United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60207

Sheaneter J. Bogan, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

MTD Consumer Group, Incorporated, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:14-CV-225

Before Jones, Haynes, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Sheaneter Bogan sued her former employer, MTD Consumer Group, 

alleging she was terminated because of her race and sex in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. A jury found 

in her favor but awarded her only $1 in nominal damages, and after the 

district court denied her requests for reinstatement and front pay, she 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 29, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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appealed. We affirmed the denial of front pay but remanded for 

reconsideration on reinstatement because we concluded that two of the 

reasons noted by the district court for denying reinstatement were invalid. 

We instructed the district court to eliminate those reasons from its analysis

and to reconsider the reinstatement claim accordingly.

On remand, the district court followed our instructions, reconsidered 

the permissible factors, and came to the same conclusion. Bogan appealed 

again. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

reinstatement based on the two considerations we found permissible in the 

first appeal. Nor did it abuse its discretion by denying Bogan’s request for 

another evidentiary hearing and additional discovery. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

I.

The facts of this dispute have already been detailed in our previous 

opinion in this case. See Bogan v. MTD Consumer Grp., Inc., 919 F.3d 332, 

335 (5th Cir. 2019). Suffice it to say that Bogan worked at MTD Consumer 

Group for nearly 20 years, pursued a degree in social work while working 

there, had disputes with her employer about her class and work schedules, 

and was eventually fired. Id.

A jury found that MTD “discriminated against [Bogan] on the basis 

of her race and/or gender” but awarded her only nominal damages of $1. Id. 

Bogan requested front pay and reinstatement. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) 

(Title VII provides relief for victims of unlawful employment discrimination, 

and the district court has discretion to order reinstatement “or any other 

equitable relief [it] deems appropriate.”). The district court denied her 

request for front pay because Bogan failed to mitigate her damages. Bogan v. 

MTD Consumer Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 4158623, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 

2017). It also denied her request for reinstatement based on four 

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considerations: (1) the low feasibility of returning Bogan to her previous 

position; (2) Bogan’s intent to change careers to social work; (3) MTD’s 

argument that it would have fired Bogan even in the absence of any alleged 

discrimination; and (4) sufficient discord between Bogan and MTD made 

reinstatement inappropriate. Id. at *5–6.

We affirmed the denial of front pay, finding no clear error in the 

district court’s conclusion that Bogan did not mitigate her damages because 

she failed to “use reasonable diligence to obtain ‘substantially equivalent 

employment.’” Bogan, 919 F.3d at 336. However, we found that the district 

court should not have considered two of the four factors it used to make its 

reinstatement determination. Id. at 339. While the first two factors 

“counsel[ed] against reinstatement,” as “Bogan’s position no longer 

‘exist[ed] as it did during her employment’” and she “intended to change 

careers to social work,” the final two did not. Id. at 337–38. The jury rejected 

MTD’s defense that it would have fired Bogan even without any alleged 

discrimination, making the third factor impermissible. Id. at 337. The district 

court also should not have relied on discord between the parties because it 

neither cited any “specific instances” nor found that the acrimony was so 

great as to “irreparably damage[]” the relationship. Id. at 339 (citing Walther 

v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992)).

We then vacated the denial of reinstatement and remanded to the 

district court “for further proceedings without suggesting how [it] should 

exercise its discretion based on the two factors that remain or other 

permissible considerations that [it] may find relevant.” Bogan, 919 F.3d at 

340.

The district court followed our instructions on remand. Bogan v. 

MTD Consumer Grp., 2020 WL 957414, at *1–4 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 2020). 

It acknowledged that the jury rejected MTD’s defense that it would have 

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terminated Bogan even without any discrimination and found that this factor 

“weighs in favor of reinstatement.” Id. at *3. It also found no “specific 

instances of discord” to support the denial of reinstatement.” Id.

Nevertheless, these considerations alone did not “support an 

alternate result, particularly in light of the other factors[,] which weigh 

heavily against reinstatement.” Id. After once again denying Bogan’s 

request for reinstatement, the district court reaffirmed its denial of front pay 

because Bogan failed to mitigate damages, noting that front pay is not 

“automatic” even when reinstatement is denied. Id. at *3–4. It “relied 

solely on the evidence presented at trial and heard through post-trial 

motions” and denied Bogan’s requests for another evidentiary hearing and 

additional discovery because they were “unnecessary.” Id. at *4.

Bogan appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion 

by denying reinstatement based on the first two factors and by refusing to 

hold another evidentiary hearing or to allow additional discovery.

II.

The exercise of a district court’s equitable power to award front pay 

or reinstatement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Deloach v. Delchamps, 

Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990). Both the decision whether to reopen 

the record and the denial of an evidentiary hearing are also subject to review

for abuse of discretion. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 

523, 551 (1983) (“On remand, the decision whether to reopen the record 

should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”); Brown v. Oil States 

Skagit Smatco, 664 F.3d 71, 80 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We review the district 

court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.”).

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A.

Reinstatement is the preferred equitable remedy under Title VII. 

Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir. 

1989). This court considers several factors when determining whether to 

award or deny reinstatement. See Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d 

474, 489 (5th Cir. 2007) (in reviewing a district court’s decision to award or 

deny reinstatement, we consider a number of factors, such as “whether 

positions now exist comparable to the plaintiff’s former position,” “whether 

reinstatement would require an employer to displace an existing employee,” 

“whether the plaintiff has changed careers,” and “whether animosity exists 

between the plaintiff and [the] former employer”). “[E]xcept under 

extraordinary circumstances. . . innocent incumbents may not be displaced.” 

Id.

Courts generally award front pay if reinstatement is not appropriate or 

possible, but denying one does not necessarily result in awarding the other. 

Id.; Hadley v. VAM P T S, 44 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Front pay is an 

equitable remedy that can be employed when reinstatement is not feasible.”);

Hansard, 865 F.2d at 1469–70 (instructing that if the district court “finds on 

remand that [Plaintiff] cannot be reinstated, the court must consider his 

failure to mitigate his damages in determining the extent to which, if at all, 

front pay is appropriate”) (emphasis added). In fact, this court has left open 

the possibility of denying both. In Hadley v. VAM P T S, we remanded to the 

district court for a reconsideration of its denial of front pay even though the 

district court also found reinstatement not feasible, leaving open the 

possibility that it would award neither. 44 F.3d at 374, 376–77 (remanding 

for reconsideration of front pay determination “[w]ithout expressing any 

opinion on how the court’s discretion should be exercised”). More recently, 

we affirmed a district court’s reduction of a successful plaintiff’s jury award, 

its award of only $1 in nominal damages, and its denial of both front pay and 

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reinstatement. Schaeffer v. Warren Cty., Miss., 744 F. App’x 871 (5th Cir. 

2018) (per curiam), aff’g, 2017 WL 5709640, at *1–7 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 27, 

2017). It may be “unusual,” as we noted in Bogan’s first appeal, to deny both 

front pay and reinstatement, as well as “meaningful retrospective” relief,

after a finding of discrimination, but it is not unheard of. Bogan, 919 F.3d at 

336.1

On appeal, Bogan contends that neither of the first two considerations 

support the district court’s denial of reinstatement. She claims that the 

“many changes” to her former position are not significant enough and that 

she did not successfully change careers to social work. Both claims are 

unavailing. 

We have already found that the district court properly determined 

that these two factors weigh against reinstatement. Id. at 337. Furthermore, 

as the district court noted, the record makes clear that these factors “weigh 

heavily against reinstatement.” Bogan, 2020 WL 957414, at *3. The position 

Bogan held no longer exists as it did when she worked at MTD, there have 

been substantial updates to the machine and process she worked on, and 

there is no room in MTD’s relevant departmental budget for additional 

employees. Reinstating Bogan would thus require displacing an innocent 

employee, which we disfavor except under “extraordinary circumstances.” 

Palasota, 499 F.3d at 489.

The district court also relied on ample evidence confirming, as we did 

in the first appeal, that Bogan’s intent to change careers to social work 

counsels against reinstatement. Though she had not yet found full-time 

1 Other circuits have also affirmed denials of both front pay and reinstatement 

under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Olivares v. Brentwood Indus., 822 F.3d 426, 430 (8th

Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of both front pay and reinstatement when only nominal 

damages were awarded and no comparable positions were available).

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employment in social work, she demonstrated a clear pursuit of this new path 

by, among others, obtaining her social work degree and applying for multiple 

positions in the field.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying both 

reinstatement and front pay here. See Schaeffer, 744 F. App’x at 871; Hadley, 

44 F.3d at 376–77.

B.

“The mandate rule requires a district court on remand to effect our 

mandate and to do nothing else.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 

500 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2007). We remanded to the district court “for 

further proceedings without suggesting how [it] should exercise its discretion

based on the two factors that remain or other permissible considerations that 

[it] may find relevant.” Bogan, 919 F.3d at 340. Our only instruction was to 

reconsider its reinstatement determination “with two fewer factors on the 

‘no reinstatement’ side of the scale.” Id.

The district court did exactly that. Bogan insists that the district court 

should have allowed for additional discovery or held another evidentiary 

hearing at which she could present evidence of her willingness to accept a 

lower-paying role at MTD. She reminds us that a district court “may not 

disregard the explicit directives of [the appellate] court.” In re Abbott, 

956 F.3d 696, 710 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Matthews, 

312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002)).

But we did not instruct the district court to reopen discovery or hold 

additional evidentiary hearings. In fact, we were silent on the matter and 

declined to suggest how the district court should proceed. The district court 

did as we instructed and explained why the first two factors were sufficient 

to deny Bogan’s reinstatement, even without the remaining factors. Bogan, 

2020 WL 957414, at *2–3. Far from abusing its discretion or disregarding 

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our directive, the district court followed our instructions and acted within its 

discretion to decline to reopen the record or hold another evidentiary 

hearing.

* * *

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

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