Oral argument was heard in this case on April 15, 2005, in Pulaski, Giles County, Tennessee, as part of this 1

Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 15, 2005 Session at Pulaski1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PATRICK D. COLLINS

 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2001-T-324 Frank G. Clement, Jr., Judge

No. M2002-02885-SC-S09-CO - Filed June 29, 2005

We granted review of thisinterlocutory appeal to determine whether the defendant was sufficiently

advised of the consequences of refusing to take a breath-alcohol test. The arresting officer informed

the defendant that his license would be suspended for one year if he refused the test, but under the

provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(a) (2000) in effect at the time, the

penalty was two years. The trial court held that the defendant was not sufficiently advised of the

consequences and barred the State from seeking any suspension of the defendant’s driver’s license.

The trial court also barred the State from arguing to the jury on the DUI charge that the defendant

had refused the breath test. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was

adequately advised of the consequences for refusing the test. After reviewing the record and

applicable authority, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal

Appeals on the separate grounds set forth herein. We hold that although the State may request

suspension of Collins’ license, the State may not seek a suspension of longer than one year because

Collins was incorrectly advised of the consequences of refusing to take the test.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals

Affirmed in part and Reversed in part

E. RILEY ANDERSON,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J.,

and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

V. Michael Fox, Nashville, Tennessee, and Darren J. Scoggins, Burns, Tennessee, for the Appellant,

Patrick David Collins.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth

T. Ryan, Senior Counsel; Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Scott R.

McMurtry, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
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OPINION

Background

This case comes to us on a pre-trial interlocutory appeal. The facts contained in the limited

record are as follows.

On September 28, 2000, defendant Patrick Collins (“Collins”) was stopped for speeding in

Davidson County, Tennessee. After subjecting Collins to a number of field sobriety tests, the

arresting officer determined that Collins was intoxicated. The officer then read Collins a standard

script, issued by the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (“Metro”), advising Collins:

There are reasonable grounds to believe you were driving or in

physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of

alcohol. I hereby request you to submit to a breath alcohol test. You

will be informed of the results and then have the right to a blood test

at your own expense. You have the right to refuse this test.

However, according to Tennessee state law, if you do, you will be

charged with violating the implied consent law and, if the court finds

you in violation of this law, then the court will suspend your license

for one year. Do you understand? Will you take the breath test?

Collins did not take the breath test. He was subsequently indicted for driving under the influence

of an intoxicant (“DUI”) in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 (2000). The

State also sought to suspend Collins’ license as a penalty for his failure to take the breath test

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406 (2000). 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(a)(1) provides that anyone driving a motor

vehicle in this state “is deemed to have given consent to a test for the purpose of determining the

alcoholic or drug content of that person’s blood.” This “implied consent” statute provides that

refusal to submit to such a test subjects the driver to revocation of his license. See State v. Turner,

913 S.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Tenn. 1995). The statute further provides that “if the driver was not

advised of the consequences ofsuch refusal,” a court may not suspend his license. Tenn. Code. Ann.

§ 55-10-406(a)(2). 

Prior to 2000, the statutory revocation period was one year. As amended effective July 1,

2000, section 55-10-406(a)(3) provides for revocation periods of between one and five years. The

revocation period is two years if the driver was previously convicted of, inter alia, driving under the

influence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(3)(B) (2000). Collins had a prior conviction for driving

under the influence and so, under section 55-10-406(a)(3)(B), he was subject to a two-year

suspension for refusing to take the alcohol test. However, although Collins was arrested nearly three

months after the July 2000 amendments took effect, Metro’s standard script had not been revised to
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conform to the amendments. The arresting officer therefore stated to Collins that he was only

subject to a one-year suspension for refusing to take the breath test.

Because the arresting officer had read him an incorrect advisory statement, Collins moved

prior to trial to strike the implied consent charge and bar the State from attempting to revoke his

license. Collins also sought to bar the State from arguing to the jury on the DUI charge that he

refused to submit to a breath test knowing that he would lose his driver’s license by refusal. 

The trial court ruled that the State did not sufficiently inform Collins of the consequences of

his refusal to take the breath test becauseCollins was informed that the consequence was a one-year,

rather than a two-year, suspension. The trial court therefore ruled that the State could not seek

penalties under the implied consent law. Reasoning that the statement of rights read by the officer

was “wholly deficient,” the trial court also held that the State could not argue to the jury that Collins

knew he would lose his license if he refused the test, because Collins was not in fact going to lose

his license.

The trial court granted the State’s request to continue the trial in order to permit the State to

pursue an interlocutory appeal as to whether it could seek suspension of Collins’ license and as to

whether it could argue to the jury that Collins refused the breath test knowing that he would lose his

license. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the interlocutory appeal and reversed the trial court,

holding that Collins was adequately informed of the consequences of refusing the breath test. The

court reasoned that it would be cumbersome and confusing to attempt to inform a suspect of all

possible consequences of refusal under the revised statute. Because Collins was informed that his

license would be suspended, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that “[a]ny additional

explanation of the consequences of refusal would be gratuitous on the officer’s part.” The court also

held that the State would not be precluded from arguing to the jury that Collins knew his license

would be suspended if he refused the breath test.

We granted review.

Analysis

This case requires us to interpret Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406. We

undertake statutory interpretation de novo, with no presumption of correctness given to the courts

below. State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004). 

The requirement that officers advise drivers of the consequences of refusing an alcohol or

drug test is set forth in section 55-10-406(a)(2). As of September 28, 2000, the date of Collins’

arrest, that section provided in pertinent part:

Any law enforcement officer who requests that the driver of a motor

vehicle submit to a test pursuant to this section for the purpose of

determining the alcoholic or drug content of the driver’s blood shall,
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prior to conducting such test, advise the driver that refusal to submit

to such test will result in the suspension of the driver’s operator’s

license by the court and, if such driver is driving on a revoked,

suspended or cancelled license, when the person’s privilege to do so

is cancelled, suspended or revoked because of a conviction for

vehicular assault under § 39-13-106, vehicular homicide under

§ 39-13-213, aggravated vehicular homicide under § 39-13-218, or

driving under the influence of an intoxicant under § 55-10-401, that

the refusal to submit to such test will, in addition, result in a fine and

mandatory jail or workhouse sentence. The court having jurisdiction

of the offense for which such driver was placed under arrest shall not

have the authority to suspend the license of a driver who refused to

submit to the test if the driver was not advised of the consequences of

such refusal.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(2) (emphases added). We note that Collins was advised only that

refusal to take the breath test would subject him to a suspension of his license, not that there was a

possibility of a fine or jail sentence. Since there is no evidence that Collins was driving on a

revoked, suspended or cancelled license at the time of his arrest, however, the “consequences” of his

refusal to take the test were limited to suspension of his driver’s license. We express no opinion as

to whether the officer’s statement would have been deficient had Collins been subject to a fine or

jail sentence.

The consequences of refusing to take an alcohol or drug test are set forth in section 55-10-

406(a)(3) which, as of September 2000, stated in pertinent part:

If such person having been placed under arrest and thereafter having

been requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to such test

and advised of the consequences for refusing to do so, refuses to

submit, the test shall not be given, and such person shall be charged

with violating this subsection (a) . . . . If the court finds that the

driver violated the provisions of this subsection (a), except as

otherwise provided in this subdivision (a)(3), the driver shall not be

considered as having committed a criminal offense; however, the

court shall revoke the license of such driver for a period of:

(A) One (1) year, if the person does not have a prior conviction for

a violation of § 55-10-401 [DUI] . . . in this state or a similar offense

in any other jurisdiction.

(B) Two (2) years, if the person does have a prior conviction for an

offense set out in subdivision (A).
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(3). 

“The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended

scope.” Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262,

263 (Tenn.1993)). Where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we derive the legislative

intent from its plain and ordinary meaning. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d at 341. If, however, “the parties

derive different interpretations from the statutory language, an ambiguity exists, and we must look

to the entire statutory scheme in seeking to ascertain legislative intent.” Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926

(citing Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1994)). “In ascertaining the intent of the

legislature, this Court may look to ‘the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach

of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be

accomplished in its enactment.’” State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 275 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State

v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tenn.1997)). “Statutes ‘in pari materia’ – those relating to the same

subject or having a common purpose – are to be construed together.” Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926

(citing Lyons, 872 S.W.2d at 897). With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

Collins argues that failure to apprise him of the two-year suspension provision constitutes

a failure to inform him of the consequences of his failure to take the breath test. Therefore, he

argues, his failure to take the test should not subject him to suspension of his license, and the State

should not be permitted to argue to the jury on the DUI charge that Collins knew he would lose his

license if he refused the breath test. The State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly

held that the length of the suspension is immaterial; what matters is that Collins was informed that

refusal to take the test would subject him to having his license suspended. Collins further argues that

all evidence of his “alleged refusal” to take the breath test should be suppressed at his DUI trial. We

decline to address this broad argument. The interlocutory appeal granted by the Court of Criminal

Appeals was limited to review of the trial court’s determination that the State could not seek

suspension of Collins’ license and that the State could not argue to the jury on the DUI charge that

Collins “knew” he would lose his license if he refused the breath test. Additionally, Collins did not

raise to the Court of Criminal Appeals the argument that all evidence relating to the breath test

should be suppressed. We therefore confine our review to the questions of whether the State may

seek suspension of his license and whether the State may argue to the jury on the DUI charge that

Collins knew he would lose his license. 

In our view, the purpose and structure of section 55-10-406 indicate that the legislature

intended only that a driver be advised that his license will be suspended if he refuses an alcohol or

drug test, not that a driver be advised of the specific length of the suspension. As we have previously

observed, we must construe section 55-10-406 together with all of the driving under the influence

statutes. Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 160. The purpose of these statutes is “to remove from the highway,

prosecute, and punish those who engage in the dangerous menace of driving under the influence.”

Id.; see also State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993) (driving under the influence

statutes are “‘intended to enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes’”) (quoting

Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. 1975)). 
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Thus, the purpose of the implied consent statute is not to allow motorists suspected of driving

under the influence to make an “informed choice” about whether to take an alcohol or drug test;

rather, it is to advance the State’s objective of keeping intoxicated drivers off the roadways. In

furtherance of this objective, “[t]he legislature intended to enable the State to establish the offense

by scientific evidence. For the privilege of operating a vehicle on our highways, the driver consents

to a test to determine whether that privilege is, as a law enforcement officer suspects, being abused.”

Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 160. We note also that section 55-10-406(a)(3) specifically provides that

revocation of a driver’s license under the circumstances applicable to Collins does not constitute a

criminal offense, as it confers only an administrative penalty. Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 163. Therefore,

the rule that we strictly construe the statute against the State does not apply. Id.

Viewing the statute in this light, we conclude that section 55-10-406(a)(2) required only that

Collins be informed that his license would be suspended if he refused to take the breath test. Section

55-10-406(a)(2) does not mandate that the specific length of the suspension, which varies according

to the driver’s prior history, be spelled out for the driver. Rather, section 55-10-406(a)(2) sets

general parameters, requiring that a driver be informed that refusal to be tested will result in a license

suspension and could result in a mandatory fine and mandatory jail or workhouse sentence. As the

Court of Criminal Appeals noted, the 2000 amendments did not alter the language requiring that the

driver be advised that refusal to take the test will result in suspension. The amendments also did not

change the provision barring suspension of the license when the consequences of refusal are not

stated. 

The particular consequences of refusal are spelled out separately in section 55-10-406(a)(3).

That section specifies the length of the suspension as well as the maximum fine and the minimum

jail or workhouse sentence. Had the legislature intended these consequences to be spelled out to

each driver who is requested to take an alcohol or drug test, the legislature would have included the

specific consequences in section (a)(2) of the statute. The legislature did state with specificity in

section (a)(2) the prior convictions which subject a driver to a mandatory fine and jail or workhouse

sentence; this bolsters our conclusion that the legislature did not intend to require arresting officers

to enumerate the entire range of consequences of refusal to take an alcohol or drug test in the

advisory stated to drivers. Because the specific consequences are spelled out in a separate section,

we conclude that a general statement of consequences is sufficient. 

Although we conclude that the advisory statement made to a driver need not be specific, we

disagree with the State and with the Court of Criminal Appeals that it need not be accurate. Law

enforcement officers may not “misinform motorists, some of whom may understand the inaccurate

warning and rely upon it.” People v. Johnson, 758 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ill. 2001) (emphasis added)

(holding that rescission of summary suspension of driver’s license was warranted if an inaccurate

warning was given and “that misinformation directly affects the motorist’s potential length of

suspension”).

Had the arresting officer simply advised Collins that his license would be “suspended,” we

would have little difficulty in concluding that the statute’s requirement that Collins be advised of the
 Our holding is limited to application of the implied consent law as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated 2

section 55-10-406.

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consequences of refusing the breath test was met. Here, however, the arresting officer incorrectly

advised Collins, pursuant to Metro’s standard form, that refusal to take the breath test would subject

him only to a one-year suspension. 

There is no evidence in the record that the arresting officer intended to deceive Collins or

acted with bad faith. If the record showed that the officer had intended to mislead Collins, we

would agree with Collins that the State should be precluded from seeking any suspension of his

license whatsoever. See State v. Stade, 683 A.2d 164, 166 (Me. 1996) (“[A]lthough the State’s

interest in preventing drunk drivers from operating on our highways is great, the State has no

legitimate interest in allowing its lawenforcement officers . . . to affirmatively mislead citizens about

the consequences of taking or failing to take a blood-alcohol test.”). In this case, however, the basic

requirement of section 55-10-406(a)(2) was met: Collins was informed that his license would be

suspended if he refused to take the breath test. That the arresting officer then went beyond the

minimum requirements of the statute and incorrectly advised Collins that his license would be

suspended for one year rather than two does not void the advisory statement because the officer’s

error was made without an intent to deceive Collins. We therefore hold that the State may seek to

suspend Collins’ driver’s license, but that the State may not seek a suspension of greater than one

year. Indeed, the State recognized the unfairness of subjecting Collins to a two-year suspension and 2

represented to the trial court that it would seek only a one-year suspension. 

Our holding that the error in the advisory limits the State to seeking a one-year suspension

does not mean, as Collins argues, that the State should be barred from arguing to the jury that Collins

knew he would lose his license if he refused the breath test. The provisions for advising a driver of

the consequences of refusing a drug or alcohol test only apply to the State’s ability to seek the civil

penalty of license suspension. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(4). The issue of whether

Collins’ refusal to take the test is admissible in his criminal DUI trial is entirely separate. We see

no reason to bar the State from presenting evidence and arguing to the jury that the arresting officer

informed Collins that his license would be suspended if he refused the breath test. 

Conclusion

Having considered the record and applicable authority, we hold that the implied consent law

does not require an arresting officer to enumerate the entire range of consequences of refusal to take

an alcohol or drug test. However, because Collins was erroneously advised that he would be subject

only to a one-year suspension, the State may not seek to suspend Collins’ driver’s license for longer

than one year. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in part. We affirm the Court of

Criminal Appeals in part as to the admissibility of Collins’ refusal to take the test on the DUI charge,

and we hold that the State may argue to the jury that Collins was told that he would lose his license

if he refused the breath test. Costs are taxed equally to the State and to Patrick David Collins and

his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
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___________________________________ 

E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE