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Knight v. United States UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEA LS FOR THE SECOND C IRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER R U L I N G S B Y

S U M M A RY

O R D E R D O N O TH A V EP R E C E D E N T I A LE F F E C T . C I T A T I O NT O A S U M M A RY O R D E R F I L E D O NO R

A F T E R J A N U A RY 1, 2007 , I S PE R M I T T E D A N D I S G O V E R N E D B Y F E D E RA L R U L EO F A PP E L L A T E P R O C E D U R E 32.1 A N D T H I S C O U RT ' S L O C A L R U L E 32.1 .1. W H E NC I T I N G A S U M M A RY O R D E R I NA D O C U M E N TF I L E D WI T HT H I S C O U RT, A P A RT Y M U ST C I T EE I T H E R

T H E F E D E RA L A PP E N D I XO R

A NE L E C T R O N I CD A T A B A SE ( W I T HT H EN O T A T I O N " SU M M A RY O R D E R "). A P A RT Y C I T I N G A

S U M M A RY

O R D E R M U ST S E RV EA

C O PY O F I TO NA N Y

P A RT Y N O TRE PRE SE N T E D B Y C O U N SE L . At a stat ed ter m of the Uni ted S tate s Court o f Appeals f or the Se cond Ci rcui t, held at t he Thu rg ood M arshall Uni ted S tate s Courtho use, 40 Foley S quare, in the City of New Yor k, on t he 12 day of August , two t housand fourt een. t h PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRES I,

DENNY CHIN, RAYM OND J. LOHIER, JR.,

Circ uit Judges

.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RANDALL DELBE RT KNIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. 13-775-pr UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA, Responden t-Appellee

.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FORPETITIONER-APP ELLANT: JANE S. MEYER S, Law Offi ce of Jane S. Mey ers, Bro okly n, NY.FORRESPONDENT-AP PELLEE : MONI CA J. RICHARDS , Assi stant Uni ted St ates Att or ney, forWi lli am J. Hochul, Jr., Uni ted S tate s Atto rney fo r t he Western Di stric t of New Yor k, Buffalo, NY. Appeal from the United Stat es Di stric t Co urt for the Wester n Di stric t of New York (Skr etny, C. J. ).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORD ERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that t he final order of the dis tr i ct court is VACATE D and the case i s REMANDED for furt her pro ceedings.

Peti tioner-appellant Randall D elbert K ni ght was charged on June 21, 2010 wi th commi tting murder-for-hi re o n or aboutJuly 3, 1994, in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Pursuan t to a plea agre ement, Knight pled gui lty t o the charg e i n the Uni ted S tate s Di stric t Co urt for the Wester n Di stric t of New Yor k (Sk ret ny, C. J. ) on July 14, 2010. The di stric t courtsentenced Kni ght pr i nci pally to 288 months' i mpri sonment.

At t he tim e Knight commi tte d hi s offens e, the maximum penal ty fo r murder-for-hi re was li fe i mpri sonment, and, therefor e, the appli cable s tatut e of li mi tations w as fi ve y ears. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). In Se ptember 1994, Co ngress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) to inc rease the maximu m pun i shm ent to death. See Vi olent Cr i me Contr ol and Law Enfor cement Act of 1994, Pub . L. No. 103-322, § 60003(a) (11), 108 Stat. 1796 (effecti ve S ept. 13, 1994) (codi fi ed at 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)). Accordi ngly, t he murder-for-hi re stat ute was no longer subject to any statute o f li mi tations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3281. 2When Congr ess am ended § 1958(a) in September 1994, t he origi nal

fi ve-year statute o f li mi tations had n ot r un w i th respect to Kni ght's crim e. When he pled gui lty in July 2010, there was n o dis cus si on on the r ecord o f wh ether the amendmen t of § 1958(a) to indi rectly eli minate the stat ute of li mi tations appli ed ret ro acti vely . During the plea allocution, the di stric t j udge asked Knight i f he understood t hat he was gi ving up h i s ri ght t o assert a stat ute of li mi tations defen se by pleading guil ty. K ni ght answered "[y]es," and h i s coun sel added that "for t he recor d there i s no statute of lim i tations." App. at 75.

Kni ght t hereafter fi led a motion to vacate , set asi de, or corr ect hi s sen tence pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 2255. On January 31, 2013, the dis tr i ct court (Sk ret ny, C. J. ) deni ed the motion. In an order enter ed Mar ch 7, 2013, the di stric t courtgr anted Kni ght's mot i on for a cer tifi cate of appealabi li ty as to whether hi s attor ney was i neffec tive in: "(1) advis i ng hi m to plead guilty to a cr i me for whi ch the statute of li mi tations may have expired, or r elatedly, (2) fai ling to rais e a defense that a convic tion would vi olate t he federal Ex Post Facto Clause of the Uni ted S tate s Consti tution." App. at 5-6. We assu me the part i es' fami li arity wi th the facts, procedural hi stor y, and i ssu es on appeal. A. Applicable Law

"A clai m of ineffec tive ass i stance entai ls a s howing that: 1) the defens e

couns el's perfor manc e was objecti vely unreasonable; and 2) the defi ci ent perfo rmance 3prej udi ced the defens e." Kovacs v. United S tat es , 744 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Ci r. 2014) (ci tin g

Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Th e Strickland test "appli es to gui lty plea challenges." Id. (ci tin g Hill v. L ockha rt, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). "Both the perfor manc e and prej udi ce components of the ineffec tiveness i nqui ry are mixed questi ons of law and fact." Chhabra v. United States , 720 F.3d 395, 406 (2d Ci r. 2013) (internal quot ation marks and alterations omi tte d).

Under t he perfor manc e pro ng of the Strickland test, we ask whether

couns el's perfor manc e was "s o defi ci ent that, in li ght o f all the ci rcums tances, the i denti fi ed acts or o mi ssi ons were outsi de the rang e of pro fess i onally competent assi stance." Gonza lez v. United S tat es , 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Ci r. 2013) (internal quot ation marks omitted). "Ju di ci al sc rutiny of couns el's perfor manc e mus t be hi ghly defere nti al," and requi res us "to reconstr uct the ci rcums tances of coun sel's challenged conduc t, and to e valuate t he conduc t fro m couns el's perspecti ve atthe time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In consi dering wh ether couns el's perfor manc e was defi ci ent, we have held that "where a habeas peti tioner establi shes that counsel's choi ces w ere no t the r esult of a

consc i ous, reasonably i nformed deci si on made by an atto rney with an eye to benefi tting hi s cl i ent, court s may ques tion s uchchoi ces." Greiner v. Well s , 417 F.3d 305, 325 (2d Ci r. 2005) (internal quot ation marks omi tte d). "Indeed, courts have found defi ci ent perfor manc e where counsel's conduc t r esulted from . . . a legal er ro r o r a 4mi sun derstandi ng of the law." Id . Accordi ngly, "ev i dence of coun sel's f ai lure to make

consc i ous, reasonably i nformed deci si ons for the benefi t of t he cri minal defendan t may at times be su ffi ci ent to ov ercome the pr esum ption of effecti veness." Id. Of course, the Constituti on "does not ins ure thatdefense c ounsel w i ll recognize and rai se ever y concei vable consti tutional c lai m." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). Nor does i t require couns el to "for ecast ch anges or adv ances i n the law." Jameson v. Coughlin , 22 F.3d 427, 429 (2d Ci r. 1994) (i nternal quot ation marks omi tte d).

"[T] o satis fy the prejudi ce prong with respect to a clai m focu sing on a plea of gui lty, ' the defendant mus t show that ther e i s a reasonable probabi li ty t hat, but for

couns el's err or s, he w ould not have pleaded gui lty and would have in si sted on go i ng to tr i al.'" Gonza lez , 722 F.3d at 130 (quot i ng Hill , 474 U.S. at 59). "[W] here t he alleged err or of counsel i s a fai lure to advis e the defendant of a pot entialaffi rmative defense to the cri me charged, the r esoluti on of the 'pr ejudic e' in qui ry wi ll depend largely o n whether the affi rmative defense li kely would have succeeded at trial." Hill , 474 U.S. at 59; see also Panucc io v. Kelly, 927 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Ci r. 1991). The court need not, however , find that the is sue w ould ulti mately be re solved inthe defendant's favor , but rather only t hat there i s a fai r likelihood "that, but for the defic i ency, the outcome o f the proceeding would have been di fferent." McKee v. Un ited States , 167 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Ci r. 1999).

5B. Application The di stric t courtdi d not r each the i ssu e of whether counsel's perfor manc e fell below an objecti ve standard o f reasonableness . Instead, the dis tr i ct court r uled, purely as a legal matter , that Co ngress's chan ge t o the maximu m penalty under § 1958(a) effecti vely amended the appli cable s tatut e of li mi tations. Acc or dingly, the di stric t courtheld that "Knight's atto rney could nothave been i neffec tive for fai li ng to r ai se a statute of lim i tations defen se that di d not ex i st." Deci si on and Order , Jan. 31, 2013, at 9. In i ts response to K ni ght's mot i on below, the Gove rnment to ok t he posi tion that Knight had no statute of lim i tations defen se. On appeal, however, t he Gover nment origi nally too k no po si tion. After we requested briefing on the iss ue, the Gover nment too k the o pposi te v i ew bas ed on i ts posi tion in opposing certiorarii n another case, seeBrief

for t he Uni ted S tate s in Opposi tion at 14-15 n.4, Seale v. Un ited States , cert. deni ed, 131 S. Ct . 163 (2010) ( No. 09-11229), and i ts sub sequent confes si on of

err or in yet ano ther case, see Uni ted S tate s of Ameri ca's Bri ef at 37, United S tat es v. Mueller, 661 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 2011) ( Nos. 10-3159, 10-3691) , 2011 WL 2179433 at *37. Speci fi cally, the Gover nment i s now of the viewthat t he 1994 amendm ent to § 1958(a) di d not ex tend the lim i tations peri od for cri mes c ommi tte d prior to the amendment becau se, "wh ere a substanti ve change appli es only pro specti vely , an indi rect amendmen t to the statute of li mi tations does not apply ret ro acti vely ." Appellee's 6Supplemental Br. at 6. The Gov ernment now tak es the posi tion, therefor e, that K ni ght

can dem onstrat e prej udi ce. Nevert heless, the Gov ernment ar gues that Knight's motion for habeas corpus reli ef should be deni ed becau se couns el's perfor manc e di d not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. In li ght o f the Gover nment's new posi tion, w e remand the case for the dis tr i ct court t o r econsi der bot h prongs of K ni ght's i neffec tive ass i stance of coun sel cl ai m.

First, becau se the di stric t courtdi d not deci de the perfo rmance prong, we do nothave an adequate r ecord t o consi der t he i ssu e. Addi tionally, our cases m ake clear that ex cept i n "hi ghly unusu al ci rcums tances . . . evi dence, in the form of live testim ony, affi davits, or brief s," i s helpf ul to deci ding the question of whether counsel

was c onsti tutionally ineffec tive. Cox v. Donnell y, 387 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Ci r. 2004). We find no "hi ghly unusu al ci rcums tances" here, and, therefor e counsel s hould be affor ded an oppor tuni ty t o ex plain her strat egy and performance.

Second, ev en though the Gov ernment concedes that Knight may demonstrate prej udi ce bec ause a s tatut e of li mi tations defen se was availab le, the

conces si on does not necessari ly end the in qui ry . We note t hat whi le the Gov ernment's posi tion i s "enti tled to gr eat wei ght," we, along with the di stric t court, have an obli gation to "ex amine independently the er ro rs confess ed." Young v. U nited States , 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1942); see also Casey v. United S tat es , 343 U.S. 808, 808 (1952) (acc eptin g the So li ci tor General's confes si on of er ro r where t o do so "would not involve t he 7establi shm ent of any pr ecedent"). To be c lear, we do not expr ess any v i ew as to

whether the Gov ernment's posi tion in conceding err or based on the exis tence of a statute o f li mi tations defen se i s correct, o r whether, r egar dlessof i ts posi tion on the statute o f li mi tations defen se, i ts conces si on that K ni ght can establi sh prejudi ce i s di sposi tive as to Strickland 's sec ond pro ng. We merely poin t outthat because of the Gover nment's conc essi on, whi ch i s contrary to t he posi tion i t to ok in response to Kni ght's mot i on below, i t is appropr i ate for the di stric t courtto consi der t he prej udi ce prong anew and m ake any factual findings neces sary t o prudently resolv e the is sue. Cf. Jot a v. Texaco, Inc. , 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Ci r. 1998) (explai ning on r emand i t would be appropr i ate for di stric t courtto r econsi der merits of an i ssu e based on party' s ch anged posi tion on appeal).

Accordi ngly, we VACATE the fi nal order of the dis tr i ct court and REMAND the case for further proceedings p ursuant to the procedures set for th i n United S tat es v. Jacob son , 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Ci r. 1994), for t he di stric t courtto allo w

couns el an oppor tuni ty t o be heard, make any addi tional fi ndings of fact that are

necess ary to r esolve K ni ght's clai m, and revis i t the mer i ts of i ts deci si on i n li ght o f the Gover nment's newposi tion. Th e part i es are to i nform the Cler k of t he Courtby lett er wi thi n twenty-one days of when the di stric t courthas i ssu ed i ts deci si on. Fo llowing

such notifi cati on, jur i sdi cti on of this appeal wi ll automatic ally be resto red t o thisCourt

8wi thout need for ei ther par ty t o fi le a new noti ce of appeal. After j uri sdi cti on i s

resto red, t hi s panel w i ll resume i ts consi derat i on of this case. FORTHE COURT: Cather i ne O'Hagan Wo lfe, Clerk

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