approval for procuring and installing phase 3 suites in July 2013. 

Exceeded Planned Cost Estimate 

Teleport Generation 3’s planned total life-cycle cost estimate increased nominally by 3 percent from its first 

APB estimate in September 2010 of approximately $563.7 million. Specifically, the latest life-cycle cost 

estimate, as of September 2012, was approximately $581.2 million. Program officials attributed this increase, 

in part, to a more rigorous and accurate projection of operations and maintenance costs, a 3-year extension in 

the program’s planned operations and maintenance phase, and a change in the program’s schedule for 

purchasing and installing phase 2 terminals. 

Exceeded Planned Schedule Estimate 

The full deployment date for Teleport Generation 3 is not yet determined; it is expected to be set at the 

program’s full deployment decision review, scheduled for February 2015. The program has experienced a 6-

month slip in the planned date for full deployment decision compared to its first APB schedule, which was 

planned for August 2014. Teleport program officials attributed this slip to a delay in the testing of the phase 2 

terminals, which was the responsibility of an external program office in Army’s Product Manager Wideband 

Enterprise Satellite Systems organization. Officials reported that the testing delay affected delivery of the 

phase 2 terminals to Teleport sites. Additionally, the program experienced a 6-month slip in milestone C for 

phase 3 of the program—from January 2013 to July 2013. Program officials attributed this slip to Teleport’s 

dependency on another DOD program that was experiencing delays and was in the process of rebaselining its 

schedule. Program officials plan to align Teleport’s schedule with the other program’s new schedule once it is 

approved. 

Unavailable System Performance Data 

As of December 2012, Teleport Generation 3 was in the early stages of implementation and, as such, had not 

fully implemented any terminals. Thus, system performance data were not available. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 82 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 83 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 84 GAO-13-311 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Valerie C. Melvin at (202) 512-6304 or melvinv@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff also made key 

contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Rebecca 

Eyler; James Heisel; David Hong; Javier Irizarry; Emily Kuhn; John 

Ockay; and Madhav Panwar. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(310982)
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