IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-20056

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

WILLIAM HORNBEAK, also known as Pookie,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:09-CR-453-2

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

William Hornbeak pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to 

participate in sex trafficking, charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts

of transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent for such 

individual to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. He first 

challenges the adequacy of the factual basis offered in support of his guilty plea

as to the conspiracy count. He contends that there was an inadequate basis to 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 7, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 13-20056

2

support the offense set forth in the written judgment, which described the 

object of the conspiracy as sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. 

Hornbeak’s appeal waiver bars an appeal of his sentence and does not apply to 

this claim, which pertains to the validity of his conviction. See United States 

v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Palmer, 456 

F.3d 484, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2006).

The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Hornbeak’s guilty 

plea to the § 371 conspiracy was supported by a sufficient factual basis. See 

Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d at 474-75; United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 699 

(5th Cir. 2012). At rearraignment, Hornbeak agreed that he knowingly 

conspired with others to pursue the sex trafficking and prostitution scheme as 

to the adult victims. He admitted taking overt actions to further the scheme. 

Also, the indictment and the plea agreement, which Hornbeak signed, indicate 

that he physically abused and beat victims of the scheme. A signed addendum 

to the agreement indicates that Hornbeak reviewed the plea agreement with 

his attorney, understood it, and voluntarily agreed to its terms.

Finally, one of the victims to the scheme testified at an initial sentencing 

hearing that Hornbeak routinely beat her with an extension cord. See 

Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d at 475 (holding, under clear error review, that 

“inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence adduced after the 

acceptance of a guilty plea but before or at sentencing” when determining 

whether there is an adequate factual basis for a guilty plea) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). Even if there were nothing to show that 

Hornbeak, himself, used force, fraud, or coercion during the scheme, there was 

a sufficient factual basis demonstrating that, as to the conspiracy offense in 

Count One, his co-conspirators did. See United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 

453 (5th Cir. 1992). On this record, we cannot say that we are left “with a 

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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States 

v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Next, Hornbeak raises three arguments challenging the district court’s 

inclusion, in the written judgment, of a requirement that he comply with the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a condition of 

supervised release. The record reflects that Hornbeak’s appeal waiver was 

knowing and voluntary. United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 

1994). His challenges to the district court’s inclusion of the SORNA 

requirement as a condition of supervised release are barred by his valid appeal 

waiver, and we discern no clerical error in light of the inclusion of a description 

of Hornbeak’s duties under the SORNA in his plea agreement. See United 

States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 738-39 & n.16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. 

Ct. 2319 (2014); see also United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357-58 (5th 

Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

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