www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 1 

The United States faces an important strategic question in northwest Africa: what level of activity by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would constitute a sufficient threat to U.S. national security interests 

to warrant a more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement 

response? AQIM already poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in the region, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand.1

 Since 2007, the group has professed its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al 

Qaeda’s senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the 

subregion. These attacks have included the use of suicide bombers, improvised 

explosive devices, kidnapping operations, and assassinations.

AQIM’s targets include African civilians, government officials, and security 

services; United Nations (UN) diplomats and Western embassies; and tourists, 

aid workers, and private sector contractors. As a result, combating AQIM is the 

focus of substantial foreign security assistance provided by Western countries, 

including the United States and France, to their partner nations in the Maghreb 

and Sahel. In 2005, the United States created the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to coordinate activities by the Department of State, 

Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to combat terrorism in the region.2

 Now including 10 African 

countries,3 TSCTP operates with a combined annual interagency budget of approximately $120 million.4

However, the extent of the threat posed by AQIM and the appropriate U.S. 

response remain hotly debated in both academic and policy circles. These debates 

question the seriousness of the threat posed by a relatively small group of hundreds of militants operating in mountainous and arid areas of Africa, their level 

of ideological commitment versus their criminal and financial motivations, and 

even the potential complicity of regional security services in supporting AQIM.5

The Evolving Threat of al 

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

by Andre Le Sage

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for Strategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

Dr. Andre Le Sage is a Senior 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM) poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational 

terrorism in northwest Africa and 

is escalating its attacks against 

regional and Western interests.

◆ The U.S.-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership has 

focused on building local and regional capacities to combat AQIM, 

but these efforts have proved 

insufficient to prevent further attacks, let alone defeat the group.

◆ While Algerian counterinsurgency operations in the northeast 

of that country have degraded 

the group’s capabilities in the 

Maghreb, AQIM activity in the 

Sahel—including Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—has increased 

dramatically since 2007.

◆ Extremist AQIM leaders threatening attacks in Europe, emerging 

ties with militants in Nigeria and 

other parts of Africa, the potential 

for AQIM to benefit from unrest 

in North Africa, and AQIM’s growing connections to West Africa’s 

drug trade are all factors that may 

force a more robust U.S. response.

July 2011
2 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

The United States needs to understand the nature of the 

threat that AQIM poses today as well as current trends 

highlighting the future capabilities and intentions of the 

group. Only with these assessments in place can U.S. policymakers make appropriate decisions on questions about 

counterterrorism in northwest Africa that are hotly but 

inconclusively debated.

Overview of AQIM

Emanating from Algeria’s decade-long conflict with 

Islamists in the 1990s, AQIM is the only significant militia force remaining from that struggle. Led by Abdulmalik Drukdal, it was created when the Salafist Group 

for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) pledged allegiance to 

al Qaeda’s senior leadership in January 2007.6 While the 

GSPC was seen as a national insurgency on the verge of 

collapse because of continued Algerian security operations, 

AQIM quickly proved that it was not a spent force. In December 2007, the group conducted simultaneous bombings 

in Algiers of the UN office complex and the Constitutional 

Court—a symbol of AQIM’s new dual agenda of attacking 

both Algerian national and global jihadi targets.

AQIM aspires to become a transnational movement across the Maghreb and Sahel areas, encompassing the militants and communities that were loyal to 

earlier generations of Islamist militant groups in the 

region, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 

(LIFG), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Tunisian 

Islamic Front (TIF), Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ), and others. These groups were 

effectively suppressed by North African governments, 

but the drivers of extremism in the region, including 

poverty, political marginalization, and social alienation, 

have never been fully addressed.7

Based in the mountains of Boumerdes in Algeria’s Tizi Ouzou region,8

 AQIM is a highly structured organization. Despite significant Algerian 

military pressure, the group coordinates its activities 

through a centralized shura council, including emirs 

responsible for matters related to military affairs, religious propagation, finance, and communications/

AQIM aspires to become 

a transnational movement, 

encompassing militants that were 

loyal to earlier generations of 

Islamist militant groups

propaganda. In addition to its overall emir, Abdulmalik Drukdal, the United States has identified 

Ahmed Deghdegh (Abu Abdallah) and Salah Abu 

Muhammad (Salah Gasmi) as AQIM’s finance and 

communications leaders, respectively.9

The size of the group remains limited. While estimates vary, the overall number of AQIM militants is 

near 1,000.10 Military commanders are organized into 

battalions responsible for four distinct zones of operation. Three of these zones spread across northern Algeria, and a fourth zone covers the Algerian Saharan and 

Sahel areas. The zones are then subdivided into katibas

or battalions assigned to a particular commander.11 In 

the southern zone or Sahel, roughly 300 militants are 

split between AQIM’s two main Sahelian battalions, the 

Tarik Ibn Ziad Brigade led by Abdelhamid Abu Zeid 

and the Al Mulhatamin Brigade led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Another leading militant is Yahya Abu Hammam, who is reported to be second-in-command to Abu 

Zeid.12 Under their leadership, the Sahel has been transformed from a rear base to an active operational area.

Despite suspicions several years ago that AQIM was 

making inroads with Sahelian tribal communities, particularly the Tuareg or Berabiche, contacts and sympathies 

between them remain limited. Rather than mobilizing 

mass public support from the local population, AQIM 

has cultivated relationships with key individuals through 

marriage and business. Other criminal elements have been 

employed by AQIM as contractors to conduct kidnap operations and deliver their hostages back to AQIM leaders for a fee. Of course, some exceptions exist and a small 

number of Tuareg or other Sahelian tribal militants have 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 3 

joined the ranks of AQIM. According to Jane’s, “One Malian who seems to be growing in importance in AQIM 

is Abu Ab-al-Karim al-Tarqi, an alias that indicates he is 

a Tuareg.” He is reported to be responsible for killing a 

French hostage in July 2010 and commands a small group 

of 50 fighters in the Al Ansar Brigade.13

AQIM has increasingly sophisticated propaganda 

capabilities and maintains a media group known as Al 

Andalus, which regularly releases statements that critique northwest Africa’s ruling regimes, detail the group’s 

ideological demands, or take credit for attacks. However, 

according to Geoff Porter, “It is challenging to derive 

from this ideology what the group wants beyond a rough 

sketch—to rid North Africa of insufficiently Islamic governments and to cleanse North Africa and the Sahara of 

foreigners, in particular the French and the Americans.”14

Despite representing an immediate security threat, 

the small number of militants that AQIM has been able 

Libya

Mediterranean Sea

Atlantic

Ocean

Atlantic

Ocean

Gulf of Guinea

Morocco

Algeria

Tunisia

Western

Sahara

Chad

Abeche

Lake Chad

N’Djamena

Mali

Mauritania Niger

Bamako

Kidal

Arlit

Agadez

Niamey

Timbuktu

Gao

Mopti

Nioro

du Sahel

Nouakchott

Senegal

Guinea Benin

Nigeria

Cameroon

Gabon Congo

D.R.

Congo

Central

African Republic

Equitorial

Guinea

Burkina Faso

Togo

Ghana

Sierra

Leone

Liberia

Côte

d’Ivoire

Sikasso

Gambia

Guinea

Bissau

Niger

Senegal River

Algiers

Tunis

Tripoli

Adrar

Rabat

Tamanrasset

Oran

Sidra

Benghazi

Dakar

Ouagadougou

Kano

Lagos

Abuja

Northwest Africa

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) Members

Marrakech

Northwest Africa
4 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

to attract from across northwest Africa demonstrates the 

general lack of appeal of the group’s message. Other than 

Algerians, the largest number of AQIM recruits now 

comes from Mauritania. The government in Nouakchott 

has long been wary of political Islamic movements in the 

country, and groups such as the GMPJ were successfully 

repressed by national security services. Nonetheless, a 

small group of militants known as Al Murabitin is reported to have left the country and joined with AQIM 

(at that time still the GSPC) in 2006.15 This is likely the 

basis for the growing number of Mauritanian recruits 

and Mauritania-focused operations by AQIM.

Securing funds to continue its operations is a major 

source of concern for AQIM. While conducting individual attacks may cost only tens of thousands of dollars, 

maintaining the movement is far more costly. Like other 

terrorist groups, AQIM needs to recruit, train, equip, and 

sustain its forces, as well as purchase weapons, ammunition, and explosives. To make matters more difficult and 

expensive, AQIM must accomplish these tasks in the 

mountains of Algeria and the desert expanses of the Sahel. In the latter location, accessing fuel and water alone 

is a costly endeavor.

European hostages have been by far the most valuable source of revenue for AQIM. Despite official denials, media reports suggest that multimillion-dollar 

ransoms as well as the release of incarcerated AQIM 

militants from regional prisons are regularly offered for 

the safe release of these hostages.16 Some analysts estimate that ransoms paid for Western hostages between 

2008 and 2010 amounted to $25 million and that the 

average payment for a Western hostage is as high as $6.5 

million.17 If ransoms were paid for the release of three 

additional hostages in February 2011—one French, one 

Malagasy, and one Togolese—then the overall sum of 

ransom paid to AQIM in the past few years may be significantly higher.18

Assessing the AQIM Threat

AQIM does not pose an immediate threat to Algeria’s political stability, and aggressive counterinsurgency 

operations there have left the group little choice but to 

conduct low-level hit-and-run and explosives attacks 

against government forces. Today, the Sahel is where 

AQIM poses the most immediate threat to African and 

Western interests. While parts of northern Mali were a 

longtime GSPC rear base, smuggling zone, and training 

area, AQIM’s new leadership has turned the Sahel into 

an operational area. Belmokhtar and Abu Zaid, AQIM’s 

southern zone commanders, have ordered numerous 

kidnapping operations against Western tourists, diplomats, and aid workers.19 Victims have included nationals of France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, 

Germany, and the United Kingdom, as well as several 

African countries.

While most hostages have been released for ransom—

a critical means of raising revenue for AQIM’s sustainability—a growing number risk execution. A British hostage, 

Edwin Dyer, was the first to be killed in 2009, after the 

British government failed to respond to AQIM demands 

for the release of convicted terrorists from British jails.20

In July 2010, Michel Germaneau, a 78-year-old French 

engineer kidnapped by AQIM in Niger, was executed. 

Following his death, French President Nicholas Sarkozy 

declared war on AQIM and provided military support to a 

Mauritanian security operation to attack AQIM elements 

threatening additional attacks in Nouakchott.21

The threat of kidnapping has continued to expand. 

In 2010, the United States warned that AQIM was plotting to kidnap a Western national in northern Burkina 

Faso, resulting in the evacuation of U.S. Peace Corps 

volunteers.22 In January 2011, two French citizens were 

most kidnapping activities of AQIM 

are intended to secure ransom 

payments so the terrorist group 

can continue financing its 

operations and have resulted in 

only limited casualties
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 5 

killed during a failed rescue operation after an AQIMsponsored raid of a restaurant in Niamey, the capital city 

of Niger.23 Interestingly, while hostages are moved to 

northern Mali after being seized, the actual kidnapping 

operations have taken place across the border in Niger or 

Tunisia.24 This has led some to suspect that AQIM does 

not want to jeopardize its safe haven in the Sahel or incur 

the wrath of the Bamako government by conducting attacks on Malian soil.25

In addition, Mauritania has become the site of a 

growing number of AQIM attacks. This includes several 

confrontations with local security forces, the murder of 

a family of French tourists in December 2007, a failed 

assault on the Israeli embassy in February 2008, the murder of a U.S. aid worker in the capital city in June 2009, 

and a failed suicide bombing of the French embassy in 

August 2009. Most recently, in February 2011, Mauritanian soldiers intercepted an AQIM convoy only 8 miles 

outside of the capital as it tried to enter the city to launch 

car bomb attacks.26 AQIM responded to the botched attack by threatening to kill President Mohamed Ould 

Abdel Aziz for his collaboration with France in the war 

on terrorism.27

Despite the significantly increased operational tempo of AQIM in the Sahel since its formation from the 

GSPC, the group faces a large number of constraints, and 

even its increased operational activities in the Sahel may 

be of limited interest to al Qaeda globally. In particular, 

AQIM has failed to emerge as a trans-Sahara umbrella 

organization. Its operations inside Algeria have been 

constrained by persistent counterinsurgency pressures 

from local security forces, and AQIM has conducted few 

major attacks in Algeria since 2008.28 Moreover, AQIM 

has not been able to extend operations into key countries 

in the Maghreb, including Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya.29

In fact, leaders of the LIFG actually rejected a possible 

merger with al Qaeda in a June 2009 statement.30

Most kidnapping activities of AQIM are intended 

to secure ransom payments so the terrorist group can 

continue financing its operations and have resulted 

in only limited casualties. Aside from Mauritania, the 

group has conducted few attacks in other Sahelian countries. And, as detailed below, while AQIM is known to 

have relations with drug trafficking syndicates operating 

in the Sahel, the link is not direct. Rather, AQIM levies 

a tax on all types of smuggling operations in the region 

for financial gain.

By these metrics, there would appear to be little 

strategic pressure to step up efforts to defeat AQIM. In 

fact, it could be argued that additional counterterrorism 

activities, especially those led from outside the African 

continent, would be counterproductive. They might enable AQIM to portray its operations as defensive efforts 

to combat U.S. aggression and create a motivation for 

foreign fighters to flow toward northwest Africa to support their AQIM brethren. 

Future Scenarios

African and international government strategies should be careful not to exacerbate the existing 

AQIM problem, but they should not be premised on 

the current threat picture alone. They must also take 

into account the potential short- and medium-term 

evolution of the AQIM threat and prepare appropriate 

responses. With the next several years in mind, there 

are already several indicators that AQIM is a growing, 

not a stable or receding, threat to U.S., European, and 

African security interests.

AQIM continues to threaten attacks on Western countries, with France and Spain regularly identified as targets.31

Both al Qaeda’s senior leadership and AQIM have declared 

their intention of “restoring al-Andalus,” the section of the 

African and international 

government strategies should 

be careful not to exacerbate the 

existing AQIM problem, but they 

should not be premised on the 

current threat picture alone
6 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

Iberian Peninsula that was once ruled by Muslims.32 In 

April 2010, an AQIM posting on a jihadi Web site threatened to attack the U.S.-England soccer match at the FIFA 

World Cup in South Africa.33 In addition, the group’s predecessor organization, the GSPC, was known to maintain 

significant networks across Europe, although these were 

used primarily for financing and foreign fighter facilitation 

purposes. With AQIM’s capabilities in the Maghreb and 

Sahel at a plateau, al Qaeda’s senior leadership may seek for 

AQIM to reactivate these networks or build new ones to 

make its threats against Europe a reality.

An additional risk is that AQIM will lash out in 

response to increased unilateral security pressure by key 

countries in the region that do believe the group to be 

an immediate threat. Even if the United States does not 

presently rank AQIM as an imminent strategic threat, 

countries such as France, Algeria, and Mauritania certainly do. The potential for their security forces to confront AQIM outside their borders, with or without the 

consent of a country such as Mali, was demonstrated in 

two separate incidents in 2010. As noted above, France 

supported a brief Mauritanian military incursion into 

northern Mali in July after AQIM killed a French hostage. This was followed in September by a sustained 

Mauritanian operation into Mali to push AQIM elements away from its border.34 If these operations succeed in pressuring AQIM, the group may respond by 

conducting new attacks in Bamako, Dakar, or elsewhere.

AQIM’s relationship with drug trafficking 

through West Africa is an additional concern.35 In 

2007, an estimated 40 tons of cocaine valued at $1.8 

billion transited West Africa, comprising some 27 

percent of Europe’s annual supply.36 Facilitation of the 

drug trade and other smuggling activities through the 

Sahara has bolstered the capabilities of ethnic militias drawn from the Tuareg and Berbiche tribes and, 

more recently, AQIM. Members of these groups all 

run protection rackets against traffickers and receive 

financial payoffs in exchange for either escorting contraband shipments or simply leaving the traffickers 

unmolested. Until recently, most drugs were smuggled 

from coastal West Africa to Europe via commercial air 

or sea routes. However, overland trade across the Sahel 

may be on the rise. In 2009, a Boeing 727 aircraft was 

burned on a desert airstrip in northern Mali after as 

much as 10 tons of cocaine had been offloaded.37 As 

this illicit trade continues to expand, there is potential 

for a significant growth in AQIM’s revenue streams 

and operational capabilities.

The possibility also exists for AQIM to develop 

cooperative relations with other al Qaeda–affiliated 

movements in other parts of Africa. The most worrisome potential relationship would be with the 

East Africa al Qaeda cell and the Somali al Shabaab 

movement, which are known to provide safe haven 

and training to a wide range of foreign fighters.38 If 

such ties developed, the resulting threat would be 

substantial. The groups could pool resources (including fighters and funds) and support each other with 

recruitment, indoctrination, training, and facilitation 

of movement. Of more concern, however, are the very 

complex threat vectors that would emerge from pooled 

target sets and personnel: a terrorist operative from 

one country could get recruited in a second country, 

receive training elsewhere, and ultimately be deployed 

for an attack far from home. The resulting challenge 

of “connecting the dots” to disrupt such plots would 

become enormously complex.

AQIM and Nigeria

Over the short term, there is potential for AQIM 

to penetrate and begin operations farther south into 

facilitation of the drug trade and 

other smuggling activities through 

the Sahara has bolstered the 

capabilities of ethnic militias drawn 

from the Tuareg and Berbiche tribes 

and, more recently, AQIM
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 7 

West Africa. Even if the group does not have any 

substantial public support there, AQIM may attract 

small numbers of disaffected Muslims in the subregion to expand their network or conduct limited terrorist operations. In fact, some assessments note that 

AQIM already has personnel or facilitators or at least 

smuggling contacts as far west as Senegal, Guinea, 

and Guinea-Bissau.39 That said, the greatest concern 

now should be ties developing between AQIM and 

the militant Boko Haram movement in Africa’s most 

populous country, Nigeria.

In a recent communiqué to Nigeria’s Muslim 

community, AQIM emir Drukdal stated, “We are 

ready to train your children to use weapons and will 

supply them with all we can, including support and 

men, weapons, ammunitions and equipment, in order 

to defend our people in Nigeria and respond against 

the aggression of the Christian minority.”40 This follows a series of deadly clashes in early 2010 between 

Nigerian Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos, 

which has heightened inter-religious tensions. It also 

follows Nigerian security force confrontations with 

the militant Islamist movement Boko Haram, whose 

name is commonly translated to mean “Western education is a sin,” in July 2009.41

Boko Haram came to prominence in the rural 

northeastern states of Nigeria in 2003. It was initially 

led by a charismatic preacher named Mohamed Yusuf, 

who attracted thousands of followers to his mosque 

in Maiduguri. His acolytes included a cadre of educated and middle-class former students from regional 

universities, as well as recruits from Islamist schools 

and the wider public interested in Yusuf ’s critique of 

Western civilization as the driving force behind what 

he perceived to be Nigeria’s political corruption and 

lack of social mores. While known today as Boko Haram, the group has also been known as Jama’at Hijra 

wal Takfir. More colloquially, it had been labeled the 

“Nigerian Taliban” following statements praising the 

government and ideology of the Afghan Taliban and 

its leader Mohamed Omar. It is estimated to number 

several hundred militants and a broader following in 

the low thousands.

Boko Haram’s evolution as a political and military challenge in northern Nigeria has been slow and 

uneven. The group first made headlines between December 2003 and late 2004 when its supporters attacked police stations and government offices in Yobe 

State near Nigeria’s border with Niger.42 The attacks 

and the subsequent police crackdown led to dozens 

of deaths and displaced thousands of Nigerians from 

affected towns. From 2005 until 2008, the group was 

dispersed and relatively inactive. However, Mohamed 

Yusuf publicly reemerged in northern Nigeria that year. 

In 2009, he and his followers barricaded themselves in 

the group’s Maiduguri compound after Nigerian security services discovered caches of weapons and explosives in their possession. After a military assault on the 

compound, Mohamed Yusuf was killed (possibly while 

in custody43) along with some 100 followers.44

Following Yusuf ’s death, there was another lull in 

Boko Haram’s activity, leading some analysts to hope 

that the group had been successfully disrupted and 

dispersed. Such optimism was crushed in 2010 when 

Boko Haram reappeared in northeast Nigeria. The 

group conducted a prison raid in Bauchi that freed 

hundreds of inmates, including a substantial number of 

the group’s followers. Boko Haram also walked away 

from the prison with a new cache of weapons and ammunition.45 Following the prison raid, Boko Haram activity continued to increase. Operations have included 

the targeted killings of dozens of Nigerian police and 

government officials since mid-2010, often conducted 

some assessments note that AQIM 

already has personnel or facilitators 

or at least smuggling contacts as 

far west as Senegal, Guinea, and 

Guinea-Bissau
8 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

by young men shooting from the back of moving motorcycles.46 This ongoing, low-level violence was punctuated by the even more serious threat of targeted 

bombings. On Christmas Eve of 2010, Boko Haram 

expanded its area of operations to Nigeria’s restive 

Middle Belt where Christian and Muslim communities 

from different tribal backgrounds contest control of local land and government offices. Boko Haram launched 

coordinated bomb attacks against Christian churches 

in the town of Jos, killing over 80 people.47 Another 

bombing followed. It killed dozens at New Year’s Eve 

celebrations at a Nigerian army barracks in the capital 

city of Abuja.48

These incidents represent a more dangerous trajectory of militancy by Boko Haram since the death 

of Mohamed Yusuf. His reported successor, Abubakar 

Shekau (Abu Muhammad), appears to be focused on 

short-term violence by clandestine Boko Haram cells 

rather than cultivating a mass public following.49 At 

the same time, Nigerian security services have been at 

pains to locate Boko Haram militants who are able to 

find safe haven in Nigeria’s remote northern border areas or operate cross-border into Niger and Cameroon 

near the Lake Chad basin. If AQIM follows up its public statements of support for Boko Haram with actual 

operational cooperation, the threat will expand further. 

AQIM could provide sophisticated operational training to Boko Haram leaders and foot soldiers. More 

worrying still, AQIM may influence Boko Haram’s 

target selection by pushing or even funding the Nigerian group to attack Western interests.50

AQIM and the “Arab Spring”

Recent uprisings in North Africa—ranging from 

the ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 

Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to the 

ongoing crisis in Libya—raise additional concerns about 

AQIM’s future evolution. Certainly, these events caught 

AQIM by surprise just as they did the rest of the world.51

However, AQIM is attempting to take advantage of the 

situation. While there were no indicators of prior connections to antiregime organizers in these countries, 

AQIM has released several media statements supporting demonstrators and rebel forces and calling for similar 

pressure to be brought against the regime of President 

Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria.52 These are obvious attempts to overlay AQIM’s agenda and vision onto those 

of antiregime proponents, and they have not been met 

with interest even by political Islamic forces in the new 

governments or political parties in Tunisia or Egypt, or 

the rebels in eastern Libya.

Nonetheless, there are several reasons why the unrest in North Africa will provide new opportunities for 

AQIM to strengthen its role in the Maghreb, as well as 

avenues for AQIM to bolster its capabilities in the Sahel. First, AQIM will be tempted to send militant cells 

to Libya to participate in ongoing antiregime efforts 

or to launch their own attacks. Their efforts could gain 

further notoriety and possibly credibility for AQIM 

with opposition elements that may eventually take the 

reins of national or regional power. Even a limited operational foray into Libya could be an investment in alliance building. Alternatively, AQIM could simply take 

advantage of the fact that security services in Tunisia 

and Libya have their hands full and cannot prevent 

AQIM from placing operatives as sleeper cells to conduct future attacks against Western interests.

Second, even once the unrest in North Africa ends, 

the new governments are unlikely to focus significant energy on domestic and regional counterterrorism concerns. 

operations have included the 

targeted killings of dozens of 

Nigerian police and government 

officials since mid-2010, often 

conducted by young men 

shooting from the back of 

moving motorcycles
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 9 

New governments in the region led by civil society leaders 

are unlikely to have close and trusted relations with their 

own internal security and intelligence services. Moreover, 

these governments may not have the same control over 

their territory and borders that their more autocratic predecessors did. AQIM will likely find greater freedom of 

movement in the subregion and possibly the opportunity 

to establish new safe havens for their Maghreb operations 

in peripheral areas of Tunisia or Libya.

Third, AQIM may also hope to find new militant 

Islamist partners in North Africa. During the 1980s 

and 1990s, the LIFG, Tunisian Combat Group, and 

TIF were effectively suppressed by the Qaddafi and 

Ben Ali regimes.53 However, there is a chance that 

these groups may reemerge over the coming years, 

possibly fed by foreign fighter returns from other jihadi theaters such as Afghanistan, by Islamist militants released from North African prisons during the 

unrest, or by a new generation of militants who are 

angered by insufficient outcomes of their revolutions. 

AQIM would certainly prefer to harness such individuals and nascent movements to become part and 

parcel of its own group as an umbrella movement for 

militant action in the region. Yet even if these groups 

developed their own leadership structure and national 

cadres, AQIM would be strengthened by coordinating 

operations with them.

Finally, AQIM is likely to exploit the unrest in 

Libya by gaining access to additional weapons, ammunition, and explosives from stockpiles that are no longer 

controlled by the government. With millions of dollars 

of ransom money at its disposal, particular concern is 

focused on AQIM’s ability to acquire man-portable air 

defense systems, which could be used to target military 

and civilian aviation.54

Strategy Considerations

These indicators demonstrate the potential for a 

growing and serious AQIM threat to both African and 

Western national security interests. Their realization 

would likely drive increased U.S. security involvement 

in the Sahel. A relatively small number of opportunistic 

kidnapping-for-ransom operations and involvement in 

smuggling activity may be viewed as manageable problems. Yet with more extremist leadership of AQIM’s 

Sahelian battalions, more funding for AQIM operations from hostage ransoms and drug smuggling, the 

emergence of affiliated militant movements in Nigeria, 

and the potential to leverage ongoing unrest in North 

Africa, there is a possibility that AQIM could escalate 

its operational tempo, expand its area of operations, and 

further enmesh AQIM in global jihadi operations that 

are autonomous from its traditional guerrilla activities 

in Algeria.

Since 2005, the United States has responded to 

the threat posed by AQIM by establishing the TSCTP 

to coordinate efforts by the U.S. Department of State, 

DOD, and USAID to combat terrorism in northwest Africa. U.S. military efforts under the TSCTP 

umbrella fall under Operation Enduring Freedom—

Trans-Sahara and are managed by U.S. Africa Command and its Special Operations Command–Africa 

component through a Joint Special Operations Task 

Force–Trans-Sahara.

According to Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the 

State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism:

The program supports partner efforts to: build longterm capacity to defeat terrorist organizations and 

facilitation networks; disrupt efforts to recruit, 

train, and provision terrorists and extremists; 

AQIM is likely to exploit the unrest 

in Libya by gaining access to 

additional weapons, ammunition, 

and explosives from stockpiles 

that are no longer controlled 

by the government
10 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

counter efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist 

organizations; disrupt foreign fighter networks that 

may attempt to operate outside the region; address 

underlying causes of radicalization; and increase the 

capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence 

vulnerable populations. It also supports efforts to 

increase regional and sub-regional cooperation and 

interoperability, in such areas as communication 

and intelligence sharing.

55

TSCTP partner countries now include Algeria, 

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 

Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. It has been a successful 

interagency effort weaving together disparate programs 

focused on diplomacy to build regional political will 

to combat terrorism, and the program has increased 

regional security cooperation, support for good governance, community outreach, poverty reduction, and 

humanitarian assistance with military-led training efforts to build African command-and-control, special 

forces, general infantry, intelligence, communications, 

and logistics capabilities.56 One of the major objectives 

of this effort has been convincing countries, including 

Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria, to increase their 

cooperation against AQIM. The formation of a joint 

military base and intelligence fusion cell by these countries in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset is a 

possible indicator of progress in building a harmonized 

regional approach.57

While this represents a measure of success for 

the United States, a study by the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office in July 2008 found several areas that need to be addressed for TSCTP to be implemented more effectively.58 These include the lack of a 

“comprehensive, integrated strategy,” including prioritization of operational activities against milestones of 

progress, questions of authority over DOD personnel 

temporarily assigned to work in Africa, challenges of 

adequately resourcing State Department and USAID 

efforts, and the lack of metrics to gauge TSCTP’s success over time.

Despite international efforts to build military capacity, promote regional intelligence sharing, and develop political will in the region, there has been little 

coordinated action by Sahelian countries against AQIM. 

For instance, U.S. Special Operations forces have been 

heavily engaged through Joint Combined Exchange 

and Training ( JCET) activities to build the counterterrorism capabilities of elite African military units across 

the Sahel, with a focus on Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. 

However, Mali—where AQIM’s Sahel battalions are 

based—has never fully “graduated” its forces from this 

training cycle or put their new skills and equipment to 

use in confronting AQIM, resulting in a stable safe haven for the movement.

A primary criticism of U.S. interagency efforts has 

been lack of clarity on the final objectives of TSCTP 

activities. On the one hand, if the objective is actually 

to defeat AQIM, the United States would be required 

to become more directly engaged in on-the-ground 

security efforts to confront AQIM. However, there is 

concern that increased U.S. involvement in the region 

would not be welcomed by countries such as Algeria 

and Mali59 and that such involvement would legitimize 

and build support for AQIM in the eyes of Islamic 

militants in Africa and around the globe. On the other 

hand, if the objective is to support regional security capabilities and promote development over the long term, 

there is a serious danger that the level of investment is 

too little and too slow to contain AQIM. In brief, the 

United States is at risk of allowing a small, geographically isolated and exposed threat to metastasize across 

the United States is at risk of 

allowing a small, geographically 

isolated and exposed threat to 

metastasize across other parts of the 

continent while waiting for African 

partners to take action
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 11 

other parts of the continent while waiting for African 

partners to take action.

Conclusion

At present, the threat posed by AQIM may appear 

manageable, particularly to policymakers concerned that 

additional U.S. involvement in the region may exacerbate 

Islamist militancy and increase regional tensions. However, as described above, events on the ground in northwest Africa indicate a serious potential that the threat 

posed by AQIM will continue to grow. In this context, 

the United States needs to be prepared to take more aggressive actions to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat 

AQIM and should clearly determine in advance what 

level of increased AQIM activity would represent a direct threat to U.S. national security interests.

There are a number of specific scenarios that would 

likely force the United States, working in conjunction 

with its African and European partners, to act. These include: increased AQIM operational presence and attacks 

on capital cities, including Bamako, Niamey, Dakar, and 

Abuja, or other urban centers in Nigeria; hostage crises 

involving credible AQIM threats to harm U.S. citizens if 

political demands are not met; use of AQIM’s safe haven 

in the Sahel by other al Qaeda–associated movements or 

AQIM support for new generations of militants in the 

Maghreb; planning by AQIM to conduct attacks against 

U.S. or European diplomatic, military, or private interests 

in Africa; and any AQIM effort—whether successful or 

unsuccessful—to launch or support al Qaeda–linked attacks outside the African continent.

In the latter case particularly, there would likely be 

an immediate increase in direct U.S. counterterrorism 

pressure, as happened with regard to al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen after the failed 

December 2009 airline bombing plot. However, even 

lower levels of threat activity would require the United 

States to take more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement actions against AQIM. While 

challenges exist to implementation—including rancorous regional relationships, the need for a combined multilateral campaign, and the expansive geographical area 

in which AQIM operates—the outlines of such a strategy are clear.

First, the Department of State, acting through U.S. 

Embassies in the region, needs to place far more pressure on the governments of Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, 

and Niger to take coordinated action against AQIM. The 

message needs to be clearly delivered that the establishment of military coordination and intelligence-sharing 

mechanisms is an insufficient response if no actual security pressure is brought to bear against AQIM in places 

such as northern Mali. Given France’s declaration of war 

on AQIM, it is quite certain that that country would 

support U.S. diplomatic efforts, and other European 

Union partners are likely to follow suit.

Second, the U.S. Intelligence Community needs 

to work with European and African counterparts to 

build a better understanding of AQIM’s vulnerabilities and how they can be leveraged. Tensions are often 

reported among the group’s Sahelian battalion leaders, 

as well as between them and the national emir in Algeria.60 Opportunities may exist to exploit these divisions, possibly through tribal contacts and negotiations 

to bring less ardent jihadists out of the desert. Alternatively, in its arid safe haven, AQIM remains highly 

dependent on the financing it receives from ransoms 

and the logistical support it receives from criminal and 

smuggling networks. Domestic security agencies in 

the Sahel could, for instance, track down, arrest, and 

the United States needs to be 

prepared to take more aggressive 

actions to disrupt, degrade, and 

ultimately defeat AQIM and should 

determine what level of AQIM 

activity would represent a direct 

threat to national security interests 
12 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

prosecute the town-based facilitators of AQIM who 

provide weapons, funds, and other supplies to AQIM 

units operating in deserted areas of the Sahel. Since 

many of these actors are also involved in other regional 

smuggling and criminal activities, joint counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts would be most useful. 

Additional intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism assets should also be dedicated to track 

and help Nigerian security services dismantle Boko 

Haram and to support new regimes in North Africa to 

prevent the revival of militant movements there.

Third, if coordinated and resourced properly, simultaneous and internationally supported military action 

should be considered. If supported by Mali, Mauritania, 

Niger, and Algeria, a slow and deliberate movement of 

forces into northern Mali could effectively box in and destroy AQIM’s Sahelian battalions. In this regard, DOD 

could provide additional support to select African partners to actively degrade, if not defeat, AQIM. In some 

cases, particularly in the Maghreb, TSCTP partners do 

not currently require or simply would not authorize the 

deployment of U.S. or other foreign forces on their soil 

to directly support security actions against AQIM. Elsewhere, however, particularly in the Sahel, African actions 

are limited by continued problems of capacity or confidence that could be addressed by embedding Western 

military and intelligence advisors and mentors within 

local counterterrorism units.

On the one hand, given their limited actions in 

northern Mali in 2010, the French military may be 

willing to take a strong lead in supporting sustained 

offensive operations in the Sahel. On the other hand, 

there are potential means for additional U.S. engagement. One available option to increase assistance in 

the Sahel is shifting U.S. special operations activities 

from training and equipping local militaries through 

JCET programs to more aggressive Joint Planning 

and Advisory Teams. Under this construct, U.S. forces 

would not engage directly in combat but would provide support to local security initiatives to field patrols 

in AQIM-dominated territory. In addition, the presence of U.S. forces near the front lines with AQIM 

would ease constraints on the sharing of sensitive intelligence, which would certainly be useful for African 

efforts to combat AQIM.

Fourth, military actions against AQIM are unlikely to succeed on their own. They need to be balanced 

with and premised upon a range of diplomatic and 

peacebuilding activities in northwest Africa to achieve 

several objectives. Countries in the Sahel, particularly 

Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, need to embolden ongoing efforts to reach out to disenfranchised and antagonized communities to ensure their acquiescence to, if 

not support for, these security actions. In Mali, this requires accelerated implementation of the Algiers Accords with the Tuareg-based Alliance for Democratic 

Change (ADC), including further economic development efforts and the integration of ADC forces into 

mixed paramilitary units designed to promote security in the country’s northern regions. In Niger, newly 

elected civilian leaders must similarly reach out to Tuareg communities to ensure that the insurgent Movement of Nigeriens for Justice is not revived. Without 

such confidence-building measures, pressing militarily 

into disputed territories on the continent—which U.S. 

policymakers often refer to as “ungoverned areas”—is 

a recipe for exacerbating existing tensions and possibly 

pushing local actors into the arms of criminal or terrorist groups.

Together, these four elements of a more aggressive U.S. 

involvement in the campaign against AQIM are the basis 

for a clearer strategy to protect U.S. national security interif supported by Mali, Mauritania, 

Niger, and Algeria, a slow and 

deliberate movement of forces into 

northern Mali could effectively 

box in and destroy AQIM’s 

Sahelian battalions
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 13 

ests if the AQIM threat continues to grow. At the same 

time, it represents a middle ground between direct U.S. military action that could exacerbate the AQIM threat and the 

current approach of supporting African security capabilities 

in the hope they will eventually be deployed to improve regional security. Essentially, the United States would take a 

lead in forging regional agreement to confront AQIM on 

the ground. However, U.S. forces would focus on assisting African security forces at the operational level without 

compromising African governments’ sovereign control of 

their forces. Thus, their role remains within the framework 

of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to support African countries’ own efforts to combat terrorism.

Notes

1 Other active terrorist threats in the subregion include a range 

of low-level, often unnamed, extremist cells operating in Morocco, 

and Hizballah operatives focused primarily on fundraising in West 

Africa.

2 For details on U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region, see 

Daniel Benjamin, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities, Strategy 

Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” testimony to the Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 17, 2009.

3 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 

partner countries now include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 

Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Burkina 

Faso joined TSCTP in 2009, and Libya has been discussed as a possible future partner.

4 TSCTP was created following the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), 

which ran from 2002–2004 and focused on military training and 

equipment provision for only Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

5 See David Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali and the War 

on Terror,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 ( January 2007), 59–76; and Jeremy Keenan, “Waging War on Terror: 

The Implications of America’s ‘New Imperialism’ for Saharan 

Peoples,” Journal of North African Studies 10, nos. 3, 4 (September 

2005), 619–647.

6 For background on the Salafist Group for Preaching and 

Combat (GSPC), see Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? Africa Report No. 92, International Crisis Group, March 31, 

2005.

7 For additional details, see Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the 

Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, Monograph 

Series Number 144, Institute for Security Studies, June 2008.

8 Geoff Porter, “AQIM’s Objectives in North Africa,” CTC 

Sentinel 4, no. 2 (February 2011). 

9 “AQIM’s African Recruitment,” in Jane’s Terrorism and Security 

Monitor, March 4, 2011.

10 See Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Group Profile, March 8, 2011; and the 

National Counterterrorism Center, “Al-Qaida in the Lands of the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Group Profile, available at <www.nctc.

gov/site/groups/aqim.html>.

11 Use of the term brigade or battalion in the al Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) context does not imply any particular force 

structure or size similar to Western military convention. In fact, one 

brigade or battalion may actually be a subunit of another brigade or 

battalion in AQIM parlance.

12 Leela Jacinto, “Key Figures in al Qaeda’s North African 

Branch,” France 24, September 24, 2010.

13 “AQIM’s African Recruitment.”

14 Porter, 5.

15 “AQIM’s African Recruitment.” Also see “Political Transition 

in Mauritania: Results and Prospects,” Middle East/North Africa 

Report No. 53, International Crisis Group, April 2006.

16 For instance, see “Al-Qaida Group Hints at Ransom Payment 

for Freed Spanish Hostages,” The Guardian, August 24, 2010, which 

reports a payment of nearly 4 million euros for the release of two 

Spanish aid workers. Other sources place the ransom closer to 10 

million euros.

17 Jean-Charles Brisard, “AQIM Kidnap-for-ransom Practice: A 

Worrisome Challenge to the War against Terrorism Financing,” The 

Terror Finance Blog, September 27, 2010, citing Algerian government 

sources. Also see Duncan Gardham, “Al-Qaeda a ‘Money Making 

Machine,’” The Telegraph, March 15, 2011.

18 “France Says Three Hostages Released in Niger,” Xinhua, 

February 26, 2011. Two additional French hostages, employees of the 

Areva and Satom corporations supporting uranium mining operations 

in Niger, remain held by AQIM.

19 Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, “AQIM Funds Terrorist 

Operations with Thriving Sahel-Based Kidnapping Industry,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 4, January 28, 2010.

20 “Al-Qaeda ‘Kills British Hostage,’” BBC News, June 3, 2009.

21 “France Says Joins Mauritanian Strike on al Qaeda,” Reuters, 

July 23, 2010; and “France ‘Declares War on al-Qaeda,’” Al Jazeera, 

July 28, 2010.

22 “Americans Evacuated from North Burkina Faso after Terror 

Warning,” New York Post, July 7, 2010.

23 “Two French Hostages in Niger Killed in Rescue Attempt,” 

BBC News, January 8, 2011.

24 For a map showing locations where AQIM hostages have 

been abducted, see Jane’s Terrorism and Security Center, “Desert Storm 

Brewing,” November 2, 2010.

25 “AQIM Risks Mali Refuge,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security 

Monitor, August 27, 2009.

26 “Mauritania: ‘Al Qaeda Men Die’ as Troops Fire on Car,” 

BBC News, February 2, 2011.

27 “AQIM Threats to Kill Mauritanian President for His Ties 

with France,” Ennahar Online, February 7, 2011.

28 In August 2008, AQIM successfully conducted a suicide attack on Algerian police and military buildings near Tizi Ouzu, killing 

some two dozen people. 

29 While several al Qaeda–inspired attacks have taken place in 

Morocco and Tunisia in the past decade, these were conducted by local groups not affiliated with AQIM. For further details on the terrorist threats in those countries, see Andre Le Sage, “Terrorism Threats 

and Vulnerabilities in Africa,” in African Counterterrorism Cooperation, 

ed. Andre Le Sage (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press and Potomac Books, 2007).

30 Camille Tawil, “Libyan Islamists Back Away from al-Qaeda 

Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi Regime,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 17, June 18, 2009.

31 Jean-Luc Marret, “Homeward Bound: AQIM Fails to Strike 

Western Europe,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 11, 2010.
14 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

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National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

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briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

32 J. Peter Pham, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: An Evolving Challenge in the War on Terror,” Strategic Interests, World Defense 

Review, May 8, 2008, available at <http://worlddefensereview.com/

pham050808.shtml>.

33 Richard Edwards, “Terrorism Threat to England Opening Match 

against USA at Football World Cup,” The Telegraph, April 10, 2010.

34 “Mauritania Strikes at Militants on Mali Border,” BBC News, 

September 18, 2010.

35 Johnnie Carson, “Confronting Drug-trafficking in West Africa,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, DC, June 23, 2009.

36 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development 

(Vienna: UNODC, December 2007), 3.

37 Serge Daniel, “Burnout Boeing, A Clue in African Drugs 

Trade,” Agence France Presse, December 11, 2009.

38 For instance, Nigeria recently extradited to the United States 

a man trained by al Shabaab in Somalia. Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim 

Ahmed was captured in Nigeria with a large sum of money and 

instructions for manufacturing bombs. See “Nigeria: Man Arrested 

in Country Charged in U.S. with Assisting Terror Group,” The Daily 

Trust, March 9, 2010.

39 “AQIM’s African Recruitment.”

40 NEFA Foundation, “AQIM: ‘The Annihilation of the Muslims in Nigeria,’” February 1, 2010, available at <www.nefafoundation.

org/miscellaneous/NEFA%20AQIM%200210.pdf>.

41 More recently, the group’s propaganda statements have used 

the name Jama’atu Ahlu Sunna Lidda’awati wal Jihad or “The Group 

of the People of Sunnah, Call and Jihad.”

42 Some date the formation of Boko Haram to as early as 1995 

when a cleric named Abubakah Lawan led a movement named Ahlu 

Sunna wal Jama’a Hijra. See Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Islamist 

Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained,” African Security 

Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2010), 55. 

43 “Nigerian Sect Head Dies in Custody,” BBC News, July 31, 2009.

44 “Nigerian Troops Shell Islamists,” BBC News, July 28, 2009.

45 Adam Nossiter, “Prison Raid in Nigeria Releases Hundreds,” 

The New York Times, September 8, 2010.

46 Adam Nossiter, “Killings in Nigeria Are Linked to Islamic 

Sect,” The New York Times, October 18, 2010. 

47 “Islamic Sect Claims Nigeria Attacks, Toll at 86,” Reuters, 

December 28, 2010. 

48 “Nigerian Capital Abuja Hit by Barracks Bomb,” BBC News, 

January 1, 2011.

49 The potential for Islamist extremism in Nigeria to directly 

impact U.S. security interests was demonstrated by the failed attack 

in December 2009 on Northwest Flight 253 by a Nigerian national, 

Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab. However, while that plot transited 

Nigeria, no connection has been made to Boko Haram. 

50 It is important to note that at this time, Boko Haram’s attacks 

have neither impacted nor threatened the productivity of Nigeria’s 

hydrocarbon sector. Oil production in the Niger Delta is the target 

of distinct groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of 

the Niger Delta. See Michael Watts, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal 

Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the Niger Delta,” Review of African 

Political Economy 34, no. 114 (December 2007), 637–660.

51 Nelly Lahoud, “Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt: A Blow to 

the Jihadist Narrative?” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 2 (February 2011), 4. 

52 For instance, see “Al-Qaeda Supports the Events in Tunisia 

and Algeria,” Ennahar Online, January 14, 2011.

53 See Andre Le Sage, “Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in 

Africa.” 

54 Scott Stewart, “Will Libya again Become the Arsenal of 

Terrorism?” Stratfor Global Intelligence, March 10, 2011. Also see 

“Libyan Anti-aircraft Missiles in the Hands of Droukdal,” Ennahar 

Online, March 26, 2011, citing a statement by Chadian President Idris 

Deby that AQIM already acquired surface-to-air missiles.

55 Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities, Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” testimony 

to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 

African Affairs, November 17, 2009.

56 In addition to bilateral engagement, the United States has 

worked to develop regional counterterrorism strategies and capabilities through engagement with the African Union’s African Centre for 

the Study and Research on Terrorism and regional groupings such as 

the Economic Community of West African States. These organizations, however, do not play an operational role in combating terrorism. 

For further details, see Jason Ipe, James Cockayne, and Alistair Millar, 

“Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in West 

Africa,” Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, September 2010.

57 See Walid Ramzi, “New Sahel-Saharan Joint Military Command Opens in Algeria,” Magharebia, April 22, 2010.

58 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Combating 

Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” report to Ranking Member, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO08-860, July 2008.

59 See “Mali Says West Should Limit Fight Against AQIM,” 

Associated Press, October 13, 2010.

60 For instance, see Nazim Fethi, “Droukdel Possibly Out as 

Leader of AQIM,” Magharebia, March 15, 2010. Also see Jane’s, 

“Desert Storm Brewing.”
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 268 15 

New from 

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press 

publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays

Edited by Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays with Vincent A. Manzo, 

Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn

This volume is a product of the efforts of the Institute for National Strategic Studies Spacepower 

Theory Project Team, which was tasked by the Department of Defense to create a theoretical framework for examining spacepower and its relationship to the achievement of national objectives. The 

team was charged with considering the space domain in a broad and holistic way, incorporating a 

wide range of perspectives from U.S. and international space actors engaged in scientific, commercial, 

intelligence, and military enterprises. 

This collection of papers commissioned by the team serves as a starting point for continued 

discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine, and integrate a broad range of viewpoints about humaninitiated space activity, its relationship to our globalized society, and its economic, political, and security 

interactions. It will equip practitioners, scholars, students, and citizens with the historical background 

and conceptual framework to navigate through and assess the challenges and opportunities of an 

increasingly complex space environment.

The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, 

Terrorism, and Globalization

Edited by James Clad, Sean M. McDonald, and Bruce Vaughn

The topic of border studies is experiencing a revival in university geography courses as well as in 

wider political commentary. Until recently, border studies in contemporary Southeast Asia appeared 

as an afterthought at best to the politics of interstate rivalry and national consolidation. The maps set 

out all agreed postcolonial lines. Meanwhile, the physical demarcation of these boundaries lagged. 

Large slices of territory, on land and at sea, eluded definition or delineation. 

That ambiguity has disappeared. Both evolving technologies and price levels enable rapid resource extraction in places, and in volumes, once scarcely imaginable. The world is witnessing an 

intensifying diplomacy, both state-to-state and commercial, over offshore petroleum. In particular, 

the South China Sea has moved from being a rather arcane area of conflict studies to the status of a 

bellwether issue. Along with other contested areas in the western Pacific and south Asia, the problem 

increasingly defines China’s regional relationships in Asia—and with powers outside the region. 

The contributors to this book emphasize this mix of heritage and history as the primary leitmotif 

for contemporary border rivalries and dynamics. Whether the region’s 11 states want it or not, their 

bordered identity is falling into sharper definition—if only because of pressure from extraregional 

states. Chapters are organized by country to elicit a broad range of thought and approach as much as 

for the specific areas or nation-states examined in each chapter. This book aims to provide new ways 

of looking at the reality and illusion of bordered Southeast Asia.
16 SF No. 268 www.ndu.edu/inss

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