NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANTHONY ROMERO HORN, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2024-1054

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:23-cv-00509-MRS, Judge Molly R. Silfen.

______________________ 

Decided: June 7, 2024

______________________ 

ANTHONY ROMERO HORN, SR., Bessemer, AL, pro se. 

 KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________ 

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2 HORN v. US

Before STOLL and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges, and 

CECCHI, District Judge.1

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Romero Horn, Sr. appeals from a final decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Horn v. United 

States, No. 23-509 C, 2023 WL 6182544 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 22, 

2023) (“Decision”). Because the Court of Federal Claims 

properly dismissed the complaint, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Horn filed the present suit against the United 

States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary relief from a District of Columbia family court order requiring Mr. Horn to pay child support. In his complaint, 

Mr. Horn raised several constitutional, criminal, and state 

law claims alleging that: (1) “he was not properly served 

papers by the court in his child support case”; (2) “his case 

was overseen by a magistrate judge, who, [he] argues, [did] 

not have the constitutional authority to rule on [his] case”; 

and (3) “various local and municipal staff members committed criminal acts” against him. Decision, 2023 WL 

6182544, at *1. The Court of Federal Claims concluded it 

lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Horn’s complaint as his claims 

were not filed within the six-year statute of limitations as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Further, the court explained 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all of Mr. 

Horn’s claims, including (1) his claims alleging criminal 

conduct; (2) his claims against defendants other than the 

federal government; and (3) his claims under the First, 

1 Honorable Claire C. Cecchi, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting 

by designation.

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HORN v. US 3

Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which are not 

money-mandating. 

Mr. Horn appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction de novo. Waltner v. United States, 

679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Any “[f]indings of 

fact relating to jurisdictional issues are reviewed for clear 

error.” Roman v. United States, 61 F.4th 1366, 1370 

(Fed. Cir. 2023).

The Tucker Act provides that: “Every claim of which 

the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction 

shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within 

six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

The statute of limitations is a jurisdictional requirement 

that cannot be waived. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 

v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

After analyzing Mr. Horn’s arguments, we conclude 

that the trial court did not err in holding that Mr. Horn’s 

claims are time-barred under the Tucker Act. Mr. Horn’s 

complaint stems from his “child support order that was entered sometime before November 21, 2008,” and the resulting loss of his vehicle in 2014 “allegedly due to his inability 

to satisfy his child support obligations.” Decision, 2023 WL 

6182544, at *4. The six-year time-limit of § 2501 “commences to run when claimants know or should know of 

their potential claims” and, here, more than six years have 

passed from the time Mr. Horn knew or should have known

of these claims to the filing of Mr. Horn’s complaint. Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340, 1999 WL 542849, 

at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Shoshone 

Indian Tribe of Wind River Rsrv., Wyo. v. United States, 

672 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[U]nder § 2501, a 

claim does not accrue until all the events which fix the 

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4 HORN v. US

government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Further, 

to the extent that Mr. Horn argues the Court of Federal 

claims erred by not considering that he was unaware of the 

six-year time limit, the statute of limitations is not tolled 

by a party’s lack of knowledge of the time limit. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 

720–21 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“It is settled . . . that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2501 is not tolled by the [parties’] ignorance of their legal 

rights.” (emphasis omitted)).

Mr. Horn also seems to challenge the Court of Federal 

Claims’ dismissal of his claims alleging constitutional violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 We see no error in 

the court’s dismissal. For a party’s claim to come within 

the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal 

Claims, the party “must identify a . . . source of substantive 

law that creates the right to money damages,” or in other 

words, is “money-mandating.” Fisher v. United States, 

402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). We 

have repeatedly held that the constitutional claims asserted by Mr. Horn are not money-mandating. See Allen 

v. United States, 546 F. App’x 949, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

(holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are 

not money-mandating and thus, do not provide jurisdiction 

2 To the extent that Mr. Horn raises new issues in 

his appeal briefs, we do not consider these arguments because they were not raised in his submissions to the Court 

of Federal Claims. As a court of appellate review, we do 

not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Hitsman v. United States, 825 F. App’x. 859, 861 (Fed. Cir. 

2020) (“Ordinarily, we ‘do[ ] not give consideration to issues 

not raised below.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hormel 

v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941))).

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HORN v. US 5

under the Tucker Act); Drake v. United States, 792 F. App’x 

916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Court of Federal Claims, 

however, does not have jurisdiction to render judgment on 

claims against the United States based on the Sixth 

Amendment because it is not money mandating.”); Brown 

v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because monetary damages are not available for a Fourth 

Amendment violation, the Court of Federal Claims does 

not have jurisdiction over a such a violation.”).

We have considered Mr. Horn’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive.3 For the foregoing reasons, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

No costs.

3 On May 9, 2024, Mr. Horn filed a petition for writ 

of mandamus requesting that we order the Department of 

Health and Human Services and the District of Columbia 

Department of Motor Vehicles to remove the indefinite suspension of his commercial driver’s license. We do not have 

jurisdiction to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295; see also Perry 

v. United States, 524 F. App’x. 680, 682 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A 

writ of mandamus is not a substitute for the regular appeal 

process, . . . and cannot be used [] to rectify [a party’s] failure to file in the court that has jurisdiction over his 

claim.”).

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