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Letort Paper

TALKING PAST EACH OTHER?

HOW VIEWS OF U.S. POWER

VARY BETWEEN U.S. AND

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL

Richard H. M. Outzen

February 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. 

policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and 

sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-559-3
iii

FOREWORD

A decade of multinational operations and global engagement has forced the U.S. military into a deeper and 

more sustained set of military-to-military relationships 

than previous strategic conditions required. In many 

cases, this experience has demonstrated differences between how our current generation of officers and their 

international peers view and discuss the exercise of U.S. 

power and influence overseas. Anecdotally, it has sometimes seemed as if American officers and their foreign 

partners were talking past each other—not only coming to different conclusions, but using entirely different 

premises and reasoning to explain the exercise of U.S. 

power abroad. In some cases, friction driven by miscommunication has manifested as low-level dissatisfaction 

and has been contained by professional norms and institutional processes. In other cases, especially when dealing with predominantly Muslim militaries—Turkey and 

Pakistan, no less than Iraq and Afghanistan—the friction 

has burst forth into open acrimony, sometimes with lethal results. 

U.S. margins for tolerating such negative outcomes 

will decrease along with our reduced funding, force 

structure, and presence overseas. Simply put, we must 

take care to better understand and more seamlessly cooperate with our allied and coalition militaries. In this 

context, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased 

to present the accompanying monograph, which addresses the question of how well U.S. officers and their 

international peers understand one another. The research was conducted in the spring of 2012 by a student 

at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 

drawing on large pools of U.S. and international officers 

studying at the National Defense University (NDU). The 

Paper attempts to support improved understanding by 
addressing the following questions: How much do the 

views of U.S. and international military officers diverge? 

What are the underlying reasons for that divergence? Do 

the differences follow predictable patterns? If so, what 

recommendations can be made?

This Paper contributes to an emerging body of research on the sources and modes of anti-U.S. sentiment 

in the international arena. It does so in a research area 

seldom touched by the broader academic community—

military-to-military relations—but one of great potential utility to our audience. SSI is pleased to present this 

example of thoughtful analysis produced by one of our 

Senior Service Schools.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD H. M. OUTZEN is a colonel in the U.S. 

Army. He is currently serving with the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem. Previous assignments 

have been as a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer 

(FAO), with a regional focus on the greater Middle 

East. He was commissioned in the Field Artillery 

and served in tactical staff and command positions 

in Germany, Turkey, and the United States. Since 

entering the FAO program in 1999, he has served 

in security assistance, attaché, and liaison positions 

in Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Colonel 

Outzen speaks four foreign languages, and has written extensively on matters of strategy, language, and 

culture. He is a 1989 graduate of Dartmouth College, 

and a 2012 graduate of the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces.

vii

SUMMARY

This Paper addresses the question of whether 

anecdotally observed friction between U.S. military 

personnel and their international partners stems from 

underlying bias or other factors that cannot be practically remedied. After providing a backdrop of the types 

of friction that have been observed, and that seem to be 

escalating, the Paper examines alternative theoretical 

explanations for such friction. The friction mirrors, in 

a sense, the broader sharpening of anti-U.S. sentiment 

observed throughout much of the globe over the past 

decade. There are two broad explanatory approaches: the friction and sentiment stem from who we are 

and are thus immutable; or they stem from discrete 

actions and policies, and thus may be ameliorated to 

some degree. 

The Paper provides a method for measuring variance between U.S. military officers and their international peers, by constructing a survey comprised of 

questions about U.S. power and military operations 

overseas. A subset of the questions was constructed in 

such a way that the questions could not be answered 

objectively or based on personal experience, and thus 

could be used as indicators of subjective bias for or 

against the United States. The variation of responses 

to all survey questions would indicate the degree 

of variance between the views of the two populations, while responses to the “subjective” questions 

would provide the key to understanding whether the 

source of the variance was subjective/pathological or 

objective/rational. 
viii

Key Findings include:

On questions of U.S. power and influence, the 

responses of senior international officers differ significantly from those of their U.S. peers nearly half 

the time. 

• Two groups of military officers similar in rank, 

age, and experience—one U.S. and one international—showed statistically significant variation between aggregate response patterns on 40 

percent of the items on a 40-question opinion 

survey.

On questions of belief, opinion, and bias related 

to U.S. power and influence, the international group 

diverged from their U.S. counterparts exactly half the 

time, and the clustering of responses suggests that 

U.S. value and belief positions account for 80 percent 

of the variance.

• A subset of the survey questions was designed 

to indicate underlying bias for or against the 

United States in response patterns. Significant variation between U.S. and international 

responses within this subset was expected to 

indicate that strongly held opinions or beliefs, 

rather than differences of interpretation or 

evaluation, were driving variation. Statistically 

significant variation occurred in response to 

half the questions (5 of 10).

• International officer responses showed a fairly 

wide distribution, whereas U.S. officer responses clustered over a much narrower range, 

suggesting that where bias drove the variation, 

it was U.S. rather than international officer bias.
ix

Response patterns to certain questions were unambiguous enough to suggest clear areas for policy focus 

or strategic communication. Examples include:

• Majorities in both groups thought the U.S. 

people and government do not understand the 

world well enough to exercise global leadership effectively. Agreement on that point was 

near-total—it had the lowest score for significant deviation in the entire survey.

• Nonetheless, both groups still believe it is in 

the world’s best interest for the United States 

to remain globally engaged, and to maintain a 

robust official and business presence abroad.

• The two groups strongly agree that the U.S. 

Government acts overseas based on hard interests rather than ideology, and that the United 

States is unique in how it uses its power.

• More than twice as many U.S. as international 

officers believe in the necessity and benefits of 

the missile shield program currently being deployed in Europe.

• U.S. officers are nearly unanimous in the belief 

that drone strikes against terror targets are necessary and justified; international respondents 

are deeply divided on this issue.

• U.S. officers are far more convinced than their 

international peers that the United States 

is genuinely committed to democracy, human rights, the law of war, and counterdrug 

policies abroad.

Survey and interview data suggest that international officer views of the United States are frequently critical, but seldom cluster in responses that are 

categorically anti-U.S.
x

• This evidence helps to refute the notion that

criticism of the United States is driven by reflexive, predictable bias—sometimes referred 

to as “pathological” anti-Americanism. It supports interpretation of anti-U.S. sentiment or 

criticism as a varied, rational, and contingent.

International military personnel at U.S. commands 

and schools constitute a valuable resource for sampling opinion on a systematic basis.

• High-level contacts between attachés and general officers should be complemented through 

regular surveys and focus groups that help us 

understand differing views among our critical 

partners. Such tools, as well as the information 

they yield, can best be leveraged in the various 

Professional Military Education programs.

The research broadly supports the views of political scientist Joseph Nye, who has argued that America’s subjective attractiveness to the people of other nations, or soft power, ebbs and flows based on practical 

steps responsive to policy. The response data show 

that there is significant variation in attitudes and 

beliefs separating U.S. personnel from international 

partners, but that the variation stems from considered 

positions rather than reflexive bias or lack of appreciation. Where bias is a barrier, it is more frequently 

our bias than theirs. The salient implication is that 

U.S. strategists and decisionmakers must adopt approaches to systematically measure, understand, and 

cooperatively resolve differences of attitude and belief 

that can impact our missions and interests overseas.
1

TALKING PAST EACH OTHER?

HOW VIEWS OF U.S. POWER

VARY BETWEEN U.S. AND

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL

Richard H. M. Outzen

BACKGROUND THEORY: THE ACADEMIC 

STUDY OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

Primary Explanations for a Growing Phenomenon.

A combination of public polling data and global 

criticism of U.S. military operations abroad raised 

academic interest in the study of anti-Americanism in 

the early 2000s.1

 Public commentators such as Thomas 

Friedman wondered, “Why do they hate us?” following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, and “Why 

does everybody else hate us?” after the invasion of 

Iraq.2

 While no clear and immediate remedy seemed 

available for the negative trends, observers such as 

David Levinson understood the need for careful study: 

For several years running, public opinion research has 

told us that many people around the world no longer 

trust the United States . . . and object to U.S. foreign 

policy . . . [T]oo little serious thought has been given 

to how and why people form their opinions about the 

U.S. and what causes them to change. . . . Unless we 

discover how factors such as these influence people’s 

thinking and perceptions, we can never expect to have 

a full understanding . . . and we cannot hope to significantly influence those perspectives.3
2

The scope, tone, and intensity of popular and political invective against the United States marked this 

new brand of criticism as related to but distinct from 

that studied by scholars of the preceding generation. 

Previous research on international public criticism 

looks through the lens of ideological processes, rather 

than engagement strategies. David Apter and Clifford 

Geertz, for instance, focused their effort on understanding the competing purposes of ideology, both as 

an expression of rational interest or as a sort of a pressure relief valve for popular discontent.4

 John Zaller 

later addressed the role of ideology in summarizing 

expert and elite opinion for mass audiences, helping 

maintain interest awareness and mobilize support 

when elite opinion was discordant or indicated dispute.5

 The context for such studies was the Cold War 

paradigm of competing and ideologically coherent 

opposed blocs, each facing an imperative of maintaining domestic ideological support while undermining 

the global standing of its rival. Public anger and discontent were more or less assumed to be ideological, 

with clear instrumentality in a binary power struggle 

waged across defined borders. Global conflict lent 

the occasional burst of public outrage a coherent 

framework. 

With the end of the Cold War, though, the explicit 

ideological basis for public outrage seemed to have 

dissipated. The sense that ideology would create far 

less strife and anger in subsequent decades, expressed 

most plainly in Francis Fukuyama’s End of History 

and the Last Man, seemed to augur a world trending 

toward liberal democracy and parliamentary debate, 

away from shooting wars and agitated publics.6

 Samuel Huntington’s counterthesis in A Clash of Civilizations tempered that prospect somewhat, but in the 
3

years between 1991 and 2001, it seemed unlikely that 

the United States would face a durable constellation 

of international terrorists, lethal insurgencies, and 

broadly negative international opinion in the near- to 

midterm.7

 Yet by late-2003, that is exactly the situation U.S. strategists faced. 

Much intellectual effort went into diagnosing and 

remedying the threats of terrorism and insurgency, 

but only gradually did the concomitant problem of 

America’s deteriorating standing in the eyes of the 

global public receive detailed attention. Eventually a 

number of thoughtful works emerged, generally reflecting one of two explanatory approaches. We can 

refer to these approaches as the “transitory” and the 

“pathological.” In discussing these explanatory approaches, we will use the term “anti-Americanism” in 

a broad and flexible sense. It encompasses the entire 

range of negative views of U.S. behaviors and actions, 

whether they are passionate or intellectual, reasoned 

or visceral, transitory or pathological. 

Transitory Explanation.

Giacomo Chiozza took on the task of explaining 

what motivates foreign and domestic critics of the 

United States in his work Anti-Americanism and the 

American World Order (2009). Chiozza began by reviewing current and recent literature on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, and grouping the leading 

theoreticians of anti-Americanism into those who see 

it as irrational and implacable, and those who see it as 

rational and temporary. The first group he refers to as 

the anti-Americanism as a syndrome school; the second 

group, with whom Chiozza ultimately sides, he refers 

to as the dimensions of anti-Americanism school. Other 
4

researchers have used more or less the same categories but refer to them as the pathological explanation 

and the soft power explanation, respectively. 

Chiozza argues that much anti-Americanism is 

ephemeral, rising in response to particular incidents 

and dissipating as provocative policies or actions recede in time. While some anti-American attitudes or 

views may be relatively durable, other types seem to 

respond to remedial U.S. action, positive messaging, 

or the passage of time. In Chiozza’s view this leaves 

substantial opportunity for specific U.S. policies to 

build and maintain goodwill abroad, an approach he 

consciously links to Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power:

Joseph Nye, in particular, has argued that the United 

States has a unique reservoir of soft power that enhances U.S. ability to exercise global leadership. The 

argument in this book partially concurs with the soft 

power thesis. . . .8

In addition to accepting that there are different 

causes and dimensions of anti-Americanism, Chiozza questions the notion that anti-Americanism in 

the public ipso facto damages our ability to exercise 

power abroad.9 He argues that the extent to which 

anti-Americanism damages or constrains the exercise 

of American power depends on whether such views 

are strict ideological constructs, or a mode of public 

expression with complex and unpredictable impact on 

actual policies and actions. He traces the argument for 

strict ideological construction through the writings of 

researchers such as Paul Hollander, Barry and Judith 

Culp Rubin, and Jean-Francois Revel, all of whom receive attention below. 

Chiozza’s second category, individuals skeptical 

of a direct causal linkage between mass opinion and 

political actions, includes Philip Converse and John 
5

Zaller.10 Converse argues that ignorance, ideological 

incoherence, and low levels of commitment militate 

against the operational effectiveness of such vaguely 

accepted ideological programs.11 Zaller lays out the 

often-contradictory nature of public opinion, sensitive 

to a diverse array of stimuli and extremely sensitive 

to observer bias during measurement.12 In short, these 

observers argue, we should not draw any hasty conclusions from apparent mass sentiment—things are 

often not what they seem. 

Chiozza concludes that the historical record predominantly shows anti-Americanism as a “loosely 

constrained belief system” ambivalently held, and 

only infrequently as a determinative and fixed program.13 Anti-American views do not predetermine opposition, but they do complicate through suspicion the 

advantages of soft power identified by Joseph Nye.14

The upshot is that periodic waves of criticism or emotional anti-Americanism do not erect a monolithic and 

deep wall against us, but rather constitute a long-term 

and complex rub that complicates without foreclosing our options for exercising power.15 More rooted 

opposition to U.S. policies or power may not entail 

personal or cultural hatred at all; conversely, praise 

for the ideals or people of the United States does not 

ensure political, diplomatic, or practical support.16 In 

Chiozza’s estimate, the pervasive anti-Americanism 

of the first decade of the 21st century is not really so 

different from previous waves tied to similar but unrelated international contexts. We seem destined to 

repeat a dynamic that has recurred since World War 

II: periodic waves and spikes in anti-American sentiment overlaid on a generally positive cultural and social viewpoint, moderated by the hard power interests 

of particular international actors.17
6

Where Chiozza uses Nye as a starting point for his 

interpretation of the transitory causes of anti-Americanism, Ole Holsti traces the roots further back in U.S. 

political tradition in his To See Ourselves as Others See 

Us (2008). Holsti points out that our national leaders 

from the time of the Founding Fathers saw great utility in tracking and positively influencing the sensibilities of foreign leaders and publics: 

Although Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues, in 

writing the Declaration of Independence, were not 

aware of the concept of “soft power,” the phrase ”a 

decent respect to the opinions of mankind” in that historic document reflected a belief that the manner in 

which others viewed the legitimacy of claims to independence by the upstart colonies might in fact influence the prospects for a successful divorce from the 

mother country. . . . [I]n contrast to hard power, the 

base of soft power resides in the ”hearts and minds” of 

other countries, especially among the leaders of their 

political, economic, military, cultural, and other major institutions. . . . Although it is not always possible 

to establish a causal link between public opinion and 

government policy . . . leaders . . . who chose to defy 

Washington acted in ways that were consistent with 

the preferences of their publics.18

Holsti argues that both the elite and public views 

of the United States in other countries should matter 

to us—the former because of the immediate impact of 

civil and military decisionmakers; the latter because of 

their fundamental weight in shaping those decisions 

over time. Effective statecraft requires that we understand and to some degree heed sensitivities of the host 

nations, at least if we want political or military support from the government that answers to that public. 
7

Holsti largely supports Chiozza’s differentiation 

of the various and often-conflicting dimensions of foreign sentiment regarding America. He groups those 

dimensions into the generally positive views of the 

idealism and promise that America is, and the frequently criticized things that America does in specific 

circumstances.19 The most fervent criticisms often reflect disappointment stemming from local and temporary factors; they ebb and flow over time, and thus can 

be ameliorated or mitigated over time, as well. The 

reservoir of abstract good will based on America’s underlying character has, on the other hand, remained 

generally constant in long-interval polling data. Holsti argues emphatically that the United States can 

only damage its own interests by concluding that our 

critics hate us because of what we are, and that they 

therefore are the “real” source of the problem. 

Polling data and historical precedent both support 

a policy approach that assumes the international community generally shares a benign view of the United 

States (there are, of course, exceptions), and each incidence of criticism should be evaluated and, where 

possible, remedied on its own merits.20 This is not to 

deny that some criticism is too self-serving or specious to be taken seriously—as Paul Hollander and 

others have argued persuasively. Allowing “criticism 

fatigue” to reduce our attentiveness and impute insincerity or enmity to all criticism, though, would be both 

a cognitive and a strategic mistake. 

If transitory rather than pathological factors drive 

criticism of the United States, we may expect that this 

should be reflected within the subset of foreign opinion addressed by the current study, that of foreign senior military officers. We can hypothesize that critical 

views may emerge in response to specific policy dis-
8

putes or strategic behaviors, but should be absent on 

matters of general identity or “what America is.” Such 

a pattern might suggest areas of U.S. strategic behavior that have generated friction or criticism, but may, 

through a nuanced approach of discussion and compromise, be rendered less problematic. If, conversely, 

critical views extend beyond specific and measurable 

instances of interest conflict and into the area of broad, 

intangible, and subjective beliefs, our problem takes 

on a more immutable and strategic character. Under 

such conditions, one hears the echo of Dean Acheson’s dismissive judgment, “World opinion . . . is pure 

fancy—no more substantial a ghost than the banging 

of a shutter, or the wind in the chimney.”21 There are 

a number of analysts who argue that this is indeed 

the case. 

Reflexive or “Pathological” Explanations.

The most provocative and lyrical of those arguing 

that most anti-American sentiment is irrational and 

ungrounded in sincere policy criticism was Jean-Francois Revel, a sympathetic and insightful observer of 

the United States and its people, rather in the tradition 

of Alexis de Tocqueville. Revel argues in his seminal 

work, Anti-Americanism (2000), that many European 

critics of the United States are not responding to specific actions or inactions, so much as they are seeking 

to discredit the powerful symbiosis of political liberalism and capitalism the U.S. embodies. 

 . . . the anti-Americanism of the extreme Right, it is fueled by the same hatred of democracy and the liberal 

economy that goads the extreme Left. . . . The principal 

function of anti-Americanism has always been, and 

still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its su-
9

preme incarnation. . . . The Blame America First reflex 

to each and every problem has for long been instinctive among the cultural upper echelons.22

The wave of European revulsion and criticism 

that increased in the decade from the fall of the Soviet 

Union to the 9/11 attacks was not so unprecedented, 

says Revel, but was fully in keeping with a pattern 

that pertained through much of the Cold War. 

As the sixties unfolded, I had begun to be invaded by 

doubts as to the validity of this reflexive anti-Americanism, which indiscriminately condemned America’s 

‘imperialistic’ foreign policy—Soviet imperialism, in 

contrast, was but philanthropy—and American society. . . . The astonishing thing is . . . that even outside 

Communist circles it could gain a certain credibility—

and this in countries where the press is free and it is 

easy to cross-check data. The mystery of anti-Americanism is not the disinformation—reliable information 

on the United States has always been easy to obtain—

but people’s willingness to be misinformed.23

Revel noted that criticism of specific U.S. policies 

and actions was frequently accompanied by sweeping indictments of U.S. culture and social conditions. 

The most frequent charges—recurring charges, since 

they seem to crop up in every new generation’s jealous attacks on the United States—are that Americans 

are ruled by money, have no other values, have commoditized everything and everyone, that poverty and 

pandemic violence are the dominant social realities, 

and that we are a democracy only in appearance—one 

that delights in electing only defectives and miscreants as President.24
10

The misrepresentations of social relations and living standards in the United States, while gratifying 

anti-American passions, serve finally to denigrate free 

market economies. Likewise, the incomprehension or 

caricaturing of American institutions helps to spread 

the idea that the United States is not truly a democracy, and, by extrapolation, that liberal democracies 

are democratic in appearance only. But it’s in the area 

of international relations that the ‘hyperpower’ finds 

itself held in particular abhorrence.25

Revel describes a lineal descent from the antiAmericanism of the Vietnam War generation in Europe and the United States, to that of the anti-globalists of today. 

The youthful anti-globalists are actually superannuated ideologues, revenants from a past of ruin and 

bloodshed. . . . America is the object of their loathing 

because, for a half-century or more, she has been the 

most prosperous and creative capitalist society on 

earth. . . . What the current crop of anti-globalizers 

have in common with the soixante-huitards is a simplistic Marxist article of faith: absolute evil is capitalism, incarnated in and directed by the United States.26

The language and fervor of sweeping denunciation, unaccompanied by carefully critical analysis or 

proof, crept also into the anger of Islamist insurgents 

and their sympathizers across the globe. 

The clumsiest of these fallacies was an attempt to justify Islamist terrorism by claiming that America has 

long been hostile towards Islam. But the truth is that 

the United States’ actions historically have been far 

less damaging to Muslim interests than the actions of 

Britain, France, or Russia.27
11

Revel sees such criticism as a global phenomenon, 

not restricted to Middle East war zones and European 

capitals: 

European literary figures are not alone in despising 

American authors, to whom, nevertheless, they owe 

so many renewing themes and revolutionary narrative techniques. The daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun, 

interviewing Japanese writers and philosophers after 

September 11, recorded not only political attitudes 

leaning more towards the jihadists than their victims, 

but literary judgments imbued with condescension 

and assurance of superiority.28

Revel is not blind to the necessity of legitimate 

and well-grounded criticism. He notes, however, that 

the disproportionate type of criticism sometimes observed may indicate a purposeful manipulation of 

facile prejudice:

There is a big difference between being anti-American 

and being critical of the United States. Once again: 

critiques are appropriate and necessary, provided 

that they rest on facts, address real abuses, real errors 

and real excesses—without deliberately losing sight 

of America’s wise decisions, beneficent interventions 

and salutary policies . . . anti-Americanism is at base 

a totalizing, if not totalitarian, vision.... Anti-Americanism thus defined is less a popular prejudice than a 

parti pris of the political, cultural, and religious elites.29

Revel also highlights the biggest danger stemming 

from criticism not tethered to facts by context or proportion: that Americans will stop listening. 

The Anti-American obsession, in effect, aggravates 

the evil that it aims to extirpate, namely [American] 

unilateralism . . . and causes them to keep thinking: 
12

‘They’re always blaming us, so why consult them at 

all? We already know they’ll only vilify us.’ . . . The fallacies of the anti-American bias encourage American 

unilateralism.30

Barry Rubin and Judith Culp Rubin, writing 4 

years after Revel during the emotionally charged aftermath of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, 

carried the pathological explanation further in their 

work Hating America (2004). Like Revel, they are careful to acknowledge that not all criticism of America or 

U.S. policies constitutes anti-Americanism. They look 

for true anti-American sentiment in words or actions 

that show systemic antagonism, that greatly exaggerate U.S. shortcomings, deliberately misrepresent the 

nature or policies of the United States, or misperceive 

U.S. society, policies, or goals in a manner that falsely 

portrays them as ridiculous or malevolent.31

Interestingly, the Rubins identify a cascade of factors driving anti-Americanism that is largely independent of specific U.S. policies or actions. The biggest 

single cause is fear of domination by the dominant 

global power:

One of our most important conclusions is that there 

has been a historical continuity and evolution of antiAmericanism, coinciding with the development of 

the United States, changes in other societies, and the 

world situation. We have detected five phases in this 

process. . . . [I]n the current phase . . . those who hold 

anti-Americanism views see the U.S. domination, both 

as a great power and as a terrible model for civilization 

(as the centerpiece of globalization, modernization, 

and Westernization), to be an established fact. That is 

why it is the most angry and widespread exemplification of anti-Americanism ever seen.32
13

While not denying President George Bush’s unparalleled ability to antagonize America’s critics personally, the Rubins discount the singularity of his impact, 

and the role of the war itself, in catalyzing hatred and 

opposition. The upsurge of anti-Americanism in the 

wake of 9/11 and the war in Iraq was a natural continuation or fulfillment of a trend that can be traced 

back 2 centuries.33

The Rubins focus more attention on the average 

American’s response to such antagonism than do 

other observers: 

In general, there have been two distinct American 

responses to this supposedly paradoxical hatred of 

America. Most commonly, there is a sense of anger 

and annoyance coupled with curiosity. How could 

people be so antagonistic to a country of such decent 

intentions and frequent successes? How can the good 

side of America at home and the positive things it has 

done internationally be so ignored? This must arise 

from hostility to America’s basic values such as democracy, free enterprise, and liberty. The alternative 

view is that the hatred is deserved, a result of bad 

American policies.34

Americans in the Rubins’ first category usually 

proceed to fight with rhetoric and weapons against 

the country’s perceived enemies, while trying to restate the national reasoning more clearly. Those in the 

second category tend to become active in protest and 

reform movements, proceeding from the premise that 

“changing U.S. policies will inevitably dissipate antagonism.” The Rubins note that neither approach gives 

sufficient consideration to the fact that there is a structure and political use to anti-Americanism, as well as a 

historical trajectory. The Rubins are optimistic that we 
14

can understand this phenomenon more clearly, but 

not at all optimistic that our ameliorating actions will 

lessen the vehemence or scope of criticism. After all, 

there is too much political utility and comfort in such 

denunciatory theater. As long as the United States remains a powerful and unique model that inspires imitation in the politics, economics, social, and cultural 

affairs of other nations, anti-Americanism will remain 

powerful, durable, and varied.35

Paul Hollander, writing contemporaneously with 

the Rubins, argues that the question is not whether pathology undergirds some criticism of the United States 

in the early-21st century, but just how widespread 

that pathology is. He asserted in Understanding AntiAmericanism (2004) that “reflexive disparagement” of 

the United States, by observers both foreign and domestic, is real and widespread.36 Hollander recognizes 

that in the natural course of public and political events, 

a prominent power such as the United States will attract criticism, much of it justified, toward specific 

“. . . institutions, policies, leaders, or cultural 

trends. . . .”37 When such criticism becomes generalized into “undifferentiated, diffuse, and empirically 

untenable hostility” toward the United States, it has 

become something pathological. Anti-Americanism 

then emerges as a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition that perceives the United States as an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity and the source of all, or 

most, other evils in the world.”38

Hollander points out that there are both domestic 

and international varieties of such pathological antiAmericanism. Both have been on the rise in recent decades, he posits, due to a combination of five factors. 

These are the fall of Soviet communism, eliminating a 

rival magnet for pathological hatred; U.S. assertions 
15

of military power abroad, above all else in Iraq and 

Afghanistan; the personality and policies of President 

Bush; globalization; and the rise of explicitly antiAmerican Islamic fundamentalism.39 In the broader 

sense, pathological anti-Americanism stems from the 

underlying human need for scapegoats, and the utility of a 

strong, rich nation for that role. This psycho-social need 

and, in a complementary sense, the partially accurate 

association of the United States with globalization and 

the frequently justifiable criticism of specific errors or 

flaws, drives much current anti-Americanism.40

The research focus reflected here is an attempt to 

shed light on the relative merits of the transitory and 

pathological explanations through examination of 

a uniquely paired group of subjects: senior U.S. and 

international military personnel. Two groups of students at the National Defense University (NDU), one 

composed of senior U.S. military personnel and the 

other of their international peers, were surveyed to 

compare critical views and biases in their analysis of 

U.S. actions overseas.41 The groups make for a compelling comparison, not only because of the global variety of the international students, but because the two 

groups are closely matched in terms of rank, experience, and professional culture. A series of questions 

designed to elicit varying degrees of critical response 

regarding U.S. power and influence—including a subset of questions that imply a reflexive or pathological 

basis for critical response—was administered to the 

two groups, to confirm the presence and cause of the 

potential variance in responses. 
16

Other Survey Data Relevant to 

“Anti-Americanism.”

A number of opinion and polling firms, such as 

Pew and Gallup, have conducted research relevant to 

the study of views on U.S. power and influence overseas. That body of research provides a useful backdrop for the study of the international military officer 

opinion regarding the United States. These previous 

surveys show that public opinion of the United States 

in many countries has worsened over the past decade. 

In some cases, such as the unrest following Hosni 

Mubarak’s fall in Egypt, senior-level military ties 

have served to stabilize relations and maintain contact 

amid highly chaotic political conditions.42 Evidence 

of more sympathetic views among senior military 

officers might validate strategies based on engaging 

and building relationships with such groups in order 

to positively affect broader bilateral and multilateral 

understandings. 

The Pew Research Center, a “fact tank” funded by 

charitable grants and foundations, began measuring 

opinion among foreign publics in 2001.43 Its Global 

Attitudes Project has interviewed over 270,000 people 

in over 57 countries, and published numerous reports. These reports document well the global trends 

toward viewing the United States as an aggressive 

and threatening power between 2003 and 2008. While 

President Barack Obama’s election raised favorable 

ratings in some countries, the global economic crisis 

stimulated global concerns that the United States had 

become a declining power. While global surveys are 

dynamic, the overall trend is for foreign publics to 

view the United States through a suspicious and negative lens, with grave doubts about its intentions and 

future strength.44
17

The picture is even bleaker in several regions and 

countries, particularly those with Muslim-majority 

populations. The consistently low positive numbers 

provide some ammunition for those who believe that 

reflexive bias or “pathologically” driven anti-Americanism has become a more or less permanent feature 

of the early-21st-century strategic landscape. 

The Gallup Organization also conducts extensive 

overseas polling, normally in conjunction with research on consumer confidence factors, business climate, and domestic politics. Gallup also produces a 

regular measure of attitudes toward the United States. 

While that measure, the “Global Views of U.S. Leadership,” is focused on leadership, and thus reflects more 

about the President’s popularity than it does about 

power and influence more broadly, it can serve as a 

rough proxy for the overall tone of public opinion 

regarding the United States in a variety of countries. 

This set of surveys indicates that world opinion of 

the United States generally saw a bounce in 2008-09, 

but has dropped since that time, and currently runs 

less than 50 percent favorable in most countries.45 It 

is against this recently improved, but still generally 

negative, backdrop of global opinion toward the United States, then, that we may consider a more specific 

group for study.

A natural next step in the study of anti-Americanism—so far primarily the domain of academics and 

pollsters—is for specific professional groups to expand data collection toward peer or customer groups 

relevant to their specific missions. Professional military officers comprise one such group. Increasing 

levels of international security cooperation have created new opportunities for aggregating and analyzing opinion data related to foreign militaries. One set 

of opportunities exists in multinational headquarters 
18

and commands in the field, where U.S. and international military personnel operate together on a dayto-day basis. Due to the operational nature of these 

assignments, though, systematic study is normally 

not possible without interfering in the conduct of necessary work and missions. A better set of opportunities exists in academic or liaison environments, where 

a diverse set of foreign military personnel interact 

with U.S. counterparts with sufficient frequency to 

ensure both that they have relevant views on the United States, and that they are accessible and willing to 

participate in opinion-based study. The NDU offers a 

rich environment, with more than 100 senior-ranking 

foreign military personnel working alongside several 

hundred senior U.S. officers and defense civilians. Because no such systematic study appears to have been 

conducted to date, the current research was designed 

to provide a useful new data set, based on use of an 

opinion survey instrument for the comparative analysis of the views of U.S. and international students at 

the NDU. Building on the context provided through 

theoretical and polling works, this monograph may 

help identify specific problems and possible solutions 

for military commands functioning in an international 

or multinational context. 

RESPONSES OF SURVEYED MILITARY 

PERSONNEL TO THEMES

Survey Design and Methodology.

The survey instrument was designed, based on 

themes encountered in foreign media outlets regarding U.S. power, influence, or operations abroad. Media 

samples were taken from a variety of newspapers in 

different regions of the globe, including Latin Amer-
19

ica, Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the Far East.46 In some 

cases, questions derived from the media samples reflect wording from statements in editorial essays or 

columnists’ writing, and in other cases, the questions 

blend elements from multiple sources within in a region. Themes and topics raised by individual military 

personnel in informal settings, both U.S. and international, were also synthesized to inform the questions.

The purpose of basing survey items on these multiple sources was to produce a pool of statements 

that required respondents to go beyond the limits of 

their own national press coverage when evaluating 

statements about U.S. power and influence. Survey 

respondent answers thus reflect responses to arguments or views found in global press coverage of U.S. 

power and influence, rather than definitive analysis 

of the underlying events. This reflects the research 

goal of determining the variability of analytic frames 

common between U.S. and non-U.S. personnel, rather 

than views of specific military or political events seen 

through a professional frame. Survey respondents 

were volunteers from personnel assigned to the NDU, 

including officers from lieutenant colonel through 

major general, or defense civilians of equivalent rank. 

Appendix I has a more detailed description of the 

survey’s methodology.

Survey Items, Response Tables, and Summary 

Charts.

The survey items and responses are summarized 

below. Each item is followed by a table describing 

how the two groups (U.S. and international officers) 

responded on a scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither, 
20

Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) to statements that 

describe their views and beliefs. Values in the tables 

are expressed as a percentage of total responses for 

each item. Two additional statistical measures are given alongside the percentages to indicate the existence 

and strength of the correlation between the respondents' nationalities and their views or beliefs. 

The first measure is an F-Statistic, used by statisticians to determine the likelihood that a given result is 

statistically significant. In this case, the F-Statistic indicates whether variance between U.S. and international 

response patterns is random or statistically significant. 

Statistical significance simply means that a result is 

unlikely to have occurred by chance.47 Not all statistically significant variance is important; to determine 

importance, a second measure called Eta Squared is 

used. Eta Squared measures association by describing 

strength of correlation on a range from 0 to 1.0, with 

1.0 being the strongest. Eta Squared was calculated 

for those items with an F-Statistic over 3.75 (a higher 

F-Statistic means lower probability of randomness). 

Eta Squared was calculated to confirm the importance 

of association, with values over .05 considered strong 

association (relatively important). Following the last 

survey item is a summary chart for all 40 items. Appendix I contains a breakdown of responses by region.
21

Q1: The United States is unique among great powers in its desire to use its 

power and influence overseas to support the interests of democracy and 

the international community. 

Q2: U.S. policy in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America is 

driven by strategic and economic advantage, and U.S. ideology and values 

are used to justify those interests.

Q3: The United States remains the only credible mediator between the 

Arabs and the Israelis. 

Q4: The U.S. intervention in Iraq was based on a genuine desire to help the 

Iraqi people become a free, democratic, and stable society.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 53.1 28.1 0 12.5 6.3

.373 N/A

International 37.5 37.5 6.3 15.6 3.1

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 25 46.9 9.4 15.6 3.1

3.665 N/A

International 37.5 53.1 6.3 0 3.1

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 12.5 25 3.1 43.8 15.6

.734 N/A

International 15.6 21.9 25 25 12.5

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.1 28.1 12.5 43.8 12.5

7.892 .113

International 0 15.6 6.3 28.1 50
22

Q5: The United States will never entirely withdraw from Iraq and 

Afghanistan, because it has too much invested and too much to gain from 

a long-term presence. 

Q6: The United States has a good record of opposing colonialism and 

supporting free and democratic governance in the world. 

Q7: The U.S. missile shield project is beneficial to Europe and the Middle 

East, because it addresses the pressing problem of growing Iranian 

ballistic missile capabilities.

Q8: In countries where the U.S. military has a substantial presence or 

operations, the host nations should pay a substantial amount of the cost 

for that presence, since the forces are there to benefit the local people. 

Q9: Other nations should be more grateful and positive about U.S. 

military activities overseas, since those activities support peace, stability, 

commerce, and development. 

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 9.4 34.4 15.6 25 15.6

3.849 .056

International 25 40.6 12.5 12.5 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 9.4 53.1 9.4 28.1 0

.584 N/A

International 9.4 46.9 15.6 12.5 15.6

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 34.4 50 12.5 3.1 0

17.534 .22

International 6.3 37.5 34.4 12.5 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 12.5 43.8 18.8 21.9 3.1

12.031 .163

International 0 21.9 21.9 40.6 15.6

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 18.8 50 18.8 9.4 3.1

7.072 .102

International 6.3 34.4 25 21.9 12.5
23

Q10: The United States has traditionally helped the Muslim countries of 

the Middle East, by supporting their independence, protecting them from 

communism, and encouraging their development. 

Q11: U.S. actions overseas have not been overly advantageous or 

disadvantageous to Muslim countries, but have varied according to U.S. 

national interest and the facts of each situation. 

Q12: The United States and Europe share key values and interests, and are 

committed to the same priorities overseas.

Q13: The main question about U.S. power in the 21st century is how to 

limit and constrain it.

Q14: The main question about U.S. power in the 21st century is how to 

keep Americans internationally engaged and active in a leading role.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.3 37.5 21.9 21.9 12.5

.452 N/A

International 3.1 28.1 28.1 31.3 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 43.8 46.9 3.1 6.3 0

.114 N/A

International 31.3 62.5 3.1 3.1 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.1 50 15.6 21.9 9.4

4.852 .073

International 15.6 56.3 12.5 15.6 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 3.1 9.4 37.5 50

25.81 .294

International 12.5 21.9 18.8 40.6 6.3

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.3 65.6 9.4 9.4 9.4

.714 N/A

International 18.8 50 18.8 9.4 3.1
24

Q15: The nations of East Asia need a robust and active U.S. presence to 

ensure a stable and productive regional balance.

Q16: The United States contributed significantly to the success of the Arab 

Awakening, by encouraging and supporting democratic movements.

Q17: The United States delayed the start of Arab democracy as long as 

it possibly could, then changed policy once its favored leaders could no 

longer maintain power. 

Q18: U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan show good will and 

good faith with our local and international partners.

Q19: The United States is justified in using drone strikes against terrorists 

and their support networks abroad.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 15.6 37.5 18.8 18.8 9.4

.715 N/A

International 9.4 28.1 31.3 21.9 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.3 28.1 9.4 43.8 12.5

.179 N/A

International 6.3 25 31.3 21.9 15.6

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.1 28.1 18.8 25 25

10.418 .114

International 12.5 53.1 15.6 12.5 6.3

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 12.5 34.4 21.9 31.3 0

.327 N/A

International 6.3 40.6 21.9 21.9 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Squared Eta Squared

U.S. 46.9 43.8 3.1 6.3 0

11.416 .155

International 21.9 34.4 15.6 15.6 12.5
25

Q20: I trust the United States to effectively and justly pursue international 

policies that support human rights, nonproliferation, and democratic 

reform.

Q21: Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and war atrocities by U.S. Soldiers are 

exceptions—generally U.S. military forces are respectful of the law and 

human rights.48

Q22: U.S. policies regarding the drug trade, immigration, and human 

rights are not serious, but are used as an excuse to meddle in the affairs 

of other countries. 

Q23: The United States has become very much like an empire, and 

exercises very broad and effective power over governments in Africa, 

Asia, and Latin America. 

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 25 62.5 3.1 9.4 0

9.615 .134

International 6.3 53.1 9.4 21.9 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 84.4 12.5 3.1 0 0

25.147 .289

International 34.4 21.9 15.6 25 3.1

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 9.4 6.3 34.4 50

15.801 .203

International 9.4 18.8 28.1 31.3 12.5

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 12.5 6.3 50 31.3

14.38 .188

International 15.6 25 18.8 31.3 9.4
26

Q24: The United States is a declining power. 

Q25: The establishment of U.S. African Command shows a deeper and 

more serious interest in helping the countries of Africa. 

Q26: The United States is a Christian nation and acts to promote 

Christianity overseas.

Q27: I expect big social problems in the United States in the near future, 

based on poverty, the gap between rich and poor, racism, and social 

violence.

Q28: Other countries would be better off, if their political and social 

institutions were more like those of the United States.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 34.4 12.5 31.3 21.9

.654 N/A

International 3.1 25 25 43.8 3.1

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 15.6 56.3 6.3 21.9 0

9.711 .135

International 3.1 31.3 21.9 34.4 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.2 3.2 29 22.6 41.9

3.34 N/A

International 6.3 18.8 21.9 31.3 21.9

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 19.4 16.1 38.7 25.8

8.972 .128

International 6.3 40.6 9.4 43.8 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.3 35.5 32.3 19.4 6.3

.249 N/A

International 6.3 31.3 25 34.4 3.1
27

Q29: Most people overseas like Americans as individuals, but do not like 

the American government.

Q30: American culture is spreading globally, and is a threat to local 

cultures in many places.

Q31: The United States treats its partners overseas equally, and knows 

how to listen and compromise. 

Q32: If I were in charge of my own country, I would want a robust 

American presence, with plenty of businessmen, diplomats, and tourists 

visiting or staying. 

Q33: U.S. power has been dealt a great blow by the failure of its campaigns 

in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 12.9 41.9 19.4 19.4 6.5

1.519 N/A

International 21.9 40.6 21.9 15.6 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 16.1 48.4 6.5 22.6 6.5

1.555 N/A

International 12.5 34.4 9.4 34.4 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 13.3 20 43.3 23.3

2.069 N/A

International 0 34.4 12.5 34.4 18.8

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

US 23.3 43.3 26.7 6.7 0

.053 N/A

International 21.9 43.8 25 9.4 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.7 23.3 13.3 26.7 30

4.18 .065

International 12.5 34.4 15.6 31.3 6.3
28

Q34: A strong U.S. military presence overseas is in the best interests of 

my country. 

Q35: Most countries in most regions of the world are better able to resolve 

their own disputes and problems if there is no significant American military 

presence in the region.

Q36: Globalization is a planned and directed process that primarily benefits 

the United States. 

Q37: Americans care and take into account the interests and goals of 

partners and allies.

Q38: The United States could stop most wars and economic problems, 

but chooses not to.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 16.7 43.3 16.7 23.3 0

1.015 N/A

International 12.5 34.4 28.1 15.6 9.4

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.3 30 16.7 36.7 13.3

.325 N/A

International 3.1 15.6 46.9 34.4 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 10 6.7 36.7 46.7

1.396 N/A

International 3.1 15.6 9.4 34.4 37.5

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 20 63.3 3.3 10 3.3

4.329 .067

International 6.3 53.1 9.4 31.3 0

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 0 6.7 0 30 63.3

10.506 .149

International 3.1 15.6 15.6 40.6 25
29

Q39: Americans generally listen to and respect the opinions of their foreign 

colleagues, and generally understand what they are hearing.

Q40: U.S. people and government understand the world well enough to 

effectively exercise the leadership role their power gives them.

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 6.7 33.3 16.7 36.7 6.7

1.427 N/A

International 12.5 43.8 9.4 31.3 3.1

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree F-Statistic Eta Squared

U.S. 3.3 23.3 23.3 33.3 16.7

.001 N/A

International 0 28.1 21.9 34.4 15.6

Table 1: Summary U.S. and International Responses 

(U.S. in parentheses)48

# Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree F-Score Stength 

(Eta2

)

1 37.5 (53.1) 37.5 (28.1) 6.3 (0) 15.6 (12.5) 3.1 (6.3) 0.373

2 37.5 (25) 53.1 (46.9) 6.3 (9.4) 0 (15.6) 3.1 (3.1) 3.665

3 15.6 (12.5) 21.9 (25) 23 (3.1) 25 (43.8) 12.5 (15.6) 0.734

4 0 (3.1) 15.6 (28.1) 6.3 (12.5) 28.1 (43.8) 50 (15.6) 7.892 0.113

5 25 (9.4) 40.6 (34.3) 12.5 (15.6) 12.5 (25) 9.4 (15.6) 3.849 0.056

6 9.4 (9.4) 46.9 (53.1) 15.6 (9.4) 12.5 (28.1) 15.6 (0) 0.584

7 6.3 (34.4) 37.5 (50) 34.4 (12.5) 12.5 (3.1) 9.4 (0) 17.534 0.22

8 0 (12.5) 21.9 (43.8) 21.9 (18.8) 40.6 (21.9) 15.6 (3.1) 12.031 0.163

9 6.3 (18.8) 34.4 (50) 25 (18.8) 21.9 (9.4) 12.5 (3.1) 7.072 0.102

10 31.1 (6.3) 28.1 (37.5) 28.1 (21.9) 31.3 (6.3) 9.4 (12.5) 0.452

11 31.3 (43.8) 62.5 (46.9) 3.1 (3.1) 3.1 (6.3) 0 (0) 0.114

12 15.6 (3.1) 56.3 (50) 12.5 (15.6) 15.6 (21.9) 0 (9.4) 4.852 0.073

13 12.5 (0) 21.9 (3.1) 18.8 (9.4) 40.6 (37.5) 6.3 (50) 25.81 0.294

14 18.8 (6.3) 50 (65.6) 18.8 (9.4) 9.4 (9.4) 3.1 (9.4) 0.714

15 9.4 (15.6) 28.1 (37.5) 31.3 (18.8) 21.9 (18.8) 9.4 (9.4) 0.715

16 6.3 (6.3) 25 (28.1) 31.3 (94.4) 21.9 (43.8) 15.6 (12.5) 0.179
30

# Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree F-Score Stength 

(Eta2)

17 12.5 (3.1) 53.1 (28.1) 15.6 (18.8) 12.5 (25) 6.3 (25) 10.418 0.114

18 6.3 (12.5) 40.6 (34.4) 21.9 (21.9) 21.9 (31.3) 9.4 (0) 0.327

19 21.9 (46.9) 34.4 (43.8) 15.6 (3.1) 15.6 (6.3) 12.5 (0) 11.416 0.155

20 6.3 (25) 53.1 (62.5) 9.4 (3.1) 21.9 (31.3) 9.4 (0) 9.615 0.134

21 34.4 (84.4) 21.9 (12.5) 15.6 (3.1) 25(0) 3.1 (0) 25.147 0.289

22 9.4 (0) 18.8 (9.4) 28.1 (6.3) 31.3 (34.4) 12.5 (50) 15.801 0.203

23 15.6 (0) 25 (12.5) 18.8 (6.3) 31.3 (50) 9.4 (31.3) 14.38 0.188

24 3.1 (0) 35 (34.4) 25 (12.5) 43.8 (31.3) 3.1 (21.9) 0.654

25 3.1 (15.6) 31.3 (56.3) 21.9 (6.3) 34.4 (21.9) 9.4 (0) 9.711 0.135

26 6.3 (3.2) 18.8 (3.2) 21.9 (29) 31.3 (22.6) 21.9 ( 41.9) 3.34

27 6.3 (0) 40.6 (19.4) 9.4 (16.1) 43.8 (38.7) 0 (25.8) 8.972 0.128

28 6.3 (6.3) 31.3 (35.5) 25 (32.3) 34.3 (19.4) 3.1 (6.3) 0.249

29 21.9 (12.9) 40.6 (41.9) 21.9 (19.4) 15.6 (19.4) 0 (6.5) 1.519

30 12.5 (16.1) 34.4 (48.4) 9.4 (6.5) 34.4 (22.6) 9.4 (6.5) 1.555

31 0 (0) 34.4 (13.3) 12.5 (20) 34.4 (43.3) 18.8 (23.3) 2.069

32 21.9 (23.3) 43.8 (43.3) 25 (26.7) 9.4 (6.7) 0 (0) 0.053

33 12.5 (6.7) 34.3 (23.3) 15.6 (13.3) 31.3 (26.7) 6.3 (30) 4.18 0.065

34 12.5 (16.7) 34.4 (43.3) 28.1 (16.7) 15.6 (23.3) 9.4 (0) 1.015

35 3.1 (3.3) 15.6 (30) 46.9 (16.7) 34.4 (36.7) 0 (13.3) 0.325

36 3.1 (0) 15.6 (10) 9.4 (6.7) 34.4 (36.7) 37.5 (46.7) 1.396

37 6.3 (20) 53.1 (63.3) 9.4 (3.3) 31.3 (10) 0 (3.3) 4.329 0.067

38 3.1 (0) 15.6 (6.7) 15.6 (0) 40.6 (30) 25 (63.3) 10.506 0.149

39 12.5 (6.7) 43.8 (33.3) 9.4 (16.7) 31.3 (36.7) 3.1 (6.7) 1.427

40 0 (3.3) 28.1 (23.3) 21.9 (23.3) 34.4 (33.3) 15.6 (16.7) 0.001

Table 1: Summary U.S. and International Responses 

(U.S. in parentheses)48 (continued)

NOTE: Highlighted survey item numbers (e.g., “5”) indicate a 

survey item designated as a reflexive bias indicator. Highlighted 

F-statistic values (e.g., 7.892) indicate a value above the screening 

(3.75), showing statistically significant variance between U.S. and 

international values. Highlighted Eta2 values (e.g., 0.113) indicate 

value above the screening level (.05), showing the strength of the 

variation. 
31

Preliminary Observations on the Data.

For 24 of the 40 survey items, there was no statistically significant variation between the patterns of answers for the two groups. For 16 of the 40 questions, 

the international group’s answers varied in a statistically significant manner from those of the U.S. group. 

Observations based on specific question/answer pairs 

follow. (“Q” refers to survey question numbers). The 

observations fall into five general categories of related 

survey questions or themes: the U.S. role in the international system, U.S. global military operations and 

presence, regional views for the Middle East, regional 

views for areas other than the Middle East, and general views of the U.S. and its people.

U.S. Role in the International System.

U.S. and international officers agree with impressive consistency that the U.S. Government acts overseas based on hard analysis of interests rather than 

ideology (Q2 and Q11), but also agree that the United 

States is unique in how it uses that power (Q1). Majorities in both groups say the United States has a good 

record of opposing colonialism and promoting democracy (Q6). U.S. officers overwhelmingly reject the 

notion that others should act to limit or constrain U.S. 

power, while international officers are almost evenly 

divided on the issue (Q13). Notably, though, both 

groups agree on the need to keep the United States 

engaged globally (Q14). A striking pattern of results 

emerges from the series of four questions on U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights in the international system (Q20 through Q23). Almost every U.S. 

respondent trusts the United States to pursue human 
32

rights, nonproliferation, and democracy abroad (87 

percent); to generally respect law and human rights 

in military operations (97 percent); to be serious about 

its counterdrug and immigration policies (84 percent); 

and not to behave like an empire (81 percent). The corresponding numbers for internationals were 59 percent, 56 percent, 44 percent, and 41 percent. Only a minority of respondents in both groups believe that the 

United States is a declining power (Q24). Questions 35 

through 38 indicate that neither U.S. nor international 

officers consider the United States the underlying 

cause for problems of the international system. Few 

in either group think that it would be easier to resolve 

disputes around the world without a major role for 

the United States (Q35). Majorities in both groups reject the notions that the United States is behind globalization (Q36), or can do significantly more good in the 

world but chooses not to (Q38). 

U.S. Global Military Operations.

U.S. and international officers have nearly opposite views on whether other nations should fund the 

U.S. military presence and activities overseas (Q8), 

and whether other nations should be grateful and positive about U.S. willingness to conduct such activities 

(Q9). U.S. officers are nearly unanimous in endorsing 

drone strikes against terror targets; a narrow majority of internationals also agree, although there is significant regional variation—and strong objection from 

respondents from countries where the strikes actually 

have occurred (Q19). Only a minority of either group 

believe that U.S. power or prestige suffered as a result 

of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns (Q33). 
33

Regional Questions—Middle East.

U.S. personnel are skeptical of America’s continued credibility as sole mediator between Arabs and Israelis; international officers are more hopeful, though 

still divided (Q3). Officers from principally Muslim 

regions (Middle East, South and Central Asia) believe 

more in the U.S. ability to be sole mediator than do 

Europeans or Latin Americans. U.S. officers are generally skeptical of official justifications for Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM; international officers are even 

more so (Q4). Majorities in both groups give the United States credit for supporting democracy movements 

in the Arab Awakening (Q16). A clear majority of international respondents also think the United States 

delayed Arab democracy by supporting “friendly” 

dictators as long as possible, though this is a minority 

opinion among U.S. officers (Q17).

Regional Issues—Other.

More than twice as many U.S. than international 

officers believe in the necessity and benefits of a missile shield in Europe (Q7). Both U.S. and international 

officers believe that the United States and Europe 

share key values, though Europeans appear divided 

on this issue (Q12). Just over half of U.S. respondents 

see the U.S. presence in East Asia as vital for the stability of the region, while just over 40 percent of internationals agree (Q15). Over 70 percent of U.S. officers see 

the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) as a sincere and significant commitment to 

the progress of African people, whereas only a third 

of international respondents see it in such a positive 

light (Q25). 
34

Views of the United States and Its People.

International officers were far more likely (47 percent to 19 percent) to predict large social problems for 

the United States in the near future (Q27). International and U.S. respondents answered with similar distribution, about whether other countries would be better off with U.S.-style institutions (Q28), and whether 

Americans are likeable as individuals even for those 

who dislike the U.S. Government (Q29). U.S. respondents were slightly more likely (64 percent to 47 percent) to agree that American culture is spreading in a 

way that threatens local cultures (Q30). Majorities in 

both groups agree that a robust American presence—

official, unofficial, and business—is desirable for leaders of other countries (Q32, Q34). Majorities in both 

groups think the U.S. people and government do not 

understand the world enough to effectively exercise 

global leadership (Q40). 

Interestingly, majorities in both groups still believe that the United States would try to take into account the goals and interests of its partners, despite 

this lack of understanding (Q37). Majorities in both 

groups agree that the United States does not do a 

good job of listening to its partners and treating them 

equally (Q31), though in neither case did a majority 

think Americans as individuals fail to listen to foreign 

colleagues (Q39).
35

INTERPRETING RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Areas of Convergence and Divergence.

Responses to the 40 items in the survey show significant overlap between the U.S. and international officers. Some areas of agreement were predictable; for 

instance, both groups agree that U.S. actions overseas 

are driven more by hard power considerations than 

by ideology, both express skepticism over the U.S. 

announced motives for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 

and both agree that the United States has a strong historical record of opposing colonialism and supporting 

democracy. Some were less obvious; neither group 

believes the United States is a declining power in the 

world, and both see it as desirable that the United 

States remain actively engaged on the international 

scene. Of note, one three-question series (35/36/38) 

phrased to reflect generalized anti-U.S. bias elicited 

similar responses from both groups, with both rejecting the reflexively critical positions.49 The survey item 

of greatest consensus was Question 40. The fact that 

majorities in both groups agree that the American 

people and government lack the requisite knowledge 

to exercises effective leadership internationally, and 

that the response pattern showed the lowest score 

for variation in the entire survey (F-Statistic of .001), 

should give students of American international policy 

and strategy serious cause for concern. 

U.S. military and civilian leaders responsible for 

international communications and cooperation might 

do well to focus on the areas of disagreement. Divergence in response patterns on the missile defense in 

Europe, drone strikes against terrorist targets, and 

host government financial support to U.S. military 
36

operations and presence indicate that U.S. personnel 

must carefully check their assumptions before engaging with international counterparts about these and 

related areas. Some of the differences are nuanced. 

The U.S. and international groups agree that the United States helped facilitate the Arab Awakening and 

the removal of Arab dictators, but international differ from U.S. respondents in believing that the United 

States also intentionally delayed the onset of democratization in the Arab world until the position of favored 

dictators was no longer tenable. 

While there is agreement that Americans as individuals listen to and respect their international partners, the international group does not agree that the 

United States on a national level respects its partners 

and treats them as equals. A particular cause for concern might be found in the responses to questions 20 

through 23. This sequence deals with perceptions of 

U.S. commitment to human rights, democracy, nonproliferation, drug trafficking, and other issues related 

to shared values in the international system. International responses varied from roughly 40 percent to 50 

percent in agreeing that the United States supports the 

“right” position on these matters, but the U.S. respondent group was nearly twice as high, ranging from 81 

percent to 97 percent. In other words, we appear not 

to seriously question that the United States takes the 

high road on international issues of rights, crime, etc., 

but for our international partners, the United States 

has yet to prove its case. 

The 10 questions selected as indicators of reflexive 

or “pathological” bias are keys to understanding the 

nature of the international group’s critical views of the 

United States, and for clarifying whether the response 

pattern supports either of the theoretical explanations 

of anti-Americanism. Of the 10, statistically significant 
37

variance occurred in five cases.50 This result could be 

used to argue that reflexive or pathological bias underlies some portion of the criticism directed at the 

United States. Looking at the data further, though, reveals that in most cases—four out of five—the variance 

stems from a lopsided distribution within the United 

States side of the response pool, rather than that of 

the internationals. In other words, U.S. respondents 

were so certain in their answers that the distribution 

weighted heavily toward Strongly Agree/Agree or 

Strongly Disagree/Disagree, whereas the international response pool was more widely distributed. This 

suggests that variation between the narrowly grouped 

U.S. responses and the widely grouped international 

responses is more likely to stem from beliefs or values 

specific to the U.S. officers—their bias—rather than reflexive opposition from the internationals. 

The data in Table 2 do not, of course, constitute 

proof in a deterministic sense. Neither do they purport to comprehensively explain why the two groups 

respond to questions of subjective response and bias 

in different ways with different distribution patterns. 

They do show that the two groups have a variety of 

starting points on matters of subjective assessment 

and bias, and that the international distribution is 

more even—meaning U.S. representatives must seek 

in dialogue, not presupposition, the starting points 

for discussions with specific international partners on 

specific contentious issues. The data also present a solid piece of evidence that no pervasive pattern of antiU.S. bias exists among international military officers 

on questions for which subjective opinion predominates. International views show a similar distribution 

to U.S. views five times out of 10, and in four of the 

remaining five cases, internationals showed greater 

variety of opinion than did U.S. officers as a group. 
38

Table 2. Significance and Source of Variance

on Pathological Questions.

Focus Group Review of Preliminary Observations.

A focus group conducted with a small number of 

U.S. and international survey respondents to review 

the aggregate responses largely supports the observations listed in the two preceding sections. The group 

also offers consensus insights on several of the survey 

items. The group speculated that international skepticism on the missile shield project (Q7) stemmed from 

the belief that Iranian missiles may target Israel but 

not Europe or other regions, and that the Iranian leadership is rational, not irrational. The greater international skepticism regarding human rights abuses or 

Question Significant Variance Lopsided Spread

5 N N/A

17 Y IF

21 Y US

22 Y US

23 Y US

26 N N/A

28 N N/A

30 N N/A

36 N N/A

38 Y US
39

atrocities by U.S. troops (Q21) were attributed to the 

fact that ground forces fighting among civilian populations inevitably commit some violence against noncombatants—that the nature of war, rather than some 

uniquely American trait, makes regular violations 

likely. On the issue of U.S. seriousness against drugs, 

illegal immigration, and human rights abuses, the 

example of Manuel Noriega was raised several times 

as a counter-example (Q22). On questions relating 

to U.S. responsibility for the ills of the international 

system (Q35/36/38), international participants noted 

that they would have been more likely to lay broad 

blame on the United States prior to participating in the 

U.S. military educational system, interacting with U.S. 

officers and officials, and learning how U.S. political 

and military systems actually work.

The international focus group felt that the response 

patterns of U.S. students demonstrated a real need to 

assess international issues through alternate perspectives and points of view. Several officers noted that 

the variety of international military views in the study 

reflected the limits of the U.S. professional military 

educational system, since officers or personnel were 

not included from states such as Russia, China, Iran, 

and Venezuela. The group recommended that the 

United States try to survey opinions and views from 

such officers through third parties, such as the United 

Kingdom (UK) or other allied countries that might 

have exchanges with or host officers from those countries. Several others noted that the limited variety and 

sample size of international respondents kept trend 

measurement at a fairly generalized level, and recommended focused regional studies on particular issues 

to facilitate more specific policy recommendations. 
40

Another observation raised by the focus group 

was the utility of the survey data for international officers—specifically, great value was placed on the ability to quantify the beliefs and values of U.S. officers 

regarding international affairs in order to sensitize 

officers from the sending countries who might work 

in coalition or bilateral environments in the future. Finally, several focus group participants raised concern 

over the quality of international coverage in U.S. news 

media, speculating that U.S. military and most civilian 

personnel are not frequently exposed to international 

media perspectives.

One U.S. focus group member used the metaphor 

of a “light switch” to describe how he answered certain survey items. Sensing that the items were framed 

differently than the way U.S. press or officials would 

frame them, he “flipped a switch” and answered from 

the perspective that he supposed an Iraqi, an Afghan, 

or other international would use. This was not the case 

for all U.S. respondents; for those unable to flip this 

conceptual switch, the questions or statements posed 

in an unfamiliar frame occasionally elicited confusion or irritation. Several officers wrote comments 

on the margins of the survey instrument to indicate 

disagreement with how particular items were framed 

or worded. 

International Officer Opinion in Light of Pew and 

Gallup Polling Data.

The responses of the NDU international officers 

and defense civilians provide a useful comparison 

and contrast with the polling data from Pew and Gallup. Compared with the Pew data, which reflect fairly 

broad and persistent negative views of the United 
41

States and its presence overseas, the survey responses 

seem balanced and optimistic. It may be that the personal experiences of international respondents while 

at NDU and in the United States more generally have 

dispelled negative stereotypes and provided important context. It may also be the case that senior military and defense personnel compose a select and elite 

group for opinion study, a group whose composition 

ensures variation from measures of broader public 

opinion. This need not be cause for alarm, though, for 

that same elite status and role will render their more 

balanced and positive views to influence public policy 

in the sending nations more directly. 

The Gallup organization’s data focus more specifically on America’s leadership role in the world, and 

there is much in our survey data to confirm negative 

trends in Gallup’s work. Simply put, our internationals see the United States as indispensable and unique, 

but are not sure we are up to the task. Frequently, it 

seems that negative responses have been shaped by 

specific exercises of U.S. combat power. The fact that 

appetite for U.S. leadership per se has not generally 

diminished, and that most internationals want a robust civilian U.S. presence in their countries, though 

not necessarily a military one (Q32 and Q34), indicate 

that the door remains open for influence through nonmilitary instruments of power.

Given that the foreign media themes had some 

resonance with the international respondents, we may 

conclude that an informed approach to military cooperation must take into account foreign media themes 

as well as opinion data focused on foreign general 

publics. As one observer of foreign media and polling 

has noted:
42

. . . far too little serious thought has been given to how 

and why people form their opinions about the United 

States and what causes them to change these opinions 

and perspectives . . . clearly mass media has an enormous influence on world opinion. Unless we discover 

how factors such as these influence people’s thinking 

and perceptions, we can never expect to have a full 

understanding of perspectives on the U.S., and we 

certainly cannot hope to significantly influence those 

perspectives.51

Some of the tools and products we need to study 

our partners and their attitudes effectively already 

exist, such as the Pew and Gallup data. Other, more 

focused, tools may be available through the use of 

surveys and focus groups in the unique personnel 

pool made possible through our multinational headquarters and institutions for professional military 

education. 

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Implications for Anti-Americanism Theory.

The data from this survey indicate that foreign or 

international criticism of the United States does not 

show reflexive or pathological bias in the demographic under study. Simply put, international military officers are not uniformly critical of the United States; 

they show patterned distribution of responses similar 

to those of their U.S. peers slightly more than half the 

time, and do not generally support broadly stated positions of bias or anti-Americanism per se. When critical 

views are offered, they show great variety among and 

within regions, and across the five major categories 

of questions. Those most critical of the United States 
43

on certain regional or systemic issues often showed 

respect and admiration for the United States generally or for Americans as a people. Conversely, support for specific U.S. positions did not always come 

with broadly supportive views on the character of the 

nation or its people. Broadly speaking, these findings 

support the “soft power” or “transitory” theories of 

anti-Americanism in foreign populations; in other 

words, they support the interpretation that criticism 

and anger toward the United States are reactions to 

specific actions or policies, “what we do” rather than 

“what we are.” 

The characteristics of the respondent pool must 

be kept in mind, however, when extrapolating the results. The professional rank and status of the military 

officer demographic means that they constitute an elite 

segment of opinion in their respective countries; their 

views likely do not reflect mass opinion or the views 

of “the street.” The fact that the participating internationals were mid-course at a prestigious U.S. military 

educational institution almost certainly provided insights and qualifications to their opinions that could 

mitigate reflexively negative views, though in some 

cases the opposite effect might have occurred as well. 

The data should not, therefore, be interpreted as refuting pathological explanations of anti-Americanism in 

all populations, all regions, and all areas of opinion. 

They should be seen as evidence that pathological or 

reflexive bias does not predetermine critical views 

among the group of military officers and defense officials that U.S. military personnel will likely encounter 

as peers during the rest of their careers. This finding 

has implications for how U.S. personnel and organizations should solicit, analyze, and respond to critical views received through media, official contacts, or 

personal communications. 
44

Implications for U.S. Policy and Operations.

In 2002, Joseph Nye presented a vigorous defense 

of multilateralism over unilateralism as a strategic approach, and for a foreign policy that listens closely as 

well as speaking persuasively and acting decisively.52

Nye was right then, and is even more right now. He 

pointed out that when international partners feel not 

only that they are listened to, but that their arguments 

carry weight and are acted upon at least some of the 

time, they have a greater incentive to make common 

cause and remain closely aligned with the United 

States. As a decade of overt interventions and great 

strategic cost yields to an age of budgetary austerity in 

the United States, our strategic interests will demand 

a much greater role for and reliance on the actions of 

such partners. Listening not just attentively, but effectively, will be a critical skill.

This monograph has shown that we have a tall task 

ahead of us. The response data show that not only is 

there significant variation in attitudes and beliefs 

separating U.S. personnel from international partners, 

but that the variation stems from considered positions rather than reflexive bias or lack of appreciation. 

Where bias is a barrier, it is more frequently our bias 

than theirs. The salient implication is that U.S. strategists and decisionmakers must adopt approaches to 

systematically measure, understand, and cooperatively resolve, differences of attitude and belief that can 

impact our missions and interests overseas. 
45

Recommended Mitigation Measures.

Based on this study, the Department of Defense 

(DoD) should consider the following measures to 

mitigate the problems of understanding and communication that can stem from differing analytical 

frames, differing viewpoints on relevant geopolitical 

issues, and the current lack of mechanisms to measure 

and resolve these differences. First, the DoD should 

implement survey and focus group methodology at 

headquarters and schools where the population of international military personnel can sustain them. This 

can provide a baseline for consistent and frequent 

measurement of international opinions and the problems or possibilities they indicate. Doing so will give 

a systematic and rigorous quality to our attempts at 

improving cross-cultural understanding in multinational and coalition environments. 

Second, the DoD should commission a small number of more detailed, focused studies on particular 

regional or bilateral issues when a greater degree of 

detailed information would be useful to inform policy 

or command decisions. One example might be drone 

strikes; understanding skeptical and critical views 

through focused study might not necessarily lead to 

cessation of the strikes, but could help produce partnership strategies for consultation and strategic messaging that reduce their undesired side effects. Another example might be the use of Human Terrain Teams 

to thoroughly examine and analyze specific regions or 

population centers that are critical to military operations in various theaters. 

Third, Combatant Commands and elements of the 

Joint Professional Military Education (PME) system 

should expand curricular and staff activities to deepen awareness and understanding of foreign cultures 
46

and perspectives. Especially for the generation of 

younger officers raised professionally in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD must recognize that the paradigm 

of reconstructing another nation’s security forces 

under combat conditions is a very different proposition from cooperating with international partners on 

a sustained basis under dynamic strategic and fiscal 

conditions. Understanding the perspectives, analytical frames, and cultural mindset of those partners is 

mission-critical.

Developing the skills to perceive and operate 

through a variety of cultural paradigms and frames 

is not a one-lesson or one-course process. It should 

be seen as a consistently relevant and expanding part 

of PME—from commissioning source through Senior 

Service College and beyond. Some of the Senior Service Colleges already provide analytical cultural training that includes descriptive models, diagnostic tools, 

and practical guidance.53 This initial, abbreviated sort 

of “awareness” training helps develop the critical 

context of viewing culture as a system and a process, 

rather than a marginally important body of customs 

or traditions. But it is only a start. That start should 

not be made with our colonels and Navy captains; it 

should be made with our cadets and midshipmen, 

lieutenants and ensigns. By the time of Senior Service 

College, an approach to cultural competency that has 

been integrated into all phases of PME over the length 

of a career will yield more than awareness; it will develop a nuanced understanding and the judgment required for the unity of understanding and effort with 

international partners. In a dynamic strategic environment that requires even junior personnel to work 

effectively with partners from very different cultures 

using very different analytical frames, a high standard 

of early, effective, and continuous competency-based 

cultural training should be the DoD standard. 
47

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49

ENDNOTES

1. Pew Research Center, “Pew Global Attitudes Project: About 

the Project,” available from www.pewglobal.org/about/. Pew’s is the 

most prominent set of regularly published polling data; Pew began systematically tracking favorable opinion of the United States 

in foreign publics in 2002. The consistently low levels of popularity initially did not track with the frequently favorable self-image 

of Americans regarding America’s role overseas. 

2. Thomas Friedman, “A Theory of Everything,” New York 

Times, June 1, 2003, available from www.cnn.com/2003/US/06/01/

nyt.friedman. 

3. David Levinson and Karen Christensen, Global Perspectives 

on the United States: A Nation by Nation Survey, Great Barrington, 

MA: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2007, p. xii.

4. David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, London, UK: Glencoe 

Press, 1964, p. 56.

5. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 327.

6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New 

York: Free Press, 1992.

7. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Touchstone Press, 1997.

8. Giacomo Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World 

Order, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 5.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Ibid., p. 27. 

11. Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 

Publics,” in Apter’s Ideology and Discontent, 1964, p. 231.

12. Zaller, pp. 93-95.
50

13. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

14. Joseph Nye and Yasushi Watanabe, Soft Power Superpowers, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2008; Joseph Nye, The Paradox of 

American Power, Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2002.

15. Chiozza, Anti-Americanism, p. 201.

16. Ibid., pp. 4, 29. 

17. Ibid., pp. 13-25, 200-201.

18. Ole Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See Us, Ann Arbor, 

MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008, pp. 9-10. 

19. Ibid., p. xii.

20. Ibid., pp. 216-220. 

21. Chiozza, Anti-Americanism, p. 7. 

22. Jean-Francois Revel, Anti-Americanism, San Francisco, CA: 

Encounter Books, 2003, pp. 4, 12.

23. Ibid., pp. 4-6.

24. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

25. Ibid., p. 23.

26. Ibid., pp. 34-37.

27. Ibid., p. 66.

28. Ibid., p. 80. 

29. Ibid., p. 143.

30. Ibid., pp. 171, 176.

31. Barry Rubin and Judith Culp Rubin, Hating America: A 

History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. ix.
51

32. Ibid., p. xi.

33. Ibid., p. 218.

34. Ibid., pp. 219-221.

35. Ibid.

36. Paul Hollander, The Only Superpower: Reflections on 

Strength, Weakness, and Anti-Americanism , Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009, p. 6.

37. Ibid., p. 12.

38. Ibid., p. 14.

39. Ibid, pp. 16-19. 

40. Ibid, p. 34.

41. Both the U.S. and international groups included a small 

number of civilian defense officials, although the great majority 

were uniformed military officers. The inclusion of a small number 

of civilian defense officials reflects the student body demographics at the NDU. 

42. Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Chief Argues against Egypt 

Aid Cutoff,” Reuters U.S. Ed., February 16, 2012, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-usa-egypt-aid-idUSTRE81F1V220120216.

43. Pew Research Center, “Pew Global Attitudes Project: 

About the Project.” 

44. Richard Wike, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power,” 

available from Pew Research Project website, www.pewglobal.

org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-declining-power/.

45. Gallup Organization, “Global Views of U.S. Leadership,” 

Gallup.com website, available from www.gallup.com/poll/142631/

Worldwide-Leadership-Approval.aspx. 
52

46. Themes and topics were selected during a several-week 

period observation process in November 2011. The primary 

source for articles and essays was the U.S. Government’s Open 

Source Center, which aggregates and, when necessary, translates, 

foreign press articles for an English-language audience. A sampling of press service reporting in Turkish, German, Hebrew, 

and Arabic languages was conducted as well, using websites 

such as www.hurriyet.com.tr; www.nrg.co.il; www.dwelle.de; and 

www.aljazeera.net. 

47. Siddharth Kalla, “Statistically Significant Results,” Experiment Resources Website, 2009, available from www.experimentresources.com/statistically-significant-results.html. 

48. Several respondents objected to the wording on this question, specifically the linkage of Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and 

atrocities in a like category. The wording in this and several other 

questions reflects media portrayals in foreign press accounts of 

U.S. operations, rather than legal or moral categorization. The fact 

that the several objectors were uniformly U.S. and Western European respondents is instructive, and reinforces the perspective 

differences between U.S. and most international respondents. 

49. One of the questions had a high Gamma value, but the 

significant variation was one of degree (Strongly Disagree versus 

Disagree) rather than opposed positions per se.

50. Questions 5, 17, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 30, 36, and 38. 

51. Levinson and Christiansen, Global Perspectives on the United States, Vol. III, “Themes and Theory,” p. xii.

52. Nye, Paradox of American Power, pp. 155-160.

53.

 Dr. Maarten Aaser, “Inter-Cultural Competence,” briefing 

slides with scripted commentary, Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces, March 26, 2012.
53

APPENDIX I

SURVEY DESIGN AND CONDUCT

Topics reflecting content found in these media 

samples were shaped into a series of statements or assertions about U.S. power and influence abroad. Forty 

statements were included in the survey, covering a variety of global and regional topics. Respondents were 

given five options to respond to each of the statements: 

Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, 

Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. Of the statements, 

30 were fairly straightforward questions addressing 

policy or strategy decisions and outcomes. The other 

10 questions were worded with an intention of reflecting underlying negative or positive bias, in order to 

test for reflexive or pathological drivers of negative or 

positive views of the United States. 

Survey answers were collected along with a minimal amount of demographic data: rank, service, and 

region of the respondent’s home country. Additional 

demographic data was added for two categories—

whether the respondent came from an English-speaking country, and whether the respondent came from 

a predominantly Muslim country. The survey was 

administered to a total of 64 respondents, 32 from the 

United States and 32 from a variety of other countries. 

U.S. respondents ranged in rank from lieutenant colonel to major general, while the international respondents ranged from lieutenant colonel to brigadier 

general. In both groups, there were a small number of 

civilian defense executives with rank equivalent to a 

senior colonel. The respondent pool included students 

at National Defense University’s (NDU) National War 

College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and 

Inter-American Defense College. 
54

The answers were aggregated and subjected to a 

simple statistical analysis using the Statistical Package 

for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The first purpose 

of this analysis was to indicate whether U.S. and international officers differed in a statistically significant 

pattern when answering the questions. The U.S. respondents served as a baseline or control group, with 

the international students serving as a test group to 

gauge divergence. The statistical significance of the 

variation was assessed using two measures produced 

by the SPSS, the F-statistic, and the Eta Squared statistic. The threshold for significant variance between the 

two sets of data for a given question was set at 3.75, 

and the Eta Squared threshold for strength of association for that divergence was set at .05. 

After an aggregate data run to measure significance 

variation of the international respondents as a group, 

separate runs were conducted, sorted by region. This 

provided a breakout of the variation for regional 

groups, divided into United States, Latin America, 

Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South 

and Central Asia, and East Asia. Additional runs were 

conducted, based on the responses from personnel 

from Muslim countries only, and from English-speaking countries only. 
55

# Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7

1 17/9/0/4/2 2/5/0/1/0 2/2/1/1/1 2/0/0/0/0 3/1/0/2/0 0/2/1/1/0 3/2/0/0/0

2 8/15/3/5/1 4/3/0/0/0 3/3/1/0/0 0/2/0/0/0 2/3/0/0/1 2/2/0/0/0 1/3/1/0/0

3 4/8/1/14/5 0/0/2/3/2 1/1/1/3/1 0/2/0/0/0 2/0/3/0/1 1/3/0/0/0 1/1/1/2/0

4 1/9/4/14/4 0/2/0/2/3 0/0/0/4/3 0/1/1/0/0 0/0/0/1/5 0/0/0/2/2 0/1/1/0/3

5 3/11/5/8/5 1/3/1/1/1 1/2/2/2/0 0/1/1/0/0 3/1/0/1/1 1/3/0/0/0 2/2/0/0/1

6 3/17/3/9/0 1/4/0/2/0 0/4/3/0/0 1/0/1/0/0 1/2/1/0/0 0/1/0/2/1 0/3/0/0/2

7 11/16/4/1/0 0/2/3/1/1 0/3/2/2/0 1/1/0/0/0 0/3/3/0/0 0/1/2/0/1 0/2/1/1/1

8 4/14/6/7/1 0/2/1/3/1 0/1/1/3/2 0/0/0/1/1 0/2/3/1/0 0/0/0/4/0 0/2/1/1/1

9 6/16/6/3/1 1/2/2/1/1 1/2/3/1/0 0/1/0/1/0 0/2/1/2/1 0/1/0/2/1 0/2/2/0/1

10 2/12/7/7/4 1/2/1/2/1 0/3/1/2/1 0/0/1/1/0 0/2/0/3/1 0/1/2/1/0 0/1/3/1/0

11 14/15/1/2/0 2/4/0/1/0 1/5/1/0/0 1/1/0/0/0 5/1/0/0/0 0/4/0/0/0 1/4/0/0/0

12 1/16/5/7/3 1/5/0/1/0 1/2/2/2/0 0/1/0/1/0 3/2/1/0/0 0/3/0/1/0 0/4/1/0/0

13 0/1/3/12/16 1/2/2/1/1 0/1/0/5/1 1/0/0/1/0 1/2/2/1/0 0/2/1/1/0 1/0/1/3/0

14 2/21/3/3/3 1/3/2/1/0 1/2/2/1/1 1/1/0/0/0 3/2/1/0/0 0/3/1/0/0 0/4/0/1/0

15 5/12/6/6/3 0/0/3/4/0 0/3/4/0/0 0/1/0/0/1 1/0/3/1/1 0/2/0/2/0 2/2/0/0/1

16 2//9/3/14/4 1/3/2/1/0 0/1/2/3/1 1/0/0/1/0 0/1/3/0/2 0/1/1/1/1 0/1/2/1/1

17 1/9/6/8/8 1/1/2/2/1 0/5/1/0/1 1/0/0/1/0 2/3/1/0/0 0/4/0/0/0 0/3/1/1/0

18 4/11/7/10/0 0/4/0/2/1 0/3/3/1/0 0/0/1/1/0 2/2/1/0/1 0/2/1/0/1 0/2/1/2/0

19 15/14/1/2/0 1/3/0/2/1 0/5/1/1/0 1/1/0/0/0 1/1/2/1/1 0/0/2/0/2 3/1/0/1/0

20 8/20/1/3/0 0/4/0/3/0 1/4/1/1/0 0/1/1/0/0 0/3/1/0/2 0/1/0/2/1 1/3/0/1/0

21 27/4/1/0/0 2/2/1/2/0 3/3/1/0/1 1/0/0/1/0 2/0/1/2/1 1/0/1/2/0 1/2/1/1/0

22 0/3/2/11/16 1/2/0/2/2 0/0/3/3/1 0/0/0/2/0 2/1/2/1/0 0/2/1/0/1 0/1/3/1/0

23 0/4/2/16/10 0/3/1/3/0 1/2/2/1/1 1/0/0/1/0 2/0/1/3/0 1/1/1/1/0 0/2/1/0/2

24 0/11/4/10/7 1/2/0/4/0 0/0/2/4/1 0/0/0/2/0 0/2/3/1/0 0/2/1/1/0 0/2/1/2/0

25 5/18/2/7/0 0/3/1/2/1 0/1/1/5/0 1/0/0/1/0 0/2/2/0/2 0/1/2/1/0 0/2/1/2/0

26 1/1/9/7/13 0/2/2/2/1 1/2/0/3/1 0/0/1/0/1 0/0/1/3/2 0/0/1/1/2 0/3/0/2/0

27 0/6/5/12/8 0/2/1/4/0 1/3/0/3/0 0/1/1/0/0 1/3/0/2/0 0/1/0/3/0 0/3/0/2/0

28 2/11/10/6/2 1/4/1/1/0 0/1/3/2/1 0/0/0/2/0 0/3/2/1/0 1/2/0/1/0 0/0/1/4/0

29 4/13/6/6/2 0/3/3/1/0 1/0/1/0/0 4/1/0/1/0 2/2/0/0/0 0/3/0/2/0 0/3/0/2/0

30 5/15/2/7/2 0/2/0/4/1 2/3/0/1/1 1/0/0/1/0 1/1/1/3/0 0/1/1/1/1 0/4/0/1/0

31 0/4/6/13/7 0/5/1/1/0 0/1/2/2/2 0/1/0/1/0 0/1/1/1/3 0/1/0/3/0 0/1/0/3/1

32 7/13/8/2/0 1/2/1/3/0 2/2/3/0/0 1/1/0/0/0 1/3/2/0/0 1/3/0/0/0 1/3/1/0/0

33 2/7/4/8/9 1/2/4/0/0 0/3/0/4/0 0/0/0/1/1 2/2/0/2/0 0/2/1/0/1 1/2/0/2/0

34 5/13/5/7/0 0/1/1/4/1 1/1/5/0/0 0/1/1/0/0 1/2/2/0/1 0/2/0/1/1 2/3/0/0/0

35 1/9/5/11/4 0/1/1/5/0 0/2/3/2/0 1/0/0/1/0 0/2/3/1/0 0/0/4/0/0 0/0/3/2/0

36 0/3/2/11/14 0/1/0/3/3 0/0/1/1/5 0/0/0/2/0 1/2/2/1/0 0/1/0/2/1 0/1/0/2/2

37 6/19/1/3/1 0/4/0/3/0 0/4/0/3/0 0/1/1/0/0 1/5/0/0/0 1/0/1/2/0 0/2/1/2/0

38 0/2/0/9/19 0/2/0/3/2 0/1/0/3/3 0/0/1/1/0 0/1/2/1/2 1/1/2/0/0 0/0/0/4/1

39 2/10/5/11/2 0/6/0/1/0 0/3/0/4/0 0/2/0/0/0 1/1/2/2/0 2/1/0/1/0 1/1/0/2/1

40 1/7/7/10/5 0/3/1/2/1 0/2/1/2/2 0/1/0/1/0 0/1/2/1/2 0/1/1/2/0 0/1/1/3/0
56

NOTE TO TABLE 2: Regional breakdown as follows: Region 

1 U.S. (32 respondents), Region 2 Americas (less U.S. - 7 respondents), Region 3 Europe (7 respondents), Region 4 Sub-Saharan 

Africa (2 respondents), Region 5 Middle East North Africa (6 respondents), Region 6 South and Central Asia (4 respondents), and 

Region 7 East Asia (5 respondents). Numbers indicate (in order, 

separated by “/” marks) Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree 

nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree).

NOTE: Survey item numbers in gray (e.g., 38) indicate a survey item designated as a reflexive bias indicator. F-statistic values 

highlighted in grey (e.g., 7.892) indicate a value above the screening (3.75), indicating statistically significant variance between 

U.S. and international values. Eta2

 values in grey (e.g., .113) indicate values above the screening level (.05), indicating the strength 

of the variation. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

and 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Richard H. M. Outzen

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil