## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C O R P U S C H R IS T I - 

## EDI NBURG

No. 13-10 -001 25-CV DA NIEL C A BA LL ERO , F OX T REE &L A ND SCA PE N U R SE RY, IN C ., M ON IK A P A GE , B IZ M A

T C H , I N C ., BIZM A TCH B USINE SS SO LUTIONS, INC., A ND BIZ M A TC H COMM ERC IA L BR OKE RA GE, L LC , A pp ellan ts,
v . DON NIE B. CON TR ERAS A ND PIC LID IX, IN C., A pp ellees .

On a p p ea l f ro m th e C o u n ty C o u rta t L aw N o . 4 of N ue ces Co un ty , T exas . No. 13-10 -001 50-CV IN R E D A N C A B A L L ER O, F OX T R EE &L A N D SC A PE N U R SE RY, IN C ., M ONIK A PA GE, B IZM A

TC H, INC ., BIZ M A

TC H BU SINE SS S OLU TION S, INC. , A ND BIZM A

TCH C OM M ERCIA L BROKERA GE, LLC
On Petit ion fo r Writ of M an da mus . 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON2 

### B efo re J u st ic es Y añ ez , R o d rig u ez , a n d G arza M emo rand um Opin ion b y Ju stice R od rigu ez By t h i s c o mb i n e d a p p e a l a n d o r i g i n a l p ro c e e d i n g , D a n i e l C a b a l l e ro , FoxTree & Lands cape Nurser

y , I nc. , M oni ka Pag e, Bi z match, Inc ., Bi z match Busi ness Sol uti ons, Inc ., and Bi z match Commercia l Br o kerag e, LL C (c oll ect iv ely “ appel lan ts” ), se ek to v acat e an order deny ing thei r moti on to co mpel ar bit ra ti on i n a commer ci al dis pute ov er the sal e of a bus ine ss
. W e deny

the peti ti on for

w ri t of m andamus, rev erse the t ri al cour t’ s o rd er , and
re mand the ca se for furt her proceed ing s c onsi ste nt w it h thi s o pin ion

. I. B A CKGRO UND Fox Tree & L andsc ape N urser y ( “F ox ”) , ow ned by

D ani el Cab all ero, ow ns and ope ra t e s nurseries at se v eral dif feren t locatio ns in Corpus Christi, T exas. Caballero d e c id e d to sell the lan d an d bu siness atone of these location s, 142 09 North w est Bou levard, so he reta ined the services of Biz ma tch, In c. (“Biz ma tch”), a busin ess broke r, to l ocat e prospec ti v e purchas ers for the lan d a n d b u sin e ss at that loc ati on. Don nie B. Contre ras, the principal an d owner of Piclidix , Inc. (“ Piclidix ”) w as w orking w ith Bizmatch to find a s uit abl e i nv est ment. Pi cl idi x ul ti matel y

purchas ed th e l and and bus ine ss at 14209 No rt h we s tB o u le va rd f ro m Fo x. Piclidix ma de a cash dow n payme nt of $12 5,0 00. T he remain der of th e pu rchase pr ic e for the land and busi ness w as sel ler-fin anced w it h a w ra paround real es tate li en not e for $82 5,0 00. The transact ion includ ed b oth security and g uara nty ag reem ent s. As part of the s ale , t he par

ti es ex ecut ed an “A rb it ra ti on Ag re ement” w hic h prov ide s, in par t: TRAN SAC TION : Sal e of la nd and busi ness l ocat ed at14209 Nor thw estBl v d., Cor pus Chr is ti , Tex as3

LEGAL D OC UM EN TS: W ra paround R eal Es t a t e L i e n N o t e , W ra paround Dee d of Trus t, W ra paround W ar ra nty D eed w it h Vendor ’s Li en, Secu ri ty Ag re ement, Guaranty Ag re ement, Non -C ompeti ti on Ag re ement, Bi ll of Sal e, U CC -1 , Ag ree ment C oncer nin g Leg al D o c u me n t s a nd Tr ansac ti on, A ttor ney Di sc los ur e, an d Ar bit ra ti on Ag re ement. Seller, Bu y er, and Individuals agree t hatany controversy or claim ar is ing out of or re lat ing to the Transa ct ion, th e Leg al Doc uments , or the br each thereof shal l be settl ed by bi ndi ng ar bit ra ti on i n ac cordance w it h the Commerci al Ar bit ra ti on R ule s o f the Amer ic an Ar bit ra ti on As soc iat ion

. Any cont ro v ersy

or cl aim subj ect to thi s ar bit ra ti on prov is ion sh all be d eci ded by one ar bit ra tor , and j udg ment on the aw ard re ndered by the ar bit ra tor

may be entered i n any

co urt hav ing jur is dic ti on thereof. Any ar bit ra ti on proceed ing shal l be c onduc ted i n the ci ty and sta te w here the r e a l proper ty thati s t he subj ectof thi s A g re ement i s l ocat ed. Cab all ero s ig ned t he ag re ement ind iv idu all y and as pr esi dent of Fox , and C ontreras si g ned t h e a gr e e m e n tin d ivi d u a ll y a n d a s p re s id e n to f P ic li d ix. Af ter closing, Piclidix occup ied the land and ran the busine ss. Allegi ng that Piclidix br eache d i ts ag re ements , s peci fical ly w it h reg ard to it s re q uirement to mai ntai n adeq uate in ve n t ory

on site to secure th e pu rchase , Fox repo ssessed the pro perty and bu siness. P ic li d ix d is p u t e d Fo x’s a ll e ga t io n s a n d c o n t e n d e d t h a t F o x wro n gf u ll y se ize d t h e p ro p e rt y. T he factu al c ir c um stan ces surroun ding the alleged breach and reposse ssion are h otly dis puted by

the par ti es. Con trer as and Pi cl idi x

broug ht s uitag ain st appel lan ts in Cou nty C our t N umber

F our of Nueces Cou nty, Texas for, inter alia, w rongf ul repo ssession a nd the f t. Fo x subse quently filed a de mand for ar bit ra ti on w it h the Amer ic an Ar bit ra ti on Ass oci ati on. In county co urt, Con treras and Pi cl idi x

fil ed a moti on to st ay

ar bit ra ti on, a nd appe ll a n ts , in tur n, fil ed a moti on to co mpel ar bit ra ti on. Followin g s ev eral ro unds of amended pl eadi ng s, the t ri al
co u rthe ld a t ru n ca te d he a rin g on th e m o ti o n to st a y an d m o ti o n to co m p e l. Atth e he a rin g,4

the p arti es pr esent ed arg ument on the meri ts of thei r posi ti ons, then beg an di sc uss ing the actu al scope of

the arb itration hea ring itsel f ; t h a t is, whethe r it w as to be a sum ma ry proceed ing or a full ev ide nti ar y hear ing

. Fol low ing thi s dis cus si on, the tr ial co u rt st ated: “L et’ s set me up to re ad thes e thi ng s, to make a ru li ng
. . . . I need t o rea d th e m and und erstan d the m to m ake the right decision , all ri ght, the n w e’ll have a hearing if I overrule y our moti ons and w e’l l g o to the e v ide nti ar y st ep.” At t he c onc lu sio n of the h ear ing , t he w it ness es w ho had been s ubpoenaed to app e a r a n d g i v e t e s t i mo n y

w e r e re l e a s e d w i t h t h e u n d e rs t a n d i n g t h a tt h e h e a r i n g w as “contin uing.” On M arch 5, 2 010 , the trial court issued an order w hich: (1) den ied ap pellan ts’
mo tion to stay or aba te cou rt p ro ceed ing and com pel arbitra tion; (2) g rante d ap pellee s’ moti o n t o s t a y a r b i t r a t i o n ; a n d ( 3 ) o v e r r u l e d a l l o bj e c t i o n s p r e s e n t e d b y a p p e l l a n ts or appel le e s to e videnc e offer ed by the par ti es in suppo rtof the mot ion s. This appeal and
or ig ina l proceed ing ens ued. F o x a n d Ca b a ll e ro ra is e twe lve is s u e s
. Pa ge a n d B izm a t c h ra is e t h o s e sa m e twe lve is sues and one add it ion al iss u e p e rt ain ing to thei r ri g ht t o c ompel ar bit ra ti on unde r the agreem ent . W e ha v e reorganized som e of these issues for the p urpo se of ana ly sis. II. F EDERA L A RBI TR A TI ON ACT OR T EXA S A RBI TR A TI ON ACT T he trial cou rt’s order did not specif y w het her the arbitratio n agreem entin this case
w as gov erne d by the Fede ral Arbitratio n Act ( “FAA”) or the Te x as Arbitratio n Act (“TAA”). See 9 U.S .C

. §§ 1- 16 ( 2009) (FAA); T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . §§ 171.001 -. 098 (V er non Su pp. 2 009) ( TAA). Therefore, appel lan ts seek rev iew of t h e o rd e r deny ing arbitratio n b o t h b y man dam us an d inte rlocuto ry app eal. See Jack B. An glin Co., In c. v.T ex as C i vi l P rac t i c e & R em ed i es C od e se c t i on 51

. 01 6, en ac t ed i n 20 09 , provi de s for an i nterl oc utory 1 appea l i n a m at t er subj ect t o t he FAA “ undert he sa m e ci r cum st ances t hat an appea l f r om a f eder al di st r i ct c o u rt’ s o rd e r o r d e c i s i o n w o u l d b e p e rm i tte d b y ” th e F A A

. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 51. 016 (V ern on S up p. 20 09 ). S ec t i on 51

. 01 6 do es no t ap pl y t o t hi s c as e be c au s e t hi s c as e aros e pri or t o i t s effec t i ve d a te

. See Act of

M ay 27, 200 9, 81st Leg

. , R

. S. , ch. 820 , § 1, 200 9 T EX
. G EN
. L AW S 2061, 206 1 ( codi f i ed a t T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 5 1.01 6). 5 Ti pps , 842 S.W .2d 2 66, 2 72 ( Tex . 199 2) ( prov idi ng thatl it ig ant s all eg ing enti tl ement t o arbitratio n un der the FAA and T AAm u s t pursue parallel proce edin gs)

. Appe llants’ f irst 1 and s econd i ss ues ar e s tated as foll ow s: As a threshol d m a tt e r to j ur is dic ti on and proper reli ef, does the F ederal Ar bit ra ti on Ac t (F AA)

. . . 9 U .S.C . § 1 et s eq. , or the Te xas Ge neral Ar bit ra ti on Ac t ( TGAA) , Tex

. Ci v . Prac. & Rem. C ode § 171.001 et s eq. , or both the FAA and TGAA apply as the subs tanti v e l aw

i n thi s c ase re g ardin g enforc ement of the par ti es’ w ri tten ar bit ra ti on ag re ement i n thi s c ase? If the F AA an d TGAA both appl y , i s there a confli ct betw een t he F AA an d the TGAA w ar ra nti ng F AA preempti on of the TGAA? The FA A appl ies to transac ti ons that i n volve i ntersta te c ommerc e. See 9 U .S.C . § 2 (2 009) . “ Commerce ” has been broadl y defined and enc ompass es cont ra cts rela ti ng to int ersta te c ommerc e. See In r e Gar dner Z em ke Co. , 978 S.W .2d 6 24, 6 26 (Tex . Ap p.–El Paso 1998, or ig . proceed ing ). As defined by the FAA , “i ntersta te commer ce” is not li mite d to the int ersta te shi pment of g oods, but inc lud es all cont ra cts “rela ti ng to ” in te rst ate
commer ce. In re Fi

rs tMer it Bank , 52 S.W .3d 7 49, 7 54 ( Tex . 200 1) ( or ig . proceed ing ); Lost Creek Mun. Util. Dist. v. Tr avis In d u s
. P ainte rs, Inc. , 8 2 7 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 3 , 1 0 5 (T e x. App.–A ust in 1992, w ri t den ied ). I ntersta te c ommerce is ev ide nced by , i nter al ia, the loc ati on o f a p a rt y ’ s h e a d q u a rt e rs i n a n o t h e r s t a t e , t h e m a n u fa c t u r e o f c o mp o n e n tp a rts in a dif feren t state , the transp ortat ion of goods across state lines, and billings prepared in another st ate. TMI, Inc. v. Brooks , 225 S.W .3d 7 83, 7 91 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.]6

200 7, pe t. de nied ); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mack , 9 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 3 3 0 , 3 3 3 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 st Di st. ] 199 7, w ri t di sm’ d w .o.j .)

. Fur ther , t he w ord “ inv olv ing ” in the FA A is construe d broa dly and is the f unct iona l equi va le n t of “af fecting,” sig naling Congress’s int ent t o ex er ci se it s C ommerc e C la u se pow er to the ful les t extent. See Allied-Bruce Ter m ini x C os. v. D obson , 513 U.S. 265, 272- 74, 2 76- 78 ( 1995) ; W ee Tot s Pedi atr ic s, P.A. v. Morohu nfo la , 268 S.W .3d 7 84, 7 89- 790 ( Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth 20 08, n o pet .)

. The FA A does not req uire a s ubst anti al eff ecton int e rs tate commer ce; rather , i t merely req uires co mmerc e to be i nv olv ed or affect ed. S e e L & L K e m p wo o d A s s o c s
. , L .P. v. Om ega Bui lde rs, Inc. (

In r e L &L K

e m pwood As soc s., L.P .) , 9 S. W .3d 1 25, 1 27 ( Tex . 199 9) (comb ined app e a l & orig. proceed ing) (notin g tha t the FAA “exten ds to an y contract af fecting com me rce, as far as the Com me rce Clause of the Unite d Sta tes Con stitutio n w ill
re ach” ). W hen, as her e, an agreement is si len t as to w hether the FAA appl ies , t he q uest ion of w het her the transact i on a f fects inte rstate comm erce, an d thu s w het her the FAA gov erns, is one of fact. TMI, Inc. , 225 S.W .3d a t 791 ; In re Edu c. Mgm t. Corp ., 14 S.W .3d 418, 422 (Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 2000, or ig . proceed ing ). App e llants c ontend that “[ b ] e c a u s e o f

t h e n a t u re o f t h e t ra n s a c t io n in t h is c a s e , t h e t ra n s a c t io n a p p e a rs t o in vo lve int ersta te c ommerc e i n a s uff ic ien t deg re e to inv oke the F AA.” Ap pel lan ts conc ede, howev er, tha t the evidence is not “w ell-develope d” in this area be cause of the trial court’s “ref usal to allow

for an evident iary

hea ring.” “W het her the parties con tem plate d tha t the ir transa ction would subst ant ially af fect int ersta te c ommerc e i s i rrele v ant; if the transac ti on affects int e rstat e c ommerc e ‘ in fact,’7

the arbitration provi sion is gov erne d by the FAA.” In re Edu c. Mgm t. Corp ., 14 S.W .3d a t 4 2 3 (quo ti n g Pal

mHar bor Hom es, Inc . v

. McC oy, 944 S .W .2d 716 , 719 (Tex. App. –Fort W o rt h 19 9 7 , o rig. pro ce e d in g) (cit in g Al li ed- Br uc e, 51 3 U .S. at 28 1) ). I n the i nst ant c ase, a revi ew of

the ple adin gs indicat es tha t all parties involv ed in th e suit are T exas residents, the c ontractw as si g ned i n Tex as, and the c ontractw as to be per formed in T ex as. See, e.g ., TMI, Inc. , 225 S. W .3 d at 791 ( “H er e, i t i s u ndi sput ed Tr endmaker i s a Tex as
cor porati on s ell ing real proper ty l ocat ed w it hin Tex as v ia pur chas e ag re ements ex ecut ed solely in Te x as. “). Th e re is no ev iden ce in the record indicat ing that the parties’ transac ti on in fact affects int ersta te c ommerc e. See In re Edu c. Mgm t. Corp ., 14 S. W .3d at 42 3. Accordin gly , w e con clude thatt he FAA doe s n ot app ly t o this transa ction. Be cause thi s d i s p u t e i s g o v e r n e d b y t h e T AA , w e n e e d n o ta d d r e s s a p p e l l a n t s ’ i s s u e re g ar din g pr eempti on. W e deny

appel lan ts’ peti ti on for w ri t of m andamus file d purs uant to the F AA and proceed to address the meri ts of the i nter loc utor y appeal

. III . VA LI DI TY A ND S C OPE In th eir third issue, ap pellan ts cont end thatthe trial cour t a buse d its discretion in “fai li ng to enforc e s ummari ly the writ te n a rb it ra ti on ag re ement .

. . bec ause Fox Tree conclu siv ely esta blished the existence of a valid a rbitration a greem ent , tha t the cla ims in the law suit w ere w ithin its scope , and tha t Piclidix w as ref using to arbitrate .” See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . § 171.021 ( Ver non 200 5)

. W hen rev iew ing by

i nter loc utor

y appeal an o rd er

deny ing ar bit ra ti on unde r the TAA,
w e appl y

a de nov o s ta n d a rd to leg al deter minat ion s a nd a “n o ev ide nce” st andard to factual determ in a ti o n s. PER Gr oup, L.P. v. D ava Onc olo gy, L.P

. , 294 S.W .3d 3 78, 3 848

(Tex

. App.–D all as 2009, no pet .) ; Tram m ell v. Galaxy Ranch Sch., L .P. (In re Tram m ell) , 246 S. W .3d 8 15, 8 20 ( Tex . Ap p.–D all as 2008, no pet .) ; TMI, Inc. , 225 S.W .3d a t 791

. In
r e v i e w i n g t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s fa c t u a l d e t e r mi n a t i ons, w e m u s tc r e d i tfa v o r a b l e e v i d e n c e i f a
reaso nab le fact-f inde r could and disregard cont rary evidence unless a reason able fact- finder

co uld not. PER

Gr oup, L.P. , 294 S.W .3d a t 384 ; Tram m ell , 246 S.W .3d a t 820 (ci ti n g Kroge r Tex. Ltd. v. Su beru , 216 S. W .3d 788 , 793 (Tex. 2006 ); City of Keller v. W il son , 168 S.W .3d 8 02, 8 07 ( Tex . 200 5) ); TMI, Inc. , 225 S.W .3d at 791. H ow ev er , w hen the fact s re le van t to the ar bit ra ti on i ss ue are notdi sput ed, w e are present ed onl y w it h is sues of law

and w e rev iew

the tr ial co urt’ s o rd er

de n ov o. PER

Gr oup, L.P. , 294 S.W .3d at 38 4; Tram m ell , 246 S.W .3d a t 820

. A party attem pting to com pel arbitra tion m us t f ir s t e stab lish thatthe disp ute in q uest ion fall s w it hin the sc ope of a v ali d ar bit ra ti on ag re ement. J.M. D avidso n, In c. v. W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 2 23, 2 27 ( Tex . 200 3) ; TMI, Inc ., 225 S. W .3d a t 791 ; C appadonna Elec. M gm t. v. Cam er

on C ounty, 180 S.W .3d 364, 37 0 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2005,
or ig . proceed ing ). A cour t may not order ar bit ra ti on in the absen ce of s uch an ag re ement. Cappadonna , 1 8 0 S. W .3 d at37 0 (cit in g Fr eis v. C anales , 8 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 3 , 2 8 4 (T e x. 1994) ). The par

ti es’ ag re ement t o ar bit ra te mus t be cl ear
. Mo ham ed v. Au to Nati on U SA Corp ., 89 S.W .3d 830, 835 (Tex

. App.–H oust on [1s t Di st. ] 2002, no pet .) ( combi ned app eal & or ig . proceed ing ). If the pa rty oppos ing ar bit ra ti on deni es the ex is tenc e of an ag re ement to ar bit ra te, that is sue is dete rmi ned “ summar il y ” by the cour t as a matter

of law

. T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . § 171.021 (b ); J

. M. D avidson, Inc ., 128 S. W .3d a t 227

. If the
mov ant e sta bli shes thatan a rb itra tion ag re ement g ov er ns the d is pute, the burden t hen9

shi fts to the p arty

oppos ing ar bit ra ti on to est abl is h a defense to the ar bit ra ti on ag re ement. Mc Rey nolds v. El

sto n , 222 S.W .3d 7 31, 7 39 ( Tex . A p p .– Ho u sto n [14 th D is t.] 2007, no pet.)

. Cou rt s may not order par ti es to ar bit ra te unl ess they hav e ag re ed to do so
. Se e Freis , 8 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d at 28 4 (“W hile cou rts may enforce agreem ent s to arbitrate disput es,
ar bit ra ti on c annot be ordered i n the abs ence of such an a g re eme n t.”) ; Bel m ont Con str uctor s, Inc . v

. Ly ondel l Petrochem ic al Co. , 8 9 6 S

. W

. 2 d 3 5 2 , 3 5 6 -5 7 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 st Di st. ] 199 5, no w ri t) (combi ned appeal & ori g . proceed ing ). Ther efore, despi te s trong presumpt ion s t hat fav or arbi trati on, a val id ag re ement t o ar bit ra te remains
a s ettl ed, t hr eshol d req uirement t o obt ain ing reli ef, w hether under t h e T AA or

the FAA

. See In r e Kel logg Br own & R oot, Inc ., 16 6 S. W .3 d 7 3 2 , 7 3 7 -3 8 (T e x. 20 0 5 ) (o rig. proce edin g) (analyz ing the FAA); J. M. D avi dson, Inc ., 128 S. W .3d a t 227 ( anal y z ing the TAA). Ordina ry

contractp rinciples are ap plied to the de term inatio n of w het her the re is a
v ali d ag re ement t o ar bit ra te. J.M. D avi dson, Inc ., 128 S .W .3d at 227; see In r e B u n zl U.S.A. , Inc. , 155 S.W .3d 2 02, 2 09 ( Tex . Ap p.–El Pas o 2004, or ig. p roceedi ng ). I n determ in in g the sc ope of the ar bit ra ti on ag re ement, w e focus on t he pet it ion ’s factual all eg ati ons ra ther than the leg al caus es of acti on as ser ted. See In r

e F ir stMer it Bank , N.A. , 5 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 5 4 ( d e c i d e d under F AA) ; PER

Gr oup, L.P. , 294 S.W .3d a t 386 ( deci ded under TAA)

. Cou rt s re sol v e any doubt s a bout an ar bit ra ti on ag re ement’ s s cope in fav or of arbi trati on. TMI, Inc. , 225 S.W .3 d a t 7 9 1 ( appl y ing TAA)

. W hen par ti es ag re e to
ar bit ra te an d the ag re ement encompas ses the cl aims ass erted, the tr ial cour t mus t c ompel10

ar bit ra ti on and sta y

lit ig ati on pending arbi trati on. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 171. 021( b) ; Me yer

v. W MC O- GP, LLC , 211 S.W .3d 3 02, 3 05 ( Tex . 200 6) ; PER Gr oup, L.P. , 294 S.W .3d a t 384

. In rev i e w i n g t h e t e xto f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e me n ta n d c o n s i d e r i n g t h a tt h e p a rt ies si g ned i t and the acc ompany ing doc uments , w e concl ude that ap pel lan ts hav e es tabl is hed
a v ali d ag re ement to ar bit ra te. See In r e Kel logg Br own & R oot, Inc ., 166 S. W .3d a t 737 ; Bates v. M TH Hom es- Tex., L.P. , 177 S.W .3d 4 19, 4 22 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 st Di st. ] 200 5, no pet .). Th e agreem entrequires arbitrat ion be tw een the two comp anie s and their pr inc ipa ls and appl ies to “a ny co ntrov ersy

or cl aim ar is ing out of or re lat ing to the Trans act ion , t he Leg al Doc uments , or the br each thereof.” W e further conc lud e tha t t he cl aims at is sue in thi s l aw sui t fall w it hin the sc ope of the ag re ement. See In re First Tex. Hom es, Inc ., 120 S.W .3d 868, 870 (Tex . 2003) (o ri g . proceed ing ) (p er cu ri am) (e x amini ng the s cope of an ar bit rati on ag re ement t hat a ppl ied to “a ll di sput es betw een [ them]

. . . ar is ing out of t his Ag re ement or other act ion per formed

. . . by [F irs t T e xas]” ); see a lso Em er ald T ex. Inc . v

. Pe el , 920 S.W .2d 398, 40 3 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 st Di st. ] 199 6, no
w ri t) ( “I f .

. . the [ar bit ra ti on] cl ause is broad, ar bit ra ti on s houl d notbe d eni ed unl ess i t c an be s aid w it h pos it iv e as surance that the p arti cul ar di sput e i s n ot c ov er ed.” ). Al th ou g h w e ha v e c on c l ud ed th at th e ar bi trat i on ag r ee me nt w as v al i d an d th e c l ai ms at issue were within t he scope of the arb itration agreeme nt, we may not susta in app ellant s’ thi rd i ss ue i n i ts enti re ty bec ause w e hav e noty et c onsi dered appe ll ees’ defenses to the
ar bit ra ti on agreement. See J.M. D avi dson, Inc ., 128 S. W .3d a t 227 ( sta ti ng thati f the tr ial court f inds a valid agreem ent , the burde n shif t s to the party opp osing arbitration to raise11

an affirmat iv e defense to en forci ng ar bit ra ti on) ; In r e H .E. Bu tt

G ro ce ry Co. , 17 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tex . App.–H oust on [14th D is t.] 2000, or ig . proceed ing ); City of Alam o v. Garcia , 878 S.W .2d 664 , 665 (Tex. App. –Corpu s Christi 199 4, no w rit). IV. E VI D ENT I A R Y H E A RI NG In t hei r ele v enth is sue, appel lan ts cont end t hat t he tr ial co urt abu sed it s d is creti on in re fusing to prov ide for a n ev ide nti ar y hear ing w hen: Pi cl idi x had not estab li shed it s enti tl ement to rel ief concl usi v ely under any

of [its] de fense s, and it had prom ised an ev iden tiaryhea ring t o F ox T ree if it ov er ru led i ts obj ect ion s t o Pi cl idi x ’s summar y ev ide nce in oppos it ion to Fox Tree’ s mot ion to compel ar bit ra ti on and in suppo rt of Pic li dix ’s moti on to st ay ar bit ra ti on. Tex as Ci v il Pract ic e and Remedi es Cod e s ect ion 171. 021 al low s tr ial co urts to “s ummari ly

determi ne” the is sue of w hether to compel a pa rty

to ar bit ra te i ts cl aims . T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . § 171.021 ( Ver non 200 5) ; Jack B . An g lin C o ., Inc ., 842 S. W .2 d a t 269 ; see a lso Petro leum Ana lyzer Co. LP v. Olstowski , N o
. 0 1
- 0 9
- 0 0 0 7 6
- C V, 2010 Tex . Ap p. LE X IS 5 581, at * 23- *24 (Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1st Di st. ] Jul y 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op. on re h’g ). In Ang lin , the supreme co urt defin ed th e proper ci rc umstan ces under w hic h a t ri al cour

t s houl d h o ld a f ull ev ide nti ar y hear ing on a moti on to co mpel
ar bit ra ti on: B e c a u s e t h e m a in b e n e f it s o f a rb it ra t io n li e in e xp e d it e d a n d le s s e xp e n s ive dis posi ti o n of a di sput e, an d the l eg is lat ur e has mandate d tha t a moti on to compel ar b itra ti on be deci ded s ummari ly , w e thi nk itunl ik ely thatthe legislature inten de d t he issue to be reso lv ed followi ng a fu ll ev iden tiary hear ing in all cases
. W e also env is ion that the hear ing at w hic h a mot ion to c om pe l ar bi trat i on is dec i de d w ou l d ordi na r i l y i nv ol v e ap pl i c at i on o f t he t er ms of the ar bit ra ti on ag re ement t o undi sput ed facts , amenable to proof by aff ida v it

. W it h these cons ide ra ti ons in mind, w e hol d tha t t he tr ial co urt may su m ma rily

decide w het her to co mp el arbitratio n on the ba sis of af f idavits, ple adi ng s, dis cov er

y , and st ipu lat ion s. H ow ev er , i f the mater ial facts12

nece ssaryto det ermin e the issue are controverted, byan op posin g af f idavit or othe rw ise adm issible evi den ce, th e trial court mu st cond uct an ev iden tiary hea ring to de term ine th e dispu ted mat erial facts. Jack B. Anglin Co., In c. , 842 S.W .2d at 269. The supreme courtreaff ir med and re appl ied thes e pr inc ipl es in 2008. See In r e Pol y- Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d 3 37, 3 54 ( Tex . 200 8) (“ Beca use the o nly

facts Luna pr esent ed on the mot ion to comp e l w er e unc ontrov erted under thi s s tandard—Lun a’s aff ida v it s a cc ompany ing hi s o ri g ina l peti ti on w er e nei ther cont radicte d no r challenged in Po ly -Ame rica’s respo nse—we believe th e cou rt of app eals acte d prop erly

in crediting those facts on app eal.”). One o f our si ste r cour

ts has ex pla ine d tha t a moti on to co mpel ar bit ra ti on s houl d be treat ed a s “essentia lly

a mo tion for sum ma ry judgmen t, subjec t t o the same ev iden tiary stan dard s.” In re Jeb bia , 26 S.W .3d 7 53, 7 56- 57 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 2000,
or ig . proceed ing ); see als o In re Ji mWalter Ho mes, Inc

. , 2 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 8 8 8 , 8 9 6 -9 7 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 2006, or ig . proceed ing ). The pa rty al leg in g an ar bit ra ti on ag re ement mus t present“ compl ete s ummary proof of his ‘c ase- in- chi ef’ ” t h a t a n a g re ement to arbi trate req uires ar bit ra ti on of the dis pute. In r e Jeb bia , 26 S. W .3d at 756 -57. Once thi s i s a cc ompli shed, the par ty resi sti ng arbi trati on mayrais e an is sue of materi al fact abou t h is o p p o n e n t ’s p ro o f

o r p re s e n ts o m e e vid e n c e su p p o rt in g e ve ry e le m e n to f a d e fe n s ive cl aim that there is no enforc eabl e ag re ement to ar bit ra te. See i d. Onl y i f a mater ial i ss ue of fact is ra is ed is an ev ide nti ar y hear ing nec ess ar

y . Id. ; see Jack B. Anglin Co., In c. , 842 S.W .2d a t 269

. It is an a buse of dis creti on to g ra nt or deny ar bit ra ti on w it hout hol din g an ev ide nti ar

y hear ing i f ther e are di sput ed i ss ues of materi al fact. See, e.g., In re Wash. Mut. Fi n., L.P. , 173 S.W .3d 189 (Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2005, or ig . proceed ing ) ( hol din g that13

the t ri al cour

t abu sed it s d is creti on by su sta ini ng a de fense to ar bit ra ti on w it hout hol din g an ev ide nti ar

y heari ng to deter mine dis puted is sues of mater ial fact) ; Rog er s v . M aid a , 126 S.W .3d 643 , 646 (T ex. App.– Bea um ont200 4, orig. proceed ing) (holdin g tha t the trial court
er re d i n notco nduct ing an e v ide nti ar y hear ing on a rb it ra bil ity of dis pute)

. Acc ordin g ly , i n order

to deter mine w hether

the tr ial co urt w as re q uired to hol d an
ev ide nti ar

y hear ing on the moti on to compel ar bit ra ti on, w e ex amine the p lea din g s a nd th e evidence to dete rmine if ap pellee s have raise d any m ate rial issue s o f fact regarding their defensi v e i ss ues to ar bit ra ti on. In this reg ard, in thei r fifth is sue, appel lan ts arg ue th at t he trial co urt abu sed its d iscretion in “summ arily grantin g Piclidix

relief

. . . when Piclidix

did notes t ablish co nclusively any v alid af

f irmative def ense to enforcem entof the valid
ar bit ra ti on ag re ement be tw een Pi cl idi x and Fox T re e.” Und er

T ex as law , as w it h any

othe r cont ra ct, ag re ements to ar bit ra te are v alid u n le ss grounds ex is t atl aw or i n eq uity

for
re v ocat ion of the a g re ement. In r e Pol y- Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d a t 348

. The burden of provi ng such a ground

— s u ch as f raud , unco nscion ability or v oidn ess un der pu blic pol icy —fall s on the par

ty oppos ing the cont ra ct. See i d. ; In r e F ir stMer it Bank , 52 S.W .3d at 75 6. In th eir sixth, se v ent h, eighth , ninth , and tent h issues, app ellant s add ress specif ic defenses to t he ar bit ra ti on ag re ement, re spec ti v ely , unc onsc ion abi li ty , frau d, w aiv er or est oppel , and “ sel f-hel p” w aiv er
. W e address thes e al leg ed defenses in tur n. In thei r si xth is sue, appellan ts c o ntend there i s n o ev ide nce of uncons ci onabi li ty , procedu ra l or subs tanti v e, rela ti ng to the a rb it ra ti on ag re ement atthe ti me thatthe ar bit ra ti on ag re ement
w as made s o as to w ar ra nt a deni al of summary enfor cementof

the ar bit ra ti on ag re ement.14

Arb it ra ti on ag re ements are noti nherentl y unc onsc ion abl e. In r e Pal mHar bor Hom es, In c. , 195 S.W .3d 672 , 678 (Tex. 2006 ) ( orig. proceed ing). “Unconscio nab le cont ra cts , how ev er

— w h e t h e r re l ati ng to ar bit ra ti on or not— ar e unenfor ceabl e under Tex as law .” In r

e Pol y- Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d a t 3 4 8 -4 9

. T he T exas Arbitration Act spec ific all y

ac know led g es thi s d efense and prov ide s t hat a co u rt m ay not enforc e an ar bit ra ti on agreement “i f the cour t f ind s t he ag re ement w as uncon sc ion abl e at the t ime the agreem entw as ma de. ” T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . § 171.022 ( Ver non 200 5) ; see In re Palm Harbor Hom es, In c. , 195 S.W .3d a t 677 ; In re W eeks M ar ine , Inc ., 242 S. W .3d 849 , 860 -61 (Te x . App .–Hou ston [14t h Dist.] 200 7, orig. proceed ing). Accordin g to th e T exas Suprem e Court, “[u] ncon sciona bility is to b e de term ined in lig ht of a v ariety of facto rs, w hich aim to prevent op pression and unfair surprise; in general,
a cont ract w ill be foun d unco nscion able if it is grossly

one -sided. ” See In r

e Pal mHar bor Hom es, In c. , 195 S.W .3d a t 677 ( citi ng D A N B. D OBBS , 2 L AW OF R EM EDI ES 703, 706 ( 2d ed. 1 9 9 3 ), R E S TA TE ME NT (S E COND ) OF C ON T R ACT S § 208, cmt . a (1 979) ( “The deter minat ion th a t a co n tr a ctor t e rm is o r is n o t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e is m a d e in th e ligh t o f its se tt in g, purp ose, and ef

fect. Relevant facto rs include w eakn esses in th e con tracting process like thos e i nv olv ed i n more s peci fic r ule s a s t o c ontract ual ca paci ty , fra ud, a nd ot her inv ali dati ng causes ; the poli cy also ov er lap s w it h rul es w hic h render par ti cul ar barg ain s o r ter ms une nforce abl e on g ro unds of publ icpoli cy .” ))

. In cons ide ri ng an ar bit ra ti on c lau se, all eg ati ons of un cons ci onabi li ty “mus t s peci fical ly rela te t o the [ar bit ra ti on c lau se] i tse lf, not the cont ract as a w hole , if [unco nscion ability is] to def eatarbitration .” In re FirstMerit Bank, N. A. , 52 S.W .3d a t 756

.15

Unc onsc ion abi li ty

may be e it her

procedu ra l or

su bst anti v e i n na tu re
. See i d. Generall y

sp eaki ng , procedu ra l uncon sc ion abi li ty refers to the c ircums tanc es sur ro undi ng the a dopti on of the ar bit ra ti on prov is ion , and su bst anti v e unc onsc ion abi li ty co ncer ns the fair ness of the a rb it ra ti on prov isi o n itse lf. Id. ; In r e Hall ibu rton C o. , 80 S.W .3d 5 66, 5 71 (Tex . 200 2) ( or ig . proceed ing ). M or e s peci fical ly , procedu ra l uncon sc ion abi li ty rela tes to the mak ing or

i nduce ment of t he cont ra ct, focusi ng on t he facts su rroundi ng the barg ain ing proces s. TMI, Inc. , 22 5 S .W .3d a t 792 ; s ee Abdel Haki mLabi di v. Sydo w , 287 S.W .3d 922 , 927 (Tex. App. –Hou ston [14t h Dist.] 200 9, no pet. ) ( statin g tha t the success o r fa ilure of an argume nt regarding proced ural unco nscion ability is dep end ent upo n the ex istence
o f fa c t s wh ic h a ll e ge d ly i ll u s t ra t e u n c o n s c io n a b i l i t y ). T h e t e s tfo r s u b s t a n t ive
uncon sc ion abi li ty

i s w hether , “g iv en the parti es’ general commerci al back g ro und and the
commer ci al needs of the p arti cul ar trade or ca se, the c lau se inv olv ed i s s o one- si ded t hat iti s u ncons ci onabl e under the ci rc umstan ces ex is ti ng w hen t he par ti es made the co ntract .” In re Fi rs tMer it Bank , 52 S.W .3d a t 757 ; see In r e Pal mHar bor Hom es, Inc ., 195 S. W .3d at 67 8. Th e p a rt y

a s s e rt i n g u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y b e a rs t h e b u rd e n o f p ro o f. In re Turner Bros. Tr uck ing C o. , 8 S.W .3d 3 7 0 , 3 76-7 7 (Te x . App .–T exarkana 19 99, orig . procee ding). W hether a c ontracti s c ontrar

y to publ icpol icy or uncon sc ion abl e at t he ti me i t i s for med is a q uest ion of law

. In r e P o ly- Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d a t 348 -4 9; Hoo ver Slovac ek LLP v . Walton , 206 S.W .3d 5 57, 5 62 ( Tex . 200 6) . Becau se a tri al cour t has no d is creti on t o d e t e rm in e wh a tt h e la w is o r ap p ly th e la w in c o rr e c t ly, it s cl e a r fa il u re t o p ro p e rl y a n a lyze
or appl y the law of uncon sc ion abi lit y co n st it utes an a buse of dis creti on. In re Poly-16

Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d a t 349 ; W alk er v. Packer

, 827 S.W .2d 833 , 840 (Tex. 1992 ); In r e Gr een Tr ee Ser vici ng LLC , 275 S.W .3d 5 92, 6 02- 603 ( Tex . Ap p.–Tex ar kana 2008, orig. proceed ing). Appel lee s rais e numerous g ro unds w hic h the y as ser t render the ar bit ra ti on ag re em e n t u n cons ci onabl e. Appel lee s c ontend that the a rb it ra ti on ag re ement w as uncon sc ion abl e bec ause Cab all ero personally a nd phy si cal ly reposs ess ed th e proper ty
w hen C ontreras w as one day l ate on a monthl y pay ment, w hen the note all ow ed for a fiv eday “ g ra ce” per iod, ins tead of ins ti tuti ng ar bit ra ti on bec ause of the al leg ed breach; how ev er , appell ees ar e i nst ead al leg edl y l imi ted i n the ir

remedie s t o ar bit ra ti on. Cf. In re Palm Harbor Hom es, In c. , 195 S.W .3d at 677 (s tati ng that an ar bit ra ti on ag re ement may be i ll usor y if a par ty ca n uni lat erall y

av oid the ag re ement t o ar bit ra te)

. Appel lee s c ontend that th e ar bit ra ti on ag re ement w as uncon sc ion abl e g iv en th e di spar ity i n s ophi sti cat ion betw een t he par

ti es, the ru shed nature of the cl osi ng , t he ti ming of the d is cl osure of
re lev ant d ocument s t o C o n t re ra s , a n d B i z ma tch ’s al leg ed represent ati ons to C ontreras that it w ould “take care o f h im.” See id. (e xp la in in g t h a tt h e t e s tfo r s u b s t a n t ive
uncon sc ion abi li ty

enc ompass es the p a rt ie s’ g eneral commer ci al back g ro und and the
com me rcial need s of

the p a rt ic u la r case to de term ine if the arb itration agreeme nt is so
one- si ded t hat i t i s u ncons ci onabl e)

. Appel lee s fur ther co ntend the arbi trati on ag re ement
w as uncon sc ion abl e bec ause Cab all ero ent er ed th e ag re ement un der a false name. They poi nt t o new s a rt ic les i ndi catin g that C abal lero w as an as sumed name uti li z ed by an ind iv idu al named D av id Anthon y Boen, w ho had been ar re ste d for tamper ing w it h g ov er nmental records and had a c ri minal hi sto ry i ncl udi ng pos ses si on and sal e of
m a ri ju a n a a n d p o s s e s s io n o f st o le n p ro p e rt y. A p p e ll e e s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e y wo u ld n o th a ve17

ent ered the arb itration agreeme nt ha d the y known of

Caballero’ s t ru e id ent ity . Further, int er al ia, appel lee s c ontend that the a rb it ra ti on ag re ement i s u ncons ci onabl e bec ause of
ex ces si v e c ost s. By

aff ida v it , C ontreras tes ti fied reg ardin g hi s a bil ity to pay th e c ost s o f
ar bit ra ti on: I investe d my sa v ing s a nd my

i nit ial reti re ment funds int o thi s n ew busi ness v enture. From thes e funds, I i nv est ed th e i nit ial dow n pay ment of $125,00 0.00, pl us cl osi ng ex pense s, and t he i nit ial ca pit al re q uired to open and ope ra te t he busi ness for the first nin e to tw elv e month per iod , i ncl udi ng the p er iod from c los ing to Ju n e 1 9 th, 2009. This i nv est ment i n and c ap i ta l i z at i on o f

t he N urs er

y req ui red my

u s i ng a s ub s ta nt i al p or ti on o f my sav ing s a nd av ail abl e personal funds. I had ant ic ipa ted that the o perati ng bu s i ne s s w ou l d g en erat e ad di ti on al s uffi c i en t i nc om e an d fun ds , w i th my ini ti al inv est ments, to adeq uatel y ca pit ali z e t h e b u si ness dur ing i ts ini ti al per iod of operati on. On J une 19t h, 20 09, D an C aba lle ro and his ag ents w ro ng fully took poss ess ion of my busi ness pr emis es, personal proper ty and inv entory , i ncl udi ng sp eci fical ly the re al proper

ty

. . . . The ac ti ons by

D an Cab all ero and his ag ents has resul ted i n des troy ing my bus iness and it s g enerati on of i ncome
. T h is h as re sul ted i n my no- lon g er

bei ng abl e to financi all y

defend my sel f or prosec ute D an C abal lero w it hout re pr esent ati on by m y a tt o rney s. I bel iev e tha t t his [adv erse] resul t of C abal lero’s ac ti ons w as anti ci pated by

C abal lero et al[ .] and t he bl atantmanner of h is taki ng ov er my bus ine ss and proper

ty w as done i n ant ic ipa ti on of furthe r dis si pati ng myfrag il e financ ial co ndi ti on.

. . . . I und erst a n d thati f I w as forced to ar bit ra te my cl aim w it h the Am erican Arbitra tion [Associatio n], and my claim against Fox and Caballero w as $1,000, 000 t o $5, 0 0 0 ,000, I w oul d hav e to pay a fil ing free of $1,000, $ 7 , 8 0 0 p ro c e e d fe e [ , ] a n d $ 3 , 2 5 0 f in a l fe e
. I a ls o u n d e rs t a n d I wo u ld h a ve to pa y for o ne- hal f of

the arb it ra ti on fee, w hic h w oul d be $3,000 to $5 ,000 dollars. I c an no t pa y

t hi s
. F ox

t oo kmy $ 12 5, 00 0 pa y me ntfor t he n ursery as w ell as the nurser

y and I c annot afford the pay ment for the a rb it ra ti on. Fur ther , ac cordin g to an affidav itdate d F ebr uar y 5, Con treras further

tes ti fied th at: Attach e d hereto as Ex hib it“ 1" i s a n i nv oic e from t he Amer ic an Ar bit ra ti on As soc iat ion for $ 5,000. 00. It is m y unders tandi ng thatthi s i s t he “in it ial” fee to c ov er

i nit ial matte rs
. The Ar bit ra ti on i s s chedu led for September

7, 2010. I hav e no f u n d s to paythi s i nv oic e, or addi ti onal ar bit ra tor fees. I am cur re ntl y

unempl oy ed. I am c ur re ntl y recei v ing nomi nal18

unempl oy ment ben efits but suc h benefit s w il l be te rmi nated in the n ear future. Therefore, I am n ot ab le to pa y the ar bit ra ti on fees i f I am forc ed to arbitratio n in this ma tter. Con treras’ s c ounse l, Kev in W . Gri ll o, al so tes ti fied by aff ida v it , at tac hin g and inc or porati ng by referen ce a pa ge of the AAACo mm ercial Arbitration Rules explaining the app licable arbitratio n fees: To the e xtent Don nie C ontreras’ cl aim

. . . w as made as a c lai m in [an] AAA proce edin g, the claim of $1,0 00, 000 to $5, 000 ,00 0 w ould requ ire Donnie Con trer as to pa y

an i nit ial fil ing fee o f $1, 000, a proceed fee of $7,800 and a fi n a l fe e o f $ 3 , 2 5 0

. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e AAA s e l e c t e d a r b i t r a t o r ch ar g es $ 1 , 7 5 0

. 0 0 p e r d a y. Ac c o rd in g t o AAA ru le s , Co n t re ra s wo u ld h a ve t o p a y 1⁄2 of the ar bit ra ti on fees, w hic h for 3- 5 .

. . day s w oul d b e $2,6 25.00 to $4,375. 00. Both the U nit ed St ates and T e xas S u pr eme C our t hav e recog niz ed th at t he existence of

larg e arbitrat ion cost s could preclud e litig ant s f rom e f fectively v indicat ing their ri g hts i n an ar bit ra l forum. Gr een Tr ee Fi n. C or p. v . R andol ph , 531 U .S. 79, 9 0 ( 2000) ; In
re F ir stMer it Bank , N.A. , 52 S.W .3d a t 756

. W hil e nei ther co urt s peci fied how

deta il ed th e show ing of prohi bit iv e ex pense mustbe, the par ty oppos ing ar bit ra ti on mus t prov e the li kel iho od of i ncur ri ng su ch cos ts and produce some spec ifici nformati on s ubst anti ati ng the all eg ed c ost s. Green Tree Fin. Corp ., 531 U .S. at 90 ; In re Odysse y Healthca re, Inc. , 310 S.W .3d 4 19, 4 22 ( Tex . 201 0) ( or ig . proceed ing ) (p er cu ri am); In re Fi

rs tMer it Bank , N.A. , 52 S.W .3d at 75 6; see In r e D ecem ber

N ine C o. , 225 S .W .3d 693 , 702 (Tex. App. –El Pa so 200 6, orig. proceed ing). Spe cif ically , the party opp osing arbitration mustprodu ce ev ide nce re g ardin g the ex actco sts of ar bit ra ti on, s how thatthe cos ts ar e ex ces si v e, an d show thatthey

are notsp ecul ati v e i n nat ur e: Here, t he de los Sant oses tes ti fied, i n tw o s w or n aff ida v it s, that th e AAA charg ed a mini mum $ 2 ,0 0 0 fil ing fee and a $ 250/ day /par ty hear ing fee, alo ng w it h s e veral othe r unspe ci fied fees, for hear ing s b efore a19

three- member panel

. But w e need not deci de w hether these c ost s w oul d be ex ces si v e. As in Gr

een T re e , t he de los Santoses prov ide d no ev ide nce that the AAA w ould actua lly cond uct the arbitratio n or charge the specif ied fees. The Ar bit ra ti on Ad d e n d um does not sta te t hat t he AA A w il l condu ct the ar bit ra ti on, a nd i t mak es no menti on of ar bit ra ti on cos ts. W e al so note that t h e m o s tre c e n tA

AAco m m e rc ia l a rb it ra t io n ru le s p ro vid e t h a t“t h e A AAm a y, in the ev ent of extreme hardshi p on the p art of any par ty , defer or reduce the adm inistrative fe es.” Moreover, i n the ev entthe de los Sant oses d o notav ail themse lv es of

F irstM er itBank ’s ch oic e of ar bit ra tors, the F AA pe rmi ts the trial court to cho ose a n alte rnate set of arbitrato rs. T he de los San tose s also compl ain that the re q uirement of t hr ee ar bit ra tors is inh er entl y cos tl y. But again, w ithou t any specif ic info rm ation on w hatthe cost s w ill be, this re q uirement i s n ot ev ide nce of uncons ci onabi li ty

. Fi nal ly , in ag re ein g to the Add end um , Pete and Janie de los Sant o s a greed “that arbitra tion is a less expensive meth od o f

disput e resolut ion th at de crease s serv icing costs of this loa n .
. . .” Be caus e the record c ontai ns no s peci fic ev ide nce that the de l os Santos es w il l actu all y

be c harg ed ex ces si v e ar bit ra ti on fees, w e c oncl ude that there i s l eg all y

i nsuffici ent e v ide nce that the p lai nti ffs w oul d be deni ed access to arbitration base d on ex cessive costs. In r e F ir stMer it Bank , N.A. , 52 S.W .3d a t 756 -5 7; see In re U.S. Hom e Corp ., 236 S. W .3d 761, 764 ( Tex . 200 7) ( or ig . proceed ing ) (“ [T]he plai nti ffs pres ented no ev ide nce other than a sche dule of

the Am erican Arbitra tion As s o c ia tion’s usu al fees. Th is is noteno ugh”). Lawson v. Ar

cher , 267 S.W .3d 3 76, 3 84- 85 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 2008, no p et.) (h old ing that“ the record c ontai ns no ev ide nce from w hic h w e may conc lud e that al loc ati ng the costs o f

arbitration rende rs the arbitrat ion provision subst ant iv ely unco nscion able ”); TMI, Inc. , 225 S.W .3d a t 795- 96 (d eny ing ar bit ra ti on w here the cl aimant s had noti nit iat ed
ar bit ra ti on, t he arbi trati on prov is ion di d notl imi t t he c lai mants’ remedie s o r prov ide for fee splitt i ng , the claiman ts had not pre sent ed sp ecif ic ev iden ce regarding their inability to af ford
ar bit ra ti on ot her

than co ncl usor

y st atements , and the cas e present e d “ no publ icpol ic ies count er v ail ing the fact that Tex as law st ro ng ly fav ors a rb it ra ti on” ); Olshan Fo und . Repa ir Co. v. Ayala , 180 S.W .3d 2 12, 2 14- 16, &n.4 (Tex . Ap p.–San Antoni o 2005, pet. deni ed) (dete rmining tha t the trial court prop erly den ied arbitration w here the arbitratio n costs wereI n t he em pl oy er - em pl oy ee cont ext , t he T exas Supr em e has fu r t her concl uded t hat t her e i s “ not hi ng 2 th a t w o u ld p r e v e n t a r b itr a to r s f r o m f a ir ly a d j u s tin g
. . . e m p lo ye e c o s t p r o v is io n s w h e n n e c e s s a r y to a llo w f u ll vi nd i c ati on of s t atut ory ri gh t s i n t he arbi t ral forum

. ” I n re Pol y-Am er i ca , L

. P. , 262 S

. W

. 3d 337, 356
- 57 ( T ex. 2008)

. Accor di ng t o t he su pr em e cou r t , an “ ar bi t r at or i s bet t ersi t uat ed t o asse ss whet her t he cost pr ov i si on in th is c a s e w ill h in d e r e ff e c tiv e v in d ic a tio n o f[t h e c la im a n t’s ] s ta tu to r y r ig h ts a n d , ifs o , t o m o d if y th e c o n tr a c t’s t er m s accor di ngl y . ” Id .; see I n r e O dyssey Heal t hcare, I nc ., 3 1 0 S .W .3 d 4 1 9 , 4 2 2 -2 3 (T e x . 2 0 1 0 ). W e assum e, wi t hout deci di ng, t hat such a n ar gum ent i s app l i cabl e i n t he co nt ext of ar bi t r at i on o t her t han bet ween an e m pl oy er and em pl oy ee. W hi l e ar bi t r at or s ar e cap abl e of consi der i ng t he u nconsci onabi l i t y ofar bi t r al cost s, def er r i ng t hi s i ssue t o an ar bi t r at or assum es, as a m at t er of ci r cul ar l ogi c, t hat t he m at t er shou l d be a rb i tra te d . I n s te a d , i t w o u l d a p p e a r p re fe ra b l e th a t th e is s u e th a t l a rg e a rb i tra ti o n c o s ts c o u l d p re c l u d e l i ti g a n ts fr o m e ff e c ti v e l y vin d i c a ti n g th e i r rig h ts i n a n a rb i tra l fo ru m s h o u l d b e s u b m i tte d to , a n d d e c i d e d b y , th e c o u rts a s a g a te w a y m a tte r. M o re o v e r, d e fe rr i n g th e d e c i s i o n a s to th e a l l e g e d e x c e s s i v e n e s s a n d u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i ty oft he co st s of

ar bi t r at i on t o an ar bi t r at or i n a f ut ur e pr oceedi ng, wher e t he a r bi t r at or m i ght , or m i ght not , adj ust t he co st s, i s specu l at i v e an d f ai l s t o en sur e t hat a cl ai m ant i s not gi v i ng u p sub st ant i v e r i ght s i n an ar bi t r al fo ru m
. 20 alm ost th ree time s t he am oun t of t he origi nal cont ract at issue, and t he claima nts’ sha re of the arb itration costs w as over tw ent y -f iv e pe rcent of the fam ily ’s annu al gross incom e). In s hor t, to av oid ar bit ra ti on based on the u ncons ci onabi li ty of ex ces si v e c ost s, the p arty oppos ing ar bit ra ti on mus t s how thathi s a bil ity

to pursu e h is c lai m in the ar bit ra l forum hin g es upon hi s p ay ment of the est imat ed c ost s. In re Pol y- Am er ic a, L. P. , 262 S.W .3d a t 349. 2 W hile w e do not con clude thatapp ellees have esta blished unco nscion ability, w e are mi n d fu l o f t h e T e x a s S u p r e me C o u rt ' s a d mo nit i o n t h a ta “ c o n t r a c ti s u n e n fo r c e a b l e i f,

‘ g i v e n t h e p a rt i e s ’ g e n e r a l c o mm e r c i a l b a c k g ro u n d a n d t h e c o mm e r c i a l n e e d s o f t he par ti cul ar trade or cas e, the cl ause inv olv ed is so one- si ded that iti s u ncons ci onabl e under the circumsta nces e x isting w hen the pa rties ma de th e con tract.’” Id. at34 8 (quo ti n g In re Fi rs tMer it Bank , 5 2 S. W .3 d a t 7 5 7 , a n d cit in g In r e Hall ibu rton C o. , 80 S.W .3d 5 66, 5 71 (Tex . 200 2) ); see a lso Olshan Foundation Repair , 180 S.W .3d at 214 ( w hen rev iew ing “ the t ri a l c o u rt ' s d e c is io n co n c e rn in g t h e u n c o n s c io n a b il it y o f a n a rb it ra t io n a gr e e m e n t

. . . we defer t o the tr ial co urt' s fact ual dete rmi nati ons” ). Ap ply ing thi s g uid eli ne i n the co ntext of the s tandard of r e view as di sc uss ed by the In r e Jebbi a and In r

e J imWalter

Hom es21

deci si ons, w e c oncl ude t hat a ppel lee s h av e rai se d a n i ss ue of mater ial fact reg ardin g unco nscion ability base d on the foregoing mat ters. Accor d in gl y , the trial court erred in failing to hold an ev iden tiaryh earing o n the a rbitrability of t he instan t dispu te. W e susta in app ellant s’ elev ent h issue and o v errule the ir sixth issue. B ecau se w e have reach ed th is
conc lus ion , w e need not a ddress appel lee s’ othe r all eged d efenses to t he ar bit ra ti on agreem ent , such as f raud , altho ugh w e not e tha t the se oth er d efense s m ay also require further ev ide nti ar

y hea rin g. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47 .1. W e also ne ed n ot ad dress Bi z match’ s a ddi ti onal i ss ue on appeal

. See i d. V. C ONCL US I ON Beca use the mat er ial facts nec ess ar y to deter mine the v ali dity of the a rb itra ti on ag re ement w er e controv erted byaff ida v itand other admi ss ibl e ev ide nce, the tr ial co urt w as re q uired to co nductan e v ide nti ar y hear ing on t he moti on to compel ar bit ra ti on. See Jack B. An glin Co., In c. , 842 S.W .2d a t 269 ; see also In re W hitfield , 1 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 3 , 7 5 5 (T e x. App.–B eaumont 2003, or ig . proceed ing ). T he p etition for w rit of

man dam us in cause n u m b e r 1 3 -10-00 150 -CV is DENIED. In cau se nu mb er 13-10 -001 25-CV, th e orde r of t he trial cou rt is REVERSE D and th e cau se is RE MA ND ED

. The tr ial cour t i s i nst ru cte d to condu ct an ev ide nti ar y hear ing co nsi ste nt
w it h thi s o pin ion

. See Jack B. Angl in Co. , 842 S.W .2d a t 269

.

NE LDA V. RO DR IGU EZ J u s t i c e Del iv er ed and filed the 31st day of Aug ust , 201 0.