8894 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 39 / Wednesday, February 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

financial instruments (including bonds, 

shares of stock and notes of 

indebtedness), jewelry, heirlooms and 

other articles of obvious sentimental 

value, to be held in trust for the legal 

claimant(s). 

(c) After receipt of a personal estate, 

the Department may seek payment of all 

outstanding debts to the estate as they 

become due, may receive any balances 

due on such estate, may endorse all 

checks, bills of exchange, promissory 

notes, and other instruments of 

indebtedness payable to the estate for 

the benefit thereof, and may take such 

other action as is reasonably necessary 

for the conservation of the estate. 

§ 72.26 Vesting of personal estate in 

United States. 

(a) If no claimant with a legal right to 

the personal estate comes forward 

within the period of five fiscal years 

beginning on October 1 after the 

consular officer took possession of the 

personal estate, title to the personal 

estate shall be conveyed to the United 

States, the property in the estate shall be 

under the custody of the Department, 

and the Department may dispose of the 

estate under as if it were surplus United 

States Government-owned property 

under title II of the Federal Property and 

Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 

U.S.C. 4811 et seq. or by such means as 

may be appropriate as determined by 

Department in its discretion in light of 

the nature and value of the property 

involved. The expenses of sales shall be 

paid from the estate, and any lawful 

claim received thereafter shall be 

payable to the extent of the value of the 

net proceeds of the estate as a refund 

from the appropriate Treasury 

appropriations account. 

(b) The net cash estate shall be 

transferred to the miscellaneous receipts 

account of the Treasury of the United 

States. 

§ 72.27 Export of cultural property; 

handling other property when export, 

possession, or import may be illegal. 

(a) A consular officer should not ship, 

or assist in the shipping, of any 

archeological, ethnological, or cultural 

property, as defined in 19 U.S.C. 2601, 

that the consular officer is aware is part 

of the personal estate of a United States 

citizen or non-citizen national to the 

United States in order to avoid conflict 

with laws prohibiting or conditioning 

such export. 

(b) A consular officer may refuse to 

ship, or assist in the shipping, of any 

property that is part of the personal 

estate of a United States citizen or noncitizen national if the consular officer 

has reason to believe that possession or 

shipment of the property would be 

illegal. 

§ 72.28 Claims for lost, stolen, or 

destroyed personal estate. 

(a) The legal representative of the 

estate of a decreased United States 

citizen or national may submit a claim 

to the Secretary of State for any personal 

property of the estate with respect to 

which a consular officer acted as 

provisional conservator, and that was 

lost, stolen, or destroyed while in the 

custody of officers or employees of the 

Department of State. Any such claim 

should be submitted to the Office of 

Legal Adviser, Department of State, in 

the manner prescribed by 28 CFR part 

14 and will be processed in the same 

manner as claims made pursuant to 22 

U.S.C. 2669–1 and 2669 (f). 

(b) Any compensation paid to the 

estate shall be in lieu of the personal 

liability of officers or employees of the 

Department to the estate. 

(c) The Department nonetheless may 

hold an officer or employee of the 

Department liability to the Department 

to the extent of any compensation 

provided to the estate. The liability of 

the officer or employee shall be 

determined pursuant to the 

Department’s procedures for 

determining accountability for United 

States government property. 

Real Property Overseas Belonging to a 

Decreased United States Citizen or 

National 

§ 72.29 Real property overseas belonging 

to deceased United States citizen or 

national. 

(a) If a consular officer becomes aware 

that the estate of a deceased United 

States citizen or national includes an 

interest in real property located within 

the consular officer’s district that will 

not pass to any person or entity under 

the applicable local laws of intestate 

succession or testamentary disposition, 

and if local law provides that title may 

be conveyed to the Government of the 

United States, the consular officer 

should notify the Department. 

(b) If the Department decides that it 

wishes to retain the property for its use, 

the Department will instruct the 

consular officer to take steps necessary 

to provide for title to the property to be 

conveyed to the Government of the 

United States. 

(c) If title to the real estate is 

conveyed to the Government of the 

Unites States and the property is of use 

to the Department of State, the 

Department may treat such property as 

if it were an unconditional gift accepted 

on behalf of the Department of State 

under section 25 of the State 

Department Basic Authorities Act (22 

U.S.C. 2697) and section 9(a)(3) of the 

Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926 

(22 U.S.C. 300(a)(3)). 

(d) If the Department of State does not 

wish to retain such real property the 

Department may treat it as foreign 

excess property under title IV of the 

Federal Property and Administrative 

Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 511 et 

seq.). 

§ 72.30 Provisions in a will or advanced 

directive regarding disposition of remains. 

United States state law regarding 

advance directives, deaths and estates 

include provisions regarding a person’s 

right to direct disposition of remains. 

Host country law may or may not accept 

such directions, particularly if the 

surviving spouse/next-of-kin disagree 

with the wishes of the testator/affiant. 

Fees 

§ 72.31 Fees for consular death and 

estates services. 

(a) Fees for consular death and estates 

services are prescribed in the Schedule 

of Fees, 22 CFR 22.1. 

(b) The personal estates of all officers 

and employees of the United States who 

die abroad while on official duty, 

including military and civilian 

personnel of the Department of Defense 

and the United States Coast Guard are 

exempt from the assessment of any fees 

proscribed by the Schedule of Fees. 

Dated: January 26, 2007. 

Maura A. Harty, 

Assistant Secretary Consular Affairs, 

Department of State. 

[FR Doc. 07–889 Filed 2–27–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710–06–M 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

28 CFR Part 72 

[Docket No. OAG 117; A.G. Order No. 2868–

2007] 

RIN 1105–AB22 

Office of the Attorney General; 

Applicability of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act 

AGENCY: Department of Justice. 

ACTION: Interim rule with request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice is 

publishing this interim rule to specify 

that the requirements of the Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification 

Act, title I of Public Law 109–248, apply 

to sex offenders convicted of the offense 

for which registration is required before 

the enactment of that Act. These 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 39 / Wednesday, February 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 8895 

requirements include registration by a 

sex offender in each jurisdiction in 

which the sex offender resides, is an 

employee, or is a student. The Attorney 

General has the authority to make this 

specification pursuant to sections 112(b) 

and 113(d) of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act. 

DATES: Effective Date: This interim rule 

is effective February 28, 2007. 

Comment Date: Comments must be 

received by April 30, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to 

David J. Karp, Senior Counsel, Office of 

Legal Policy, Room 4509, Main Justice 

Building, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, 

NW., Washington, DC 20530. To ensure 

proper handling, please reference OAG 

Docket No. 117 on your correspondence. 

You may view an electronic version of 

this interim rule at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. You may also 

comment via the Internet to the Justice 

Department’s Office of Legal Policy 

(OLP) at olpregs@usdoj.gov or by using 

the www.regulations.gov comment form 

for this regulation. When submitting 

comments electronically you must 

include OAG Docket No. 117 in the 

subject box. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Laura L. Rogers, Director, Office of Sex 

Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 

Apprehending, Registering, and 

Tracking; Office of Justice Programs, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, 202 514–4689. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Since the 

enactment of the Jacob Wetterling 

Crimes Against Children and Sexually 

Violent Offender Registration Act (42 

U.S.C. 14071) in 1994, there have been 

national standards for sex offender 

registration and notification in the 

United States. All states currently have 

sex offender registration and 

notification programs and have 

endeavored to implement the Wetterling 

Act standards in their existing 

programs. 

Title I of the Adam Walsh Child 

Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Pub. 

L. 109–248), the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act 

(SORNA), contains a comprehensive 

revision of the national standards for 

sex offender registration and 

notification. The SORNA reforms are 

generally designed to strengthen and 

increase the effectiveness of sex 

offender registration and notification for 

the protection of the public, and to 

eliminate potential gaps and loopholes 

under the pre-existing standards by 

means of which sex offenders could 

attempt to evade registration 

requirements or the consequences of 

registration violations. Broadly 

speaking, the SORNA requirements are 

of two sorts: 

First, SORNA directly imposes 

registration obligations on sex offenders 

as a matter of federal law and provides 

for federal enforcement of these 

obligations under circumstances 

supporting federal jurisdiction. These 

obligations include registration, and 

keeping the registration current, in each 

jurisdiction in which a sex offender 

resides, is an employee, or is a student, 

with related provisions concerning such 

matters as the time for registration, the 

information to be provided by the 

registrant, and keeping the information 

up to date. See 42 U.S.C. 16913–16917, 

enacted by SORNA §§ 113–17. 

The enforcement mechanisms for 

these registration obligations include 

requirements that the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons and federal probation offices 

inform offenders released from federal 

custody or sentenced to probation who 

are required to register under SORNA 

that they must comply with SORNA’s 

requirements, as well as requirements 

that these federal agencies notify state 

and local authorities concerning the 

release of such offenders to their areas. 

See 18 U.S.C. 4042(c), as amended by 

SORNA § 141(f)–(h). Federal offenders 

subject to SORNA are also obligated to 

comply with its requirements as 

mandatory conditions of their 

supervision. See 18 U.S.C. 3563(a)(8), 

3583(d), 4209(a), as amended by 

SORNA § 141(d)–(e), (j). More broadly, 

18 U.S.C. 2250, enacted by section 

141(a) of SORNA, creates federal 

criminal liability for any person 

required to register under SORNA if: (i) 

the registration requirement is based on 

a conviction under federal, District of 

Columbia, Indian tribal, or U.S. 

territorial law, or the person travels in 

interstate or foreign commerce or enters 

or leaves or resides in Indian country, 

and (ii) the person knowingly fails to 

register or update a registration as 

required under SORNA. Because 

circumstances supporting federal 

jurisdiction—such as conviction for a 

federal sex offense as the basis for 

registration, or interstate travel by a 

state sex offender who then fails to 

register in the destination state—are 

required predicates for federal 

enforcement of the SORNA registration 

requirements, creation of these 

requirements for sex offenders is within 

the constitutional authority of the 

Federal Government. 

The second broad aspect of SORNA is 

incorporation by non-federal 

jurisdictions of the SORNA standards in 

their own sex offender registration and 

notification programs. The affected 

jurisdictions are the states, the District 

of Columbia, the principal territories, 

and Indian tribes to the extent provided 

in SORNA § 127. See 42 U.S.C. 

16911(10), enacted by SORNA § 111(10). 

Section 124 of SORNA generally 

provides a three-year period for 

jurisdictions to implement SORNA, 

subject to possible extension by the 

Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. 16924. 

Jurisdictions that fail to substantially 

implement SORNA within the 

applicable period are subject to a 10% 

reduction of federal justice assistance 

(Byrne Grant) funding. The SORNA 

provisions cast as directions to 

jurisdictions and their officials are, in 

relation to the states, only conditions 

required to avoid this funding 

reduction. See 42 U.S.C. 16925(d), 

enacted by SORNA § 125(d). Since the 

SORNA requirements are only partial 

funding eligibility conditions in relation 

to the states, and beyond that apply only 

to jurisdictions that are generally subject 

to federal legislative authority under the 

Constitution (D.C., Indian tribal, and 

U.S. territorial jurisdictions), creation of 

these requirements is also within the 

constitutional authority of the Federal 

Government. 

In contrast to SORNA’s provision of a 

three-year grace period for jurisdictions 

to implement its requirements, 

SORNA’s direct federal law registration 

requirements for sex offenders are not 

subject to any deferral of effectiveness. 

They took effect when SORNA was 

enacted on July 27, 2006, and currently 

apply to all offenders in the categories 

for which SORNA requires registration. 

As in the Wetterling Act provisions 

(42 U.S.C. 14071) that preceded 

SORNA, Congress recognized in SORNA 

that supplementation of the statutory 

text by administrative guidance and 

rules would be helpful, and in some 

contexts necessary, to fully realize the 

legislation’s objectives. Section 112(b) of 

SORNA accordingly directs the 

Attorney General to issue guidelines 

and regulations to interpret and 

implement SORNA. In addition, there 

are provisions in SORNA that identify 

specific contexts in which clarification 

or supplementation of the statutory 

provisions by the Attorney General is 

contemplated. 

One of these specific contexts appears 

in section 113(d) of SORNA, which 

states that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General shall 

have the authority to specify the 

applicability of the requirements of this 

title to sex offenders convicted before 

the enactment of this Act or its 

implementation in a particular 

jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for 

the registration of any such sex 

offenders and for other categories of sex 

offenders who are unable to comply 


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8896 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 39 / Wednesday, February 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

with subsection (b).’’ 42 U.S.C. 

16913(d). (The cross-referenced 

‘‘subsection (b)’’ states the normal 

timing rules for initial registration by 

sex offenders—before release for 

imprisoned offenders, and within three 

business days of sentencing for 

offenders not sentenced to 

imprisonment.) Section 113(d) ensures 

that there will be a means to resolve 

issues about the scope of SORNA’s 

applicability, including any questions 

that may arise concerning the 

retroactive applicability of its 

requirements to sex offenders convicted 

prior to its enactment, and a means to 

fill any gaps there may be concerning 

registration procedures or requirements 

for sex offenders to whom the Act’s 

normal procedures cannot be applied. 

For example, consider the case of an 

offender who was convicted of, and 

sentenced to probation for, a sex offense 

within the categories for which SORNA 

requires registration prior to the 

enactment of SORNA, but who did not 

register near the time of his sentencing 

because the offense in question was not 

subject to a registration requirement 

under federal law or applicable state 

law at the time. Following the 

enactment of SORNA, registration by 

the sex offender within the normal time 

period specified in SORNA § 113(b)(2)—

not later than three business days after 

sentencing—is not possible, because 

that time is past. Under section 113(d), 

the Attorney General has the authority 

to specify alternative timing rules for 

registration of offenders of this type. 

The purpose of this interim rule is not 

to address the full range of matters that 

are within the Attorney General’s 

authority under section 113(d), much 

less to carry out the direction to the 

Attorney General in section 112(b) to 

issue guidelines and regulations to 

interpret and implement SORNA as a 

whole. The Attorney General will 

hereafter issue general guidelines to 

provide guidance and assistance to the 

states and other covered jurisdictions in 

implementing SORNA, as was done 

under the Wetterling Act, see 64 FR 572 

(Jan. 5, 1999), and may also issue 

additional regulations as warranted. 

The current rulemaking serves the 

narrower, immediately necessary 

purpose of foreclosing any dispute as to 

whether SORNA is applicable where the 

conviction for the predicate sex offense 

occurred prior to the enactment of 

SORNA. This issue is of fundamental 

importance to the initial operation of 

SORNA, and to its practical scope for 

many years, since it determines the 

applicability of SORNA’s requirements 

to virtually the entire existing sex 

offender population. 

Considered facially, SORNA requires 

all sex offenders who were convicted of 

sex offenses in its registration categories 

to register in relevant jurisdictions, with 

no exception for sex offenders whose 

convictions predate the enactment of 

SORNA. See SORNA §§ 111(1), (5)–(8), 

113(a). Nor is there any ex post facto 

problem in applying the SORNA 

requirements to such offenders because 

the SORNA sex offender registration 

and notification requirements are 

intended to be non-punitive, regulatory 

measures adopted for public safety 

purposes, and hence may validly be 

applied (and enforced by criminal 

sanctions) against sex offenders whose 

predicate convictions occurred prior to 

the creation of these requirements. See 

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 

Likewise, in terms of underlying policy, 

the general purpose of SORNA is to 

‘‘protect the public from sex offenders 

and offenders against children’’ by 

establishing ‘‘a comprehensive national 

system for the registration of those 

offenders.’’ 42 U.S.C. 16901, enacted by 

SORNA § 102. If SORNA were deemed 

inapplicable to sex offenders convicted 

prior to its enactment, then the resulting 

system for registration of sex offenders 

would be far from ‘‘comprehensive,’’

and would not be effective in protecting 

the public from sex offenders because 

most sex offenders who are being 

released into the community or are now 

at large would be outside of its scope for 

years to come. For example, it would 

not apply to a sex offender convicted of 

a rape or child molestation offense in 

2005, who is sentenced to imprisonment 

and released in 2020. 

Nevertheless, sex offenders with 

predicate convictions predating SORNA 

who do not wish to be subject to the 

SORNA registration requirements, or 

who wish to avoid being held to account 

for having violated those requirements, 

have not been barred from attempting to 

devise arguments that SORNA is 

inapplicable to them, e.g., because a rule 

confirming SORNA’s applicability has 

not been issued. This rule forecloses 

such claims by making it indisputably 

clear that SORNA applies to all sex 

offenders (as the Act defines that term) 

regardless of when they were convicted. 

The Attorney General exercises his 

authority under section 113(d) of 

SORNA to specify this scope of 

application for SORNA, regardless of 

whether SORNA would apply with such 

scope absent this rule, in order to ensure 

the effective protection of the public 

from sex offenders through a 

comprehensive national system for the 

registration of such offenders. 

The rule adds a new Part 72 to 28 CFR 

with three sections. Section 72.1 

explains that the purpose of this rule is 

to specify the applicability of the 

SORNA requirements to sex offenders 

convicted prior to the Act’s enactment. 

Section 72.2 states that terms used in 

the regulations have the same meaning 

as in SORNA § 111. Thus, the statutory 

definitions may be consulted as to the 

meaning of such terms as ‘‘sex 

offender,’’ ‘‘convicted,’’ and 

‘‘jurisdiction.’’ Section 72.3 states that 

the SORNA requirements apply to all 

sex offenders, including sex offenders 

convicted of their registration offenses 

before the enactment of SORNA, and 

provides illustrations. 

Administrative Procedure Act 

The implementation of this rule as an 

interim rule, with provisions for postpromulgation public comments, is based 

on the ‘‘good cause’’ exceptions found at 

5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) and (d)(3), for 

circumstances in which ‘‘notice and 

public procedure thereon are 

impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 

to the public interest.’’ 5 U.S.C. 

553(b)(3)(B). 

The rule specifies that the 

requirements of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act apply 

to all sex offenders (as defined in that 

Act), including those convicted of the 

offense for which registration is 

required prior to the enactment of the 

Act. The applicability of the Act’s 

requirements promotes the effective 

tracking of sex offenders following their 

release, by means described in sections 

112–17 and 119 of the Act, and the 

availability of information concerning 

their identities and locations to law 

enforcement and members of the public, 

by means described in sections 118 and 

121 of the Act. 

The immediate effectiveness of this 

rule is necessary to eliminate any 

possible uncertainty about the 

applicability of the Act’s requirements—

and related means of enforcement, 

including criminal liability under 18 

U.S.C. 2250 for sex offenders who 

knowingly fail to register as required—

to sex offenders whose predicate 

convictions predate the enactment of 

SORNA. Delay in the implementation of 

this rule would impede the effective 

registration of such sex offenders and 

would impair immediate efforts to 

protect the public from sex offenders 

who fail to register through prosecution 

and the imposition of criminal 

sanctions. The resulting practical 

dangers include the commission of 

additional sexual assaults and child 

sexual abuse or exploitation offenses by 

sex offenders that could have been 

prevented had local authorities and the 

community been aware of their 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 39 / Wednesday, February 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 8897 

presence, in addition to greater 

difficulty in apprehending perpetrators 

who have not been registered and 

tracked as provided by SORNA. This 

would thwart the legislative objective of 

‘‘protect[ing] the public from sex 

offenders and offenders against 

children’’ by establishing ‘‘a 

comprehensive national system for the 

registration of those offenders,’’ SORNA 

§ 102, because a substantial class of sex 

offenders could evade the Act’s 

registration requirements and 

enforcement mechanisms during the 

pendency of a proposed rule and delay 

in the effectiveness of a final rule. 

It would accordingly be contrary to 

the public interest to adopt this rule 

with the prior notice and comment 

period normally required under 5 U.S.C. 

553(b) or with the delayed effective date 

normally required under 5 U.S.C. 

553(d). 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Attorney General, in accordance 

with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this 

regulation and by approving it certifies 

that this regulation will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities for 

the purposes of that Act because the 

regulation concerns the application of 

the requirements of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act to 

certain offenders. 

Executive Order 12866 

This regulation has been drafted and 

reviewed in accordance with Executive 

Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and 

Review,’’ section 1(b), Principles of 

Regulation. The Department of Justice 

has determined that this rule is a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 12866, section 3(f), and 

accordingly this rule has been reviewed 

by the Office of Management and 

Budget. 

Executive Order 13132 

This regulation will not have 

substantial direct effects on the States, 

on the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. There has been 

substantial consultation with state 

officials regarding the interpretation and 

implementation of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act. 

Therefore, in accordance with Executive 

Order 13132, it is determined that this 

rule does not have sufficient federalism 

implications to warrant the preparation 

of a federalism assessment. 

Executive Order 12988—Civil Justice 

Reform 

This regulation meets the applicable 

standards set forth in sections 3(a) and 

3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995 

This rule will not result in the 

expenditure by State, local and tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

in any one year, and it will not 

significantly or uniquely affect small 

governments. Therefore, no actions were 

deemed necessary under the provisions 

of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995. 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996 

This rule is not a major rule as 

defined by section 251 of the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996. 5 U.S.C. 804. This 

rule will not result in an annual effect 

on the economy of $100 million or 

more; a major increase in costs or prices; 

or significant adverse effects on 

competition, employment, investment, 

productivity, or innovation, or on the 

ability of United States-based 

companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic and 

export markets. 

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 72 

Crime, Information, Law enforcement, 

Prisons, Prisoners, Records, Probation 

and parole. 

■ For the reasons stated in the preamble, 

part 72 of chapter I of Title 28 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations is added to 

read as follows: 

PART 72—SEX OFFENDER 

REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 

Sec. 

72.1 Purpose. 

72.2 Definitions. 

72.3 Applicability of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act. 

Authority: Pub. L. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587. 

§ 72.1 Purpose. 

This part specifies the applicability of 

the requirements of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act to sex 

offenders convicted prior to the 

enactment of that Act. These 

requirements include registering and 

keeping the registration current in each 

jurisdiction in which a sex offender 

resides, is an employee, or is a student. 

The Attorney General has the authority 

to specify the applicability of the Act’s 

requirements to sex offenders convicted 

prior to its enactment under sections 

112(b) and 113(d) of the Act. 

§ 72.2 Definitions. 

All terms used in this part that are 

defined in section 111 of the Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (title 1 of Pub. L. 109–248) shall 

have the same definitions in this part. 

§ 72.3 Applicability of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act. 

The requirements of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act apply 

to all sex offenders, including sex 

offenders convicted of the offense for 

which registration is required prior to 

the enactment of that Act. 

Example 1. A sex offender is federally 

convicted of aggravated sexual abuse under 

18 U.S.C. 2241 in 1990 and is released 

following imprisonment in 2007. The sex 

offender is subject to the requirements of the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act and could be held criminally liable 

under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for failing to register or 

keep the registration current in any 

jurisdiction in which the sex offender 

resides, is an employee, or is a student. 

Example 2. A sex offender is convicted by 

a state jurisdiction in 1997 for molesting a 

child and is released following imprisonment 

in 2000. The sex offender initially registers 

as required, but disappears after a couple of 

years and does not register in any other 

jurisdiction. Following the enactment of the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act, the sex offender is found to be living in 

another state and is arrested there. The sex 

offender has violated the requirement under 

the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act to register in each state in 

which he resides, and could be held 

criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for the 

violation because he traveled in interstate 

commerce. 

Dated: February 16, 2007. 

Alberto R. Gonzales, 

Attorney General. 

[FR Doc. E7–3063 Filed 2–27–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–18–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Minerals Management Service 

30 CFR Parts 250 and 253 

RIN 1010–AD39 

Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in 

the Outer Continental Shelf and Oil 

Spill Financial Responsibility for 

Offshore Facilities—Civil Penalties 

AGENCY: Minerals Management Service 

(MMS), Interior. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The MMS is required to 

review the maximum daily civil penalty 


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