BORDER SECURITY

DHS’s Progress and 

Challenges in Securing U.S. 

Borders

Statement for the Record by Rebecca Gambler, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice 

Statement for the Record to the

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, March 14, 2013

GAO-13-414T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-13-414T, a statement 

for the record to the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, U.S. Senate 

March 14, 2013 

BORDER SECURITY

DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. 

Borders 

Why GAO Did This Study 

At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS 

had about 28,100 personnel assigned 

to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect 

travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, at 

a cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end 

of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 

41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, 

and sea POEs and along the border, at 

a cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has 

reported that this stronger enforcement 

presence was one of several reasons 

why fewer people were attempting to 

illegally cross the border. However, 

challenges remain in securing the 

border. In recent years, GAO has 

reported on a variety of DHS border 

security programs and operations. 

As requested, this statement addresses 

some of the key issues and 

recommendations GAO has made in the 

following areas: (1) DHS’s efforts to 

secure the border at and between POEs; 

(2) DHS interagency coordination and 

oversight of border security information 

sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) 

DHS management of infrastructure, 

technology, and other assets used to 

secure the border. This statement is 

based on prior products GAO issued 

from January 2008 through February 

2013, along with selected updates 

conducted in February 2013. For the 

selected updates, GAO reviewed 

information from DHS on actions it has 

taken to address prior GAO 

recommendations. 

What GAO Recommends 

While this statement contains no new 

recommendations, GAO has previously 

made recommendations to DHS to 

enhance border security. DHS has 

generally concurred with these 

recommendations and has taken 

actions, or has actions planned or 

under way, to address them.

What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, 

but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal 

year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border 

between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO 

reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest 

border from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, which generally mirrored a decrease in 

estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed 

this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources 

for border security. Data reported by CBP’s Office of Border Patrol (Border 

Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased 

from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is 

too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO 

reported in December 2012 that the number of apprehensions provides 

information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource 

allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance 

goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border 

between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for 

developing and implementing them, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS 

agreed and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and 

time frames by November 2013. 

DHS law enforcement partners reported improvements in interagency 

coordination and oversight of intelligence and enforcement operations, but gaps 

remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and 

communication among federal law enforcement officials had increased; however, 

gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat 

information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies determine if more 

guidance is needed for federal land closures and that they ensure interagency 

agreements for coordinating information and integrating operations are further 

implemented. These agencies agreed and in January 2011, CBP issued a 

memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border 

security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the 

intent of GAO’s recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor 

and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements. 

Opportunities exist to improve DHS’s management of border security assets. For 

example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance 

technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border. In 

January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS 

canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan (Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in 

November 2011 that in developing the new Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of 

alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, 

quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which 

GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO 

View GAO-13-414T has ongoing work in this area and expects to issue a report in fall 2013. . For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-13-414T 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to submit this statement on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. borders against threats of 

terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and 

illegal migration since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the 

end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS existed as an agency, it 

had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and 

about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air, land, and sea ports of 

entry (POE),1 and a total of about $5.9 billion allocated to secure the 

entire U.S. border.2 At the end of fiscal year 2011, both the number of 

personnel and amount of resources dedicated to border security had 

significantly increased, with approximately 21,400 agents assigned to 

patrol the U.S. land borders and more than 20,000 officers assigned to 

air, land, and sea POEs,3

DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was one of 

several reasons, including changes in the U.S. economy, why fewer 

people were attempting to illegally cross the border. However, challenges 

remain in securing the border both at and between land POEs. For 

example, DHS data have shown that several hundred thousand persons 

have entered the country illegally through and between the nation’s 

POEs. Further, our analysis of DHS data indicated that across southwest 

border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 

amounting to about $11.8 billion allocated to 

secure the entire U.S. border.

 

1

POEs are the facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the 

United States for persons and materials. Specifically, a POE is any officially designated 

location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are 

assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws. 

2

The number of border agents includes those assigned to northern and southwest border 

sectors. The number of officers assigned to POEs does not include those performing trade 

or agricultural inspections. The $5.9 billion includes all funds appropriated to DHS for 

border security in fiscal year 2004. 

3

In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that Border Patrol was to 

maintain an active duty presence of no fewer than 21,370 agents protecting the border of 

the United States. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 

2011, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-414T 

percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011—from 10,321 to 18,898.4

DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the 

primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 

Office of Field Operations (OFO)

In 

fiscal year 2012, DHS data indicate that seizures decreased to 17,891 

across the southwest border.

5 and Office of Border Patrol,6

Over the years, we have reported on a variety of DHS border security 

programs and operations. As requested, my statement discusses 

progress and challenges in the following areas:

respectively. Other DHS components also play a role in border security. 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine operates a fleet of air and marine assets 

in support of federal border security efforts. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating cross-border 

illegal activity and criminal organizations that transport persons and 

goods across the border. In addition, other federal, state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies expend resources for border security. For 

example, the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) 

have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal borderlands administered 

by their component agencies, including DOI’s National Park Service, Fish 

and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management, and USDA’s 

Forest Service.

(1) DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between POEs,

(2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security 

information sharing and enforcement efforts, and

 

4

Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband seizures; contraband seizures 

other than drugs include firearms, ammunition, and money.

5

OFO is responsible for processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country 

through air, land, and sea POEs where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to 

determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country.

6

Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the United 

States between POEs by using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats of 

cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across locations; integrating 

border security operations with other law enforcement partners to address threats; and 

developing rapid response capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in 

threat.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-414T 

(3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets 

used to secure the border.

This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued 

from January 2008 through February 2013 that examined DHS efforts to 

secure the U.S. border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this 

statement). It also includes selected updates we conducted in February 

2013. Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained 

and analyzed from officials from various DHS components; the 

Departments of Justice (DOJ), DOI, and USDA; and state and local law 

enforcement agencies. More detailed information about our scope and 

methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the 

updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to 

address recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement 

is based. We also reviewed publicly available documents, such as CBP’s 

budget justification for fiscal year 2013. We conducted all of this work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-414T 

Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim 

measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance 

reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that 

apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011.7 These data generally mirrored a 

decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border 

sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol 

following the issuance of our December 2012 report show that total 

apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 

in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.8

In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects 

other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform 

assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal 

migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data 

It is too early to 

assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border 

Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 

2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors 

in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic 

objectives, and increased resources for border security.

 

7

GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 

2012).

8

GAO, Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security 

Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-330T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2013).

CBP Has Reported 

Progress in Stemming 

Illegal Cross-Border 

Activity, but Could 

Strengthen 

Assessment of Its 

Efforts

Border Patrol Has 

Reported Some Success in 

Reducing Illegal Migration, 

but Challenges Remain in 

Assessing Efforts 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-414T 

show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known 

illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known 

illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), 

and (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband.9

As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations 

track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the 

appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being 

deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from 

Border Patrol headquarters.

Our analysis 

of these data show that the percentage of estimated known illegal 

entrants apprehended from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 varied across 

southwest border sectors. The percentage of individuals apprehended 

who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined by 6 percent from 

fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs 

and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal 

year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011.

10 Border Patrol data showed that the 

effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border 

improved from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.11

 

9

Border Patrol’s estimate of known illegal entries includes illegal, deportable entrants who 

were apprehended, in addition to the number of entrants who illegally crossed the border 

but were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico (referred to as turn 

backs) or continued traveling into the U.S. interior (referred to as got aways). We defined 

these illegal entries as estimated “known” illegal entries to clarify that the estimates do not 

include illegal entrants for which Border Patrol does not have reasonable indications of 

cross-border illegal activity. These data are collectively referred to as known illegal entries 

because Border Patrol officials have what they deem to be a reasonable indication that 

the cross-border activity occurred. Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through 

various sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from credible sources (such as 

residents), camera monitoring, and detection of physical evidence left on the environment 

from animal or human crossings. 

Border Patrol 

headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect, 

and report turn back data (entrants who illegally crossed the border but 

10Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it adds 

the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector and divides this total by 

the total estimated known illegal entries—determined by adding the number of 

apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways for the sector. Border Patrol views its border 

security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage 

of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a 

percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased.

11The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease in the overall 

effectiveness rate from 86 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 68 percent in fiscal year 2011.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-414T 

were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got 

away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued 

traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness 

rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border 

Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol 

sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away 

data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied 

across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and 

judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials 

issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent, 

standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and 

got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually 

responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to 

Border Patrol officials, it is expected that once the guidance is 

implemented, data reliability will improve. This new guidance may allow 

for comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding 

resource deployment for securing the southwest border.

Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and 

measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border 

between ports of entry and for informing the identification and allocation 

of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified 

milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since 

fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the 

southwest border between ports of entry as an interim performance goal 

and measure for border security as reported in its annual performance 

report. Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish 

this goal.12 Operational control—also referred to as effective control—was 

defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the 

capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. 

DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control 

of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving 

operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. 

northern, southwest, and coastal borders.13

 

12Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under operational control using factors 

such as operational statistics, third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, 

resource deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents. 

Along the southwest border, 

13GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012). 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-414T 

DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the 

about 2,000 border miles.

14 At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS 

transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security. We testified in May 2012 that the interim 

goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border 

between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not inform 

program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and 

therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and 

Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.15

Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of 

apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency 

officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border 

illegal activity.16

Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of 

developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified 

milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. 

According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time 

frames for the development of performance goals and measures is 

contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan, 

such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time frames for 

implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 

2014—are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish 

milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, 

for border security between ports of entry that defines how border security 

is to be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for 

assessing progress made in securing the border between ports of entry 

and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS 

concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set 

milestones and timeframes for developing goals and measures by 

November 2013.

 

14GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 

Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011) 

15GAO-12-688T. 

16For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005).
 

Page 8 GAO-13-414T 

As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP 

inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists 

and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel 

documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and 

inadmissible goods from entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP 

inspected about 352 million travelers and over 107 million cars, trucks, 

buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs. 

We have previously identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection 

program and made recommendations to DHS for addressing these 

vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these recommendations. We 

reported in January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP’s inbound traveler 

inspection program,17 including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing 

levels because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening 

procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility 

of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.18

In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program 

for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training 

Contributing factors included a lack of focus, complacency, lack of 

supervisory presence, and lack of training. We recommended that CBP 

enhance internal controls in the inspection process, implement 

performance measures for apprehending inadmissible aliens and other 

violators, and establish measures for training provided to CBP officers 

and new officer proficiency. DHS concurred with these recommendations 

and has implemented them. Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, 

among other things, that all land port directors are required to monitor and 

assess compliance with eight different inspection activities using a selfinspection worksheet that is provided to senior CBP management. At that 

time, CBP also established performance measures related to the 

effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP 

began conducting additional classroom and on-the-job training, which 

incorporated ongoing testing and evaluation of officer proficiency.

 

17GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at 

Our Nation’s Ports of Entry, GAO-08-329T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2008).

18The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and CBP policies and 

procedures for traveler inspection at all POEs require officers to establish, at a minimum, 

the nationality of individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1225(a); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).

CBP Has Taken Action to 

Strengthen POE Inspection 

Programs and Officer 

Training, and Has 

Additional Actions 

Planned or Underway
 

Page 9 GAO-13-414T 

development standards.19

We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the 

training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure 

that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP’s 

results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted 

over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection 

process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP 

developed a “Back to Basics” course in March 2010 for incumbent 

officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training.

Additionally, CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible 

causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the test results. 

We recommended in December 2011 that CBP evaluate the “Back to 

Basics” training course and analyze covert tests, and DHS concurred with 

these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials notified GAO that it 

had completed its evaluation of the “Back to Basics” training course and 

implemented an updated, subsequent training course. In November 2012, 

CBP officials stated they had analyzed the results of covert tests prior to 

and since the implementation of the subsequent course. GAO is currently 

reviewing CBP’s analysis of the covert test results and other 

documentation CBP has provided to determine the extent to which CBP 

has addressed this recommendation. Further, in July 2012 CBP 

completed a comprehensive analysis of the results of its document fraud 

covert tests from fiscal years 2009 to 2011. In addition, we reported that 

CBP had not conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps 

between identified critical skills and incumbent officers’ current skills and 

competencies. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a 

training needs assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. In 

January 2013, CBP notified GAO it had developed a survey of incumbent 

officers to seek feedback on possible gaps in training. CBP is currently 

analyzing the survey results and preparing a report, which will 

recommend a path forward to address training needs. According to CBP, 

Consistent with these standards, CBP 

convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks 

that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new 

curriculum was designed to produce a professional law enforcement 

officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, 

biological, and agricultural threats.

 

19GAO, Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers are Fully Trained, 

GAO-12-269 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2011).
 

Page 10 GAO-13-414T 

if an additional training need is identified and funding is available, CBP 

will develop or revise the current training program. In February 2013, CBP 

officials stated it plans to complete this process by April 15, 2013.

Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands 

protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest 

and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and 

cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the visiting public at 

risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and 

communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials 

had increased in recent years.20

 

20GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, 

For example, interagency forums were 

used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency 

liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. However, gaps 

remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law 

enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better 

ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal 

activity. For example, in Border Patrol’s Spokane sector on the northern 

border, coordination of intelligence information was particularly important 

GAO-11-177 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 18, 2010). 

DHS Law 

Enforcement Partners 

Reported Improved 

Results for 

Interagency 

Coordination and 

Oversight of 

Intelligence and 

Enforcement 

Operations, but Gaps 

Remain 

DOI and USDA Reported 

Improved DHS 

Coordination to Secure 

Federal Borderlands, but 

Critical Gaps Remained in 

Sharing Intelligence and 

Communications for Daily 

Operations 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-414T 

because of sparse law enforcement presence and technical challenges 

that precluded Border Patrol’s ability to fully assess cross-border threats, 

such as air smuggling of high-potency marijuana.

We recommended DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and 

accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for 

coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies 

agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a 

memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents 

emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address 

border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to 

fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take 

further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing 

interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands.

DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal, 

and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the success of 

northern border security efforts. We reported in December 2010 that DHS 

efforts to coordinate with these partners through interagency forums and 

joint operations were considered successful, according to a majority of 

these partners we interviewed.21

 

21GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 

Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, 

In addition, DHS component officials 

reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border 

was improved. However, DHS did not provide oversight for the number 

and location of forums established by its components, and numerous 

federal, state, local, and Canadian partners cited challenges related to the 

inability to resource the increasing number of forums, raising concerns 

that some efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law 

enforcement partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work 

cited ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol 

and Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration 

in sharing information and resources that compromised daily border 

security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established 

and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination 

challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and 

local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of 

these agreements.

GAO-11-97 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 

2010).

Northern Border Partners 

Reported Interagency 

Forums Improved 

Coordination, but DHS 

Oversight Was Needed to 

Resolve Interagency 

Conflict in Roles and 

Responsibilities 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-414T 

We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol’s border 

security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law 

enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of partner 

law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol 

resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make more efficient 

resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for 

assessing border security and resource requirements. We recommended 

that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency forums and for 

component compliance with interagency agreements, and develop policy 

and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources in border security 

assessments and resource planning documents. DHS agreed with our 

recommendations and has reported taking action to address them. For 

example, in June 2012, DHS released a northern border strategy, and in 

August 2012, DHS notified us of other cross-border law enforcement and 

security efforts taking place with Canada. However, in order to fully satisfy 

the intention of our recommendation, DHS would need to develop an 

implementation plan that specifies the resources and time frames needed 

to achieve the goals set forth in the strategy.

In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 

multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and 

reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned to 

develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology, 

known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical 

infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP 

increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and 

vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles 

Opportunities Exist to 

Improve DHS’s 

Management of 

Border Security 

Assets 

DHS Has Deployed Assets 

to Secure the Borders, but 

Needs to Provide More 

Information on Plans, 

Metrics, and Costs
 

Page 13 GAO-13-414T 

presently.22 We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for the 

impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border 

security.23 Specifically, CBP had reported an increase in control of 

southwest border miles, but could not account separately for the impact of 

the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we 

recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and 

other infrastructure to border security.24

Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of challenges 

related to schedule delays and performance problems with SBInet. 

SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual 

fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS 

deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that 

represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to 

concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS 

canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona 

border.

DHS concurred with our 

recommendation and, in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland 

Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the 

impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in 

February 2012 that preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an 

additional 3 to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment.

In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information 

needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS 

and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.25

 

22The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S. International Boundary and 

Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length of the land border is 675 miles, while the 

length of the border along the Colorado River and Rio Grande River is 1,279 miles. 

In developing 

the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to 

potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the analysis justifying 

23GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and 

Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010). 

24GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 

2009).

25GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).
 

Page 14 GAO-13-414T 

the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border 

surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Specifically, according to 

CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process to develop the Plan. First, 

CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to 

conduct an analysis of alternatives beginning with ones for Arizona. 

Second, following the completion of the analysis of alternatives, the 

Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a 

comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an 

analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. 

While the first step in CBP’s process to develop the Plan—the analysis of 

alternatives—was well documented, the second step—Border Patrol’s 

operational assessment—was not transparent because of the lack of 

documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without 

documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and 

deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the 

Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify 

how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the 

decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We also reported that 

CBP officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from 

implementing the new Plan, and defining the expected benefit could help 

improve CBP’s ability to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is 

implemented.

In addition, we reported that CBP’s 10-year life cycle cost estimate for the 

Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-magnitude 

analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of 

confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest. Specifically, we 

found that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices, 

being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet 

other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility, 

because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of 

risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are 

important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. 

In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence 

in its estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine 

what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks 

associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining 

Arizona border.

We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP 

document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan, 

determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle 

cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with these recommendations, 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-414T 

and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations. 

For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the 

operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet’s initial deployment in 

high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has identified examples 

of mission benefits that could result from implementing technologies 

under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated action to update its cost 

estimate for the Plan by providing revised cost estimates in February and 

March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed Towers and Remote Video 

Surveillance System, the Plan’s two largest projects. We currently have 

ongoing work for congressional requesters to assess CBP’s progress in 

this area and expect to issue a report with our final results in the fall of 

2013.

In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine 

(OAM)—which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its 

customers, primarily Border Patrol—had not documented significant 

events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement 

across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate 

that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones in 

fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats.26

 

26GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air 

and Marine Assets, 

OAM issued various 

plans that included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat 

information. However, we could not identify the underlying analyses used 

to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across 

locations. OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the 

deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. For 

example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s highest priority 

for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air 

support than the northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document 

analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets 

across locations. OAM officials said that while they generally documented 

final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not 

have the resources to document assessments and analyses to support 

these decisions. However, we reported that such documentation of 

significant events could help the office improve the transparency of its 

resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness of 

these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and addressing 

threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP document analyses, 

GAO-12-518 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2012).
 

Page 16 GAO-13-414T 

including mission requirements and threats, that support decisions on the 

mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine resources. DHS concurred 

with our recommendation and stated that it plans to provide additional 

documentation of its analyses supporting decisions on the mix and 

placement of air and marine resources by 2014. 

DHS took action in 2004 to better monitor and control the entry and exit of 

foreign visitors to the United States by establishing the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, which tracks 

foreign visitors using biometric information (such as fingerprints) and 

biographic information. DHS has incrementally delivered US-VISIT 

capabilities to track foreign entries, and a biometrically enabled entry 

capability has been fully operational at about 300 air, sea, and land POEs 

since December 2006.27

Since 2004, however, we have identified a range of DHS management 

challenges to fully deploying a biometric exit capability intended, in part, 

to track foreigners who had overstayed their visas and remained illegally 

in the United States. For example, in November 2009, we reported that 

DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, 

and tracking the work needed to deliver a comprehensive exit solution.28

In August 2010, we reported that the DHS pilot programs to track the exit 

of foreign visitors at air POEs had limitations curtailing the ability to inform 

a decision for a long-term exit solution at these POEs.29

In the absence of a biometric entry and exit system, DHS uses various 

methods for identifying overstays, primarily biographic data, and sharing 

of overstay information.30

 

27GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, 

but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, 

US-VISIT identifies overstays by analyzing 

biographic data maintained in the Arrival and Departure Information 

GAO-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2009). 

28GAO-10-13. 

29GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air 

Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2010). 

30GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and 

Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411

(Washington, D.C. Apr. 15, 2011).

DHS US-VISIT Program 

Technology Provides an 

Opportunity to Identify 

Illegal Migration through 

Overstays
 

Page 17 GAO-13-414T 

System—a database that contains information on aliens’ entry, exit, and 

change of status—and electronically and manually comparing Arrival and 

Departure Information System records with information in other 

databases to find matches that demonstrate that a nonimmigrant may 

have, for instance, departed the country or filed an application to change 

status and thus is not an overstay. Additionally, DHS shares overstay 

information among its components through various mechanisms, such as 

alerts that can inform a CBP primary inspection officer at a POE of a 

nonimmigrant’s history as an overstay violator, at which point the officer 

can refer the nonimmigrant to secondary inspection for a more in-depth 

review of the alien’s record and admissibility. Furthermore, ICE’s 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit uses data provided by 

US-VISIT and various databases to identify leads for overstay cases, take 

steps to verify the accuracy of the leads, prioritize leads to focus on those 

identified as most likely to pose a threat to national security or public 

safety, and conduct field investigations on priority, high-risk leads. From 

fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting a relatively 

constant percent of its total field office investigative hours to 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit overstay investigations, 

ranging from 3.1 to 3.4 percent.

We reported in April 2011 that DHS was creating electronic alerts for 

certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more than 

90 days, but was not creating alerts for those who overstay by less than 

90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay violators, as 

identified by CBP. We recommended in April 2011 that DHS assess the 

costs and benefits of creating additional alerts, and DHS concurred with 

this recommendation. DHS has since reported that it would begin creating 

additional alerts, which could improve the chance that these individuals 

are identified as overstays during subsequent encounters with federal 

officials. We have additional work ongoing for congressional requesters in 

this area regarding DHS’s identification of and enforcement actions 

against overstays and expect to issue a report with our final results in the 

summer of 2013.

This concludes my statement for the record.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-414T 

For further information about this statement, please contact Rebecca 

Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key 

contributions to this statement included Kathryn Bernet, Lacinda Ayers, 

and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Directors; as well as Frances A. Cook, 

Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, Lara Miklozek, and Ashley D. Vaughan.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 1 GAO-13-414T 

Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border 

Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-330T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 26, 2013.

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to 

Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25. 

Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.

Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts. GAO-12-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012.

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of 

DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2012.

Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers are Fully 

Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.

Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, 

and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs. 

GAO-11-411. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 

for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 15, 2011.

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 

Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. 

Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 

Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. 

GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 

Understanding of Air Exit Options. GAO-10-860. Washington, D.C.: 

August 10, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 2 GAO-13-414T 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 

Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.

Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of 

Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 3, 2008.

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