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THE REBALANCE TO ASIA:

WHY SOUTH ASIA MATTERS (PART I)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau for South and 

Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 14

Mr. Joseph Y. Yun, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Ohio, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 9

The Honorable Robert O. Blake: Prepared statement .......................................... 16

Mr. Joseph Y. Yun: Prepared statement ............................................................... 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

(1)

THE REBALANCE TO ASIA:

WHY SOUTH ASIA MATTERS (PART I) 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everybody 

to our first meeting of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific. I want to welcome all of my colleagues, as I say, 

to the very first hearing this Congress. 

I want to acknowledge my friend from American Samoa, the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega. Eni, it has been a 

pleasure working with you over the years, and I welcome the opportunity now to sit side by side with you on this committee. I look 

forward to the opportunity to work with you. Eni and I actually 

were the representatives from the House of Representatives to the 

U.N. for a year right after 2001, the attack on our Nation, for 

about a year or so. It was an interesting time, and we have been 

friends for a long time now. Even though we are different parties, 

we actually do get along in this institution. 

It is a very critical time for Asia, and I know we will have plenty 

of work ahead of us over the next couple of years. I would also like 

to welcome all of our new freshmen members, which is actually a 

majority of the members of this committee, so we welcome all of 

them to the Congress. We are looking forward to working with each 

and every one of them and hope that they will enjoy serving on this 

subcommittee, both Democrats and Republicans. 

I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses: Assistant Secretary Robert Blake and Acting Assistant Secretary Joseph 

Yun. 

Before we begin, the ranking member and I will make opening 

statements. Other members will be given 1 minute to make a statement if they should choose to do so, and then we will get to the 

witnesses. 

Last Congress, I was honored to serve as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, which was a truly 

rewarding experience—it was a time of both great opportunities 

and tragedy. 

2

As the new chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 

I am happy to announce that South Asia is once again under the 

jurisdiction of this committee, the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee. 

Historically and culturally, I think combining the two makes sense. 

They share transnational threats from terrorism and natural disasters to nuclear proliferation and human rights abuses. 

In November 2011, the Obama administration detailed its plan 

to strengthen American engagement and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve regional security, promote U.S. values, and increase economic prosperity. This strategic rebalance toward Asia is also viewed by many as an attempt by the United 

States to address the growing political and military influences of 

China. 

Examining the administration’s efforts to create a more integrated approach to the region over the past 2 years, much of the 

focus has been on East Asia and Southeast Asia. We see this 

through the improved military relations with Philippines, South 

Korea, and Japan; the opening of a Marine base in Darwin, Australia; and the positioning of littoral combat ships in Singapore. We 

also witnessed this in Burma following the opening of its borders 

to the world and its pursuit of democratic reforms in which the 

United States has played a key role; and also in the ongoing TransPacific Partnership Agreement negotiations that aim to create a 

high standard free trade agreement linking the Asia-Pacific region. 

While there have been successes, it seems many of the priorities 

and goals described in the ‘‘pivot’’ are more ambitious rhetoric than 

detailed plans describing how to achieve long-term sustainable results. And one area that we see a disparity in is a subregion that 

has been largely neglected from the rebalance strategy that is 

South Asia. 

Straddling the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Java 

and South China Seas, South Asia bridges a world fraught with 

uprisings and civil strife to one that will drive global politics and 

the world’s economy. It consists of the world’s largest democracy, 

second most populous nation, one of the poorest countries, and one 

of the youngest overall demographics. As the center of the Indian 

Ocean Rim-land that extends from the Middle East to India and 

south to Indonesia, South Asia is a subregion in need of strategic 

stability. 

The scene of a power struggle for energy and security, the Indian 

Ocean maritime region holds the world’s most important shipping 

and trade routes, accounting for 70 percent of petroleum product 

shipments and half of the world’s container traffic. It is in the recognition of this region’s importance that the rivalry between China 

and India is interlocked with a rivalry between the United States 

and China. 

The rise of China, India, and other Asian nations, and the rapid 

growth and seaborne trade and dependence upon imported energy 

from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca, has resulted 

in the unification of the Indian Ocean maritime region to the Pacific as one geostrategic space, in what some refer to as the ‘‘IndoPacific’’ region. 

Secretary Clinton used ‘‘Indo-Pacific’’ for the first time in November of last year to describe the integration of South Asia as part 

3

of the United States’ broader strategic rebalance to Asia. I welcome 

this as a sign that India and the broader region will play a more 

critical role going forward. I do not believe the ‘‘pivot’’ will succeed 

unless the U.S. does more to build stronger relationships in South 

Asia and with India, in particular. 

India’s cultural influence, pluralistic society, democratic government, and growing military power place India in the position to 

take advantage of future economic growth in East and Southeast 

Asia, while also contributing to regional security and achieving national security interests that both India and the U.S. share. 

While we have seen progress in certain areas of the U.S.-India 

relationship, many arenas are at a state of frustrating impasse. 

This is partly due to the divergence of various objectives in the region, historical distrust, and India’s determination to maintain 

strategic autonomy. These concerns raise many questions about 

how to move forward; however, these obstacles should not impede 

efforts to place the U.S.-India relationship as a key feature of the 

broader U.S. strategy in Asia. 

The administration stated in December 2012 that its ‘‘strategic 

rebalancing to Asia will continue with renewed vigor,’’ and that 

‘‘U.S. engagement in South Asia would be central to the reinvigorated outreach.’’ I hope the witnesses here today will elaborate on 

this statement and discuss how the administration is planning to 

continue the rebalance with a stronger focus on South Asia, not forgetting U.S. engagement with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the 

Maldives, and Pakistan, and further elaborate on specific actions or 

commitments it plans to take in this effort to achieve more tangible 

results. 

I now yield to the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. 

Faleomavaega, for a 5-minute opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chabot follows:]

4


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<!Committee on jforei(tlt ~(fair% 

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February 26,2013 

The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1) 

Chairman Steve Chabot (R-OH) 

Opening Statement 

Last Congress, I was honored to serve as Chainnan of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia, which was a truly rewarding experience filled with both great opportunities and 

tragedies. As the new Chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I am happy to 

announce that South Asia is once again under the jurisdiction of the Asia Subcommittee. 

Historically and culturally, I think combining the two makes sense. They share transnational 

threats from terrorism and natural disasters to nuclear proliferation and human rights abuses. 

In November 2011, the Obama Administration detailed its plan to strengthen American 

engagement and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region in order improve regional security, 

promote U.S. values, and increase economic prosperity. This strategic rebalance toward Asia is 

also viewed by many as an attempt by the United States to address the growing political and 

military influences of China. Examining the Administration's efforts to create a more integrated 

approach to the region over the past two years, much of the focus has been on East and Southeast 

Asia. We see this through the improved military relationships with the Philippines, South Korea, 

and Japan; the opening ofa Marine base in Darwin, Australia; and the positioning of littoral 

combat ships in Singapore. We also witnessed this in Bunna following the opening of its 

borders to the world and its pursuit of democratic refonns in which the U.S. has played a key 

role in; and also in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations that aim to 

create a high-standard free trade agreement linking the Asia-Pacific region. 

While there have been successes, it seems many of the priorities and goals described in the 

"pivot" are more ambitious rhetoric than detailed plans describing how to achieve long-tenn, 

sustainable results. One area that we see a disparity is in a subregion that has been largely 

neglected from the rebalance strategy---South Asia. 

Straddling the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Java and South China Seas, South Asia 

bridges a world fraught with uprisings and civil strife to one that will drive global politics and 

the world's economy. It consists of the world's largest democracy, second most populous 

nation, one of the poorest countries, and one of the youngest overall demographics. As the 
5


79579d-2.eps

center of the Indian Ocean rim-land that extends from the Middle East to India and south to 

Indonesia, South Asia is a subregion in need of strategic stability. 

The scene of a power struggle for energy security, the Indian Ocean maritime region holds the 

world's most important shipping and trade routes, accounting for 70 percent of petroleum 

product shipments and half the world's container traffic. It is in recognition of this region's 

importance that has created an intense rivalry between India and China. The rise of China, India 

and other Asian nations, and the rapid growth in seaborne trade and dependence upon imported 

energy from the Indian Ocean through the Straits ofMalacca, has resulted in the unification of 

the Indian Ocean maritime region to the Pacific as one geostrategic space-in what some refer to 

as the "Indo-Pacific" region. 

Secretary Clinton used "Indo-Pacific" for the first time in November of last year to describe the 

integration of South Asia as part of the United States' broader strategic rebalance to Asia. I 

welcome this as a sign that India and the broader region will playa more critical role going 

forward. I do not believe the "pivot" will succeed unless the U.S. does more to build stronger 

relationships in South Asia and with India, in particular. 

India's cultural influence, pluralistic society, democratic government, and growing military 

power place India in a position to take advantage of future economic growth in East and 

Southeast Asia, while also contributing to regional security and achieving national security 

interests that both India and the U.S. share. While we have seen progress in certain areas of the 

U.S.-India relationship, many areas are at a state of frustrating impasse. This is partly due to the 

divergence of various objectives in the region, historical distrust, and India's detennination to 

maintain strategic autonomy. These concerns raise many questions about how to move forward; 

however, these obstacles should not impede efforts to place the U.S.-India relationship as a key 

feature of the broader U.S. strategy in Asia. 

The Administration stated in December 2012 that its "strategic rebalancing to Asia will continue 

with renewed vigor" and that "U.S. engagement in South Asia" would be central to this 

reinvigorated outreach. I hope the witnesses here today will elaborate on this statement and 

discuss how the Administration is planning to continue the rebalance with a stronger focus on 

South Asia, not forgetting U.S. engagement with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the 

Maldives, and further elaborate on specific actions or commitments it plans to take in this effort 

to achieve more tangible results. 

2 
6

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly 

want to say for the record how pleased I am and what an honor 

it is for me personally to have you as the chairman of this important subcommittee. 

And I also want to welcome our colleagues in the subcommittee 

as we will be discussing and I am sure dialoguing some very important issues affecting this region of the world. 

I also want to offer my personal welcome to the two gentlemen 

who will be testifying before our subcommittee. In all the years 

that I have been here, Mr. Chairman, this is the first time in history that we have had now two Assistant Secretaries testifying before this committee. So I am really, really blessed and very, very 

happy to see Secretary Blake and also Secretary Yun here with us 

this morning. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. I cannot think of a 

better subject or issue that we should be discussing. As I have said 

for many years—in the years that I have served on this committee—my personal opinion, nobody wanted to talk about Asia-Pacific issues because the entire mentality here in Washington, both 

in the Congress and previous administrations, leaned toward Europe and the Middle East. If we weren’t bashing the Chinese, we 

were bashing the Japanese, nothing passive in terms of our looking 

at the Asia-Pacific region as an important and integral part of 

what should be our relationship with this region. 

Today we are playing catchup in a region that accounts for more 

than 60 percent of the world’s population. In 2011, the Asia-Pacific 

region surpassed Europe to become the top exporter of merchandise. Two years ago, or 2010—I am sorry—the world’s top container 

ports were in the Asia-Pacific region, including the top five container ports in the world are in the Asia-Pacific region. 

I remember a couple of years ago, the late Senator Daniel Inouye 

made an observation that for every 747 that flies across the Atlantic, four 747s fly in between the Pacific and the United States. The 

U.S. has a vital interest in making sure there is a free flow of global trade and commerce through the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. 

The Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes 

in the world. Thousands of vessels pass through the strait per year, 

carrying about one-quarter of the world’s traded goods, including 

oil, about a quarter of the oil carried by sea passage through the 

strait. 

I might also comment, Mr. Chairman, that another very important strait that is connected through the Indian Ocean is the Strait 

of Hormuz between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We need to remember 

that as well. 

For the first time since 1979, Iran naval forces just crossed the 

Strait of Malacca and will dock in China, India, or Sri Lanka. 

Regarding Sri Lanka, Mr. Chairman, I agree with the Gary 

Luger congressional report, which declares we need to rechart U.S. 

strategy in Sri Lanka beyond humanitarian and political reforms. 

The U.S. simply cannot afford to lose Sri Lanka due to its strategic 

importance. 

Last week I had the privilege of visiting Sri Lanka. I met with 

President Rajapaksa for more than 2 hours. I also met with governor of the northern province and personally visited Jaffna beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\022613\79579 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

cause I wanted to see for myself the post-conflict development since 

2009, when Sri Lanka finally became the first country in the world 

to eradicate terrorism on its own soil by defeating the Tamil Tigers, 

which remains listed as a terrorist organization by 32 countries, including our own country, Mr. Chairman, India, Canada, and members of the European Union, and dubbed by the FBI as one of the 

most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world. 

After a 30-year terrorist conflict or war, the challenges the Sri 

Lankan Government faces are enormous, but the strides the government has made to rebuild in a way that establishes lasting 

peace and equality for all citizens should be firmly acknowledged. 

The United States should join Australia in praising the work the 

Sri Lankan Government has done in the north and east of the island in such a short period since the war, as Australian deputy opposition leader Julie Bishop and the parliamentary delegation she 

led recently stated on their visit. 

Regrettably, in the resolution it intends to submit again to the 

United Nations Human Rights Council, the U.S. fails to mention 

one, not even one, positive development for Sri Lanka. Such failure 

suggests that the United States is not being evenhanded when it 

comes to dealing with sensitive human rights issues across the 

globe. 

And I am, Mr. Chairman, deeply concerned that our inconsistent 

policies, which lead to a loss of credibility for the United States, 

which will negatively impact our relations in the Asia-Pacific region for years to come. 

So I call upon my Government, the United States of America, to 

find a better way forward, rather than using the United Nations 

resolutions to destabilize developing nations and Sri Lanka while 

ignoring human rights abuses in nations like in Asia, where our 

geopolitical, strategic, and military interests supersede our human 

rights agenda. 

The U.S.-led United Nations resolution should also be withdrawn 

for focusing only on the last few months of the war and failing to 

acknowledge, therefore, almost 30 years, Mr. Chairman, the Tamil 

Tigers hacked to death innocent women, men, women, and children, in Sri Lanka; carried out some 378 suicide attacks, more than 

any other terrorist organization in the world. 

We also do not need to criticize Sri Lanka for borrowing money 

from China. And, by the way, I was there, Mr. Chairman. In terms 

of our ability to provide assistance to these Third World countries, 

China was able to provide Sri Lanka with $500 million of low-interest loans for them to rebuild their seaport as well as the brand new 

international airport that I was there to witness. 

I also want to suggest that it is time for our Government to begin 

a dialogue with the Chief Minister Modi, the Chief Minister Modi, 

who may well be the next prime minister for India. The U.S.-India 

relationship is significant, as you have commented in your statement, Mr. Chairman. It is one of the defining partnerships of the 

21st century. And Chief Minister Modi is a leading figure in that 

process. 

Chief Minister Modi’s philosophy of bringing development to the 

doorstep of every poor person, every farmer, every worker is a philosophy that transcends caste, culture, regional, and religious difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\022613\79579 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

ferences, and has led to a decade of unprecedented growth and development in the province of the State of Gujarat, a key state, 

which has contributed considerably to India’s economy and development. Companies like Ford and General Motors are setting up factories in Gujarat and in a move that promises to strengthen U.S.-

India relations now and in the years to come. 

I note my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I will leave the rest for another opportunity, but I do want to thank you and thank my colleagues for their attendance at this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

9


79579c-1.eps

Mr. Chairman: 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

ENI F.R. F ALEOMA V AEGA (D-AS) 

RANKING MEMBER 

The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1) 

February 26, 2013 

Thank you for holding this important hearing. As I have said for many, many years, the United 

States has neglected Asia and the Pacific at the expense of Europe and the Middle East and 

consequently we have placed our strategic, economic and political interests in jeopardy. 

Today, we are playing catch-up in a region that accounts for more than 60% of the world's 

population. In 2011, the Asia-Pacific region surpassed Europe to become the top exporter of 

merchandise. In 2010,20 of the world's top container ports were in the Asia-Pacific region, 

including the top five 

The U.S. has a vital interest in making sure there is a free flow of global trade and commerce 

through the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. The Strait of Malacca is one of the most important 

shipping lanes in the world. Thousands ofvessels pass through the strait per year, carrying about 

one-quarter of the world's traded goods, including oil. About a quarter of all oil carried by sea 

passes through the strait 

For the first time since 1979, Iran Naval forces just crossed the Strait of Mal ace a and will dock 

in China, India or Sri Lanka. Regarding Sri Lanka, I agree with the Kerry-Lugar Congressional 

report which declares the need to "re-chart" U.S strategy in Sri Lanka beyond humanitarian and 

political concerns The U.S. simply cannot afford to lose Sri Lanka due to its strategic 

importance 

Last week, 1 visited Sri Lanka and met with President Rajapaksa for more than 2 hours. 1 also 

met with the Governor of the Northern Province and personally visited Jaffna because I wanted 

to see for myself post-conflict developments since 2009 when Sri Lanka became the first country 

to eradicate terrorism on its own soil by defeating the Tamil Tigers which remains listed as a 

terrorist organization by 32 countries, including the United States, India, Canada and member 

nations of the European Union, and dubbed by the FBI as one of the most ruthless in the world. 
10


79579c-2.eps

After a 30-year terrorist conflict, the challenges the Sri Lankan government faces are enormous 

but the strides the government has made to rebuild in a way that establishes lasting peace and 

equality for all citizens should be firmly acknowledged. The United States should join Australia 

in praising the work the Sri Lankan government has done in the North and East of the island in 

such a short period since the war, as Australian Deputy Opposition Leader Julie Bishop and the 

parliamentary delegation that she led recently stated upon their visit 

Regrettably, in the resolution it intends to submit again to the UN Human Rights Council, the 

U.S. fails to mention one positive development in Sri Lanka. Such failure suggests that the 

United States is not being even-handed when it comes to dealing with sensitive human rights 

issues across the globe and I am deepl y concerned that our inconsistent policies will lead to a 

loss of credibility for the United States which will negatively impact our relations in the Asia 

Pacific region for years to come. 

So I call upon the U.S. to find a better way forward rather than using UN resolutions to destabilize developing nations like Sri Lanka while ignoring human rights abuses in nations like 

Indonesia where our geopolitical interests supersede our human rights agenda. The U.S.-led UN 

resolution also should be withdrawn for focusing only on the last few months of the war and 

failing to acknowledge that for almost 30 years the Tamil Tigers hacked to death innocent men, 

women and children - Sinhalese and Tamils alike - and carried out over 378 suicide attacksmore than any other such organization in the world. 

We also do not need to criticize Sri Lanka for borrowing money from China to build its port. If 

the U.S or India had stepped up to assist, Sri Lanka would have accepted the assistance. As 

President Rajapakse said during a July 2009 interview with TIME Magazine when asked about 

China's strategic interest in the port, "I asked for it. China didn't propose it. It was not a 

Chinese proposal. The proposal was from us; they gave the money. IfIndia said, 'Yes, we'll 

give you a port', I will gladly accept it If America says, 'We will give you a fully equipped 

airport' - yes, why not? Unfortunately, they are not offering to us." 

I also want to suggest that it time for the U.S. to begin a dialogue with Chief Minister Modi of 

India's Gujarat State who may very well be India's next Prime Minister. The U.S.-India 

relationship is significant It is one of the defining partnerships of the 21 ,t century, and CM 

Modi is a leading figure 

CM Modi's philosophy of bringing development to "the doorstep of every poor person, every 

farmer, every worker" is a philosophy that transcends caste, culture, regional and religious 

differences and has led to a decade of unprecedented growth and development in Gujarat - a key 

State - which has contributed considerably to India's economy. 

Companies like Ford and General Motors are setting up factories in Gujarat in a move that 

promises to strengthen U.S.-India trade and investment. And with delegates from more than 121 

countries attending the Vibrant Gujarat 2013 Summit to explore business opportunities and forge 

strategic partnerships, it could be argued that Gujarat - an economic powerhouse - is now the 

global gateway to India. 
11


79579c-3.eps

While I am aware of the 2002 communal riots and see eye to eye with the national and 

international community that what happened calls for justice and accountability, the fact remains 

that after an investigation that has been ongoing for almost a decade, India's Supreme Court has 

not found any evidence against CM Modi So I question the Supreme Court's recent decision to 

allow for a new petition to be put forward. 

I believe such action is politically motivated and that the U.S. should shift its attitude and extend 

the hand offriendship to CM Modi, just as the European Union and the UK are doing, given that 

CM Modi is the frontrunner among the Bharatiya Janata Party's prime ministerial candidates and 

that India is essential for the success of the U. S. rebalance to Asia. 

It is my sincere hope that the Administration will also re-consider its budget priorities While 

touting a re-balance to Asia, the FY20\3 budget included a five percent decrease for East Asia 

and the Pacific and a seven percent decrease for South Asia when compared to FY 2012 

spending levels. I hope funding in 2014 will be increased, and I also hope the U.S. will get 

serious about approving its Compact with Palau. 
12

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will recognize back and forth, as all the committees 

do. We go by seniority, although we do go by who was here when 

the meeting actually began at that point and then seniority from 

there. That is the list I have, so that is the reason I will be calling 

in the order that I am at this point. 

We will now hear from anyone who has a 1-minute opening 

statement. We will first go to Representative Holding from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

today. And thank you to the witnesses for your time and your testimonies that we are going to hear. 

You know there has been a lot of rhetoric put forward from this 

administration about a so-called pivot toward Asia and the Pacific, 

but, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that that rhetoric has largely 

remained just that: Rhetoric. The United States has always maintained an interest in the Asian and Indo-Pacific regions. This includes economic interests in established and emerging markets but 

one that also includes strategic defense, national security interests, 

one that has once again been reinforced by recent actions in North 

Korea. Any move toward the Asia-Pacific region must ensure both 

interests are given close and careful consideration. 

I look forward to getting the answers to numerous questions that 

remain from this administration regarding the pivot and especially 

those policies impacting Southeast Asia. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 1 

minute for an opening statement. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, for 

calling this hearing. Thank you to the witnesses. 

America’s pivot to Asia is critical at this juncture and is a much 

needed evolution of our foreign policy, particularly out shift to 

South Asia as we look at building a critical strategy around our relationship with India. 

The U.S.-Indian relationship is critical and vital to us, both economically and strategically. And we find ourselves at a moment in 

time when we are going to be drawing down our troops in Afghanistan. India has a critical role in holding onto and maintaining some 

of the gains that we have made. India has a critical role in helping 

anchor stability in that region. 

Economically, you know, trade with India is vital. From my home 

state, California, we export over $3.7 billion annually. And that is 

just the tip of the iceberg. If we can strengthen our trading relationship and open up India’s export markets, this will be very strategic in a bilateral way to both countries. 

I look forward to hearing both of the witnesses talk about this 

strategic relationship. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for agreeing to testify and, of course, all of 

the guests as well. I am privileged to be here. 

13

And I, too, agree with the administration’s pivot on policy to this 

region, but it cannot be one of rhetoric only. It has to be one of action and robust action. We must, I think, provide confidence to our 

allies and friends in the region while recognizing the interests of 

China, but we need to also urge them to be responsible partners 

with all of their neighbors regarding trade, human rights, and military activity. And I look forward to your testimony in that regard. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman from California is recognized. Mr. 

Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is important to support the pivot to the AsiaPacific region as to our diplomatic resources, but if it includes a 

pivot involving our military resources, we should reflect on the fact 

that we already have nearly 100,000 ground troops in the region, 

that confronting China over the islands it disputes with Japan 

could involve resources involving many tens of billions of dollars 

and that Japan itself has not devoted all that much in the way of 

economic resources to the defense of these islands. 

The United States’ relationship with India is based on a shared 

commitment to democracy. Both nations have suffered from terrorism. And the U.S.-India relationship I think will be pivotal, both 

economically and strategically. 

This committee strongly supported, sent to the floor, and passed 

through the House a bill that included a provision calling for Voice 

of America broadcasts in the Sindi language. And I hope that we 

will reach out to the people of Pakistan in the languages they 

speak, not just the languages spoken by the government officially. 

And I look forward to hearing the testimony. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messer, is recognized. 

Mr. MESSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member. Thank 

you to the witnesses. I appreciate this opportunity to be here to 

learn more about the Indo-Pacific region. Obviously it has very important implications for our national security but also the American economy. 

I represent 19 small towns in eastern and southeastern Indiana, 

many of them with an agricultural or manufacturing-based economy. The countries in this region have companies doing business 

over in my area of the world. It is important we maintain those relationships as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard, is recognized for a 

minute. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Faleomavaega for convening this important hearing. 

And please do hear the resolve from my colleagues talking about 

robust action, not rhetoric, as we look toward this pivot, toward 

Asia and the Pacific. Coming from Hawaii, these exchanges and 

partnerships and friendships between countries across the Pacific 

and Asia, South Asia in particular, are really a way of life for us 

in Hawaii, both economically and culturally, and understand how 

this is vital, strategic, and really related to security now for our 

14

country and that we have to remain committed to engaging these 

nations. 

I have personally involved with engagements, including with the 

National Guard; been witness to many of the military exchanges 

and the economic and educational and cultural exchanges that 

have done volumes for us as a country; and look forward to being 

able to continue that work and hearing from our witnesses today. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel here this 

afternoon. We will begin with Ambassador Robert Blake, who is the 

Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia at the U.S. State 

Department. As Assistant Secretary, he oversees U.S. foreign policy 

with India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives, Bhutan, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 

Tajikistan. He previously served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka and 

Maldives from 2006 to mid-2009, and deputy of chief of mission at 

the U.S. Mission in New Delhi, India from 2003 to 2006. Since entering the Foreign Service in 1985, he has served at the American 

Embassies in Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt. We welcome 

you here this afternoon. 

I would now like to introduce Mr. Joseph Yun, who is currently 

Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, also at the 

State Department. He was previously Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs under 

Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell before he left just a couple of 

weeks ago. Since entering the Foreign Service in 1985, Mr. Yun 

has served at American Embassies in the Republic of Korea, Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 

Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record. We would ask that each of the witnesses keep their presentations as close to 5 minutes as possible. 

We also have a lighting system. You will get a yellow light when 

you have 1 minute. When the red light comes on, we would appreciate if you would wrap up. 

So we will begin with you, Ambassador Blake. 

Mr. BLAKE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

thanks as well to the ranking member and to all of the members 

of this committee for inviting me here today. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. BLAKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLAKE. Let me say at the outset that it has been a privilege 

and a pleasure to work with you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member, over the last several years. I look forward to continuing 

that very close cooperation. 

Before I begin, I want to just congratulate the committee on the 

reorganization of the subcommittee to include South Asia together 

with the East Asia and Pacific region. Many of the policies that we 

have been promoting in the region over the past few years reinforce 

the subcommittee’s new organizational structure. So we see this as 

a positive development that will help us to address the challenges 

and the opportunities presented by this dynamic part of the world. 

15

One quick note. The South Asia region that I cover consists of 

India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and the Maldives. So 

while Afghanistan and Pakistan, of course, play a large role in 

South Asia, my remarks here today will focus mostly on India, the 

Asia-Pacific, and the greater connectivity between the two. This is 

also reflected in the more comprehensive written statement that I 

have submitted for the record. 

Mr. Chairman, to fully understand why South Asia matters, we 

need to first look at the Asia-Pacific as a single geographically coherent space, one that not only ends on our own shores but also 

expands westward to encompass the Indian subcontinent. Much of 

the history of the 21st century will be written in this broader AsiaPacific region, projected to become home to over 5.2 billion people 

by 2050. That history will have a profound impact on the people 

and the economy of the United States. 

Any discussion of South Asia has to start with India. It is one 

of our most trusted and valuable partners in the region and, really, 

the foundation upon which greater regional economic cooperation 

and expansion will be built. 

Our relationship, from our burgeoning trade to defense sales and 

exercises to our growing education and clean energy partnerships, 

has never been stronger. Just think about how far India has come 

in the past 20 years, with a GDP 10 times what it was in 1993. 

What was then a closed economy is now the 13th largest trading 

partner of the United States in goods. And by 2025, India is projected to become the world’s third largest economy. With that 

growth will come enormous resource constraints, particularly in infrastructure. Current estimates suggest that 80 percent of the infrastructure required to sustain and support India in 2025 has yet 

to be built. So we see an enormous opportunity in this growth to 

deepen our commercial partnership with India, working together 

with American companies to build the airports, power plants, water 

and sanitation systems, and fiber optic networks of India’s future. 

Although the U.S.-India relationship is a topic that could easily 

take up our entire afternoon, I would like to quickly shift our focus 

to India’s immediate neighborhood, a region where prospects for 

economic growth loom larger than anywhere on Earth. Thanks in 

part to Burma’s recent political and economic reforms, we now see 

unprecedented opportunities for trade and engagement between 

South and East Asia. 

Nowhere are those opportunities more pronounced than along 

the emergent air, road, and sea links between India, Bangladesh, 

Burma, and the rapidly expanding economies of the Association of 

South East Asian Nations. In the past year alone, trade between 

India and the countries of Southeast Asia has increased by 37 percent. This emerging Indo-Pacific economic corridor isn’t just a boon 

for the region. It provides American businesses with substantial 

new markets. 

Mr. Chairman, just a few words in closing. We are bullish on the 

future of this region, but we are also clear-eyed about the challenges that we face: Terrorism, such as we saw last week in 

Hyderabad; regional rivalries; nuclear proliferation; refugees; 

human trafficking; and the potentially catastrophic effects of global 

climate change. But the architecture of cooperation we are building 

16

together with the countries of the region is helping meet these 

challenges. And we continue to view South and Southeast Asia, including the Indian Ocean, as a crucial driver for America’s economic growth and prosperity. We must continue building the regional and bilateral partnerships at the heart of a more stable, 

prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific so that our own country 

can continue to grow and prosper in the 21st century. 

So I thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]


79579a-1.eps
17


79579a-2.eps

The United States' strong geopolitical focus on Asia is a wholc-of-govemment 

acknowledgement that, over the next eentUlY, events in Asia - from Delhi to 

Beijing - will drive global politics and economics, And while it may not get the 

same attention as our relationships with the countries of East Asia, US, 

engagement in South Asia remains central to our reinvigorated outreach to the 

t:nti re continent 

Throughout the Asia-Pacific, economics - alongside more traditional fonns of 

national power - are increasingly shaping the strategic landscape, Regional 

powers like India and China are gaining strength by putting economics at the 

center of their foreign policies, focusing on economic growth even more than the 

size oftheir armies, As these countries successfully use the growing size of their 

economies to project global power, we need to ensure that our policies remain 

focused on an Asia-Pacific defined by economic openness, democratic governance, 

and political freedom, because an Asia-Pacific rooted in peaceful and predictable 

patterns of behavior will ultimately bolster our own growth and security, 

This is particularly tme as we look to the future, where rising powers like India and 

China will increasingly shape the global system Acconm10dating this new center 

of gravity in global affairs will not always be smooth or easy, but T believe we can 

chart a path in this region that avoids conflict and that builds on the areas where 

our interests align, strengthening the region's stability and its (and our own) 

prosperity, A key, perhaps the key, to this rests in deeper economic cooperation 

and integration, not only between the United States and the region, but between the 

regional powers themselves, 

III. India: Anchor of Growth 

So, when looking at why South Asia matters, there is probably no better place to 

start than India, It is one of our most tmsted and valuable partners in the region, 

and really the foundation upon which greater regional economic cooperation and 

expansion will be built I have been working on U,S,-India relations for a decade 

now, and I can tell you that our relationship, from defense sales and exercises to 

our growing education and clean energy partnerships, has never been stronger, 

Increasing Indian prosperity has only strengthened our bonds of shared democratic 

values, C011U110n regional priorities, and a joint vision for a more secure and 

prosperous future, Just think about how far India has come in the past 20 years, 

with a GDP 10 times what it was in 1993, What was then a closed economy is 

now the United States' 13th largest trading partner in goods, As the Indian market 
18


79579a-3.eps

continues to open and integrate more fully with the global economy, the future 

looks even brighter. In Standard Chartered has called India "the driver 

the current ,global "projecting that the Indian economy could reach 

$30 t1illion in 2030, up from only $1.6 trillion two years ago. This expanding 

economic base, which includes everything from high-tech and media to finance 

and tourism, could be even larger if the Indian government addressed policy and 

regulatory restrictions that constrain imports from the US. and elsewhere. 

With this growth will come enormous resource constraints, particularly in 

infrastructure. Current estimates suggest that 80 percent of the infrastructure 

required to sustain and support India in 2030 has yet to be built. The United States 

is home to some of the most competitive road, bridge, water supply, electrical grid, 

and telecommunications companies in the world. So we see an enomlOUS 

opportlllity in this growth to deepen our commercial partnership with India, 

working together with American companies to build the airports, power plants, 

water and sanitation systems, and fiber optic networks ofIndia's future. 

Of course, the extent of our economic relationship with India isn't just confined to 

infrastructure development With a population of 1.2 billion and a fast-growing 

middle class, India is already an enormous market for US. goods and services. 

Proof ofthis potential lies in our trade relationship: from 2002 to 2011, U.S. 

services exports to India more than tripled, while goods exports to India 

quintupled. If trade continues to expand at this pace, total two-way trade in goods 

and services between India and the United States may surpass $100 billion in 2013, 

for the first year on record. 

Simply put American companies are open for business in India. 

Outside of our robust economic relationship, we are also fostering increasingly 

strong defense ties, a development that will reap extraordinary dividends both in 

economic and security tern1S in the years to come. Those ties have helped fuel 

skyrocketing US. defense sales to India over the last decade, with over $8 billion 

in sales over the past four years. Our two militaries also enjoy an active series of 

exchanges, strengthening the critical linkages that will help us cooperatively 

address future challenges in the Indian Ocean, the Asia Pacific, and beyond. 

Examples incl ude the recent completion of a series of army exercises that were 

i111precedented in both complexity and scale, and the conduct of MALABAR, a 10-

day navy exercise involving thousands of soldiers and sailors and an entire carrier 

strike group. From cOlllter-piracy to disaster reliet: this sort of military 
19


79579a-4.eps

cooperation establishes deep and abiding levels of cooperation between our two 

militaries, our two governments, and ultimately our people. 

IV. Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor: 

Although the U.S.-India relationship is a topic that could easily take up our entire 

afternoon, I'd like to quickly shift our focus to India's inm1ediate neighborhood, a 

region where prospects for economic growth 100m larger than anywhere on Earth. 

Thanks in part to Burma's ongoing political and economic reforms - plmctuated by 

the President's visit last November - as well as India's continuing diplomatic 

outreach toward its neighbors - we now see lmprecedented opportlmities for trade 

and engagement between South and East Asia. Nowhere are those opportunities 

more pronounced than along the emergent road, air, and sea links between India, 

Bangladesh, Burma, and the rapidly expanding economies of the Association of 

South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN. 

While there were serviceable road and rail networks connecting these countries up 

until World War II, overland connectivity is now outdated or in disrepair. What 

roads and railways do exist suffer from a lack of ports; sparse multi-modal 

connections to broader railway networks; and too few low-cost trans-shipment 

facilities. 

In spite of those challenges, trade between India and the countries of Southeast 

Asia has increased by 37% percent over the past year. This emerging "IndoPacific Economic Corridor" isn't just a boon for the region; it also provides 

American businesses with substantial new markets. Based in part on the prospect 

ofthis increased regional trade, Bangladesh is attracting unprecedented levels of 

interest and investment from U.S. companies like GE, Coca-Cola, Honeywell, 

Rockwell Automation, Tyco, and Merck. Meanwhile, large American energy 

concerns like Chevron are making strategic investments in Bangladesh and 

elsewhere, developing regional energy resources and fueling the region's economic 

growth. 

By reducing the time and cost associated with shipping goods between the huge 

markets ofTndia and ASEAN, this burgeoning Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor 

promises to increase prosperity and regional stability and help secure our regional 

interests. Because by working collaboratively with our partners toward responsible 

regional economic integration, we help ensure that countries like Burma are 

encouraged, supported, and rewarded for pursuing democratic and economic 

reforn1s. 
20


79579a-5.eps

As a proof ofthis concept, we might envision Ford Figos assembled in Chennai 

one day getting shipped via multi-modal transport across the Bay of Bengal to 

bustling showrooms in Bangkok, or tea, cultivated with American machinery in the 

northeastern Indian state of Assam making its way overland to processing plants in 

Hanoi. 

In many ways, this Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor is a realization of India's 

longstanding "Look East" policy, which, as India's Ambassador to the United 

States Nirupama Rao recently noted, is fast becoming an "Act East" policy. For 

evidence of this, we needn't look further than Indian Prime Minister Singh's May 

2012 visit to Bunna, where India otlered its neighbor a $500 million line of credit 

to repair over 60 bridges linking India's northeast with the regional centers of 

Mandalay and Rangoon, while also agreeing to help upgrade the Trilateral IndiaBurma-Thailand Highway to one day include Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 

Further east, Thailand's Prime Minister pledged to help build fledgling road and 

sea transportation routes that will link India and Thailand through Burma, while 

committing to increase bilateral trade to $10 billion over the next two years. To 

bolster these efforts, multilateral development banks, including the Asian 

Development Bank, are lining up partial credit guarantees for many of these 

projects, boosting project credit ratings and accelerating tinancing. 

This sort ofregional cooperation doesn't stop with infrastructure development. 

Late last year, India and ASEAN announced a free trade agreement that aims to 

increase intra-regional trade to $100 billion by 2015, doubling the 20 II figure. 

New Delhi now also hosts the India-ASEAN Delhi Dialogue on an annual basis to 

foster more pan-Asian ties, while lnaintaining an $80 billion trade relationship with 

China, the largest in the region. India also notably concluded new bilateral 

economic partnerships with Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea, and 

established new strategic partnerships with Indonesia and Vietnam. These 

partnerships can help strengthen trade and investment flows between and among 

these countries. In so doing, they complement America's policy objectives in the 

region of greater economic integration through reduced barriers to trade. 

On our end, we have been encouraging new and innovative U.S. regional 

partnerships, spearheading both a US.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue and a US.-

India-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue. These mechanisms have quickly evolved 

into frank and constructive forums for discussing a wide range of issues - from 

investment and infrastructure, to maritime security, to regional multilateral 
21


79579a-6.eps

concems - all of which reinforce the concept that an integrated Asia-Pacific is in 

our interest, and in the interests of our partners and allies. 

V. A Global Architecture of Cooperation 

While the main thmst ofthis Indo-Pacific cooperation is economic, it shouldn't be 

considered solely as a means to accelerate economic growth. It should also be seen 

as an effective way to address broader socioeconomic and environmental issues 

facing the region, as part of a broader "global architecture of cooperation." 

Economic growth and cooperation will, for instance, playa key role in women's 

economic empowerment in the region. Investing in women and girls is an essential 

driver of economic growth that creates better social and political outcomes. That is 

exactly what we are doing through initiatives such as the South Asia Women's 

Entrepreneurship Symposium, which provides a platform for the networking, 

training, and cross-border collaboration necessary to overcome many ofthe 

economic barriers facing women in the region. 

Regional cooperation is also an integral part of managing the impact of 

environmental issues, such as water use, marine habitats, energy production and 

distribution, urbanization, climate change, and disaster management. With river 

systems like the Mekong, Indus, and Ganges all crossing national borders and 

essential to local livelihoods in this region, establishing and implementing fair and 

practical water-sharing and conservation arrangements is increasingly critical. 

When r look at this region, r see the system of open trade which we have long 

championed taking root. More trade within the region translates into more 

investment, which means more economic growth. And as these governments work 

to build economic partnerships that add value rather than extract it, there is more 

incentive for the citizens ofthese countries to pursue opportunity. That is good for 

the people ofthe region, but also for our regional interests, which are better served 

by this larger, freer, and fairer market, and the more stable, prosperous, and 

democratic region it helps create. 

VI. The Indian Ocean 

The last theme I want to touch upon here today also has a regional focus, and that 

is the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean not only provides the backdrop for the 

increased Indo-Pacific economic engagement, but also plays host to a number of 

other vitally important American interests in South Asia and beyond. The Indian 

Ocean covers over one quarter ofthe Earth's surface, but unlike the Atlantic and 
22


79579a-7.eps

the Pacific, maritime traffic on the Indian Ocean is channeled through only three 

narrow waterways - the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and Bab el 

Mandeb. Each year an estimated $200 billion of oil transits the Strait ofHonnuz, 

and some $60 billion transits the Strait ofMalacca, mostly en route to China and 

other cOlmtries in East Asia. 

Fueled by Asian economic expansion and the growing need for raw materials and 

energy resources from Africa and the Middle East, fifty percent of the world's 

container traffic and seventy percent of global energy trade transits the Indian 

Ocean. As these numbers continue to grow, it becomes clear that any significant 

disruption in Indian Ocean region trade would have serious global repercussions. 

India, like us, sees itselfas a steward of these waterways, and we welcome India as 

a partner and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka 

and the Maldives, both strategically located along the busiest shipping lanes ofthe 

Indian Ocean, are also deeply invested in shaping the future of the region. As we 

continue to develop our own approach to the variety of opportunities and 

challenges in the Indian Ocean, we believe our interests will be best served by 

stronger and more cooperative partnerships with these and other littoral states. 

This is something on which we are working hard. In addition to participating in 

the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Sununit, and the Asian Defense 

Ministers Meeting - Plus Eight, we were also recently admitted as an observer into 

the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (lOR-ARC), a 20-

member body devoted to strengthening maritime security, economic growth and 

trade in the Indian Ocean. This is progress we will build on as we explore future 

maritime security cooperation. 

VII. Conclusion 

Mr. Chainnan, just a few words in closing. We are bullish on the future of this 

region, but we are also clear-eyed about the challenges that we face - the ever 

present threat of global terrorism, regional rivalries, protectionism, nuclear 

proliferation, refugees, and hmnan trafficking. From the lack of progress on worker 

rights throughout the region, reflected in the recent factory fires in Bangladesh, to 

the potentially catastrophic effects of global climate change in countries like the 

Maldives, regional stumbling blocks remain. 

We work every day (and many nights) to address and ameliorate those issues. But 

despite these challenges, we continue to view South and Southeast Asia, including 
23


79579a-8.eps

the Indian Ocean, as a crucial driver for America's economic growth and 

prosperity. Because a globalized South Asia, from Kabul to Colombo, will playa 

leading role not only in our own economic future, but also in improving the lives 

offully one-fifth of the world's population. 

In fifty years, I think we will look back at this region and be astonished at the 

degree to which the burgeoning people-to-people ties and conmlercial iLmovations 

we have discussed here today have transfomled the region's political and economic 

landscape. And we will be thankful we had the foresight to build and facilitate 

these regional and bilateral partnerships now, so that our country could continue to 

grow and prosper throughout the 21st century and beyond. 

So thank you again, Mr. Chaimmn. I'll now look forward to taking any questions. 
24

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate it. 

And now we will move to Mr. Yun. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Faleomavaega and members of the subcommittee. Thank you very 

much for inviting me here today to testify why South Asia matters 

in our engagement with East Asia and Pacific region. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, as you have pointed out, it is increasingly important that the U.S. views the Indian Ocean region and 

East Asia and the Pacific region in a coherent and integrated manner. The current organization of this subcommittee to include both 

South Asia and East Asia is an important recognition of this strategic imperative. I believe that this new vision will help the United 

States better address the key challenges and opportunities in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

As a Pacific power, the U.S. is bound to Asia through geography, 

history, alliances, and economic ties. Growing numbers of American 

companies are investing in and exporting to rapidly expanding 

Asian markets. Asian-Pacific businesses are increasing their profiles in the U.S. and providing jobs for American workers. Record 

numbers of American citizens now live, work, and study in this 

part of the world. These connections underscore our significant 

stake in the region’s stability and prosperity. 

Our department’s multifaceted approach to the Asia-Pacific region reflects this reality. We have sought to amplify our political 

and security ties as well as our economic engagement. We are 

strengthening and modernizing our longstanding alliances with 

Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, 

which have for decades been the foundation for the region’s stability. And, given the importance, strategic importance, and collective significance of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, we have also increased our engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Our efforts 

with China, which include an unprecedented number of high-level 

and people-to-people interactions, aim to build a stable relationship 

grounded in reality but also true to our principles and interests. 

On the economic side, we have elevated our engagement in the 

region through multiple avenues, from hosting APEC in 2011 to 

last July’s commitment to connectivity, which brought together the 

largest grouping of U.S. and ASEAN Government and business 

leaders ever. 

We are working on comprehensive and high-standard trade 

agreements in the region. In fact, just the Trans-Pacific Partnership to level the playing field for American companies and advance 

a rule space trading system. At the East Asia Summit last November, the President announced a new initiative called the U.S.-AsiaPacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership, which cuts across 

ASEAN, APEC, and other Asian regional forums to promote the development of new and sustainable energy markets in the region. At 

25

the same summit, the President also announced a trade and investment engagement program with the 10 ASEAN countries, known 

as the Enhanced Economic Engagement, which is dealing with 

trade facilitation, investment rules, and digital economy issues. 

Across the region, the United States is seeking sustained adherence to democratic practices and improved governance. We press 

for improvements with those governments that fall short in human 

rights and support those struggling to promote the values we 

share. Our commitment to advancing freedom, democracy, and the 

rule of law has manifest itself in our steadfast support for reform 

and opening in Burma, where positive developments on a range of 

political and humanitarian concerns of the international community have allowed us to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that the message from the 

region to U.S. has been clear. Asians are saying that the role of the 

U.S. in Asia is critical and that they want to see us even more engaged in diplomacy, security, trade and investment, and more programs linking Asians and Americans, such as education, cultural 

exchange, sports, tourism, just to mention a few. 

So why do South Asia and Indian Ocean regions matter to what 

the U.S. does in Northeast or Southeast Asia? The answer, we believe, lies in the fact that the Indian and Pacific Oceans now form 

a continuous throughway for global commerce and energy. China, 

Japan, South Korea, and others in the region depend upon the secure access of energy and raw material from the Middle East and 

Africa. As these trends continue, any significant disruptions of 

trade in Indian and Pacific Oceans will have serious global repercussions that would also be felt here at home by American workers. 

So as economic and strategic interests continue to span the 

breadth of the Indo-Pacific, we have an important state in ensuring 

freedom of navigation, promoting respect for international law, and 

fostering greater cooperation and dialogue among the countries of 

both regions on maritime security. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today, Mr. 

Chairman. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]

26


79579b-1.eps

Testimony of Joseph Yun 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State 

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

February 26, 2012 

"The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1)" 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Faleomaveaga, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for 

inviting me here today to testify on the importance of the Indian Ocean and South Asian region 

to our strategic rebalance to the broader Asia-Pacific region, as well as for the chance to outline 

key elements of our engagement in the region. I would also like to take a moment to commend 

this subcommittee for its role in building a bipartisan consensus on the importance of engaging 

the Asia-Pacific region and advancing U.S. interests there. Our partners in the region pay close 

attention to Congressional views, and it is vital to demonstrate the bipartisan nature of our 

commitment to enhancing our regional engagement. 

It is increasingly important that the United States views the Indian Ocean region and East Asia in 

a coherent and integrated manner. The current organization of this subcommittee to include both 

South Asia and East Asia is an important recognition of this strategic imperative. I believe that, 

going forward, this new vision will help the United States address the key challenges and 

opportunities that will arise in this part of the world. 

Home to nearly half of the world's population and over half of global trade and economic output, 

the Asia Pacific has witnessed very strong rates of economic growth and poverty reduction. 

Over the past decade, Asian nations have also increased their profile on the world stage and 

continue to increase their role and clout in addressing global challenges. Their views and 

decisions on transnational concerns, such as climate change and financial architecture, among 

others, will have consequences that will reverberate far beyond Asia, to Africa, the Middle East, 

and Latin America. 

Our strategic "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region therefore reflects a deep recognition that the 

United States must substantially increase its political, economic, development, and defense 

investments in the Asia-Pacific given the region's fundamental importance to our future 

prosperity and security We are bound to Asia through our geography, history, alliances, 

economies, and people-to-people ties, which will continue to grow in importance over the next 

decade. Over the last four years, we have made a deliberate and strategic effort to broaden and 

deepen our engagement in the region. Continuing and strengthening our engagement and our 

commitment to the region are essential for both seizing future opportunities and confronting 
27


79579b-2.eps

2 

challenges to build partnerships and a more secure and prosperous future. Given geographic, 

historical, and economic ties, South Asia will playa critical role in this endeavor. 

At the core of our approach is an understanding that diplomatic, security and economic 

relationships in the Asia-Pacific region are mutually supportive. Growing numbers of American 

companies are investing in and exporting their products and services to rapidly expanding East 

Asian markets. Asian-Pacific businesses are increasing their profiles in the United States and 

providingjobs for American workers. Record numbers of American citizens now live, work and 

study in this part of the world. These connections help underscore that we have a significant 

stal,e in the region's stability and prosperity; that is, our security and economic interests are 

intertwined. 

Our multifaceted approach to the Asia-Pacific region reflects this reality. We have sought to 

amplify our political and security ties as well as our economic engagement We are moving 

ahead in strengthening and modernizing our long-standing alliances with Japan, the Republic of 

Korea (RoK), Australia, Thailand and the Philippines that have for decades underpinned the 

region's stability. That stability created the conditions for robust market and trade expansion 

that have formed the basis for the region's growing prosperity. Our alliances leverage our 

presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges. 

As we renew our alliances to meet new demands, we are also working to build new partnerships 

throughout the region that can help solve shared challenges. Given the strategic importance and 

collective significance of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, we have increased our engagement with 

Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Our 

efforts with China, which include an unprecedented number of high-level and people-to-people 

exchanges and interactions, aim to build a stable, multifaceted bilateral relationship that is 

grounded in reality, true to our principles and interests, and focused on results. We understand 

that countries in East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific seek good relations with China, and we 

encourage them to do so. A China that plays by established rules and nonns, actively cooperates 

in addressing regional challenges, and is a source of global economic growth benefits all of us. 

And beyond our bilateral relationships, the United States is committed to continuing our high -

level engagement in helping to develop effective and results-oriented multilateral institutions, not 

only with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its affiliated institutions, and 

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, but also through fora such as the Pacific 

Islands Forum and through mini-lateral dialogues aimed at building regional cooperation like the 

Lower Mekong Initiative. 

The United States has a robust economic agenda that recognizes the importance of the AsiaPacific region. We are working to accomplish the objectives of our economic agenda through 

multiple avenues, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a comprehensive high standard 

trade and investment agreement that will boost US. economic growth and support the creation 

and retention of high-quality American jobs. And at a broader level, we continue to work 

through APEC, which we hosted in 201 I, to strengthen regional economic integration and 

promote trade and investment liberalization among the twenty-one member economies. More 

recently, at the US.-ASEAN Leaders meeting this past November, President Obama and the 
28


79579b-3.eps

Leaders of the ten ASEAN states announced the launch of a new initiative, the U.S.-ASEAN 

Expanded Economic Engagement (E3), which is a new framework for economic cooperation 

designed to expand trade ties between the United States and ASEAN, creating new business 

opportunities and jobs in all eleven countries. At the East Asia Summit (EAS) last November, 

the President announced a new initiative called the US.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy 

Partnership, which cuts across ASEAN, APEC and other Asian regional forums to promote the 

development of new and sustainable energy markets in the region. 

Of course, the Asia Pacific's remarkable economic growth over the past decade and its potential 

for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been 

guaranteed by the U.S. military. The United States has a vision for the region where freedom of 

navigation is assured, disagreements are managed cooperatively, and the Korean Peninsula is 

free from nuclear weapons. A peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific benefits the peoples of the 

United States and the region, who can enjoy the jobs and opportunity that come from unhindered 

shipping and trade; and who can raise their children without the specter of conflict We continue 

to assess our force posture and presence in the region that can better respond to non-traditional 

security threats, protect allies and partners, and defend U.s. national interests. 

Across the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is seeking sustained adherence to democratic 

practices and improved governance, quality health and education, strengthened disaster 

preparedness/emergency response, and increased natural resource management, which will 

contribute to greater human security, stability, and prosperity, as well as deepen u.s. ties in the 

region. Our commitment to advancing freedom, democracy, and the rule of law has manifested 

itselfin our steadfast support for refonn and opening in Burma, known by many as Myanmar, 

where positive developments on a range of concerns of the international community have 

allowed us to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. The opening of a USAID Regional 

Office in Papua New Guinea after an absence of 15 years has helped strengthen the U.S. 

commitment to the Pacific Islands. Similarly, we will continue to press for improvements with 

those governments that fall short on human rights and democracy issues while supporting those 

fighting for the values we share. In doing so, we recognize that the Asia-Pacific is home to some 

of the world's largest and most vibrant democracies. Democracy and human rights are 

increasingly part of the fabric of the Asia-Pacific. 

Each element of this strategy is mutually reinforcing and is intended to advance peace, 

prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment And thus far, Asian states 

have welcomed with enthusiasm our efforts to reinvigorate our engagement The most frequent 

message to the United States has been the same: The United States' role in Asia is critical, and 

we want to see you even more engaged on all fronts - diplomatically, militarily, and 

economically. 

Our Asia-Pacific interlocutors, however, are quite attuned to developments in domestic 

American politics. They are concerned about the possibility of decreased U.S. engagement in 

the Asia-Pacific region and a reduction in foreign assistance for Asia. They hear talk of 

sequestration, growing calls for slashing foreign assistance, and they see the comparatively larger 

amounts of resources devoted to U. S. engagement el sewhere in the world. In some quarters, 

doubts continue to linger, particularly regarding our financial ability and political will - given 
29


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4 

pressing security challenges elsewhere in the world - to maintain a long-term regional presence. 

We believe it will be increasingly vital for U.S. ofllcials to continue to underscore - in concrete 

tenns - our firm and unwavering commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. 

On the original question of how South Asia fits into the rebalance, we need to remember that the 

cultures of the Indian subcontinent have influenced Southeast Asia for millennia and are visible 

across the region South Asian traders and merchants have long been sailing to what they called 

the SlIvarnadwipa, or "Golden lands." Similarly, China's maritime presence at its height once 

extended to the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, when one looks at the AsiaPacific and the wider Indian Ocean region, it becomes readily apparent that there are imprints 

from historical East and South Asian civilizations. 

The rapid economic growth that has taken place in East and South Asia is a catalyst that is 

reenergizing these patterns of engagement. The increasing economic integration of South and 

East Asia has strengthened the strategic significance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a 

continuous throughway for global commerce and energy. Approximately 90 percent of globally 

traded merchandise travels by sea. China, Japan, RoK, and others in East and Southeast Asia 

depend upon the secure access of energy imports from the Persian Gulf and natural resources and 

other materials from Africa to fuel their economies and ship their exports to important markets in 

the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe. As much as 50 percent of the world's container traffic 

and 70 percent of global energy trade now transits the Indian Ocean. Similarly, as India's trade 

with East Asia and North America grows, India has a growing stake in the security of the Straits 

ofMalacca and the South China Sea, through which half of the world's tonnage flows. 

As these trends continue into the future, it becomes clear that any significant disruption of trade 

in the Indian and Pacific Oceans would have serious global repercussions, repercussions that 

would also be felt here at home by American businesses and workers. As our economic and 

strategic interests continue to span the breadth of the Indo-Pacific, we have an important stake in 

ensuring freedom of navigation, promoting respect for international law, and fostering greater 

cooperation and dialogue with and among the countries of both regions on maritime security 

Enhanced economic integration, while yielding immense benefits to the region, also means that 

regional instability in South and Southeast Asia - brought on by interstate conflict, terrorism, 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and non-traditional security threats, such as 

pandemic diseases, climate change, and environmental degradation - can pose a threat to the 

entire global economy. 

No country can address these challenges singlehandedly; multilateral cooperation is vital. This 

interdependence is why we have placed so much importance on strengthening our relations with 

the region's burgeoning multilateral architecture. The Administration has taken important steps 

in building stronger ties with regional institutions such as ASEAN, the EAS, the securityoriented ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus 

(ADMM+). 
30


79579b-5.eps

5 

As Southeast Asia connects both sides of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, we see a strong and 

integrated ASEAN as an important component in bolstering the security of the entire AsiaPacific. 

Following the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009, the opening of the U.S. 

Mission to ASEAN in 2010, and the appointment of the first resident U.S. Ambassador to 

ASEAN, the Administration has elevated our relationship with ASEAN to a strategic level. We 

are working with ASEAN to build a strong ASEAN Secretariat capable of addressing pressing 

security and economic policy issues, to facilitate the development of an ASEAN Economic 

Community, and to strengthen ASEAN member states' coordination and cooperation with regard 

to managing disasters, mediating and resolving conflicts, mitigating pandemic threats, combating 

illicit trafficking of persons and goods, and on other transnational security concerns. 

As part of our overarching effort to strengthen regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and 

address the growing list of non-traditional security issues, we also have redoubled our efforts to 

broaden and deepen our engagement through the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), a U.S.-led 

effort to foster greater sub-regional integration and cooperation among Burma, Cambodia, Laos, 

Thailand, and Vietnam in the areas of health, environment and water, education, connectivity, 

energy security, and food security. The LMI, along with Japanese, Korean, and other Mekong 

organizations that seek to promote greater cooperation among the lower Mekong countries, is 

helping to build greater East-West connectivity in Southeast Asia by encouraging Mekong 

countries to work more closely together on pressing transnational challenges, but also on 

enhancing their physical and institutional connectivity. Tn particular, the dramatic series of 

reforms that have taken place in Burma over the past two years have also opened the possibility 

for greater infrastructure financing and development in the country and for enhanced integration 

into the regional and global economy. Located directly at the crossroads between China, India, 

and Southeast Asia, an economically and physically integrated Burma that respects human rights 

and achieves national reconciliation with its ethnic minorities can provide a crucial land-link 

between East Asia and South Asia. 

East Asia and South Asia are also linked in other important regional structures. India's 

membership in the East Asia Summit and the ADMM+, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 

Lanka's membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, also provide us an opportunity to engage 

both South Asian and East Asian nations in the same multilateral fora to address shared concerns 

and build tangible habits of cooperation. 

India's participation in the EAS is especially important in light of the expanding role and 

influence of the Summit. Since the President's participation in the November 2011 East Asia 

Summit in Bali, the United States has actively supported efforts to shape the Summit into the 

region's premier forum to discuss political and strategic issues, including non-proliferation, 

maritime security, and disaster management. As a Leaders-led forum, the EAS plays an 

important role in defining the agenda for other ASEAN related institutions such as the ASEAN 

Regional Forum, and the ADMM+. Accordingly, the EAS will guide those organizations to take 

concrete steps to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. 
31


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6 

We see a strong role for Indian leadership in these fora and for greater U.S.-India cooperation on 

regional security in the Asia-Pacitic and elsewhere. India shares many of our values, including a 

commitment to human rights and democratic government and adherence to the international 

system of norms and rules, including freedom of navigation and access to resources in 

accordance with principles of international law. Following the birth in 1991 of its "Look East" 

policy, India has made considerable progress raising its profile in East Asia. India's overtures to 

its eastern neighbors have been met with welcome enthusiasm, as various East Asian countries 

see India as a rising power that will contribute to the regional balance and it's large and growing 

domestic market as an opportunity to diversify their economic engagement. 

This was clearly evident in December 2012 when nine often ASEAN leaders travelled to New 

Delhi to tal<e part in a Commemorati ve Summit celebrating 20 years of India-ASEAN relations. 

India has also sought to engage the countries of the lower Mekong sub-region through the 

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation initiative which focuses on enhancing connectivity among member 

countries. India has forged closer ties with U.S. allies like Japan and Australia and key partners 

such as Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. India is also developing a cooperati ve relationship 

with China, through enhanced bilateral discussions and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 

South Africa), fully cognizant that the relations between these two economic and demographic 

giants will play an important role in shaping the regional, and indeed global, environment for 

many years to come. 

Looking at India's growing engagement leaves no question that there are significant areas of 

strategic convergence between India and the United States in Asia. This is why, in 2009, we 

launched the U.S.-India Consultations on the Asia-Pacific as part of an effort to ensure that our 

two countries exchange views on the development of this vital region. The consultations have 

offered us an important platfonn not only for discussing how we can better align our strategies to 

reinforce one another's engagement, but also for discussing our disagreements openly. We 

continue to engage India through the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral consultation on regional issues 

that helps leverage our resources to strengthen the region's multilateral architecture. 

Lastly, I would like to address the importance of India's growing economic engagement in the 

Asia-Pacific and the implications for U.S. policy of an India that is economically integrated with 

Southeast Asia. The rules-based system that the United States created after 1945 and our 

continued role as a major trading and investment partner underpin the region's vibrancy. India 

shares the US. values of open societies. With its young and dynamic population, India presents 

an opportunity to sustain economic expansion in Asia, while Japan, RoK, and China face 

challenging demographic trends. Likewise, the U.S. and Indian economies will continue to 

benefit from deeper involvement in East Asia's economic engine. 

Like the United States, India is making efforts to deepen its formal engagement with East Asia. 

At the November EAS, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged that India's 

economic future is also tied to East Asia. During 2012, India finalized an agreement on services 

to complement the 201 0 India-A SEAN Free Trade Agreement on goods. Indian-A SEAN trade is 

now approaching approximately $80 billion. Trade between India and ASEAN can be expected 

to rise even faster if and when countries in the region can overcome the considerable 
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7 

infrastructure and policy gaps that prevent the free and efficient flow of goods between South 

and East Asia. 

India boasts a $ 2 trillion economy today. Experts anticipate that India's economy will continue 

growing through the coming decades until India peaks demographically in 2060. At that time, 

India will represent one fifth of the global economy. For East Asia, the economic potential of 

enhanced trade with India is significant: India's large and growing market is a destination for 

both high-value added and consumer goods. India's prowess in the service industry 

complements China's strength in manufacturing goods. Additionally, Indian companies offer a 

potential new source of investment for Southeast Asia. The Indian economy has been the leader 

in business process outsourcing (BPO) for many years, but as economies like the Philippineswith high educational standards and strong English skills-move up the BPO value chain, they 

stand to benefit from increasing investment opportunities in the BPO sector. 

From a strategic perspective, our allies and partners in East and Southeast Asia also benefit 

immensel y from increasing economic engagement with India. In particular, for the smaller 

economies of Southeast Asia, an East-West corridor can supplement their traditional NorthSouth economic ties, offering an opportunity to diversify markets and hedge against future risks. 

Creating an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor between South Asia and Southeast Asia will require 

significant investment in physical infrastructure throughout the region: road, rail, sea and air 

connectivity between these two regions must be developed. While financing will necessarily 

come primarily from countries in the region and international financial institutions, U.S. 

companies are well-positioned to participate in connectivity projects and stand to benefit from 

some of the increased commercial opportunities that will result. Additionally, we have 

encouraged the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to identify gaps in the Indo-Pacific Economic 

Corridor that could be filled by public-private investment. 

In this context, the United States also has strongly supported India's commitment to invest $500 

million in road connectivity between Northeast India and Burma. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would underscore that from a strategic perspective, as we 

continue to implement our strategic rebalance, we are acting in recognition of the emerging 

realities of the new Indo-Pacific world. Our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is strong and 

irreversible, and we support and welcome the involvement of India and other countries of South 

Asia in the Asia-Pacific region as well. We face numerous challenges in continuing our 

involvement in the region, but the United States will also realize multiple benefits as well. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I am pleased to answer any questions 

you may have. 
33

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate the testimony 

of both of our witnesses here this afternoon. 

I will now recognize each member for 5 minutes to ask questions. 

I will begin with myself. 

First question I will address to you, Ambassador Blake. The 2008 

Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement was considered a watershed 

moment for U.S.-India relations, but 4 years later, many believe 

that it has failed to tie India closer to the U.S.-led global nonproliferation and arms control architecture. 

India has made no efforts to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty or to voluntarily halt its production of fissile materials. The 

deal was also supposed to build a robust security relationship between the U.S. and India serving as the nucleus to balance Chinese 

power. However, India’s Non-Alignment 1.0 and now Non-Alignment 2.0 have made this goal a strategic nightmare. 

At the same time, in pursuit of a greater global presence, India 

seeks to join the five permanent members of the U.N. Security 

Council and the four major arms control groups, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia 

Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Ambassador 

Blake, what is the outlook for India’s participation in these groups? 

And, with reference to the Indo Civilian Nuclear Agreement, 

have the U.S. and India made any progress on resolving the nuclear liability issue, which has created an obstacle for a number of 

U.S. firms? What is the administration doing in order to move this 

issue forward? 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just talk a little bit about the nuclear deal first. As you 

say, this is one of the really transformative deals that was done in 

the course of the Bush administration. The Obama administration 

came in, determined to try to continue that momentum. I think 

there has been some progress, but there are also still many challenges ahead. 

One challenge is that India passed a nuclear liability law that 

our companies do not agree with and do not think provide them 

sufficient protection from possible liability suits. And, therefore, we 

have focused most of our efforts on trying to negotiate with the 

unions and support our companies’ efforts to negotiate what are 

called early works agreements that are things like site preparation 

and early contracts and things like that that could again pave the 

way for future civil nuclear contracts. 

The Indians have set aside several areas in Gujarat and Andhra 

Pradesh for American companies to eventually build such plants. 

And we continue to work through our liability concerns with the 

Indian Government. So we hope very much this year that one of 

these early works agreements can be signed by Westinghouse and 

the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, which is its counterpart. So I think there has been progress, but, again, much work 

needs to be done. 

With respect to your comment about how India is not aligned, actually, I would, respectfully, disagree. India has moved very, very 

much closer to us now on defense cooperation. We now have the 

largest exercise program of any country in the world with India. 

34

And I think all three of their services very much appreciate the opportunity to exercise with ours. And there is a growing coordination in that respect. 

Likewise, our defense sales relationship has grown from virtually 

nothing to more than 9 billion with several billion more of sales 

pending now. So, again, I think our militaries are growing much 

closer together. And there is great interest in developing closer 

interoperability and closing working relationships. And we will certainly continue to build on those. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

And in a limited time—I have about a minute left here—let me 

just touch on Sri Lanka. I know my ranking member had brought 

up Sri Lanka, which can be a quite controversial issue. There are 

two sides to a lot of the things that are said about this. I have had 

many contacts with the government and also with the Tamils. And, 

shall we say, they differ in a number of areas. 

I would say the attempts at reconciliation between the government and the Tamil people have been disappointing in many respects. Sri Lankan leaders, for example, are talking about repealing the Thirteenth Amendment, which guarantees certain basic 

rights to provincial councils. And U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka has, 

so far, apparently not worked out or been able to convince the government to keep its basic agreements to bring reconciliation and 

political settlement to fruition. 

What steps has and can the administration make to urge the 

government to move toward a more genuine reconciliation with the 

Tamil community? And either one, but if you could keep it relatively short because our time is now up? 

Mr. BLAKE. Let me try to answer your question and also the 

ranking member’s question simultaneously because he talked about 

that in his statement. And let me just say with a little bit of background that, you know, obviously I have been working on Sri 

Lanka now for 6 years. I know the country extremely well. I consider myself a friend of the country and supporter of the country. 

And at the end of the conflict, as you know, there were many questions about the number of civilians that were killed at the very end 

of the conflict. And independent U.N. panel estimated that between 

10,000 and 40,000 innocent civilians may have been killed. 

Nonetheless, the United States decided that it would support a 

domestic that was a Sri Lankan domestic process to try to get to 

the bottom of that and to investigate that and to develop what has 

now been called a lessons learned and reconciliation commission 

process. But we did so with the understanding, Mr. Chairman, that 

there would be rapid progress toward reconciliation and accountability. 

And I must say progress thus far on implementing the LLRC action plan has been slow. And we have been disappointed, as you 

say, that the government has not proceed so far with elections for 

the Northern Provincial Council 4 years after the end of the war. 

We have been disappointed that there hasn’t been a conclusion of 

the dialogue between the Tamil National Alliance, the umbrella 

group for the Tamil groups, as well as to permit a T&A of dialogue 

with the government on devolution. And we have been disappointed that there has been some backward movement on democVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Apr 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\022613\79579 HFA PsN: SHIRL
35

racy, as you say, things like the Thirteenth Amendment but also 

recent impeachment of the Sri Lanka’s chief justice. 

So, for that reason, last year we supported a resolution in the 

U.N. Human Rights Council to put additional pressure on Sri 

Lanka to implement its own lessons learned and reconciliation report. We did so with the support of countries like India that voted 

yes and a large majority of other countries in the Human Rights 

Council. 

I think there is good support thus far to have another vote this 

year to continue to urge Sri Lanka to implement its own report. 

And that is why we are pursuing that again this year. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

The gentleman from American Samoa is recognized. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do want to say to Secretary Blake that this is not in any way 

a personal attack on you, but I do want to follow up on the chairman’s question and concerns about the situation in Sri Lanka. 

I mentioned in my statement about the double standard that we 

are applying as far as violation of human rights. And the sense 

that I have, why is the most powerful country in the world picking 

on a small, little country like Sri Lanka, the size of West Virginia, 

60,000 square miles with only 3 million people? We talk about 41 

million people living there. 

The question, the serious question, I have is that for 27–29 

years, this country was in a state of civil war. It is not a conflict. 

It is not a question of a time when people are asking for more autonomy. We have to understand that not all Tamils are members 

of this terrorist organization called the LTTE, or Tamil Tigers that 

our Government along with 32 other countries had also categorized 

as a terrorist organization. And in the process you are talking 

about 27 years where some 80,000 to 100,000 Sri Lankans ended 

up dead—a lot of innocent men, women, and children, what I am 

trying to seek here is that there also was a country that had a civil 

war—the United States of America after 4 years, we ended up with 

600,000 of our soldiers dying from that terrible conflict. 

And it wasn’t a question of the Southern states asking for autonomy. They wanted to secede, to pull away from their mother country, just like the Tamil Tigers wanted to do in their efforts in seeking this war against the Tamil government. 

My concern here is that we are looking at such a small, little sequence that was 2 or 3 months that now we are questioning and 

the reason why we have this resolution before the United Nations 

Human Rights Council but forgetting the fact that for 29 years, the 

Sri Lanka Government has had to deal with this terrorist organization. And I just could not believe the atrocities that were committed by these people. And now over night, we just say, ‘‘Oh, we 

have got to get this resolution in here.’’ So this is where my concern is that this is a double standard. 

Our Government for the 10-year period we were in war in Vietnam, Mr. Secretary. Let’s talk about the tens of thousands of 

women and children, innocent civilians that were exposed to Agent 

Orange when we were there for the 10-year period. Let’s ask the 

people in Laos and Cambodia about the 6 million pounds of cluster 

36

bombs that we dropped there. These countries never declared war 

on us. 

Where is the consistency in our standards as far as human rights 

are concerned? We are pointing the finger at this little country, Sri 

Lanka. I think that perhaps we need to clean up our own backyard 

and suggest that maybe we would be a little more consistent. If we 

are going to do it against Sri Lanka, let’s make sure that we are 

clean ourselves. 

I just wanted you to comment on that. I have got only 1 minute 

left on this. 

Mr. BLAKE. Well, thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Let me just say with respect to the LTTE, we fully agree. The 

United States was one of the very first countries to declare the 

LTTE a foreign terrorist organization. And we have a long line of 

public statements and other condemnations that we issued for the 

terrible acts of terrorism that they were responsible for. 

We also took concrete action to help the Sri Lankans. We gave 

them radar systems so that they would be able to detect LTTE——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That may help the Sri Lankan Government 

fight against the Navy that——

Mr. BLAKE. Exactly. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [continuing]. The Tamil Tigers have. 

Mr. BLAKE. But, you know, we certainly took a very uncompromising view with respect to the LTTE. But, again, at the very end 

of the war, the question is, what happened to those 10,000 to 

40,000 civilians who were killed? And I think everybody in Sri 

Lanka believes that there needs to be closure on that question and 

closure needs to be achieved through this lessons learned and reconciliation commission process. It is a domestic process. So it 

should have the support of the government. And we hope that that 

will continue. And that is the purpose of this resolution. 

But there needs to be justice, Mr. Chairman, for there to be closure. And there needs to be reconciliation between these communities. So that is what we are trying to achieve. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I only have 10 more seconds, Mr. Secretary. 

I just wanted to say that that was part of the subject, that I discussed this personally with the President of Sri Lanka. And he is 

concerned. He is spending more time up there in the northern 

province. And all the amount of resources they are trying to do can 

make this as part of the reconciliation process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

The gentleman from North Carolina was next but isn’t here, so 

I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania is next. Mr. Perry? 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And either gentleman can answer the question. It is fairly general. And I want to get away from Sri Lanka, if I could [laughter] 

for just a comment, not taking anything away from the effort and 

the gravity of the situation. But I am concerned about the looming 

defense cuts in the United States and our commitments to the 

broader region along with our continued commitments to Europe 

and the Middle East and now Africa. And I am wondering if you 

could enumerate what your view is of what we will need from a 

military standpoint to continue to balance or provide a balance in 

37

the region. And be fairly specific, if you could, on what your view 

is, either one of you or both of you, on what you think that our 

commitment should be and will need to be moving forward in the 

long term. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much. 

As you know, in our region, in the East Asia and Pacific region, 

there are now about 29,000 troops in Korea and South Korea and 

about 40,000 in Japan. And, of course, beyond that, really, the region of South China Sea as well as East China Sea and the Pacific 

rely on full Pacific Command, especially the Pacific Command 

Navy, to do everything that is needed to keep the oceans open. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a serious issue, that if there is any shortfall in our budget, especially going to the military side, I think it 

will affect the operations we do, freedom of navigation exercises we 

do, and certainly a lot of bilateral and multilateral exercises we do. 

These are very important to, number one, project our forces in the 

region; and, number two, to keep all of the sea lanes open. 

And, just last week, we concluded a multi-nation exercise in 

Thailand called Cobra Gold. And those are also very useful for 

keeping the troops in the region, working with our troops in the region. 

So my own view is that it will have significant effect. And, similarly, it will also have significant effect on the diplomatic side, Mr. 

Chairman. We have Embassies that need to be open. We have obligations to our local employees. Often it is very difficult to follow 

them because they come under national law, not U.S. law. So there 

are severe constraints on both the security side and diplomatic 

side. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BLAKE. Sir, we don’t have American troops stationed in 

South Asia, but obviously we have a very expensive exercise program. And the Pacific Command is involved with Nepal, Bangladesh, many other countries in various aspects from disaster 

management to counterterrorism cooperation. 

We haven’t yet learned how that, all of that, cooperation is going 

to be affected by the potential sequestration. So I would just support what my colleague said. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, if I could, Mr. Chairman, just follow up, then, 

let’s just say that the United States has to pull back a certain level 

of operational capability, few exercises, a diminished presence. Can 

you give us any thoughts to what scenarios you think might play 

out if the United States or its allies aren’t present in that regard 

for keeping shipping lanes and sea lanes open and providing a balance? Are there certain actions that other actors would or would 

not take in the region based on our lack of presence or diminished 

availability to be there? 

Mr. YUN. I think we have seen about 21⁄2 weeks ago now there 

was a third nuclear test by North Koreans. And certainly there is 

a lot of proliferation-related activities, goods going from Northeast 

Asia through Strait of Malacca to Middle East, Iran, and so on. So 

those things that we do in the region, it is not just about when 

there is an emergency, but, rather, it has to be daily type of activities. 

38

And, similarly, I do believe that you have to do, for example, regular freedom of navigation exercise because that is what makes assert our interpretation of the law of the sea and including what we 

can and what we should not do in EEC. And so I think it is very 

important that there not be up and down, you know, activity but, 

rather, we sustain the level of activity that we are committed to 

sustaining. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Blake, Mr. Yun, both in all of this talk about the 

great economic opportunity that exists between the United States 

and India and the South Asia region, Ambassador Blake, having 

spent as much time as you have there, can you comment on what 

some of the perceived threats are to that relationship and to the 

economic opportunities that exist? 

Mr. BLAKE. Well, you know, I think the main threat is the declining growth rate that has occurred in India because of declining investment and because there has been a slowdown in the economic 

reform efforts over the past several years. It is no secret that the 

Indian Parliament has been tied up in knots over debates about 

corruption and other such things. And so very little has gotten 

done. To its credit, they did pass a quite important reform to open 

up India to foreign direct investment in the multi-brand retail sector, which we think is very, very important. And they have taken 

some steps to try to accelerate the approval process for a foreign 

investment, but much more needs to be done. I think the Indians 

fully recognize that. 

And certainly our companies through the U.S.-India Business 

Council have given them a very rich menu of suggestions of things 

that could be done to open up in the areas of banking, in the areas 

of retail, in the areas of things like defense, all of which would—

insurance is another one—tremendously increase the levels of foreign direct investment and help boost the levels of growth in India. 

Mr. BERA. And obviously opening up India’s markets is beneficial 

both to our economy and our companies——

Mr. BLAKE. Yes. 

Mr. BERA [continuing]. And certainly helps India become a much 

more modern economy. Are there strategic things that we can do 

diplomatically to help speed along this process? 

Mr. BLAKE. Very much so. We have a range of economic dialogues that we conduct with our Indian counterparts. The U.S. 

Trade Representative has something called the Trade Policy 

Forum. So there are a number of different initiatives that are underway that help again remove some of the blockages that do occur. 

But I should say that, even with some of these problems, India 

remains one of the fastest growing economies in the world at 5 percent. And it is projected to be the third largest economy in the 

world by 2025. And our trade continues to grow very substantially. 

It has quadrupled over the last 8 years, and it is growing at roughly 20 percent a year. So, you know, obviously we would like to do 

39

even more, but I think we are very happy with the progress that 

has been made. 

Mr. BERA. We certainly would. You know, shifting a little bit, I 

know you commented that Afghanistan is not part of the South 

Asia region, but obviously, as we draw down and bring our troops 

home, you know, it will be critical to maintain some of the gains 

and some of the stability. 

Obviously the U.S.-India relationship is a very strategic relationship here. From your perspective, what do you see as India’s role 

in helping maintain stability in Afghanistan and the region entirely and then what we can do diplomatically in the U.S.-India relationship? 

Mr. BLAKE. Well, your question is a timely one, Congressman. 

We have just finished our latest trilateral dialogue with India and 

Afghanistan last week that I represented the United States at in 

Delhi. And we appreciate very much the significant role that India 

is playing in Afghanistan. In fact, we see India as kind of the economic linchpin for the future as our troops draw down, as their 

spending draws down. 

It is going to be much more important now to establish a private 

sector basis for the Afghan economy and to make a trade-based 

economy and not an aid-based economy. And India has such an important role to play in that. 

First, if has a very large investment program. It has invested in 

things like the Hajigak iron ore deposit that is going to be a major 

probably $8–$10 billion investment. It hosted a major investment 

conference last year to promote foreign investment into Afghanistan. It has its own very substantial assistance program of approximately $2 billion. And it very much has embraced this regional integration vision that Secretary Clinton and now Secretary Kerry 

have endorsed to open up all of these trade links to allow for, for 

example, the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas pipeline and other forms of infrastructure, road, rail, and other openings that will link up this region in a very significant way. And 

India is really at the heart of all of those efforts and is such an 

important part or force. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would like to announce that we are supposed to have a series 

of votes any minute now, but we have about 15 minutes. We have 

three more questioners, so I think we can probably, as a courtesy 

to the panel, wrap up and not have you come back. So if we keep 

to our time, we should be able to do that. 

The next gentleman is the chairman of the Western Hemisphere 

Subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Blake, Mr. 

Yun, thank you for being here today. 

I was privileged to be able to participate in a CODEL just in the 

last few weeks over with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China 

and the Philippines. And a lot of issues that we talked about, but 

the most pressing issue by far was the concern of proliferation, the 

WMDs with North Korea. I am also concerned about the potential 

with Pakistan. But the issue du jour seems to be North Korea. 

We had a hearing a couple of weeks ago with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. And I expressed my frustration, my 

40

feeling. And I think that is echoed by a lot of our colleague that 

so far the activities by the United Nations to try to dissuade North 

Korea from proliferating have been very impotent at best. I think 

we all understand that China has a disproportionate share of influence when it comes to motivating North Korea to do the right 

thing. 

But I would like to pose a different thought. My concern if North 

Korea continues in its path toward proliferation is that—how are 

we going to dissuade some of the other countries in the region, like 

Japan, like South Korea, and like Taiwan from pursuing their own 

nuclear programs? And then what will happen if all hell breaks 

loose in terms of all of these countries wanting to proliferate? What 

is going to happen to economic stability in the region? What are we 

going to do since what we are doing right now is clearly not working? What are we going to do move the ball up the field and properly motivate North Korea? 

The chairman of the full committee has recommended that 

maybe we take a look at financial institutions that provide financial services for North Korea and maybe we take a look at possibly 

freezing assets, as we have done in the past with Iran and in the 

past with North Korea. 

I would like your thoughts on any and all issues. I think it is 

time that we think outside the box and we do everything that we 

can otherwise I think it is going to destabilize pretty quickly. 

Thank you. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much. 

This is, of course, I think the most serious problem that we have 

in Northeast Asia today. Two weeks ago North Korea announced 

that it had done its third nuclear test. The first one was ’06, ’09 

and now. And, of course, in that interim, they have, believe, improved their capabilities. 

And I think the first thing we have to do is make sure that international community is unified in their response to North Korea. 

And that has to be the burden of the U.N. Security Council, At the 

moment, we are negotiating in U.N. Security Council a resolution, 

which we believe should have Chapter 7 incorporated as well as additional sanctions incorporated. 

Mr. Chairman, without having the international community with 

us, any kind of sanctions become very difficult to enforce. And I believe once we have very tough U.N. multilateral sanctions, thereafter it is time to enforce our own. 

For example, if U.N. agrees in Security Council to do financial 

sanctions, as you have suggested, then we will implement them. 

But I think to go ahead and do the unilateral ones could be questionable in value if other countries don’t join us. So I think, number one, it is very important to have multilateral sanctions. 

Mr. Chairman, this has been a problem for a long time, not just 

since 2006, but North Korean nuclear program has been there 

probably since the late ’60s. So I would say we need to take a 

longer-term view, not rather to see it if they have done this much 

in 40 years. I think to some extent, the deterrence has worked. 

And, of course, in the ’70s, there was a history of South Korea 

wanting its own nuclear program, which we persuaded not to have. 

41

With regards to the position of South Korea; Japan, as you mentioned; Taiwan, you know, of course, we have very strong mutual 

defense treaties, both with South Korea and Japan. And you are 

out there in the region, Mr. Salmon. And you realize the value of 

them. 

I think it is safe to say we are working very, very close with our 

Japanese and South Korea and our colleagues to see this in a very 

unified vision. But ultimately China, which border has a long border with North Korea, a lot of burden is on them. I think you are 

right in that, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have about 9 or 10 minutes left on the clock. We have three 

people now here that want to ask questions. I would ask unanimous consent that we reduce it to 3 minutes. All three can get in 

if that is okay? Without objection, so ordered. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with and appreciate many of the concerns that have already been brought up and, again, just recognize the importance of 

these relationship-building opportunities and partnerships. Mr. 

Yun, you mentioned Cobra Gold. I have also been involved with 

Garuda Shield, Yama Sakura, and other types of exercises that 

have—I have seen firsthand what benefits can come from these 

types of exchanges in really being proactive so that we are not getting to a point of where we are talking about very real tactical 

threats. 

As we are looking at budget cuts, which is another issue that I 

know we are all thinking about very seriously, I just wanted to 

hear from you about some of the other resources that we have 

available to us to reach that same objective, one of which we have 

based in Hawaii, the East-West Center, which has been a very 

vital resource to us nationally having an alumni of 55,000 over 600 

partner organizations, and would like to hear briefly from both of 

you how you have utilized the East-West Center as well as how you 

see the future relationship between the State Department and the 

center continuing, especially as we look at this rebalance toward 

Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much. I think East-West Center has 

been crucial in building relationship and exchanges in Asia and us. 

Hawaii, therefore, has become center of so many think tanks and 

so many military and civilian diplomats as well as politicians. I 

think it would be really a shame if we were to reduce funding for 

East-West Center. And we would be very supportive of sustaining 

it as much as possible. 

Mr. BLAKE. I would strongly second that. We have a parade of 

South Asians who go to the East-West Center. I myself have addressed it several times. And it is one of our premier institutions. 

And I am hoping to do everything we can to preserve funding for 

it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back. Thank you 

very much. 

The gentleman from California is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

42

I will just get right into it. It is a travesty that the United States 

has such an integrated economy and our economic well-being is so 

tied to the world’s worst human rights abuser, namely China, and 

that we have not developed as much economic relationship and as 

great an economic relationship as we have with India. And it just 

seems to me that this is something we have got to come to grips 

with. This is out of synch with the long-term interests of the people 

of the United States because in the long run, if we just ignore the 

totalitarian nature of the Chinese regime, we are going to pay a 

price. And that is already becoming very evident. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your leadership in starting out this way for this new session of Congress. Let’s hope in this 

session of Congress we recognize that China is playing an increasingly negative role that has got to be addressed. And it will be addressed by our relationship with other countries in Asia like India. 

Today we see the Chinese supporting, for example, just what 

they are doing with Pakistan, just what they are doing with Pakistan. The Chinese are helping this state, the sponsor of terrorism. 

They are trying to have a power grab for the rare minerals, the oil, 

the gas, and other natural resources of Central Asia. And we have 

got to come to grips with this. And I would hope that those of you 

in the Executive Branch, that we work together to reshape America’s basic policy toward Asia so that, instead of a tilt toward China 

with a blind eye toward human rights and democracy, that, instead, we with both eyes open focus on trying to get better relations with India and those other countries who are struggling for 

democracy. 

That is my statement. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And because of time, I think the statement speaks for itself. We 

will turn to the gentleman from Virginia for 3 minutes, Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In picking up on Mr. Rohrabacher’s statement, Ambassador 

Blake, I assume you would agree that there is something to that. 

In terms of with the end of the Cold War and with the rapprochement between the United States and India, there are new opportunities for creating space among many relationships, including the 

juxtaposition with China. 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Connolly, nice to see you again. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Likewise. 

Mr. BLAKE. We have been very proud of the progress we have 

made in our relations with India. And India itself has made tremendous progress in its relations with China, particularly on the 

economic front, where their trade is almost 70 billion now and is 

their fastest growing treading partner. They still have some tensions on border issues and things like that, but both of us have 

been clear that the progress that we are making in our respective 

relations with China is not coming at the expense of the other. We 

are not seeking to contain China. We are trying to engage China 

as much as possible. And certainly in my 4 years working on this 

job, I have spent a lot of time trying to get China to work more 

closely with us on our central objectives in places like Afghanistan 

to get them to invest more in the infrastructure there. 

43

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I would agree with everything you are saying. I by no means was once suggesting containment or at the expense of, but in terms of the richness of the fabric of South 

Asia,——

Mr. BLAKE. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. The emerging relationship that did 

not exist heretofore between the United States and India it seems 

to me is definitely in our mutual best interest——

Mr. BLAKE. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. And especially in light of unfolding 

facts and developments in the region. 

Mr. BLAKE. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One more question, if I may, for both of you. In 

the so-called pivot to Asia or rebalancing in Asia, I have seen some 

documents that talk about the purpose of all of this, maybe renegotiating bases in the Philippines and elsewhere in the region and so 

forth and plus existing treaty obligations is to deter aggression. I 

am very worried about that expression because presumably it 

means more than deterring pirates. And I am worried about false 

expectations, that it raises expectations in the region that the 

United States will extend its defense umbrella. And that is a very 

difficult expectation to meet. How are we managing those expectations in 30 seconds? [Laughter.] 

Mr. YUN. We are managing very well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. YUN. No. Mr. Connolly, I think you are 100 percent right. 

I think to emphasize deterring aggression at the expense of others 

I think is misleading. I would say pivot to Asia is, by and large, 

most about our economic presence. We need to be there to take advantage of the increasing economic value that is out there, investment trade. 

We look at the opening up of Southeast Asia. American companies have tremendous advantage in infrastructure. Look at GE. 

Look at Boeing. Look at how we build airports. So I think that has 

to be the number one emphasis, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would like to thank the panel here this afternoon. Members 

will have 5 days to submit additional questions or extend their remarks. The panel did an excellent job here this afternoon. We appreciate it. 

If there is no further business to come before the subcommittee, 

we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

46

f


79579n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

us. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman 

February 19, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and 

the Pacific, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at yvwwfo!Cig;naffi!ill;.hous\U;QY): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, February 26, 2013 

2:00 p.m. 

The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part I) 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake 

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 

US. Department of State 

Mr. Joseph Y. Yun 

Acting Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

US. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 

1 he Cummillee on ForeIgn "'W;,in" leeks Iv maAe ill"./ili7!JIJCS (/(( essJhie 10 penuns 1i~lh disobiiJlin.l(1'IJU are J/J need u/ITe! i<11 au ommudu/w17s, pleme (ol! 

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47

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79579m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

M1NUIES OF SUBCOMMlTTEE ON _______ --'-'A=si=-a:::"'::::'dc:/!::::""Pc:":::o"'ifi.:.c _______ HEARlNG 

D.y __ T"-u",e",s",d",a"V __ Date ___ 2",Y:-='2",61,,'2,,O,,1-,,3,-__ Room, __ "R.!cH,-,O",-B"-,Z"lcc7-,,Z __ 

Starting Time _-,2~·",04.,p"'IIv., __ Endin~ Time ~~ 

Recesses ; __ . L-to __ ) L-to __ J L-to __ ) ~to __ ) L-to __ ) ~to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Steve Chahot (R-OH) 

Clreck all a/the/al/owing thot opp~v: 

Open Session [2] 

Execulh'f (closed) Session D 

Teleyised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (taped) [2] 

Stell():,{rap hie Record [ZJ 

The Rebalallce to Asia: Why South Asia Jiatters (Part 1) 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Steve Chabot (R-OH), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Jl-fatt Salmon (R-AZ), J.fo Brooks (R-AL), George Holding (R-NC), Scott Perry 

(R-PAj, Luke Me.'\'si'r (R-IlV), l{n; /':11. Fulemnavaegu (D-AS), Ami Bera (D-CA), Tuls; CaMard (V-HI), Brad S'hermun (f)-CAj, 

Gerald E. Connnl~F (V-VA) 

NON-SlJBCOl\lMITTEE .M.El\lBERS PRESENT: O.1ark with an * ?frhey are not members a/fiJI! committee,) 

H~ARING ,\'ITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'? Yes [J No 0 

(If "no ", please list heluw and include tille, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEl\IENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List allY statements submitted fiH the record.) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED _-,-3.",·Z..:.Sp=m __ 

Suhcommittee Staff Director