Joint History Office

• Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Other 

than 

War

Frank N. Schubert

The American Military 

Experience and Operations 

in the Post-Cold War Decade

Joint History Office

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC • 2013

Other 

than 

War The American Military 

Experience and Operations 

in the Post-Cold War Decade

Frank N. Schubert
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Schubert, Frank N.

 Other than war : the American military experience and operations in the post-Cold War decade / Frank N. 

Schubert.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States--Armed Forces--Operations other than war--History--20th century. 2. United States--

Armed Forces--Civic action--History--20th century. 3. United States--History, Military--20th century. 4. 

World politics--1989- I. Title. II. Title: American military experience and operations in the post-Cold War 

decade. 

 UH723.S38 2013

 355.4--dc23

 2013009190
[iii]

Executive Summary

The almost 300 military deployments between 1989 and 2001 appear at a 

glance to be a bewildering assortment of domestic and overseas missions 

that overtaxed the US military and confirmed theories of global chaos. “Other 

than War,” Dr. Frank N. Schubert’s analysis of the American military experience and operations in the post-Cold War decade, demonstrates that the operations were neither as diffuse nor as numerous as they first appeared. Instead 

of looking at hundreds of disparate operations ranging the globe, grouping 

common operations in specific regions significantly reduces the overall total and 

clarifies the focus of the deployments. Moreover, the nature of the operations 

comports with a long US military tradition of law enforcement, disaster relief, 

humanitarian assistance, and nation building as well as constabulary operations, 

including pacification and so-called small wars.

The pattern of operations seems perplexing in part because they were listed 

as individual responses to separate emergencies and not conceptualized as parts 

of broader campaigns. Stability operations in the Balkans and Iraq, for example, 

assigned new names to iterations or single tasks of the continuing operations 

and obscured the fact that these were two regional campaigns, not almost 100 

separate ones. The profusion of names also appeared in the continuing drug 

enforcement and migrant interdiction operations in the Caribbean and Panama. 

Humanitarian operations during the decade responded to an average of three 

disasters per year, half in the Western Hemisphere where autumn hurricanes, 

spring floods along the Missouri and Mississippi, and summer fires in the 

western part of the United States were almost predictable events. Other deployments included non-combatant evacuation (NEO) operations and support of 

travel by senior executive branch officials.

Experts were misled by the variety of names and the numbers of military 

personnel involved in deployments relative to the size of the total overseas forces. In any one year, fewer than five percent of US military personnel stationed 

overseas were deployed on operations and most of them were in the Balkans or 

Southwest Asia, namely Iraq.

Major units in demand were not conventional combat formations but 

military police, engineers, civil affairs, and Special Forces as well as specialized 

aircraft for reconnaissance, surveillance, and air defense suppression. The Army’s 

and Air Force’s reliance on reservists offset the operational tempo at least to 

some degree.
[i v ]

Other than War

The pattern of the late 20th century may reemerge after the United States 

departs from Afghanistan. Containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions recalls containing Iraq; small, specialized units, not conventional forces, will continue the hunt 

for terrorists; humanitarian, drug interdiction, and disaster relief missions will 

continue to demand military resources. All operations were unique, to be sure, 

but they also evolved in an operational, institutional, and historical context that 

help explain their purpose and define their character.
[ v ]

Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic 

direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

( JCS) continued in the postwar era to play a significant role in the development 

of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National 

Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War 

II is essential to an understanding of their current responsibilities. An account 

of their activities in peacetime and during times of crises provides, moreover, 

an important account of the military history of the United States. For these 

reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for 

the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers 

newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff 

studies will be readily recognized.

In this study, Dr. Frank N. Schubert examines the almost 300 US military deployments that occurred between 1989 and 2001. At the time the large 

number of these deployments appeared to overtax the US military and support 

theories of global chaos. His analysis of the American military experience and 

operations in the post-Cold War decade demonstrates that the operations 

were neither as diffuse nor as numerous as first thought. Instead of looking at 

hundreds of disparate operations ranging the globe, grouping common operations in specific regions significantly reduces the overall total and clarifies the 

focus of the deployments. Moreover, the nature of the operations comports with 

a long US military tradition of law enforcement, disaster relief, humanitarian 

assistance, and nation building as well as constabulary operations, including 

pacification and so-called small wars.

Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the 

manuscript for publication. This volume is an official publication of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute 

the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC

January 2013

John F. Shortal

Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)

Director for Joint History

[ vii]

Preface

This book originated in the complex post-Cold War operational environment of the 1990s. In the autumn of 1996, while working in the Joint 

History Office, I received my first request for a list of current operations from 

a joint staff action officer. Before the year ended, one of the chairman’s speechwriters asked for an accurate list of operations and deployments. No such 

list existed at that time, so I undertook to build one. For the next five years, I 

accumulated data for operations that had already been completed, tried to keep 

current on operations in progress, and sorted out the names of too many operations whose names started with “Provide,” “Restore,” and “Support.” All the 

while, requests for such information continued, reinforcing my confidence that 

this was a useful undertaking.

Judging from the requests for data and my own sense of the kinds of information that were needed, I sought to track a wide range of operation elements, 

from the identity of the unified command responsible for a mission to the 

number of casualties incurred. Other items of interest included the identity 

and nature of deployed units, the names of commanders, the duration of an 

operation, the nature of the mission, the involvement of contractors, non-governmental organizations and other government agencies, and the dollar cost of 

the operation. As Gerald Turley wrote early in 2001, the data was vital for an 

appreciation of the wide range of possible scenarios, for an understanding of 

economic, cultural, and geographic aspects of operations, and even for modeling and simulation. “Given the large number of incidents since 1945,” he 

went on, “it is surprising that there is no established database or repository for 

MOOTW [Military Operations other than War]; nor is there a single location 

where historical information (i.e., dates, locations, types of actions, and lessons 

learned) is stored.”1

Not all of the desired data became available for all of the operations. A 

member of a Department of Defense working group seeking to create its 

own database correctly noted in October 2000 that my collection was indeed 

“uneven and incomplete.” Moreover, it would always remain imperfect, for a 

variety of reasons, among them the quality and nature of record-keeping and 

the classification of some documentation. But I continued to share my data base 

with any Department of Defense Office that expressed interest. A number in 

fact did, including elements of the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the service staffs, I also provided copies to the Department of De-
[ viii]

Other than War

fense client of any contractor who asked about the project.

The assembly and examination of the data suggested connections among the 

missions themselves as well as between them and two centuries of American 

military operations. This essay seeks to identify and explain these connections, 

to try to make sense of what some claimed was a mass of diffuse and unrelated 

missions, and to consider what the decade’s work portended for the future. It is 

based mainly on the data base itself, along with my reading in the professional 

and scholarly literature of the 1990s. Now that the wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq are winding down, Marine General Anthony Zinni’s prediction on operations to come—“We’re going to be doing things like humanitarian operations, 

consequence management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement ... operations 

other than war. These are our future.”—may have renewed validity.2

As might be clear by now, I undertook the creation of the data base on 

which this essay is largely based without an official directive to do so. Dr. David 

A. Armstrong (BG, USA, Ret.), who then headed the Joint History Office, saw 

the merit in what I was doing and supported me in the preparation of the documentation and in the writing of the essay itself. I am grateful for his encouragement, guidance, and friendship. Ensign Nathaniel Morgan, USN, had a major 

role in shaping the data base on which this essay is based. While I was trying to 

decide how to go about this at the end of 1996, Ensign Morgan was assigned to 

the office on a short-term basis while awaiting a more permanent assignment. 

His technical skill was indispensible in setting up a framework in Microsoft’s 

Access database program. By the time he left the office I was able to store the 

data in a sortable manner. He is as much responsible to the emergence of a 

usable product as I am. Others who facilitated and influenced this work included Norman Polmar, Edgar Raines, Erwin Schmidl, John M. Gates, John Pitts, 

James T. Matthews, Peg Nigra, Kent Beck, Maren Leed, and most recently Dr. 

John F. Shortal (BG, USA, Ret.) the present Director for Joint History, Edward 

J. Drea, and Penny Norman. Thank you all.

Mount Vernon, Virginia Frank N. Schubert

January 2013
[i x ]

Contents

An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Nineteenth Century Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Central America and the Caribbean: Panama, 

Drug Enforcement, and Migrant Interdiction . . . . . . . 21

Humanitarian Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Other Types of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Big Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Transition to the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

[ 1 ]

Chapter 1

An Overview

The period from the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 to the attacks on 

the United States by terrorists on 11 September 2001 spanned little more 

than a decade. American military operations during that time ranged the globe 

and included peace operations, humanitarian expeditions of various kinds, and 

counter-drug efforts. Carried out without the coherent framework provided by 

the Cold War, the missions of the 1990s were many, diverse, and diffuse, characteristics that sometimes created an impression of heavy activity, even overwork. 

The common thread among these post-Cold War missions, from the intervention in Panama during December 1989 to soldiers and Marines fighting forest 

fires in the western United States in the summer of 2000, was that they rarely 

resembled conventional warfare.

The collapse of the Soviet Union had left the United States the world’s 

preeminent military power. Yet despite the fact that there was no substantial 

conventional threat to the country, in the ensuing decade the American armed 

forces seemed extremely busy with operations that sent American military personnel to places far from their homes and families. These activities included stability operations, which were missions “characterised [sic] by intra state conflict 

between two or more factions divided over issues such as ethnicity, nationality 

and religion,” and “encompassing peace building, peacekeeping, peace making, 

and peace enforcement.”1

 The decade also brought humanitarian assignments 

and responses to disasters and political crises. Some missions, such as the series 

of operations in Southwest Asia and in the Balkans, were long and costly. Others, such as the evacuation of American civilians from countries in sub-Saharan 

Africa, were quick and relatively inexpensive. Overall, hundreds of operational 

names were applied to an apparently bewildering array of deployments.2

Similar and highly optimistic names, such as Provide Assistance, Provide 

Comfort, Provide Hope, Provide Promise, Provide Refuge, Provide Relief, 

and Provide Transition, abounded.3

 In the Balkans, where the proliferation of 

operational names presented almost as great a challenge to understanding as the 

competing claims and grievances of the aggrieved parties, at least six operational designations started with “Decisive,” four with “Deliberate,” and four with 

“Determined.” Five other names began with “Joint.” If their names were frequently similar, the locations of the operations were all over the map, with 253 
[ 2 ]

Other than War

deployments of various sizes, composition, and duration, including about 110 

to Latin America (44%), 43 to Europe (17%), 35 to Asia (14%), 29 to Africa 

(11%), 21 in North America (8%), and 15 in Oceania (6%).4

While joint operations responded to a wide range of emergencies and were 

conducted around the world, there were several regions in which large numbers 

of joint operations took place in response to prolonged regional crises. Occurring 

in the same region and in response to a common threat, these groups of operations closely resembled the campaigns of conventional wars and can be thought 

of in those terms. Because they were made up of individual responses to separate 

emergencies, rather than part of a single plan aimed at achieving a sequence of 

objectives leading to a decisive goal, such campaigns often contained operations 

of multiple types and phases, frequently with separate names. Consequently, the 

pattern of operations frequently seemed bewildering, in part because of the large 

number and dispersion of activities as well as the profusion of names, and in part 

because of its sharp contrast with the single focus of the Cold War.

The conflict with the Soviet Union had concentrated the attention and expectations of American policymakers and planners and the American public on 

a single large-scale conflict within the framework formed by the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact alliances.5

 At the same time, the two 

superpowers had exercised some control of their allies and client states. Consequently, to observers accustomed to the relatively static background of the Cold 

War, the large number, frequency, and diverse nature of the activities demanded 

by the post-Cold War environment often seemed to impose unusually high 

demands on the United States military.

Yet when aggregated into functional or regional clusters, the operations of the 

post-Cold War decade were not as diverse or numerous as they appeared. Some 

groups reflected traditional American interests, such as activities in the Caribbean; others, such as humanitarian operations and noncombatant evacuations in 

sub-Saharan Africa, did not. The two biggest and most costly bodies of operations involved decade-long efforts to contain the regime of Saddam Hussein in 

Iraq and to bring stability to what had once been Yugoslavia. Seen in retrospect, 

these two groupings closely resemble the campaigns of earlier conflicts.

Viewed from a longer historical perspective, the operations during the 

decade did not represent new departures. Throughout its history the American 

military has engaged in peace operations, nationbuilding, humanitarian work, 

and law enforcement. While the end of the Cold War removed a structure 

which had given coherence to and, to some degree, constrained American operations for nearly two generations, missions carried out in the 1990s were not a 

radical departure from the experience of the more distant past.

At times, the missions of the first post-Cold War decade seemed new and 

unprecedented; peace operations certainly appeared to represent a new feature 
An Overview

[ 3 ]

of the post-Cold War environment. Nevertheless, as Thomas Mockaitis points 

out,6

 the description of peace operations published in the Army’s field manual 

on the subject strongly resembled a depiction of Cold War-era insurgency:

Peace operations may often take place in environments that are 

less well-defined than in war. The identity of belligerents may be 

uncertain and the relationship between a specific operation and a 

campaign plan may be less clear than would normally be the case 

in combat .... Loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or 

other conflicting segments of a population may predominate. These 

segments will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of disaffection 

within the population.7

As much as the operational pattern of the 1990s appeared distinctly different, it 

contained strong elements of continuity with the past.

During the 1990s, it became clear that the forces in greatest demand were 

not the major combat formations that dominated the Cold War structure of 

American forces. Military police, medical units, engineers, air transport, and 

surveillance aircraft were in very high demand; armor and infantry divisions 

and carrier battle groups were not. In response, the military services sought to 

adjust to the reality of post-Cold War operations; they changed their doctrines, 

organizations, and deployment policies. Many of these changes were being 

implemented when the terrorist attacks of September 2001 gave the American 

military a new operational focus which, nevertheless, had some of the 1990s 

requirements and concerns.

Although United States forces were busy throughout the 1990s, they were 

involved in only a small portion of the world’s disasters and armed conflicts. 

According to the Emergency Events Database, developed and maintained by 

the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters of the School of 

Public Health at Louvain Catholic University in Brussels, Belgium, during 

the years 1990 through 1999, 4,864 disasters were reported. This figure included events in which at least ten people were reported killed and 100 people 

were reported affected and which were followed by an appeal for international assistance, the declaration of a state of emergency, or both. Aggregated by 

continent, the worldwide total included 798 disasters in Africa, 1,088 in the 

Americas, 2,071 in Asia, 734 in Europe, and 172 in Oceania.8

 In addition to 

these thousands of events, there were numerous armed conflicts, 98 in the seven 

years from 1990 through 1996, including seven clashes between states and 91 

between factions within a single country or political entity.9

There was much about the operational environment of the 1990s that had ample precedent in the American military tradition. During the 1920s and 1930s, the 
[ 4 ]

Other than War

United States armed forces lacked a major war to fight. Nevertheless, the twenty-year period was a busy one for both the Army and the Navy, with a wide range 

of operations in the United States and outside the country in the Western Hemisphere and the coastal zones of East Asia. These ranged from long-term stability 

operations in the Caribbean—Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti—to 

quelling domestic disturbances and managing massive water resource development programs that gave employment to thousands during the Depression.

Still earlier, in the period between the Civil War and the war with Spain in 

1898, the United States did not face a major threat. Yet the American armed forces 

were busy with operations over much of the country, especially the vast reaches of 

the trans-Mississippi West. These operations included campaigns against Indians—

small, grueling conflicts that disrupted long periods of “inter-positional peacekeeping,” that put the Army between the growing number of civilian settlements 

and natives whose lives they were disrupting and changing. The frontier Army also 

responded to calls for help from civilian communities afflicted by floods, blizzards, 

droughts, even infestations of grasshoppers, as well as to labor disputes that grew 

in number, size, and scope as the twentieth century approached. Elements of the 

Army surveyed and built roads, protected telegraph lines, laid out river crossings, 

and protected overland commerce and migrations. Meanwhile, the Navy was also 

busy with numerous operations designed to protect Americans and their commerce.

Overall, from the earliest days of the Republic, operations such as those 

identified above characterized the role of American forces during long periods 

of peace. As Andrew Birtle, an Army historian specializing in small wars and 

counterinsurgency operations, noted at the end of the twentieth century, “In the 

century and a half between the founding of the Republic and America’s entry 

into World War II, the Army conducted explorations, governed territories, 

guarded national parks, engaged in public works, provided disaster relief, quelled 

domestic disturbances, and supported American foreign policy short of engaging in open warfare.”10 Meanwhile, the Navy and Marines were busy with operations designed to protect Americans and their commerce; their involvement in 

enforcing freedom of the seas had begun early in the nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was also combat, much of it 

in the context of “unconventional conflicts against a bewildering array of irregulars, from American Indians to Bolshevik partisans.”11 Although increasingly 

large in size and scope, in the period before the Cold War conventional wars involving American forces were relatively few: the war with Britain (1812-1815), 

the war with Mexico (1846-1848), the Civil War (1861-1865), the war with 

Spain (1898), and the two World Wars. As Birtle noted, the American military 

tradition involved a “continuous engagement in operations other than war.”12
[ 5 ]

Chapter 2

Nineteenth Century Operations

Much of the American military tradition is a study in dualities. One dichotomy, the regular versus the citizen-soldier, is frequently examined.1

Another, the expansion for war of a very small peacetime armed force and the 

drastic contraction of the force following hostilities, is also generally known and 

appreciated.2

 But another duality, the two aspects of the operational history of 

the American military, is less widely understood. On one side are wars against 

foreign enemies and planning and preparation for them, efforts widely considered to be the raison d’etre of the US armed forces. Procurement programs, 

training, doctrine, and organization all focus on this aspect of military operations. In the year 2000, this view of war against foreign enemies as the proper 

role of the American military extended to senior officials of both major political 

parties.3

 A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Democratic administration divided the responsibilities of the military into fighting wars, a core 

function, and civil support, a secondary one.4

 On the same day during a nationally televised debate, George W. Bush, then the Republican presidential candidate, said: “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation 

building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win a war.”5

In spite of the apparent consensus represented by these views, American 

military history reflects two operational aspects, one that has involved wars 

against foreign enemies and another that involved a variety of operations, 

including law enforcement, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and nationbuilding. These types of tasks, sometimes referred to as gendarme or constabulary operations, include pacification operations and “small wars,” later called 

counterinsurgency or contingency operations.6

In carrying out a diverse array of missions and responsibilities, United 

States forces operated in the tradition established nearly two thousand years ago 

by the Army of Imperial Rome. On the far frontiers of the empire, in Britain, 

across Germany along the Rhine and through the Carpathian basin on both 

sides of the Danube, in Arabia and North Africa, the Roman army carried out 

both conventional warfare and gendarme missions. The latter included guarding the frontiers against barbarian attacks; battling outlaws within the empire; 

preparing maps and surveying the land; building forts, roads, bridges, and aqueducts; supervising construction projects and labor details in mines and quarries; 
[ 6 ]

Other than War

and digging canals and dams. Like soldiers of other eras, the legionaries hated 

such assignments. The Roman historian Tacitus noted that in Germany the 

men “complained about the hardness of the work and specifically about building ramparts, digging ditches, foraging, collecting timber and firewood, and all 

the other camp tasks ....”7

 Nevertheless, they carried out their orders and major 

construction activities: “Thousands of legionaries ... became instant quarrymen, masons, brickmakers, limemakers and tilers; hundreds of sailors became 

bargees and lightermen.” According to British historian Derek Williams, they 

served as “... the gendarmerie of the empire’s edges and keepers of its gates; not 

only policing the frontier and administering the formalities at checkpoints and 

crossings, but also defending it and retaliating to trouble.”8

In the course of carrying out their duties, the soldiers of the Roman Empire 

protected and nurtured the development of settlement, created a demand in the 

outlying parts of the empire for manufactured goods and farm produce, spent 

their salaries on local entertainment and products, and generally encouraged the 

development of towns and commerce. Like the Roman army which, as Stephen 

Drummond observed, represented “the dominant institutional factor in the 

development of the frontier,” the United States Army on the frontier was “the 

‘right arm’ of the federal government in its nineteenth-century expansionist 

policies.”9

 In either case, an organization devoted exclusively to preparation for 

and fighting foreign wars could not have made such a dramatic and pervasive 

impact on regional development.

From the earliest days of the American republic, its military forces made 

vital contributions to the development of the nation’s frontier regions, carrying 

out contingency operations traditionally known as “shows of force.” The longest-standing variety, which eventually came to be called “operations of interposition,” sought to protect American lives and property by placing military forces 

between threatened citizens and the danger. In fact, the United States Army, 

“the child of the frontier,” according to Robert M. Utley, was born of the operational requirement emerging from conflict between settlers and native peoples 

who resisted encroachment on their lands and the inability of local volunteer 

organizations to cope with the problem.10 This problem became clear in the 

autumn of 1791, when a coalition of tribes attacked the camp of Major General 

Arthur J. St. Clair. When the Indians withdrew, more than 600 American militiamen were dead in the worst Indian war disaster to befall American military 

forces. As Utley noted, “The Indian rout of [Brigadier General Josiah] Harmer 

and St. Clair so dramatically exposed the inadequacies of the militia as to give 

birth to the Regular Army, a contribution of the militia to US military history 

of no small significance, however negative.”11

The American Army’s major operations against Indians in the pre-Civil 

War years are marked by eight campaign streamers covering the years from 
Nineteenth Century Operations

[ 7 ]

1790 to 1858 and involving operations from Florida to the Great Lakes.12 In 

this period there were brief conventional foreign wars against the British in 

1812-1815 and against Mexico in 1846-1848. The pre-Civil War Army—“overworked, underfunded, and dispersed among many small posts,” according to 

Utley—spent the bulk of its time policing the nation’s ever-changing western 

boundary.” Soldiers enforced laws and treaties, explored and later policed newly 

acquired territories, punished aggressive hostiles, and regulated contact between 

citizens of the Republic and Indians. In the course of carrying out these duties 

“by offering security or the appearance of it, together with a market for labor 

and produce, they encouraged further settlement.”13

During the period between the Mexican War and the Civil War, both 

the Army and the Navy made significant contributions to national development well outside their primary missions of providing defense against foreign 

enemies. The Army worked largely within the boundaries of the United States, 

mapping, surveying, protecting migrating citizens, and expanding the nation’s 

borders, while documenting the fauna, flora, native peoples, and providing 

places on expeditions for scholars eager to examine the new country. The Navy 

made its contributions outside of the United States, through scientific and 

technical expeditions and data collections of wide-ranging impact, with maps 

of winds and currents that proved of vital importance to commercial mariners, 

as well as expeditions to regions of great interest to scientists, including the 

Amazon, the Isthmus of Panama, and the Arctic Ocean. The eagle of American 

expansion screamed on the high seas as well as on the continent.14

In the years before the Civil War, US Navy operations resembled in many 

respects the Army’s police operations in North America. These took place 

on foreign shores—in Latin America, Asia, the South Pacific, and along the 

Mediterranean. They sometimes went beyond interposition to become “operations of intervention,” intended to restore order, quell insurrection, or impose 

punitive measures for harm done to American nationals. In at least twenty-four 

instances between the War of 1812 and the American Civil War, sailors and 

Marines landed either to protect Americans, their property and commerce in 

places remote to the United States or to punish those who had abused American citizens. Sometimes, they landed to shield third-country nationals and their 

property.15 Historian Kenneth Hagan saw these operations as manifestations of 

a global pattern of deployment. While keeping an eye on Barbary pirates, the 

small American Navy cruised the Pacific to protect American trade and whaling, watched over the China trade in the seas south of India, and hunted pirates 

and slavers off the coast of Africa, in the West Indies, in the Gulf of Mexico, 

and along the southern coast of the United States.16 Once widely known as 

“gunboat diplomacy,” these operations long ago faded into disuse and by the 

1990s were replaced by non-combatant evacuation operations, termed “NEOs,” 
[ 8 ]

Other than War

which resulted in very brief use of forces to extract, rather than protect in place, 

Americans and others endangered by local turmoil.

In the pre-Civil War period, naval operations involved the enforcement of 

American law as well as international law and standards. Between the United 

States ban of the slave trade in 1808 and the onset of the Civil War, American 

vessels periodically operated against slavers along the coast of West Africa. 

Carried out in accordance with a treaty with Britain after 1842, operations 

against the slave trade reflected an “unprecedented sense of Anglo-American 

cooperation on distant stations” that marked the pre-Civil War period. The 

American effort never approached the much larger British commitment, which 

was driven in part by abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire in 

1838. Partly because of the US Navy’s small size and partly due to its lack of 

enthusiasm for catching slavers, American commanders seized a total of 24 

ships along the coast of Africa, while the British bagged 595. However, as the 

Civil War approached, the tempo of American naval operations against the 

slave trade increased. In 1859, the Navy captured five separate carriers of human 

cargo, including one at the mouth of the Congo River. In 1860, the last full year 

of peace at home, thirteen slave ships were seized.

In another field of maritime law enforcement, operations against pirates included landings on Greek islands in 1827 and maritime operations near Hong 

Kong in the 1850s. The Navy also contributed significantly in the war in Florida against the Seminoles in 1835-1842 in which Marines played a land combat role.17 Generally, American naval operations in the pre-Civil War period 

mirrored those of the much larger British navy, “suppressing piracy, intercepting 

slaving ships, landing marines, and overawing local potentates from Canton to 

Zanzibar ...” albeit on a much smaller scale.18

American maritime and land operations short of war shared certain characteristics. Whether conducted by the Navy in Fiji and Sumatra or the Army in 

the swamps of south Florida, they usually took place in relatively undeveloped 

and isolated areas. Operational missions reflected domestic political concerns, 

whether they involved the freedom of Americans to trade in foreign ports or 

the rights of citizens to establish farms on the frontier. Opponents were usually 

small irregular or semi-irregular forces, and operations tended to be diverse and 

complex, and to lack immediate conclusive results. Additionally, they came in 

periods of no conventional foreign threat and occurred in places that to Americans might be considered on the margins, on land in the Indian west and south 

and at sea in the Caribbean and along Asian coastal regions: Siberia, China, 

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and islands in the south Pacific. The Army had 

the primary job of operating against North American natives, while the Navy 

handled most of the small engagements outside the nation’s territory. In all 

cases, whether the goal was assertion of commercial and navigation rights or the 
Nineteenth Century Operations

[ 9 ]

securing of title to frontier lands, political considerations were central to operational and tactical choices. Success in these operations depended on the interaction of American military forces with local leaders, which in turn required 

that tactical commanders develop and use political and diplomatic skills, to use 

Andrew Birtle’s phrase, “inherently civil-military in scope.”19

In the United States, the onset of the Civil War diverted attention from 

almost all other operational needs; scant attention could be devoted to Indian 

fights. The Civil War quickly became a conventional war of great size, scope, 

and duration with cataclysmic social and economic outcomes—the abolition 

of slavery and devastation of the rebellious states.20 The war forced the federal 

government to deal with issues central to interposition and intervention operations in which American forces faced irregular forces. These problems included 

the legal status of guerilla fighters and hostile populations and the actions taken 

by military forces in dealing with them. The war also led to massive military 

involvement in the vast, post-war law enforcement effort, called Reconstruction, 

“designed to reshape the subject society.”21

For the Army the period between the Civil War and the war with Spain 

represented peak involvement in the widest range of gendarme or constabulary 

operations, with the dominant operational concern the Indian campaigns in 

the trans-Mississippi West. The Military Division of the Missouri, the geographic subdivision of the Army responsible for the huge territory between 

the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, published a 95-page list of 

combat encounters with Indians in 1868-1882.22 During 1866-1891, clashes 

with Indians, from frequent minor skirmishes to rare pitched battles, totaled 

around 1,200.23 Most of these fights were part of twelve campaigns, but they 

also included other battles for which soldiers were eligible to receive the Indian 

Wars Campaign Medal.24

As John M. Gates observed, “Much of the army’s work on the frontier was 

that of a frontier constabulary.” The Army “served eviction notices on Indians and then forcibly removed them when required.” If the tribesmen left the 

reservations on which they had been placed, the Army “found them and coerced 

them back,” or if necessary fought them until they again surrendered. “Most of 

the time,” according to Gates, “it was routine though difficult police work.”25

For example, Lieutenant John Bigelow, Tenth Cavalry, considered his experience during 1869-1872 at Fort Sill in Indian Territory to have been that of “an 

army of occupation, to hold the country from which the Indians had been expelled and to keep the Indians within the bounds assigned to them.”26 Likewise, 

Lieutenant (later Colonel) George Andrews characterized the Twenty-fifth Infantry’s ten years in Texas, during 1870-1879, as “a continuous series of building 

and repairing of military posts, roads and telegraph lines; of escort and guard 

duty of all descriptions; of marchings and counter-marchings from post to post, 
[ 1 0 ]

Other than War

and scouting for Indians which resulted in a few unimportant skirmishes.”27 Far 

from being directed just against the Indians, frontier police work was as likely 

to involve protection of the reservations, keeping land-hungry settlers off of 

them as well as keeping Indians on them.

Frequently routine, tedious, and unpleasant, this work was essential to the 

expansion of the nation. As General William T. Sherman reminded Elizabeth Custer, many years after the death of her husband, “I say that the Indian 

wars are as much wars as conflicts with foreigners or our own people .... [The] 

Regular Army of the United States should claim what is true and susceptible of 

demonstration, that it has been for an hundred years ever the picket line at the 

front of the great wave of civilization.” Sherman’s statement reflected a bedrock 

belief that the Army was the vanguard of an expanding civilization.28

Then as now, American soldiers disliked gendarme work and thought that 

it kept them from concentrating on their proper business of preparing to fight 

real wars against foreign enemies. Even while the Indian wars were in full 

swing, “military leaders looked upon Indian warfare as a fleeting bother.”29 This 

view almost certainly reflected their experience during the Civil War. A Civil 

War veteran, Brigadier General John Pope, commander of the Department of 

the Missouri, complained in his annual report of 1881 that Indian campaigning 

was not “conducive to the proper discharge of military duty or the acquirement, 

either in theory or practice, by officers or soldiers, of professional knowledge or 

even of the ordinary tactics of a battalion.”30 Other senior officers shared these 

views; consequently, the Army never developed a doctrine for Indian warfare, 

which its officers considered a diversion from the real job of preparing for a 

big foreign war.31 Clearly, Pope’s comments reflected the widely held view that 

frontier warfare was “an aberration in a world where the principal menace still 

lay beyond the sea.”32 Commenting on United States military operations in the 

1990s, Richard Shultz reflected on the persistence of such views: “The military 

defines itself, almost exclusively, as either deterring wars or fighting and winning them. Civil-military operations and those elements of the force structure 

that engage in them are not judged as being very important—and this has been 

an enduring aspect of US military culture.”33 Members of think tanks reinforced 

this inclination by labeling gendarme operations of the 1990s as “missions outside the traditional spectrum of warfighting roles ....”34

John Pope’s generation of officers did not have to look far to find additional 

grounds for complaining about diversions from preparation for a large foreign 

war. New operational requirements arose because “the army represented the one 

federal agency capable of responding to natural disasters with some degree of 

organization and alacrity.”35

In the years after the Civil War, the Federal role in society expanded dramatically; there were major responsibilities to be fulfilled for the millions of 
Nineteenth Century Operations

[ 1 1 ]

veterans of the Civil War—cash bonuses, bounty lands, and service pensions 

to be administered. In addition, the Freedmen’s Bureau, intended to ease the 

transition to freedom for ex-slaves, was moving into “government relief work 

on a grand scale ... schools, health care, and flood and famine relief to tens of 

thousands of poor people without regard to their race.”36 The change in the role 

of government was “immediate, continuous, and dramatic ...,” and the mission 

of the nation’s military forces changed as the public sector expanded.37

The Freedmen’s Bureau, whose full official title was Bureau of Refugees, 

Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, operated as an element of the War Department under a Regular officer, Major General Oliver Otis Howard. Military 

officers provided some of the staff for the bureau, whose primary purpose was 

“to protect the interests of former slaves.”38 But the Army’s main role in the 

post-Civil War South was enforcement of Federal law, including the supervision of elections. The troop strength in the region declined throughout the 

period 1865-1876, rapidly at first, from about 200,000 at war’s end to under 

12,000 by the autumn of 1869, and finally to about 6,000 at the end of Reconstruction in 1876. Overall, Army involvement in Reconstruction was judicious, 

restrained, and responsible, but it was anathema to southern whites seeking 

to reassert political control of the formerly secessionist states and the newly 

free black population. Recently returned to Congress, southern representatives 

codified their view in the Posse Comitatus provision of the War Department Appropriations Act of 1879. This law restricted the use of federal troops to enforce 

the law within the United States, one of the significant elements of gendarme 

operations, to cases in which they had explicit Congressional or Constitutional 

approval.39 Intended to end Federal efforts against the return of white domination to the South, Posse Comitatus succeeded.

Despite the passage of Posse Comitatus, Army constabulary operations outside 

of the South expanded greatly. In the years between 1877 and the end of the century, the Army became involved at least a dozen times in labor disputes and other 

civil strife. Some of these episodes, such as the occasional range war and efforts to 

keep impatient homesteaders—“sooners” and “boomers”—off of Indian land until 

native claims were formally extinguished, were familiar. Other instances, such as 

the anti-Chinese race riots at Rock Springs, Wyoming, and in Seattle and Tacoma, Washington, during 1885; the nationwide strike of railroad workers against 

the Pullman Company in 1894; and major work stoppages by the Western 

Federation of Miners in Idaho during 1892, 1894, and 1899 were problems of 

the emerging industrial future.40 At remote forts built to keep the Indians under 

control, Army officers considered this new prospect and wrote papers about cavalry operations in urban situations and in the protection of industrial property.41

In the years after the Civil War, for the first time, the Army responded to a 

wide range of emergencies. Natural disasters included a grasshopper infestation 
[ 1 2 ]

Other than War

that ruined farms over a wide swath of the central plains, as well as blizzards, 

floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, droughts, the devastating San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, and other fires, including the great conflagration in 

Chicago during 1871, as well as the yellow fever epidemics that twice swept 

through the south in the 1870s.42 Faced with the Indian wars as the dominant 

form of combat, and with other operations that rarely required that a shot be 

fired in anger becoming increasingly significant, military leaders tried “to place 

the Army on a more enduring basis than afforded by Indian warfare,” planning 

for conventional warfare, and seeking to create an Army that “was designed for 

the next conventional war rather than the present unconventional war.”43

After the Civil War, Army forces, especially when engaged against the 

Indians, rarely operated in groups as large as regiments. During the Pine Ridge 

campaign of 1890-1891, about 6,000 troops (nearly one fourth of the active 

force) from all over the West, mobilized by telegraph and transported by rail, 

converged on the southwestern corner of South Dakota to confront Sioux ghost 

dancers. Otherwise, only strike-breaking duty brought together forces that were 

regimental or larger in size. Usually, in the patrolling and skirmishing that took 

place during the generation after the Civil War, soldiers fought as companies, 

sometimes as portions of companies, and sometimes in ad hoc battalions of 

two or three companies assembled for a particular campaign. As the twentieth 

century dawned and the prospect of large-scale foreign conflict emerged, the 

Army began to train in larger formations—entire regiments, brigades, and even 

divisions—and to consider seriously the use of such large units.

Meanwhile, through the waning years of the nineteenth century, the Navy 

continued to be employed in a large number of missions that ranged between 

interposition and intervention. Piracy remained an occasional problem, but the 

larger portion of the Navy’s effort between the Civil War and the turn of the 

twentieth century focused on landings in Latin America (thirteen) and in the 

Pacific (fifteen).44

The statement of General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 2000, that “Today the United States strives to 

keep its military forces combat-ready while, at the same time, engaging in missions that do not routinely involve combat,” could have as readily applied to the 

second half of the nineteenth century as to the beginning of the twenty-first.45
[ 1 3 ]

Chapter 3

The Twentieth Century

I

n the first fifty years of the twentieth century, America engaged in three 

major wars. For most of the period, however, the US military was occupied 

with operations other than large conventional conflicts. The war against Spain 

in 1898 distracted the energies of the War and Navy Departments only briefly. As soon as hostilities ended, the United States entered a period in which 

military operations occurred in familiar regions: in the Caribbean, reflecting the 

continuing American commitment to the Monroe Doctrine and to the maintenance of stability in Latin America, and in Asian coastal regions facing the 

United States. Compared to operations in the years between the Civil War and 

1898, naval and Marine operations in Latin America grew almost three-fold to 

thirty-seven in the period between 1899 and 1933; they were, moreover, much 

longer and more complex than the landings of the earlier period. A substantial 

land conflict in the Philippines that began in 1898 ended in 1902 with the defeat of a Filipino independence movement. Increasingly, China became a focal 

point of maritime operations.

Particularly noteworthy was the long duration of some of the Caribbean 

operations. United States Marines occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and they 

had units on the other side of the island of Hispaniola, in the Dominican Republic, from 1916 to 1924. For a five-year period, 1926-1930, Marines actively 

supported the government of Nicaragua against the Sandinista revolution. 

Major General Smedley Butler, a double Medal of Honor recipient, served in 

operations in China, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico and Haiti. Another Marine hero, Lewis “Chesty” Puller, was in Haiti from 1919 to 1924 and 

twice in Nicaragua.1

 “Some of the occupations,” as Kenneth Hagan noted, “were 

quite protracted, and all of them had the objective of altering the political and 

social structure of the occupied country.”2

 These operations were firmly rooted 

in the operational patterns of the previous century.

Army forces participated in the Army of Cuban Pacification and in management of Cuban government offices between 1906 and 1909 when as many as 

sixty Army officers served as managers and advisors in law enforcement, public 

health and sanitation, and other areas. The Army also took part in the occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914, and conducted substantial operations along 

the Mexican border before and during World War I. After World War I, the 
[ 1 4 ]

Other than War

Army permanently replaced the Marine regiment that had garrisoned the Panama Canal Zone with coastal defense and infantry units.3

 In 1933-1934, Colonel 

Aaron Brown, USA, served as chairman of a tripartite commission that supervised a League of Nations peacekeeping force on the Colombia-Peru border.4

Navy forces engaged in humanitarian response operations, disaster relief, 

and rescue work including the evacuation in 1904 of American citizens in 

Korea endangered by the war between Russia and Japan, a very early example of 

a non-combatant evacuation. Sailors landed in Morocco to rescue a kidnapped 

American in 1904, fought fires and assisted victims of the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, and assisted Greek nationals forced out of Asia Minor 

by the Turkish government in 1921-1922. The USS Lexington even generated 

almost 4.3 million kilowatt-hours of electricity for Tacoma, Washington, during 

a month-long emergency in 1930.5

Described as gendarme or constabulary operations, these activities usually did not involve combat even against irregular opponents. When they did 

require armed responses, these gendarme operations differed in key ways from 

conventional military operations. They almost always involved much lower acceptable levels of firepower in order to stop and apprehend lawbreakers rather 

than destroy an enemy. Perhaps most important, the military operated under 

restraints that tolerated only very low levels of ancillary death and destruction. Use of the military in such operations took advantage of their access to 

supplies and transportation, responsiveness, and commitment to serving the 

nation. The missions were in response to natural disasters and, less frequently, to “non-natural disasters,” ranging from fires to “industrial, transport and 

miscellaneous accidents.”6

The military services also became involved in law enforcement, most 

unpleasantly in the growing number of labor disputes in the waning years of 

the nineteenth century, protecting the property of large industrial enterprises 

in confrontations with striking workers. Soldiers hated this duty.7

 Accustomed 

to seeing themselves as spearheads of civilization as it swept across North 

America, soldiers found themselves confronting other working class Americans struggling for better wages and working conditions, but the job got done. 

As Michael Tate observed, “the nineteenth century ended not with images of 

universally respected cavalrymen dashing across the West in search of renegade 

Indians and outlaws, but with a growing public dissatisfaction with the army’s 

continued service as a domestic constabulary.”8

In the nineteenth century, the Army had been involved in “nation-building” 

activities in two broad categories. One type of activity involved the creation of 

national infrastructure, and included exploration, surveys, mapping, and construction of roads, water crossings, communications networks, and in the United States massive water-resource projects. Closely related to the first, a second 
The Twentieth Century

[ 1 5 ]

variety concerned scientific inquiries regarding fauna and flora, natural history, 

geography, geology, and ethnology—studies and assessments that enhanced the 

ability to understand, exploit, and even conserve the resources of the nation.9

 Its 

involvement in some aspects of these activities would continue in the twentieth 

century; however, increasingly other federal, state, and private institutions would 

occupy center stage in many of these fields.

A third type of nation building, the creation and nurturing of sound public 

institutions and ultimately a state itself, began at the beginning of the twentieth 

century beyond the nation’s borders. When the United States occupied Cuba, 

Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after the war with Spain, nation building 

continued along paths established in the United States, with the creation of the 

infrastructure on which modern civil society depended—roads, sewer systems, port facilities, and the like. Later, when the occupation of Haiti and the 

Dominican Republic by the Navy and the Marines involved management of 

government offices and efforts to create police organizations that were free of 

corruption, the emphasis moved to the establishment of responsible institutions 

of government.10 This drive found its expression in President Woodrow Wilson’s 

declared intent to “teach the South American Republics to elect good men.”11

At its broadest level, nation building takes on profound significance. As David A. Wilson of RAND Corporation observed in the 1960s, “nation-building” 

can become “a metaphoric rubric for the social process or processes by which 

national consciousness appears in certain groups and which, through a more 

or less institutionalized social structure, act to attain political autonomy for 

their society.”12 American involvement in this type of nation building reached 

its peak in the post-war occupations of Japan and Germany. Directed by the 

American military, the nation building under these occupations aimed at the 

reform of entire governing structures and the attitudes and values that underlay them. State building in the fullest sense, the occupations were concerted, 

externally led efforts to replace defeated totalitarian regimes with stable, secure, 

democratic governments. They were successful.13

Recent military involvement in nation building has been much smaller 

and more sporadic. Operation Just Cause in Panama during 1989 was the last 

twentieth-century operation in which American military forces directed political reconstruction.14 Two programs sponsored by the American military take 

a more indirect approach. The International Military Education and Training 

Program (IMET) strives to assist in nation building in that it exposes foreign 

officers to American institutions and practices, in the hope that they will be 

emulated. The post-Cold War Joint Contact Team Program, managed by US 

European Command and designed to provide advice to the military organizations of former elements and satellites of the Soviet Union, embodies the 

same impulse.15
[ 1 6 ]

Other than War

However, in the immediate post-Cold War period, nation building fell out 

of favor with the military and many politicians. Despite recognition that some 

involvement in public works might be necessary to accomplish humanitarian 

missions, officers expressed reluctance to become involved in such endeavors. 

At a conference of Army generals on operations other than war, sponsored by 

the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command in 1995, the soldiers turned their 

backs on the Army’s long history of successful nation-building accomplishments: “participants universally agreed that wide-scale infrastructure refurbishment is not an appropriate task for US military forces.”16 In 1996 Congress 

restricted military employment in nation building by limiting humanitarian 

and civic assistance activities associated with military operations to those that 

used less than $5 million in “equipment, services, and supplies.” The same law 

restricted construction activities to “rudimentary” structures.17

When the Cold War became the dominant framework for international relations, the United States armed services entered a period of nearly fifty 

years in which a large standing force faced a formidable, long-term threat. It 

was Major General John Pope’s dream come true. The American professional 

military establishment which had been born of the need to police frontiers 

menaced by Indians and to deal with pirates on the high seas now was required 

to plan, organize, and operate on a global basis. With its singleness of purpose 

and “learned habits of restraint,” the Cold War provided a prism through which 

all military operations were viewed, shaped, and evaluated, and it lasted long 

enough to dominate the experience and attitudes of two generations on both 

sides of the conflict.18

The Cold War capped a process that had been underway since the emergence of the United States as a great power early in the twentieth century. Even 

before the war with Spain, American military thinkers were looking toward a 

great power future, studying and reporting on the military institutions of Europe. Organizational reforms at the turn of the century, battleship construction, 

involvement in a major European war, attempts at joint planning by the Navy 

and Army, and the development of multiple war plans prior to World War II 

all centered on preparation for a war with a major power. Increasingly military 

officers concentrated on plans, roles, organizations, doctrines, and equipment 

suitable for the armed services of a major power.

During the Cold War this process reached its logical conclusion, as the 

military came to define itself, “almost exclusively, as either deterring wars or 

fighting and winning them.” Small deployments short of war remained an 

important aspect of military responsibilities during the Cold War—there were 

more than two hundred in the period between 1946 and 1975, and more than 

three hundred for the entire Cold War period—but civil-military operations 

and those elements of American forces that engaged in them were less im-
The Twentieth Century

[ 1 7 ]

portant than combat and combat units. This view hardened into what Richard 

Shultz characterized as “an enduring aspect of US military culture.” Concerned 

primarily with meeting the requirements of major land combat posed by the 

Cold War confrontation in Central Europe, the Army opposed counterinsurgency missions in Vietnam and elsewhere in the 1960s, and resisted the creation 

of Special Operations Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in the 1980s.19

As the Cold War consensus on the role of the armed forces solidified, the 

classic gendarme functions for which the United States Army was initially 

established and which played major parts in long periods of the history of the 

United States Navy were relegated to secondary status.20 A process took place 

that resembled developments in the post-World War I British Army.21 Police 

duties were insignificant when compared to the large-stakes confrontation of 

the Cold War.

However, during the Cold War the American military continued to carry 

out gendarme missions, including deployments within the United States to 

quell a variety of civil disturbances including the refusals of Southern states to 

comply with the school desegregation orders of Federal courts. In the autumn 

of 1962, units of the Army’s 82nd and 101st Airborne Infantry Divisions joined 

federalized Mississippi National Guard troops, Marines, and Air Force elements, a total of 31,000 troops based at a staging area on a Naval Air Station 

near Memphis, Tennessee. The bulk of these forces, 23,000 in all, then deployed 

to Oxford, Mississippi, and nearby locations. At Oxford the resistance of white 

supremacists to the enrollment of a black student, James H. Meredith, for classes at the University of Mississippi, led to widespread violence. On 1 October 

1962 Meredith successfully registered for classes, resolving “the greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War,” in which a state’s defiance of the orders of 

the Federal courts and executive branch enforcement of the courts’ orders had 

resulted in widespread violence. Soldiers remained at Oxford through the entire 

academic year; the last five hundred men did not leave until June 1963.22

In the years following the end of World War II, the world was a far from 

orderly place. Between 1940 and 1966, the demise of the French, British, and 

Belgian colonial empires spawned fifty-four new, mainly Asian and African, 

states. By the end of the Cold War, twenty-four additional new countries had 

made their appearance. By contrast, in the 1990s, seventeen nations emerged 

from the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, what Yahya Sadowski 

called “the Leninist extinction.”23 Moreover, between 1966 and 1989, forty-four 

wars erupted, some between states and others within states. Nineteen—almost 

half—continued into the 1990s.24 Clearly, the same disorder that marked the 

disappearance of a “world order” anchored by European empires attended the 

end of the “bipolar world” imposed by the superpower competition.
[ 1 8 ]

Other than War

While American military forces were often engaged in gendarme functions, in the nineteenth century European armies went in a different direction. 

During the Napoleonic Empire, the French national police or gendarmerie was 

created to carry out a wide range of functions other than waging war against 

foreign enemies; it was an arm of the Ministry of the Interior, not the French 

army. Most European states followed the French model, and the new organizations that emerged replaced a host of ad hoc groups. The gendarme forces that 

replaced these expedient units professionalized and nationalized policing and 

sometimes constituted more professional military forces than the regular armies 

they supplemented. Clive Emsley’s study of the emergence of national police 

organizations explains this apparent contradiction: “... the gendarmes were professional soldiers/policemen at a time when the armies of continental Europe 

were increasingly shifting from a professional mercenary to a conscript base.”25

The national police forces that emerged from the Napoleonic period conducted many of the same kinds of operations carried out by American regular 

units in the nineteenth century. They garrisoned barracks in the countryside, 

patrolled isolated areas, pursued bandits, and helped those whose lives were 

disrupted by floods, earthquakes, and train wrecks. But the gendarmerie also 

performed internal security duties more generally associated with European 

absolutist regimes, gathering intelligence against and tracking the movements 

of political opponents of the government, collecting taxes, and enforcing conscription.26 Later in the century, they protected European governments against 

socialist ideas and labor radicalism. In Europe the gendarmes were important 

instruments in the consolidation of central state power, while in the United 

States soldiers carrying out law enforcement duties were transitional figures in 

the process of transforming territorial governments into states with their own 

viable law enforcement agencies.27

Gendarme or constabulary functions tended to be various and complicated 

and frequently lacked conclusive, immediate results.28 Campaigns against bandits 

or nomadic natives could seem interminable and sometimes very nearly were; 

they also lacked the focus provided by a big war against a single enemy with a 

clear outcome. Natural disasters and other catastrophes were rarely predictable 

and inevitably disrupted established routines. Over long periods, military operations tended to alternate between wars and gendarme operations, but “operations 

other than war” occupied the armed forces for longer periods of time.29

In the post-Cold War period, after nearly fifty years of a relatively static 

order imposed by the superpower contest, problems demanding swift attention 

seemed to occur all over the globe and together constituted an operational environment that, when compared to the Cold War, seemed new.30 American military leaders had a clear and unenthusiastic view of the likely problems posed by 

involvement in this complex morass.31 Their political masters “went along with 
The Twentieth Century

[ 1 9 ]

a defense review that argued for a capacity to fight two conventional wars at the 

same time.” This view persisted despite ten years of experience in which only 

the repetitive pummeling of the Iraqi military and the complex of operations in 

the Balkans—part bombing, part sanctions enforcement, part peacekeeping, and 

part humanitarian assistance—bore any resemblance to a major theater war.32

During the post-Cold War decade, there was a major gap between the 

reality of what the armed forces did and what they thought they should legitimately do. Certainly, the vast American experience with small wars and other 

missions was overlooked. As Robert Utley had noted in 1977 when the Cold 

War still dominated military reality, “the contribution of the frontier to American military history was of paramount significance, but its contribution to the 

American military tradition was not of comparable significance.”33 Eliot Cohen 

characterized the result as a failure to appreciate the long-standing legitimacy 

and validity of gendarme or constabulary operations, to understand their significance and their demands on resources, and to devote sufficient thought to their 

proper execution:

International police work is the wayward child that the Pentagon 

cannot decide whether to embrace (because it is the only job immediately available and because it justifies the current force structure) 

or reject (because it conflicts with Cold War concepts of what the 

military exists to do).34

At bottom, an awareness and understanding of the legitimacy of missions 

has a lot to do with the direction of planning. Peace operations in all of their 

variations, like many forms of gendarme operations, were very much in the 

mainstream of things at the end of the 1990s. They were “no longer a makeshift 

to cope with occasional crises,” but “recognized as a core function of the UN 

[United Nations], and one likely to grow.”35 They were also in a long tradition of 

American operations. Only when seen through the prism of the Cold War experience were they, as one civilian analyst described them, “unconventional duty.”36

[ 2 1 ]

Chapter 4

Central America and the Caribbean: Panama, 

Drug Enforcement, and Migrant Interdiction

Military involvement in efforts to reduce the amount of illegal drugs 

entering the United States goes back at least to 1982, with the establishment of Operation Bahamas and Turks, sometimes called “OPBAT.” In 1986, 

President Ronald Reagan labeled drug traffic a threat to national security. Two 

years later, after debating requiring the armed forces to seal the border with 

Mexico against drug smugglers, Congress directed the Department of Defense 

to become involved in detecting and monitoring shipments of illegal drugs and 

to support law enforcement agencies in preventing drug smuggling.1

The rhetorical emphasis on drugs as a threat to national security and even 

the use of the phrase “war against drugs” did not seem to legitimize the enterprise within the military services that viewed counter-drug operations as 

outside the normal scope of their duties.2 OPBAT, for example, started as a 

joint Drug Enforcement Agency and Air Force mission, carried out with United Kingdom and Bahamian agencies, but the Air Force succeeded in ending its 

involvement in 1986. The Army and the Coast Guard then took over. Despite 

comparisons to war and allusions to national security, operations aimed at 

stopping the flow of drugs across the border with Mexico, from the sea on both 

coasts, and even in producing countries, were bottom law enforcement operations. By placing the armed forces in a lead role in detecting and monitoring 

the movement of illegal drugs toward the United States, these operations did 

represent a new form of military cooperation with law enforcement agencies 

and unfamiliar operational territory.3

 Nevertheless, they all harkened back to 

law-enforcement operations of earlier peacetime periods, such as enforcement 

of the nineteenth-century ban on the slave trade and the protection of mail 

trains by Marines after two such trains were robbed in the early 1920s.4

 The 

Coast Guard’s involvement in the counter-drug efforts also closely resembled 

that service’s contributions to an earlier effort to keep illegal substances out of 

the United States during the “rum war” of the prohibition era in 1920-1933.5

Enforcement of counter-drug policy and curtailing illegal immigration 

generated considerable work for United States Southern Command was headquartered first in Panama and by the end of the decade in Miami, Florida; that 

the United States Atlantic Command ( Joint Forces Command since October 
[ 2 2 ]

Other than War

1999), based in Norfolk, Virginia; and for United States Pacific Command 

in Hawaii. Counter-drug operations managed by these commands took place 

largely in the Caribbean, Central America, and the adjacent waters of the Pacific Ocean, historically areas of importance to the United States.

The period from 1989 through 2000 started and ended with American military activity in Panama. Originally code-named Blue Spoon, Operation Just 

Cause, the invasion of Panama, took place in December 1989.6

 Unlike many 

of the missions undertaken throughout the decade that followed, Operation 

Just Cause was carried out without involving third countries or international 

organizations. During Just Cause, the Panamanian dictator, General Manuel 

Noriega, was deposed, arrested and brought to the United States to face charges 

as a drug trafficker.

In the decade that followed Just Cause, American activity in Panama 

remained high, with Just Cause7

 followed by a peacekeeping operation known 

as Promote Liberty8

 that lasted from 1990 to 1994, three defense and security 

operations on anniversaries of Just Cause to protect American forces stationed 

near the Panama Canal (Diamante 1 in 1994-95; Diamante 2 in 1995-1996; 

and Sustain Liberty in 1994-1997), and Safe Haven in 1994-1995 that was 

concerned with rescue and detention of Cuban migrants attempting to enter the 

United States illegally from the sea. At the end of the 1990s, a logistical joint task 

force, known as JTF Panama, supported the withdrawal of American forces from 

the Canal Zone and the transfer of the Canal to the government of Panama.

Table 1. Operations in Panama, 1989-2000

 Year Type

Diamante 1 1994-1995 defense/security

Diamante 2 1995-1996 defense/security

JTF Panama 1999-2000 logistics (withdrawal)

Just Cause 1989-1990 offensive (with counter-drug component)

Blue Spoon

JTF South

Nimrod Dancer

Promote Liberty 1990-1994 peacekeeping

Backstop

Hawk

JTF Panama 90

Overwatch

Safe Haven 1994-1995 immigrant interdiction (Cubans)

Sustain Liberty 1994-1997 defense/security

During the decade, other Caribbean countries, particularly Cuba and Haiti, 

were of great interest to the United States. American troops had first landed 
Central America and the Caribbean

[ 2 3 ]

in Cuba in 1898, to expel Cuba’s Spanish masters, in “America’s first quasi-humanitarian war ....”9

 In the century after 1898, American armed forces carried 

out long-term interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. 

In the 1990s, the American military, including the Coast Guard, executed a 

number of operations in the Caribbean, some of which were designed to turn 

back migrants trying to reach American shores.

The most prominent of these operations was, in large measure, a response to 

the increasing number of Haitians seeking to leave their island home. Begun in 

September 1994 and gradually declining in size and importance until it ended 

six years later, Operation Uphold Democracy10 successfully reinstalled the 

government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide that had been overthrown by a military 

junta. In 1994, Haiti faced simultaneous political and economic crises stemming from the junta’s seizure of power and the resulting imposition of United 

Nations sanctions on the military government. Thousands of Haitians tried to 

leave for the United States, frequently in the most fragile and dangerous vessels. 

Uphold Democracy was meant to “secure our borders,” as President William J. 

Clinton put it, against these waves of illegal immigration as well as to return the 

legitimate government to power in Haiti.11

In addition to Uphold Democracy, eleven other operations reflected 

American concern with illegal immigration from the Caribbean; most focused 

on Haitian migrants. There were two waves of Haitian migration. The first, in 

the period from September 1991 to July 1993, stemmed from the political crisis 

after the Haitian army ousted President Aristide. The second, from October 

1993 to September 1994, resulted from a combined political and economic crisis caused by the failure of a negotiated political settlement and the imposition 

of United Nations sanctions.12 Sometimes labeled “humanitarian” or “migrant 

resettlement” operations,13 all of these deployments focused on keeping illegal 

immigrants out of the United States.

The George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations took the same approach to the problem, stopping Haitian vessels outside United States waters in 

order “to prevent massive numbers from applying for political asylum.” The tactic 

dated from October 1991, when the Bush administration began setting up camps 

for the Haitians at the American naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba.14 Originally 

critical of the Bush approach, Clinton ultimately adopted the same policy.15

A sudden flood of Cubans also came during the second wave of Haitian 

flight that started in the autumn of 1993. Faced with this mass influx, the United States government rescinded a three-year-old policy of automatic asylum for 

Cubans and directed the Navy and the Coast Guard to apply the same guidelines to those fleeing both Haiti and Cuba.16 Eight operations between 1991 

and 1995 dealt with this problem, underscoring Secretary of Defense William 

S. Cohen’s later insistence that stopping illegal immigration constituted a “crit-
[ 2 4 ]

Other than War

ical national interest.”17 Cohen’s view would carry over into the administration 

of President George W. Bush.18

Migrant intercept operations involved primarily maritime deployments to 

pick up people found at sea, and construction, management, and maintenance 

of detention camps to hold the migrants until their return to their homelands. 

Navy and Coast Guard vessels and aircraft carried out the offshore patrols. Joint 

task forces administering the camps included large numbers of Army military 

police. For example, Sea Signal between June 1994 and January 1996 employed 

an MP brigade headquarters, four battalion headquarters, and fifteen companies, usually deployed in six-month shifts, as well as three security police companies from the Air Force. The camps quickly became overcrowded. Guantanamo soon exceeded its capacity of 15,000 migrants. The United States convinced 

Panama to allow construction of a camp for as many as 10,000 more, and 

another camp was built in Suriname.19 Plans were made for even more facilities 

in the region, but they were not required. Three of the eleven operations, with 

facilities planned in Belize, Honduras, and Costa Rica, were never carried out.20

By the end of the nineties, the flow of migrants abated, and the camps emptied.

Operations involving Cuba responded to other political imperatives, 

including those created by assertive and politically active, anti-Castro Cuban-Americans centered in Miami. Elements of this community attempted to 

confront the Cuban government necessitating Passive Oversight, a defense 

and security operation in response to a flotilla organized by a Cuban exile group 

in July 1997, and Sentinel Lifeguard, a show of force after Cuba shot down 

two aircraft piloted by members of the Cuban-American group “Brothers to the 

Rescue” in February 1999.

Table 2. Immigrant Interdiction Operations: Cuba and Haiti

Cuba/Haiti Dates

GITMO both 7 November 1991-1 October 1994

Safe Harbor Haiti 21 November 1991-1 July 1993

Able Manner Haiti 13 January-26 November 1993

Sea Signal1 both 9 June 1994-18 January 1996

Able Vigil Cuba 15 August-22 September 1994

Safe Haven2 Cuba 27 August 1994-6 March 1995

Deliberate Entry Cuba December 1994

Safe Passage3 Cuba 1 December 1994-20 February 1995

Distant Haven Haiti 19 August 1994-20 January 1995

Central Haven

Island Haven

JTF Belize

West Haven
Central America and the Caribbean

[ 2 5 ]

Table 2. Immigrant Interdiction Operations: Cuba and Haiti (continued)

Cuba/Haiti Dates

Present Haven both February 1997

1. The names JTF 160 and Phoenix Perch were also associated with this operation.

2. The names Asilo Seguro and Deliberate Entry were also associated with this operation.

3. The name Phoenix Perch was also associated with this operation.

The use of the name Safe Haven unintentionally underscored the dramatic change that had taken place in American attitudes toward immigration. In 

1956-1957, the same name had been applied to the rescue and transport to the 

United States of Hungarians who had fled their country to the West in the 

chaotic aftermath of the failed revolution of October 1956.21 In 1994-1995, 

the name was applied to the movement of Cubans who had tried to enter the 

United States illegally to camps in Panama prior to repatriating them to Cuba. 

One Safe Haven brought people to the United States to live; another excluded 

people from entry into the country.

In addition to eight operations concerned with illegal Cuban and Haitian 

migrants, six operations of the same type focused on illegal Chinese immigration. These operations generally took place in the second half of the decade, 

while the effort concerning Cubans and Haitians peaked around 1994 and 1995.

Table 3. Immigrant Interdiction Operations: Chinese

Region Year

Marathon Atlantic Caribbean 1996

Marathon Pacific South Pacific 1996

Marathon Pacific 99 South Pacific 1999

Present Lift Caribbean 1997

Prompt Return South Pacific 1995

Provide Refuge South Pacific 1993

In the year 2000, Chinese citizens again tried to get into the United States 

but not in large enough groups for named operations to be established in 

response. Nevertheless, those who made the attempt were persistent and willing 

to endure extreme risks and deprivation to succeed. In December 1999, the 

United States Coast Guard cutter Munro intercepted a rusty Chinese freighter, 

Wing Fung Lung, with 4 smugglers and 249 passengers 300 miles off the Pacific 

coast of Guatemala. In addition to abysmal sanitary conditions and water in the 

engine room, boarding parties met violent resistance aboard the vessel, the eighteenth such occurrence of the year, compared to only one in 1997. The Munro’s

commander, Captain Wayne Justice, commented that “now you see people who 
[ 2 6 ]

Other than War

are absolutely determined to reach their destination, and they’ll fight back when 

they realize you are going to stop them.”22

If the politics of US-Cuban relations gave a special dimension to the problem of illegal immigration, the United States’ position regarding refugees from 

poor countries resembled those taken by other prosperous Western nations. For 

example, Australian maritime doctrine listed under “constabulary operations” 

the “prevention of illegal immigration” by the Royal Australian Navy; in 2001 

Australia refused entry to a shipload of almost 1,000 Afghan refugees. Nevertheless, Dennis McNamara, Director of International Protections for the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees, singled out the US, claiming that the United 

States “... with a proud history of refugee involvement, has in place some of the 

most severe restrictions in its history, which affect asylum seekers and refugees 

trying to enter the United States.” McNamara also noted that poorer countries 

tended to follow the lead of the United States in refugee matters.23

The developed nations of the West were not alone in judging people fleeing 

poor countries as undesirable prospective residents. Rwandan refugees in the 

mid-1990s were viewed with indifference or outright hostility in neighboring 

Burundi and Zaire. President Aristide in Haiti and King Hassan in Morocco 

used the threat of refugee flows in attempts to secure increased aid while prosperous countries gave assistance to curb such movements. In many countries 

considerable effort went into assuring that the movements of populations were 

carefully monitored, controlled and even prevented.24 The International Red 

Cross, an agency particularly concerned with refugees and their movements, 

noted that “One country’s refugee is another’s alien.”25

During the 1990s, the other major type of law enforcement activities assisted by American forces was counter-drug operations. The use of military force 

in the “war against drugs” had its origins in laws passed at the end of President 

Reagan’s second term. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized military 

assistance to the anti-narcotics efforts of friendly governments, and the Defense 

Authorization Act for 1989 made the Department of Defense the lead US 

government agency “for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime 

transit of illegal drugs into the United States.”26 Overall, the ensuing effort cost 

well over $10 billion, with US Southern Command spending just over $400 

million in Fiscal Year 2000 alone. In the first half of the decade, the US Atlantic 

Command also had a substantial counter-drug mission, but in October 1995 

Southern Command’s maritime area of responsibility was expanded to include 

the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and portions of the Atlantic Ocean, the major East Coast drug trafficking areas. In addition, US Pacific Command carried 

out counter-narcotics operations along the Pacific coast of Central America, in 

Southeast Asia, and in the waters in between.
Central America and the Caribbean

[ 2 7 ]

As an ancillary benefit, the counter-drug program did provide the military 

useful experience in patrolling, intelligence gathering, and development of 

skills with advanced technical equipment, such as night vision and communications equipment, for the forces of participating countries.27 In operations 

against drug smugglers over the decade, two trends emerged. The number of 

flying hours and ship days provided by the Department of Defense declined, 

with the slack taken up by the Coast Guard and Customs Service. At the 

same time, narcotics traffickers moved gradually from air shipment to water 

transportation.28

The counter-drug mission did not always involve operations with clearly 

delineated start and end dates. Managed by US Pacific Command, Wipeout

started in 1990 and continued at least through 1994. This effort, described by 

the Pacific Command historian as a “multi-agency eradication and enforcement 

operation, aimed at destroying the marijuana crop in Hawaii, arresting and 

prosecuting major growers, and discouraging the local populace from pursuing 

that line of work,” involved helicopters from the 25th Infantry Division and the 

Army National Guard, airplanes from the Air National Guard, and vessels from 

both the Coast Guard and the Navy.29 A similar but briefer operation in Jamaica during 1996, called Weedeater, eradicated nearly 400,000 marijuana plants, 

879 pounds of cured leaf, and 400 pounds of seeds. Carried out by helicopters 

of the 3rd Infantry Division, Joint Interagency Task Force East, and elements 

of the Marine Corps Reserves, it was truly a joint operation.30

Joint Interagency Task Force East was one of three operational joint task 

forces established in 1989 to control Department of Defense counter-drug 

operations. It began as Joint Task Force ( JTF) Four when Congress designated 

the Department of Defense as the lead agency for detecting and monitoring 

aerial and maritime drug trafficking and replaced a two-year-old command and 

control system run by the Customs Service and the Coast Guard. Initially, JTF 

Four reported to United States Atlantic Command. Renamed Joint Interagency Task Force East in 1994, it was reassigned to United States Southern Command in 1997. The JTF coordinated operations in the Caribbean and Atlantic 

from offices in Key West, Florida. Joint Task Force Five, organized at the 

same time and renamed Joint Interagency Task Force West in 1994, worked 

in Pacific waters and reported to United States Pacific Command from its 

headquarters near San Diego, California. Joint Task Force Six, also established 

in 1989 and stationed in El Paso, Texas, covered the land border with Mexico, 

working for Forces Command, the Army component of United States Atlantic 

Command. The activities of all three counter-drug joint task forces involved 

other government agencies, among them the Drug Enforcement Agency, the 

Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as 

well as state and local law enforcement organizations.31
[ 2 8 ]

Other than War

Joint Task Force Six’s estimates of the number of operations that it conducted were extremely high. The count for the first four years of its existence, 

through 1993, came to 646, and at the end of the decade it estimated participation in more than 4,300 missions in support of more than 300 law enforcement 

agencies. These activities included establishment of listening and observation 

posts and the deployment of electronic sensors as well as more active measures—ground patrols and aerial reconnaissance and transport.32

The organizational structure for handling counter-drug operations was 

unusual, with the three joint interagency task forces managing individual operations of short or indeterminate duration for three different unified commands. 

No other type of mission was handled in this way, the usual procedure being to 

set up an individual joint task force reporting to one of the unified commands 

for each new mission. In the 1990s, at least 44 operations large enough to be 

included in the annual histories of unified commands were managed by the 

counter-drug joint task forces or directly by the unified commands. Of the 44 

that were identified, 24 took place in Southern Command, 10 in Pacific Command, and 9 in Atlantic Command.33

Southern Command, the combatant command most involved in counter-drug operations, and its subordinate, Joint Interagency Task Force East, 

saw beyond the individual operations that proliferated in Central and South 

America and organized them into six campaigns. The comprehension of the 

entire effort as a set of campaigns, rather than as a host of disparate operations, 

dated from the tenure of General Maxwell Thurman, USA, who commanded the 1989 intervention in Panama and understood that the counter-drug 

effort had to be viewed from an overall regional perspective. Army Generals 

George Joulwan and Barry McCaffrey retained and refined Thurman’s insight. 

Each campaign subsumed a number of operations in a specific portion of the 

region. Carib Ceiling and Close Corridor covered water routes through the 

Caribbean between the northern coast of South America and Cuba. Inca Gold

involved land-based operations in South America, and Central Skies focused 

on establishment of a coherent counter-drug operating structure throughout 

Central America. Caper Focus and Carib Shield operated on the Pacific and 

Atlantic coasts of South and Central America, respectively.34

Overall, the trend for appropriations for counter-drug operations through 

the decade was downward, with funding decreasing somewhat faster than the 

number of operations. Aggregate financial support declined from $1.3 billion 

at the start of the decade to $975 million per year from 1993 to 1999. As a 

consequence, Southern Command surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering flights declined, with overall flying hours down 62 percent and 

the number of days ships spent on patrol also reduced by 62 percent by the end 
Central America and the Caribbean

[ 2 9 ]

of the period. However, in the same period, the US Customs Service and the 

Coast Guard increased their counter-drug activities.35

Counter-drug and immigrant interdiction operations comprised almost 

the entire category of military operations concerned with the enforcement of 

US law. One additional operation conducted by JTF-LA (Los Angeles) related 

to law enforcement. This 1992 mission supported California law enforcement 

agencies responding to racial disturbances triggered by the acquittals in the first 

trial of police officers accused of beating black motorist Rodney King. Military 

operations in support of the enforcement of US laws, which were classic gendarme or constabulary missions, added up to 60 (or 27 percent) of the 207 total 

operations counted for 1989-2000.36

The counter-drug and immigrant interdiction operations executed beyond 

the borders of the United States usually took place nearby, particularly in the 

Caribbean and along the border with Mexico, areas of traditional concern. 

These locales were the source of real and potential problems, represented in the 

1990s by illegal drugs and unwanted immigration, what the Department of 

Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 called “transnational dangers.”37

United States operations concerning drugs and unwanted immigrants in areas 

close to the United States could be said to respond to what Benjamin Miller called “an extrinsic interest,” an interest that is based on “the geographical 

proximity of the region in question to the hegemon or to its most important 

allies.” According to Miller, “proximity to the great power or to its most vital 

allies makes even a region poor in resources more important than it would have 

been if located far away.”38 Or, as President James Monroe put it in the portion 

of his December 1823 message that became known as the Monroe Doctrine, 

“With the movements in this Hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and 

impartial observers.”

[ 3 1 ]

Chapter 5

Humanitarian Operations

As far back as the 1870s, when the Army responded to the needs of civilian 

communities struck by epidemics and insect infestations, humanitarian 

operations had been a part of the work of US armed forces. In the post-Cold 

War decade, Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief depended on requests from affected countries and 

were guided by assessments by the American embassy at the scene and the resources available. The State Department’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA) served as the main coordinating agency. Other assistance programs involving DOD agencies included donation of excess property, use of space-available transportation for supplies donated by non-governmental agencies, and 

limited assistance for restoration of facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure.1

Humanitarian missions from 1990 to 2000 totaled 61. Among them were 

non-combatant evacuations and other rescues, and 28 responses to natural 

disasters caused by weather, mainly floods, and by earthquakes.2

Fifteen of the responses were carried out in the Western Hemisphere, 

seven in North America and eight in Central America and the Caribbean. But 

there were responses to natural disasters in all parts of the world—Asia (four), 

Europe (three), Africa (two), and the South Pacific (six). Averaging nearly three 

responses every year, US military humanitarian assistance missions reacted to 

only a very small portion of the 2,468 natural disasters listed for the period by 

the Red Cross and Red Crescent.3

 Table 4, “Responses to Natural Disasters,” 

shows the geographic distribution and the variety of types of the 31 disasters to 

which American forces responded.

Table 4. Responses to Natural Disasters

Name Region Type Duration

Antigua 90 Caribbean hurricane 1990

Hurricane Hugo

Atlas Response Africa flood 2000

Silent Promise

Avid Response I and II Europe earthquake 1999

Balm Restore South Pacific cyclone 1992-93

Caribbean Castle Caribbean hurricane 1999
[ 3 2 ]

Other than War

Table 4. Responses to Natural Disasters (continued)

Name Region Type Duration

Caribbean Express Caribbean hurricane 1995

Colombia 94 South America earthquake 1994

Disaster Relief JTF Caribbean hurricane 1998

Hurricane Georges

Fiery Vigil Southeast Asia Rescue/evacuation 1991

JTF Marianas 91 temporary shelter

Fundamental Relief Caribbean/North 

America hurricane 1998

Full Provider

Fundamental Response South America floods 1999-2000

Hot Rock Europe volcano 1992

Hurricane Floyd North America hurricane 1999

India 2001 South Asia earthquake 2001

JTF Aguila (Eagle) Central America hurricane 1998

JTF Andrew North America/

Caribbean hurricane 1992

JTF Hawaii South Pacific typhoon 1992

Garden Isle

JTF Marianas 92 South Pacific typhoon 1992

Noble Response Sub-Sahara floods 1998

Philippines 90 Southeast Asia earthquake 1990

Recuperation North America winter storms 1998

Sea Angel South Asia cyclone/typhoon 1991-92

Productive Effort

Strong Support Central America hurricane 1998-99

Fuerte Apoyo

JTF Bravo

Tunisia Africa storm 1990

Typhoon Mike Southeast Asia typhoon 1990

Typhoon Ofa South Pacific typhoon 1990

Typhoon Val South Pacific typhoon 1991-92

Water Pitcher South Pacific drought 1992

Western Fires 1994 North America wild fires 1994

Western Fires 1996 North America wild fires 1996

Western Fires 2000 North America wild fires 2000

Lumberjack

Thunder
Humanitarian Operations

[ 3 3 ]

In three of these operations, elements of the Department of Defense came 

under the simultaneous direction of two separate Federal agencies, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the territory of the United States 

and the State Department’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for emergency 

aid elsewhere. The first of these operations was the response to the damage done 

by Typhoon Ofa in Samoa. In independent Western Samoa, OFDA managed 

United States relief operations, while in American Samoa FEMA took charge; 

military support on both sides of the island came from United States Pacific Command. The same arrangement obtained on Samoa during Operation 

Balm Restore in December 1992, after a tropical cyclone hit the island. In the 

Caribbean six years later, after Hurricane Georges swept through the region, the 

United States Southern Command worked for the same two agencies in providing assistance in Puerto Rico and in the Dominican Republic.

Disaster relief operations sometimes made use of annual training for Reserve Component units. This was especially true in Central America, where a 

large number of short-term engineer missions under the control of Joint Task 

Force Bravo labored to restore local infrastructure damaged by hurricanes. 

Reserve units rotated through Nicaragua and Honduras on two-week tours of 

active duty for training. Starting in the 1980s, the practice continued through 

the 1990s, and accelerated at the end of the decade in the wake of the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in Central America. For example, elements 

of Wisconsin Army National Guard units—the 724th Engineer Battalion, the 

106th Quarry Team, and the 829th Engineer Detachment—with active component engineers from the Army and the Marines built educational and medical 

facilities in Nicaragua during the summer of 2000 as part of Joint Task Force 

Sebaco, a fifteen-day training rotation for the Guardsmen. Their work was part 

of a continuing effort to restore infrastructure ruined by Hurricane Mitch and 

involved annual training for about six thousand Army Reserve Component soldiers, with about five hundred of them in Central America at any given time.4

During the 1990s, humanitarian operations included eighteen non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). These operations were firmly rooted in 

the two-hundred-year tradition of naval responses to the distress of American 

citizens in foreign countries. However, in earlier times, United States forces, 

usually the Navy and Marines, had directed their efforts at protecting American 

nationals in place rather than quickly removing them from tense and dangerous situations.5

 Evacuations in the nineties involved Navy Amphibious Ready 

Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units as well as special operations forces 

and aircraft.

The 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in US 

European Command was frequently employed in these operations both in 

Africa and Europe. In 1996, the unit was involved in two nearly simultaneous 
[ 3 4 ]

Other than War

African evacuations, in Liberia (Assured Response) and the Central African 

Republic (Quick Response). In addition, the 22nd was alerted for at least two 

more NEOs during 1997-1998, Autumn Shield in Albania and Guardian Retrieval in Zaire. In the spring of 1997, after two months on alert for Guardian 

Retrieval, the 22nd went directly into Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, for 

Noble Obelisk, carrying out three evacuations within five days “in the midst of 

near anarchy.”6

Table 5. Completed Noncombatant Evacuations

Name Country Year

Assured Response Liberia 1996

Distant Runner Rwanda 1994

Eastern Exit Somalia 1991

Firm Response Congo (Brazzaville) 1997

Kuwait 98 Kuwait 1998

Liberia 94 Liberia 1994

Noble Obelisk Sierra Leone 1997

Quick Lift 1991 Zaire 1991

Quick Response Central Africa 1996

Romania 89 Romania 1989

Safe Departure Eritrea 1998

Sharp Edge Liberia 1990-91

Silver Anvil Sierra Leone 1992

Silver Compass Liberia 1992

JTF Liberia

Silver Fox Tajikistan 1992

Silver Wake Albania 1997

Sudan 91 Sudan 1991

Yemen Yemen 1994

In terms of effort and resources, the eighteen evacuations do not represent 

the whole story of noncombatant rescues. Fifteen other NEOs were planned; 

fourteen were cancelled as situations appeared to stabilize. The fifteenth, JTF 

NEO, was a standing plan for evacuation of military dependents and other 

noncombatants from Korea in case of war. Of the thirty-three noncombatant 

evacuations that were either executed or planned, eleven came during the fouryear Bush presidency and twenty-two during the eight Clinton years, so the 

level of this activity throughout the 1990s remained generally constant.
Humanitarian Operations

[ 3 5 ]

Like those that were completed, noncombatant evacuations which were 

planned but not executed tended to center on sub-Saharan Africa. All but one 

of the operations that were planned but not executed came in the three years 

from 1997 through 1999. Nine involved African countries. Overall, twenty-two 

of the thirty-three total and thirteen of the eighteen that were actually implemented took place in the sub-Saharan region, with four carried out and another planned in Liberia alone. The large number of these operations in Africa 

reflected a period of conflict and instability in the sub-Saharan region with its 

forty-six countries and immense internal differences in culture and language.7

A New York Times editorial writer called the situation a “chain of interconnected conflicts that are ravaging a vast swath of Africa from the Horn of Africa 

to Namibia.”8

 The recurring need to assist the many victims of these conflicts 

underscored the relationship between war and humanitarian operations. One 

created the need for the other, prompting New York Times Nairobi bureau chief 

Ian Fisher to observe that “humanitarianism is, at its core, about war ....”9

 The 

concentration of evacuation operations, planned and executed, in Africa meant 

that most of the burden of planning and controlling these operations fell on 

United States European Command headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.10

Planning for possible evacuations reflected the experience of carrying out 

such operations as well as a new emphasis on Africa in American policy in the 

1990s. President Clinton made two trips to the continent, one to East Africa in 

the spring of 1998, called Eagle Vista, and another to Nigeria two years later.11

Nineteen more operations, among them major ones such as Restore Hope in 

Somalia, Support Hope in Rwanda and Zaire, and Atlas Response in Mozambique, took place on the continent.12 The missions ranged from delivery of 

food to famine-stricken areas of Kenya and Tanzania to logistical support for 

stability operations in Angola 1992 and Sierra Leone in 2000, and included the 

Incident Reach missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan during August 1998, 

in retaliation for the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, an operation that one observer termed “modern-day gunboat diplomacy by 

airpower.”13 At the end of the decade, the Agency for International Development called the Horn of Africa the United States government’s “highest-priority humanitarian emergency in the world currently.”14 The increased number of 

operations in Africa reflected this concern as well as the instability that marked 

the region in the 1990s.

The need to plan for non-combatant evacuations in advance went beyond concerns about Africa and mirrored the sheer increase in the number of 

American embassies. By the end of the 1990s there were 260 embassies around 

the world, some in new and unstable countries. Moreover, each embassy 

constituted a potential target for terrorism and was, therefore, a candidate for 

evacuation planning.15
[ 3 6 ]

Other than War

Table 6. Noncombatant Evacuations Planned but not Executed

Name Country Year

Autumn Shelter Dem. Repub. of Congo 1998

Balkan Calm II Albania 1999

Bevel Edge Cambodia 1997

Bevel Incline Indonesia 1998

Distant Rescue Burundi 1995

Guardian Retrieval Zaire 1997

Joint Guarantor Bosnia 1999

JTF NEO Korea (since) 1998

JTF Sarajevo Bosnia 1992

Shadow Express Liberia 1998

Shepherd Venture Guinea-Bissau 1998

Silent Guide Ivory Coast 1999

Silver Guardian Angola 1992

Silver Knight Albania 1998

Autumn Shield

Victor Squared

Haiti 1991

Eritrea 1999

Ethiopia 1999

The entire group of humanitarian operations, including rescue, evacuation, 

and disaster relief operations, represented a significant portion of the overall 

operational activity of the American military in the 1990s. Other humanitarian 

efforts included training and assistance in clearing land mines in Afghanistan 

and in Central America—Operations Clean Sweep in 1995-1996 and Safe 

Passage 88 in 1988-1991, provision of medical supplies in various parts of 

the former Soviet Union in Operation Provide Hope during 1992-1994, and 

several efforts to aid people displaced by war and famine. Also included was one 

operation to provide assistance in the development of viable government institutions. From 1993 to 1997, this was the task of the Haiti Assistance Group 

working in conjunction with Operation Uphold Democracy and its United 

Nations successors.

The United Nations operation that supplanted Uphold Democracy in 

March 1995, known as the United Nations Mission in Haiti or UNMIH, 

brought US forces, mainly from the 25th Infantry Division, under UN command. However, Major General Joseph Kinzer, USA, Deputy Commander of 

Fifth US Army, served as both the UN commander and the commander of the 

American forces. On 4 June 1995, the Second Cavalry Regiment replaced the 

25th Infantry in Haiti. Through the rest of the year and into early 1996, the forc-
Humanitarian Operations

[ 3 7 ]

es participating in the operation were gradually reduced until the UN mandate 

expired on 29 February 1996. By the spring of that year, only a small American 

training cadre remained.16

Two of the decade’s humanitarian missions responded to terrorist events. 

Resolute Response followed the bombing of American embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania in 1998, and Determined Response came after the attack on 

the USS Cole while it was anchored in the Yemeni port of Aden in October 

2000. Overall, humanitarian operations totaled to 61 (or 29 percent) of the 207 

operations in the period.

The American military was not the only organization that faced what 

appeared to be an accelerating operational tempo. In the first half of the 1990s, 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees dealt with increasing 

numbers of displaced people fleeing for their lives or seeking better opportunities for themselves and their families. Worldwide in 1992, there were 83 million 

people who had emigrated from one country and settled in another. There were 

15 million economic migrants in Western Europe and about the same number 

in North America, where the United States absorbed about two million legal 

and illegal immigrants per year. While there had been 22 million refugees and 

displaced people in 1985, ten years later the number was 37 million.17 Other 

humanitarian organizations including the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement and the World Food Program also spent more of their 

time and money on refugees and populations displaced by war.18 In Rwanda in 

1994 more than one hundred such groups were at work, providing food, medical care, housing, transportation, and education.19

For military organizations involved in relief efforts, the presence of large 

numbers of private charities represented substantial coordination challenges, 

usually addressed through the establishment of civil-military operations centers 

or more directly focused humanitarian operations centers.20 The need for a systematic approach to coordination became clear during the operation in Somalia, where the first Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) was established 

in December 1992. The US command, along with liaison officers from other 

members of the multinational force, used the CMOC to coordinate military 

support for convoys of relief supplies, to assign pier space for supplies arriving in Mogadishu, and to arrange port access. Ultimately nine CMOCs were 

established in Southern Somalia, one for each humanitarian relief sector. Before 

the operation ended, the Civil Military Operations Center controlled issue of 

identification cards, tracked the movement of relief supplies, and worked closely 

with the United Nations’ Humanitarian Operations Center (run by the UN), 

creating a focal point for all relief agencies in country.21
[ 3 8 ]

Other than War

Table 7. Non-governmental Organizations Operating in Rwanda and Neighboring 

Countries (Summer/Autumn 1994)

Organization Specialty

*Action Aid/Assist equipment

*Action Internationale Contre la Faim/France emergency medical care

*Action Internationale Contre la Faim/USA emergency medical care

*Action Nord Sud distribution of seeds and tools, livestock 

vaccination

*Adventist Development and Relief Agency medical, shelter, food

*African Medical and Research Foundation health care

*Africare sanitation services

Air Serv International humanitarian flights

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee food, health

American Jewish World Service emergency medical care

*American Refugee Committee health care 

American Red Cross

Baptist World Aid

Baptist World Alliance

Brother’s Brother Foundation medical supplies and equipment

Canadian Baptist Missionaries

*CARE International camp management, distribution and 

monitoring, food, sanitation, seeds and tools

*Catholic Relief Services food, other assistance

Christian Children’s Fund health

*Christian Reformed World Relief Committee seeds and tools

Church World Action-Rwanda coalition

Direct Relief International health

Doctors of the World

Doctors without Borders, USA, Inc.

*Feed the Children/Europe food, emergency supplies

Food for the Hungry International

International Aid Inc. health

*International Committee, Red Cross

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

*International Medical Corps health care

*International Rescue Committee sanitation

Jesuit Refugee Service/USA

Lutheran World Federation camp management, distribution monitoring

MAP International health
Humanitarian Operations

[ 3 9 ]

Table 7. Non-governmental Organizations Operating in Rwanda and Neighboring 

Countries (Summer/Autumn 1994) (continued)

Organization Specialty

*Medicins Sans Frontieres/France water, sanitation

Mercy Corps International health

Operation USA medicines

Oxfam America airlift, money

Refugees International

Salvation Army

*Samaritan’s Purse health

Save the Children (USA)

*Save the Children’s Fund/UK non-food aid, health

*Solidarites logistical support

Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

United Methodist Committee on Relief

World Concern supplies, medicines

*World Food Program

*World Relief medical

*World Vision Relief and Development non-food items, sanitation, seeds, tools

YMCA of the USA

Source: InterAction, “Rwanda Crisis Situation Report No. 10 Draft,” 20 October 1994; US 

Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of US Foreign 

Disaster Assistance (OFDA), “Rwanda—Civil Strife/Displaced Persons Situation Report #1 

Fiscal Year (FY) 1995.”

Note: As of October 1994, there were 118 NGOs operating in Rwanda according to the US 

Agency for International Development situation report, 17 October, 1994.

* Direct recipient of US government funding as reported by the US Agency for International 

Development; others may have received such support indirectly from international 

organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United 

Nations Children’s Fund.

The year 1992 saw an exceptional number of humanitarian operations. 

Stephen Guerra’s observation that for the US Navy “1992 stands out as the year 

with the greatest number of such efforts” applied to the entire defense establishment.22 During the year, the American military either responded to or continued work from the preceding year on seven natural disasters, four in the South 

Pacific, one in Europe, one in South Asia, and one—Hurricane Andrew—in 

North America and the Caribbean.

Joint Task Force Andrew, the military response from August to October 

1992 to the hurricane of the same name, illustrated the types of military units 

that were in high demand for such operations. The force included eight Army 

Military Police companies among the 106 deploying units representing all ser-
[ 4 0 ]

Other than War

vices. In addition there were a press camp headquarters detachment (public affairs) and 15 medical units, among them air ambulance, entomology, and public 

health personnel. Nineteen deploying units, almost one out of every five, were 

either Navy or Army engineers; they included combat and construction units, a 

bridge-building company, firefighters, and divers.23 With the military providing 

this wide range of services—medical care, law enforcement, and engineering—

at no cost to state and local governments, it was difficult to withdraw units from 

domestic disaster relief missions such as JTF Andrew.

24

In addition to Joint Task Force Andrew, activities in 1992 included three 

non-combatant evacuations, conducted in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Tajikistan, 

with two others planned for Bosnia and Angola. Three other humanitarian missions—Fiery Vigil in the Philippines, Provide Hope in the former Soviet Union, 

and Provide Relief in Somalia—also required planning and operational support. 

There were sanctions enforcement missions and a humanitarian assignment in 

the Balkans, and Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Provide 

Comfort were all active in Southwest Asia. At the same time, the active-duty 

force continued to decline in strength. It was gradually being reduced from its 

1980s level of just over two million and now stood at 1.8 million.25 If there was 

a year in which the operational tempo seemed nearly overwhelming, it was 1992.

In general, this kind of humanitarian operation fit squarely within the 

nineteenth century tradition of gendarme operations. As Clive Emsley wrote in 

his study of the various European gendarmerie during the nineteenth century, 

“assisting the population in times of accident or natural disaster was a way of 

promoting the state as a guardian of its citizens ...,” so they fought fires and assisted with rescue and recovery after floods, earthquakes, volcanoes, explosions, 

and train crashes.26 The big difference involved the size of the stage on which 

such work was carried out. In nineteenth century Europe, the gendarmerie 

acted within national borders, promoting and asserting the primacy of the state 

while providing useful services to the citizenry in troubled times, just as United States forces had done, carrying out similar functions in the same period, 

mainly in the trans-Mississippi West. In the post-Cold War world, United 

States forces acted on an international scale bringing assistance to desperate 

people, sometimes in concert with other nations and sometimes under the aegis 

of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While the 

worldwide scope of operations and the frequent participation in international 

efforts set American operations after the Cold War apart from earlier gendarme 

operations elsewhere, the type of mission itself was far from new.
Humanitarian Operations

[ 4 1 ]

Table 8. Humanitarian Operations Worldwide

Name Region Type Duration

Clean Sweep Central America humanitarian (de-mining) 1995-96

Determined Response SW Asia explosion 2000

Guardian Assistance Sub-Sahara humanitarian (assist refugees) 1996

Haiti Assistance Group Caribbean nation-building 1994-97

High Flight Sub-Sahara rescue (airplane crash) 1997

Phoenix Lion

Mongolia Central Asia humanitarian 1991-95

Noble Response Sub-Sahara humanitarian 1998

Persistent Support North America humanitarian 1998

Provide Hope CIS humanitarian 1992-98

Provide Relief Sub-Sahara humanitarian (UN peace enforce) 1992-93

Resolute Response Sub-Sahara humanitarian 1998

Safe Passage 88 South Asia humanitarian (de-mining) 1988-91

Support Hope Sub-Sahara humanitarian 1994

Provide Assistance

Quiet Resolve

Turquoise

UNAMIR

Note: Operations listed as Non-combatant Evacuations, responses to natural disasters, and 

operations in the Balkans and concerning the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq are listed 

separately.

[ 4 3 ]

Chapter 6

Stability Operations

Except in Panama, United States involvement in stability operations during 

the period took place in a multinational framework, with other participant 

nations, with some kind of international mandate, and alongside numerous 

non-governmental organizations.1

 Operations that involved enforcement of 

international law and standards, as asserted by United Nations Security Council resolutions, or in concert with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, 

formed the bulk of the missions. Others came at the request of nations embroiled in disputes or from regional groups in need of assistance.

Except for their complexity and global distribution, stability operations 

resembled classic gendarme operations. Participating federal agencies included 

the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, the National Security Council and the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Transportation, among others. Participation by non-governmental 

organizations grew to the point where more than one hundred such entities 

took part in relief work in Rwanda.2

 The need to keep the participants from 

getting in each other’s way complicated operations and became an operational 

requirement. Even the missions that involved or included combat operations 

also required establishment and enforcement of law and order, and fell within 

the framework stated by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review: “US forces 

encourage adherence to the international norms and regimes that help provide 

the foundation for peace and stability around the globe ....”3

Like humanitarian operations and missions related to the enforcement of 

United States law, stability operations formed a large portion of the decade’s 

effort, totaling 50 (or 24 percent) of 207 operations; as the decade ended there 

was no reason to expect that they would decline in complexity or in number.4

Stability operations involving American forces clustered in two distinct and 

substantial groups, one concerning the Balkans (Table 9) and another focused 

on operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Table 13). A 

handful of operations stood outside these two groupings (Table 14).
[ 4 4 ]

Other than War

Table 9. Unclassified Names of American Operations Involved in the Enforcement 

of International Law and Standards in the Balkans, 1992-2001

Name Type Duration Authority

Able Sentry peacekeeping 1993-99 UN/under NATO 1999

Auger Express reconnaissance 

(peacekeeping) 1998 NATO

Autumn Shield defense/security 1998

Balkan Calm peace observers 1998 NATO

Deliberate Falcon show of force 1998 NATO

Deliberate Force air strike 1995 NATO

Deny Flight sanctions enf 1993-95 NATO/UN

Balkan Shield

Nomad Vigil

Persuasive Force

Determined Falcon show of force 1998 NATO

Determined Force air strike 1995 NATO

Determined Forge sanctions enf(sea) 1998-99 NATO

Eagle Eye peacekeeping 1998-99 NATO

Joint Guarantor

Determined Guarantor

Essential Harvest peacekeeping 2001 NATO

Joint Endeavor peacekeeping 1995-96 NATO

Decisive Edge sanctions enf(air) 1995-96 NATO

Decisive Endeavor

Decisive Enhancement sanctions enf(Sea) 1995-96 NATO

Quick Lift 1995 logistics

Joint Forge peacekeeping 1998-99 NATO

Decisive Forge peacekeeping 1998-99 NATO

Deliberate Forge sanctions enf(air) 1998-99 NATO

Joint Guard peacekeeping 1996-98 NATO

Decisive Guard peacekeeping 1996-98 NATO

Deliberate Guard sanctions enf(air) 1996-98 NATO

Determined Guard

Nomad Endeavor logistics 1996

Joint Guardian peacekeeping 1999- UN

Decisive Guardian peacekeeping 1999- UN

Maritime Guard sanctions enf(sea) 1992-93 UN

Maritime Monitor sanctions enf(sea) 1992 UN
Stability Operations

[ 4 5 ]

Table 9. Unclassified Names of American Operations Involved in the Enforcement 

of International Law and Standards in the Balkans, 1992-2001 (continued)

Name Type Duration Authority

Noble Anvil air strikes 1999 NATO

Allied Force

Flexible Anvil

Nimble Lion

Sky Anvil

Provide Promise humanitarian 1992-96

Provide Refuge 1999 humanitarian 1999

Sharp Fence sanctions enf(sea) 1993-95 UN

Sharp Guard sanctions enf(air) 1993-95 UN

Sharp Vigilance sanctions enf(air) 1992-93 UN/NATO

Shining Hope humanitarian (displaced 

people) 1999 NATO

Allied Harbour

Sustain Hope

Sky Monitor 1992

The United Nations, under whose aegis parts of the effort in the Balkans 

took place, was not exactly a paragon of denominative clarity. The international 

organization put ten separate names on its post-Cold War operations in the 

Balkans and added a bewildering array of acronyms. However, the United Nations did not adopt the American practice of frequently changing the names of 

ongoing operations.

Table 10. United Nations Peace Operations in the Balkans, 1992-2000

Location Dates

UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) B&H, Croatia, 

FRY, Macedonia Feb 92-Mar 95

UN Peace Forces (UNPF) Mar 95- Jan 96

UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) B&H Mar- Dec 95

UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) Croatia Mar 95- Dec 96

UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) Macedonia Mar 95- Feb 99

UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH) B&H Dec 95-

UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) Croatia Jan 96-Jan 98

UN Civil Police Support Group (UNPSG) Croatia Jan-Oct 98

UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Croatia Jan 96-

UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) Kosovo Jun 99-
[ 4 6 ]

Other than War

The diversity of the operations in the Balkans went beyond overlapping, 

repetitive, and confusing names and an apparently large variety of purposes. 

Sometimes, individual units participated simultaneously in combat action as 

well as humanitarian relief, a combination known as “cops and docs.” The 26th

Marine Expeditionary Unit, which began a six-month deployment to the Balkans at the end of April 1999, participated in both Noble Anvil, the bombing 

of Serbia, and Shining Hope, the provision of supplies to refugees from Kosovo 

in Albanian camps. In June, when the bombing campaign ended, 2,200 Marines 

of the 26th went to Macedonia as peacekeepers, under Operation Joint Guardian, where they stayed for a month. Six weeks later, the 26th was in Turkey on a 

humanitarian mission, Avid Response, in the wake of an earthquake.5

For all of their apparent diversity, operations in the Balkans constituted parts 

of a single prolonged effort to bring peace and stability to the region. For the 

1990s, this cluster of missions was the nearest equivalent to the “major theater 

war” envisioned by American military planners. The effort involved all types of 

American forces in conjunction with the forces of friendly nations, cost billions 

of dollars, and went on for the entire decade. It did not meet the definition of 

major theater war set by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, as taking place at 

the “high end of the crisis continuum,” nor did it resemble a conventional war or 

cause a large number of US casualties.6

 The Quadrennial Defense Review was silent 

on the exact size and nature of the force needed to respond to a major theater war, 

but its authors clearly had in mind a large commitment of forces, probably based 

on “the Gulf War case—envisioning the deployment of a massive, armor-heavy 

force supported by a vast fleet and hundreds or thousands of aircraft ....”7

Operations in the Balkans had some of the attributes of a response to a 

large crisis, using as much as 40 percent of the Air Force’s combat aircraft.8

 In 

any case, as an Institute for Defense Analyses study observed, “More and more, 

humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and other military operations other 

than war (MOOTW) have become the norm.”9

 While a major theater war 

was not likely, “major and persistent situations,” as a Center for Naval Analyses 

writer referred to the Balkans, Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia, became prominent parts 

of the international landscape.10 These groups of operations could be seen as 

“mini-containment clusters,” including “everything from strikes and shows of 

force down to humanitarian assistance and nation-building.”11

In 1999, when the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reported to 

Congress on the number of operations underway in the decade, it listed thirteen separate operations in the Balkans as “major smaller scale contingencies,” 

rather than noting a single overall enterprise to which all of the operations were 

connected. The OSD list reflected the tendency to assign new names to iterations or elements of single tasks in the Balkans. For example, Joint Endeavor

(December 1995-December 1996), Joint Guard (December 1996-June 1998), 
Stability Operations

[ 4 7 ]

Joint Forge ( June 1998-June 1999), and Joint Guardian ( June 1999- ) all 

designated different periods of what was essentially a single, long-term Balkan 

peacekeeping operation. The OSD report cemented the impression of numerous 

organizations at work in a complicated situation and did nothing to dispel difficulties in understanding and tracking the operations. Moreover, by organizing 

them by year and by type rather than by locale and by singling out operations 

that were components of other operations, the report obscured the interconnected nature of these efforts and their common purpose.12

Table 11. The OSD Balkan Thirteen

Name Nature Period

Deliberate Force Air strikes Aug-Sep 95

Deliberate Guard Air support for Joint Guard Dec 96-Jun 98

Deny Flight Sanctions enforcement Apr 93-Dec 95

Maritime Monitor Sanctions enforcement Jul-Nov 92

Maritime Guard (follow-on to Maritime Monitor) Sanctions enforcement Dec 92-Jun 93

Sharp Guard (follow-on to Maritime Guard) Sanctions enforcement Jun 93-Dec 95

Decisive Enhancement (Support of Joint 

Endeavor) Sanctions enforcement Dec 95-Dec 96

Able Sentry Peacekeeping Jun 93-Feb 99

Joint Endeavor Peacekeeping Dec 95-Dec 96

Joint Guard (follow-on to Joint Endeavor) Peacekeeping Dec 96-Jun 98

Joint Forge (follow-on to Joint Guard) Peacekeeping Jun 98-Jun 99

Eagle Eye Air verification of cease fire Oct 98-Mar 99

Provide Promise Humanitarian Jul 92-Jan 96

Multiple joint task forces operating in the Balkans carried out different 

pieces of what could have been characterized as a single overall campaign. 

Whether keeping the peace, delivering food and medicine, enforcing sanctions, 

or dropping bombs, these forces accomplished their missions simultaneously or 

nearly so and in the same small region, albeit under different operational names. 

These operations involved 6,149 personnel in 1994, 17,221 two years later, and 

declined to 8,650 at the end of 2001.

While their different missions as peacekeepers, providers of humanitarian 

assistance, or enforcers suggested distinctions and separation, the operations 

came together on the ground as parts of the overall effort to stabilize the small 

portion of southeastern Europe known as “the Balkans.” As parts of the American contribution to United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

efforts, these operations also came together at the headquarters of the Southern 

Europe Task Force at Aviano, Italy, or at the United States European Com-
[ 4 8 ]

Other than War

mand Headquarters at Patch Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. As components 

of multinational operations, they came together with the forces of other nations 

in the NATO Headquarters at Mons, Belgium.

One United States government agency did view the operations in the Balkans as a unified entity. In computing the costs of operations in the Balkans, the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) considered all of the efforts to be of a single 

piece. The total of funds specifically allocated for the un-programmed missions 

known as contingency operations and spent in the region from 1992 to 2000 

came to $13.82 billion or 62 percent of the Defense outlay for contingency 

operations of almost $21.3 billion.13

Table 12. DOD and US Government Costs (in millions) for Support Operations, 

1992-1995

DOD Total

Somalia $ 1,522.1 $ 2,223.1

Former Yugoslavia 784.0 2,186.9

Rwanda 144.1 573.7

Haiti 953.9 1,616.7

Source: US General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: US Costs in Support of Haiti, Former 

Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, March 1996).

The cluster of operations focused on containing and influencing the behavior 

of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq came nearer to the size that might approximate a major theater war than did operations in the Balkans. Issued in 1999 

with the oxymoronic title of Major Smaller Scale Contingencies, an OSD report 

listed eight separate operations in Southwest Asia.14 For most of the 1990s, an 

estimated 20,000 United States military personnel served, mainly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in operations associated with the collective $7.44 billion effort.15

Table 13. Operational Names for Enforcing International Law and Standards in 

Southwest Asia

Name Type Duration Authority

Arabian Gulf MIO Sanctions Enf 1990 UNSCRs 661, 966 (1990)

Determined Response

Desert Calm

Desert Sortie

multiple (USS Cole) 

(withdraw forces) 2000-

Desert Farewell logistics 1992 UN

Desert Fox Air strikes 1998-99 UN

Desert Shield defense/security 1990-91 UN

Desert Storm Offensive 1991 UN
Stability Operations

[ 4 9 ]

Table 13. Operational Names for Enforcing International Law and Standards in 

Southwest Asia. (continued)

Name Type Duration Authority

Desert Sabre

Desert Sortie

Desert Sword

Patriot Defender defense/security 1991

Proven Force

UNIKOM peacekeeping 1991 UN

Desert Strike missile attacks 1996 UN

Desert Thunder Air strikes 1998 UN

Desert Vigilance defense/security 1994-95 UN

Desert Viper show of force 1998 UN

Nordic Knight defense/security 1998

Northern Watch sanctions enf 1992- UNSCR 688

 Constant Vigil

 Desert Safeguard

Provide Comfort I and II humanitarian 1991-96 UNSCR 688

Encourage Hope

Express Care

Pacific Haven 1996-97

Quick Transit 1996

Snow Eagle 1992

Provide Cover defense/security 1991-

Southern Watch sanctions enf 1992- UNSCRs 687, 688, 949

Desert Falcon 1997-

Desert Focus 1997-

Desert Spring 1999

Guarded Skies

Gunsmoke 1999

Intrinsic Action

JTF SWA

 Noble Safeguard defense/security 1999

Phoenix Jackal

Phoenix Scorpion I

Phoenix Scorpion II

Shining Presence defense/security 1998

Vigilant Sentinel show of force 1995

Vigilant Warrior show of force 1994

TLAM Strike (2) offensive 1993

TLAM Strike offensive 1996
[ 5 0 ]

Other than War

Over the decade, the use of nearly fifty names to designate operations in the 

Balkans and almost as many names for work in and around Southwest Asia obscured the fact that two major regional campaigns were conducted in the 1990s 

and remained active when the decade ended. With their ambiguous outcomes, 

these series of operations resembled but were short of classic combat operations. 

Both involved long periods of time, high monetary cost, and extensive use of 

major weapons systems, notably a wide variety of tactical aircraft and Naval 

combatants. They also resulted in few friendly casualties. American commanders could shuttle active and reserve units into and out of the operations without 

apparent loss in operational effectiveness. For example, Air National Guard 

units went into and out of Saudi Arabia on two-week rotations for Northern 

Watch and Southern Watch, with some units doing as many as four two-week 

rotations in three to four years.16

While by far the largest efforts of their kind, the decade-long campaigns in the 

Balkans and in Southwest Asia did not represent the only efforts to uphold international law and standards. The armed forces of the United States played a variety of 

roles in fourteen other operations of this general type, which are listed in Table 14.

Table 14. The Enforcement of International Law and Standards in Regions other 

than the Balkans and Southwest Asia

Name Region Type Duration Authority

JTF Timor Sea Ops Southeast Asia peacekeeping 1999-2000 UN

INTERFET

USGET

Stabilize

UNAMIC/UNTAC Southeast Asia peacekeeping 1991-93 UN

MFO Sinai Middle East peacekeeping 1982-2000 UN

MINURSO North Africa peacekeeping 1991-98 UN

UNTSO Middle East peacekeeping 1948- UN

Assured Lift Sub-Sahara logistics 

(peacekeeping) 1997 ECOMOG

Provide Transition Sub-Sahara defense/logistics 1992 UN

Restore Hope Sub-Sahara peace enforce 1992-93 UN

Continue Hope Sub-Sahara multiple types 1993-94 UN

Focus Relief/

UNAMSIL Sub-Sahara logistics/training 

(peacekeeping) 2000 UN

Safe Border (MOMEP) South America peacekeeping 1995-99 Latin American 

nations

Support Democracy Caribbean sanctions 

enforcement 1993-94 UN

Uphold Democracy Caribbean peacekeeping 1994-2000 UN

UNOMIG Georgia peacekeeping 1993 UN
Stability Operations

[ 5 1 ]

Overall, the joint operations of the 1990s did not cohere as much by type 

as by place. Operations came together in a small number of clusters, nearly all 

relating to each other geographically as they took place in the same region, 

rather than connecting based on type of mission. The largest groupings were in 

the Balkans and Southwest Asia. Other substantial sets formed along Caribbean drug shipment routes and in sub-Saharan Africa where numerous noncombatant evacuations and humanitarian missions together with a few stability 

operations took place.

Even disaster relief operations, the responses to unpredictable meteorological and other natural catastrophes, followed general patterns, with autumn 

hurricanes in the Caribbean and the southeastern United States, springtime 

floods along the Mississippi River system, and summer fires in the western 

forests. Instead of hundreds of disparate operations all over the world, a distribution that would support the views of theorists of global chaos, this handful of 

operational groups in specific regions yields a more accurate view of a complex 

decade of operational challenges.

Occurring early in the decade, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia,17 was 

extremely significant in shaping American views of later military commitments. 

The operation began as a straightforward humanitarian effort during the last 

weeks of the Bush administration.18 The Somali population was reeling from 

drought; the effects of predatory clan leaders, civil war and anarchy; and the loss 

of International Monetary Fund aid. In response, non-governmental organizations concentrated their resources on Somalia. The International Red Cross 

spent nearly half of its worldwide budget trying to get enough food into the 

country to overwhelm the capacity of clans and gunmen to steal aid shipments 

as they arrived.19

The nature of the American operation changed drastically in the early 

days of the Clinton presidency when it became clear that a stability operation 

was necessary since humanitarian aid could not be delivered effectively in the 

chaotic environment created by the violent conflicts between warring clans. In 

June 1993, gunmen killed twenty-four United Nations soldiers from Pakistan 

who were participating in the UN-sponsored attempt to stabilize Somalia. The 

operation then focused on an American manhunt for Mohamed Farah Aideed, 

a powerful Somali clan leader in Mogadishu, turning what started as a struggle 

to deliver food into the most significant operation of the decade in terms of its 

impact on subsequent American operations. The deaths of eighteen American 

service members in a single violent encounter with Somali gunmen on October 3, 1993, followed by the macabre display of some of their bodies in the 

streets of Mogadishu, caused revulsion and a significant backlash in the United 

States.20 David Halberstam called it “a devastating setback for humanitarian intervention.”21 In the immediate aftermath of this fight, force protection became 
[ 5 2 ]

Other than War

the highest priority mission for all United States forces in Somalia. When President Clinton “defined the US mission [in Somalia] as four-fold,” on October 

7, 1993, his first objective was “protect our troops and our bases ....”22 If Desert 

Storm, the war against Iraq in 1991, had demonstrated the power of American 

forces in a conventional conflict, Restore Hope in Somalia underscored their 

vulnerabilities and limitations in an unconventional environment.

The experience in Somalia highlighted the potential consequences of the 

evolution of an operation into something that was larger and more troublesome 

than originally anticipated. Any humanitarian operation was susceptible to 

such change, as the involvement in the solution of one problem either led to 

the uncovering of another difficulty in need of urgent attention or even caused 

another problem. After Somalia, this possibility, known to some as “the law of 

unintended consequences” and characterized by the military as “mission creep,” 

became a major concern.23

Ignited by the experience in Somalia, concerns about “force protection,” 

“end states,” “exit strategies,” and “mission creep” were fueled by memories of 

the Vietnam conflict, where an advisory effort had expanded into a long war 

that had consumed over 50,000 American military lives and billions of dollars. 

These concerns also reflected the relatively low importance of humanitarian and 

stability operations for the American military. Moreover, the idea of missions 

that changed and expanded contradicted the view of “normal” civil-military relations in which civilians stated the mission and the military was left to accomplish it, without the substantial further involvement of those who assigned and 

established the task.24

The Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997 downplayed the use of the armed forces for humanitarian emergencies. Ignoring 

two centuries of American military history, the authors of the study claimed 

that: “When the interests at stake are primarily humanitarian in nature, the 

US military is generally not the best means of addressing a crisis.” Conceding 

that it might be “both necessary and appropriate” to use military assets, the 

report specified that “the military mission should be clearly defined, the risk to 

American troops should be minimal, and substantial US military involvement 

should be confined to the initial period of providing relief until broader international assistance efforts get underway.” The decision to use military forces would 

“depend on our ability to identify a clear mission, the desired end state of the 

situation, and the exit strategy for forces committed.”25

Occasional military voices, such as that of Marine General Anthony Zinni, 

who commanded US Central Command from August 1997 to July 2000, noted 

that missions could evolve with changing situations and that the armed forces 

were able to adapt rapidly to changing situations. For Zinni, one of the main 

attributes of the American armed forces was operational flexibility and respon-
Stability Operations

[ 5 3 ]

siveness. Distinctions had to be made between mission creep and mission shift 

as situations could change and new requirements result. General Zinni urged 

that commanders anticipate the evolution of missions and not dismiss such 

changes as “mission creep.” “Keep the mission focused,” he said, “avoiding mission creep, but allow for mission shift (a conscious evolution that responds to 

the changing situation) ....”26 Nevertheless, the conventional view, as articulated 

in the Quadrennial Defense Review, was of a narrow and restrictive definition 

of the proper circumstances for the use of military forces in humanitarian and 

stability operations.27 At the end of the 1990s, civilian critics decried “force protection fetishism”28 and “the emerging American way of war—which emphasizes the avoidance of risk and casualties ....”29

During the decade, American casualties were always attended by substantial 

press coverage. The most remembered and the most influential such incident 

was the obscene display of American dead in Mogadishu. Ranged against the 

relatively low toll in battle deaths in the decade were more than one thousand 

American military fatalities that occurred during training and non-combat operations. Three operations—Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Northern Watch—

had American casualties inflicted accidentally by friendly forces. All of these 

deaths occurred in the context of a perceived low public tolerance for casualties, 

inescapable media coverage, and a preoccupation with accounting in detail for 

all casualties that grew out of the POW/MIA movement following the Vietnam War and was embodied in the agency that searched for the remains of 

service members missing in action, Joint Task Force Full Accounting.

30

The Somalia experience led to cautious and less direct American participation in humanitarian and stability operations. This effect manifested itself 

in American commitments worldwide, especially in Africa. After the Rwanda 

genocide in the spring of 1994, the United States deployed soldiers from US 

European Command into the border area between Rwanda, Burundi, and the 

Congo, then still called Zaire, to provide relief support in the massive refugee 

camps.31 Known as Operation Support Hope, the effort was carefully limited 

in duration and in extent to preclude any long-term commitment in the region. 

American forces departed after a few weeks.

In Liberia during 1997 (Assured Lift) and in Sierra Leone three years later 

(Focus Relief), the United States played a supporting role, providing logistical 

help and training for peacekeepers from other nations. These missions mirrored 

the training missions of the early Cold War when American troops helped 

train government forces to put down communist insurgencies in Greece and 

the Philippines; they also recalled earlier experiences with the establishment of 

native constabularies in the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, 

and Nicaragua.32 Other such operations in the 1990s included contracting and 

training civilian police for duty in Haiti and Bosnia. American forces in JTF 
[ 5 4 ]

Other than War

Timor Sea operations in Indonesia supported a peace enforcement effort lead 

by Australia.33

A particularly noteworthy enterprise was Operation Uphold Democracy in 

Haiti.34 American interest in Haiti and the Caribbean had long and deep roots. 

Despite the long history of concern, which included major long-term interventions earlier in the twentieth century, Uphold Democracy was a singular effort. 

The operation began on an ambiguous note as American units did not know 

whether they would enter Haiti as invaders or as invited guests. Only when 

on the verge of landing in Haiti did their commanders learn that their forces 

would not be opposed when they arrived.35 Once on the ground, the American 

force restored the legitimately elected government and made modest improvements in living conditions in the country.

Two operations resembled the larger efforts in the Balkans and Southwest 

Asia in their duration, if not in size and complexity. Established in the wake of 

the 1979 Camp David Accords, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 

in the Sinai served as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces during 

Israel’s withdrawal from the peninsula. Based on a brigade-sized American 

contribution, this force remained in place at the end of the twentieth century. In 

northwestern Africa, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), to which the United States made a much smaller 

commitment, lasted nearly eight years and never involved more than a handful 

of Americans. Both efforts were reminders of the sometimes inconclusive and 

extended nature of peace operations.

During the decade, American forces participated in international operations 

in several modes. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who represented the United 

States at the United Nations in 1999 and 2000, noted three: in the Balkans, the 

United States operated as an integral part of the international effort; in East 

Timor, the small United States contingent operated alongside but not under the 

command of the United Nations force; and in Sierra Leone, the United States 

did not participate in the actual peacekeeping operation but provided training 

and financial support.36 Regardless of the specific form taken by American involvement, at the end of the decade it appeared that as General Zinni observed 

in a speech at the Naval Institute: “We’re going to be doing things like humanitarian operations, consequence management, peace keeping and peace enforcement ... operations other than war. These are our future.”37
[ 5 5 ]

Chapter 7

Other Types of Operations

A different category of operation that merits attention was travel by members 

of the executive branch including cabinet officials, the vice president, the 

first lady, and particularly the president. Overseas trips by the head of state are 

integral elements of public diplomacy, highlighting American interest in specific 

parts of the world. Called “Banner” by Air Mobility Command, these missions 

are not usually considered in analyses of military operations.1

 However, they not 

only consume large amounts of military resources, particularly transport aircraft 

and associated crews and fuel, but also personnel and equipment for security and 

communications. President Clinton flew to parts of the world rarely visited by 

American chief executives in the past—Africa twice and Vietnam once. Distant 

from the United States, these areas had little usable communications infrastructure. Consequently, his entourages were large and imposed significant demands 

on Air Mobility Command aircraft and crews. During the two Clinton administrations, the upward trend in presidential travel that had started during the 

first Bush presidency continued and then accelerated.

Table 15. Phoenix Banner (president) and Phoenix Silver (vice president) Airlift 

Missions, Domestic and Foreign, 1988-1999

Year Missions Passengers Tons of Cargo

CY 1988 477 9,611 5,773

CY 1989 388 10,885 6,859

CY 1990 702 15,169 8,638

CY 1991 555 10,179 6,484

CY 1992 928 11,795 7,901

CY 1993 348 6,065 4,934

CY 1994 598 16,571 12,416

CY 1995 559 14,233 9,535

CY 1996 1,029 25,365 17,826

CY 1997 569 15,056 11,564

CY 1998 929 20,097 17,582

CY 1999 1,240 26,481 20,314

Source: Data provided by United States Transportation Command Research Center, Scott 

Air Force Base, Illinois, from annual histories of Air Mobility Command and its predecessor, 

Military Airlift Command.
[ 5 6 ]

Other than War

Public interest in President Clinton’s travel peaked in the months after his 

visit in the spring of 1998 to Rwanda and other East African nations. Particularly 

expensive and complex because of communications requirements, the visit to six 

countries cost $42.8 million. The Africa trip involved at least 1,300 government 

employees, who either accompanied the chief executive or preceded him as members of advance teams. Two months after he returned from this trip, the President 

went to China, with a smaller retinue of about one thousand people.

The report of a General Accounting Office review of presidential travel in 

September 1999 noted that the travel was expensive and cost the Department 

of Defense $292 million for 1997 through 1999. The report also showed that in 

his first term Clinton and his predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had comparable 

travel records. President Bush visited 50 countries over 86 days during four years, 

spending 21.5 days abroad each year; President Clinton went to 49 countries 

in 81 days during his first term, just under 21 days per year. However, Clinton’s 

second term saw substantial increases, and for his two terms he averaged 28.6 

days abroad annually. Overall, Clinton was the most widely traveled president 

and the first to visit a number of countries and regions, including Botswana, 

Rwanda, Bulgaria, the Balkans, and northern Vietnam.2

 It was clear that “the 

scope of detailed planning, magnitude of requirements, and depth of contingency management required to transport the leader of the free world make even the 

briefest of trips nothing short of a full-blown military operation.”3

President Clinton’s largest trip, to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in the 

early spring of 2000, underscored the impact of presidential travel as a consumer 

of Department of Defense assets. Known as “India Banner,” the mission cost a 

total of $46.5 million, and included 146 cargo flights “to ferry everything from 

trucks and communications equipment to the presidential limousine.” All told, it 

required 894 sorties and a total of 5,708 flying hours. The simultaneous humanitarian operation called Atlas Response in Mozambique, in which the United 

States joined a number of nations in providing emergency aid after flood waters 

had submerged much of that country, required 443 sorties and just over onefourth of the flying hours—1,592—expended on the Clinton visit to India.4

Two other types of presidential support operations occurred on a regular 

and predictable basis. One involved the ceremonies and festivities surrounding 

the presidential inauguration and primarily occupied elements of the Military 

District of Washington. In 2001, this mission used just under 1,000 military personnel for about two weeks. The other support activity concerned the 

shipment of presidential papers and memorabilia to the site of the presidential 

library. In the case of President Clinton, it took eight flights by Air Mobility Command C-5 aircraft to move more than 660 tons of documents, gifts, 

artifacts, and other materials from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, to Little 

Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas.5
Other Types of Operations

[ 5 7 ]

A small number of the operations that took place in the decade did not fit 

in any of the categories outlined above. Steel Box in 1990 and Auburn Endeavor in the spring of 1998 involved materials associated with what came to 

be known as “weapons of mass destruction.” Steel Box moved chemical munitions from Western Europe and Auburn Endeavor removed weapons-grade 

uranium from former Soviet territory. Other missions ranged from JTF Olympics, which supported the 1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta, Georgia, 

to Eastern Access, the reopening and securing of the Navy’s Vieques bombing 

range after Puerto Rican protesters had blocked access. JTF Panama removed 

American forces at the end of the United States presence in the Canal Zone. 

Deep Freeze, the Antarctic research project that had started in 1957, depended 

on Department of Defense re-supply missions throughout its life and provided 

a reminder of the role of both the Army and the Navy in nineteenth century 

scientific research and surveys.

Other operations were singular. Joint Task Force Full Accounting, with its 

headquarters in Hawaii, searched for the remains of American servicemen. Joint 

Task Force Computer Network operations concentrated on protective measures 

against and responses to cyber-warfare. Joint Task Force Civil Support dealt 

with responses to possible acts of terrorism against the United States. Unlike 

most joint task forces, which were set up in response to specific short-term 

emergencies, these organizations were established on a more permanent basis.

Table 16. Miscellaneous Operations

Name Region Type Duration

Auburn Endeavor Former USSR Environmental/logistical 1993

Computer Network Def USA Electronic security 1999-

Deep Freeze Antarctica Scientific/logistical 1957-

Diamante 1 Central America defense/security 1994-95

Diamante 2 Central America defense/security 1995-96

Eastern Access Caribbean logistics (reopen Viequez) 2000

Full Accounting Southeast Asia remains recovery 1992-

Incident Reach Sub-Sahara offensive (TLAM) 1998

JTF Bravo Central America multiple types 1982-

Encourage Hope

JTF Civil Support USA defense/security 1999-

JTF I (Inauguration) USA logistics 2001

JTF Olympics USA logistics 1995-96

JTF Panama 99 Central America logistics (withdrawal) 1999

JTF Philippines SE Asia show of force 1989
[ 5 8 ]

Other than War

Table 16. Miscellaneous Operations (continued)

Name Region Type Duration

Just Cause Central America Offensive (with counterdrug component)1989-90

Northern Denial North America defense/security 2000

Passive oversight Caribbean defense/security 1997

Presidential Records North America logistics 2001

Promote Liberty Caribbean peacekeeping 1990-94

Sentinel Lifeguard Caribbean show of force 1999

Silent Assurance SW Asia defense/security 1997

Steel Box I, II, III Western Europe logistics 1990-91

Sustain Liberty Caribbean defense/security 1994-97

Taiwan Straits East Asia show of force 1996

Operations in this miscellaneous category sometimes involved large numbers of other government agencies along with the Department of Defense. 

Presidential travel regularly engaged the State Department, the United States 

Information Agency, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, and the Customs Service as well as elements of the Department of 

Defense. JTF Olympics, which employed military elements in security and 

logistical support for the Summer Games in Atlanta in 1996, required coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Public Health Service, the 

Customs Service, and the Federal Aviation Agency. Contacts with nearly sixty 

Georgia law enforcement agencies were managed through a Law Enforcement 

Joint Coordination Center. Almost 14,000 military personnel contributed to 

the effort, including twenty-nine explosive ordnance disposal teams and thirty-two military working dog teams; the cost was $27 million.6

Pacific Haven, a mission that was related to Operation Provide Comfort, 

also had the complexity that characterized the more atypical assignments of 

the period. This operation provided support to Kurdish refugees who had been 

employed with Operation Provide Comfort, the effort to protect and support 

Kurds who had been driven from their homes in the wake of the war against 

Iraq, and were, therefore, at risk in their homeland. More than 6,000 refugees were transported to Guam between September 1996 and the end of the 

operation in the following March; there they were screened before entering the 

United States. A relatively small operation with a US government price tag of 

$10 million, Pacific Haven involved at least seven other government agencies 

and a dozen non-governmental organizations. Unlike humanitarian operations, 

which tended to involve large numbers of non-governmental organizations, and 

counter-drug efforts, which included a wide variety of law enforcement agen-
Other Types of Operations

[ 5 9 ]

cies, these singular missions derived their complexity from the participation of 

many agencies of the federal government.

Table 17. Non-DOD Participants in Operation Pacific Haven

US Government Agencies

Office of Refugee Resettlement (Department of Health and Human Services)

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (Department of State)

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Central Intelligence Agency

Customs Service

Public Health Service

Non-Governmental Organizations

Immigration and Refugee Services of America

Salvation Army

American Red Cross

Refugee Data Center

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service

US Catholic Conference

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society

Church World Service

Ethiopian Community Development Council

InterAction

World Relief

International Rescue Committee

[ 6 1 ]

Chapter 8

The Big Picture

Despite the large number of operations, the majority of American personnel 

in overseas assignments during the decade were on stable tours of duty in 

places where the American military had long been assigned. Given the proliferation of operational names and frequent press speculation that use of United 

States military forces in many small operations might degrade their ability to 

respond to a serious crisis, it is important to note that most overseas stationing 

of troops followed the Cold War pattern. The bulk of the armed forces serving 

overseas were in routine assignments in the same places—Germany, Korea, Japan, Okinawa—where they had been stationed during much of the Cold War.1

Moreover, in the 1980s, when the armed forces ranged in size from just under 

2.1 million to almost 2.2 million, a larger portion (ranging from 23.8 percent to 

25.3 percent) as well as a larger absolute number was regularly deployed outside 

the United States than during the post-Cold War decade.

Table 18. Overseas Deployment, Ashore and Afloat, 1980-2000

Year Active Force Deployed

1980 2,050,826 488,726 (23.8%)

1981 2,082,897 501,832 (24.1%)

1982 2,108,612 528,484 (25.1%)

1983 2,123,349 519,517 (24.5%)

1984 2,138,157 510,730 (23.9%)

1985 2,151,032 515,367 (24.0%)

1986 2,169,112 526,328 (24.3%)

1987 2,174,217 523,702 (24.1%)

1988 2,138,213 540,588 (25.3%)

1989 2,130,229 509,873 (23.9%)

1990 2,046,144 609,422 (29.8%)

1991 1,986,259 447,572 (22.5%)

1992 1,807,177 344,065 (19.0%)

1993 1,705,103 308,020 (18.1%)

1994 1,610,490 286,594 (17.8%)

1995 1,518,224 238,064 (15.7%)
[ 6 2 ]

Other than War

Table 18. Overseas Deployment, Ashore and Afloat, 1980-2000 (continued)

Year Active Force Deployed

1996 1,471,722 240,421 (16.3%)

1997 1,438,562 227,258 (15.8%)

1998 1,406,830 259,871 (18.5%)

1999 1,385,703 252,763 (18.2%)

2000 1,384,338 257,817 (18.6%)

Source: “Active Force” and “Deployed” data provided by the Directorate for Information 

Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, and is for 30 September of each year, except for the year 2000, which is 

reported as of 30 June.

Beginning in 1994, the Joint Staff tracked the number of service members 

deployed on operations. T﻿hose “deployed” on current operations, as opposed 

to those “stationed” overseas, never represented as much as 5 percent of the 

active-duty force. Increasing numbers of deployed service members came from 

the reserve components; this was especially true for the Air Force and the Army. 

At the end of the 1990s, the Army began to rely heavily on the Army Reserve 

and the Army National Guard to provide forces for duty in the Balkans.2

 At 

the end of every fiscal year except 1994, when substantial numbers of military 

personnel were serving in Haiti, the overwhelming majority of those involved 

in current operations were concerned with one of the two major clusters of 

operations, either in Southwest Asia or the Balkans. A historical example of a 

force truly stressed by overseas deployments is provided by a British army at the 

end of the nineteenth century that had 104,000 men, nearly half of its 212,000 

soldiers, deployed abroad.3

 It was, in the words of General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 

“a squeezed lemon.”4

Despite the small portion of the force deployed on current operations 

outside of the United States, these missions raised the question of whether the 

employment of American forces in stability operations and other gendarme 

operations represented a legitimate use of the military. The discussion focused on 

whether such use would degrade training and wear down equipment and people, 

eroding combat effectiveness. Included in the debate was the question of whether frequent deployments would cause service members to leave the service.

Viewed from the perspective of aggregate numbers alone, the issues generated by deployments in this decade could be considered marginal, but much of 

the discussion proceeded without informed reference to numbers. Many analysts knew little more than the total size of the force and the number of troops 

cut in the years following the end of the Cold War. When it came to the overall 

magnitude of deployments, precision frequently went out of the window.
The Big Picture

[ 6 3 ]

Table 19. Portion of Active Force Outside of the United States and Assigned to 

Operations from 1994 to 2000

Year

Total 

Strength

On Duty in 

Foreign Countries 

and Areas

Deployed 

on Current 

Operations

In SW 

Asia

In the 

Balkans

SW Asia 

and Balkans 

as % of all 

Deployed

1994 1,610,490 286,594 (17.8%) 67,731 (4.2%) 20,878 5,826 39.4%

1995 1,518,224 238,064 (15.7%) 36,786 (2.4%) 25,225 4,956 82.0%

1996 1,471,722 240,421 (16.3%) 62,990 (4.3%) 31,152 24,911 89.0%

1997 1,438,562 227,258 (15.8%) 35,145 (2.4%) 12,756 18,062 87.7%

1998 1,406,780 259,871 (18.5%) 43,067 (3.1%) 25,799 13,472 91.2%

1999 1,385,703 252,763 (18.2%) 47,975 (3.5%) 27,236 16,701 91.6%

2000 1,372,900 238,047 (17.3%) 39,049 (2.8%) 20,875 15,908 94.2%

Source: “Total Strength” and “On Duty in Foreign Countries and Areas” data provided by the 

Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, and is for 30 September of each year, except for the year 2000, 

which is reported as of 30 June. Data concerning personnel “Deployed on Current Operations” 

is provided by J-1 of the Joint Staff on a weekly basis and is taken from the report for the 

last week of September except for the year 2000, for which the last week of June is used. 

“Personnel Deployed on Current Operations” is a subset of personnel “On Duty in Foreign 

Countries and Areas.” All percentages are based on the “Total Strength” of the active force for 

each respective year.

James Kitfield, a civilian writer who wrote often on military issues and 

strongly supported military claims that new missions were causing great strain, 

asserted that “the pace of deployments increase[d] by more than 300 percent 

since 1989.”5

 Major General Arnold Fields, the Director of the Marine Corps 

Staff, claimed in 2000 that the pace of deployments had increased “16-fold” 

since the end of the Cold War.6

 A New York Times reporter added that “the 

number of peacekeeping missions, relief efforts and other military operations 

has proliferated.”7

 Basing their assessments on unclassified slides posted on 

“defenselink,” the Department of Defense website, operations research analysts accepted without comment the assertion that “over the past 10 years the 

military has downsized at a time when operations tempo and OOTW [Operations Other Than War] have dramatically increased.”8

 Paul Mann declared that 

“US Armed Forces have been ordered overseas with much higher frequency in 

the past 10 years than during the near half-century after World War II.” Mann 

asserted that, “In the decade since 1990, deployments numbered more than 60. 

They totaled fewer than 50 in the entire 45 years from 1945-90, according to 

congressional figures.”9

 Drawn from a Congressional Research Service report, 

Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989, written by 

Ellen Collier, the “congressional figures” counted the entire Korean War as one 

deployment and the 1964-1973 conflict in Vietnam as another. Post-Cold War 
[ 6 4 ]

Other than War

practice gave more than forty names to the cluster of operations in the Balkans that was, in the aggregate, far smaller than either the Korean War or the 

Vietnam conflict.10 Clearly, all deployments were not equal, although the 1990’s 

practice of naming them could give the impression that they were.11 Merely 

counting post-Cold War operations did not acknowledge the fact that they 

varied widely in size, duration, importance, and allocation of forces.12

The post-Cold War approach to naming operations was part of the problem. The war in Vietnam, which was the focus of operations from the early 

1960s to the 1970s, encompassed about twenty operations with English-language names every year in the late 1960s. Like deployments in the post-Cold 

War decade, these named operations varied widely. There were ground offensives, air strikes, pacification missions, and even humanitarian operations that 

provided medical care and emergency relief to civilians. However, the number 

and diversity of individual operations never obscured the identity of the overall 

conflict; they were all part of the Vietnam War.13

Missing from the commentary on and analyses of post-Cold War operations were two basic facts: seldom, if ever, did the actual number of service 

members deployed on operations exceed 5 percent of the total force; and much 

of the operational activity occurred in two large, complex, and expensive operational clusters in the Balkans and in Southwest Asia. Despite the many names, 

the focus and locations of the operations were restricted.

The military services used complex methods to measure the extent of their 

overseas commitments. Instead of using overall service strength as the baseline 

against which to compute the level and impact of deployments, all four services 

based their calculations on what they considered to be their deployable force—a 

much smaller figure than their total strengths. Moreover, all four services used 

different processes to compute their baselines—methods which incorporated some abstruse methods of counting. The Marines and the Army added to 

the number of deployed personnel those individuals in training overseas but 

subtracted from the deployable force those in training in the United States, reducing the baseline by the number of trainees at home and inflating the size of 

the deployed group by the number of trainees abroad. Since they began tracking 

the numbers at different times, it was impossible to make comparisons over the 

entire decade.14

Some statements that could be used to support claims of over-extension 

were truly misleading. In May 1997, the Army announced that its soldiers 

served for the first time in one hundred foreign countries, a total that had increased from eighty the preceding year. The total number involved in this global 

activity at the end of the fiscal year amounted to 31,000 soldiers. Moreover, 74 

of the countries listed by the Army had nine or fewer soldiers for a total of 270; 

an average of about 3.65 service members per country, many of whom were 
The Big Picture

[ 6 5 ]

probably attachés and members of attaché staffs, routinely assigned to United 

States embassies.15 The bulk of deployed Army personnel were in Germany 

(44,000) and Korea (29,000), just as they had been during the Cold War.16

More recently, the newsletter of the Association of the United States Army, 

Defense Report, noted that “thousands of soldiers do the day-to-day work of engagement,” and cited the Army role in Hungary, Turkey, Moldova, East Timor, 

Micronesia, Australia, Japan, and Haiti.17 Indeed, there were Army representatives in all of these nations at the end of calendar year 2000. However, the 1,740 

soldiers in Japan reflected the long-standing, post-World War II commitment 

of forces to that country, and the 28 in Micronesia had nothing to do with 

engagement, since Micronesia, which is also known as the Trust Territory of 

the Pacific Islands, belongs to the United States. The other deployments ranged 

from moderately small levels relating to current operations—360 in Hungary, 

mainly in support of Balkan operations, and 190 in Turkey, largely associated 

with operations against Saddam Hussein’s regime—to 11 in Australia; nine in 

Indonesia, including East Timor; nine in Haiti; and three in Moldova.18

The Navy, like the Air Force, seeking to hold deployments of individual 

sailors to a maximum of six months while adhering to a regular schedule of ship 

maintenance, deployed two aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and claimed as a 

result that some ship upkeep and crew training had to be curtailed. One expert 

argued that the operational availability of carriers varied from one in three to 

one in four, depending on the location, making each operational deployment 

represent something like a $20 billion investment, each deployed carrier representing an expense of between $6 billion and $7 billion.19

During the 1990s, in response to changing operational imperatives, the 

Navy increasingly relied on amphibious ships rather than on aircraft carriers. 

Carrier participation in operations declined from 78 percent in 1977-1984 to 

about 50 percent in 1990-1996.20 Only one humanitarian response operation 

involved aircraft carriers. Multiple eruptions of Mount Pinatubo on Luzon in 

June 1991 were followed by cascades of ash that covered the Clark Field airbase 

so densely that it collapsed several roofs. The smoke, ash, and other debris also 

forced closure of all island airports, so the operation, known as Fiery Vigil, included at least one carrier battle group, totaling more than 10,000 sailors, in the 

rescue of nearly 20,000 American nationals. The aircraft carriers USS Abraham 

Lincoln and USS Midway removed thousands of people, with 3,600 sailing on 

the Lincoln to the island of Cebu where they were flown to Guam.21 Carriers 

were still used extensively; during 1993-1994, the Navy rotated at least seven 

carriers into Operation Southern Watch.

Despite the apparently small portion of the total force deployed at any 

time, personnel tempo (perstempo) and operational tempo (optempo) were 

important. Concerns were, in part, a response to the change in the nature of 
[ 6 6 ]

Other than War

deployments. In some operations, the situation more closely resembled the 

experience of the Indian-fighting Army than that of the Cold War force, with 

little detachments at widely scattered and remote stations responding to small 

emergencies as they popped up, rather than larger forces located mainly at 

permanent stations with substantial facilities. The experience of the 22nd Marine 

Expeditionary Unit in 1996-1998 with six noncombatant evacuations, executed 

or planned, surely fit this pattern.

Frequent deployments created disruption and austerity for those involved. 

Air Force pilots coped with the boring routine of policing the no-fly zones over 

Iraq and the stark living conditions of the expeditionary environment in Saudi Arabia. Accustomed to operating as a Cold War garrison force with service 

members accompanied by families and working out of large and comfortable 

permanent bases, the Air Force faced the frequent need to send parts of aviation 

units to austere Persian Gulf installations which “disrupted home base operations and disrupted personal lives.” As Lieutenant General Patrick Gamble 

observed in 1998, “My impression ... is that the real cost we’re paying is a turbulence factor in rear areas, combined with no light at the end of the tunnel.”22

Optempo and perstempo issues clearly had an impact on some elements of 

the armed forces as a variety of units and types of equipment were regularly in 

high demand. According to the General Accounting Office, they were “major 

platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission 

capabilities and are in continual high demand to support worldwide joint military operations.”23 Priorities for the use of such assets ranked war at the top of 

the list; then other military operations that might involve hostile contact, such 

as peacekeeping; then training; and finally counter drug operations.24

In a major change from the Cold War years, assets that were in high 

demand were usually not major combat formations. This was especially true in 

the Army, where demand was extremely high for military police, aviation, civil 

affairs units, and special operations forces.25 But it was also true for the other 

services for whom specialized aircraft, including EA-6B aircraft which were 

used to suppress enemy air defenses and electronically jam anti-aircraft radar, as 

well as Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, U-2 reconnaissance planes, and F-16 CJ fighter aircraft equipped with anti-radar missiles 

were in short supply.26

Among ground forces, military police units were in very high demand 

throughout the 1990s, for operations in the United States as well as abroad. 

Joint Task Force Andrew, the military response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 

included eight Army Military Police companies among the 106 units from all 

services that deployed.27 In Bosnia, three years later, MP units replaced some 

infantry and armor formations after six months, as it became clear that they 

were more appropriate for the mission. In Rwanda in 1994, where the 325th
The Big Picture

[ 6 7 ]

Airborne Infantry Regiment provided security for military units that produced 

safe drinking water and participated in the relief effort, it became apparent that 

Military Police could have performed these roles.28 Two years later, in the wake 

of the June 1996 terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers, at least 64 one- and 

two-person bomb-sniffing dog teams, from the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, 

went to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Focus.

In the middle of the decade, the demand for military police severely 

strained the Army’s ability to provide them. During the period from October 

1994 through December 1995, US Army Forces Command military police 

assets were fully committed to operational requirements. Two brigades, six 

battalions, twenty-six companies, and one Prisoner of War Internment Center 

were either deployed outside the continental United States or had just returned 

from overseas duty. The MP companies were deployed, on the average, for 147 

days during fiscal year 1995, with an average interval between deployments of 

only 8.4 months.29

Even missions not associated with the operations in the Balkans or Southwest Asia made major demands on military police assets. Sea Signal/JTF 160, 

which involved operating and securing camps for as many as 50,000 Cuban and 

Haitian refugees, at Guantanamo, Cuba, and in Panama, employed 14 military 

police companies, three battalion headquarters, and a brigade headquarters, a total of 18 of the 55 Army units deployed. Since 1982, Joint Task Force Bravo had 

provided an American presence in Honduras that expanded and contracted in response to natural disasters and provided training to reserve component units; the 

operation employed four MP companies on three-month tours of duty. Sustain 

Liberty in Panama required four MP companies on six-month assignments.30

The emergence of military police in a position of prominence in post-Cold 

War operations seemed to affect the morale of unit members positively. Writing in the Washington Post, Thomas Ricks observed that, “Of the roughly 5,600 

US troops on the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, the happiest appear to be 

the 500 military police.” Ricks noted that the military police enjoyed being 

“at the center of the international effort, patrolling constantly and interacting 

with the population.” On the other hand, he wrote, “The infantry and other 

combat units, by contrast, tend to hate it.” The central role of MPs, who were 

“old hands at using the least amount [of force] necessary to get the job done, a 

key skill here,” changed traditional roles in which infantry, armor, and aviation 

tended to get the most attention and play the central parts. “MPs,” Ricks wrote 

of operations in Kosovo, “head out to patrol the exotic towns and snow-capped 

mountains of this Balkan province, while tank crews pull boring guard duty at 

the dusty main gate” of Camp Bondsteel.31

Toward the end of the decade, the central role of military police received 

increased attention. The British army had discovered some decades ago that, 
[ 6 8 ]

Other than War

“speaking generally, the tank is an unnecessarily powerful weapon for police 

work and has the disadvantage of noisiness; and in many areas the use of heavy 

armored vehicles is restricted by the nature of bridges which exist or could 

be constructed with limited resources.”32 As one American observer recently 

noted, police were in fact best suited for police work: “the Army already has 

units whose doctrine, equipment and training fit them almost perfectly for 

constabulary operations. They’re called military police ....”33 The Army began to 

consider expanding the size, structure, and role of MPs in military operations 

abroad. There were two police issues: force protection and crime. Military police 

increasingly seemed to provide the right answer to the former and perhaps 

to the latter as well. With future threats coming from thugs, ethnic cleansing 

within terrified populations suspicious of authority, and terrorists, military police seemed right for the job, and Major General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief of the 

Army Reserve, argued that military police were needed more than ever.34

Training increasingly took into account the use of military police in gendarme operations. A four-day session for 2,575 reservists of the 800th MP 

Brigade at Fort A. P. Hill, an exercise known as Gold Sword IV, was “intended 

to test military units charged with running camps that handle prisoners of war, 

civilian internees and refugees .... The growing occurrence of humanitarian 

efforts, like the Bosnia and Haiti missions, has demanded that training focus on 

managing civilian refugees, said Lieutenant Colonel David L. Parker, commander of one of the [four] camps.”35

Meanwhile, the United Nations department of peacekeeping operations 

scrambled to assemble the thousands of police officers needed for its operations 

in the Balkans, East Timor, several war zones in Africa, Cyprus, Tajikistan, 

Haiti, and Guatemala. Few civilian police departments had officers to spare 

to meet the high demand for civilian as well as military police. Nevertheless, 

from 1989 forward, most United Nations operations used some civilian police, 

who were limited to monitoring and supervising indigenous law enforcement 

agencies. In Somalia, where attempts to create a semblance of order foundered, 

some observers considered creation of a national police force or gendarmerie to 

be one of the first essential steps in establishing the rudiments of civil society.36

Ruth Wedgwood, a Council on Foreign Relations expert on the United Nations, complained “Every time there’s been any question of where to put together a really robust police force, everybody has ducked.” She thought the issue was 

“something that the Pentagon and NATO really have to face up to,” because 

“the United Nations does not have the military.”37 Realistically, law enforcement 

resources of all types were overburdened and adequate police resources were not 

available to either the United Nations or the United States.

The United States Marine Corps took steps to add military police training 

and personnel to their deployable units. Like the Army, the Marines began to 
The Big Picture

[ 6 9 ]

appreciate that police work could lie at the center of future missions. Consequently, the Corps began modest restructuring of its brigade-sized Marine 

Expeditionary Units (MEUs) to include expanded police capabilities. In the 

early months of 2000, the units that deployed from Camp LeJeune, North 

Carolina—the 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEUs—had six or seven members with 

police training, typically led by a sergeant or staff sergeant. The Camp Pendleton, California, expeditionary units—the 11th, 13th, and 15th—had restructured 

to increase the deploying military police presence to as many as 14 Marines led 

by a staff non-commissioned officer. When the 11th MEU deployed, it had a 

captain serving as force protection/anti-terrorism officer and a military police 

trained lieutenant, with a sergeant and a detachment of 12 school-trained 

military police.38

By the end of the decade, restructuring the Marine military police community and enhancing the military police presence within Marine expeditionary 

units was close to realization. The Corps’ three-star generals had approved 

creation of military police battalions within three units, with battalions in turn 

creating detachments for various tactical units, such as the 2nd Marine Division 

at Camp Lejeune or 11th MEU at Camp Pendleton. The goal was to restructure 

by 2002. All three of the new battalions had identical structures but with fewer 

people than stateside military police battalions. This structure allowed deployment of half platoons of 20 Marines led by a police-trained lieutenant, adding 

seven military police to the largest MEU detachments and as many as 14 to the 

others.39 American ground forces were starting to adapt to the reality of postCold War operations.40

Adaptation did not come without disagreement over where the emphasis 

should be. In July 2000, the General Accounting Office examined the issue of 

high demand-low density assets for the Subcommittee on Military Readiness 

and Management Support of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The 

inquiry focused on “six military assets that have been heavily used in contingency operations in a series of case studies,” but when it came to land forces, the 

GAO emphasized Army divisions and civil affairs forces rather than military 

police. Operations in the Balkans employed forces from four of the Army’s ten 

active divisions and one of the eight National Guard divisions by the end of 

1999. Regarding civil affairs units, the report noted that the Army did not have 

enough capability to meet its requirements but was optimistic about an improved supply of these specialists in the future.41

Otherwise, the General Accounting Office focused its report on specialized 

aircraft that belonged to the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Prominent 

among these was the EA-6B (Prowler), whose mission was suppression of 

enemy air defenses by electronically jamming anti-aircraft radar and communications. Both aircraft and crews were in short supply, so much so that the 
[ 7 0 ]

Other than War

combined demand for these aircraft for Operations Northern Watch and 

Southern Watch and for Noble Anvil forced closure of classes at the Whitbey 

Island Electronic Attack Weapons School so instructors could deploy. At one 

point, 17 of the Marine Corps’s 20 EA-6Bs were operationally engaged.42 For 

three other seriously over committed aircraft types—AWACS, U-2s, and F16 

CJs—the problem was similar. There were simply not enough crews, and those 

that were available deployed beyond the standard of 120 days per year set by 

both the Navy and the Air Force.43 The Joint Staff agreed with the GAO on 

the shortages of these and other specialized planes, helicopters, and unmanned 

aerial vehicles.44

Because so many operations responded to humanitarian emergencies or at 

least had a humanitarian component, medical resources were frequently in high 

demand. Fifteen of the 106 units that deployed to Florida as part of JTF Andrew were medical, among them air ambulance, entomology, and public health 

personnel. The Air Force’s Critical Care Air Transport Team from Lackland Air 

Force Base, Texas, went to eastern Africa in August 1998, after the bombings 

of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as 

part of Operation Resolute Response. Prior to that assignment, the unit had 

deployed 35 times in 1996, to Central and South America as well as Europe.45

Medical units generally responded to two sets of needs, those of the population in the area affected by a disaster and those of the American troops sent 

into unfamiliar environments that usually also had significant deficiencies in 

sanitation and public health. In Haiti, 13 of the 35 Army units from Forces 

Command that went into the operation were medical units. They went in two 

groups of six, with one company of an area support medical battalion overlapping the assignment of each group. The six in each set—the first went in 

January through June 1995 and the second in June-November 1995—included 

one hospital, one medical logistics company, one veterinary detachment, one 

combat stress detachment, one sanitation/entomology detachment, and an air 

ambulance company.46

Where the disaster responses involved a significant construction component, engineer units were heavily involved. During JTF Andrew, nineteen 

deploying units—almost one out of every nine—were either Navy Seabees or 

Army engineers. They included combat and construction units, a bridge-building company, firefighters, and divers.47 The frequent demand for forces usually 

seen as support elements—military police, engineers (including Navy Seabees), 

civil affairs, medical, and public affairs units—seemed to turn the conventional idea of “tooth and tail,” which held that combat arms forces were the main 

deployed forces and that others supported and sustained them, on its head. 

Even though Desert Storm very early in the decade was the only operation 

that approximated a major regional war, the Department of Defense adhered 
The Big Picture

[ 7 1 ]

to the traditional notion of “tooth and tail” in its efforts to “preserve the critical 

capabilities of our military forces—‘the tooth’—while reducing infrastructure 

and support activities—‘the tail’—wherever prudent and possible.”48

Strategic airlift represented a critical part of any deployment. Analysts frequently noted the central importance of air transportation in moving forces and 

equipment into operations.49 General Anthony Zinni, whose Central Command 

often drew heavily on such support, told an interviewer that “Strategic airlift in 

general is our number one concern and the area we place as our top requirement, 

and airlift as a whole.”50 Partly because of the dependence on movement of 

people and supplies by air and partly because of the preference for air operations 

over the commitment of ground combat forces, the Air Force appeared to be 

more heavily taxed by operational requirements than the other services.51

Although some shortages, such as those in airlift and medical support, 

occurred regularly, certain operations imposed large demands on assets that 

were seldom strained. For example, Operation Joint Endeavor, the first in the 

long series of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia—it was followed in order 

by Joint Guard, Joint Forge, and Joint Guardian and their variously named 

ground, air, and sea components—put a severe strain on public affairs units. 

Fourteen separate public affairs organizations, 12 from the Army and two from 

the Air Force, totaling more than 200 people, went to the Balkans.52 Restore 

Hope in Somalia had a public affairs staff of sixty. These large commitments 

of public affairs elements and specialists reflected what Charles Moskos called 

a reversal in the historic pattern of media build-up, which traditionally came 

after a military action started. In modern gendarme operations (Moskos called 

them “operations other than war”), commercial media organizations mobilized 

at least as rapidly as the military force, carried extraordinarily sophisticated 

equipment to record and immediately transmit images, and sometimes beat 

the military to the area of operations. Not all operations called for deployment 

of large contingents of public affairs personnel. The involvement of 24,000 

Army troops in the response to Hurricane Andrew in the United States in 

August-October 1992 led to the deployment of only one public affairs unit, a 

press camp headquarters detachment.53

The addition of so many public affairs units to the force that went to Bosnia 

may have been due to the politically sensitive nature of the deployment, but 

the lessons of Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1994 may also have played a role. 

In the Somalia operation, photographers and reporters, intentionally alerted by 

official press briefings in Washington to an impending nighttime amphibious 

operation, had waited for armed reconnaissance parties to hit the beach, then 

blinded them with television lights. In Haiti, media representatives agreed 

to refrain from illuminating any airborne assault, but still appeared in such 

large numbers that they interfered with the soldiers’ work. The commander of 
[ 7 2 ]

Other than War

Atlantic Command complained to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

of the “lack of restraint on the part of reporters covering the operation,” noting 

that “we’ve seen photographers wander dangerously close to automatic weapons 

fire–watched camera crews weaving their way through troops working to secure 

an area.” With anywhere from 1,000 to 1,300 media representatives watching 

the operation and searching for stories, commanders “even witnessed reporters 

interviewing soldiers as actions are ongoing.”54 Public affairs organizations were 

needed to create space in which units could operate.

All of the services initiated some responses to changing operational requirements. Midway through the decade, just after the large deployment to 

Haiti, the smaller mission to Rwanda, and in the middle of a period of intense 

counter-drug and immigrant interdiction activity, the Army was beginning to 

try to adjust to the new environment. General William Hartzog, the commander of Training and Doctrine Command and formerly the deputy commander of 

US Atlantic Command during the Haiti operation, convened “a general-officer 

level conference” in April 1995, to discuss recent operational experiences, “in 

an effort to understand more clearly the unique operational challenges that 

OOTW [operations other than war] present and to ensure that the United 

States Army is developing force structure and personnel with the capabilities 

and skills needed to meet these challenges ....”55 The Army’s effort continued 

through the decade, with emphasis on considering lighter, more flexible forces 

than the large infantry and armor divisions that had been the mainstays of the 

Cold War force. Toward the end of the decade, the Defense Science Board saw 

a new interest in “transformation-related initiatives” and expressed optimism 

concerning the focus of all of the services on “advanced concept development 

and experimentation ....”56

While all of the services considered changes, the Air Force implemented 

the most far-reaching structural modification. In addition to reducing aircrew 

deployments to Southwest Asia from ninety to forty-five days and reassigning 

air crews to high demand/low density aircraft, such as AWACS, HC-130s, 

and U-2s, in 2000 the Air Force rearranged its deployable force into ten Air 

Expeditionary Forces to manage the high demand for air transport and various 

combat aircraft. The ten Air Expeditionary Forces rotated primary responsibility 

for missions every ninety days. Each contained 175 aircraft, for combat, transport, refueling, and surveillance. Each was on alert for ninety days, so that the 

burden of responding to contingencies was shared and so the disruption caused 

by deployments could be controlled and made more predictable.57

Other structural and organizational adaptations took place within the 

service organizational structures with little notice or fanfare. The presence of 

Marines trained as military police in the Marine Expeditionary Unit is a case 

in point. The change in the way Army lawyers viewed their role also illustrates 
The Big Picture

[ 7 3 ]

the evolution of views in response to mission changes. As early as 1983, in the 

aftermath of Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, the Judge Advocate General 

Corps saw the need to move beyond traditional roles in courts martial, claims, 

and legal assistance to service members, into complex areas such as rules of 

engagement, pre-deployment legal assistance with wills and powers of attorney, advising commanders on combat targeting and contracting, assisting in 

investigation of war crimes and friendly fire incidents, and drafting war trophy 

policies. By the middle of the 1990s, with the experience of the war against Iraq 

and operations in Somalia and Haiti, these changes within the Judge Advocate 

General Corps were essentially complete.58 The Army lawyers’ adaptation took 

place quietly and professionally. During the decade, in response to new requirements, the missions of certain specialists changed and expanded without any 

apparent problems.

Major changes also took place in the use of reserve forces. Under the “Total 

Force” policy that emerged after the Vietnam War, US forces, particularly the 

Army and the Air Force, were structured so that they needed substantial reinforcement by reserve forces to conduct a major operation effectively. Still, reserve forces were exactly that, additional organizations and personnel designed 

to augment combat forces and provide combat support and combat service 

support elements required to sustain the active force in the event of emergencies. The force that went to war against Iraq in 1990-1991 made significant 

use of Reserve and National Guard augmentation within this post-Vietnam 

framework.59

Some use of reserve forces in the 1990s fit the post-Vietnam pattern. The 

Air Force, for example, repeatedly sent Air Guard fighter units to Southwest 

Asia to augment the active squadrons enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. 

In addition, Air Force reserve component transport units frequently became 

involved in delivery of emergency supplies during humanitarian operations. In 

other cases that remained within the traditional framework of reserve usage, 

specialists such as Army civil affairs officers were frequently called to duty.60

However, the deployment of Army National Guard combat brigades to 

operations in the Balkans represented a major departure from previous practice under the “Total Force” framework.61 More than 700 soldiers of the 49th

Armored Division went to Bosnia for six months in the summer of 2000, as 

both the headquarters and major troop component for American peacekeepers 

in Bosnia. The Army National Guard did not go to Bosnia to augment active 

forces; it went in lieu of them. It was the first such use for a major combat 

formation of the Army Guard, and it was accompanied by a general rise in the 

use of Army Reserve and National Guard forces. Subsequent unit rotations also 

included National Guard headquarters elements and general officers, marking 

a significant change from the use of reserve component forces during the war 
[ 7 4 ]

Other than War

against Iraq, when the Army resorted to provisional commands under senior 

active component officers rather than activate reserve component organizations 

commanded by reserve component generals.62

Contracting offered another way to reduce the operational burden. The use 

of civilian firms to perform support and logistical tasks, ranging from camp 

construction to port operations and from food service to motor pool management, had ample historical precedent and became big business during the 

Vietnam War. During the 1990s, contractor operations ranged from general 

logistical support to provision of specific types of technical support, such as Serbo-Croatian translators. Brown and Root, which had been one of the principals 

in the RMK-BRJ construction consortium that built American military facilities in Vietnam, had a substantial role in numerous post-Cold War operations, 

starting with provision of support to troops in Somalia during Operation Support Hope.

63 This firm’s involvement peaked in a group of huge contracts dating 

from 1995 and totaling over $2 billion, to develop infrastructure and support 

American troops in Bosnia and Kosovo during Operations Joint Endeavor, 

Joint Forge, and Joint Guardian.

64

Adjustments in response to the post-Cold War operational environment 

also were implemented or at least considered at the joint level. The global 

military force policy, established by the Joint Staff in July 1996, was intended 

to allocate scarce assets among theater commanders for use in crises, contingencies, and long-term joint task force operations, based on mission priorities, 

validated requirements, and availability. The military services identified assets 

to be included under the policy and determined the rate at which these assets 

could be deployed without adversely affecting unit readiness and quality of life. 

The goal was to meet the theater commanders’ requirements, while assuring that 

assets were maintained at the highest possible level of readiness and availability 

to respond to crises.65

Early assessments of the impact of the policy were optimistic. The 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review reported that the policy “had dramatically improved management of AWACS deployments, stabilized RC-135 and EP-3 

deployments at a steady-state rate, and improved the deployments rate for 

EA-6Bs” and that initial success was leading to development of a more comprehensive system “to monitor the effects of high operating tempo.”66 A report on 

contingency operations two years later echoed this confident tone.67 Nevertheless, after air operations over Yugoslavia in 1999, the over commitment of scarce 

aircraft assets again became an issue.68

Admiral James O. Ellis, commander of US Naval forces in Europe, proposed another approach to the issue of operational tempo. Ellis, who also 

commanded JTF Noble Anvil during Operation Allied Force, the bombing 

operations of the spring of 1999 in Yugoslavia, urged development of a plan 
The Big Picture

[ 7 5 ]

for a fully functional joint task force and component staffs, a kind of “JTF in 

a Box.” The concept included construction of facilities, creation of a training 

program, and development of procedures, as well as a database for tracking the 

availability of potential staff members.69 Such a concept had been tried earlier 

in the Army Corps of Engineers, where it had foundered because the lists of 

potential staff members for so-called “redi districts,” that were intended to handle emergency construction, had not been kept up to date.70

Programs such as the global force policy and proposals for deployable organizations responded directly to conditions that were prevalent during the first 

half of the decade. Two analysts, Billy Brooks and Kevin Roller, noted “more 

peace keeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations were 

initiated during 1991-95 than during any of the three previous five-year time 

periods since 1975.”71 Moreover, the operations raised questions concerning 

specific American interests and the effectiveness of military forces in such operations. Haiti, Rwanda, and especially Somalia did not respond quickly to the 

application of the military forces the United States employed. These missions, 

as Brooks and Roller noted, “were not amenable to decisive and quick action.” 

They tended to stretch out in time, like the peacekeeping mission in the Sinai 

Peninsula (Multinational Force and Observers or MFO) that dated from 

1982 and the subsequent operations in the Balkans.72

Overall, the decade seemed to be marked by a major contradiction between 

the demands of gendarme operations and domestic political concerns. Gendarme operations, whether they concerned law enforcement, peacekeeping in 

all of its varieties, nationbuilding, or disaster relief and humanitarian work, were 

messy, frequently did not promise clear end states, and could be marked by 

changes in missions and increased expenditures. Law enforcement, particularly 

the pursuit of diverse villains such as Manuel Noriega, Mohamed Farah Aideed, 

and Slobodan Milosovic, could take startling and violent turns. Such operations, whether involving drug interdiction, illegal immigrants, or the crimes of 

dictators and terrorists, rarely allow clearly defined exit strategies, schedules, and 

end states, all of which were elements of domestic political demands for clarity 

and finality. Nor could such operations meet the desire to avoid casualties, what 

Max Boot called “bodybag syndrome.”73

In the emphasis on operations that did not resemble conventional wars, 

the decade resembled several periods of American history when the gendarme 

function had predominated. The twelve years between Operation Just Cause

and 9/11 were marked by complex operations with military personnel working with international organizations, allies, contractors, and private charitable 

organizations, always under intense media scrutiny. Sometimes bombing and 

distribution of humanitarian assistance went on simultaneously, much to the 

discomfiture of relief agencies, who complained about blurring distinctions 
[ 7 6 ]

Other than War

between fighters and aid workers and who required confidence in their neutrality on the part of belligerents. Thus in Kosovo NATO built refugee camps in 

Macedonia and Albania while American planes dropped bombs as part of the 

same operation.74

Overall, complexity and diversity were the hallmarks of this decade. Even 

taking into account the tendency to exaggerate the amount of work, the operational tempo remained high, while the demand for forces moved away from 

traditional large combat formations. Above all, the multiple missions of the 

period touched virtually all regions of the globe.
[ 7 7 ]

Chapter 9

Transition to the Future

I

n some respects the discussions and debates and projections all became 

irrelevant on Tuesday, 11 September 2001, when the United States was 

attacked by terrorists who commandeered four American airliners and crashed 

them with devastating results. All of the compelling issues of the preceding 

twelve years—casualty avoidance, the preference for remotely fired, precision-guided weapons rather than ground forces, operational tempo, exit strategies and end states—were moot, at least for the moment. Discussion of substantial reductions in the budget and personnel of the Defense Department 

ended. All involved in national defense turned their attention to identifying, 

dealing with, and punishing the perpetrators of the attacks of September 11. 

Reserves were called to duty, money was appropriated, and the old questions 

lost their importance. The immediate post-Cold War era of operations ended 

when the 9/11 catastrophe took place.

Yet the period that started at the end of 1989 and ended in September of 

2001 still merits attention as it provides numerous examples of the conduct of 

many kinds of missions. Study of these operations raises the question of how an 

era that shared so many elements with much of America’s military history could 

have been considered so unique. Review of the period also raises the question 

of why there was widespread acceptance of the idea that during the period 

American military forces were overextended, when the numbers do not support 

such a claim.

The period of 1989-2001 put a premium on types of military forces that had 

previously not been in the highest demand or of the highest concern. Military 

police, engineers, medical and civil affairs units all were in high demand as were 

airlift assets as well as specialized reconnaissance and combat aircraft. Heavy 

combat forces were used for missions more appropriate for other formations 

partly because they were more numerous and, therefore, more available than 

units more suited to the tasks. After September 2001, the emphases shifted 

again, renewing the Cold War era reliance on traditional combat forces while 

expanding the need for more mobile combat units and special operations forces 

to deal with terrorists not tied to a single state.

The period that started on 11 September 2001 appears to carry forward 

the post-Cold War decade’s emphasis on gendarme operations but with an 
[ 7 8 ]

Other than War

important modification. Kenneth Anderson, a professor of international law at 

American University, noted that the terrorist attacks were “simultaneously an 

act of war and a crime.” A crime committed against the almost 3,000 people 

who were killed and an act of war aimed at the United States. The American response, usually referred to as the “Global War on Terrorism” or GWOT, pulled 

together both sides of the operational tradition, a conventional war against the 

Taliban-dominated state of Afghanistan, which harbored the terrorists, and a 

worldwide manhunt for the perpetrators, their accomplices, and financiers.1

 The 

war against the Taliban regime was prosecuted effectively and ended quickly. 

However, the law enforcement operation to catch and punish the terrorists and 

their accomplices went on, reflecting the past record of gendarme operations as 

tending to be long, complex, frustrating, and frequently deadly.

The twentieth century saw an increasing tendency of gendarme operations 

to become global, slowly expanding and moving from enforcement of national 

law to international law and standards. A substantial portion of missions always 

dealt with situations close to the United States, in areas of traditional interest, 

along the southern border and in Caribbean waters, but gendarme operations 

increasingly took place in more remote locales as America’s interests expanded 

and as its ability to project forces grew. In the 1990s, US operations clustered 

in areas removed from US interests—sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, and 

southwest Asia—borderland areas in which cultures overlapped and confronted 

each other and competition caused friction and war.

Some operational continuity connected the periods divided by the events 

of September 11, 2001. Provide Hope, the delivery of humanitarian aid to 

elements of the former USSR, started in 1992 and provided medical supplies 

and equipment through much of the 1990s. Together with the Joint Contact 

Team Program, through which American military specialists provided advice 

and counsel to fellow military professionals in the armed forces of former 

Warsaw Pact states, Operation Provide Hope was one of the few exceptions to 

the almost complete disappearance of the former Soviet Union from American 

operational concern. In the 500th mission of this operation, a C-5 aircraft of the 

436th Airlift Wing, US Air Force, landed at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on June 17, 

1997, and delivered privately donated medicines to the local hospital.2

 Beginning two years later, Army Special Forces troops regularly went to Uzbekistan 

on training missions, “one element of an accelerating security arrangement in 

which the two nations were laying the groundwork for more extensive military 

cooperation.” That connection continued to expand after 2000. Beginning in 

1995, opportunities for Uzbek officers to study in the United States expanded, 

as did regular consultations between CENTCOM and the US embassy with 

Uzbek Ministry of Defense officials. American assistance in acquisition of supplies and equipment other than arms also increased.3
Transition to the Future

[ 7 9 ]

After the events of 9/11, American operations continued to rely on contractors and on reservists. Brown and Root, the company that carried out the huge 

facilities development program in the Balkans, built Camp Delta at the Guantanamo naval base for the detention of suspected terrorists. Army Reserve and 

National Guard military police companies provided most of the Guantanamo 

guard force.4

While the events of 9/11 ended the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, the 

cluster of operations against Saddam Hussein in Southwest Asia and the group 

of stability operations in the Balkans continued. Three long-term joint task 

forces also remained active. They were: Computer Network Operations, which 

was established on 1 January 1999; Joint Task Force Civil Support in Joint 

Forces Command, with its mission of preparing to cope with the effects of 

weapons of mass destruction or “WMD consequence management”; and Joint 

Task Force Full Accounting in Hawaii.

There had been operational responses to terrorist actions before September 11, 2001. Desert Focus in 1996 had followed the bombing of the military 

barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and two operations, Resolute Response and Incident Reach in 1998, reacted to the attacks on American embassies in Africa. Determined Response came after the attack on the USS Cole

in 2000. Begun after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Operation Enduring 

Freedom was an operational campaign in the Global War on Terrorism, and 

Operation Noble Eagle focused on protecting the United States from terrorist 

attacks. A variety of activities designed to train and equip the military forces 

of the Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen for counter-terrorist operations were 

begun. Designed to build working relationships and rapport between American 

Special Operations Forces and their foreign counterparts, these programs had 

their roots in the period before the 2001 attacks.5

By the turn of the twenty-first century, before counter-terrorism became the 

focus of interest, Department of Defense involvement in counter-drug operations was declining. Priorities changed, funding decreased, and emphasis shifted 

toward other areas, among them peacekeeping and training. After September 

2001, the trend continued.6

 The effort to control and reduce the flow of drugs 

into the United States did presage the new Global War On Terrorism in its 

effort to bring to justice law breakers operating in locations far from the United 

States and in its effort to deal with stateless transnational enemies, drug cartels 

rather than organized terrorist groups. Both counter-drug and counter-terrorist 

efforts operated simultaneously in widely separated places, drew on the assets of 

several combatant commands, used the metaphor of “war” to describe far-flung 

gendarme operations, and seem destined for long, indeterminate battles against 

shadowy foes.
[ 8 0 ]

Other than War

Both the drug war and the campaign to bring terrorists to justice resembled the long campaigns in the Balkans and against Saddam Hussein in one 

important respect. All were single, long-term campaigns in which individual 

operations varied greatly and had the characteristics of contingencies. Within 

the long-range context of the campaign itself, these operations were often brief 

and extemporaneous, and were dissimilar. They also took place in numerous 

locations and involved the full range of gendarme operations—peacekeeping, 

disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance, law enforcement, and even 

nation building. However, appreciation of the broader context of the individual 

operations differed widely. In the case of the campaign in the Balkans and the 

one focused on Iraq, the sense of an overall long-term enterprise never seemed 

to emerge. While for the so-called drug war, such an awareness developed in 

Southern Command but did not extend to the other military participants and 

contributors. In the campaign against the terrorists who struck the United 

States and their supporters, such an understanding seems to have informed the 

effort from its earliest stages. As with the “wars” on drugs, crime, and poverty, 

the war on terrorism did not appear to promise a clear and decisive triumph in 

the near-term.7
[ 8 1 ]

Endnotes

Preface:

1. Gerald H. Turley, “Prepare for the Most Likely 

Commitments,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (April 2001), p. 89.

2. “Verbatim,” Washington Post, 16 July 2000, p. B2.

Chapter 1

1. “Stability operations are typically characterized by intra-state conflict between two or more 

factions divided over issues such as ethnicity, 

nationality and religion. A stability operation is 

an umbrella term encompassing peace building, 

peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement.” Catherine Abbott, “Utilization of New 

Zealand Defence Force Capabilities on International Stability and Military Operations 1946-

1998,” Unpublished mss, p. 4. Not all observers 

see these operations as existing on a continuum. 

Some view peace enforcement as categorically 

different from peacekeeping, because the former 

requires participants to be heavily armed, involves 

much greater danger, and carries a much higher 

likelihood that the arms will be used. See Frederick 

Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, 

Solutions, and US Interests (Westport, CT: Praeger, 

2002).

2. At the end of November 2002, the author was 

able to identify 450 operational names; some were 

used only for planning purposes; others cross-referenced to other names. Nevertheless, the large 

number of names is confusing. The more extensive 

list of names published in William M. Arkin, Code 

Names: Deciphering US Military Plans, Programs 

and Operations in the 9/11 World (Hanover, NH: 

Steerforth Press, 2004) also includes names of 

exercises and programs.

3. On the naming of operations, both the theory, 

with its well-ordered system based on blocs of 

letters assigned to the combatant commands, and 

the practice, with its eye to the public image, see

the following: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Manual 3150.29A, “Code Word, Nickname, 

and Exercise Term Report (Short Title—NICKA), April 23, 1998; Linton Weeks, “Operation 

War Language: How the Pentagon Mints its 

Campaign Monikers,” Washington Post, September 21, 2001, p. C1; Gregory C. Sieminski, “The 

Art of Naming Operations,” Naval War College 

student paper, in author’s files.

4. Data was assembled by the author from a 

variety of Joint Staff sources.

5. See Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of 

American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

1994), p. 3.

6. Thomas Mockaitis, “From Counterinsurgency 

to Peace Enforcement,” Peace Operations Between 

War and Peace, edited by Erwin A. Schmidl (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 42-43.

7. US Army, FM 100-23: Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, 1994), p. iii.

8. Peter Walker and Jonathan Walter, eds., World 

Disasters Report 2000: Focus on Public Health

(Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross 

and Red Crescent Societies, 2000), pp. 159-162. 

The database contains information from a variety 

of sources, and the Red Cross considers its overall 

compilation “relative and indicative, rather than 

absolute.” “Priority is given to data from UN 

agencies, followed by OFDA, and then governments and the International Federation. The 

priority is not a reflection of the quality or value 

of the data, but it recognizes that most reporting 

sources do not cover all disasters or have political 

limitations that may affect the figures.”

9. Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 2-3.

10. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency 

and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 1998), p. 3.
[ 8 2 ]

Other than War

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

Chapter 2

1. See Edward M. Coffman, “The Duality of the 

American Military Tradition,” Journal of Military 

History 64 (October 2000), pp. 967-980, and the 

works cited in Coffman’s article regarding the 

history of reserve components of United States 

forces.

2. See, for example, Marvin A. Kreidberg and 

Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization 

in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955).

3. Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, p. 177, characterizes the United States military’s view of peace 

support operations as persistent “isolationist policy 

and antipathy ....”

4. James A. Schear, “The Interagency Planning 

Process,” Interagency Coordination and Planning 

Seminar, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, October 11, 2000.

5. Remarks of George W. Bush, transcript of 

presidential debate of October 11, 2000, New York 

Times, October 12, 2000, pp. A20-21. See also Andrea Stone, “Let Others Take Up Peacekeeping, 

Pentagon’s No. 2 Says,” USA Today, June 19, 2001.

6. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, p. 4.

7. Roy W. Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 

David Breeze and Valerie A. Maxfield, eds. (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 34. 

On the Roman army’s role in protecting and 

nurturing society on various frontiers, see: Stephen 

K. Drummond, “The Roman Army as a Frontier 

Institution in the First and Second Centuries 

AD,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University 

of Kansas, 1981; Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial 

Roman Army, Raphael Bate trans., (London: 

Routledge, 1994); Derek Williams, Romans and 

Barbarians: Four Views from the Empire’s Edge, 1st

Century AD (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); 

Derek Williams, The Reach of Rome: A History of 

the Roman Imperial Frontier 1st-5th Centuries AD 

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

8. Williams, Reach of Rome, p. 38.

9. Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Army and the 

Settlement of the West (Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. x; Stephen K. Drummond, “The Roman Army as a Frontier Institution 

in the First and Second Centuries AD,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, 

1981, p. 157. Roman tactics and equipment were 

designed to reduce their casualties. As Robert 

Kaplan noted, “We are not the first great empire 

to despise casualties.” Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior 

Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos

(New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 123-124.

10. Coffman, “The Duality of the American Military Tradition,” pp. 971-972.

11. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Indian Heritage of 

America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 

316; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense: A Military History of the United 

States of America (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 

92; William H. Guthman, March to Massacre: A 

History of the First Seven Years of the United States 

Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 

1975), pp. 220-244; Robert M. Utley, “The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military 

Tradition,” in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in 

Military History, 1959-1987, edited by Harry R. 

Borowski, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, 1988), p. 533. The Continental Army had 

been disbanded in 1784, and a single regiment, the 

1st American Regiment, was established immediately afterward. This unit depended on the states 

for manpower and Congress for money. The first 

units of a truly national army were not established 

until the creation of General “Mad Anthony” 

Wayne’s Legion of the United States, over 5,000 

strong, in 1793. See Millett and Maslowski, Common Defense, pp. 86-93.

12. John B. Wilson, Campaign Streamers of the 

United States Army (Washington, DC: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1995), p. 16.

13. Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 

Sons, 1956), p. 110; Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency, p. 7; Utley, “The Contribution of the 

Frontier to the American Military Tradition,” 

p. 527. For a detailed discussion of the missions 

summarized by Utley, see Tate, Frontier Army.

14. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The 

Making of American Sea Power (New York: The 

Free Press, 1991), pp. 157-158. Also see Frank N. 
Endnotes

[ 8 3 ]

Schubert, ed., The Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps of Topographical Engineers 

1838-1863 (Fort Belvoir, VA: Office of History, 

US Army Corps of Engineers, 1988); Frank N. 

Schubert, Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers 

in the Trans-Mississippi West 1819-1879 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Office of the 

Chief of Engineers, 1980).

15. See Jack Sweetman, American Naval History: 

An Illustrated Chronology of the US Navy and 

Marine Corps, 1775-Present (Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 1989), passim for the Navy’s operational history in this period.

16. Hagan, This People’s Navy, p. 94.

17. Sweetman, American Naval History, pp. 39-49, 

61; Ellen C. Collier, Instances of Use of United 

States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report 

No. 89-651 F, 1989), p. 4; Hagan, This People’s 

Navy, p. 92. An 1820 American law defined the 

slave trade as piracy.

18. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great 

Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 

154-155; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: 

Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New 

York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 51. Also see Millis, 

Arms and Men, p. 85.

19. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, p. 4; Boot, Savage Wars, 

p. 39.

20. “The shift from slavery to freedom precipitated by the Civil War was the cataclysmic event and 

central dilemma of the [nineteenth] century.” Kirk 

Savage, Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, 

War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 

Press, 1997), p. 3. Nevertheless, it is also true 

that the war with Mexico was “the only formally 

declared American war fought between 1815 and 

1898.” Hagan, This People’s Navy, p. 124.

21. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, p. 5.

22. United States Army, Record of Engagements 

with Hostile Indians within the Military Division of 

the Missouri from 1868 to 1882, Lieutenant General 

P. H. Sheridan, Commanding (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1882), pp. 7-102.

23. Three separate counts yield anywhere from 

939 to 1,282. A composite count of all encounters 

listed in at least one of these three sources totals 

1,296. See: Adjutant General’s Office, Chronological List of Actions, &c., With Indians, From January 

1, 1866, to January, 1891; Francis E. Heitman, 

Historical Register and Dictionary of the United 

States Army, from its Organization, September 

29, 1789, to March 2, 1903, vol. 2 (Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 426-449; 

George W. Webb, Chronological List of Engagements Between the Regular Army of the United 

States and Various Tribes of Hostile Indians Which 

Occurred During the Years 1790 to 1898, Inclusive

(St. Joseph, MO: National Indian War Veterans, 

1939). A fourth count was made by Thomas D. 

Phillips, “The Black Regulars,” in The West of 

the American People, edited by Allan G. Bogue, 

Thomas D. Phillips, and James E. Wright (Itasca, 

IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., n.d.), p. 141. 

Phillips concluded that there had been 2,704 

armed encounters but neither published a list nor 

explained his research.

24. Wilson, Campaign Streamers, p. 16; John M. 

Carroll, The Indian Wars Campaign Medal: Its 

History and Its Recipients (Mattituck, NY: J. M. 

Carroll & Co., 1992), p. iii.

25. John M. Gates, “Indians and Insurrectos,” p. 4, 

in Gates, The US Army in Irregular Warfare (http://

www.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-ch2.html

(copy in author’s files). Also see Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the 

Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor: University of 

Michigan Press, 1974), p. 61.

26. John Bigelow, “Tenth Regiment of Cavalry,” 

Journal of the Military Service Institution 8 (March 

1892), p. 221.

27. George Andrews, “Twenty-fifth Regiment of 

Infantry,” Journal of the Military Service Institution

8 (March 1892), p. 225.

28. Quoted in Edward T. Lininthal, Sacred 

Ground: Americans and their Battlefields (Urbana: 

University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 131.

29. Utley, “The Contribution of the Frontier to the 

American Military Tradition,” p. 530.

30. Quoted in Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the 

Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-

1899 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 

1994), pp. 120-121.
[ 8 4 ]

Other than War

31. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. 283. A consequence of preoccupation with large conventional 

warfare was that there was little written on the 

conduct of frontier wars. Edward S. Farrow, 

Mountain Scouting, A Handbook for Officers and 

Soldiers on the Frontier (New York: E. S. Farrow, 

1881), was, according to historian Jerome A. 

Greene, “something of a phenomenon, for treatises 

dealing with the formal methodology of Indian 

warfare are virtually nonexistent.” See Greene, 

“Introduction,” Farrow, Mountain Scouting, p. 3. 

Farrow was an experienced frontier officer, cited 

for bravery in action during the Nez Percé War of 

1879, who taught tactics at the Military Academy. 

On the overall matter of the transmission of 

lessons learned in the field during the hard years 

of frontier combat against the western tribes, see

Thomas A. Dowling, “Intelligence in the Final Indian Wars, 1866-1887” (MA thesis, Joint Military 

Intelligence College, 1996).

32. Jerome A. Greene, “Foreword,” Farrow, Mountain Scouting, p. 3. Greene’s essay provides a good 

summary of the Army’s tactical approach to battle 

with western tribes.

33. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: 

US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building 

in Panama Following Just Cause (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), p. 19.

34. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Summary 

Report of a Conference On: Operations Other Than 

War (Washington: IFPA, 1995), p. v.

35. Tate, Frontier Army, p. 216.

36. Tate, Frontier Army, p. 215.

37. Tate, Frontier Army, pp. 215-216.

38. James E. Sefton, The United States Army and 

Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 41.

39. For a copy of the pertinent section of the 

1879 Appropriations Act (Section 1385, Chapter 

LXVII, Title 18, US Code), see William W. Epley, 

comp., Roles and Missions of the United States Army: 

Basic Documents with Annotations and Bibliography

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 1991), p. 119. For many years, historians 

accepted the Southern white view that this Act 

was adopted in response to excesses and abuses of 

power by the military. That view survives in Epley, 

Roles and Missions, and in another official Army 

volume, Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, 

The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic 

Disorders 1877-1945, (Washington, DC: US 

Army Center of Military History, 1997). For more 

balanced perspectives, see Robert W. Coakley, The 

Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 

1789-1878, (Washington, DC: US Army Center 

of Military History, 1988), and Sefton, United 

States Army and Reconstruction.

40. Tate, Frontier Army, pp. 98-99, 107-109.

41. Frank N. Schubert, Buffalo Soldiers, Braves 

and the Brass: the Story of Fort Robinson, Nebraska

(Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing 

Company, 1993), p. 121.

42. Many of these operations are mentioned in 

Tate, Frontier Army, pp. 216-225. Also see Gaines 

M. Foster, The Demands of Humanity: Army 

Medical Disaster Relief (Washington, DC: Center 

of Military History, 1983); Jerry M. Cooper, 

“The Army and Industrial Workers: Strikebreaking in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Soldiers 

and Civilians: the US Army and the American 

People, edited by Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. 

Nenninger (Washington, DC: National Archives 

and Records Administration, 1987); Clayton D. 

Laurie, “Extinguishing Frontier Brushfires: The 

US Army’s Role in Quelling the Pullman Strike 

in the West, 1894,” Journal of the West 32 (April 

1993), pp. 54-63; Laurie and Cole, The Role of 

Federal Military Forces.

43. Utley, “The Contribution of the Frontier to the 

American Military Tradition,” p. 530.

44. Sweetman, American Naval History, pp. 91-

102; Collier, Instances of Use of United States Armed 

Forces Abroad, 1798-1989, pp. 6-8.

45. Henry H. Shelton, “Peace Operations: The 

Forces Required,” National Security Studies Quarterly 6 (Summer 2000), p. 105.

Chapter 3

1. Sweetman, American Naval History, pp. 116-

154; Collier, Instances of Use of United States Armed 

Forces Abroad, 1798-1989, pp. 9-14; John Whiteclay Chambers II, editor, The Oxford Companion 

to American Military History (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1999), pp. 98, 580.

2. Hagan, This People’s Navy, pp. 236-237.
Endnotes

[ 8 5 ]

3. Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United 

States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934

(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 

p. 39; Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military 

History (Washington, DC: US Army Center of 

Military History, 1989), pp. 352-353, 355; Millett 

and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, pp. 

318-319.

4. The United States never joined the League of 

Nations, but concern for maintenance of some 

semblance of stability in Latin America demanded that some commitment be made to this effort 

to avert war over the small Amazon River port of 

Leticia. See William O. Scroggs, The United States 

in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign 

Relations, 1933 (New York: Harper & Brothers for 

the Council on Foreign Relations, 1934); p. 193.

5. Sweetman, American Naval History, pp. 119, 

120, 127, 146, 147, 156; Norman Polmar, Aircraft 

Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its 

Influence on World Events (Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday, 1969), p. 52. The largest American 

humanitarian operation of all time did not involve 

American forces in a management role. The 

American Relief Administration in 1921-1922 fed 

more than ten million Russian adults and children 

during 1921-1922. This remarkable operation 

involved 199 Americans assisted by about 120,000 

Soviets. See Bertrand M. Patenaude, The Big Show 

in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921 (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2002).

6. Walker and Walter, eds., World Disasters Report 

2000, p. 176.

7. Kenneth Anderson, “Language, Law and 

Terror,” (London) Times Literary Supplement, no. 

5138 (September 21, 2001), pp. 13-15.

8. Tate, Frontier Army, pp. 108-110.

9. For an overview of early projects of these two 

types, see Schubert, ed., The Nation Builders.

10. See John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The 

US Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, 

CT: Greenwood Press, 1973); Hans Schmidt, 

The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934

(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 

1971); Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: 

The Dominican Republic During the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas 

Press, 1984); Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. 

Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic 1916-

1924 (Washington, DC: History and Museums 

Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1974); 

Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Durham, NC: 

Duke University Press, 1985); and Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States 

Marine Corps (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

11. Quoted in John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution 

1913-1917 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 32.

12. David A. Wilson, “Nation-Building and Revolutionary War,” in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. 

Foltz, eds., Nation-Building (New York: Atherton 

Press, 1966), p. 84.

13. This definition very closely follows that 

proposed by Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, p. 10. 

Also see Haass, Intervention, p. 61.

14. Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, p. 175.

15. See Robert T. Cossaboom, The Joint Contact 

Team Program (Washington, DC: Joint History 

Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 1997).

16. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Summary 

Report of a Conference on: Operations Other Than 

War, p. 5.

17. 10 US Code Annotated 401 (1998), paragraphs 

(c)(3), (e)(2), and (e)(4).

18. Edward Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military 

Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75 ( June-August 1996), 

p. 33. Rudolph Vecoli described the international 

consensus that held together so-called free-world 

states and stifled the outbreak of small conflicts 

not related to the great superpower competition 

as “the discipline of fear ....” Vecoli, “American 

Centrifuge: Ethnicity in the United States at the 

End of the Century,” Politics and Progress: American Society and the State since 1865, Andrew E. 

Kersten and Kriste Lindenmeyer, eds. (Westport, 

CT: Praeger, 2001), p. 140.

19. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, p. 19; Barry M. 

Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without 

War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument

(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 

23; Gerald H. Turley, “Prepare for the Most Likely 

Commitments,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (April, 2001), pp. 88-89; Conrad C. Crane, 
[ 8 6 ]

Other than War

Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army’s Response to Defeat 

in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2002), p. 2.

20. Turley, “Prepare for the Most Likely Commitments,” pp. 88-89.

21. Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1934, 1939), p. 7.

22. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in 

the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1988), p. 670; William Doyle, An American Insurrection: the Battle of Oxford, Mississippi, 

1962 (New York: Doubleday, 2001), pp. 277-278. 

For a summary of earlier uses of Federal armed 

forces to suppress civil disturbances, see Doyle, An 

American Insurrection, pp. 101-102. The quotation 

is from Doyle, An American Insurrection, p. 257.

23. Both the lists and the quoted phrase are in 

Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 

1998), pp. 178-179.

24. Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos, p. 84.

25. Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in 

Nineteenth Century Europe (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1999), pp. 7-8, 17, 149-152. The 

quotation is from page 7.

26. The US Army also had substantial experience 

with domestic intelligence gathering. The Army 

became prominent in domestic surveillance directed against American citizens during World War I, 

when “Army intelligence ... became a vast force at 

home for the first time in history,” and remained 

active through the Depression, World War II, and 

into the Cold War. This role became especially 

controversial because of “massive army surveillance 

of dissenters” during the Vietnam War years, but 

by then domestic military intelligence activities 

had a long history, starting as unorganized and 

extemporaneous in the nineteenth century and becoming more systematic in the twentieth. See Joan 

M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-

1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 

The quotations are from pages 177 and 230.

27. Emsley, Gendarmes and the State, pp. 154-155, 

172, 204-205.

28. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

1990), p. 163.

29. The names of two of the chapters in Birtle, 

US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine reflect the importance of this 

type of operation. Chapter 3, “The Constabulary 

Years, 1865-1898,” covered operations during 

Reconstruction in the South and against Indians 

in the West. Chapter 5, “The Imperial Constabulary Years, 1900-1913,” covered missions in China, 

Cuba, and the Philippines.

30. David Robertson, “Modern Technology and 

the Future of the Soldier,” Europe’s New Security

Challenges, Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price 

and Erich Reiter, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner, 2001), p. 81. The requirement to fight 

and win two “major theater wars” was reminiscent 

of the approach of another unrivalled superpower, 

Great Britain in the 1880s. The huge shipbuilding 

program of 1884 was justified by a “two-power 

standard,” meaning that “the Royal Navy ought 

always to be equal or superior to the combined 

forces of the next two largest navies in the world.” 

William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: 

Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since AD 1000

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 

274-275.

31. See, for example, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, Summary Report of a Conference on: 

Operations Other Than War, for expressions of an 

Army consensus in favor of avoiding involvement 

in gendarme operations.

32. Lars-Erik Nelson, “Armed to the Teeth,” 

New York Daily News, 3 September 2000, DL 

Washington.

33. Utley, The Contribution of the Frontier to the 

American Military Tradition, p. 528.

34. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the 

Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs 79 (November-December 2000), p. 46.

35. Richard C. Hottelet, “Moving Beyond Makeshift Peacekeeping,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 

Sep 2000, p. 11.

36. James Kitfield, “Standing Apart,” National 

Journal, June 13, 1998.

Chapter 4

1. Savannah (Georgia) Morning News, July 29, 

2001; Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the 

US-Mexican Border, 1872-1992: Low-Intensity 
Endnotes

[ 8 7 ]

Conflict Comes Home (Austin: The Center for 

Mexican American Studies, The University of 

Texas at Austin, 1996), pp. 2-3, 25; National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, 

Public Law 100-456, 29 September 1988 (102 

Stat. 1918). Dunn argues that the expanded use 

of the military services in counter-drug operations on the border and military involvement in 

coordination of efforts to stem illegal immigration 

indicate an increasing militarization of the border 

with Mexico. See Dunn, Militarization of the 

US-Mexican Border, pp. 133-138.

2. To their credit, military officers almost immediately began thinking and writing about aspects 

of their role in counter-drug missions. Five of the 

seven articles in the March 1990 issue of Military 

Review, published by the Army’s Command 

and General Staff College, dealt with matters 

related to operations against drug traffickers. The 

Proceedings of the US Naval Institute also had three 

articles on the subject during the first half of 1990, 

one article was about the US Coast Guard.

3. Dunn, Militarization of the US-Mexican Border, 

p. 25; US General Accounting Office, Assets 

DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug 

Supply Have Declined (Report No. GAO/

NSIAD 00-9, December 1999), p. 8; Savannah

(Georgia) Morning News, July 29, 2001.

4. Sweetman, American Naval History, p. 145.

5. See Eric S. Ensign, Intelligence in the Rum War 

at Sea, 1920-1933 (Washington: Joint Military 

Intelligence College, 2001).

6. On the planning and execution of Just Cause, 

see Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: Panama

(Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995).

7. Other names associated with Just Cause 

included Blue Spoon, JTF South, Nimble Lion, 

and Poplar Tree.

8. Other names associated with Promote Liberty 

were Backstop, Hawk, Joint Task Force Panama 

90, and Overwatch.

9. Adam Wolfson, “How to Think about Humanitarian War,” Commentary 110 ( July-August 2000), 

p. 45.

10. Other names associated with this operation 

were Maintain Democracy, Haiti Assistance 

Group (HAG), JTF Raleigh, Phoenix Halibut, 

Phoenix Shark, Restore Democracy, Support Democracy, and UNMIH (United Nations Mission 

in Haiti).

11. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 

States: William J. Clinton, 1994, vol. II, August 1 

to December 31, 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 

1994), p. 1572.

12. John Pitts, Migrant Resettlement Operations. 

Supplement Nr. 2 to US Southern Command 

History for 1 January 1994-31 December 1995 

(Miami, FL: Office of the Command Historian, 

1998) p. 1.

13. See, for example, John Pitts, United States 

Southern Command, Command History: Tenure of 

General Barry R. McCaffrey, February 1994-February 1996 (Miami, FL: Office of the Command 

Historian, 1998), p. 128.

14. Pitts, Migrant Resettlement Operations, pp. 1-2.

15. Haass, Intervention, p. 47. The population 

of Haiti was estimated in 1982 at just over five 

million.

16. Pitts, Migrant Resettlement Operations, p. 4.

17. William S. Cohen, Report to Congress on US 

Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War (Washington: 

OSD, March 1999), pp. 13-14.

18. The Commission on America’s National 

Interests, America’s National Interests, July 2000, 

p. 37., http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/

monographs/nationalinterests.pdf.

19. Pitts, Migrant Resettlement Operations, pp. 1, 

2, 4.

20. These were Operations Central Haven (Belize), Island Haven (Honduras), and West Haven 

(Costa Rica).

21. Daniel L. Haulman, The United States Air Force 

and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947-1994

(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), p.7.

22. Washington Post, January 27, 2000; New York 

Times, October 20 and 27, 2000. For an account of 

the lengths to which people are willing to go and 

the risks and deprivations that they will endure, 

see David Finkel, “Dreams Dashed on the Rocks,” 

Washington Post, June 10, 2001. Also see Brian 

Lavery, “Irish Say Refugees Were in Box Aboard 
[ 8 8 ]

Other than War

Ship for Up to 8 Days,” New York Times, December 10, 2001; John W. Fountain with Jim Yardley, 

“Skeletons Tell Tale of Gamble By Immigrants,” 

New York Times, October 16, 2002.

23. Barbara Crosette, “Stiffer Rules Are a Threat 

to Refugees, Agency Says,” New York Times,

December 13, 1998; Crossette, “For Lack of 

Support, UN Agency Shrinks Aid to Refugees,” 

New York Times, April 29, 2001; RAN, Australian 

Maritime Doctrine, p. 57; “Afghan Refugees Arrive 

at Anauru,” New York Times, 19 September 2001; 

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 1996, p. 78. The United 

States and several other major donors reduced 

their contributions to the UN High Commissioner which in the spring of 2001 forced the UN 

to cut its assistance to the estimated 22 million 

refugees in the world.

24. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: 

Understanding the International Economic Order 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 

pp. 365-366. Throughout the period, the discussion of the international movements of people 

focused on limiting such movements.

25. International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report, 

1996, pp. 78, 122; Von Hippel, Democracy By Force, 

p. 170.

26. Alexander M. Monroe, US Atlantic Command 

Support of Counterdrug Operations in the Caribbean

1989-1997, p. 17. See Section 4205 of Public Law 

100-690 (102 Stat. 4268) and Section 1101 of 

Public Law 100-456 (102 Stat. 1918).

27. David Passage, “Latin America: The Next 

Quarter-Century Challenges and Opportunities,” 

in Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the 

Cold War, edited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Robert 

L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and W. Bradley Stock (N.P.: 

n.p.), pp. 125-126.

28. US General Accounting Office, Assets DOD 

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined, pp. 13-16.

29. Command History Division, United States 

Pacific Command, Commander in Chief US Pacific

Command History, 1990, vol. I (Camp H. M. 

Smith, Hawaii, 1991), p. 90.

30. Mervin W. Stark, US Army Forces Command 

Annual Command History, 1 January 1996-31 

December 1996 (Fort McPherson, GA: Military 

History Office, US Army Forces Command), 

[1998].

31. US General Accounting Office, Assets DOD 

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined, p. 8. For an unclassified Joint 

Interagency Task Force East organization chart, 

see (S-NF) Monroe, US Atlantic Command 

Support of Counterdrug Operations in the Caribbean 

1989-1997, p. 23; (U) “JIATF East Mission and 

History ( JIATF-E History 20000826.doc), in 

(S) HQ USSOUTHCOM Historical Archives, 

September 1997-September 2000, disk 5.

32. Dunn, The Militarization of the US-Mexico 

Border, p. 135; Dallas Morning News, November 

19, 1999.

33. This summary of counter-drug operations was 

compiled from annual histories of the unified 

commands and is understated. There tends to be a 

lag of a few years before histories of operations in 

specific years are completed. When the histories 

of the commands at the end of the decade are 

completed, they will almost certainly contain 

additional entries. Reported operations for Joint 

Task Force 6 included many activities too small 

for inclusion in annual histories, but they do 

suggest the problems in counting operations and 

comparing types of operations quantitatively.

34. US General Accounting Office, Assets DOD 

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined, pp. 32-33; e-mail message, John 

Pitts, SOUTHCOM historian, to author, 6 January 2001, author’s files.

35. US General Accounting Office, Drug Control: 

DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts, 

(Report No. GAO/NSIAD 00-77, January 2000), 

pp. 1-16.

36. The number “207” is significantly smaller 

than the number of names of operations and 

was reached by counting only the names that 

were attached to overall missions, rather than to 

subsumed component command missions. For 

example, Joint Guard was counted as an operation, 

but Decisive Guard, Deliberate Guard, and Determined Guard, all of which were components of 

Joint Guard, were not.

37. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 

1997, p. 4.
Endnotes

[ 8 9 ]

38. Benjamin Miller, “The Logic of US Military 

Interventions in the post-Cold War Era,” Contemporary Security Policy, 19 Dec 1998, p. 81.

Chapter 5

1. Frank J. Cook, III, Jeffrey A. McChesney, Gary 

R. Stephens, Gregory G. Wilmoth, and William 

M. Wilson, The Defense Department’s Role in 

Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government National Security Program 

Policy Analysis Paper 93-02 (Cambridge: Harvard 

University, 1993), pp. 2, 4.

2. The International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies considers the category of 

“natural disasters” to include disasters caused by 

earthquakes, landslides and avalanches, epidemics, 

droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, forest and 

scrub fires, volcanoes, windstorms, insect infestations, and waves and surges. Walker and Walter, 

eds., World Disasters Report 2000, p. 172.

3. Walker and Walter, eds., World Disasters Report 

2000, p. 169. The figure 2,468 was reached by 

subtracting the number of epidemics (340) and 

the number of non-natural disasters (2,056) from 

the Red Cross-Red Crescent total number of 

disasters (4,864).

4. Madison (Wisconsin) Capital Times, August 

1, 2000; US Army Reserve Command, News 

Release 99-03-24; US Army Reserve Command. 

“Joint Task Force ?? New Horizons 99-02,” briefing slides [Feb 99].

5. Billy T. Brooks and Kevin Roller, Historical 

Analysis of US Military Responses: 1975-1995

(McLean, VA: Science Applications International 

Corporation, 1996), p. 8.

6. Ann A. Ferrante, “Chronology of the United 

States Marine Corps–1997,” typescript (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps Historical Center).

7. Michael Chege, “What’s really wrong,” Times 

Literary Supplement, No. 5086 (September 22, 

2000), p. 8.

8. “A Peace Strategy for Congo,” New York Times, 

January 31, 2000. The comparison to the Thirty 

Years War has been made for another African war. 

See J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Africa’s 

Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963-

1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).

9. Ian Fisher, “Can International Relief Do More 

Good than Harm?” New York Times Magazine (11 

February 2001).

10. For an argument for the creation of a separate 

unified command dealing with Sub-Saharan 

Africa, see Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for 

Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified 

Command Plan,” Parameters, 30 (Winter 2000-

2001), pp. 102-117.

11. Presidential trips are not usually considered 

military operations. However, they are large 

consumers of military resources, especially aircraft 

and crews, but also communications, security, and 

administrative assets. See United States Transportation Command home page: http://tacc.scott.

af.mil/taccapps/custreport/MsnSummaryRpt.asp, 

for mission summary reports, Air Mobility Command, February 1999-July 2000. Also see US General Accounting Office, Presidential Travel: Costs 

and Accounting for the President’s 1998 Trips to 

Africa, Chile, and China, GAO/NSIAD-99-164; 

Ellen Nakashima, “White House Travel Bill: $292 

Million,” Washington Post, August 18, 2000.

12. Atlas Response, the provision of emergency aid to flood victims in Mozambique and 

Madagascar, took place simultaneously with the 

single most expensive presidential trip to India, 

Bangladesh, Pakistan, Oman, and Switzerland in 

March 2000. The trip required 5,704 flying hours 

by Air Mobility Command aircraft and crews, 

“to ferry everything from trucks and communications equipment to the presidential limousine.” 

By contrast, the relief effort took 1,592 hours, 

less than one-third of those required for the trip. 

Ellen Nakashima, “White House Travel Bill: 

$292 Million,” Washington Post, August 18, 2000; 

United States Transportation Command home 

page: http://tacc.scott.af.mil/taccapps/custreport/ 

MsnSummaryRpt.asp, for mission summary 

reports, Air Mobility Command, February 1999-

July 2000.

13. David Robertson, “Modern Technology and 

the Future of the Soldier,” Europe’s New Security

Challenges, Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price 

and Erich Reiter, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 71.

14. (S) E-mail, COL Jim A. Coggin, J5, to CJCS, 

8 August 2000. Material quoted was unclassified. 

Also see Ian Fisher, “Congo’s War Triumphs Over 

Peace Accord,” New York Times, Mon, Septem-
[ 9 0 ]

Other than War

ber 18, 2000, pp. 1, 8, DL Congo, September 

13, 2000; Philip Gourevitch, “Forsaken: How a 

seven-nation war engulfed Congo,” New Yorker, 

September 25, 2000; Michael Chege, “What’s 

really wrong,” Times Literary Supplement, No. 5086 

(September 22, 2000), p. 8; Douglas Farah, “Upheavals Undermine Hope for W. Africa Stability,” 

Washington Post, September 29, 2000, p. 29, DL 

Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Blaine Harden, “The US 

Keeps Looking for a Few Good Men,” New York 

Times, August 27, 2000, Week in Review, pp. 1, 5; 

Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, p. 190.

15. “Security at 220 of 260 US Embassies Falls 

Short,” Washington Post, September 19, 1998, p. 6.

16. Until that time the only other instance of 

American troops serving under UN command 

during the decade had been in the 1993 United 

Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in 

Macedonia. This force deployed in accordance 

with UN Security Council Resolution 795 of 

11 December 1992, to prevent escalation of 

ethnic clashes between Serbs and Albanians. A 

battalion-sized American force, called Task Force 

Able Sentry, joined the UNPROFOR contingent 

in July 1993 and participated in this organization, 

which numbered about 1,200, until March 1995.

17. Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 43, 46.

18. International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 

1996, p. 9.

19. International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 

1996, p. 63.

20. Joseph P. Culligan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: Relations Between Civilian and Military 

Components,” in Fariborz L. Mokhtari, ed., 

Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare: 

The Future Role of the United Nations (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 

pp. 57-70; US European Command, After Action 

Review: Operation Support Hope 1994, p. 2; Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1995); Jonathan 

T. Dworken, “Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief 

Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly No. 8 (Summer 

1995), pp. 14-20; Resource Guide, Unified Task 

Force Somalia, December 1992-May 1993, Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, DC: US Army 

Center of Military History, 1994); Joint Doctrine 

for Civil-Military Operations ( Joint Publication 

3-57), 8 February 2001.

21. Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 69-70; 

Dworken, “Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief 

Operations,” pp. 15-16. For a detailed list of Civil 

Military Operations Center functions, see Allard, 

Somalia Operations, pp. 109-111.

22. Stephen J. Guerra, Responses to Harm’s-Way and 

Humanitarian Situations by Naval Forces, 1990-

1996, CRM 97-100 (Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1997), p. 19.

23. Daniel L. Haulman, The United States Air Force 

and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947-1994

(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 114-115.

24. Cook, McChesney, Stephens, Wilmoth, and 

Wilson, The Defense Department’s Role in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, p. 9.

25. See Table 18, Overseas Deployment, Ashore 

and Afloat, 1980-2000.

26. Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth 

Century Europe, pp. 204-207.

Chapter 6

1. Brooks and Roller, Historical Analysis of US 

Military Responses: 1975-1995, p. 32.

2. Charles C. Moskos, The Media and the Military 

in Peace and Humanitarian Operations (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2000), p. 

8; US Agency for International Development, 

situation report, 17 October 1994, p. 2, mentioned 

118 NGOs, but according to the Red Cross, “In 

Goma in 1994 ... there were over 100 NGOs 

operating in support of refugees, while in Rwanda 

itself, numbers reached over 200.” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Societies, World Disasters Report 1996, p. 63. John 

Keane, “Who’s in charge here?” Times Literary 

Supplement (18 May 2001), p. 13, estimates that 

there are about 40,000 not-for-profit international 

nongovernmental organizations.

3. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, May 1997, p. 9. Smaller powers, 

including the United States in the pre-Civil War 

period, have usually been vocal proponents of 

international law and multilateral action. Great 

powers have relied on their power to provide 
Endnotes

[ 9 1 ]

security and prosperity. The United States, while it 

supported multinational operations in the 1990s, 

remained inclined, and able, to act alone when it 

needed to do so. Michael Ignatief notes, “multilateral solutions to the world’s problems are all 

very well, but they have no teeth unless America 

bares its fangs.” See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and 

Power: America and Europe in the New World Order

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 38-41, 

45-46, 51-52, 75-76; Michael Ignatief, “The Burden,” New York Times Magazine, 5 January 2003, 

pp. 22-27, 50, 53-54.

4. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 11-12.

5. Ann A. Ferrante, “Chronology of the United 

States Marine Corps–1999,” typescript (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps Historical Center), 

copy in author’s files. Also see James Kitfield, 

“Peacekeepers’ Progress,” National Journal, 32 

(December 2000).

6. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 12.

7. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the 

Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs 79 (November-December 2000), p. 45.

8. Lisa Troshinsky, “Study Changes ‘Two MTW’ 

Standard, But Lacks Measuring Tools,” Navy 

News & Undersea Technology, 2 October 2000, p. 1.

9. D. Robert Worley, Challenges to Train, Organize, 

and Equip the Complete Combined Arms Team: The 

Joint Task Force (IDA paper P-3431, September 

1998), pp. 10-12.

10. Stephen J. Guerra, Responses to Harm’s-Way and 

Humanitarian Situations by Naval Forces, 1990-

1996, CRM 97-100, (Alexandria VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1997), p. 26.

11. Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., Eugene Cobble, Dmitry 

Gorenburg, Adam Moody, Richard Weitz, and 

Daniel Whiteneck, US Navy Responses to Situations, 1970-1999 (Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 2000), pp. 63, 77. This essay on 

the 1990s shows some understanding of how the 

operations of the decade make sense as clusters. 

The authors perceive the clusters somewhat 

differently, adding Haiti and Somalia to the two 

emphasized in this essay. They attached greater 

importance to the two clusters of naval operations 

in the Arabian Gulf and the Adriatic Sea, arguing 

that these two fueled the perception of response 

‘overload,’ given their duration, the routine nature 

of follow-on operations, and in the case of the 

Gulf, the scheduling demands imposed by the 

great transit distances to that area, p. 79.

12. The war in Vietnam also saw a proliferation 

of operational names, about twenty English-language names per year in the late 1960s, but there 

was never any question that they were all components of a single large conflict. For a chronology 

that identifies the many operations, see James S. 

Olson ed., Dictionary of the Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 547-560.

13. US General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency Operations Costs 

and Funding, GAO/NSAID-00-168, pp. 2-3. 

Between October 1994, when the number of people involved first reached into the thousands, until 

October 2000, the number deployed as of early 

October of every year are: 5,826 (1994), 4500 

(1995), 23,946 (1996), 17,659 (1997), 11,981 

(1998), 14,979 (1999), and 13,082 (2000).

14. The eight were: Vigilant Warrior, Vigilant 

Sentinel, Desert Thunder, Desert Fox, Desert 

Strike, Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, and 

Southern Watch.

15. “Overall, the United States usually maintains 

about 20,000 military personnel in the region 

[Southwest Asia], at a cost of at least $1.5 billion 

a year.” Thomas E. Ricks, “Persian Gulf, US Danger Zone,” Washington Post, Sunday, 15 October 

2000, pp. A1, A23; US General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency 

Operations Costs and Funding, p. 3.

16. See, for example, Dallas Morning News, 9 October 2000, regarding Air National Guard units 

from California, Oklahoma, Texas, and Iowa.

17. Other names associated with this effort were 

Continue Hope, Quick Draw, JTF Somalia, 

Impressive Lift, United Nations Observer Mission 

in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II, United Shield, 

and Phoenix Oryx.

18. There are at least three views of the Bush 

administration’s commitment during the summer 

of 1992 to support the relief effort in Somalia. 

First, there is the view that the decision to commit 

aircraft for delivery of relief supplies was motivated purely by humanitarian concerns, which was 

the view articulated at the Bush Library during a 
[ 9 2 ]

Other than War

conference on military intervention in November, 

2000. According to this perspective, President 

Bush was driven solely by concern for the misery 

in Somalia. Another view holds that the Bush 

administration response to Somalia was a direct 

response to images of starvation on television, a 

classic case of “the CNN effect.” This is the view 

taken in Walter Poole’s draft study, “The Effort 

to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994,” (S) 

Joint History Office: draft manuscript, October 

2000. This “CNN Effect” has a corollary, known as 

“the ‘Do Something Effect,’” caused by increased 

refugee flow affecting developed countries, media 

attention to suffering, and the felt need to defy 

“nasty rulers.” See Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, 

pp. 25-26. Finally, there is the view of Samantha 

Power that the humanitarian response was driven 

by an effort to reduce attention to images of 

misery in the Balkans, where the commitment 

required to mitigate the misery was far larger 

and riskier. According to Power, the initiative in 

Somalia succeeded in diminishing coverage and 

therefore, interest in the Balkan tragedy, kind of 

an indirect “CNN effect.” Samantha Power, “A 

Problem from Hell,” America and the Age of Genocide

(2002), pp. 285-286.

19. Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing 

US Policy in Somalia (Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 1995), pp. 5, 7-9, 11-14, 43.

20. For a vivid description of the events in Mogadishu, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A 

Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly 

Press, 1999).

21. David Halberstam, “Clinton and the Generals,” Vanity Fair, (September 2001).

22. Poole, “The Effort to Save Somalia, August 

1992-March 1994,” (S), pp. 88-92. Section cited is 

unclassified.

23. General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, Commander 

in Chief, US Central Command, coined this term 

and used it in an article “A CINC’s Perspective,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Number 2, Autumn 1993, 

according to Jay E. Hines, “Forged in the Desert,” 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The 10th Anniversary of 

the Gulf War, edited by Charles Oldham (Tampa, 

FL: Faircount, LLC, 2001), p. 61.

24. For a critique of this “normal” model, see Eliot 

A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, 

and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free 

Press, 2002).

25. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, May 1997, pp. 8-9.

26. “Military Support to Complex Humanitarian 

Emergencies from Practice to Policy,” 26 Oct 95, 

http://www.cna.org/newsevents/conferences/95cf.

html (copy in author’s files, JHO); Also see Thomas 

R. Mockaitis, “From Counterinsurgency to Peace 

Enforcement: New Names for Old Games?” in 

Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., Peace Operations Between 

War and Peace (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 54.

27. Zinni urged the importance of allowing for “... 

mission shift (a conscious evolution that responds 

to the changing situation) ....” See his “Military 

Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 

from Practice to Policy,” Center for Naval Analysis Conference, 26 October 1995, http://www.

cna.org/newsevents/conferences/95cf.html.]. Also 

see Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace 

Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” Peace 

Operations Between War and Peace, Schmidl, ed. 

(London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 16.

28. Washington Post, August 21, 2000. “Force 

protection” ordinarily emphasized the dangers emanating from hostile forces; other risks included 

disease.

29. Michael Ignatieff, “The New American Way of 

War,” New York Review of Books, 47 (20 July 2000), 

p. 42. Also see Don M. Snyder, John A. Nagl, and 

Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA; 

US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), pp. 

1-2; Adam Wolfson, “How To Think About Humanitarian War,” Commentary 110 ( July-August 

2000), pp. 44-48; Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy 

Delusion,” Foreign Affairs 77 ( January-February 

1998), pp. 57-60; William Langewiesche, “Peace 

Is Hell,” Atlantic Monthly, 288 (October 2001), 

p. 76. For the practical effect of this emphasis, 

illustrated by photographs of a British peacekeeper wearing a beret and an American with his 

Kevlar helmet, both in Kosovo, see Michael R. 

Gordon, “Looking Like War to Keep the Peace,” 

New York Times, 4 February 2001, Week In Review

section, p. 4.

30. Joyce Howard Price, “Like Osprey Crash, 

Training Can Be Tragic,” Washington Times, 29 

May 00, p. 1; Robert Novak, “Unknown War 
Endnotes

[ 9 3 ]

Leaves Victims in Anonymity,” Chicago SunTimes, 5 Aug 99, p. 33, cited in Moskos, The Media 

and the Military, endnote 9, p. 53; IFPA, Summary 

Report of a Conference On: Operations Other Than 

War, p. 6.

31. On the evolution of American policy regarding genocide, see Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 

America and the Age of Genocidec.

32. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. 282.

33. Other names were INTERFET, Stabilize, 

UNTAET, and USGET.

34. Other names used in regard to the mission 

in Haiti included Maintain Democracy, Haiti 

Assistance Group, JTF Raleigh, Phoenix Halibut, 

Phoenix Shark, Restore Democracy, and United 

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

35. At their peak, American operations in Haiti, 

involved about 24,000 service members.

36. Holbrooke made these observations on 1 December 2000 in a televised address to a conference 

on military intervention, held at the George Bush 

Conference Center, Texas A&M University. For 

“three different models for international intervention,” see Erwin A. Schmidl, “Peace Operations: 

An Assessment,” Europe’s New Security Challenges, 

Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price, and Erich 

Reiter, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 

p. 347.

37. “Verbatim,” Washington Post, 16 July 2000, p. 

B2.

Chapter 7

1. Air Mobility Command, which bore the brunt 

of the workload imposed by presidential travel, did 

not include presidential missions in its operational chronology. See Headquarters Air Mobility 

Command History Office, Air Mobility Command: 

Historical Chronologies (Scott Air Force Base, IL: 

n.d.). This document covers the period from June 

1992 through September 1997.

2. US General Accounting Office, Presidential 

Travel: Costs and Accounting for the President’s 

1998 Trips to Africa, Chile, and China (GAO/

NSIAD-99-164); John M. Broder, “In the Land 

of a Billion, a Fitting Presidential Retinue,” New 

York Times, June 21, 1998, Week in Review, p. 5; 

Nathan Abse, “Travel Report Riles White House,” 

Washington Post, 23 September 1999, p. A27; 

Ellen Nakashima, “White House Travel Bill: $292 

Million,” Washington Post, 18 August 2000, p. 2; 

George Lardner, Jr., “Study Names Clinton Most 

Frequent Flier,” Washington Post, 16 March 2001, 

p. A2.

3. Margaret Bone, “Flying Colors,” The Retired 

Officer Magazine, 57 (October 2001), p. 58.

4. From 1998 at least into 2000, data on units and 

aircraft involved in presidential trips, including 

sorties, units involved, and flying hours, was available on line on the USTRANSCOM, home page, 

http://tacc.scott.af.mil/ taccapps/custreport/MsnSummaryRpt.asp, as “Mission Summary Reports, 

Air Mobility Command, February 1999-December 2000” (Downloaded 21 July and 27 December 

2000).

5. E-mail message, Robert D. Brunkow to Aaron 

Horton, 9 April 2001, subject: Information, 

author’s files.

6. Mervin W. Stark, FORSCOM and the 1996 

Summer Olympic Games (Fort McPherson, GA: 

US Army Forces Command, 1999), pp. 2-4, 7, 10.

Chapter 8

1. See Lawrence J. Korb, “Are US Forces Unprepared and Underfunded? Fact and Fiction,” Naval 

War College Review, 55 (Spring 2002), pp. 36-37.

2. US General Accounting Office, Contingency 

Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses

Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-00-164), pp. 4-5. Also 

see Bruce D. Callander, “Pressures on the Guard 

and Reserve,” Air Force Magazine, November 

1998, p. 36.

3. James Morris, Pax Britannica: the Climax of an 

Empire (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 

1968), p. 405.

4. Quoted in Brian Bond, ed., Victorian Military 

Campaigns (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1967), p. 15.

5. James Kitfield, “Standing Apart,” National 

Journal, June 13, 1998; the same estimate appears 

in Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, 

Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA; US Army 

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 19.
[ 9 4 ]

Other than War

6. Robert Holzer, “US Army, Marines to Gauge 

Deployment Cost,” Defense News, 17 July 2000, 

p. 1.

7. Stephen L. Myers, “Peace Strains the Army,” 

New York Times, Week in Review, July 11, 1999. 

The idea of a “300 percent” increase gained considerable acceptance in just a few months. Snider, 

Nagl, and Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military 

Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century, p. 19, used 

it, and General Hugh H. Shelton, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, used it in a speech 

delivered on March 27, 2001, in Chicago.

8. Greg Parnell, Barry Ezell, Yacov Haimes, James 

Lambert, Kent Schlussel, and Mark Sulkoski, 

“Designing a OOTW Knowledge Hierarchy for 

a OOTW Decision Support System for Military 

Planners,” Phalanx 33 (December 2000), pp. 

14-19.

9. Paul Mann, “Reframing Objectives Abroad: 

When To Fight, When Not,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology (31 July 2000), p. 66.

10. See Collier, Instances of Use, pp. 9-14.

11. William Langewiesche, “Peace Is Hell,” Atlantic Monthly, 288 (October 2001), p. 52.

12. Gaffney, et al., US Navy Responses to Situations, 

1970-1999, p. 17.

13. For operations in Vietnam, see Appendix E, 

“A Chronology of the Vietnam War, 1945-1975,” 

Dictionary of the Vietnam War, James S. Olson, 

ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 

547-560.

14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report 

on Military Deployment Rates of the Armed Forces

(March 1999), (S) responded to a Congressional 

Conference Report (House Report 105-746) on 

the Appropriations Bill for the Department of 

Defense, 1998, section 8138. The compilations 

submitted by the services confirmed that all four 

used different definitions and methodologies, that 

all tended to look at overseas exercises as deployments, and that they based deployment rates on “a 

deployable pool and not a service personnel end 

strength.” Only unclassified sections were used as 

background material for this study.

15. Baltimore Sun, May 24, 1997.

16. The Baltimore Sun article cited above overstated the number of soldiers in Germany as 65,000 

and those in Korea as 37,000. For official counts 

of deployed military personnel, of all services, see

Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Service, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Personnel 

Historical Reports,” (http://web1.whs.osd.mil/

mmid/mmidhom.htm). Inflated numbers could 

be used both to support claims of overwork and to 

show the pervasiveness of an American presence 

throughout the world. See Harold Perkin, “Stretch 

marks: the cost of American empire,” Times Literary Supplement ( July 2001), p. 24.

17. Association of the United States Army, “Defense Report,” January 2001. Also see James Kitfield, “The Peacekeepers,” Government Executive

33 (March 2001), pp. 44-54, for a supporting view.

18. Directorate for Information Operations and 

Reports, Washington Headquarters Service, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Active Duty 

Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Areas 

and By Country,” on the worldwide web at http://

web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/m65/hst1200.pdf. The 

Association of the United States Army’s display of 

data to support the claim that the Army is vastly 

overextended did not end with the 1990s. See, 

especially, Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, The 

Way Ahead (Arlington, VA: AUSA, July 2000), pp. 

5-6. The chart on page 5 shows “Vietnam 1965-

75” as one deployment; the similar chart on the 

following page shows eight separate deployments 

to Southwest Asia and seven to the Balkans. East 

Timor, which was the duty station of some of the 

nine military personnel in Indonesia, is cited as 

one of multiple obligations.

19. Norman Polmar, Lecture, “The Aircraft 

Carrier: Anachronism or Force for the Future?” 

Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, 12 August 

1998.

20. Stephen J. Guerra, Responses to Harm’s-Way and 

Humanitarian Situations by Naval Forces, 1990-

1996, CRM 97-100 (Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1997), pp. 27-29.

21. US Pacific Command, Command History 

Division, Commander in Chief US Pacific Command

History, 1990, vol. 1 (Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, 

1991), pp. 173-77, 424.

22. Bradley Graham, “US Military Feels Strain of 

Buildup,” Washington Post, 5 February 1998, p. 6.
Endnotes

[ 9 5 ]

23. US General Accounting Office, Assets DOD 

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined (Report No. GAO/NSIAD 00-9, 

December 1999), p. 22.

24. US General Accounting Office, Assets DOD 

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined, p. 7.

25. Brooks and Roller, Historical Analysis of US 

Military Responses: 1975-1995, p. 34.

26. All of these types of aircraft were listed as 

among “Low Density-High Demand (LDHD) 

Assets: Unique mission capabilities for crisis 

responses/contingencies,” J-3 Joint Operations 

Division briefing slide, undated but before 3 June 

1999.

27. OPSMSTR9, lines 4686-4791.

28. COL Fred Stein, USA (Ret.), interview with 

author, 18 December 1997.

29. Mervin W. Stark, US Army Forces Command 

Annual Command History, 1 October 1994-31 

December 1995 (Fort McPherson, GA: Military 

History Office, US Army Forces Command, 

[1998]), chapter 4, p. 11.

30. Stark, US Army Forces Command Annual Command History, 1 October 1994-31 December 1995, 

chapter 4, pp. 6-8.

31. Thomas E. Ricks, “US Military Police Embrace Kosovo Role,” Washington Post, 25 March 

2001, DL Strpce, Yugoslavia.

32. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, p. 30.

33. Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Where Are the MPs 

When We Need Them?” Lawton (Oklahoma) 

Constitution, 11 June 2000, p. 4. For a brief look 

at some of the organizational options for carrying 

out gendarmerie missions, see John S. Brown, 

“Combat Cops? The Army as Constabulary: Some 

Lessons From Our Past,” Armed Forces Journal 

International, (September 2000), pp. 66-70.

34. David Wood, “Need For MPs Spurs Debate,” 

Army Times, 27 March 2000, p. 16.

35. Christine Neuberger, “POW Simulation 

Exercise Held,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 June 

1998.

36. Walter S. Poole, “The Effort to Save Somalia, 

August 1992-March 1994,” Joint History Office: 

draft manuscript, October 2000, (S) pp. 53, 55, 58; 

Erwin A. Schmidl, “Police in Peace Operations,” 

Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nummer 10 

(September 1998), p. 3.

37. Barbara Crossette, “The UN’s Unhappy Lot: 

Perilous Police Duties Multiplying,” New York 

Times, 22 February 2000.

38. C. Mark Brinkley, “Warrior Cops: How 

Kosovo Is Changing Who Deploys—And How 

You Train,” Marine Corps Times, 28 February 

2000, p. 12.

39. C. Mark Brinkley, “MP Restructuring Step 

Away From Reality,” Marine Corps Times, 28 

February 2000, p. 14; Brooks and Roller, Historical 

Analysis of US Miltary Responses: 1975-1995, p. 36.

40. Porch, “Introduction,” Small Wars, their Principles & Practice, by Charles E. Callwell, 3rd (1906) 

ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 

1996), p. xvii.

41. US General Accounting Office, Contingency 

Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses 

Challenges (GAO/NIAD-00-164), p. 5.

42. Robert Burns, “Shortage of Airborne Jammers 

Strains Military,” European Stars and Stripes, 3 

October 1999, p. 7; Adam J. Hebert, “Marine 

Corps Not A Good Place For Air Force To Find 

Optempo Relief,” Inside the Air Force, 10 September 1999, p. 3; GAO Report on Contingency 

Operations July 2000, p. 5.

43. Robert Burns, AP, “Shortage of Airborne 

Jammers Strains Military,” European Stars and 

Stripes, 3 October 1999, p. 7; GAO Report on 

Contingency Operations Jul 2000, pp. 5-6, 25. 

Other shortages also seemed to be in highly 

technical areas. See J-3 JOB briefing slide, “Low 

Density-High Demand (LDHD) Assets: Unique 

mission capabilities for crisis response/contingencies,” undated but before 3 June 1999.

44. US General Accounting Office, Contingency 

Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses 

Challenges, p. 25.

45. OPSMSTR9, lines 4686-4791; San Antonio 

Express-News, 10 August 1998.

46. Stark, US Army Forces Command Annual Command History, 1 October 1994-31 December 1995, 

chapter 4.
[ 9 6 ]

Other than War

47. OPSMSTR9, lines 4686-4791; Daniel L. 

Haulman, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947-1994 (Washington, 

DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1998), pp. 114-115.

48. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, p. 31. One critic called this approach “a 

strategy that basically rationalizes much of the 

existing structure, training and weapon programs 

of the big, muscular force intended to fight in 

Europe and to deter a nuclear exchange with the 

Soviet Union. It also is a strategy that was outdated before it was ever committed to paper. The 

missions of the American military have changed 

dramatically since the end of the Cold War. 

Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have 

become the norm. Rather than mobilizing a massive mixed force to a war zone, American military 

planners find themselves scrambling smaller units 

to a greater number of hot spots.” Bob Kemper, 

“The US Military Stands Ready—For the Wrong 

Challenges,” Chicago Tribune, September 3, 2000.

49. Billy T. Brooks and Kevin Roller, Historical 

Analysis of US Military Responses: 1975-1995

(McLean, VA: Science Applications International 

Corporation, 1996), pp. 10, 37; A. Martin Lidy, 

M. Michele Cecil, James Kunder, and Samuel H. 

Packer. Effectiveness of DOD Humanitarian Relief 

Efforts in Responses to Hurricanes Georges and Mitch 

(IDA Paper P-3560, March 2001), p. ES-5.

50. Frank Wolfe, “Zinni: Strategic Mobility 

CENTCOM’s Greatest Need,” Defense Daily, 2 

March 2000, p. 3.

51. Bradley Graham, “Military Buildup Strains 

Other Security Commitments,” Washington Post, 

24 Feb 98, p. 17; Brooks and Roller, p. iv; Adam J. 

Hebert, “Air Force Mission Capable Rates Recover Quickly After Allied Force,” Inside the Air Force, 

8 Oct 99, p. 1; Bruce Rolfsen, “The Busiest Wing,” 

Air Force Times, 13 December 1999; Elaine M. 

Grossman, “Air Force Says Post-Kosovo Recovery 

Is On Track, But Lacks Data,” Inside the Pentagon, 

30 September 1999; Myers, “Peace Strains the 

Army,” New York Times, Sun, 11 Jul 99.

52. The Army units included 6 mobile public 

affairs detachments of 13 to 18 people each; 2 

combat camera units; 2 public affairs teams of 5 

each; 1 press camp headquarters detachment of 

28; and 1 broadcast detachment with 27 people. 

The Air Force contributed a 19-person broadcast 

detachment and a combat camera unit of 39. 

OPSMSTR9, lines 4686-4791.

53. Moskos, The Media and the Military in Peace 

and Humanitarian Operations, pp. 13, 25; OPSMSTR9, line 4756; Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New 

York: Random House, 2002), pp. 128-129.

54. Telex (U), CINCUSACOM, for CJCS, 

302330Z September 1994; Memo, Kenneth H. 

Bacon, ASD/PA, to CJCS, ca. 24 September 

1994, subject: Haiti Updates/Info; Colonel Barry 

Willey, USA, Ret, telephone conversation with 

Ronald H. Cole, 3 May 2001. See Warren P. 

Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: the News 

Media’s Influence on Peace Operations (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 

pp. 2, 92-95.

55. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Summary 

Report of a Conference On: Operations Other Than 

War (Washington: IFPA, 1995), p. v.

56. DSBTF, Report on DOD Warfighting Transformation, p. iv, 11-15.

57. “Air Force to Shed Cold War Structure and 

Reorganize Units,” New York Times, August 5, 

1998, p. A 16, AP, DL Washington, 4 August 

1998; “Seeking Stability for USAF’s Warriors: An 

AFJI Interview with General Michael E. Ryan, 

Chief of Staff, US Air Force,” Armed Forces Journal 

International, November 1998, p. 28; Elaine M. 

Grossman, “Air Force Leaders Embrace Engagement as Force-Sizing Construct,” Inside the Pentagon, 4 May 2000, p. 1. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., 

“Low Density/High Demand: USAF’s Limited 

Numbers of ISR Aircraft Remain Overstretched,” 

Armed Forces Journal International (October 2001), 

pp. 20-21.

58. Frederick L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat: 

Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam 

to Haiti (Washington, DC: Office of the Judge 

Advocate General and Center of Military History, 

US Army, 2001), pp. x, 81-82, 96, 284, 309, 325.

59. On the mobilization of Army reserves for 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm see

Frank N. Schubert and Theresa Kraus, eds., The 

Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

(Washington, DC: United States Army Center of 

Military History, 1995), pp. 82-92.
Endnotes

[ 9 7 ]

60. Mike O’Connor, “Slimmer Army Relies on 

Reserves for Duty in Bosnia,” New York Times, 25 

May 1998; Robert Holzer, “US Army, Marines To 

Gauge Deployment Cost,” Defense News, 17 July 

2000, p. 1; US General Accounting Office. Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities 

Poses Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-00-164, 2000), 

p. 5; Haulman, The United States Air Force and 

Humanitarian Airlift Operations, passim.

61. On the “Total Force” concept, see Jeffrey A. 

Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 

and Answers (Lexington: The University Press of 

Kentucky, 1994); Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen 

Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve 

Forces & the Politics of National Security (Novato: 

CA: Presidio Press, 1997).

62. Army News Service, Press Release, “49th Armored Division deploys to Bosnia,” 15 February 

2000; 29th Division, Press Release, “29th Division 

part of Army’s unit rotation plan for Bosnia,” 26 

October 1999; New York Times, 25 May 1998; 

Schubert and Kraus, eds., Whirlwind War, pp. 

57-58; Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier 

Force, p. 94.

63. Carroll H. Dunn, Base Development in South 

Vietnam 1965-1970 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1972), p. 25.

64. See Janet A. McDonnell, The Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP): Supporting 

the Troops in Operation Restore Hope (Alexandria, 

VA: Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers, 

1994); Donald T. Wynn, “Managing the Logistics-Support Contract in the Balkans Theater,” 

Engineer 30 ( July 2000), pp. 36-40. Regarding 

contractors as an alternative for functions such as 

medical treatment, supply, housing construction, 

and transportation, see the following US General 

Accounting Office reports: Contingency Operations: 

Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost 

in the Balkans (GAO/NSIAD-00-225, Sep 29, 

2000); Contingency Operations: Opportunities to 

Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

(GAO/NSIAD-97-63, Feb. 11, 1997).

65. US General Accounting Office, Contingency 

Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses 

Challenges (GAO/NIAD-00-164), pp. 7-8.

66. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, p. 36.

67. Cohen, Major Smaller Scale Contingencies, pp. 

26-27.

68. US General Accounting Office. Contingency 

Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses 

Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-00-164, 2000), p. 25.

69. Admiral James O. Ellis, briefing, “A View 

from the Top,” ca. September 1999.

70. Frank N. Schubert, Building Air Bases in the 

Negev: the US Army Corps of Engineers in Israel, 

1979-1982 (Washington, DC: Office of History, 

Corps of Engineers and Center of Military History, US Army, 1992), p. 33.

71. Brooks and Roller, Historical Analysis of US 

Military Responses: 1975-1995, p. vi.

72. New York Times, 1 September 1998; Brooks 

and Roller, Historical Analysis of US Military 

Responses, pp. 28, 32.

73. Max Boot, “Will Bush Bury ‘Bodybag Syndrome’?” Wall Street Journal, 11 Sep 2000, p. 44.

74. Elizabeth Becker, “The Dangers of Doing 

Good Deeds,” New York Times, Sunday, 6 January 

2002, Week In Review, p. 4.

Chapter 9

1. The quotation is from Kenneth Anderson, 

“Language, law, and terror,” (London) Times 

Literary Supplement, 21 September 2001. For two 

insightful looks at the nature of the terrorist enemy and the response, see that essay and Anderson, 

“Expanded Horizons: Memory, Memorials and 

Manhattan’s Living Skyline,” Ibid., 6 September 

2002.

2. Air Mobility Command History Office, Air 

Mobility Command: Historical Chronologies. June 

1992-September 1997, revision thru Mar 1998, 

received from AMCHO History Office, Jul 2000.

3. Chivers, “Long Before War, Green Berets 

Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan,” NewYork 

Times, 25 Oct 01, DL Tashkent, 24 Oct 01, p. 1. 

On the Joint Contact Team program, see Robert 

T. Cossaboom, The Joint Contact Team Program: 

Contacts with Former Soviet Republics and Warsaw 

Pact Nations 1992-1994 (Washington, DC: Joint 

History Office, 1997).

4. Joseph Lelyveld, “In Guantanamo,” New York 

Review of Books 44 (November 17, 2002), p. 64.
[ 9 8 ]

Other than War

5. Dana Priest, “US Military Trains Foreign 

Troops,” Washington Post, 12 July 1998; Michael P. 

Noonan and John Hillen, “The Promise of Decisive Action,” Orbis, 46 (Spring 2002), p. 239.

6. US General Accounting Office, Drug Control: 

DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts, 

GAO/NSIAD 00-77; Dennis Jett, “Remember 

the Drug War?” Washington Post, Sunday, 13 

January 2002, Outlook, p. B4.

7. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. xiv.
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[ 117 ]

Index

Abraham Lincoln, USS: 65

Afghanistan: 26, 35, 36, 78

Africa: 1-2, 3, 33-34, 35, 51, 53, 54, 55, 

68, 70, 78, 79. See also individual countries.

Agency for International Development: 

35

Aideed, Mohamed Farah: 51, 75

Air Expeditionary Forces: 72

Air Mobility Command: 55, 56

Air National Guard: 27, 50, 73

Air transport: 3, 71, 72 

Airborne Infantry Divisions

82nd: 17

101st: 17

Airborne Infantry Regiment, 325th: 

66-67

Aircraft

allocation of: 74

crews for: 69-70, 72

demand for: 3, 46, 66, 69-70, 72, 

77

specialized: 3, 66, 69-70, 77

used for executive branch travel: 55

Airlift missions

India Banner: 56

Phoenix Banner: 55

Phoenix Silver: 55

Airlift Wing, 436th: 78

Albania: 34, 46, 76

American embassies

bombed: 35, 37, 70, 79

and humanitarian operations: 31

military attachés: 64-65

and planning for non-combatant 

evacuations: 35

American Samoa: 33

Anderson, Kenneth: 78

Andrews, Lieutenant George: 9-10

Angola: 35, 40

Antarctic research project support: 57

Anti-Chinese race riots: 11

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988: 26

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand: 23, 26

Armored Division, 49th: 73

Army National Guard

combat units deployed: 73-74

and counter-drug operations: 27

military police: 79

Mississippi: 17

overseas deployments: 62, 69

training for: 33

and the “Total Force” policy: 73

Wisconsin: 33

Army of Cuban Pacification: 13

Army of Imperial Rome: 5-6

Army Reserve: 62, 79

Asia: 1-2, 3, 8, 13. See also individual 

countries.

Association of the United States Army: 

65

Atlanta, Georgia: 58

Australia: 26, 53-54, 65

Bahamas: 21

Balkans: 1, 19, 40, 43-48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 

62, 63-64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 

73-74, 75, 78, 79, 80. See also

individual countries.
[ 118 ]

Other than War

Bangladesh: 56

Belize: 24

Bigelow, Lieutenant John: 9

Birtle, Andrew: 4, 9

Boot, Max: 75

Bosnia: 40, 53, 66, 68, 71, 73, 74

Botswana: 56

Britain: 8, 62, 67-68

Brooks, Billy: 75

Brown, Colonel Aaron, USA: 14

Brown and Root: 74, 79

Bulgaria: 56

Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 

Abandoned Lands: 11

Burundi: 26, 53

Bush, George H. W.: 23, 34, 51, 55, 56

Bush, George W.: 5, 24

Butler, Major General Smedley: 13

California: 11-12, 14, 29

Camp David Accords: 54

Caribbean: 8, 13, 21-23. See also individual countries.

counter-drug operations in: 21-22, 

27, 28-29, 51

efforts to curtail illegal immigration from: 23-24

responses to natural disasters in: 

33, 39-40

stability operations in: 4

Casualties, American: 51-52, 53, 74

Cavalry Regiment, Second: 36-37

Center for Naval Analyses: 46

Central African Republic: 33-34

Central America: 36. See also individual 

countries.

counter-drug operations in: 21-22, 

27-29

disaster relief operations: 33

Central Intelligence Agency: 43

China: 13, 25-26, 56

Civil affairs units: 66, 69, 73, 77

Civil-military operations centers: 37

Clark Field Airbase, Philippines: 65

Clinton, William J.: 23, 34, 35, 51, 52, 

55-56

Cohen, Eliot: 19

Cohen, William S.: 23-24

Cold War: 1, 2, 3, 16-17, 61, 66

Cole, USS: 37, 79

Collier, Ellen: 63

Colombia: 14

Communications requirements: 55-56

Congressional Research Service: 63

Costa Rica: 24

Costs

of counter-drug operations: 26, 28-

29

of executive branch travel: 56

of military support for the 1996 

Summer Olympics: 58

of stability operations: 48, 50

Counter-drug operations: 21-22, 26-29, 

66, 79, 80

Cuba: 13, 15, 22-25, 26, 67

Cuban-Americans, anti-Castro efforts 

by: 24

Custer, Elizabeth: 10

Cyber-warfare: 57

Cyprus: 68

Defense Authorization Act for 1989: 26

Defense Report: 65

Defense Science Board: 72

Detention camps

at Guantanamo: 23, 24

for intercepted migrants: 23, 24, 25

in Panama: 24, 25

Disaster relief: 3, 31-33, 36, 39-40, 46, 

51, 67, 70-71

Domestic disturbances, US, military role 

in quelling: 4, 29
Index

[ 119 ]

Dominican Republic: 4, 13, 15, 23, 33

Drug Enforcement Agency: 21, 27

Drummond, Stephen: 6

Eagle Vista: 35

Earthquakes: 11-12, 14, 31, 46

East Timor: 53-54, 65, 68

Egypt: 54

Ellis, Admiral James O.: 74-75

Emergency Events Database: 3

Emsley, Clive: 18, 40

Engineer Battalion, 724th: 33

Engineer Detachment, 829th: 33

Engineer units: 3, 33, 40, 70-71, 77

Europe: 1-2, 3, 33-34, 70. See also individual countries.

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 27

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency: 33

Fields, Major General Arnold, USMC: 63

Fisher, Ian: 35

Floods: 31, 51, 56

Florida: 8, 39-40, 66, 70

Force protection, and humanitarian 

operations: 51-53

Forest fires: 51

Fort A. P. Hill: 68

France: 18

Freedmen’s Bureau: 11

Freedom of the seas, enforcement of: 

4, 7

Freetown, Sierra Leone: 34

Gamble, Lieutenant General Patrick: 66

Gates, John M.: 9

Gendarme operations

and anti-terrorist operations: 79-80

and the Army of Imperial Rome: 

5-6

descriptions of the general nature 

of: 5-6, 14, 18, 19

and domestic political considerations: 75-76

and humanitarian operations: 40

and Indian campaigns in the 

trans-Mississippi West: 9-10

as a legitimate use of the military: 

62, 77-78

and military police units: 68

as a percentage of total military 

operations: 29, 63, 64

and Posse Comitatus: 11

and public relations: 71, 75

and Reconstruction: 11

responsibility for: 18

stability operations as: 43

General Accounting Office: 48, 56, 66, 

69-70

Germany: 61, 65

Global War on Terrorism: 78, 79

Gold Sword IV (exercise): 68

Greece: 14, 53

Guam: 58

Guantanamo, Cuba: 23, 24, 67, 79

Guatemala: 68

Guerra, Stephen: 39

Gunboat diplomacy: 7-8

Hagan, Kenneth: 7, 13

Haiti: 4, 13, 15, 62, 65, 68, 70, 71-72, 

73, 75

Marine Corps operations in: 13, 15

refugees from: 22-25, 26, 67

stability operations in: 4, 46, 48, 53, 

54

Haiti Assistance Group: 36

Halberstam, David: 51

Harmer, Brigadier General Josiah: 6

Hartzog, General William: 72

Hassan, King of Morocco: 26
[ 120 ]

Other than War

Hawaii: 27, 79

Holbrooke, Richard: 54

Honduras: 13, 24, 33, 67

Howard, Major General Oliver Otis: 11

Humanitarian operations: 31-41, 73

in the Balkans: 46, 47

coordination with private charities: 

37

and disaster relief: 31-33

and force protection: 51-53

and military police: 68

need for medical units: 40, 70

non-combatant evacuation operations: 31, 33-36, 51

as a percentage of total military 

operations: 37

private charities: 37-39, 43, 51

in Somalia: 51-52

Hungary: 65

Hurricanes: 33, 51

Andrew: 39-40, 66, 70, 71

Georges: 33

Mitch: 33

Hussein, Saddam: 2, 43, 48, 65, 79, 80

Idaho: 11

Immigrants, illegal

from China: 25-26

from Cuba: 22-25, 26

from Haiti: 23-25, 26

Immigration, efforts to curtail illegal 

entries: 21-22, 23-26, 29

India: 56

Indian Territory: 9

Indian wars: 4, 6-7, 8-10, 12

Indonesia: 53-54, 65

Infantry Divisions

3rd: 27

25th: 27, 36-37

Instances of Use of United States Armed 

Forces Abroad, 1798-1989: 63

Institute for Defense Analyses: 46

International Military Education and 

Training Program (IMET): 

15

International Red Cross: 26, 37, 51

Iraq: 2, 19, 43, 46, 48-49, 52, 58, 65, 66, 

73-74, 79, 80

Israel: 54

Jamaica: 27

Japan: 61, 65

Joint Contact Team Program: 15, 78

Joint Interagency Task Force East: 27, 28

Joint Interagency Task Force West: 27, 28

Joint Staff: 62, 70, 74

Joint Task Forces

160: 67

Andrew: 39-40, 66, 70, 71

in the Balkans: 47

Bravo: 33, 67

Civil Support: 57, 79

Computer Network: 57, 79

Five: 27

Four: 27

Full Accounting: 53, 57, 79

“JTF in a Box”: 74-75

NEO: 34

Noble Anvil: 74

Olympics: 57, 58

Panama: 22, 57

Sea Signal: 24

Sebaco: 33

Six: 27, 28

Timor Sea: 53-54

Joulwan, General George, USA: 28

Judge Advocate General Corps: 73

Justice, Captain Wayne: 25-26

Kenya: 35, 37, 70

King, Rodney: 29

Kinzer, Major General Joseph, USA: 36
Index

[ 121 ]

Kitfield, James: 63

Korea: 14, 61, 63-64, 65

Kosovo: 46, 67, 74, 76

Kurdish refugees: 58

Kuwait: 48

Labor disputes: 11, 12, 14

Land mines, clearing of: 36

Latin America: 1-2, 3, 12, 13-14, 15, 

27-29, 70. See also individual 

countries.

Law enforcement operations: 18, 75

and 9/11: 78

and counter-drug efforts: 21, 26, 

27-28, 29

of international law and standards: 

43-45, 48-49, 50, 68, 78

and labor disputes: 14

and migrant intercept efforts: 21-

26, 29

and racial disturbances: 4, 29

and response to Hurricane Andrew: 40

support for the 1996 Summer 

Olympics: 58

by the United Nations: 68

League of Nations: 14

Lexington, USS: 14

Liberia: 33-34, 35, 40, 53

Louvain Catholic University, Centre for 

Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters: 3

Macedonia: 46, 76

Major Smaller Scale Contingencies: 48

Mann, Paul: 63

Marijuana: 27

Marine Corps Reserves: 27

Marine Division, 2nd: 69

Marine Expeditionary Units: 33, 69, 72

11th: 69

13th: 69

15th: 69

22nd: 33-34, 66, 69

24th: 69

26th: 46, 69

Maritime law enforcement: 7, 8

McCaffrey, General Barry, USA: 28

McNamara, Dennis: 26

Medical units: 3, 40, 70, 71, 77

Meredith, James H.: 17

Mexico: 13, 21, 27, 29

Micronesia: 65

Midway, USS: 65

Migrant intercept operations: 21-22, 

23-26, 29

Chinese: 25-26

Cubans: 22, 23-25

Haitians: 23-25

Military District of Washington: 56

Military Police Brigade, 800th: 68

Military police units

Air Force: 24, 67

Army: 66-67, 79

demand for: 3, 66-69, 77

Marine Corps: 68-69, 72

morale of: 67

Navy: 67

Reserve Component: 79

and response to Hurricane Andrew: 39-40, 66

used to administer migrant detention camps: 24

Miller, Benjamin: 29

Milosovic, Slobodan: 75

Mississippi: 17

Mockaitis, Thomas: 3

Mogadishu, Somalia: 37, 51-52, 53

Moldova: 65

Monroe, James: 29

Monroe Doctrine: 13, 29

Morocco: 14, 26
[ 122 ]

Other than War

Moskos, Charles: 71

Mount Pinatubo, Luzon: 65

Mozambique: 35, 56

Multinational Force and Observers 

(MFO): 54, 75

Munro (Coast Guard cutter): 25-26

Nation building

congressional limits on: 16

general nature of: 14-16

National police forces: 18

National Security Council: 43

Natural disasters

role of the Army in responding to: 

10, 11-12, 14, 18, 31-33, 39-

40, 67

role of the Navy in responding to: 

39, 65

New York Times: 35, 63

News media: 71-72, 75-76

Nicaragua: 4, 13, 23, 33

Nigeria: 35

Non-combatant evacuation operations: 

7-8, 14, 31, 33-36, 40, 51, 66

Central African Republic: 33-34

Korea: 14, 34

Liberia: 33-34, 40

Philippines: 65

Sierra Leone: 34, 40

sub-Saharan Africa: 35

Tajikistan: 40

Non-governmental organizations

and humanitarian operations: 37-

39, 43, 51

and stability operations: 43

Noriega, General Manuel: 22, 75

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO): 2, 43, 47-48

Oceania: 1-2, 3, 12. See also individual 

countries.

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

31, 33

Okinawa: 61

Olympic Summer Games, 1996: 57, 58

Operational tempo: 65-66, 74-75

Operations

Assured Lift: 53

Assured Response: 33-34

Atlas Response: 35, 56

Auburn Endeavor: 57

Autumn Shield: 34

Avid Response: 46

Bahamas and Turks (OPBAT): 21

Balm Restore: 33

Blue Spoon: 22

Caper Focus: 28

Carib Ceiling: 28

Carib Shield: 28

Central Skies: 28

Clean Sweep: 36

Close Corridor: 28

Deep Freeze: 57

Desert Focus: 67, 79

Desert Storm: 52, 53, 70-71

Determined Response: 37, 79

Diamante 1: 22

Diamante 2: 22

Eastern Access: 57

Enduring Freedom: 79

Fiery Vigil: 40, 65

Focus Relief: 53

Guardian Retrieval: 34

Inca Gold: 28

Incident Reach: 35, 79

Joint Endeavor: 46-47, 71, 74

Joint Forge: 46-47, 71, 74

Joint Guard: 46-47, 71

Joint Guardian: 46-47, 71, 74

Just Cause: 15, 22, 53, 75

naming of: 64

Noble Anvil: 46, 69-70
Index

[ 123 ]

Noble Eagle: 79

Noble Obelisk: 34

Northern Watch: 40, 50, 53, 69-70

Pacific Haven: 58, 59

Passive Oversight: 24

Promote Liberty: 22

Provide Comfort: 40, 58

Provide Hope: 36, 40, 78

Provide Relief: 40

Quick Response: 33-34

Resolute Response: 37, 70, 79

Restore Hope: 35, 51-52, 71

Safe Haven (Cubans): 22, 25

Safe Haven (Hungarians): 25

Safe Passage 88: 36

Sea Signal: 67

Sentinel Lifeguard: 24

Shining Hope: 46

Southern Watch: 40, 50, 65, 69-70

Steel Box: 57

Support Hope: 35, 53, 74

Sustain Liberty: 22, 67

Uphold Democracy: 23, 36, 54

Urgent Fury: 73

Weedeater: 27

Wipeout: 27

Operations of interposition: 6, 9, 12

Oxford, Mississippi: 17

Pakistan: 56

Panama: 13-14, 15, 22, 24, 25, 43, 67

Panama Canal Zone: 13-14, 22, 57

Parker, Lieutenant Colonel David L.: 68

Persian Gulf: 65, 66

Personnel tempo: 65-66

Peru: 14

Philippines: 13, 15, 40, 53, 65, 79

Pirates, operations against: 7, 8, 12

Plewes, Major General Thomas J., 

USAR: 68

Pope, Major General John: 10, 16

Posse Comitatus: 11

President of the United States

inaugurations: 56

movement of papers to presidential 

libraries: 56

travel by: 35, 55, 58

Prisoner of War Internment Centers: 67

Public affairs units: 40, 71-72

Puerto Rico: 15, 33, 57

Puller, Lewis “Chesty”: 13

Pullman strike: 11

Quadrennial Defense Review (1997): 29, 

43, 46, 52-53, 74

Quarry Team, 106th: 33

Racial disturbances: 29

Reagan, Ronald: 21, 26

Reconstruction: 9, 10-11

Red Crescent Movement: 37

Refugees: 21-22, 23-26, 29, 37, 46, 53, 

58, 67, 68, 76

Reserve Component units

deployed overseas: 62, 79

disaster relief operations used as 

training for: 33

and the “Total Force” policy: 73-74

Ricks, Thomas: 67

RMK-BRJ: 74

Roller, Kevin: 75

Roman Empire: 5-6

Rwanda: 26, 35, 37, 38-39, 43, 48, 53, 

56, 66-67, 72, 75

Sadowski, Yahya: 17

St. Clair, Major General Arthur J.: 6

San Francisco earthquake and fire of 

1906: 11-12, 14

Saudi Arabia: 48, 50, 66, 67, 79

School desegregation in the South: 17

Seminoles: 8
[ 124 ]

Other than War

Serbia: 46

Shelton, General Henry H.: 12

Sherman, General William T.: 10

Shultz, Richard: 10, 17

Sierre Leone: 34, 35, 40, 53, 54

Sinai Peninsula: 54, 75

Slave trade, enforcement of the ban on: 8

Somalia: 35, 37, 40, 46, 48, 51-52, 53, 

68, 71, 73, 74, 75

South America: 28. See also individual 

countries.

South Dakota: 12

Southern Europe Task Force: 47-48

Southwest Asia: 40, 48-50, 51, 62, 64, 

65, 67, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80. See 

also individual countries.

Soviet Union

assistance to former elements and 

satellites of: 15, 36, 40, 78

and the Cold War: 2

collapse of: 1, 17

removal of uranium from: 57

Special operations forces: 17, 33, 66, 79

Stability operations: 1, 4

in the Balkans: 43-48, 51, 79

as a legitimate use of the military: 

62

as a percentage of total military 

operations: 43

in Somalia: 51-52

in Southwest Asia: 48-50, 51

Sudan: 35

Suriname: 24

Tacitus: 6

Tacoma, Washington: 11, 14

Tajikistan: 40, 68

Tanzania: 35, 37, 70

Tate, Michael: 14

Terrorism

and 9/11: 77-78, 79-80

and American embassies: 35, 37, 79

and Khobar Towers: 67, 79

and need for planning for 

non-combatant evacuations: 

35

planning for responses to: 57

responses to: 77-80

Texas: 9-10

Thurman, General Maxwell, USA: 28

“Total Force” policy: 73-74

Training

disaster relief operations used as: 

33, 67

of military police: 68

Trans-Mississippi West, military operations in: 4

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: 65

Turkey: 14, 46, 65

Typhoon Ofa: 33

United Kingdom: 21

United Nations: 19

and the Balkans: 45, 47

and Haiti: 23, 36-37

Humanitarian Operations Center 

in Somalia: 37

need for police officers: 68

and Somalia: 37, 51

United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees: 26, 37

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: 54

United Nations Mission in Haiti: 36-37

United Nations Security Council resolutions: 43

United States Air Force: 17, 21, 24, 62, 

65, 66

aircraft: 69-70

Critical Care Air Transport Team: 

70

demand for air transport: 3, 71
Index

[ 125 ]

public affairs units: 71

response to changing operational 

requirements: 72

United States Armed Services, views of 

the proper role of: 5-6, 10, 

12, 16-17, 18-19, 52-53, 62, 

70-71

United States Army

and campaigns against Indians: 4, 

6-7, 8-10, 12

and civil disturbances: 11, 17

counter-drug operations: 21, 26-27

and creation of national infrastructure: 14, 15

and Cuba: 13

disaster relief operations: 10, 11-12, 

31-33

dislike of gendarme work: 10, 14

dislike of nation-building operations: 16

field manual: 3

Forces Command: 26, 67, 70

and labor disputes: 11, 12, 14

medical units: 70

and Mexico: 13

Military Division of the Missouri: 9

and nation-building activities: 14-15

operations in the trans-Mississippi 

West: 4, 6-7, 8-10

percentage of personnel deployed 

overseas: 61-65

public affairs units: 71

and race disturbances: 11

and Reconstruction: 9, 10-11

responses to changing operational 

requirements: 72

role of lawyers in: 72-73

and school desegregation in the 

South: 17

scientific expeditions: 7, 14-15, 57

United States Atlantic Command (now 

Joint Forces Command): 21-

22, 26, 27, 28, 71-72

United States Border Patrol: 27

United States Central Command: 52, 

71, 78

United States Coast Guard

counter-drug operations: 21, 27, 29

and efforts to block illegal migrants: 23-24

and interception of Chinese migrants: 25-26

operations in the Caribbean: 23

United States Congress

and counter-drug operations: 21, 

26, 27

limits on nation-building operations: 16

and posse comitatus: 11

United States Customs Service: 27, 29, 

58

United States Department of Defense

and counter-drug operations: 26-29

and presidential travel: 55-56, 58

use of contractors: 74, 79

views of the proper structure of the 

military forces: 70-71

United States Department of Justice: 43

United States Department of State: 58

and humanitarian operations: 31, 

33

and stability operations: 43

United States Department of the Treasury: 43

United States Department of Transportation: 43

United States European Command: 15, 

33-34, 35, 47-48, 53

United States Marine Corps

aircraft: 69-70

and campaigns against Indians: 8
[ 126 ]

Other than War

and civil disturbances: 17

disaster relief operations: 33

military police: 68-69

operations in the Caribbean: 15

and Panama: 13-14

percentage of personnel deployed 

abroad: 64

and protection of Americans and 

their commerce: 7-8, 33

United States Navy

aircraft: 69-70

aircraft carriers: 65

Amphibious Ready Groups: 33

and campaigns against Indians: 8

and counter-drug operations: 27

and efforts to block illegal migrants: 23-24

enforcement of American and 

international law: 8

and gendarme operations: 13, 14, 17

and humanitarian operations: 4, 

7-8, 12, 14, 33, 39, 65

and non-combatant evacuation 

operations: 7-8, 14, 33

operational tempo: 65-66

operations in Latin America: 13

operations in the Caribbean: 15

portion of personnel deployed 

abroad: 65

and protection of Americans and 

their commerce: 4, 7-8, 12, 

33

scientific expeditions: 7, 57

Seabees: 70

Vieques bombing range: 57

United States Pacific Command: 21-22, 

26, 27, 28, 33

United States Senate, Committee on 

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Readiness 

and Management Support: 

69

United States Southern Command: 21-

22, 26, 27, 28-29, 33, 80

United States Special Operations Command: 17

University of Mississippi: 17

Utley, Robert M.: 6, 7, 19

Uzbekistan: 78

Vera Cruz, Mexico: 13

Vietnam: 55, 56

Vietnam War: 17, 52, 53, 63-64, 73, 74

War Department Appropriations Act of 

1879: 11

Warsaw Pact: 2, 78

Washington: 11

Washington Post: 67

Water resource development programs, 

military role in: 4, 14-15

Wedgwood, Ruth: 68

Western Federation of Miners: 11

Western Samoa: 33

Whitbey Island Electronic Attack 

Weapons School: 69-70

Williams, Derek: 6

Wilson, David A.: 15

Wilson, Woodrow: 15

Wing Fung Lung: 25

Wolseley, General Sir Garnet: 62

World Food Program: 37

Wyoming: 11

Yemen: 37, 79

Yugoslavia: 2, 17, 48, 74

Zaire: 26, 34, 35, 53

Zinni, General Anthony, USMC: 52-

53, 54, 71
The Author

Frank Schubert was born in Washington, DC, and is a graduate of Howard University (BA, 

1965), the University of Wyoming (MA, 1970), and the University of Toledo (PhD, 1977). 

He is a Vietnam veteran and worked as a historian in the Department of Defense for the US 

Army Corps of Engineers (1977-1989), the US Army Center of Military History (1989-

1993), and the Joint History Office of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (1993-2003). He was a Fulbright scholar at Babes Bolyai University in Cluj, Romania, 

during the academic year 2003-2004 and has lectured at universities and research centers in 

seven European countries. Most of his published work has been on North American frontier 

exploration, black soldiers in the US Army, and military construction. Official publications 

include Building Air Bases in the Negev: the US Army Corps of Engineers in Israel, 1979-1982

(1992) and Whirlwind War: the United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, (general editor with Theresa L. Kraus, 1996). His most recent book, Hungarian 

Borderlands: from the Habsburg Empire to the Axis Alliance, the Warsaw Pact, and the European 

Union, was published by Continuum (London) in the autumn of 2011. He and his wife 

Irene divide their time between homes in Fairfax County, Virginia, in Győr, Hungary, and on 

Eagle’s Nest Lake, Minnesota.