Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

CHARLES FREEMAN CHRISTIAN,

Appellant.

 No. 80045-1-I

 DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED OPINION

COBURN, J. — A jury convicted Charles Freeman Christian of three 

domestic violence crimes: assault in the second degree by strangulation or 

suffocation, assault in the fourth degree, and interfering with the reporting of 

domestic violence. Christian appeals the assault in the second degree and 

interfering convictions. Christian contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion for mistrial; the trial court violated his constitutional right to 

jury unanimity for the assault in the second degree and interfering convictions; 

and the State failed to include in its initial charging document, and the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury, that the interfering crime contains a mens rea element.

We affirm and hold that interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is a 

strict liability crime.
No. 80045-1-I/2

2

FACTS

Christian and Sharon La Rae Keith were in a romantic relationship and 

resided together in Keith’s one-bedroom Lynnwood apartment. On 

December 29, 2018, Keith was lying in bed and heard Christian talking on the 

phone. Keith heard Christian speak into the phone, “What do you mean you’re 

kicking my son out.” Then, Christian left the apartment. Christian returned with 

his son, Nigel Christian, and Nigel’s girlfriend.1 

Around 10:00 a.m., Keith asked Christian to leave, and they got into a 

verbal argument in the bedroom. Christian went into the living room and told 

Nigel, “Wherever I am, you’re welcome, too.” Keith yelled from the bedroom, 

“[N]o, he’s not.” Christian yelled to Nigel, “do you see what I’m going through, do 

you see what I’m putting up with[?]” Around 12:00 p.m., Keith and Christian 

began to argue again. Keith yelled at Christian that she wanted him and Nigel to 

leave. 

Keith grabbed her cell phone and walked towards the bed. Keith later 

testified she wanted to call 911, but Keith did not tell Christian that was why she 

grabbed the phone. According to Keith, while walking to the bed, Christian 

yelled, “bitch, give my phone back,” and tried to grab the phone out of Keith’s 

hands. According to Christian, he grabbed for Keith, not because he was 

 1 Because Christian and his son share a last name, we refer to Nigel by 

his first name for clarity. Neither Nigel nor his girlfriend testified at trial.
No. 80045-1-I/3

3

reaching for the phone, but because he was trying to get his diamond chain 

necklace that he thought Keith held. 

Keith held the phone with both hands, laid on top of the phone and her 

arms by lying on her stomach on the bed, and began to yell. Christian punched 

Keith in the back of the head and continued to grab for Keith’s hand. At some 

point, Keith ended up lying on her back. Keith testified that Christian choked her 

with both of his hands, and the force with which Christian choked Keith made her 

feel as though she could not breathe and would die.2 Christian got the phone, 

stopped choking Keith, and stood up. Christian said to Keith, “I could have just 

killed you and I love you and that’s why I didn’t.” 

Soon after Christian choked Keith, Keith ran to the apartment’s balcony 

and screamed for help.3 Keith wrapped her arms through the balcony’s railing,

and Christian repeatedly tried to pry Keith off the railing. Christian struck Keith in 

the back of the head twice before she let go of the railing. Keith made eye

contact with the apartment manager. The apartment manager heard Keith 

screaming and observed Christian strike Keith a few times and “pull her by her 

hair.” The apartment manager then called 911. A visitor to an adjacent 

apartment building also heard Keith screaming. Concerned that someone 

needed help, the visitor ran outside Keith’s apartment and saw Christian 

 2 Christian testified that he did not choke Keith. 

3 Keith also testified that she ran to the balcony between three and four 

hours after the choking incident. But, Keith testified that she had a hard time 

differentiating between the physical altercations “because they were so close 

together.” 
No. 80045-1-I/4

4

“grabbing” Keith. After Keith let go of the railing, Christian went inside the 

apartment and Keith stayed on the balcony. When Keith heard police sirens, she 

ran inside the apartment and told Christian the police were coming. Then, Keith 

jumped into bed and began to cry. 

Lynnwood Police Officers George Bucholtz and Tanner Hedlund 

responded to a 911 report of a domestic violence assault. The officers identified 

Keith’s apartment, repeatedly knocked on the door and announced their 

presence, and ordered the occupants to open the door. The officers could hear 

someone inside the apartment crying. Between knocks, the officers heard 

someone inside the apartment reply to their request to open the door by 

shouting, “no.” According to Keith, Christian yelled through the door “you cannot 

come in,” and told Nigel not to open the door. Christian denied telling Nigel or 

Keith not to open the door. Christian testified, “I told [Keith], I said answer the 

door, you’re the reason why they’re here.” 

The officers believed there were exigent circumstances—a person being 

assaulted—permitting them to enter the apartment without first obtaining a 

warrant. So, Bucholtz kicked open the apartment door. The officers found Keith 

crying and lying under a blanket on the bed and Christian standing at the foot of 

the bed. Christian approached the officers swinging his arms and shouting for 

the officers to “get out.” Bucholtz tried to handcuff Christian by grabbing his right 

arm, but Christian pulled away. Bucholtz physically restrained Christian, placed 

him in handcuffs, and removed him from the apartment. 
No. 80045-1-I/5

5

Once outside, Christian told Bucholtz that Keith “had anxiety and that she 

freaked out” and yelled at Christian and Nigel. Christian also said that “Keith had 

gone out onto the balcony in her underwear,” and Christian was trying “to get her 

to come back inside.” 

Hedlund stayed in the apartment with Keith. Hedlund observed Keith’s 

injuries including bruises around her neck, bruises and scrapes on her arms, and 

a red mark on top of her head. Bucholtz returned to the apartment and observed 

Keith was still crying, and that she had abrasions around her neck, redness on 

her arms, and lumps on her head. Keith told the officers that “she attempted to 

call 911,” but Christian threw the cell phone, so Keith went on the “balcony and 

screamed for help,” and then “Christian came outside and hit her on the head.” 

Keith also said that she went outside “hoping that someone could hear her and 

call 911 for her.” 

The State charged Christian with three domestic violence crimes:

(1) assault in the second degree by strangulation and suffocation, (2) assault in 

the fourth degree, and (3) interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. 

Before trial, the trial court granted Christian’s motion to “[e]xclude all 

reference to Mr. Christian’s current or any previous incarceration.” The trial court 

also ordered that

no reference be made by counsel or any witness to matters 

previously excluded by the Court. ER 103(c), 401. Similarly, order 

that counsel for both parties make their witnesses aware of the 

pretrial rulings so that the witnesses are careful in their testimony 

and do not violate a court order that could potentially result in a 
No. 80045-1-I/6

6

mistrial or prejudice to either party. Witnesses should be shown a 

written copy of these rulings if such written copy exists.

During trial, on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Keith, “Now, 

Mr. Christian doesn’t live there anymore; correct?” In response, Keith testified,

“Mr. Christian’s in jail. . . He’s in jail.” A few minutes later, the trial court took a 

recess and excused the jury. During the recess, the trial court asked the parties 

if they had any issues to address. They said no. Later, defense counsel asked 

Keith what happened to Christian’s diamond chain. Keith testified, “If it’s not with 

him in jail it’s in a box in the closet where all his other stuff is in my apartment.” 

Before going on a lunch recess, the trial court gave the defense another 

opportunity to raise issues and counsel declined. 

After the lunch recess, Christian asserted the State violated the court’s 

pretrial motions. The State conceded to failing to instruct Keith not to mention 

Christian’s current or previous incarceration. Christian then moved for a mistrial. 

The State objected to Christian’s motion for a mistrial by arguing Christian 

did not timely object and he waived the issue. The State also argued the 

prejudice to Christian was minimal because there was evidence that the police 

arrested Christian at the scene. The State argued, in the alternative, that

Christian opened the door to the testimony and the testimony did not violate 

Christian’s right to a fair trial. The State asked for an admonition or curative 

instruction. Christian argued he did not waive the issue. Christian argued a 

curative instruction was insufficient because the combination of having police 

officers present in the courtroom during trial, and Keith’s references to Christian 
No. 80045-1-I/7

7

being in jail, would allow jurors to speculate as to why the police officers were 

present. The trial court responded, “There’s no speculation at this point. There 

was speculation before the testimony. There’s no speculation now.” Christian 

then argued the combination of the police presence and Keith’s testimony would 

further allow the jurors to speculate that Christian was a “particularly dangerous 

person.” The trial court noted that when two uniformed police officers are in a 

courtroom throughout the trial, the jurors could infer the defendant is in custody. 

Noting that the officers were present throughout Christian’s trial, the trial court 

found the officers’ presence did not warrant granting a mistrial. 

The trial court denied Christian’s motion for a mistrial but offered to 

provide a curative jury instruction. Christian proposed, and the trial court 

accepted, jury instruction number six, which stated, “[t]estimony or evidence 

regarding incarceration of Mr. Christian shall not be considered or used by you 

for any purpose whatsoever.” 

The jury convicted Christian on all three counts. 

After the trial court read the verdicts and released the jury, the trial court 

questioned whether the conviction for the interference crime, count three, could 

stand because it lacked a unanimity or Petrich instruction.

4 Jury instruction 

 4 In State v. Petrich, our Supreme Court provided, “When the evidence 

indicates that several distinct criminal acts have been committed, but defendant 

is charged with only one count of criminal conduct, jury unanimity must be 

protected. . . The State may, in its discretion, elect the act upon which it will rely 

for conviction. Alternatively, if the jury is instructed that all 12 jurors must agree 

that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt, a unanimous verdict on one criminal act will be assured. When the State 

chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury’s 
No. 80045-1-I/8

8

number 15 provided that to “convict the defendant of the crime of interference 

with the reporting of a domestic violence offense” the State must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt “[t]hat the defendant prevented or attempted to prevent Sharon 

Keith from calling a 911 emergency communication system or making a report to 

any law enforcement officer.” The trial court stated: 

I don’t think that the verdict in relation to Count 3 is appropriate. 

You can either brief it, or you can agree with my analysis, but when 

you argued in closing there were two alternative methods in which 

to commit the crime and there was no unanimity instruction or 

Petrich instruction, I don’t think that verdict could stand. I’m certain 

it’s likely that issue will be appealed, but I do not want this case 

being returned for that issue. I think it’s a problem. So I think that I 

would have to, in all likelihood, find him not guilty of that charge.

However, at sentencing the trial court concluded a unanimity instruction was not 

required because the jury could find sufficient evidence to support each

alternative means. 

Christian appeals. 

DISCUSSION

Mistrial

Christian argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion for a mistrial based on Keith’s testimony about Christian’s incarceration

that violated pretrial rulings. 

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of 

discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d 260, 269-70, 45 P.3d 541 (2002). A 

 

understanding of the unanimity requirement.” 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173 

(1984); see also, State v. Carson, 184 Wn.2d 207, 216-17, 357 P.3d 1064 

(2015).
No. 80045-1-I/9

9

trial court “should grant a mistrial only when the defendant has been so 

prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will be 

fairly tried.” State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). “A trial 

court’s denial of a motion for mistrial will be overturned only when there is a 

‘substantial likelihood’ that the error prompting the request for a mistrial affected 

the jury’s verdict.” Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d at 269-70 (quoting State v. Russell, 

125 Wn.2d 24, 85, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its 

decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.”

State v. Brooks, 195 Wn.2d 91, 97, 455 P.3d 1151 (2020).

“[W]hen a trial irregularity occurs, the court must decide its prejudicial 

effect.” State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 177, 225 P.3d 973 (2010). “An 

irregularity in a trial proceeding is grounds for reversal when it is so prejudicial 

that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Condon, 72 Wn. App. 638, 

647, 865 P.2d 521 (1993). “In determining the effect of an irregularity, we 

examine (1) its seriousness; (2) whether it involved cumulative evidence; and 

(3) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard it.” State v. 

Hopson, 113 Wn.2d 273, 284, 778 P.2d 1014 (1989).

Trial courts have wide discretion in curing trial irregularities resulting from 

improper witness statements. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d at 177. “Courts generally 

presume jurors follow instructions to disregard improper evidence.” Russell, 125 

Wn.2d at 84. But, “no instruction can ‘remove the prejudicial impression created 

[by evidence that] is inherently prejudicial and of such a nature as to likely 
No. 80045-1-I/10

10

impress itself upon the minds of the jurors.’ ” State v. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. 

251, 255, 742 P.2d 190 (1987) (quoting State v. Miles, 73 Wn.2d 67, 71, 436 

P.2d 198 (1968)). Some curative instructions are insufficient in removing the 

prejudicial effect of evidence. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d at 177.

The instant case is similar to Condon where a witness testified in violation 

of a ruling in limine that the defendant was in jail. 72 Wn. App. at 648. The 

Condon court granted the defendant’s motion to strike those comments, denied 

the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, and instructed the jury to disregard 

references the defendant was in jail. Id. On appeal, we determined the fact that 

the defendant had been in jail did not mean he was convicted of a crime. Id. at 

649. We also determined that, while the statements had the potential for 

prejudice, they were not serious enough to warrant a mistrial, and the trial court’s

instruction to disregard the statement was sufficient to cure any potential 

prejudice. Id.; see also State v. Lewis, 141 Wn. App. 367, 166 P.3d 786 (2007) 

(no abuse of discretion where the trial court struck testimony that violated a 

motion in limine and gave a curative jury instruction).

Similar to the trial court in Condon, the trial court below gave a proper 

curative instruction. The jury could infer Christian was in custody because the 

officers arrested him at Keith’s apartment. Because we assume juries follow 

instructions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Christian’s 

motion for a mistrial.
No. 80045-1-I/11

11

Jury Unanimity

Christian argues the jury instructions for the crimes of assault in the 

second degree and interfering with the reporting of domestic violence violated his 

constitutional right to unanimous jury verdicts. We disagree.

Article 1, section 21 of the Washington State Constitution provides 

defendants the right to a unanimous jury verdict. The right to a unanimous jury 

verdict includes the right to unanimity as to the means with which the State 

charged the defendant and the court instructed the jury. State v. Owens, 180 

Wn.2d 90, 95, 323 P.3d 1030 (2014). “Where a single offense may be 

committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the 

single crime charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by 

which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each 

alternative means.” State v. Nonog, 145 Wn. App. 802, 811-12, 187 P.3d 335 

(2008), aff’d, 169 Wn.2d 220, 237 P.3d 250 (2010). “Evidence is sufficient if, 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 99.

Whether a statute provides an alternative means crime is a question of 

statutory interpretation. State v. Espinoza, 14 Wn. App. 2d 810, 819, 474 P.3d 

570 (2020) (citing Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96). “[T]he use of a disjunctive ‘or’ in a 

list of methods of committing the crime does not necessarily create alternative 

means of committing the crime, nor does the presence of statutory subsections.”
No. 80045-1-I/12

12

Id. (citing State v. Barboza-Cortes, 194 Wn.2d 639, 643-44, 451 P.3d. 707 

(2019)).

RAP 2.5(a)(3) provides that an “appellate court may refuse to review a

claim of error which was not raised in the trial court” unless the claimed error is a 

“manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” An error is manifest if the 

appellant can demonstrate actual prejudice through practical and identifiable 

consequences at trial. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). 

An error is truly of constitutional dimension if it implicates a constitutional interest. 

Id. at 98. “If a court determines the claim raises a manifest constitutional error, it 

may still be subject to a harmless error analysis.” Id. “An alleged violation of the 

right to a unanimous jury verdict is a constitutional challenge that this court 

reviews de novo.” In re Detention of Keeney, 141 Wn. App. 318, 327, 169 P.3d 

852 (2007).

A. Assault in the Second Degree

Christian asserts that a conviction for assault in the second degree must 

be supported by sufficient evidence for each of the alternative means of 

strangulation and suffocation. Because no evidence supports suffocation, he 

contends we should reverse his conviction. We disagree.

Where there are alternative ways to satisfy each alternative means (i.e., “a 

means within a means”), the alternative means doctrine does not apply. State v. 

Smith, 159 Wn.2d 778, 783, 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of 

Jeffries, 110 Wn.2d 326, 339, 752 P.2d 1338 (1988)). In other words, “the 
No. 80045-1-I/13

13

alternative means analysis does not apply to ‘sub[-]alternatives.’ ” Espinoza, 14 

Wn. App. 2d at 819-22 (determining that, even though RCW 9A.46.020 is an 

alternative means crime, the alternative means doctrine does not apply to the 

sub-alternatives of its subsection) (citing Smith, 159 Wn.2d at 783).

In Smith, our Supreme Court analyzed former RCW 9A.36.021(1) (1988), 

which contained six separate subsections representing the alternative means of 

committing the crime of assault in the second degree. 159 Wn.2d at 784. In 

2007, the legislature added “[a]ssault another by strangulation,” subsection (g),

as another means of finding a person guilty of assault in the second degree. 

LAWS OF 2007, ch. 70, § 2. In 2011, the legislature added “or suffocation” within 

subsection (g). LAWS OF 2011, ch. 166, § 1. RCW 9A.36.021(1)(g) provides, “A 

person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she” “[a]ssaults another 

by strangulation or suffocation.”

“When the alleged alternatives are ‘minor nuances inhering in the same 

act,’ these ‘alternatives’ are more accurately categorized as ‘facets of the same 

criminal conduct.’ ” Espinoza, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 819 (quoting Barboza-Cortes, 

194 Wn.2d at 644 (quoting State v. Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d 726, 734, 364 P.3d 87 

(2015)). “ ‘Strangulation’ means to compress a person’s neck, thereby 

obstructing the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe, or doing so with the 

intent to obstruct the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe.” 

RCW 9A.04.110(26). “ ‘Suffocation’ means to block or impair a person’s intake 

of air at the nose and mouth, whether by smothering or other means, with the 
No. 80045-1-I/14

14

intent to obstruct the person’s ability to breathe.” RCW 9A.04.110(27). Here, 

strangulation and suffocation are two “facets of the same criminal conduct” of 

restricting a person’s ability to breathe.

Assault in the second degree is an alternative means crime because it is a 

single criminal offense with seven separate subsections, (a) through (g),

representing the alternative means of committing the offense. 

RCW 9A.36.021(1). Here, the State charged Christian with violating 

RCW 9A.36.021(1)(g), which is one of the seven alternative means of committing 

assault in the second degree. “We presume the legislature is ‘familiar with 

judicial interpretations of statutes and, absent an indication it intended to overrule 

a particular interpretation, amendments are presumed to be consistent with 

previous judicial decisions.’ ” State v. Ervin, 169 Wn. 2d 815, 825, 239 P.3d 354, 

359 (2010) (quoting State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 264, 996 P.2d 610 (2000)). 

Thus, the legislature was aware of Smith and the interpretation of

RCW 9A.36.021(1) as an alternative means crime before it elected to add 

“suffocation” within the same alternative means of “strangulation.” By electing 

not to add suffocation as its own distinct subsection, the legislature chose not to 

make suffocation its own alternative means of committing assault in the second 

degree. Thus, strangulation and suffocation are “sub-alternatives” or “means 

within a means” within RCW 9A.36.021(1)(g). Strangulation and suffocation are 

not alternative means in RCW 9A.36.021(1).
No. 80045-1-I/15

15

Christian argues that even if strangulation and suffocation are not 

alternative means of committing assault in the second degree, under the law of 

the case doctrine, they became alternative means when the jury was so 

instructed, as proposed by the State. We disagree.

The trial court instructed the jury that to convict Christian of the crime of 

assault in the second degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) That on or about the 29th day of December, 2018, the 

defendant intentionally assaulted Sharon Keith by

a. strangulation or

b. suffocation . . . .

Christian was tried for, and the jury was instructed, on assault in the second 

degree by strangulation or suffocation and no other alternative means of 

committing assault in the second degree. However, the trial court instructed the 

jury as if strangulation and suffocation were alternative means:

To return a verdict of guilty, the jury need not be unanimous as to 

which of alternatives (1)(a) or (1)(b) has been proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt, as long as each juror finds that at least one 

alternative has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

This instruction is consistent with the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions 

for alternative means crimes. 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN 

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 4.23 (4th ed. 2016) (WPIC).

The law of the case doctrine “refers to the principle that jury instructions 

that are not objected to are treated as the properly applicable law for purposes of 

appeal.” Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41, 123 P.3d 844 (2005). Under this 

doctrine, “[i]n criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving otherwise 
No. 80045-1-I/16

16

unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included 

without objection in the ‘to convict’ instruction.” State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 

102, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). The law of the case doctrine does not apply to the 

instant case where the to-convict instruction did not contain an added element.

In State v. Makekau, Division Two of this court determined possession of 

a stolen motor vehicle was not an alternative means crime even though the 

statute, and subsequent to-convict instruction, included a disjunctive “or” list of 

methods of committing that crime. 194 Wn. App. 407, 419, 378 P.3d 577 (2016). 

There, the terms “received, possessed, concealed, or disposed of” were methods

rather than alternative means of committing possession. Id. at 419-20. Because 

possession of a stolen motor vehicle was not an alternative means crime, and 

the jury was not provided additional elements, “the State was required to prove 

only that Makekau’s conduct satisfied one of the disjunctive terms.” Id. at 420.

Similar to Makekau, here, consistent with RCW 9A.36.021(1)(g), the 

instruction properly provided the only two means within the means of finding 

assault in the second degree. While the trial court erred in providing the 

alternative means instruction, because strangulation and suffocation are means 

within a means, the State was not required to prove both sub-alternatives beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Thus, the error was harmless.

As Christian concedes, there was sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction for strangulation. Keith testified to Christian choking her, and the 

responding officers testified to observing bruising and abrasions around Keith’s 
No. 80045-1-I/17

17

neck. Thus, sufficient evidence supports a conviction for assault in the second 

degree by strangulation.

Because strangulation and suffocation are means within a means, and 

because Christian’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence that he 

strangled Keith, we find no reversible error. See Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d at 736,

(determining, because the former driving under the influence statute “does not 

create alternative means, and because Sandholm’s conviction is supported by 

sufficient evidence that he drove under the influence of alcohol, we find no 

error”).

B. Interfering with the Reporting of Domestic Violence

This court has determined the crime of interfering with the reporting of 

domestic violence is an alternative means crime. Nonog, 145 Wn. App. at 811-

12.5 RCW 9A.36.150(1)(b) provides, “A person commits the crime of interfering 

with the reporting of domestic violence if the person” “[p]revents or attempts to 

prevent the victim of or a witness to that domestic violence crime from calling a 

911 emergency communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making 

a report to any law enforcement official.” In other words, the statute sets forth

three alternative means of committing the crime of interfering: (1) preventing 

someone from calling a 911 communication system, (2) preventing someone 

 5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties in Nonog did not challenge 

our determination that interfering with reporting domestic violence is an 

alternative means crime. Nonog, 169 Wn.2d 220. The court affirmed Nonog

without reaching the issue. We decline the State’s invitation to reconsider 

whether interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is an alternative 

means crime.
No. 80045-1-I/18

18

from obtaining medical assistance, and (3) preventing someone from making a 

report to any law enforcement officer.

In the instant case, the trial court did not instruct the jury that interfering 

with the reporting of domestic violence is an alternative means crime. Instead, 

jury instruction number 15 provided,

To convict the defendant of the crime of interference with the 

reporting of a domestic violence offense, each of the following 

elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

[. . .]

(3) That the defendant prevented or attempted to prevent Sharon 

Keith from calling a 911 emergency communication system or

making a report to any law enforcement officer.

(Emphasis added.) After the verdict, the trial court recognized that it did not give 

the jury a unanimity instruction. Christian contends this is a reversible error. We 

disagree.

Instead of electing which means supported a conviction, the State 

presented sufficient evidence to support each of the two alternative means listed 

in the court’s instruction.

First, the State presented sufficient evidence that Christian prevented or 

attempted to prevent Keith from calling 911. At trial, Keith testified to holding 

onto the phone with both hands until Christian punched and choked her. Keith 

testified that once Christian got the phone, he stopped choking her and stood up. 

Also at trial, the responding officers testified that Keith reported “she attempted to 

call 911” and that Christian threw the cell phone. Officers also testified Keith said 

she went onto the balcony “hoping that someone could hear her and call 911 for 
No. 80045-1-I/19

19

her.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational 

juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Christian prevented or 

attempted to prevent Keith from calling 911.

Second, the State presented sufficient evidence that Christian prevented

or attempted to prevent Keith from making a report to any law enforcement

officer. Keith testified that, after officers knocked on her apartment door,

Christian yelled through the door, “you cannot come in” and told Nigel not to 

open the door. The reporting officers testified they repeatedly knocked on Keith’s 

apartment door, announced their presence, and ordered the occupants to open 

the door. They also testified that between knocks, they heard someone inside 

crying and someone else shout “no” to their request to open the door. After the 

officers forced their way into the apartment, they found Keith crying and lying 

under a blanket on the bed and Christian standing at the foot of the bed. 

Christian then approached the officers swinging his arms and shouting for the 

officers to “get out.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

any rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Christian 

prevented or attempted to prevent Keith from making a report to any law

enforcement officer by refusing the police entry into the apartment and ordering 

Nigel not to answer the door.

“[W]hen there is sufficient evidence to support each of the alternative 

means of committing the crime, express jury unanimity as to which means is not 

required.” Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 95. Because there was sufficient evidence to 
No. 80045-1-I/20

20

support each alternative means listed in the trial court’s instruction, the trial court 

did not violate Christian’s right to a unanimous verdict.

Culpable Mental State

Christian argues his conviction for interfering with the reporting of 

domestic violence should be reversed because the crime requires an element of 

a culpable mental state, which neither the charging information nor the to-convict 

instruction contained.6 Because we determine the crime of interfering with the 

reporting of domestic violence is a strict liability offense, we disagree.

Whether the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence 

contains a mens rea element or is a strict liability crime presents questions of law 

that are reviewed de novo. State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155, 163, 456 P.3d 

1172 (2020).7

Under common law “strict liability crimes [were] disfavored.” State v. 

Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 367, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 

163. The State was required to “prove both a bad act and bad intent.” 

Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 163. But, our legislature has plenary power to create 

strict liability crimes. State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 179, 481 P.3d 521 (2021)

(citing Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 163). Strict liability crimes are crimes that 

“criminalize conduct regardless of whether the actor intended wrongdoing.” Id.

 6 Christian argues this court should read the statute to include an implied 

mens rea element of intentional or knowing prevention of reporting. Christian 

provides no argument as to which mens rea this court should infer.

7 For clarity, we refer to State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155, 456 P.3d 1172 

(2020) as “Yishmael II” because it followed State v. Yishmael, 6 Wn. App. 2d 

203, 430 P.3d 279 (2018), which we refer to as “Yishmael I.”
No. 80045-1-I/21

21

(quoting Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 163). Strict liability crimes require the State 

prove actus reus but do not require the State to prove mens rea.8 “In particular, 

the legislature may create ‘strict liability offenses to protect the public from the 

harms that have come with modern life by putting the burden of care on those in 

the best position to avoid those harms.’ ” Id. (quoting Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 

164).

“[W]hether a statute sets forth a strict liability crime is a statutory 

construction question aimed at ascertaining legislative intent. The inquiry begins 

with the statute’s language and legislative history.” State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 

594, 604-05, 610, 925 P.2d 978 (1996); see also Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 193

(confirming that “when the legislature enacts a statute without explicit mens rea 

language, we will still look to the statutory language, the legislative history, and a 

series of nonexclusive factors to determine ‘whether the legislature intended to 

create a strict liability offense.’ ”) (quoting Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 164-66). We 

consider the “statute’s context, and the interplay with related statutes.” 

Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 164.

RCW 9A.36.150 provides,

(1) A person commits the crime of interfering with the reporting of 

domestic violence if the person:

(a) Commits a crime of domestic violence, as defined in RCW 

10.99.020; and

(b) Prevents or attempts to prevent the victim of or a witness to that 

domestic violence crime from calling a 911 emergency 

communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making a 

report to any law enforcement official.

 8 Actus reus is a voluntary act. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
No. 80045-1-I/22

22

(2) Commission of a crime of domestic violence under subsection 

(1) of this section is a necessary element of the crime of interfering 

with the reporting of domestic violence.

(3) Interference with the reporting of domestic violence is a gross 

misdemeanor.

The text of RCW 9A.36.150 does not include an explicit mens rea 

element. However, a statute’s “failure to be explicit regarding a [mens rea] 

element is not, however, dispositive of legislative intent.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 

at 361. Thus, we next consider RCW 9A.36.150’s legislative history. Blake, 197 

Wn.2d at 193; Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166.

As Christian asserts, and the State concedes, RCW 9A.36.150’s 

legislative history does not include a statement of legislative intent. The 

legislative history does not answer the questions of whether the legislature 

intended to include a mens rea element or whether the legislature purposefully 

omitted that element.

Christian argues that because RCW 9A.36.150 does not establish an 

affirmative defense, the legislature intended there to be a mens rea element. In 

Anderson, the Washington State Supreme Court considered whether the crime of 

unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree contained an implicit mens 

rea element or was a strict liability crime. 141 Wn.2d at 360. The court found 

“the legislative history [was] not conclusive on the issue of the Legislature’s 

intent.” Id. at 362-63. There, the legislature’s “failure to provide in the statute for 

the affirmative defense of unwitting conduct or to expressly eliminate lack of 

knowledge as a defense [were] . . . other indicators of its intent to make [mens 
No. 80045-1-I/23

23

rea] an element of the offense.” Id. at 362-63. In other words, we consider the 

fact that a statute does not include an affirmative defense or does not expressly 

eliminate the lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense as indicative of the 

legislature’s intent to create a mens rea element.

The State asserts the language of RCW 9A.36.150 “gives conflicting 

signals as to the legislative intent” for two reasons. First, the State asserts 

RCW 9A.36.150(1)(a) requires the defendant commit a domestic violence crime 

as defined in RCW 10.99.020, and some of those domestic violence crimes have 

express mens rea elements but others do not. The State cites rape in the first 

degree, RCW 9A.44.040, as a crime that does not have a mens rea element and 

that it is listed as a potential domestic violence crime defined in RCW 10.99.020.9

Second, the State acknowledges that RCW 9A.36.150(1)(b) includes the 

phrase “prevent or attempts to prevent,” which “suggests a mental state under 

some circumstances but not others.” The State argues the court should 

determine that “[o]nly the word ‘attempt’ indicates an intentional act.” In criminal 

law, “attempt” is “[a]n overt act that is done with the intent to commit a crime but 

that falls short of completing the crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 

2019).

When the statute’s language and legislative intent are not determinative,

as to whether a crime includes a mens rea element, we use the eight 

 9 However, “The general rape statutes require forcible compulsion or an 

unwilling or incapacitated victim.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 907, 270 

P.3d 591, 597-98 (2012) (citing RCW 9A.44.040, .050, .060).
No. 80045-1-I/24

24

“nonexclusive” factors identified in Bash “as aids in determining whether the 

Legislature has created a strict liability crime.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363 

(citing Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06); Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 166; see Blake, 

197 Wn.2d at 193 (courts still consider the Bash factors). The Bash factors are:

(1) a statute’s silence on a mental element is not dispositive of 

legislative intent; the statute must be construed in light of the 

background rules of the common law, and its conventional mens 

rea element; (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a 

“public welfare offense” created by the Legislature; (3) the extent to 

which a strict liability reading of the statute would encompass 

seemingly entirely innocent conduct; (4) and the harshness of the 

penalty[ . . .]; (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public; (6) the 

ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts; 

(7) relieving the prosecution of difficult and time-consuming proof of 

fault where the Legislature thinks it important to stamp out harmful 

conduct at all costs, “even at the cost of convicting innocent-minded 

and blameless people”; and (8) the number of prosecutions to be 

expected.

130 Wn.2d at 605-06 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 

S. Ct. 1798, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994)). “All of these factors are to be read in 

light of the principal that offenses with no mental element are generally 

disfavored.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 363.

First, we consider the statute “in light of the background rules of common 

law, and its conventional mens rea element.” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605. As the 

State correctly notes, and Christian does not dispute, there is no common law 

equivalent to the crime of interfering with the reporting domestic violence. The 

State correctly asserts this factor is “unhelpful.” State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 

904, 911, 148 Wn.3d 993 (2006) (determining this factor is unhelpful where the 

statute has no common law predecessor).
No. 80045-1-I/25

25

Second, we consider “whether the crime can be characterized as a ‘public 

welfare offense’ created by the Legislature.” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605. 

Generally, public welfare offenses do not require proof of intent or a mental state. 

Id. at 607. In other words, “the legislature may create ‘strict liability offenses to 

protect the public.’ ” Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 179 (quoting Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 

163). Public welfare offenses tend to be “regulatory offenses” “involving ‘pure 

food and drugs, labeling, weights and measures, building, plumbing and 

electrical codes, fire protection, air and water pollution, sanitation, highway safety 

and numerous other areas[.]’ ” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 607 (quoting State v. Turner, 

78 Wn.2d 276, 280, 474 P.2d 91 (1970)). Public welfare offenses:

[A]re not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with 

which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of 

neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a 

duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or 

immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger 

or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 

(1952).

Crimes that are not public welfare offenses are “moral turpitude” offenses 

and categorized as malum in se crimes.10 State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 234, 

562 P.2d 659 (1977). Moral turpitude offenses generally “require a mental 

element, some level of ‘guilty knowledge,’ even if the statute does not specify 

that element.” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 606-07 (quoting Turner, 78 Wn.2d at 280).

 10 A “malum in se” crime is a “crime or an act that is inherently immoral, 

such as murder, arson, or rape.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
No. 80045-1-I/26

26

Christian asserts, “[t]he crime of interfering with reporting of domestic 

violence is a crime of moral turpitude, not a public welfare offense” because “it 

prevents the victim from obtaining needed aid” and there is an “immediate harm” 

to the victim. 

The State agrees the offense of interfering with the reporting of domestic 

violence is not technically a public welfare offense because it is not a regulatory 

offense. But, the State argues the offense of interfering with the reporting of 

domestic violence shares some aspects of public welfare offenses because its 

harm extends beyond the victim to society. We address the State’s argument 

below in our consideration of Bash factor five examining the “seriousness of the 

harm to the public.”

The crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is more 

similar to a crime of moral turpitude than to a public welfare offense. As 

previously noted, many public welfare offenses “result in no direct or immediate 

injury to person.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-56. Unlike public welfare offenses, 

as Christian asserts, the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic 

violence may involve immediate harm to the victim. Thus, this factor weighs in 

favor of finding a mens rea element.

Third, we consider “the extent to which a strict liability reading of the 

statute would encompass seemingly entirely innocent conduct.” Bash, 130 

Wn.2d at 605. “[A] statute will not be deemed to be one of strict liability where 
No. 80045-1-I/27

27

such construction would criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent 

behavior.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 364.

Christian provides a number of examples of how RCW 9A.36.150 would 

criminalize a broad range of seemingly innocent behavior if it is a strict liability 

crime. For example, Christian asserts, “Suppose an assault victim, sometime 

after being assaulted, contemplates calling 911 but, before moving to pick up the 

phone and without announcing her intention, the defendant picks up the phone to 

call someone else, thereby preventing her from calling 911.” Christian’s 

hypothetical fails to provide other context that a jury could consider such as 

whether the assault victim was able to pick up the phone moments later and 

make the call or whether the assailant dominated the use of the phone for the 

rest of the evening. Regardless of the circumstances, the jury is to consider

circumstances in determining if the assailant, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

prevented or attempted to prevent the victim from making that call.

More importantly, Christian’s hypothetical ignores the fact that it was the

defendant who created the situation where the victim would have a reason to call 

a 911 emergency communication system, obtain medical assistance, or make a 

report to any law enforcement official. In other words, the State still has to prove 

the defendant committed a crime of domestic violence. The statute only 

criminalizes the active, not passive, conduct of interfering with the reporting of 
No. 80045-1-I/28

28

domestic violence after having committed a domestic violence crime.11 This is 

not wholly innocent nonconduct.

Furthermore, Christian’s request to add a mens rea element creates a 

potentially dangerous situation. It is reasonable that a victim of domestic 

violence would not want the defendant to know that the victim was trying to call 

for help or report the crime. Requiring the defendant to know the victim was 

trying to seek help does not contemplate the circumstances of domestic violence.

The State argues a defendant can only commit the crime of interfering 

with the reporting of domestic violence if that defendant commits a crime of 

domestic violence so the crime does not criminalize a broad range of innocent 

behavior. State v. Burch is analogous on this factor. 197 Wn. App. 382, 394, 

389 P.3d 685 (2016). In Burch, Division Two of this court considered whether 

vehicular homicide committed while under the influence of alcohol or drugs was a 

strict liability crime. Id. at 393. The court considered the fact that the underlying 

crime of driving under the influence is a serious criminal offense. Id. at 394. 

“Because vehicular homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or 

drugs requires the State to prove the facts of both impairment and operation of a 

motor vehicle, the crime necessarily encompasses primarily or solely criminal 

behavior.” Id. at 395. As the State asserts, to convict a defendant of the crime of 

interfering with the reporting of domestic violence, the State must prove and the 

 11 Cf. Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 179-80 (holding the felony of unknowing 

possession of a controlled substance unconstitutionally criminalized “wholly 

innocent and passive nonconduct on a strict liability basis”).
No. 80045-1-I/29

29

trier of fact must find the defendant committed a domestic violence crime. The 

underlying crime of domestic violence is a serious criminal offense. Thus, the 

crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence does not criminalize a 

broad range of innocent behavior. This factor weighs in favor of strict liability.

Fourth, we consider “the harshness of the penalty.” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 

605. “ ‘[T]he greater the possible punishment, the more likely some fault is 

required; and, conversely, the lighter the possible punishment, the more likely the 

legislature meant to impose liability without fault.’ ” Id. at 608-09 (citation 

omitted). Interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is a gross 

misdemeanor subject to a possible 364 days in jail. RCW 9A.36.150(3); 

RCW 9A.20.021.

Christian argues generally that a person convicted of a felony may receive 

a lighter sentence than a person convicted of a gross misdemeanor; a person 

convicted of both interfering with the reporting of domestic violence and a felony 

may receive a harsher sentence; and a person convicted of a gross 

misdemeanor will face numerous societal hardships.

As the State points out, courts have found that an offense that is a gross 

misdemeanor weighs in favor of concluding it is a strict liability offense (citing 

Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 170 (Generally, a first offense for the unlawful practice 

of law would be a misdemeanor and weighs in favor of reading the crime as a

strict liability offense.)).
No. 80045-1-I/30

30

Furthermore, courts have found that felonies that carry a maximum 

penalty of five years of imprisonment “weigh in favor” of a reading that the crime 

“is not one of strict liability.” Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 365 (emphasis added); see 

also State v. Warfield, 119 Wn. App. 871, 881-82, 80 P.3d 625 (2003) (agreeing 

with the Anderson court that “a five-year prison term is not inconsequential” and 

is a “harsh penalty”).

Because RCW 9A.35.150 is a gross misdemeanor that carries a potential 

maximum penalty of 364 days of jail, the penalty factor weighs in favor of reading 

RCW 9A.36.150 as a strict liability crime.

Fifth, we consider “the seriousness of the harm to the public.” Bash, 130 

Wn.2d at 605. “ ‘[T]he more serious the consequences to the public, the more 

likely the legislature meant to impose liability without regard to fault, and vice 

versa.’ ” Id. at 610 (citation omitted).

Without citation to any authority, Christian contends that while defendants 

charged with interfering with the reporting of domestic violence may harm the 

victim, such defendants do not harm the general public. The State argues that 

the legislature recognizes that domestic violence is a serious societal issue that 

poses immediate risk of harm to victims and their families as stated in the 

purpose and intent of chapter 10.99 RCW.

12 The legislature created chapter 

 12 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recognizes “Intimate 

Partner Violence” as “a serious, preventable public health problem that affects 

millions of Americans. The term ‘intimate partner violence’ describes physical 

violence, sexual violence, stalking, or psychological harm by a current or former 

partner or spouse.” https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/intimatepartner

violence/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
No. 80045-1-I/31

31

10.99 RCW to address domestic violence. The State points to the legislature’s 

explicit recognition of why it created this chapter:

The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of 

domestic violence as a serious crime against society. . . . Only 

recently has public perception of the serious consequences of 

domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the 

recognition of the necessity for early intervention by law 

enforcement agencies.

RCW 10.99.010 (emphasis added). The State also cites RCW 9.94A.535(3), 

which provides “an exclusive list of factors that can support a felony sentence 

above the standard range.” One of the aggravating factors is where “[t]he current 

offense involved domestic violence . . . and one or more of the following was 

present”:

(i) The offense was part of an ongoing pattern of psychological, 

physical, or sexual abuse of a victim or multiple victims manifested 

by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time;

(ii) The offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim’s or the 

offender’s minor children under the age of eighteen years; or

(iii) The offender’s conduct during the commission of the current 

offense manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim.

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h). These statutes reflect the legislature’s awareness that 

the impact of domestic violence goes beyond the victim.

Christian also generally asserts the purpose of criminal law is to deter 

conduct, and punishment for crimes without a mental element does not further 

the goal of deterrence. Christian cites Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 365, and Bash, 

130 Wn.2d at 610.

Both Anderson and Bash are distinguishable. The Anderson court 

concluded that “[w]hile one can easily argue that there is danger to society if 
No. 80045-1-I/32

32

persons who have been convicted of certain crimes knowingly possess firearms, 

we fail to see how their unwitting possession of a firearm poses a significant 

danger to the public. Neither does the punishment of such persons further a goal 

of deterrence.” 141 Wn.2d at 365. The Bash court considered the crime of 

possessing a potentially dangerous or dangerous dog that severely injures or 

causes the death of another. 130 Wn.2d at 598-99. The Bash court concluded 

that “[w]hether a strict liability standard would accomplish the goal of deterrence 

is doubtful, however, because unless the owner knows or reasonably should 

know of the dog’s dangerous propensities, it is unlikely that the owner would 

think it necessary to use extraordinary care in controlling the dog.” Id. at 610.

Unlike the defendant who unwittingly possessed a firearm or unknowingly 

possessed a dangerous dog, defendants who interfered with the reporting of 

domestic violence are not defendants who innocently found themselves in that 

circumstance. They are defendants, as the State points out, who committed a 

domestic violence crime against the victim and these defendants need only 

“stand aside and allow the victim to call the police or seek medical attention.” 

Thus, deterrence is not doubtful.

Because domestic violence is a serious crime against society, the crime of 

interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is one way to try to reduce

public harm. This factor weighs in favor of strict liability.

Sixth, we consider “the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the 

true facts.” Id. at 605. “ ‘The harder to find out the truth, the more likely the 
No. 80045-1-I/33

33

legislature meant to require fault in not knowing; the easier to ascertain the truth, 

the more likely failure to know is no excuse.’ ” Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 170-71 

(quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law

§ 5.5(a), at 518-19 (3d ed. 2017)). In other words, the easier it is for a defendant 

to discover the facts surrounding their actions, the more likely the legislature 

meant to impose strict liability for those actions.

In Yishmael II, Washington State Supreme Court determined that it “is not 

difficult to ascertain that filling out legal documents for a fee is the practice of 

law.” Id. at 171. Here, it is not difficult to ascertain that victims of domestic 

violence may want to call for help or make a report to a law enforcement officer

and that the defendant should not interfere with the victim’s ability to do so.

Christian argues this factor is “unilluminating because the circumstances 

under which a person may prevent a report are varied.” Christian asserts the 

victim of domestic violence is in the superior position to know whether they intend 

to make a report. The State argues that because “the defendant will already 

know what he did, and who he did it to, he is in possession of facts that amount 

to a crime.” (Emphasis added.) The State also argues “the defendant will know

if the victim has reached for a phone, attempts to leave the apartment, or

attempts to contact a law enforcement officer on the street nearby.” 

It is true that there are circumstances where the victim makes it known, 

either intentionally or unintentionally, to the defendant that the victim wants to call 

for help. However, it is also true that even in situations where a victim does not 
No. 80045-1-I/34

34

want the defendant to know they are trying to call for help, the defendant is still in 

the best possession to know facts that amount to a crime. The question is not 

whether defendants know that victims intend to call for help, it is whether 

defendants who commit domestic violence crimes should inherently know by 

committing domestic violence they are creating circumstances whereby victims

may want to make that call. Thus, it is not difficult for defendants under these 

circumstances to ascertain that their conduct prevents or attempts to prevent 

victims from calling for help. This factor weighs in favor of concluding the offense 

is a strict liability crime.

Seventh, we consider whether it would be “relieving the prosecution of 

difficult and time-consuming proof of fault where the [l]egislature thinks it 

important to stamp out harmful conduct at all costs, ‘even at the cost of 

convicting innocent-minded and blameless people.’ ” Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 606. 

Courts have found this factor to weigh in favor of strict liability when defendants 

could easily claim another reason for their conduct. See State v. Mertens, 148 

Wn.2d 820, 830, 64 P.3d 633 (2003) (explaining that defendants charged with 

commercial fishing without a license could “easily claim noncommercial intent”).

Christian argues the “State routinely proves a culpable mental state 

beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence alone,” so 

requiring the State to do so here would not be time-consuming or difficult. The 

State agrees that it frequently takes on the burden of proving a mental state but 

also asserts the risk of convicting innocent minded persons is low because that
No. 80045-1-I/35

35

person had committed a domestic violence crime against the victim. The State 

ultimately argues this factor “neither favors nor disfavors finding the crime has a 

mental element.” 

In the circumstance of domestic violence, defendants could easily claim 

they did not know the victim wanted to call for help, and defendants could easily 

claim another reason for their behavior. Christian’s own hypothetical provides an 

example of that. It is doubtful that the legislature requires someone who is a 

victim of domestic violence to have to alert the assailant that they wish to call for 

help. The concern of convicting someone who is innocent-minded and 

blameless is remote because evidence must support beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the person who interfered is the person who committed a domestic violence 

crime. This factor weighs in favor of strict liability.

Eighth, we consider “the number of prosecutions to be expected.” 

Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 606.

Historically, some courts did not address this factor where the record did 

not include the number of prosecutions or provide some form of statistical 

analysis to show the number of expected prosecutions. See e.g., Anderson, 141 

Wn.2d at 365 (declining to address factor eight because “the record tells us 

nothing about the number of persons who are prosecuted for the offense”); 

Warfield, 119 Wn. App. at 883 (declining to address factor eight because the 

parties did not provide “statistical analysis concerning the number of expected 

prosecutions if we find that RCW 9.41.190 creates a strict liability offense”).
No. 80045-1-I/36

36

Recently, courts address this factor by looking at the number of appellate 

cases referenced in legal databases. In Yishmael I, this court looked at the 

number of appellate opinions on the criminal prosecution of the unlawful practice 

of law. 6 Wn. App. 2d at 220. This court determined that because there were 

few appellate opinions, it is “reasonable to infer that criminal prosecutions for this 

offense are rare,” and “[t]his factor weighs in favor of strict liability.” Id. at 220. 

But, in Yishmael II, the Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion: “The 

fewer the expected prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant to require 

the prosecuting officials to go into the issue of fault; the greater the number of 

prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability without 

regard to fault.” 195 Wn.2d at 171-72 (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. 

Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.5(a), at 520 (3d ed. 2017)). The 

Supreme Court determined, “given the very few prosecutions mentioned in the 

appellate record it is likely the legislature did not intend many prosecutions. This 

factor weighs against strict liability.” Id. at 172.

Here, the State asserts, according to Westlaw,13 appellate courts have 

reviewed “more than 60 cases” where the State charged a defendant with the 

crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. The State argues 

these 60 cases weigh in favor of finding strict liability. 

Another indicator of whether a crime is rare is whether a pattern jury 

instruction exists for the specific crime. Yishmael II, 195 Wn.2d at 169 

 13 Westaw is an online legal database and research service.
No. 80045-1-I/37

37

(considering the nonexistence a pattern jury instruction for the crime of the 

unlawful practice of law as a sign that prosecutions of the crime were rare). A 

pattern jury instruction for the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic 

violence exists. See WPIC 36.57. And, in Christian’s case, the trial court 

provided the jury with an instruction based on the pattern instruction.

Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Yishmael II, this factor weighs 

in favor of strict liability.

While we need not consider all the Bash factors, on balance, the factors 

weigh in favor of strict liability. Therefore, we affirm and hold that interfering with 

the reporting of domestic violence is a strict liability crime.14

WE CONCUR:

 14 Christian challenges the validity of the charging document and toconvict instructions for missing a mens rea element. Because the crime of 

interfering with the reporting of domestic violence is a strict liability crime, the toconvict instruction and charging document were sufficient.