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i 

75–151 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–140] 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

AIRCRAFT FORCE STRUCTURE 

REDUCTIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 12, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 12, 2012, Department of the Air Force Aircraft Force Structure Reductions .................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 12, 2012 .......................................................................................... 39 

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2012 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT FORCE STRUCTURE 

REDUCTIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Branstad, Governor Terry, State of Iowa, and Co-Chairman of the Council 

on Governors ......................................................................................................... 5 

Lowenberg, Maj Gen Timothy J., USAF, Adjutant General, State of Washington Military Department ................................................................................ 18 

Miller, Lt Gen Christopher D., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Plans and Programs, A8, U.S. Department of the Air Force ........................... 16 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Branstad, Governor Terry ................................................................................ 45 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 43 

Lowenberg, Maj Gen Timothy J. ..................................................................... 85 

Miller, Lt Gen Christopher D. ......................................................................... 65 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from Governors Branstad and Gregoire to Secretary Panetta, April 

27, 2012 .......................................................................................................... 161 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 165 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 166 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 167 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 178 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 178 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT FORCE 

STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 12, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:59 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members, and Governor 

Branstad, thank you for being here, and our other distinguished 

panel witnesses to today’s hearing that will focus on the readiness 

impact associated with proposed reductions in the United States 

Air Force inventory. 

In this year’s budget request, the President proposed significant 

reductions in the United States Air Force aviation inventory, and 

proposed to retire 227 aircraft in fiscal year 2013. In supporting 

this request, General Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

indicated that the Air Force will be a smaller, but superb force that 

maintains our ability, our flexibility and readiness to engage a full 

range of contingencies and threats. Using General Schwartz’s rationale, a smaller force would be capable of supporting the entirety 

of Air Force requirements around the globe. 

My friends, I do not share General Schwartz’s assessments and 

optimism. The force structure proposed by the President in the fiscal year 2013 budget request is not supported by the requirements 

and was driven by a fiscally constrained budget. In fact, the Air 

Force has previously provided the strategic rationale and in public 

testimony supported a much larger force structure. 

If we adopt the budget request proposed by the President and 

embark on the road to reduce our force structure, we will make the 

United States less secure and embolden hostile nations to challenge 

the United States in areas that will not be to our advantage. In the 

end, the additional risk borne by our budget decisions of today 

could be paid in the loss of American lives. 

I opposed dropping off the force structure cliff of the Budget Control Act, and will actively oppose the debilitating impact associated 

with sequestration. As to the impact of the aviation force structure 

reductions to the active Guard and Reserve Components, I believe 

that it is incumbent on all the components, to include the Council 

of Governors, to have an active dialogue to discuss their needs and 
2 

to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications 

associated with their various interests. It is only through a vigorous discussion of the Nation’s interests that a clear path will be 

provided. 

As to the road ahead, it appears that there are certain force 

structure movements that can be agreed by all the parties. I would 

hope that these agreements could be quickly concluded. This would 

go a long way in relieving the indecision associated with many 

service members as to their roles in support of national defense. I 

hope that our hearing today will serve to foster this additional dialogue and best serve our Nation. 

Finally, I have heard that some of my colleagues have proposed 

an independent panel to assess the overall force structure requirements of the United States Air Force. Some critics of this proposal 

have indicated that the time associated with this independent assessment would significantly harm the Air Force and serve to exasperate future modernization efforts. 

While I would support this independent assessment, I believe 

that there are elements of the overall force structure that should 

move forward that have broad support, and would oppose an extensive freeze of the existing force structure while this assessment is 

ongoing. Additional clarity on the requirements that support the 

overall force structure has been lacking for many years and is 

clearly warranted. 

To better assess the overall United States Air Force aviation 

force structure, we have prepared two panels representing the 

United States Air Force and the Council of Governors. In the first 

panel, and representing the Council of Governors, I am pleased to 

introduce the first panel consisting of a single witness, the Honorable Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa. 

Governor Branstad, thank you for being here. 

I now would like to recognize the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, 

for any remarks she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to welcome all of our witnesses this afternoon. In 

particular, thank you, Governor Branstad, for traveling to D.C. 

[District of Columbia]. 

I also look forward to the testimony from General Miller and 

General Lowenberg in our next panel. 

We all recognize the difficult budget constraints that the Department of Defense faces. The President’s budget for fiscal year 2013 

is evidence of the difficult budget environment faced by our entire 

government. However, I think all members agree that we must 

have a sound defense strategy that drives resourcing and requirements over the next several years. 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, with the blessing of the 

President, released the new strategic guidance in January, and it 

seems sound. But many of us on Capitol Hill were deeply con-
3 

cerned that the budget decisions did not match the strategy announced in January. 

Unfortunately, this mismatch was most evident in the Air Force’s 

budget submission. In an era where we are refocusing our military 

on the Asia-Pacific region and must be ready to defend the homeland from a variety of threats, the cuts in the Air Force structure 

did not pass muster. As such, that is why this Congress and this 

committee took action to halt some of these actions. 

I applaud the efforts led by Congressman Loebsack and Congressman Hunter to restore the force structure cuts to the Air National Guard and restrict the retirement of aircraft that support 

National Guard mission requirements. Fifty-nine percent of all Air 

Force cuts impacted the National Guard. Air National Guard manpower was reduced by six times the per capita of the Active Duty 

Air Force. And most personnel cuts occurred in the first year instead of a several-year ramp. All these cuts seem aimed at continuing by another means the 2005 BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] round and do not make sense in the long run for our 

national defense. 

I acknowledge the rationale that the Air Force put forward regarding these proposed cuts, but something was lacking in their 

analysis. There appears to have been no recognition of incorporation of Title 32 responsibilities onto their planning assumptions. 

Tactical aircraft such as the C–130 and the C–27J provide critical 

homeland defense capabilities to the governors, as well as the 

President. 

The Air Force’s budget proposal would remove critical airlift that 

is postured to support the nine FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] regions. For example, the C–27J aircraft provides 

a critical and unique capability to the warfighter and to our homeland defense. And again, I believe if Title 32 civil response and 

homeland defense requirements were taken into consideration, the 

decision to terminate this program would not have been made by 

senior leaders. 

So as such, I hope that our witnesses can comment on when we 

can expect the National Guard Bureau to take the lead in developing homeland defense requirements to fulfill Title 32 missions. 

What can be done to better incorporate Title 32 requirements in 

budget planning and programming with the DOD [Department of 

Defense]? 

Further, I cannot understand the rationale for the termination of 

the Global Hawk Block 30 Program. Again, the strategy did not 

match the budget realities. I cannot understand how we can 

refocus on the Asia-Pacific region, yet eliminate this aircraft that 

performed critical missions in the Asia-Pacific region during Operation Tomodachi, taking photos of the damaged Fukushima nuclear 

power plant. 

Yet, the solution to losing this capability is to extend U–2 flights 

for the indefinite future. Why, when we are considering force structure cuts in the Air National Guard, should we keep flying a 

manned aircraft in the place of an unmanned aircraft? 

I am concerned that the Department of Defense did not appropriately utilize the Council of Governors, and that was a critical 

flaw in this process. I fear that the council was informed only after 
4 

final budget decisions were made, instead of engaging the council 

early in the budget process. 

General Lowenberg aptly raises the findings in the court’s 

Rendell v. Rumsfeld decision that ‘‘no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a National Guard unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of a governor.’’ I believe that if the Council of Governors had been an informed partner 

during deliberations regarding the budget constraints the Air Force 

faced in fiscal year 2013, they could have reached mutually agreeable solutions. 

Again, I certainly appreciate the budget realities that face the 

Air Force. However, my main concern is the process used to develop the fiscal year 2013 budget which did not allow for thorough 

vetting of requirements with regard to Title 32 missions and in the 

context of the new strategic guidance. I certainly hope that this 

hearing can outline ways in which we avoid this type of situation 

in the future. 

And again, I thank our chairman for holding a hearing on this 

important matter, and I look forward to our question and answer 

period. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine, for those comments. 

And at this time, I would like to, as we previously discussed 

prior to the hearing, ask unanimous consent that it be made in 

order to depart from regular order so that Members may ask questions that follow train of thought from the preceding Member. I 

think this will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance 

the dialogue on these very important issues. So without objection, 

that is so ordered. 

Also, I would like to welcome our House colleagues joining us 

from off the subcommittee. Two great Iowans, we have Mr. Latham 

and Mr. Boswell, both here with us today. 

So Governor, you are well represented from Iowa. 

And Ms. Hochul are also here. 

With that, I ask unanimous consent that these Members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there any objection? 

Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Now, I would like to recognize Representative Loebsack for the 

purpose of an introduction. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to extend a very warm welcome to our Iowa Governor Terry Branstad. Governor Branstad has really been working 

very, very hard as co-chair of the Council of Governors to make 

sure that the governors’ voices are heard in this debate. 

And I publicly want to thank you for all of your fantastic work 

on this, Governor. Having had many conversations with you on this 

issue, I know that the perspective that you are going to bring today 

to the table will be very beneficial to this committee. 

I am also very pleased that sitting directly behind the governor 

is Iowa’s adjutant general, Major General Tim Orr. He is here with 

us today, and two of my colleagues, as was just mentioned, Con-
5 

gressman Boswell and Congressman Latham. It is really, really 

fantastic to have you here today. 

So Governor, once again welcome and thank you for being here. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman, at this time. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, Dave. 

And Governor, it is now time to hear from you. We want you to 

know that—apologize, we may have some votes called and we may 

have to dance around. We know you have a hard stop. Anything 

that you want to give us on your opening statement, we want to 

hear. But also, please know that we are happy to put anything in 

the record you cannot get to. So we want to hear from you and now 

we turn it over to you. 

Governor, is your mike on there? 

STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR TERRY BRANSTAD, STATE OF 

IOWA, AND CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL ON GOVERNORS 

Governor BRANSTAD. Thank you very much. Now, it is on. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of 

the subcommittee, including our Congressmen from Iowa that have 

joined us, along with Congressman Loebsack, I want to thank you 

all for being here. 

My name is Terry Branstad. I am the Governor of the State of 

Iowa. I appear before you today on behalf of the National Governors Association or the NGA, and as co-chair of the Council of 

Governors or ‘‘Council.’’ Thank you for this opportunity to speak to 

you today regarding the U.S. Air Force’s fiscal 2013 budget request 

and its disproportionate impact on the Air National Guard. 

I would like to begin by thanking this committee for its leadership and support for the Air National Guard. Thanks to your work 

and that of the Senate committee, our Air National Guard will continue to have access to the personnel, aircraft and resources necessary to fulfill the dual mission at home and abroad during fiscal 

year 2013. With your continued support, governors are working 

with the Department of Defense, or the DOD, to find solutions to 

the challenges facing our Nation’s military forces. 

I am hopeful that we can find ways to fully leverage the operational strength and cost savings of the Air and Army National 

Guard as we move forward. 

Governors care deeply about this dual responsibility to support 

both the Federal missions and the homeland security requirements 

that our National Guard soldiers and airmen help fulfill every day. 

For my State, we have been deploying airmen overseas since the 

mid-1970s in support of no-fly missions and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, the Sinai Peninsula, Kuwait, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Since 2000—since 9/11 more than 17,000 Iowa National Guard 

soldiers and airmen have been serving on Active Duty in support 

of our efforts overseas. 

As governor I truly understand the deep connection between my 

colleagues and those who serve their State and Nation. I also take 

very seriously the responsibilities I have to our returning veterans 

and to the families whose loved ones have made the ultimate sacrifice for our Nation. 
6 

In Iowa, we have lost 78 service members to the War on Terror. 

The National Guard has effectively balanced both mission sets at 

the same time. Just last year, the Iowa National Guard deployed 

the second brigade combat team to Afghanistan in a full spectrum 

mission set, making it the largest deployment of Iowa National 

Guard soldiers and airmen since World War II. 

At the same time, we also responded to a historic Missouri River 

flood with approximately 1,000 National Guard service members, 

making this the longest duration emergency response operation in 

our State’s history. This flood lasted from June until September. 

As commanders-in-chief, governors take very seriously the duties 

and responsibilities placed on the men and women of the National 

Guard. We appreciate the need to reorganize, restructure, and 

modernize the military to meet the new threats and economic realities. 

We also understand the need for cost effective means to achieve 

our goals. Governors across the country have made tough choices, 

but done so in a thoughtful way to leverage the most cost-effective 

resources available. 

In the State of Iowa, we continually look for innovative ways to 

deliver services and have sought ways to better leverage private 

sector strength through public-private partnerships. I know Iowans 

at entities like Alcoa, Rockwell Collins, and the Rock Island Arsenal stand ready to help the Pentagon meet the budget challenges 

through innovative solutions. 

The Guard is a cost-effective operational force that is critical to 

our national security and our ability to respond to domestic emergencies. The Air National Guard provides 35 percent of the U.S. 

Air Force’s capabilities for 6 percent of the budget. 

Therefore, when the Air Force proposed to impose 59 percent of 

the total aircraft budget reductions and about six times the personnel reductions on the Air Guard, nearly every governor signed 

a letter to Secretary Panetta, strongly opposing the Air Force’s 

budget proposal. 

The council is a presidentially appointed, bipartisan group of 10 

governors and senior Federal officials, including the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and White House officials. 

The council provided an opportunity to discuss the governors’ 

concerns with Secretary Panetta, Air Force Secretary Michael 

Donley, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz on 

February 27th. 

At that time, I along with council co-chair, Governor Chris 

Gregoire from that State of Washington, relayed the governors’ 

frustration and dismay at having read about these proposed cuts 

to Air Guard in the newspaper instead of being consulted. 

While we do not expect to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the Department of Defense, we were disappointed by the 

lack of communications with us on such an important decision impacting our Air National Guard. 

We also are concerned by the dramatic nature of the proposal 

and its failure to recognize the role and the importance of the Air 

National Guard in our State and the experience and cost effectiveness that the National Guard provides to the total force. 
7 

Governors routinely rely on the National Guard to respond to 

emergencies. The National Guard has highly trained and readily 

accessibly personnel and equipment that provide credible—critical 

capabilities such as transportation, communications, and medical 

response. 

The proposed reductions of the Air National Guard would have 

stripped States of these capabilities and upended years of carefully 

crafted emergency response plans. I am now in my 18th year as 

governor. I served 16 and came back—and during that time the 

Iowa National Guard has always performed to the highest of standards under the most difficult of circumstances. I am very proud of 

our Guard and the great job that they have done. 

During the council meeting on February 27th, Secretary Panetta 

indicated that he understood our concerns and agreed to work with 

us to try to find a solution. 

Following that meeting, my adjutant general, or TAG, Major 

General Tim Orr, as well as Governor Gregoire’s TAG [The Adjutant General], Major General Tim Lowenberg, both of whom are 

seated behind me, engaged in discussions with the Air Force to try 

to identify a better solution for fiscal year 2013. 

While there were several discussions in early or mid-March and 

we had many telephone conferences, significant differences remained with respect to the manpower reductions, fighter aircraft, 

and airlift needs. 

On March 19, Governor Gregoire and I spoke with Secretary 

Donley and General Schwartz regarding insufficient progress to address the governors’ concerns. 

By letter that same day we encouraged them to consider cost 

neutral options for cross-leveling or reallocating programmed aircraft operations from the Active service to the Guard. Unfortunately, despite our outreach to the Air Force leadership and to 

Deputy Defense Secretary Carter, the negotiations did not resolve 

our key differences. 

On April 23, Secretary Panetta shared a letter with us that he 

had sent to the Congress in which he proposed to transfer 24 C– 

130 aircraft from the Active service to the Air National Guard. 

While we appreciate the Secretary’s recognition of the governors’ 

need for greater airlift capacity, the proposal was previously presented by the Air Force and fell far short of addressing our concerns. 

As we had discussed with Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz, this proposal failed to leverage the Guard’s cost effectiveness to retain additional manpower, expertise, and fighter aircraft 

at a reduced cost to the tax payers. 

Thankfully this committee as well as the Senate Armed Services 

Committee has put forward legislation to preserve the Air National 

Guard manpower and aircraft at their current levels for another 

year. 

We appreciate that. 

This temporary freeze will provide opportunities to exchange 

views, information, and advice on State and Department of Defense 

requirements for future fiscal years. 

The council is working on principles in appropriate coordination 

points for an open channel of communication between States and 
8 

the Department of Defense on matters impacting the National 

Guard and its dual mission at home and abroad. 

One item we have identified that contributed to this year’s challenges with the Air Force was the Air Force’s requirement that National Guard Bureau officials signed non-disclosure agreements on 

the budget process. Such a requirement creates an unnecessary restrictive process and fails to adequately include critical information 

from the States. 

The National Guard Bureau is statutorily required to serve as 

the channel of communications between the States and the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

Unnecessarily restricting the ability to share discreet but critical 

information with governors and their TAGs limits the flow of information and has resulted in disagreements that could have been 

largely avoided. 

This is just one item we hope to discuss with the Department of 

Defense during the upcoming council meeting which comes this 

weekend down in—at the governor’s meeting. 

As you know, fiscal year 2014 budget proposals for the Air Force 

and the Army are already being developed and will soon be sent 

to the Secretary [of Defense] for his review. Without quick action 

to ensure communications with the States we may be faced with 

similar budget disagreement for the coming year. 

We are hopeful that the ongoing focus by Congress, and the Senate committee’s proposed national commission on the structure of 

the Air Force will encourage the Department of Defense, the Air 

Force, and the Army to work with us as quickly as possible to establish a better, more collaborative process for fiscal years 2014 

and 2015 budgets. 

So, on behalf of the Nation’s governors, I thank you for your 

strong support for the National Guard. Your continued assistance 

and support will be helpful as governors work with the Department 

of Defense to craft solutions to the problems we share. 

We thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and 

I look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Governor Branstad can be found in 

the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. FORBES. Governor, we thank you and as we mentioned at the 

outset, you are well represented here by fellow Iowans. It shows 

their love for their State, but also their respect for you and we certainly share that respect, but we also appreciate the fact that you 

are here today on behalf of the Council of Governors and representing them. 

We wholeheartedly agree with you, these gag orders have just 

got to stop coming out of the Pentagon, because it serves no purpose not to be transparent and get this information out. 

I have three questions that I would like to get your insight on 

so we can get on the record. 

The first one is, on behalf of the Council of Governors, can you 

explain to us how the Council of Governors’ alternative proposal to 

the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 budget request developed, and what 

in your mind are the key takeaways of how the council’s alter-
9 

native proposal better meets homeland and national security readiness requirements than the Air Force proposal. 

But second, there is a proposal as you know in the Senate to propose language that would effectively stop the transfer, divestment, 

or retirement of all Guard and Reserve aircraft, not only in fiscal 

year 2013, but also in previous fiscal years 2010, 2011 and 2012. 

Could you address what you think that impact would be? 

And the final thing is do you think it would be fruitful for you 

to come back to the table with discussions with the Air Force as 

you were previously, and do you think we could have anything accomplished if we could effectuate that? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, first of all, I wanted to thank General 

Orr and General Lowenberg. They put tremendous amount of time 

in this. We have had a lot of discussions. 

I think we all feel now we really had to go to the Hill on this 

issue. We were not able to make the progress we hoped to with the 

Pentagon and with the Air Force. 

It was not without a tremendous amount of effort. And after that 

meeting on the 27th, the Council of Governors, I can tell you that 

in fact Congressman Latham and I think General Orr rode the 

plane back and forth many days. 

They were just talking about that before the meeting here today, 

because General Orr and General Lowenberg spent a lot of time in 

here and we—and they put a lot of effort into offering a costeffective alternative that met the budget guidelines but did not 

have the devastating impact on the Air National Guard. 

And this was not a perfect solution, and it obviously meant that 

we had to accept reductions that we, the governors, accept and understand. But we thought it was—made a lot more sense, because 

it is much more cost effective. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, the Guard does things in a 

much more cost-effective way. We also have a lot of experienced pilots in the Air National Guard, more experienced than the regular 

Air Force, frankly. And obviously they are part-time, and so the 

cost is much less. 

So we think the proposal that they made, made a lot of sense 

and basically the response back we got was this offer for these C– 

130s. 

Well, you know, I served during Vietnam. I was stationed at 

503rd Military Police Battalion at Fort Bragg. And we got deployed 

up here to guard the Pentagon and Arlington during one of the 

demonstrations here. We flew up on some of those C–130s and they 

were close to being obsolete in those days, and that was 1970. 

So, you know, these are planes that obviously—and there was no 

money provided for upgrading and maintenance of them as well. 

This really was, I thought, not something that really met the needs 

of the States. 

So I do not know if I have answered all of your questions, but 

I believe that we have some very capable people among—in all— 

and I would say General Orr and General Lowenberg took the lead 

on this, but they consulted with the other adjutant generals from 

representing all the other governors, all the other States and territories as well. 
10 

And we just do not feel that we got the response we should have, 

and from the beginning we did not have the consultation that is 

supposed to be required as part of the creation of the Council of 

Governors. 

That consultation really did not occur in advance, and governors 

were quite disturbed that, you know, first we got the word that we 

are going to see this reduction in aircraft, and then it was considerable later we found there was also going to be a significant reduction in personnel. 

And both of those we got very after the fact and about the same 

time after this happened, then we had our Air Guard unit deployed 

to Afghanistan, 5 days after we got the notice of what is going to 

happen. That is certainly not good for morale. 

Mr. FORBES. Governor, thank you for that insight. 

Just one last part of that question if you could address; do you 

think it would be worthwhile, useful, profitable to come back to the 

table and sit down with the council and with the Air Force to see 

if there are some common ground areas that could be effectuated? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, we are going to be meeting this weekend. And, again, we are concerned that, you know, it does not look 

like the Secretary of Defense is going to be able to attend that 

meeting. And, you know, we need to have top leadership from the 

Pentagon and from the Air Force represented there if we are going 

to be able to have fruitful discussions with them. We are—the governors stand ready and willing to do that. 

You also—one of the other aspects that you asked about was previous fiscal year budgets and freezing those in place as well without the changes. 

I guess our feeling is we do not think—if the governors agree to 

it. There are some of those changes that governors readily agree to. 

As long as the governor—the State that is affected by it, as long 

as the governor signs off and agrees on it, I would say they should 

be able to go ahead with that. 

But if there are a couple of instances I think where there are 

some disagreements there. That is—so I can understand where 

they are coming up. But I think they could on a case-by-case basis 

go ahead with those things that have been—as long as the governors agree upon it. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Governor. 

Ms. Bordallo, any questions that you—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor, I represent the U.S. territory of Guam, where we have 

the largest National Guard unit per capita of any State in the 

United States. So you know where I am coming from. 

Governor BRANSTAD. Right. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Based on your experience with budget cuts in 

your own State, how do you see balancing the need for savings and 

cuts in the Air Force budget while maintaining Air National Guard 

readiness and a governor’s civil response capability? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, when we have to make tough budget 

cuts—and I had to do that. I was elected in 2010, inherited a financial mess, and we had to make some tough decisions and we ended 

up with a budget spending less than the previous year. That is not 

an easy thing to do. But we tried to really set priorities, and we 
11 

tried to do it in such a way that was not going to hurt the most 

important priorities we have as a State. 

So, that is why across-the-board to me does not make sense. It 

makes—and certainly it does not when you have a cost-effective 

way of doing it, where you can utilize the Guard. 

And part of the problem is I think historically the Pentagon kind 

of looked at the National Guard as a stepsister. And the whole idea 

is to try to change that so that the Guard would be at the table. 

Now the Guard is represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now we 

have the governors’ council. All of this is good, but we need to see 

in reality following through what the intentions were to include the 

Guard as full partners. 

Because the Guard is now playing a very important role, a lot 

of the people that are deployed, a lot of the casualties, you know, 

from my State have been members of the National Guard. And I 

go to those funerals and meet with those families. And I can tell 

you, they are just as important as the regular military, you know, 

their role. 

And I will say this. They are better trained and better equipped 

than the regular military was when I served. So I am real proud 

of them from that perspective. 

But I just think the proposal, the alternative that the Council of 

Governors offered with the good work of our adjutant generals I 

think was a much more cost-effective way to go about this. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I certainly agree with everything you have 

said, and the Guard is out there standing shoulder to shoulder 

with Active military in the war zone. So—and we on Guam also 

have had many, many deaths. So I certainly agree with your comments. 

Also for the record, Governor, how do you suggest that we improve this process in the future so that we can avoid the problems 

we had this year? The actions that the House has taken are effective for only one year. 

Governor BRANSTAD. Right. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So we will have to address this issue again and 

if we do not get the process right we are going to have to come up 

with some solutions. 

In your opinion, how can the DOD better leverage the Council of 

Governors? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, they need to meet with us and they 

need to listen. And also, I guess, when they are working on the 

budget, when they have these restrictions where people cannot consult with the governors and with the adjutant generals, I think we 

could avoid a lot of the problems this year if we had just had that. 

And I think Chairman Forbes called it kind of a gag order. You 

know, that is not the term that they use, but essentially that is 

what it is. That is why we were totally kept in the dark until this 

was actually announced. 

And that goes contrary to the whole intent of having the Council 

of Governors. We are supposed to be there to consult with and collaborate with the Pentagon in doing this so we can all do it together. That is what we want to do. We want to make what was 

intended work in reality the way it was supposed to, and it has not 

happened yet. 
12 

Ms. BORDALLO. And, Governor, you certainly do not want to have 

to read it in the paper after all is said and done. 

Governor BRANSTAD. I do not want to have to read it in the paper 

again. I mean, this last year was a disaster. And all of our—and 

I will say, our Congressmen and Senators have been very supportive and very helpful in this process all—we have spoken as a 

united voice. The governors, you know, 49 governors, when we were 

here for our meeting in February, signed on this letter to the Secretary of Defense. 

So that shows strong bipartisan support for changing this process, and that is why we think this commission that the Senate 

Armed Services Committee is suggesting makes sense as well, so 

that we can look at the structure of the Air Force and why they 

do not seem to be willing to really work in a more collaborative 

way with the governors and with the adjutant generals. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Governor. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Griffin, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Governor, for being here today. We have been impacted in Arkansas by some of these proposed changes, both in my 

district, which is around Little Rock and the Little Rock Air Force 

Base, as it relates to the transfer of aircraft to Little Rock Air 

Force Base. 

But on the National Guard side of things, we are particularly impacted as it relates to Fort Smith, where we have A–10s. And that 

is in my colleague Representative Womack’s district, but we have 

all as a delegation been working to try to figure out the logic of the 

Air Force’s decision to take the A–10s that are based in Fort Smith 

and move them out of State. 

And we have met with everybody there is to meet with pretty 

much, except for the President. We met, the delegation, Democrat 

and Republican, met with Secretary Panetta. We have met with 

four-stars, three-stars, two-stars, all the way down. 

And what we want more than anything are facts and analysis 

that we can read. You would think that decisions like this involving millions and millions and billions of dollars in some instances 

would involve at least a memo. With all the people they got working over at the Pentagon you would think that they are not just 

sitting around a table, you know, making oral decisions without 

something documented. 

What we have found is that there is nothing that they can point 

to, that the folks in the Air Force can point to justify some of the 

decisions. And I would tell you that BRAC, the 2005 BRAC concluded—‘‘Fort Smith is an ideal location for the A–10.’’ 

And there are a lot of different reasons for that that I will not 

go into. But what we have said is, look, we are not going to come 

out as a delegation against this from the start. We just want to see 

how you got there; why you would take a high-value location and 

just say, ‘‘We are going to move the A–10s.’’ 

And all we have been able to get out of the Air Force is, and I 

do not know if they meant to say this, but all we have been able 
13 

to get is, ‘‘Well, there was sort of an idea that we want to have 

some aircraft capability in every State. So that means that we are 

going to have just rearrange a lot of aircraft and a lot of capabilities whether it is a good decision from a military perspective or 

not.’’ 

They just, I do not know if it was politically driven, but they just 

wanted to share the wealth and have something in every State. 

So, I say all that to say we are very frustrated with the lack of 

data, hard data that we could study. And I would just like to get 

your comments and find out whether you have encountered similar 

problems. And again, we have met with everybody. We have asked 

everybody. And I would also say this, and this is a little bit unrelated to today’s hearing, but we have been fighting similarly with 

regard to the AMP, the avionics modernization program upgrades 

that the Air Force wants to cancel. 

We have—a lot of that affects C–130s—that does affect C–130s 

at Little Rock Air Force Base. Similarly with regard to that, we 

have been asking for facts and how they got to the decision that 

it was more cost effective to take the route that they want to take. 

And again, no memos, no internal deliberations that we have been 

able to see; just a fact sheet and they say, ‘‘Well, here it is.’’ 

So I would like to know, have you had difficulty getting data? 

And what do you think is going on? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, I think we have had many of the 

same frustrations you have had just getting data and having the 

transparency. I mentioned, you know, we were supposed to be consulted in advance. We were not. And we think—and I just think 

the process needs to be improved. We are supposed to have collaboration and consultation on these things. And it seems to me that 

the Air Force in particular has just failed to do this. 

And this is something that obviously we are going to bring up 

again when we meet with them. But again, we have to get their 

attention. We need to get the top people that are supposed to be 

working with the governors to actually be there in attendance so 

we have that opportunity to bring this message across. 

But I think your frustration as a Congressman is very similar to 

the frustration that we have as governors and we feel, you know, 

we are the commander-in-chief of our National Guard, and if we do 

not have the capability we need and we have an emergency in our 

State, you know, it is our responsibility. So we want to make sure. 

And my experience has always been, all the years I have been 

governor, I have had the honor of serving a long time, the Guard 

has always been there. They have always responded. They have 

done a phenomenal job. I just want to make sure that they are always going to be able to do that. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I again would like to welcome Governor Branstad. 

Governor, thank you for your testimony. 

I was proud when this process was going through the committee 

that the bipartisan amendment to block these cuts that I offered 

with Congressman Hunter from California passed with such strong 
14 

support, and I really appreciate all that support from my colleagues. 

And I do appreciate the ranking member’s kind words about the 

amendment. We know about the National Guard on Guam. It is absolutely a fantastic organization. I have been overseas with Representative Bordallo and you will never forget the importance of 

the National Guard on Guam, if you have ever been with her on 

one of these congressional delegations. 

Look, we all know that we are operating at a time of budget constraints. We also face threats from around the globe, as you mentioned. We really have to use taxpayer dollars as wisely as possible 

to protect our national security. And I am really glad that you 

mentioned, to that end, that the Air National Guard provides 35 

percent of the Air Force’s capabilities, with about 6 percent of its 

budget. I think that is an important point to make. 

And the 132nd Fighter Wing of the Iowa Air National Guard has 

been recognized, as you know, as the top F–16 unit in the country, 

and their overall cost per flying hour is the second-lowest in the 

country. Yet, they found out they were slated to see their F–16s retired and over 370 personnel cut while they were deployed in Afghanistan. That is amazing. 

And in 2008, when Iowa was hit with the worst natural disaster 

to ever affect our State, the 132nd was deployed to protect our communities. 

And as the Council of Governors, and you, Governor Branstad, 

argued for months in discussion with the Department, the Air 

Force’s proposed reductions would significantly affect the governors’ ability to respond to emergencies such as the one we experienced in 2008, not to mention 2 years later, as well, 3 years later. 

So Governor, I would, if you could, outline in a little more detail 

perhaps what you think about the role of the National Guard in 

terms of homeland response, in terms of floods, other kinds of 

things that the National Guard is required to do domestically with 

respect to homeland security, and whether any of that was really 

taken into account by the Air Force when they made this decision. 

Governor BRANSTAD. It does not appear that they have really 

taken this into account. As I mentioned in my testimony, I have 

been governor a long time. I was governor back when we had the 

flood of 1993. So I have been through a lot of disasters, floods. And 

now we are into a drought. So I want to go back to Iowa next week 

and we are going to have meetings talking about the drought and 

the problems we are having, and you are aware of the damage that 

that is—— 

Mr. LOEBSACK. You will be in my district in Mount Pleasant. 

Governor BRANSTAD. Yes, I am going to be in your district on 

Tuesday. And I would just say, you know, I go back even to, and 

I mentioned last year we had all these people deployed, but then 

we also were fighting the flood along the Missouri River, and that 

was—that went on and on and on from the first of June well into 

September. 

I can go back even a little further. The crash of Flight 232 in 

Sioux City, and in fact the Air National Guard in Sioux City did 

the rescue. That was a terrible tragedy, a terrible crash, but a lot 

of lives were saved. It was so well managed because of their won-
15 

derful training and experience and whatever, that they made it 

into a movie. Charlton Heston played Captain Al Haynes in that 

movie. 

But that shows the important role that the Guard plays. And the 

same thing is with this unit—this fighter unit that we have at the 

Des Moines Airport. They are the ones that provide security there. 

So if we have a crash or we have some incident at the Des Moines 

Airport, they are the ones that are there. They have the training 

and experience, and they—I am sure they would do the same kind 

of job that the Air Guard did up in Sioux City back in the crash 

of Flight 232. 

So that is the reason why I think it is so important. And I do 

not think maybe there is a—we as governors are keenly aware of 

it because the buck stops with us if it is a domestic situation. If 

it is a flood, a tornado, an ice storm or something like that, we 

have got to act to try to protect our citizens and do all that we can. 

But—and I like the Council of Governors concept because of this 

now, we can have a dual role. And if we have a situation that affects more than one State, we can actually have—in addition to the 

Guard, we can even have Reserve Components that can help us 

with those kinds of emergency situations. 

But I do not think the Air Force has got quite an appreciation 

for the important domestic role that these units are playing, and 

the personnel. And it is medical; it is the generators and things 

like that that the Air Guard provides in addition to obviously the 

pilots. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. And then when they are transitioned from 

a Title 32 role to a Title 10 role, which we have seen, of course over 

the course of the last 10 years, that is really critical as well. They 

need to take into account all the different functions that the Air 

Guard can perform. 

Governor BRANSTAD. Absolutely. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I do not want to cut him off, but we have got a vote we have got 

to run to. 

Governor, it is probably going to take us about an hour, and I 

understand you have a hard stop at 12:30. So we want to thank 

you for being here and for all of your help. And if you have to 

leave, we understand. We will be starting our next panel right 

after these votes, if you cannot hang around. 

Governor BRANSTAD. Well, General Timothy Orr, who is my adjutant general, will be here. He has more of the details and knowledge on this than I have. So I think—and General Lowenberg, and 

they are really partners on this. So you will get a chance to hear 

from General Lowenberg in the next panel. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank you for your service and for being here 

with us. 

And with that, we are going to stand in recess until after the 

votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen once again, thank you for your patience. 

And we have lost some of our Members as you can tell, those 

plane-sitting out there, they jump in them mighty quick after these 
16 

votes, but we appreciate your patience in sitting through these 

votes. They never call us and ask if it is convenient to call the vote 

when they do, but to further clarify the impacts of the United 

States Air Force aviation reductions, I am pleased to have two distinguished individuals: Lieutenant General Chris Miller, Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, and Major General 

Tim Lowenberg the Adjutant General of the State of Washington. 

General, we appreciate both your service to your country and 

your service to this committee by being here. We are looking forward to your comments to make a record that we can use for both 

this subcommittee and our full committee and with that we would 

love to hear any opening remarks you have. 

Also, letting you know that anything you would like to submit for 

the record as well, we are certainly willing to take that and have. 

At the end of any questions that we might have from the committee, if there is anything else you would like to add, or put in 

or clarify, please let me know. We want to make sure you have 

time to do this. This is an important record for us to create and 

build. 

So with that General Miller, I guess we will let you start off. 

General, you might hit that button there. Sometimes a little 

tricky. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER D. MILLER, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND PROGRAMS, A8, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

General MILLER. I got it sir, thank you. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished 

member of the committee, I am very pleased to be here with you 

today and honored to represent your United States Air Force as we 

discuss important Air Force aspects of the President’s fiscal year 

2013 budget. 

It is also a pleasure to be alongside Major General Tim 

Lowenberg. Tim and I first worked together a few years ago when 

I was at U.S. Northern Command and NORAD’s [North American 

Aerospace Defense Command] director of plans, policy, and strategy. 

In that capacity I had the rewarding experience of working with 

both guardsmen and Reserve partners of all services on challenging 

and important issues of homeland defense and support to civil authorities. In particular I had the pleasure of personally supporting 

General Lowenberg as he led Washington State’s efforts to prepare 

for the Vancouver Olympics, which was a complex effort with great 

results that speak for themselves. 

Today, as the Air Force Deputy Chief Staff for Strategic Plans 

and Programs, I am responsible for overseeing the long-range planning needed to ensure the Air Force of the future can provide the 

global vigilance, reach and power our Nation expects from our Air 

Force. 

I am also responsible for facilitating the efforts of the men and 

women from all of the parts of our total force who each year build 

the Air Force’s budget submission, which allows us to perform the 

missions that we are assigned by the President and perform under 

the direction of combatant commanders. 
17 

In both the near term and the future, Air Force leadership is responsible for building an Air Force that advantages America and 

ensures success in meeting any challenge we are asked to overcome. 

The 2013 President’s budget submission for the Air Force reflects 

a very carefully considered prioritization of resources to achieve 

that goal. Sustaining the right mix of air, space and cyber capabilities required a number of difficult choices to be made in our most 

recent budget, such as the proposals to retire, divest or transfer 

aircraft, along with the accompanying personnel changes. 

These proposals were developed, debated and validated not only 

within the Air Force, but across the entire Department of Defense. 

If enacted, this budget will yield an Air Force with the smallest 

total force personnel end strength and total aircraft inventory in 

our history as a service. 

With that force, however, we have produced an effective total 

force solution that supports the Secretary of Defense’s January 

2012 strategic guidance and meets the requirements of the Budget 

Control Act. 

Our guiding principle was balance, with regard to both required 

capability and capacity of the Nation’s Air Force. To retain the critical core capabilities for the Air Force and the ability to effectively 

respond to mission demands, we have balanced risk across a very 

diverse set of mission areas, ranging from air superiority to global 

mobility to space superiority and nuclear deterrence. 

We also balance the demands on today’s Air Force and airmen 

with the compelling need to sustain the strength of our future total 

force. 

And with regard to the proposed reductions, two important principles drove our decisionmaking. First, we chose quality over quantity. As our force evolves to match the demands of the new strategy, retaining larger numbers of under-resourced Air Force aircraft 

without the full human and financial resources needed to operate, 

maintain and deploy those airframes would significantly increase 

the risk of a hollow force that would inevitably become inadequate 

to provide the global vigilance, reach and power the American taxpayer expects. 

Two decades of continuous combat operations have accelerated 

the aging of our aircraft and detracted from the Nation’s ability to 

recapitalize them, and that is a priority for us. 

Additionally, we have experienced a gradual erosion of our ability 

to train for the most demanding wartime missions due to the constant pace of ongoing deployed operations. Intense efforts to find efficiencies over several years have been fruitful, but all these factors 

have combined to leave the Air Force with a limited ability to shift 

resources and personnel within or between air, space and cyber 

mission areas to sustain excess aviation force structure without either hollowing today’s force or mortgaging tomorrow’s. 

Second, we are a total force, and we are deeply, irrevocably and 

successfully integrated. We are committed to staying that way. 

We are also committed to building an Air Force that continues 

to reflect air, space and cyber capabilities that fundamentally depend on the effective employment of appropriately organized, 

trained and equipped Active, Guard, and Reserve airmen. 
18 

Sustaining all aspects of that force, meeting the demands currently and potentially placed on it, while respecting the inherent 

character of each part of the total force was a key determinant of 

our fiscal year 2013 force structure proposal and the Active-Reserve 

Component mix reflected in it. 

We believe that in these proposals we struck a difficult but appropriate balance of cost-effective capabilities to serve the national 

defense, now and in the years to come. 

Finally, we fully respect and value the stewardship that the Congress exercises in these matters and thank you for your strong and 

continuing support to the men and women of our Air Force. We are 

committed to faithfully executing the law and welcome this opportunity to provide Members of Congress our perspective with regard 

to the fiscal year 2013 force structure proposals. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Miller can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

General Lowenberg. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, USAF, ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF WASHINGTON MILITARY DEPARTMENT 

General LOWENBERG. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee. My 

name is Major General Tim Lowenberg. I have served as an Air 

Force officer for more than 44 years, 21 of which have been as a 

general officer. But I appear before you today in State military status. 

My testimony has not been reviewed or approved by anyone in 

the Air Force or the Department of Defense. And I ask, Mr. Chair, 

respectfully, that my formal testimony that I have submitted to the 

committee be admitted for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. It will be. 

General LOWENBERG. We are here today because in preparing its 

fiscal year 2013 budget request the Air Force did not comply with 

any of the statutory requirements, Presidential executive order directives or policy commitments to communicate with governors and 

consult with the Council of Governors before proposing Air National Guard force structure and manpower reductions in the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request. 

When governors learned of these reductions after the fact and 

asked Secretary Panetta to reconsider the Air Force proposal on 

February 27th, the Secretary agreed and directed Air Force leaders 

to meet with Council of Governors representatives. Major General 

Tim Orr and I represented the Council of Governors in the four— 

and there were only four—meetings with Air Force and National 

Guard Bureau leaders. 

This much is undisputed, as acknowledged by Ranking Member 

Bordallo in the earlier panel: The Air Force fiscal year 2013 plan 

imposes 59 percent of all aircraft reductions and six times the per 

capita personnel reductions on the Air National Guard. 

We gave Air Force leaders an alternative proposal to get the discussions under way that would have preserved combat capacity and 
19 

saved money by restoring a balanced reliance on Air National 

Guard forces. Although Air Force officials continue to speak of carefully calibrated, symbiotic total force budget development processes, it was clear in each of our four meetings that Air Force and 

National Guard Bureau leaders agree on very little about the fiscal 

year 2013 budget. 

The National Guard Bureau calculated the council’s proposal as 

increasing total force combat capacity and preserving more aircraft 

and more men and women in uniform, while generating a net savings to the Air Force of $700 million. 

The Air Staff, reviewing the same proposals with the National 

Guard Bureau staff over a weekend, calculated that retaining the 

force structure in the Air National Guard would actually increase 

costs by $284 million. That is a $984 million variance working on 

the same set of facts but with decidedly different controlling assumptions. 

It was also the last time the Air Force staff worked with their 

National Guard Bureau counterparts prior to any of the other 

meetings. 

Less than 15 minutes into the second meeting, and after only 

about 2 hours of total discussions, Air Force leaders pronounced everything about the Council of Governors proposals to be totally unacceptable and insisted on implementing the sweep of fighter aircraft from the Air National Guard to the Active Air Force. 

Both the House-passed fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act and the bill reported by the Senate Armed Services 

Committee reject these Air National Guard force structure reductions. This bipartisan congressional intervention is essential to prevent irreparable damage to the Air National Guard. 

In addition, Secretary Panetta’s commitment to congressional 

leaders that there will be no implementation of proposed fiscal year 

2013 force structure changes until further action by Congress is a 

welcome strategic pause. 

As is, his directive to the Air Force to suspend aircraft transfers 

and retirements previously scheduled for implementation in fiscal 

year 2012, if handled correctly, this commitment can also complement the strategic pause for fiscal year 2013 actions and preserve congressional options as to disputed transfers. 

Most welcome of all is the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 

proposed commission on the structure of the Air Force. An independent review of Air Force organizational structure and strategic 

planning and budget processes is essential in light of Air Force insistence on reducing its most cost-effective Reserve Components 

and continued development of budget proposals behind closed 

doors. 

Now, not all pending fiscal years 2010, 2011 and 2012 Air Guard 

force structure changes are points of contention between the Air 

Force and State leaders. In fact, most are not. With that in mind, 

a process can and should be established to proceed with a proposed 

fiscal years 2010, 2011 and 2012 transactions that are supported 

by all affected parties while Congress studies the Air Force future 

year budget proposals and awaits the recommendation of a commission on the structure of the Air Force. 
20 

We should be able to move forward on any as yet unexecuted fiscal years 2010, 2011 and 2012 changes that are approved by the 

Department of Defense, the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau 

and the governors of each affected State or territory. 

Concurrence with such transactions can be documented in whatever manner is acceptable to Congress and the affected parties. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am 

looking forward to responding to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of General Lowenberg can be found in 

the Appendix on page 85.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

And with the subcommittee’s consent, what I would like to do is 

reverse the order of how we are asking the questions on this panel 

since some members did not get to ask their questions during the 

last panel. We will make sure everybody gets to do that, if there 

is no objection to that. And we will start with the gentleman from 

Mississippi, with his questions, then we will go to the gentlelady 

from New York next, if that is agreeable. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Definitely no objections from me to go first. 

Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank our witnesses for being here. 

Thank you for your years of honorable service to our country and 

what you do for our men and women in uniform. 

Now, I have received some personal briefings on the issue that 

we are discussing today, and the one question that continues to 

come up over and over again for me personally is where is the benefit of the reductions, where would be they be. 

Perhaps I am under the misconception that the aircraft movements and retirements were made with the intention of saving 

money, especially when the Secretary is asking for another round 

of BRAC closings. But from every angle it seems that the movement of aircraft in many cases will actually cost more in the long 

run. 

Let me give you an example. Under the force structure changes, 

about 10 aircraft were scheduled to leave Keesler Air Force Base 

in Biloxi to move to Dobbins Reserve Base in Atlanta. Not only 

does Dobbins not have the appropriate facilities to house and provide for an Active Duty Component, but it is my understanding 

that the hangars at the Dobbins are not capable of housing the C– 

130J stretch model aircraft. 

Unless I am totally mistaken, this means that there is billions 

of dollars of MILCON [military construction] that will be required 

just to move these aircraft that are suited perfectly for Keesler and 

the facilities there. 

So my question is, can you explain why at a time when we are 

all talking about the cost of doing business and driving down costs 

in this tight fiscal environment that we are in, the Air Force is 

making decisions that will actually increase costs? 

General Miller. 

General MILLER. Congressman, thank you for that question. 

In response to your—the first part of your question, why we are 

making the moves we are making, the aggregate requirement for 
21 

airlift under the new strategic guidance, because of the types of 

conflicts that we have been asked to plan for under that guidance, 

decreased from the high 300s of tactical airlift aircraft down to 318. 

So we had an excess of 65 C–130 platforms that we did not need 

to accomplish the airlift tasks that we as an Air Force expect to 

have to accomplish and have been directed to plan for. 

That was part of achieving the savings required under the Budget Control Act. So for our total force structure reduction we 

achieved about $8.7 billion worth of savings and just in fiscal year 

2013 alone about $1.4 billion of that. 

But in terms of what is required to sustain our Air Force and to 

keep the components healthy, there are some costs associated with 

the movement of aircraft that was required to mitigate the impact 

of a reduction that large. 

And so for example in the case of the move to Dobbins, while it 

is true that the facilities there are not exactly suited at present for 

the C–130J, construction of new hangars is unlikely to be necessary and modification of the existing hangars is still an option 

that I believe we are investigating. I would be happy to provide you 

further information specifically on that issue. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, absolutely. I have asked for, several months 

ago, for—you know answers to questions just like that. And again 

from every angle that we are looking at, it just does not make 

sound business sense, and I know there is probably a possible military strategy to it, but it is—as you know the distance is not that 

far away. 

It seems to me—I know they are supposed to be losing some C– 

130Hs and is this the, hey, you know, do not scream too loud Dobbins, we are going to backfill with some C–130Js, and—but at the 

time I mean you know we have spent millions of dollars, not just 

on the hangars, but on training the personnel. 

And these people enjoy flying out of Keesler Air Force Base. They 

broke records in Afghanistan. It took them 3 to 5 years to train up. 

They are there. We are you know, so to spin up the same group 

and Dobbins is just, you know, is going to take probably 3 to 5 

years. 

We have a very expensive simulator. We have got great training 

ground. So I am looking forward to your questions and looking forward you know to your answers to my questions, because I think 

we will probably be having some more, you know, discussion on 

them. 

And again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you allowing me to be 

here today. I was going to ask another question. With the cuts that 

are hitting the Air National Guard, can you all kind of give me the 

breakdown on the cuts between Active Duty Air Force, Reserve, 

and National Guard? 

And also was there any disproportional cuts made to one of the 

components over the others? 

And you can start off, yes. 

General MILLER. Sir, let me put that in perspective. As General 

Lowenberg mentioned, the cuts in this particular budget did fall 

more on the Air National Guard than they did on the Active Duty. 
22 

If you look at a longer period of time than a single year, however, 

over the last 30 years the strength of the Air National Guard has 

been somewhere upwards of 100,000 as high as 116,000. The 

strength of the Active Duty has decreased by about 43 percent 

down to its current total of 332,000 and decreasing further by 

about 3,900 in the fiscal year 2013 budget. 

All of those force structure—all of those end strength reductions 

are driven by retirement of the corresponding force structure. So in 

this particular era where our Active Duty force is both as small as 

it has ever been and tasked at a very high level, one of our big concerns was to sustain our ability to deploy airmen of all components 

consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s rotation policy. 

An Active Duty airman, the standard is to deploy one period out 

of every—one period deployed for two non-deployed; for Guard and 

Reserve, one period deployed for five non-deployed. And so the Active Duty force is expected to perform at a higher rate of deployment. 

But both components have targets for what keeps them healthy, 

and so based on our assessment of the demand for a variety of 

weapons systems, the reductions that we made were our best projection of how to make each component capable of meeting the demands that we should place on it within those parameters. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time is expired, but if either of you 

would like to supplement the record with a written response to 

that, we would love to receive it. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you extending me this courtesy. I have a particular interest in this situation 

representing the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station. 

I would be very curious to know when you say that you are favoring quantity over quality, or quality over quantity, what sort of 

decisionmaking went into deciding which bases and missions are 

the ones that have the quality? 

What metrics were used? Because that is an important decisionmaking process, that our area feels that they were not part of and 

we wanted to put our best foot forward, but feel we did not have 

that opportunity when the news came rather surprisingly that we 

would be losing that mission. 

So that is my first question. 

General MILLER. Well, ma’am, I appreciate your question, and I 

appreciate your pride in the airmen of Niagara. 

When we talk about retaining quality over quantity, that does 

not refer to the quality of individual units, and I think I should 

make it very clear that no unit is chosen because it either is performing well or performing poorly, because units are collections of 

people who do a, generally speaking, a great job. And every unit 

in the Air Force has tremendous capabilities. 

But what we did in terms of sustaining our quality was to sustain the appropriate amount of investment to be able to replace airplanes, to upgrade aircraft, to provide space and cyber capabilities, 

the things that are required for the Air Force of the future. And 

that really was the heart of the quality versus quantity. 
23 

With one important addition, and that is we have to be able to 

sustain and equip, in other words to provide parts, equipment, flying hours, all of the things that make airmen trained and ready for 

the force structure we keep. And so that was our primary consideration in making the overall aggregate determination. 

For specific selection of units, one of the things that went into 

that, the Guard and the Reserve leadership both made decisions 

according to a set of principles that were important to each component. And one of those principles for the Reserves was when there 

is another flying mission in proximity to a Reserve flying mission 

that in the aggregate was excess, that was a consideration for them 

in terms of those places that could be reduced with the minimum 

damage to the capability of the Reserves as a whole. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Then let me ask you about the decisionmaking 

process that was involved in determining which bases received new 

missions, the ones that were told you are losing this, but do not 

worry you now have ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], you have cyber-security, you have something else to replace 

it. 

And certainly I am saying that with the emotive question because if you are going to remove C–130s or have any consideration 

of that from the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, I would want 

to know why we would not be in that category to receive a new 

mission, our proximity to Canada, our tried and true record of accomplishment, 1,500 missions to Afghanistan just to name a few. 

So that is what I would be saying. 

If we want to be part of that Air Force of the future, we need 

that opportunity. 

General MILLER. Yes, ma’am, I understand that. In fact I worked 

with some Niagara folks when I was in Afghanistan, and they did 

in fact do a great job. 

We did not have sufficient mission as an Air Force to backfill 

every loss of force structure across the entire enterprise. And so in 

some cases where there was some remaining mission, that played 

into the determinations made by the Guard and Reserve leadership. 

In other cases, and I believe Niagara’s in this case, there is an 

action involving the Navy to bring a capability into that installation that will provide some backfill of a sort. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Please keep us in mind. We will be—the dialogue 

will continue, but thank you for your service and your willingness 

to come forward, but we need to get it right next time. 

I think there are a lot of people that felt that this could have 

been a more transparent process and involving the community and 

certainly the people who have a very vested interest in what goes 

on in those local bases. 

So, I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentlelady. 

And the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and greatly 

appreciate the service and leadership of our general officers here 

today. Thank you for being with us. 
24 

I want to begin by associating myself with the remarks of the 

gentlelady from upstate New York. This is a—just really an important issue to our State for yes the obvious, but also, you know, I 

just—I cannot—I do not think I can properly describe for you what 

it was like to go through that storm last year, Hurricanes Irene 

and Lee and just the invaluable service rendered by our National 

Guard, Army and Air, in the initial phase of the crisis and then 

in the beginning towards the recovery. 

Let me just say to preface a couple points I am going to make 

is, one, I certainly believe that we should be going through a comprehensive review process with an eye towards national security 

establishment reform. I have said a few things on that myself. I actually think we can be safer for less money. 

But I have had—I have struggled with this initiative for a couple 

reasons. One, in my last deployment I led the global—the Army’s 

component to the global response force to Haiti. And you know that 

was very painful to get paratroopers on the ground in Port-auPrince based on platform, strategic lift. And we got that done over 

time, but it was not where I think it should have been. 

Now there were a lot of factors that were bearing on the problem 

including the surge in Afghanistan. Certainly understanding all 

that but I say that, that when I inquired about the numbers for 

our strategic lift the response I got was that they were using the 

mobility study from 2009. 

And then I juxtaposed that to my experiences. And then of 

course, as was alluded to the testimony earlier, just moments ago, 

that the President’s directional change, strategic directional change 

and what I thought I heard you say just moments ago was that it 

appears that you are implying that you have updated the air mobility study. 

Is that true? 

I guess that is my first question is, the assumptions that were 

made, what were they based on? 

General MILLER. Well, sir, thank you for that question. The mobility study that you referred to, the MCRS–16 [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016], is still the only completed and 

fully vetted mobility study. But in the process of arriving at the fiscal year 2013 budget and in the deriving the strategic guidance 

that we work to, that study was reviewed on a number of fronts, 

not only within the Air Force but by the Department of Defense assessment entity. 

And so the requirements that we were moving to were somewhat 

relaxed in terms of the overall volume of 10 miles per day that 

MCRS–16 required compared to what we are required to be able 

to do today. 

And by the strategic airlift standards, that number has changed 

to 275, in terms of the fleet that we expect to go forward with, 

which is comprised of the C–5B, the C–5M and the C–17. 

Mr. GIBSON. And just to follow up, and I think I am going to 

have to ask the second question and let you gentlemen respond because I am not going to have time for it. 

But in this figure, how much is it sensitive to the TAGs and to 

the governors? 
25 

Because, certainly, knowing this is based on war plans, and as 

I pointed out moments ago, you know, we went through this storm, 

and I am just wondering who is the arbiter that is putting all these 

requirements together? 

And the second question has to do with, you know, when we— 

when I asked about the data that roughly a third of the mission 

are done for percent, 7 percent of the cost, the response I got from 

leadership was but the Guard is not able to keep up with the op 

tempo [operational tempo]. 

And at the time when I heard that, that was a new argument 

to me, so I went back to my TAG and I said, this is what I was 

told. And they went back and ran their analysis and they said it 

was not true. They said they still have capacity left to give. 

So I am wondering, has that been re-engaged? 

And I am sorry, it looks like I have—I am going to—perhaps you 

can respond and then you can get it for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General LOWENBERG. With the chairman’s permission, Congressman Gibson, I would like to respond because I have not had an opportunity to respond to the earlier questions. 

I have been in Haiti, and I know the difference between planning 

assumptions and ground truth. You and I have seen ground truth 

in the theater. That is what adjutants general see throughout the 

United States and abroad. The challenge and the obligation for 

American civic leaders and Members of Congress is to maintain 

maximum combat capacity and maximum surge capacity for the 

available funds. 

And we all know that there is intense pressure on the available 

funds. 

When we raised these same issues in the meetings with the Air 

Force leaders in those four meetings—and we only really discussed 

this in the first meeting—the response of some of the more senior 

leaders of the Air Force was that, as important as cost efficiencies 

are, there are other things more important. 

When we got into discussion of the assumptions that drove the 

calculations, nearly a $1 billion range between the National Guard 

Bureau’s assessment of a $700 million savings and the Air Force 

assumption of a $284 million cost overrun, if you will, we saw 

things such as—one of the units we were talking about in one of 

the meetings had deployed many times for half of the unit. Half of 

the wing had deployed for the 6-month AEF [Air Expeditionary 

Force] rotation, but that counted as a full rotation for the entire 

wing. 

So not everything that counts is counted and not everything that 

is counted counts, quite frankly. And so I think we have seen a 

wide divergence of budget figures and cost calculations that are difficult to deal with because they are done behind closed doors with 

what the chairman referred to in the earlier panel as a gag order. 

It should be done in the open day. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

And, General Miller, I do not want to cut you off. Do you want 

to respond to that? 

I want to make sure we get everything on the record. 
26 

General MILLER. Yes, sir, if I could, let me just address, with regard to the strategic airlift fleet and domestic airlift requirements, 

those two things really do not overlap. The domestic airlift requirement is primarily captured with the tactical airlift. That is not to 

say that we cannot use and do not use strategic airlifters to do 

things that need to be done by the governors or in case of natural 

disaster, but in terms of the requirement, it is not captured there 

so much. 

On the issue of cost, there is very little about cost that is actually 

behind closed doors. 

One of the things that I think is important to put into perspective is that, when we talk about 6 percent of the cost and 35 percent of the capability, there are some assumptions there that need 

to be stated. 

So the Air Force’s budget is made up of what we call blue 

obligational authority and non-blue. The non-blue is nondiscretionary. The Air Force has no control over it. 

So if you take the 6 percent of O&M [operations and maintenance] funding that the Guard expends as a percentage of what the 

Air Force actually controls, it is about 7.5 percent. If you take the 

overseas contingency operations funding out of the denominator, it 

is about 8 percent. 

If you take the research, development, testing, and evaluation 

and the procurement that the Guard does not incur an expense for 

out of the denominator, that rises to about 12 percent. And in 

terms of the actual capability, while the Guard provides huge capability in many categories of the Air Force’s output, certainly tactical 

airlift, strategic airlift, fighters, they do not provide any output in 

nuclear deterrence and nothing significant in space. 

And so there is a nuance in the 35 percent capability calculation 

that I think is also important. 

And with regard to the specific costing of the options that the 

Council of Governors put on the table, some of the things that account for the difference were discussed in those forums, and they 

have to do with the modernization of airplanes that we keep was 

not accounted for by the National Guard calculations. That was 

discussed. And when you factor in the required cost of modernization and long-term maintenance of those aircraft, the cost goes up. 

Similarly, the cost of deploying airplanes to replace combatant 

commander-required assets that are stationed in Europe that 

would have been removed by the Council of Governors’ proposal 

was not factored in. 

And so much of that delta in the cost estimate is accounted for 

and was discussed in those meetings. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank you and the ranking member, for allowing 

us to sit on at your committee. 

I think I would like to make more of a general statement. First 

off, I—all of you sitting across from me, I admire and appreciate 

your service. Thank you very much. This row, the next row and 

anybody else in the room, thank you. I appreciate it a lot. 
27 

Sometimes we are the victim of where we have been, and I would 

just like to address something that I think that I have got a little 

bit of a grip on, and we will see, as time goes on, but it looks to 

me like there is going to be continuing dialogue about how this reorg or reduction force, however you want to call it—a lot of dissatisfaction here. 

You know that. I am not telling you a thing you do not know. 

And I know, when we started with the all-volunteer idea, I was 

still in uniform. I thought this probably—I am not too sure this is 

going to work. But I have become convinced it does work. It is costeffective. And we have got some extremely highly trained people. 

I am not going to go into detail on that because I see my adjutant general sitting right behind you, who I know has got all those 

details, and you do, too, about the proficiencies of our pilots, our 

maintenance people, and so on. 

I went through a little bit of a fuss here 2 or 3 years ago about 

what was going to change doing maintenance. I appreciate that did 

not happen, could have a big morale factor, and we have got a tremendous maintenance operation in the 132nd and as other units 

do, too. 

It is, kind of, like owning your car, you know. It is your airplane, 

if you take care of it every day. It means a lot. 

So what are we going to do? 

Make no mistake about it. You know, I know, that the Reserve 

Components, the Guard and the Reserve, is part of the standing 

force. Just look what we have been doing. It is clear. 

And yet governors, as we heard from our governor today, and I 

much appreciate his testimony, and all governors still have this responsibility to deal with emergencies in their States, and they turn 

to their Guard and Reserve, and they must do that. 

So what are we going to do? I think there is more to this when 

we think about cost-effective and how do we manage this? 

And again, I am not going to regurgitate all of the details about 

how great I think the 132nd is, but it is a great unit. But there 

are other great units. I will let General Orr tell you about that. 

But when I was teaching at the Command and General Staff College and started to try to get a bigger, broader concept of tactics 

and how we are going to defend ourselves because it keeps changing, technology. Now, the big eye in the sky, the satellites, all this 

stuff, and I think of the footprint of having a—you know, to me, 

when I started, like at Fort Sill, Fort Benning, or any of the Air 

Force bases, you know, there is no community that wants to give 

up their unit, whether it is Standing or Reserve or Guard. Nobody 

wants to do that. 

When you look at this big picture, the footprint, you know, where 

are we getting the biggest bang for our buck and the most safety, 

as we think about how we situate ourselves? 

And I am saying this mostly to you, Mr. Chairman, too. You 

know, we have got this humongous base with all this equipment 

and personnel, which is, kind of, in our tradition. Nobody wants to 

give it up. Remember? Or do we spread them out and have that 

footprint pressed out over a number of areas and then realize that 

we have proven the efficiencies and the cost-effectiveness of doing 

that? And we spread it out a lot. 
28 

I do not see how you can avoid running into this here with us, 

this committee and the rest of us around here, without really addressing that carefully. 

So I would just suggest we go back and—I have no doubt you 

have been thinking about it some, because I have brought this up 

before. I brought it up with the Secretary. 

But this needs to be really carefully thought out. And you better 

pull those governors in and let them be part of it. 

This—you know, ‘‘we are having our meetings over here and then 

we will tell you when we get ready,’’ is not going to work. You already know that. 

So let us be inclusive and if you have to move into classified situations, you know how to do that. The governors know how to do 

that. And let us just put the cards out there. 

And what are we going to have when we get done with this discussion? And it seems to me, and I will be interested to watch you 

go through, and I do not want this to be a staff study where you 

know what the conclusion is before you start. 

[Audio Gap.] 

Mr. LATHAM. —that was singled out for elimination. When I 

was—when I asked about what the basis was, well, it was a judgment call—no criteria, no basis for it. They are just saying, ‘‘Well, 

somebody visited with somebody and that is what they came up 

with.’’ 

I think we all expect every taxpayer dollar to be used wisely, and 

I really question whether the Air Force oftentimes will take into 

consideration the value, say, at the Des Moines airport of all the 

other activities and assets that are put forth, you know, locally by 

the air wing there and if those things are taken into consideration. 

You mentioned earlier, I think, about that the governors did not 

take into consideration some other things that you were talking 

about. Certainly, I think it goes both ways that you should be looking also at the resources made available to the public and to the 

State offered by the Guard units. 

So just very briefly, if you could respond as far as how in the 

world could you notify people in a newspaper article, rather than 

to have conversations going on; to me, that is just appalling. 

General MILLER. Well, sir, thank you for the question. Let me 

address a couple of things. 

One is that if you look at the way we have done for years the 

resource planning process, not just in the Air Force, but in the 

Army as well, which has three components. The Air National 

Guard Bureau and the National Guard Bureau are both involved— 

Air National Guard with the Air Force resource planning process. 

They are an integral part of every meeting we have as we go 

through the formulation of each budget. For the Department, the 

National Guard Bureau is represented in the departmental—the 

DOD discussions as we finalize, or really as we develop the budget 

proposals. 

And so in this particular year, there were some additional constraints put on the sharing of information which were not absolute, 

by the way. 

Mr. LATHAM. Why? 
29 

General MILLER. Because it was a very difficult time of both reformulating a strategy and looking at the ways that we could 

achieve the targets set forth by the Budget Control Act. 

Having said that, sir, it did not—it was not an absolute prohibition. And there was involvement leading up to the President’s release of the budget to the Congress when I think decisions made 

outside the Air Force on who to talk to, when. I cannot control that, 

but I think there was certainly more control over information than 

in most years, but not absolute. 

And if I could just address your other point, sir, on the selection 

of particular bases, we looked at our aggregate fighter requirement 

under the new strategy, and that fighter requirement, based on the 

fact that we would no longer plan to fight large-scale stability operations, we were able to take the majority of our fighter reductions 

from the A–10 force, which is a more narrow capability for operating in that kind of an environment. 

So the number of F–16s that we could or wanted to remove from 

the force was fairly limited. This follows on a fiscal year 2010 reduction of about 250 Active Duty fighters. So our overall fighter capacity has decreased quite a bit over the last few years. 

The selection of where the F–16 reduction would be taken was 

primarily driven by the overall number, but then it was localized 

based on the air sovereignty alert mission and the normal production of that mission by various units and the estimate of cost savings from each of the units across the force. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The ranking member has been incredibly patient, so we are going 

to come to her next. 

But I just want to point, General Miller, this is not to you, but 

this is to that building across and down the street. You know, what 

Congressman Latham raised is incredibly important. We do not do 

transparency because it is easy. We do it because it is right for the 

American people. 

And this is a pattern. You know, just a few years ago, Secretary 

Gates issued gag orders—they were gag orders on members civilian 

and uniformed in the Pentagon that they could not even talk to 

Members of Congress about the effects that cuts were going to 

have. When they shut down the Joint Forces Command, they 

issued gag orders that no one could tell us the analysis that was 

taking place on that. 

They refused to give us a shipbuilding plan that the statute required that they give us because they did not want us to know that 

information; refused to give us an aviation plan because they did 

not want us to have that information. And now recently, they have 

issued an arbitrary rule that says reports can only be 15 pages 

long. So we get a China report that is 15 pages; two pages on 

cyber—I mean, two paragraphs on cyber-attacks and what we are 

worried about; three pages, I think, on space concerns. 

And we respect you and your service and your demeanor, so this 

is not to you. But if you do not mind, take that message back over 

to them that you are seeing a lot of Members that are tired of this 

lack of transparency. 

And with that, I want to yield to my friend and the ranking 

member for any questions that she might have. 
30 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That was 

well said. 

General Miller, I have a question for you. As you know, the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request included an Air Force request to terminate the Global Hawk Block 30 unmanned aircraft system program. Nine Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft are currently deployed 

in Central Command, European Command and the Pacific Command, including 4 on Guam. 

In congressional action to date on fiscal year 2013 authorization 

and appropriation bills, the House of Representatives as a whole 

has supported the combatant commanders’ requirement for Global 

Hawk Block 30 and require the Air Force to continue to support 

the combatant commanders. Yet, we have received unofficial information that the commander of the Air Force Air Combat Command, acting contrary to both House defense bills, recently informed General Schwartz that he intends to redeploy to the continental United States the 9 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft currently 

supporting combat commanders and the warfighters. 

So general, would you please clarify the Air Force’s plans for 

Global Hawk block 30 to comply with the current stated intent of 

the House of Representatives? 

General MILLER. Yes, ma’am. In terms of the requirements that 

combatant commanders have, those requirements are stated in 

terms of a capability, not a particular platform. And that is not just 

in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission area, 

but that is in general. Requirements are generally stated in terms 

of capabilities for output. 

It is certainly true that under the fiscal year 2013 proposals that 

we submitted, we did not think that we could or that we had to 

sustain the Global Hawk, and I recognize your point about the intent of the House. 

However, we are discussing what options we must take to essentially stay within available resources as we get closer to fiscal year 

2013. I am very well aware that we can take no irreversible actions 

that would prejudice further action by the Congress as a whole. 

And so what I can tell you is that the discussion is ongoing about 

how we deal with the Global Hawk, like it is with many other platforms in the fiscal year 2013 proposals, but at this particular time 

a decision has not been made. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. But I certainly hope we will 

rethink this. 

General Lowenberg, I understand that you will be retiring after 

44 long years in service. And just let me say—and I am sure the 

chairman also joins me in thanking you for your longtime dedication and leadership among our Nation’s TAGs. I congratulate you 

for so many long years; 44 years is a long, long time. And you will 

be missed. 

I have a question for you, General. Can you comment on the 

progress that is being made in developing the requirements for 

Title 32 missions? The Congress has for more than 3 years now requested an update on the Title 32 mission requirements and we 

have seen absolutely nothing. 
31 

One of the clear process problems with the fiscal year 2013 Air 

Force budget was lack of incorporation of Title 32 requirements. 

What more can we do to get this requirement identification done 

so that we can better assess the budget requests? 

General LOWENBERG. Ranking Member Bordallo, if I had the answer to that I would be happy to serve another 44 years to work 

on that very project. It is something that we have been raising, in 

particular with the current and previous commander of U.S. Northern Command, because I believe that is the combatant command 

that has the responsibility for articulating the requirements for 

Title 32 utilization of this magnificent Army and Air Force that the 

Congress has resourced. 

I just came to this hearing from a couple of days with General 

Jacoby at Northern Command, and quite frankly I am very encouraged by his focus on requirements and his willingness to act as a 

combatant commander to articulate those requirements. I am optimistic that Congress will see some positive action in the months 

and years ahead. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Very good, general. I will remember 

those words. 

General Miller, just a couple of quick questions. Can you outline 

for members of the committee what impact restoring the Air National Guard force structure in fiscal year 2013 will have on future 

years’ budgets? What costs or issues can we expect to deal with in 

the future? 

General MILLER. Ranking Member, thank you for the question. 

For fiscal year 2013, the costs of restoring all of the force structure as we are currently believing that it is Congress’ intent to do 

is about $1.4 billion. If we were to be required to sustain the force 

structure just for the Air National Guard throughout the FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program], that is about $4.4 billion, roughly, and that would account for putting the aircraft back into all of 

the normal servicing and modernization and upkeep that we do as 

a service. 

The consequences of that, if those resources were not provided to 

us, is obviously that we either have to reduce further the Active 

Duty force structure or reduce modernization programs that would 

result in recapitalization of both Guard and Active force structure 

and Reserve force structure and/or some of the advanced capabilities that we need to deal with evolving threats. 

So those are things along the lines of upgraded radars and electronic warfare capability, various space capabilities that are necessary. Essentially, it would be a difficult challenge for us without 

the resources. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. And one final 

question. In your professional opinion, what utility is of an Air 

Force commission as proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee? 

General MILLER. Ma’am, we view the trends that we have started with the Council of Governors, as General Lowenberg just mentioned, with U.S. Northern Command, putting additional emphasis 

on identifying those Title 32 requirements. The Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force have a very well understood and very well practiced way of taking into account combatant 
32 

commander requirements when they are expressed as combatant 

commander requirements. 

So that channel of presenting requirements will inform our decisionmaking perhaps better than it has been in the past. The ongoing dialogue with the Council of Governors, which at this point I 

think it is fair to say that there is work on a statement of principles for how that work will best proceed and how the governors 

and the Department of Defense can best inform each other, that 

work is positive. 

We are concerned that a commission, particularly with the timing that it is proposed to have, would have a very difficult job 

ahead of it to go through the levels of detail required in the time 

allotted and that the decisionmaking that would come out of such 

a commission would be very difficult to reflect in the 2014 budget 

and could require us to hold airmen and units and families and 

States and a whole lot of other folks in a very uncomfortable state 

of suspended animation for an extended period of time. 

And so while we will work with, absolutely, a commission if the 

Congress should specify that that is going to happen, it is our belief 

that we as a total force team, Department of Defense, working with 

the governors through the council, can do that work. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General, for that information. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, both of you, for your service. I appreciate it more than 

you know. And our own adjutant general back there, General Orr, 

I really, really appreciate his great service as well. 

I have a couple kids who are in the Marines, so that brings it 

home even more. They have been deployed. And so thank you so 

much. 

I guess I have a lot of frustration, which I expressed earlier when 

the governor was here, when our governor was here, and expressed 

by Congressman Latham and by our chairman and ranking member, number of folks, a lot of frustration over the transparency of 

the process, a lot of frustration over the lack of communication, especially with the governors. 

I have made very clear over the course of the past several 

months that I am deeply concerned and really pretty baffled by the 

proposal to make irreversible cuts to the Air National Guard, 

which would bear about 59 percent of the total aircraft cuts in the 

budget request. 

And under that request, they would see almost—they would almost see most of their personnel reductions also occur in 2013, 

which provides really little leeway to reverse course from a strategy that is meant, recall, to be reversible. 

I am, frankly, distressed, as I said, by the lack of clear data and 

analysis showing that this really is the best decision for our security, for our ability to respond to emergencies at home, something 

we in Iowa know very well over the course of the last 5 years, 4 

to 5 years. 

And just as important in all this for the taxpayers. The taxpayers demand to know why decisions are being made. This is a 

democracy. 
33 

Sometimes I kind of sound like a Pollyanna when I am talking 

about these things. I taught at a college before I got here. Now I 

am in the real world of politics. 

But I am a Congressman, and my job is oversight in no small 

measure, and to make sure that when folks make decisions that 

are going to affect people, not just in Iowa, but all around the country, that we actually have the data that we need and that the analysis has been carried out. 

It is up to us in the legislative branch to hold folks in the administration, the executive branch accountable in that sense. Again, I 

appreciate what you are doing. As Chairman Forbes said, this is 

not meant to be a slighting to you folks or any of that. But do take 

that message back, as he said. 

This is an important function that we serve in Congress. Yes, we 

do and say many of the things we do for our constituents, but it 

is about national security and it is about taxpayers as well. 

So I guess I want to direct my first question to General 

Lowenberg and ask you if you can share some thoughts, in addition 

to what you have already shared with us as an adjutant general, 

your perspective on the National Guard’s ability to quickly mobilize. 

And I will preface that by saying that in February I asked the 

Air Force leadership if there had ever been a time over the last 

decade that the Air National Guard was not able to respond to a 

mission requirement or a request for deployment, and I was told 

quite unequivocally that there had not been a situation like that. 

But I am also concerned not just about deploying overseas, but I 

am concerned about domestic deployments as well. 

General. 

General LOWENBERG. Congressman, when Iraq invaded Kuwait I 

was the Air National Guard commander in Washington State. We 

had air crews on the ramp, on the aircraft, waiting to flow forward 

even before the vocal requests starting coming through the channel. 

I can tell you that the Air National Guard has been engaged in 

Desert Shield, Desert Storm, enforcement of the no-fly zones for 

nearly a quarter of a century. The total Air Force has had the full 

operational contribution of the Air National Guard, without mobilization, with rare exception. Very small, low density, high demand 

units like security police, have been mobilized in the last 1 or 2 

years. 

But for nearly a quarter of a century the Air National Guard has 

responded by volunteerism engaging in every mission asked of it by 

the total force. And I know that the National Guard Bureau has 

proffered on numerous occasions to take an even larger share. So 

accessibility is not an issue in my life experience. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And, General Miller, following up on that, you 

know, we hear sort of generally about, you know, the mix of Active 

Duty versus Reserve or Guard moving forward, given our strategy, 

given the resources that we have and all the rest. 

But I do not know that we have ever been really offered a clear 

answer as to that mix and how that mix is arrived at. You mentioned earlier that Active Duty had taken big hits over the previous 

10 to 15 years. 
34 

Now, I am not—I do not think that you are making that as—that 

that is your argument as to why then we ought to be doing. I understand that. But that impression could be left with some people. 

So, you know, feel free to clear that up. But, I mean, saying that 

is all well and good, but then what goes into this, what are the factors that are used when you are trying to determine, when the Air 

Force is trying to determine the proper mix between the Reserve 

Components and the Active Duty Components. 

And if there is a longer answer to be had in writing, I would love 

to see it as well. 

General MILLER. Congressman, thank you. And I think we will 

submit a more complete discussion of that for the record. But I appreciate your question, and I think it hits some very, very important considerations. 

First of all, I would agree with General Lowenberg. The Guard 

has performed superbly over many, many years, and that is not the 

issue. I personally, the year I spent in Afghanistan out of my 20 

or 21 colonel-group commanders, at that time much of our force 

structure and 18 out of those 20 or 21 group commanders were 

Guard and Reserve colonels, and they did brilliant work and so did 

the men and women that they brought with them. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I might just say, I have flown on a lot of those 

C–130s—Kentucky group, all kinds of—— 

General MILLER. Yes, sir. Absolutely. So that is not the issue. 

The issue is this. Because it takes volunteerism, in many cases, 

to assemble a Guard capability, or because of the legitimate demands of the employers of guardsmen and reservists, the rotations 

may be shorter than 179 days. They may be 60. 

That is not necessarily a problem, but as the Active Duty force 

gets smaller, our margin for error and the number of times over 

the foreseeable future that we may have to call on the Guard or 

Reserve to fill requirements that we have will grow as our Active 

force gets smaller. 

And so our concern—you asked what the factors were. One of 

them is force sustainability. So for example, as we get a smaller 

Active force, the symbiotic relationship, much of the Guard’s experience comes from Active Duty members who serve on Active status 

and then elect to become members of the Guard. 

As the Active force gets smaller, that experienced input will get 

smaller. We are not at the point where we can give a quantitative 

answer to where that becomes a real problem, but we know that 

the margins are getting smaller. 

And so in the near term, our choices for the Active Duty mix 

were sustainability. They were driven by the deployment rates, 

particularly in some of the most heavily tasked platforms. And we 

elected to ensure that we could sustain the foreseeable, the projected Active tempo without taking Active Duty folks below the 

one-to-two policy and without having to depend on volunteerism 

that involves multiple squadrons, which sometimes do have to be 

supplemented, particularly for Guard and Reserve fighter operations. 

We have had to supplement those operations with Active Duty 

maintainers. So this is a very delicate balance and it is one of the 

reasons that we think it is extremely important for us to continue 
35 

working as we have with the Air National Guard, with the National Guard Bureau, to understand those dynamics, to better 

present that case as we go forward in fiscally challenged times that 

are ahead of us. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do look forward to something more extensive in writing. If you 

could provide that, that would be great, especially given that the 

Guard and Reserve have never been—they have always been able 

to answer the call. And if there is a fear that that will not happen 

in the future, I would like to know why that is the case, and specifically how you come to that conclusion. 

Thank you. Appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 166.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, both of you have heard virtually every 

member of this subcommittee praise the two of you for your service 

and your demeanor, how you are handling this. We understand this 

is not a problem that you brought upon yourselves. 

We also understand that this did not happen because we created 

the best strategy and then we had the debate of how to implement 

that strategy, and then we came up and said, ‘‘This is the budget 

we need to do that.’’ 

It came about because we have had a sea-change where we have 

pulled numbers out of the air and said, ‘‘Here is the budget; now 

create a strategy to meet that budget.’’ And now we have put you 

two in warring with each other about how you divide those dollars 

up. And we should never have put you in that position, and we are 

fighting on this subcommittee to get you out of that position. We 

just want you to know. 

I am going to give three questions that I do not expect you to 

answer now. I would just like for you to give me an answer on the 

record. The first one is we know that the Senate is proposing language in its version of the fiscal year 2013 NDAA that would effectively stop the transfer, divestment or retirement of all Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircraft not only in fiscal year 

2013, but also in previous fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012. If both 

of you could just get back to us in writing what you think the impact of that would be. I think it is important that we know that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 165.] 

Mr. FORBES. The second thing, General Miller, with the assumption that Congress may freeze all force structure retirements and 

divestments in fiscal year 2013 and include the associated funding 

to support, what is the likelihood that the Air Force would plan in 

the fiscal year 2014 budget and beyond to keep the force structure 

at fiscal year 2012 levels? If you could just answer that for us in 

writing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 166.] 

Mr. FORBES. And then General Lowenberg, if you could tell us, 

the subcommittee understands that as a counter-proposal to the alternative proposal that the Council of Governors submitted to the 
36 

Air Force, the Secretary of Defense chose to offer retiring 24 fewer 

C–130 aircraft to meet airlift needs of State governors. 

Now, if you could tell us, in your view, why was the Secretary’s 

offer of 24 C–130s rejected? And how could the counter-proposal 

have been improved to an acceptable level? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 166.] 

Mr. FORBES. And then one final thing; General Miller, is the Air 

Force now making any plans based upon what they think the language will be from the Senate and the House in the NDAA bill? 

General MILLER. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. FORBES. Do you want me to be more clear on that? 

General MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. There—you know what the language is from 

this authorization that came out of the House. We know there is 

a discussion in the Senate for fiscal year 2013 regarding freezing— 

not just 2013, but 2010, 2011 and 2012. Is the Air Force taking any 

action now on any plans related to that? Are they in a wait-andsee mode to see what actually comes out in the language? 

General MILLER. Sir, we are planning assuming that previously 

approved force structure actions are consummated and that the 

2013 proposals will be as well. Our planning assumptions are that 

that would happen for the long-term planning. And obviously—— 

Mr. FORBES. The planning is that the law is going to stay in 

place as it is? 

General MILLER. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 166.] 

Mr. FORBES. I have 60 seconds left. I am going to yield that to 

Mr. Latham for one additional question, if he could. 

Mr. LATHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just had a question about the reversibility of the—of what 

is happening, like the 132nd Air Wing. You have got pilots that 

have 2,500 hours of experience, are combat tested. They have been 

in different theaters time after time. You have got maintenance 

people that have, you know, 10, 11 years on average of experience 

in the regular Air Force. You are probably talking 1 to 2 years of 

experience as far as maintenance. 

If, in fact, you lose that capability, is that reversible? 

General MILLER. Congressman, I would say in general terms, 

those personnel types of action are reversible to some extent. No 

unit ever is reconstituted instantly with all the same capability. 

But we found, for example, after 9/11, that recalling aviators to Active Duty with some spin-up training, they were absolutely capable 

of performing the same kinds of missions they were when they 

were serving actively. 

So it is our intent to comply, obviously, with congressional direction on reversible actions. And so we are not anticipating units 

standing down until we have a clear signal that that is in fact acceptable. 

Mr. LATHAM. So does General Lowenberg have any comment on 

that, if that is reversible? 

General LOWENBERG. Yes, reversible only to the extent that you 

can recruit new members to a new unit with a new mission. Quite 
37 

frankly, you cannot bring those people back effectively. That is our 

big concern. 

Mr. LATHAM. Once they are gone, they are gone. Right? 

Mr. FORBES. Our time has expired. 

Anybody can submit additional questions for the record if they 

want to. 

I made both of you a promise at the beginning, and also talking 

to you before, if there was anything you wanted to add that you 

felt you needed to clarify, put in the record beforehand, you can either do it now on the record or submit it in writing. 

And let me start with you, General Miller. Anything else that 

you would like to add that you feel we have left out or you want 

to clarify for us? 

General MILLER. No, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity 

to entertain your questions and speak for the Air Force. And I look 

forward to continuing to work with my teammates in all the components to give the taxpayer the best we possibly can. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you. 

And General, if you do determine that, please feel free to submit 

it for the record. 

General Lowenberg. 

General LOWENBERG. Mr. Chairman, you very eloquently articulated the frustration that has been felt by the members of this subcommittee and by Members of Congress. And it is a frustration 

that the National Guard has felt for some time. 

It is the frustration that led this Congress to create a commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves and, as I said in my formal 

testimony, I believe the benefits of that congressional action are 

still resonating throughout Congress and throughout the defense 

community. 

I am struck by the fact that the challenges confronted by the Air 

Force are not unlike the challenges confronted by the Army. And 

yet the governors were very clear in commending the Secretary and 

Chief of Staff of the Army for having an open and transparent process. The Army did not require nondisclosure agreements as it puts 

its fiscal year 2013 budget together. 

So I think because the communication with the governors, quite 

frankly, has not happened to date in any meaningful way, in a very 

superficial way—there have been four meetings, but there has been 

a year in which the fiscal year 2013 budget was developed in which 

no Air Force leader attended any of the Council of Governors meetings—that the Congress would be well advised to support the creation of a commission on the structure of the Air Force. 

I believe that will have the same beneficial import and provide 

the kind of information Congress has been seeking and would be 

immensely helpful to you as you deal with the fiscal year 2013 and 

future year budgets. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you both. And the ranking member and I 

both are going to work to—we cannot create that commission, and 

that is going to be out of our hands to some degree—but one of the 

things we would like to do is work to make sure we get both of you 

guys sitting at a table again so we can have these discussions, 

which I think may be beneficial. 
38 

And with that, thank you both for your service and for being 

here with us today. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 12, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 12, 2012 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 12, 2012 

(161) 
162 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 12, 2012 

(165) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

General LOWENBERG. House and Senate provisions sustaining FY12 funding, 

manpower and aircraft levels for the ANG for FY13 are essential to prevent irreversible damage to the Air National Guard. As the Subcommittee on Readiness 

knows, the House-passed FY2013 NDAA and the FY2013 NDAA reported by the 

Senate Armed Services Committee both reject Air National Guard force structure 

adjustments proposed in the Air Force FY13 budget request and authorize an additional $1.4 billion to cover the cost of deferring Air Force projected cost savings. 

These congressional actions are essential to preserve the Air National Guard’s domestic and global defense capabilities and are precisely what the nation’s Governors 

and other elected officials have requested of Congress—and continue to request— 

in light of the Air Force decision to terminate communication with the Council of 

Governors on PB13. 

Secretary Panetta’s June 22, 2012 commitment to congressional leaders affirming 

there will be no implementation of proposed FY13 force structure changes until further action by Congress and directing the Air Force ‘‘to suspend aircraft transfers 

and retirements previously scheduled for implementation in FY 2012’’ is also a welcome strategic pause, as is the Senate Armed Services Committee’s proposed Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. 

I agree with the Governors’ support of the Senate proposals and believe an informed assessment by an independent Commission on the Structure of the Air Force 

would be of immense assistance to Congress in unraveling current Air Force budget 

proposals and assuring a sustainable, objective and informed process for Air Force 

budget decisions in FY14 and beyond. 

As inferred in Chairman Forbes’ question, however, suspension of FY10, 11 and 

12 transfers will have an impact on previously approved force structure moves. I 

believe the objective, therefore, should be to preserve a ‘‘dynamic status quo’’ for 

previously announced FY10, 11 and 12 transactions while Congress develops and 

undertakes final action on its 2013 National Defense authorization and appropriations legislation. A dynamic status quo would permit continued implementation of 

the vast majority of uncontested FY2010, 11 and 12 transactions while suspending 

the much smaller number of contested transactions that would be difficult, costly 

or impossible to reverse. 

I affirm what I stated in my formal testimony: 

‘‘Not all pending and unexecuted FY2010, 2011 and 2012 Air Force and Air National Guard force structure changes are or should be points of contention between 

the Air Force and the several States and territories. Many pending actions are supported by all interested parties. With that in mind, Governors and Adjutants General agree that a process should be established to proceed with proposed FY2010, 

2011, 2012 (and future FY2013 and FY2014) transactions by concurrence of all affected parties while Congress studies the Air Force FY2013 and FY2014 budget proposals and awaits the collective review and recommendations of the Commission on 

the Structure of the Air Force. 

The Council of Governors therefore supports any as-yet-unexecuted FY2010, 

FY2011 or FY2012 Air National Guard force structure, mission or manpower 

changes that are approved by the Department of Defense, the Department of the 

Air Force, the National Guard Bureau and the Governor of each State affected by 

the proposed transaction. For example, the Council of Governors supports implementation of the proposed transfer of C–130s from the Tennessee Air National 

Guard to the Puerto Rico Air National Guard provided the transfer of equipment 

and all related arrangements are approved by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, Puerto Rico Governor 

Fortun ̃ o and Tennessee Governor Haslam. There are many other examples of 

uncontested Air Force and Air National Guard transactions and force structure proposals. Such matters can be coordinated with congressional staff and the concurrence of the Council of Governors and the Governors of all affected states can be 

documented in whatever manner is acceptable to Congress and all of the affected 

parties.’’ 
166 

A process like the one I’ve outlined herein would preserve a dynamic status quo 

and facilitate the timely transition from C–5As to C–17s/C–5Ms, previously planned 

retirements of older C–130s, and transfers of aircraft to backfill missions and aircraft retirements that are supported by all affected parties. [See page 35.] 

General MILLER. Although the Senate language only identified aircraft from the 

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, the inability to execute these transfers, 

divestments, or retirements from previous fiscal years has operational impacts 

across the Total Force. These impacts include preventing the Air National Guard 

from replacing aging C–5A and C–130E aircraft and driving the Air Force to maintain multiple weapon system configurations at a single location which delays the Air 

Force from capitalizing on maintenance efficiencies and reduced costs. These delays 

impact our military capability and readiness, while introducing uncertainty in future missions and training schedules for affected units and the associated Airmen 

and families. They will also delay the Air Force’s ability to reach the level of budget 

reductions mandated in the 2011 Budget Control Act. 

Absent funding provided for this purpose by the Congress for FY13, sustaining 

any restored force structure would inevitably impact readiness, increase the potential for a hollow force, and produce a corresponding ripple effect on the viability of 

the Air Force FY14 POM submission. The proposed Senate language affected 150 

aircraft transfers and 98 aircraft retirements programmed in Fiscal Years 2010, 

2011, and 2012. The current estimate to maintain those aircraft through FY13 is 

$255M. Based on guidance received from the Senate committees, we anticipate approval to move forward on 49 of the transfers and 58 of the retirements. The potential fiscal impact of sustaining the remaining retirements and transfers through fiscal year 2013 and the FYDP are still being analyzed. The current estimate for the 

restoral of all FY13 PB force structure actions is at least $8.7B across the FYDP. 

[See page 35.] 

General MILLER. Our assumptions for Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond are based 

upon the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget. If the Congress were to approve legislation which restores force structure reductions in the FY13 budget submission, we 

will make adjustments. If funded for one year, then depending on other events in 

our fiscal future (e.g. further Budget Control Act actions), we will have to address 

force structure funding on a year-by-year basis. [See page 36.] 

General LOWENBERG. I believe the counter proposal was rejected because it failed 

to address the governors’ primary concerns and offered nothing more than a stopgap measure for addressing shortfalls in state organic theater airlift capabilities. It 

left intact the Air Force sweep of fighter aircraft from less costly Air National Guard 

units to vastly more expensive active duty units and preserved disproportionate 

FY13 Air National Guard manpower cuts. It was also predicated on the Air Force 

planning assumption that the active force is ‘‘as small as it can ever possibly be’’— 

a core assessment that was outcome determinative throughout the Air Force FY13 

budget process—and would have given the nation a reduced air combat capability 

at a higher cost than proposals advanced by the governors. 

The 24 C–130s in the Secretary’s proposal were described in our previous discussions with the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force as the ‘‘newest of the 

oldest’’ C–130s in the Air Force inventory and Air Force leaders persisted in describing them as excess to Total Force requirements, were unable to identify funding 

sources for assuring their airworthiness and were unwilling to assure they would 

even propose funding them beyond FY13. 

In my view, the nation’s Governors and Adjutants General are committed to national security decisions that preserve maximum combat force structure and assure 

military surge capacity as well as global and homeland defense flexibility while 

America gets its economic house in order. In other words, I believe they’re dedicated 

to getting the greatest national defense ‘‘bang’’ for the taxpayers’ ‘‘buck’’ and they 

didn’t see those values reflected in the Air Force proposals. [See page 36.] 

General MILLER. Our assumptions for Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond are based 

upon the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget. If the Congress were to approve legislation which restores force structure reductions in the FY13 budget submission, we 

will make adjustments. If funded for one year, then depending on other events in 

our fiscal future (e.g. further Budget Control Act actions), we will have to address 

force structure funding on a year-by-year basis. [See page 36.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

General MILLER. The Air Force routinely reevaluates and refines its AC/RC mix 

using an institutionalized process known as the Total Force Enterprise Review Process. This process includes representatives of all Air Force components (Regular Air 
167 

Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard) in an enterprise-level appraisal 

of Air Force requirements and resources, which applies mission and organizational 

analysis to support senior leader decisions. Potential future Total Force mission contributions by each component are first analytically optimized with respect to five 

major factors: 1) total strategy-based war-fighting and training demand, 2) projected 

manpower resources, 3) projected equipment inventory, 4) cost, and 5) deployment 

policy. The resulting zero-sum AC/RC mix is further refined with Force Composition 

Analysis focused on discrete weapon systems and career fields. This refinement delivers insights regarding our ability to perform the mission with a range of AC/RC 

mixes, enabling Air Force leadership to choose from several reasonable Force Mix 

Options within individual mission areas. Senior leader guidance resulting from 

these choices then informs the Air Force Corporate Structure which in turn makes 

debated recommendations back to Air Force leaders for reallocation of funding, 

equipment, and manpower resources across the Total Force. [See page 35.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

General MILLER. With regard to the hangar facility question for Dobbins ARB, a 

multi-functional site survey will be accomplished to complete an in-depth and detailed plan to execute the basing action. However, our initial review of facilities requirements at Dobbins ARB indicates modifications to existing hangars can be accomplished without MILCON funding. [See page 21.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 12, 2012 

(171) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. In order to gain a better understanding regarding the level of communication and coordination that occurred between the Department of Defense and 

States’ governors, what inputs were requested by the Air Force and National Guard 

Bureau from the Council of Governors and the States’ Adjutant Generals prior to 

release of the FY13 President’s Budget? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Thank you for your inquiry regarding communications between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Council of Governors (Council) regarding the FY2013 budget proposal. Governors and our Adjutants General were 

not informed of the budget proposal and its disproportionate impact on the National 

Guard in advance of its public release in February 2012 (aircraft reductions) and 

March 2012 (manpower reductions). 

As commanders-in-chief of the National Guard, we were frustrated to read about 

the proposed reductions in the media. We understand and appreciate the need to 

reorganize and restructure the armed forces to meet new threats and realities. We 

were concerned, however, by the U.S. Air Force’s failure to consider the impact of 

such cuts on governors’ ability to rely on the National Guard during emergencies. 

The National Guard provides critical capabilities including communications, medical 

response and firefighting that are regularly utilized during emergencies across the 

country. Since the beginning of FY2012, governors have used the Guard in response 

to more than 130 events ranging from hurricanes to wildfires to critical infrastructure protection and explosives disposal. 

Mr. FORBES. As co-chairman of the Council of Governors, what impact to Homeland Security, Civil Support, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response would 

occur with the Air Force’s proposed reduction of 21 F–16 and 102 A–10 aircraft? 

Governor BRANSTAD. The Air Force’s proposed reduction of F–16 and A–10 aircraft would have stripped states not only of these aircraft but also the corresponding 

personnel and affiliated support capabilities such as communications and medical 

response. These capabilities have proven critical to our ability to respond to a wide 

variety of emergencies and would have a significant impact on state, regional and 

national preparedness. 

In many instances, these capabilities are incorporated into state emergency response plans that have been developed and coordinated with civilian emergency responders. Their unexpected loss would upend years of planning and deprive states 

of capabilities critical to saving lives and protecting the public. 

Mr. FORBES. How was the Council of Governors’ alternative proposal to the Air 

Force’s FY13 budget request developed and what are the key takeaways in your 

view of how the alternative proposal meets both Homeland and National Security 

requirements better than what the Air Force originally proposed? 

Governor BRANSTAD. Following the Council of Governors meeting with Secretary 

Panetta on February 27, 2012, my co-chair, Governor Chris Gregoire of Washington 

state, and I directed our Adjutants General (TAGs)—MG Tim Orr and MG Tim 

Lowenberg—to prepare an alternative Air National Guard budget concept that could 

be discussed with Air Force leaders as a way of initiating the requested negotiations. By close of business on March 1, 2012 (four days after the Council meeting), 

the TAGs had presented the budget concept to Air Force leaders through the National Guard Bureau. 

It is important to note that the budget concept was not our ideal solution because 

it included several assumptions that were not ideal for states, but that had been 

identified by the Air Force as necessary for any alternative proposal. In addition, 

the timeline did not allow for review by all states—a practice the Council prefers 

to observe for major negotiations. 

The Council’s budget concept was a comprehensive alternative that would have 

decreased operational risk by increasing surge capacity, preserving the experience 

and technical expertise of the Air National Guard at a greatly reduced life-cycle 

cost, and exceeded targeted savings. This alternative would have ensured a more 

balanced approach to reductions between the active forces and the Air National 

Guard and would have preserved the necessary personnel and aircraft to respond 

to domestic emergencies throughout the country. 
172 

In response to the Council’s budget concept, the Air Force proposed to retain 24 

C–130 aircraft in the Air National Guard—a proposal that was later affirmed by 

Secretary Panetta and included in the revised Air Force budget proposal submitted 

to Congress in April. While we appreciated the recognition of governors’ need for 

additional airlift capacity, this proposal failed to recognize the Air National Guard’s 

importance to our national defense and its ability to sustain military power and capabilities at a fraction of the cost to taxpayers. As Governor Gregoire and I articulated in the attached letter to Secretary Panetta dated April 27, 2012, the offer to 

retain 24 C–130 aircraft failed to address our concerns regarding the disproportionate impact on the Air National Guard, including the loss of manpower and fighter aircraft. 

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 161.] 

Mr. FORBES. The subcommittee understands that as a counter-proposal to the alternative proposal that the Council of Governors submitted to the Air Force, the 

Secretary of Defense chose to offer retiring 24 less C–130 aircraft to meet airlift 

needs of State governors. Why was the Secretary of Defense’s counter-proposal insufficient in the view of the Council, and how could have the counter-proposal been 

structured to an acceptable level? 

Governor BRANSTAD. As discussed in the response to the previous question, the 

proposal to retain additional C–130 aircraft fell short of addressing our concerns because it failed to leverage the Air National Guard’s cost-effectiveness and did not 

address our concerns regarding manpower and the loss of fighter aircraft. When the 

proposal was first offered by Air Force Secretary Donley and Air Force Chief of Staff 

General Schwartz in March, Governor Gregoire and I wrote to Air Force leadership 

regarding our lingering concerns. In that letter (attached) we proposed that the Air 

Force consider more cost-neutral options for cross-leveling or reallocating programmed aircraft operations from the active service to the Air National Guard. 

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. FORBES. What recommendations would you make to improve the future coordination and collaboration regarding discussions of budgetary, requirements and 

force structure issues between the Council of Governors and the Department of Defense? 

Governor BRANSTAD. The Council is currently discussing ways in which greater 

information can be shared between states and the Department of Defense (DOD) 

throughout the development of the annual budget. Governors do not want to be involved in the day-to-day operational decisions of the armed services. We do expect 

DOD to adhere to federal statute and previous agreements between the Council and 

DOD that require advance notice and opportunity for discussion with governors and 

their Adjutants General regarding proposed policy and budget matters affecting the 

National Guard. 

One item in particular that we have raised with Department and Air Force leadership is the Air Force’s use of non-disclosure agreements. The requirement that the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Air Guard sign nondisclosure agreements directly interferes with the National Guard Bureau Chief’s 

statutory role as the conduit of information between states and the federal government. Had critical budget information been shared and discussed with governors 

and our Adjutants General throughout the development of the FY2013 Air Force 

budget, many of the problems that arose this year could have been avoided. 

Mr. FORBES. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the effective 

use of the Guard and Reserves ‘‘will lower overall personnel and operating costs, 

better ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and 

effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active 

and Reserve components.’’ However, the force structure adjustments that the Air 

Force proposes increase the portion of force structure located within the Active Component under the new strategy. Given that this contradicts the 2010 QDR assessment of Guard and Reserve benefits, why is it that the Air Force chose to reorganize 

the force structure in this manner? 

General MILLER. The end of combat operations in Iraq and impending changes in 

Afghanistan along with changing fiscal circumstances made it prudent for the administration to reassess the U.S. defense strategy. That assessment produced new 

strategic guidance that transitions the defense enterprise from a predominant emphasis on the last decade’s conflicts, to one that rebalances the force for a broader 

spectrum of potential conflicts while advancing the important national security imperative of deficit reduction by significantly reducing defense spending. While the 

priorities of the new strategic guidance are similar to those of the 2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, a smaller Air Force, combined with likely demands on it in the new 

strategic environment, required a force structure realignment. 
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The Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget submission focused on those 

Air Force capabilities and forces which support the new strategic guidance. Our decisions were shaped in part by a decrease in planned resources relative to Fiscal 

Year 2012 as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011. Under these constraints, 

we produced an effective total force solution that supports the new strategic guidance and meets the requirements of the Budget Control Act. 

Mr. FORBES. The Senate Armed Services Committee is proposing language in its 

version of the FY13 NDAA that would effectively stop the transfer, divestment or 

retirement of all Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircraft not only in fiscal year 2013, but also in previous fiscal years 2010, 2011 and 2012. What impact 

would enactment of this language have on Guard and Reserve unit readiness across 

the country, as well as unit readiness of the Active Component? 

General MILLER. If Congress does not provided sufficient funding for FY13 to sustain the Air National Guard and Air Reserve aircraft identified for transfer, divestiture, or retirement in the current and prior fiscal years; the resulting shortfall will 

inevitably undermine the Total Air Force’s ability to sustain a restored force structure, impact readiness, increase the potential for a hollow force, and adversely affect 

the viability of the Air Force’s FY14 POM submission. 

There were 149 aircraft transfers and 103 aircraft retirements authorized and 

programmed in Fiscal Years 2010, 2011 and 2012. Based on guidance received from 

the Senate committees, the Secretary of Defense approved the Air Force to move forward on 49 transfers and 58 retirements. However, the Air Force was only able to 

complete 17 transfers and 39 retirements before the end of Fiscal Year 2012. The 

proposed Senate language stands to affect the remaining 132 aircraft transfers and 

64 aircraft retirements. The potential fiscal impact of sustaining the remaining retirements and transfers through Fiscal Year 2013 and the FYDP are still being analyzed. The current estimated cost to restore all FY13 PB force structure actions, including required sustainment and modernization costs, is at least $8.7B across the 

FYDP. 

Mr. FORBES. The subcommittee understands that as a counter-proposal to the alternative proposal that the Council of Governors submitted to the Air Force, the 

Secretary of Defense chose to offer retiring 24 fewer C–130 aircraft to meet airlift 

needs of State governors. How was the number of 24 C–130s derived and at which 

locations were those aircraft going to remain? 

General MILLER. Based on consistent concerns expressed by individual Governors 

over time regarding lift for civil support and disaster response, and the Air Force’s 

desire to provide force structure to meet state missions, one option presented to the 

Council of Governors’ representatives would have restored 24 C–130 aircraft in 3 

ANG squadrons. In the absence of fully-articulated Title 32 airlift requirements, the 

number of aircraft was chosen with a view toward supporting a more even potential 

required distribution of airlift assets across the U.S. As such, there were no specific 

locations associated with the aircraft. Had the Council of Governors accepted our 

proposal, we would have sourced the aircraft from those planned for retirement, and 

worked with the Air National Guard to identify where they would have been assigned. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the comparable O&M (flying hour) costs and differences 

in expected service life if aircraft are operated and maintained by the Reserve Component versus the Active Component? 

General MILLER. Based upon the Air Force Total Ownership Cost System 

(AFTOC) data for FY11, the reserve component average hours per assigned aircraft 

was 57% of the active component (varies depending upon the aircraft). The reserve 

component cost per assigned aircraft (part time pay and benefits with fewer hours 

per tail) was 61% of the active (also varies depending on the aircraft). The reserve 

component mostly flies for training while the active has training plus a much heavier operational workload. Absent prudent management, and given the hours per assigned aircraft differential, the aircraft assigned to the active component would 

reach the end of service life sooner (1.8 times sooner assuming the aircraft is active 

from the time of receipt to retirement). Aircraft are generally rotated between units 

to even out expected life across each fleet. 
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Mr. FORBES. A baseline rationale that is heard many times for maintaining more 

force structure in the Reserve Component than the Active Component is because the 

Reserve Component is more cost-effective than the Active Component. Do you agree 

that the Reserve Component is more cost-effective than the Active Component? How 

does steady-state operational tempo factor into the cost-effectiveness of the Reserve 

Component and how did operational tempo factor into the Air Force decision to increase force structure in the Active Component? 

General MILLER. While the Reserve Component may be cost-effective in certain 

situations, it is imperative to consider all relevant factors that work together to ensure the Total Air Force is capable of fulfilling its mission of defending the nation 

over time. As the Air Force was driven to consider significant reductions in FY13, 

we carefully considered the forces assigned to the Active and Reserve Components 

and made choices that ensured the Total Force could fulfill the Air Force’s wartime 

surge requirements as directed in the force sizing construct of the new strategic 

guidance. Our priorities include maintaining the balance between Active and Reserve Components required to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at deployment rates and personnel tempos that are sustainable for both the Active and Reserve Components; making sure the Active Component retains the recruiting, training, and operational seasoning base required to sustain the Active Air Force, Air 

National Guard, and Air Force Reserve into the future; and ensuring the Reserve 

Component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving missions. 

Projected operational tempo was, as it must be, factored into Air Force decisions 

on force structure. The Secretary of Defense‘s deploy-to-dwell goal is to ensure active 

duty forces deploy at a rate of no more than 1:2 (for example, 6 months deployed 

followed by 12 months at home base) and the reserve components mobilize (ANG 

and the Air Force Reserve) no more than 1:5. An active-reserve balance that requires either routine active duty deployment above the policy guideline, or involuntary mobilization of the reserve forces to avoid over-use of active forces, would add 

further stress on the total force and indicate that the Air Force does not have the 

proper balance. 

Mr. FORBES. We understand that the Air National Guard operates 16 of 18 Aerospace Control Alert sites and that by 2013, retirements of F–16 aircraft will affect 

10 of 18 Aerospace Control Alert sites. What plans are in place to replace the retiring force structure for all of the Air National Guard’s Aerospace Control Alert sites? 

General MILLER. The Air Force is not retiring any force structure as a result of 

FY13 PB actions that would impact Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) sites. Furthermore, retirements of F–16 aircraft will not affect ACA sites as the retiring F–16s 

are not qualified to accomplish ACA missions. 

For the FY13 PB, NORAD is removing only the 24-hour ACA requirement at two 

locations—Duluth, MN and Langley, VA. Subsequently, the Air Force is changing 

the status of 128 Air National Guard military personnel authorizations from full 

time to part time Drill Status Guardsmen (DSGs). The number of aircraft and manpower authorizations will remain the same. NORAD still retains the authority to 

conduct ACA operations with these units at these and other locations should na-
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tional security threats elevate and higher levels of readiness are implemented by 

the NORAD Commander. 

Mr. FORBES. What additional funds, if any, are needed in fiscal year 2013 and beyond to improve the equipment readiness of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Component units that do not currently meet standards? 

General MILLER. As part of the Total Air Force, the Air Reserve Components are 

funded at the same readiness level as the regular Air Force. The Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve face known and validated equipment readiness shortfalls, as identified in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. These 

shortfalls are $2.8B for the Air National Guard and $2.2B for the Air Force Reserves. While we carefully manage the cost of keeping Air Force equipment ready, 

the combination of cost growth in the defense sector, fiscal pressures and ongoing 

operations lead us to project increasing equipment readiness shortfalls. 

Mr. FORBES. Leadership within the National Guard professes that for only 6 percent of the Air Force’s budget, the Air National Guard provides 35 percent of the 

Air Force’s force structure capability. Does the Air Force agree or disagree? If the 

Air Force disagrees, what does the Air Force believe the percentages to be and how 

does the Air Force derive the percentage calculations? 

General MILLER. The Air National Guard’s assertion they account for 6 percent 

of the cost and contribute 35 percent of the capability of the Air Force is based on 

factors involving accounting for the resources required to support the Air National 

Guard, characterizations of the total Air Force budget, and an interpretation of ownership of airframes is the same as ‘‘percent of capability’’ with which there is not 

total agreement. 

More specifically: The Air Force’s ‘‘Total Obligation Authority (TOA),’’ is the 

amount of funds the Air Force has the authority to obligate throughout the life of 

the appropriation. The entire Air Force budget is comprised of what is commonly 

called ‘‘blue’’ and ‘‘non-blue’’ TOA: the former is those resources under direct Air 

Force management (Blue) and the latter, those managed by other organizations 

(Non-Blue). Blue TOA includes both baseline and (at varying levels over the past 

decade) overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding, which can be blue or nonblue. Non-blue TOA is nondiscretionary and the Air Force has no control over it. 

For an apples-to-apples comparison of Air Force and Air National Guard operations funding, the most accurate standard for comparison is the ‘‘blue’’ baseline— 

i.e., the only resources the Air Force can allocate. Within those resources, the active 

Air Force budget bears the full cost of research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement (the National Guard does not, although the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account as a separate appropriation does develop and procure specific types of equipment). Both components benefit from 

RDT&E and procurement, and the Air National Guard does not pay, so they are 

appropriate to remove from the operating cost baseline. When RDT&E and procurement are factored out as to compare operating costs fairly, for the Air Force FY13 

baseline budget of $110.1 billion; the ‘‘denominator’’ for comparison drops to $74.3 

billion. Hence, the Air National Guard’s total operations & maintenance (O&M) and 

military personnel funding of $9.1 billion represents about 12.2%, not 6%, of the Air 

Force’s real operating costs. (Note: an additional $267 million in Air National Guard 

MILCON and Medicare comprise an additional 0.4 percent of the baseline budget). 

With regard to the ‘‘capability’’ half of the ANG assertion, the Air National Guard 

does comprise roughly 35 percent of the Air Force’s total force structure for tactical 

airlift and aerial refueling—but the ANG represents a smaller percentage in other 

weapon systems, and a far smaller percentage than 35% in other areas such as nuclear deterrence, space operations and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. 

In addition, even in those cases where the Air National Guard possesses 35% of the 

airframes of a particular type, the capability possessed is only equal to that same 

percentage when the aircraft are fully deployed. In that case, the operational cost 

is the same for ANG and active forces. But it is important to note that under 

‘‘steady state’’ deployment policy, Guardsmen deploy at a maximum 1:5 deploy-todwell ratio, as compared to a 1:2 for active forces. Thus, in conditions short of full 

mobilization, Guard force structure can only be used at less than half the rate active 

duty force structure can be used—so it does not consistently provide 35% of the capability of the Air Force. 

In summary, Air National Guard more accurately accounts for 12.2% of the ‘‘operating cost’’ of the Air Force, and the ‘‘35% of capability’’ asserted is only true for 

a part of the Air Force’s fleet, and not always true when it comes to operational 

deployment capability. Comparisons between components must be very precisely 

stated if they are to be useful, and this assertion oversimplifies and overstates a 

very complex cost/capability mix. The Air Force continues to value and depend on 
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the inherent synergy of the Total Force Enterprise and is committed maximizing the 

contributions of all components to the Air Force’s value to the nation. 

Mr. FORBES. Assume that the Department of the Air Force is tasked to fill a 6- 

month OCONUS deployment to an austere location, which already has in-place infrastructure, with capabilities and required personnel associated with 6 C–5s, 25 C– 

130s, 20 KC–135s, 10 C–17s, 54 F–16s and 24 A–10s. Based on concepts of operation and employment used over the past 10 years, how much would it cost the Active Component only to fulfill the deployment for 6 months? How much would it cost 

to fulfill the deployment with Reserve Component forces only? Please break down 

costs and assumptions into specific categories that are used to derive the total cost 

for each component. 

General MILLER. There is no significant difference in the cost to deploy Active 

Component (AC) versus Reserve Component (RC) aircraft. Additionally, AC and RC 

members of the same rank and seniority are paid at the same rates when deployed 

(i.e. serving on active duty). Therefore, assuming typical a six-month deployment is 

covered by AC or RC members who all deploy for the full 6 months, the cost of any 

AC-only deployment is equal to or less than the cost of any like mission RC-only 

deployment, because RC members are typically more senior and therefore cost more 

than AC members; and the RC member may incur pre- and post-deployment mobilization time that, while necessary, does not directly fulfill the deployment tasking. 

Based on concepts of operation and employment over the past 10 years, wherein RC 

members have typically deployed for shorter periods than AC members, an RC deployment includes an additional cost to overlap multiple RC members to fill one deployed billet. For example, when RC members deploy 30 days at a time, the cost 

of each deployed day remains the same, and the cost of overlap days in theater and 

of pre- and post-deployment days at home is multiplied by 6, to account for the 6 

RC members needed to fill the same 180 days filled by a single AC member. 

Mr. FORBES. The subcommittee understands that the Air Force budget officers a 

steady-state requirement for overseas combat air forces (CAF) in the post-surge 

FY13–17 period that is 42% higher than the greatest number of CAF needed in simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 68% higher than the 

number of CAF aircraft currently deployed overseas. How did Active Duty budget 

officers derive this increased requirement and what are the planning assumptions 

being used to determine steady-state requirements post-surge for both CAF and mobility air forces. 

General MILLER. The planning assumptions being used to determine steady-state 

post-surge demand for the joint forces, including CAF and mobility forces are derived from Department of Defense strategic guidance and the associated joint planning scenarios developed by the department, led by OSD Policy, the Joint Staff, and 

OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation for the purpose of joint force sizing. 

The Combatant Commands (COCOMs), Services and the National Guard Bureau 

participate in the development and the coordination of these joint scenarios. 

The 5 January strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 

for 21st Century Defense, provides the basic force sizing guidance: ‘‘The overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirement that the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat 

aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the 

homeland and support civil authorities.’’ This includes the ability to conduct a largescale combined arms campaign in one region while also being capable of denying 

the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in 

a second region. The annual classified Defense Planning Guidance signed by the 

SECDEF provides details on the specific scenario combinations to be used for force 

sizing to meet the strategic guidance. These mid-term (2018) scenarios are informed 

by current Operations Plans and current force rotations, as well as future projected 

threat changes and inputs from the COCOMs on future projected presence requirements. The post-surge numbers in the question come from those joint scenarios developed by OSD policy, using concepts of operations and forces developed and approved by the Joint Staff, and do not reflect independent estimates by U.S. Air 

Force budget officers. 

In addition, the post-surge numbers used to inform the FY13 President’s Budget 

do not exceed the ‘‘greatest number of CAF needed in simultaneous operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.’’ According to the U.S. Air Forces Central (then USCENTAF) 

classified report on OIF, Operation IRAQI Freedom—by the Numbers, 30 April 

2003, the CAF fighter numbers deployed in support of OIF alone greatly exceeded 

the numbers used to inform FY13 President’s Budget. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the ideal ratio between Active and Reserve Component force 

structure for combat, mobility and ISR forces to meet the operational tempo and re-
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quirements of the new defense strategic guidance, and how was the ratio modeled 

and validated? 

General MILLER. There is no single ratio that describes an ideal mix of active and 

reserve component forces; rather, the ratio is the result of many factors and the Air 

Force has directed significant effort over the past several years to building and improving a transparent process to re-examine missions as circumstances change. Accordingly, the Air Force routinely reevaluates and refines its Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix using an institutionalized process known as the Total 

Force Enterprise Review Process. This process includes representatives of all Air 

Force components (Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard) 

in an enterprise-level appraisal of Air Force requirements and resources, which applies mission and organizational analysis to support senior leader decisions. Potential future Total Force mission contributions by each component are first analytically optimized with respect to five major factors: 1) total strategy-based war-fight 

and training demand, 2) required manpower, 3) projected equipment inventory, 4) 

cost, and 5) deployment policy. The resulting zero-sum AC/RC mix is further refined 

with Force Composition Analysis focused on discrete weapon systems and career 

fields. 

This refinement delivers insights regarding mission feasibility across a range of 

AC/RC mixes, enabling Air Force leadership to choose from several reasonable Force 

Mix Options within individual mission areas. The resulting senior leader decisions 

are then considered within the Air Force’s resource allocation decision-making process, and put in a prioritized context using similar analysis of the appropriate AC/ 

RC ratio for combat, mobility, ISR and all other Air Force mission areas. 

Mr. FORBES. For the FY14 Air Force budget development, is the Air Force using 

the same collaboration and coordination techniques that were used during the FY13 

budget process as it relates to restricted information sharing and the use of nondisclosure agreements? 

General MILLER. During the development of the FY13 budget proposal, the Air 

National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, participated 

in all aspects of resource decision-making. For the FY14 budget development, the 

Air Force is operating under long-standing DOD guidance for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System, which keeps restricted and predecisional information protected, but allows coordination with properly cleared, responsible parties. 

Mr. FORBES. During the FY13 budget building process, and currently during the 

FY14 budget building process, how many Air Force, Air National Guard and Air 

Force Reserve personnel were required to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), 

and which specific offices within each of those organizations were required to sign 

NDAs? 

General MILLER. Those individuals who participated in the Air Force Corporate 

Structure (budget preparation and deliberation) process or required access to the Air 

Force budget information were required to sign non-disclosure agreements, and the 

number of non-disclosure agreements was not centrally tracked; no specific organizations were required to sign. The use of the non-disclosure agreements in the FY13 

budget process was in response to a number of factors unique to the circumstances. 

The Air Force coordinated fully with the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and 

Chief, National Guard Bureau. For the FY14 budget development, the Air Force is 

operating under long-standing DOD guidance for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System, which keeps restricted and pre-decisional information 

protected, but allows coordination with properly cleared, responsible parties. 

Mr. FORBES. What additional funds, if any, are needed in fiscal year 2013 and beyond to improve the equipment readiness of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Component units that do not currently meet standards? 

General LOWENBERG. As part of the Total Air Force, the Air Reserve Components 

are supposed to be funded at the same readiness level as the regular Air Force. The 

same shortfalls in equipment readiness should therefore exist across all Air Force 

components. For the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, unmet equipment 

readiness needs have been communicated to Congress via the annual National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. The current report identifies a $2.8B shortfall for the Air National Guard and a $2.2B shortfall for the Air Force Reserve. 

Additionally, $9.7B in Air Reserve Components modernization capabilities were 

validated by subject matter experts at the most recent annual Weapons and Tactics 

Conference forum. This forum identifies equipment requirements in an open and 

rigorous exchange among warfighters who are experts in their respective weapons 

systems. The capabilities requirements validated in this forum are translated into 

specific programs for which commercial or government off-the-shelf (GOTS) equipment is available and requires only non-developmental integration into a weapons 
178 

system. The requirements validation process includes C2, cyber, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), training, and simulator systems as well as weapons 

delivery, airlift, and tanker platforms. These capabilities and associated programs 

are documented in the annual Weapons Systems Modernization Requirements Book. 

The National Guard and Reserves Equipment Account (NGREA) has been essential in maintaining the operational capabilities of both Air Reserve components. 

The Air National Guard also uniquely provides non-Federalized air reserve component forces for national defense and homeland defense missions. To identify requirements for these constitutionally unique missions, National Guard subject-matter experts from all 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia enter into 

an equally open and rigorous analysis of mission requirements in an annual Joint 

Domestic Operations Equipment Requirements (JDOERS) conference. 

This year’s Air and Army National Guard JDOERS conference involved more than 

500 military and civilian subject matter experts from all 54 states and territories, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions and Emergency Support 

Functions (ESFs), as well as Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard 

(ANG) Readiness Center staffs. The conference defined, validated and documented 

ANG, ARNG and joint capability shortfalls for domestic operations based on the 

vast pool of experience and boots-on-the-ground understanding of domestic missions 

at all levels—local, state, regional and multi-state. In the course of the conference, 

work groups addressed equipment requirements in all of the Emergency Support 

Functions (ESFs) in the National Response Framework (NRF). 

The JDOERs process, including the annual conference and its 2012 DJOERS 

Equipment Requirements book, has catalogued domestic operations equipment 

shortfalls in each Emergency Support Function (ESF) totaling more than $486M for 

the Air National Guard. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. The House has made clear that they are uneasy with the FY13 

Force Structure Adjustment reductions and SASC NDAA language requests a pause 

on USAF force structure changes until the proposed ‘‘commission’’ submits its report 

to Congress on 3/31/2013. The SASC bill also ‘‘strongly encourages’’ the Secretary 

to suspend other, non-aircraft force structure adjustments, but does not prohibit it. 

The non-iron changes were made to pay for the iron movement. If that iron movement is not happening, does Air Force plan to reevaluate the Force Structure Adjustments with regards to personel decreases such as those at the CRTCs and AOGs 

around the Nation? 

General MILLER. The Air Force’s current planning premise, given the timelines required for budget planning, is that the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget and 

force structure changes from previous fiscal years will be approved. As it does every 

year, the Air Force will evaluate the impact of actions taken by the Congress as it 

formulates future plans and programs, including with regard to personnel changes. 

We anticipate making the necessary adjustments when we receive new guidance or 

enactment of the FY13 budget. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. While the other services are shifting resources to the Guard and Reserve in order to preserve capability at lower cost, the Air Force in its proposed force 

structure changes is actually shifting capability to the Active Component at the expense of the Guard and Reserve. Given the fact that General Dempsey has indicated 

we are going to be transitioning from a deployed force to a garrison force for the 

first time in over a decade, what is the justification to rebalance, particularly the 

tactical airlift forces, towards the Active Component? 

General MILLER. The new DOD Strategic Guidance ‘‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense’’ directs the services to build a force that 

will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. The Chairman’s statement characterizes DOD’s force in general, but the demand for USAF assets—similar to the ten years of elevated-tempo air operations in Southeast Asia 

which followed Desert Storm in 1991—are highly unlikely to decrease as much or 

as fast as they will for the ground forces. To deliver the capabilities likely to be required under this guidance, and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force 

made difficult choices in all service core functions. 

With regard to the decision to rebalance the tactical airlift forces, Case 3 of the 

Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, previously conducted by OSD 

CAPE and USTRANSCOM, calls for 270 tactical airlift support aircraft. This anal-
179 

ysis closely mirrors the new strategic guidance. The reduced tactical airlift requirement permitted divestiture of 65 older C–130H aircraft. Previous reductions in force 

structure shifted the Total Force ratio significantly toward Reserve Component 

forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President’s Budget request rebalanced 

that ratio to create a more sustainable force structure over the long term. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between the Active and Reserve Components is 

critical to sustaining Air Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and 

high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. 

Mrs. ROBY. General Swartz recently stated that the Air Force has determined 

that they could not sustain further Active Component cuts without jeopardizing the 

collective ability of the total force to support our Nation’s strategic interests. Since 

we are now out of Iraq and projected to reduce forces/remove forces from Afghanistan, what other conflicts or activities do you see on the horizon that will drive the 

Air Force to maintain the type of operational tempo we’ve seen, and that I may add 

has been successfully provided, by the current Active/Reserve Component mix? 

General MILLER. Despite the best analysis and projections of national security experts, the time and place of the next contingency are never certain and rarely what 

we expect. The 21st Century continues to be a period of extreme volatility due to 

the spread of advanced technologies, social change, and global economic stress. Facilitated by worldwide connectivity, capabilities that traditionally belonged exclusively to developed nations are now available to rising powers, rogue states, malicious groups, and even individuals with internet access—enabling those with ill intent to increasingly challenge our interests. 

Our force structure and Active to Reserve Component (AC/RC) ratios are not solely based on current or near-term operational conditions (e.g., reduction/removal of 

forces in Afghanistan), but primarily by future planning scenarios. The new Defense 

Strategic Guidance (DSG) and its defense planning scenarios create the future constructs in which our forces will be required to operate and perform. To that end, 

the evolving strategic environment, particularly in the Pacific and the Middle East, 

continues to affect the combatant commander ‘‘demand signals’’ for Air Force capabilities. By all indications, the demands on the Air Force—as a smaller, ready force 

provider—will remain constant or increase, not decrease, over the next decade. 

On top of previous years’ force reductions, the Air Force’s FY13 President’s Budget (FY13 PB) request made hard strategic choices, aligned with the DSG, that will 

yield the Air Force’s smallest total aircraft inventory in our history, and provide the 

minimum required force capability and capacity to meet the DSG’s force planning 

construct and scenarios. The analytical process used to derive the proposed FY13 

PB force levels focused on a multitude of factors, including combatant commander 

requirements for surge and post-surge (rotational forces), weapons system inventories, manpower, force policy such as deployment-to-dwell ratios, and cost. A constant or increased ‘‘demand signal’’ combined with a fiscally reduced Air Force force 

structure necessitates the proposed changes to the current AC/RC mix. 

Mrs. ROBY. The Guard and Reserve have been a particularly cost-effective way 

to provide capability. In a period where cost is and will continue to be a major factor, why would the Air Force reduce some of its most cost-effective force providers, 

and place that capability in the more expensive Active Component? 

General MILLER. As the Air Force was driven to consider reductions in FY13, we 

carefully considered the demand on, and capabilities/capacity of the Active and Reserve Components and made choices that ensured the Total Force could fulfill the 

Air Force’s surge requirements as directed by the force sizing construct of the new 

strategic guidance. We maintained the balance between Active and Reserve Components required to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at deployment rates and 

personnel tempos that are sustainable for both the Active and Reserve Components; 

made sure the Active Component retained the recruiting, training, and operational 

seasoning base required to sustain the Active Air Force, Air National Guard, and 

Air Force Reserve into the future; and ensured the Reserve Component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving missions. 

Previous reductions in force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve 

Component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President’s Budget request 

balanced reductions across the AF to create a more sustainable force structure over 

the long term. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between the Active and 

Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. 

Mrs. ROBY. With the recent support of the Council of Governors, the Guard is supposed to get 24 C–130s added back. Where will those aircraft come from and where 

will they be assigned? 

General MILLER. No final decisions have been made on the disposition of these 

24 aircraft. Based on the new strategic guidance and what and where we believe 
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future demand will be we are seeking a Total Force answer to the stationing of 

these aircraft. As always the Air Reserve Components, the Chief, National Guard 

Bureau, and the Combatant Commands will have input as to their priorities and 

requirements that may affect the final decision. 

Mrs. ROBY. Previously it was determined associations would work best on Active 

Component bases, where service members would have access to needed services like 

personnel, finance, base housing, etc. Yet many of the new associations proposed in 

the force structure announcement will be at Guard/Reserve bases, where those services are lacking, some without any nearby bases. Why are you going forward with 

associations at those locations and not at Maxwell? 

General MILLER. The Air Force routinely reevaluates and refines its Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix and its associations using an institutionalized process known as the Total Force Enterprise Review Process. This process includes representatives of all Air Force components (Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard) in an enterprise-level appraisal of Air Force requirements and resources, which applies mission and organizational analysis to support 

senior leader decisions. As part of this process, the major commands sponsor association constructs which are established after careful Air Force Corporate Structure 

evaluation and funding. Associations that assign full-time Regular Air Force manpower to Guard/Reserve bases capitalize on the availability of aircraft and other 

Guard/Reserve resources. Where these associations are established without a nearby 

active component base, it is because the cost/benefit analysis has shown that the 

mission benefits outweigh the lack of traditional services. 

Mrs. ROBY. The Air Force is making the assumption that the ops tempo for C– 

130s will remain high as a justification for rebalancing towards a more Active Duty 

centered force. Yet the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the other service chiefs 

are discussing how to adjust to being a force in-garrison as we’re out of Iraq and 

expect activity to come down in Afghanistan. What factors/actions are behind the 

assumptions that particularly the C–130 ops tempo will remain high/critically high? 

General MILLER. Our aircraft force structure and active duty to Air Reserve Component (ARC) aircraft ratios are not based on current or near-term operational conditions (e.g., decrease in activity following the end of operations in Afghanistan). Instead, they are driven primarily by future planning scenarios. The new Defense 

Strategic Guidance and related defense planning scenarios create the future employment constructs in which our forces will be expected to operate and perform. They 

shape the Air Force force structure and corresponding ratios between active duty 

and ARC. These scenarios allow the Department to determine the capabilities and 

quantities of aircraft necessary to support combatant commanders in these future 

operations. The C–130 intra-theater aircraft requirements and the ratio of these aircraft are derived, through analysis of these scenarios, to provide the necessary force 

structure for future operations. In addition, while the Chairman’s remarks describe 

the overall trend for DOD’s forces, the last several decades of Air Force history suggest that meeting combatant commander and other demands for airpower will remain significant for the USAF. 

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