BUILDING PARTNER 

CAPACITY

Key Practices to Effectively 

Manage Department of 

Defense Efforts to Promote 

Security Cooperation 

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Managing Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, February 14, 2013

GAO-13-335T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-335T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

February 14, 2013 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 

Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of 

Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has increasingly focused on 

security cooperation activities designed 

to build the defense capacity of foreign 

partners and allies, furthering the U.S. 

objective of securing international 

peace and cooperation. Both the 2011 

National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America and the 2011 

National Strategy for Counterterrorism

identify building partner capacity as a 

worldwide priority. As DOD continues 

to emphasize building partner capacity, 

the need for efficient and effective 

coordination with foreign partners and 

within the U.S. government has 

become more important, in part due to 

fiscal challenges, which can be 

exacerbated by overlapping or 

ineffective efforts. 

This testimony highlights opportunities 

to strengthen DOD’s management of 

its building partner capacity efforts by 

focusing on three key practices: 

(1) setting clear goals and defining 

terminology, (2) coordinating activities 

and sharing information, and 

(3) sustaining efforts and evaluating 

progress. It is based on GAO’s body of 

work on building partner capacity from 

April 2010 through November 2012. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made numerous 

recommendations to align goals with 

broader strategies and to clarify

terminology; develop mechanisms to 

better coordinate activities and share

information; and develop and 

implement plans and metrics to sustain 

and evaluate progress. DOD has 

generally concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and has taken some 

actions, but work remains to fully 

implement GAO’s recommendations. 

What GAO Found

GAO’s recent work has identified key practices that would enhance the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of building partner capacity efforts. 

Such efforts include a range of security cooperation activities such as military 

exercises with partner nations and counternarcotics activities. In GAO’s reviews 

of these activities, GAO found that DOD has demonstrated some of these key 

practices, but opportunities for improvement remain.

• Setting clear goals and defining terminology. Setting clear goals and defining 

terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity 

programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security 

interests. GAO has reported that DOD activities to build the capacity of 

foreign military forces though the Global Train and Equip program have 

generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also 

addressing partner countries’ security interests. However, in a 2012 review of 

security force assistance, GAO found that the lack of a common 

understanding of this term within DOD resulted in different interpretations of 

what types of activities are included and presented challenges in planning 

activities and forecasting needs for force capabilities. GAO recommended 

DOD take steps to clarify its intent and then determine what additional 

actions are required to plan for and conduct security force assistance.

• Coordinating activities and sharing information. Coordination mechanisms 

that facilitate communication within DOD and across agencies are needed to 

achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts. In 2012, 

GAO found that stakeholders had difficulties in obtaining status information 

on security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information 

systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. The 

department is developing a new information system to address this gap but it 

will not be fully implemented until 2020. Further, GAO’s review of the 

National Guard State Partnership Program in 2012 found that data systems 

used by the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau were not 

interoperable and users applied varying methods and definitions to track the 

program’s activities and funding. As a result, the data on types and frequency 

of activities were incomplete and inconsistent. GAO recommended that DOD 

develop guidance including agreed-upon definitions for data fields.

• Sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. Developing plans to sustain 

projects and establishing mechanisms to evaluate them can help ensure that 

programs have long-term impact. In 2010, GAO reported that the long-term 

impact of some projects to train and equip foreign militaries could be limited 

because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed their sustainment. 

Specifically, only 26 percent of the 135 proposals for fiscal years 2007-2009 

projects explicitly addressed the recipient country’s ability or willingness to 

bear sustainment costs. In a review on counternarcotics efforts in 2012, GAO 

found that DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance

measurement system, but the department has been unable to attest to the 

reliability of the performance data for several countries from 2007 through 

2011. GAO recommended that DOD submit its performance summary report 

with the reliability attestation to the National Drug Control Policy office. 

View GAO-13-335T. For more information, 

contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 

or stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-13-335T 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) efforts at building partner capacity and share with you a few key 

practices that can lead to effective management of these efforts. DOD 

has become increasingly focused on a broad range of security 

cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign 

partners and allies and further the U.S. objective of securing international 

peace and cooperation. These activities include training, equipping, 

advising, and assisting host countries’ security forces in becoming more 

proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their 

resources and territories. The 2011 National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America1 and the 2011 National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism2

As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for 

efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S. 

government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges, 

which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts. Strategic 

identify building partner capacity as a worldwide 

priority. These documents stress that the global security environment 

presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to 

which all elements of the United States’ national power must be applied. 

They also emphasize the need to strengthen and expand the United 

States’ network of international partnerships to enhance security and, 

according to the National Military Strategy, the joint force, combatant 

commands, and service chiefs shall partner with other U.S. government 

agencies to pursue theater security cooperation. Further, the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review report cites building the security capacity of 

partner nations as a key mission area and emphasizes security force 

assistance as an increasingly critical element of this mission. It also 

identifies several initiatives to enhance its ability to build partner nation 

security capacity, such as strengthening and institutionalizing the 

capabilities of general purpose forces to conduct security force 

assistance, enhancing linguistic, regional and cultural abilities, and 

strengthening the department’s capacities for ministerial–level training.

 

1

Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: 

Redefining America’s Military Leadership, Feb. 8, 2011. 

2

The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 28, 2011. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-335T 

guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012 emphasized 

that building partner capacity elsewhere in the world is important for 

sharing the costs and the responsibilities of global leadership and that the 

department would develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint 

approaches to achieving the United States’ security objectives.3

Since 2010, we have issued numerous reports and testimonies and made 

recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s 

management of its building partner capacity efforts. My testimony today is 

based on our prior work and will discuss three key practices that we 

believe could provide opportunities for DOD to more effectively manage 

its building partner capacity efforts. The key practices are: (1) setting 

clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and 

sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. 

The examples I will draw on today are based on our past work and 

include partner capacity building efforts that are primarily funded by DOD. 

Detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in the 

reports and testimonies we cite throughout this statement. For the 

purposes of this testimony, we also updated information on the status of 

our recommendations. We conducted the work supporting our prior 

reports, which were issued from April 2010 through November 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD’s efforts to build partner capacity include a broad range of security 

cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign 

partners and allies. These security cooperation activities include militaryto-military training, military exercises in cooperation with partner nations, 

knowledge sharing from subject matter experts, visits between senior 

military leaders, providing military equipment and supplies, and 

counternarcotics activities. Table 1 below describes selected partner 

capacity activities that DOD implements. The table illustrates the broad 

 

3

Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 

Defense, Jan. 5, 2012.

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-13-335T 

range of activities DOD engages in to build partner capacity and is not a 

comprehensive list. 

Table 1: Descriptions of Select DOD Activities that May Be Used to Build Partner Capacity 

Program Description 

Counterdrug 

Programs 

DOD counterdrug programs may provide support to foreign security forces to stop the flow of illegal drugs. It 

provides support for counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement 

agencies. DOD requested approximately $1 billion for its counterdrug programs in its fiscal year 2013 budget 

request. 

National Guard 

State Partnership 

Program 

A DOD security cooperation program that pairs state National Guards with foreign countries to promote national 

objectives, stability, partner capacity, and a better understanding and trust between the United States and foreign 

countries. As of May 2012, there were 63 active partnerships. This program began in 1993. For fiscal year 2013, 

the department requested $10 million for the program.a 

Peacetime 

Humanitarian 

Assistance 

Programs 

DOD’s two key programs are the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid-funded humanitarian assistance 

program and the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program. Activities, which are typically performed outside of 

war or disaster environments, include renovating schools and hospitals, drilling wells, providing basic health care, 

and providing training to prepare for natural disasters. DOD requested approximately $109 million for the Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

Global Train and 

Equip Program 

(also known as 

Section 1206 

Program) 

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 created this program, which is used 

to build the capacity of foreign military forces through provision of training, equipment, and small-scale military 

construction activities. It is to be used to build foreign military capacity to conduct counterterrorist operations or 

participate in, or support, military and stabilization operations in which U.S. forces are participating. Section 

1206, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to $350 million each year, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, through fiscal year 2014. DOD requested $365 million for the Section 

1206 program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.

Global Security 

Contingency Fund 

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, enacted in December 2011, 

established the Global Security Contingency Fund. This fund provides resources for emergent challenges such 

as training and other support to enhance the capabilities of foreign military and security forces to conduct 

security and counterterrorism operations and participate in or support military, stability, or peace support 

operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests. It also provides resources 

to assist with rule of law programs and stabilization efforts in certain cases. The fund is jointly administered and 

funded by the State Department and DOD, with the State Department in the lead. The legislation also included 

transitional authorities for DOD-led assistance to Africa and Yemen. The fiscal year 2012 consolidated 

appropriations act does not appropriate new monies to the fund, but permits DOD and the State Department to 

transfer up to $250 million to the fund from other accounts. 

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, and the National Defense 

Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. 

Note: There are several other authorities that have to do with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that are 

not included in the table. 

a

Section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239 

(Jan. 2, 2013), states that no activities under the State Partnership Program may be carried out after 

February 28, 2013, until (1) the Secretary of Defense submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees the final regulations required by subsection (a) of section 1210 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-84) regarding the use of DOD funds to pay 

costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting activities under the State Partnership Program 

and (2) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 

appropriate modifications have been made, and appropriate controls have been instituted, to ensure 

the compliance of the program with the Antideficiency Act in the future. As of February 5, 2013, the 

Secretary had not submitted such regulations or made such certification. However, a DOD official told 

us that the department’s response to Section 1204 is under review, and the department expects to 

meet the deadline. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-335T 

To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates six 

unified military geographic combatant commands, which are responsible 

for a variety of functions including planning for and conducting missions 

that range from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.4

In addition to theater campaign planning, DOD uses different 

implementation processes to formulate and decide whether to approve 

specific building partner capacity activities and projects. For example, for 

Section 1206 program projects, each geographic combatant command 

reviews proposals from the U.S. embassy in its area of responsibility and 

endorses for final submission those proposed projects that address its 

highest priorities. The U.S. Special Operations Command also reviews all 

Section 1206 project proposals to ensure that each aligns with U.S. 

military strategy and ranks each proposal across the geographic 

combatant commands in accordance with counterterrorism priorities.

As part of 

their planning responsibilities, geographic combatant commands develop 

theater campaign plans, which are multiyear plans that reflect the 

command’s strategy to achieve certain end states within their areas of 

responsibility. These plans are the primary vehicle for designing, 

organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities. A 

hierarchy of national and strategic guidance—including the National 

Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military 

Strategy, and the Guidance for Employment of the Force—informs the 

development of the combatant commands’ theater campaign plans.

5

 

4

The six geographic combatant commands are: U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa 

Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, 

and U.S. Central Command.

 As 

a different example, for the National Guard State Partnership Program, 

any nation requesting a state partnership sends its official request to its 

respective U.S. ambassador. Once the partnership is endorsed, the 

request is forwarded to the appropriate combatant command. If the 

command finds that the partnership meets strategic objectives and 

priorities, the command sends the request to the National Guard Bureau. 

If the Chief of the National Guard Bureau accepts the request, he or she 

5

The U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing special operations 

forces to carry out assigned missions and to plan and conduct special operations. Its 

mission is (1) to provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the United 

States and its interests and (2) to synchronize global operations against terrorist networks, 

including receiving, reviewing, coordinating, and prioritizing all DOD plans that support the 

global campaign against terror. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-335T 

notifies the combatant command and solicits proposals from the adjutants 

general of the state Guards. These proposals go through three levels of 

review within DOD, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau forwards 

a recommended nominee to the combatant command and the partner 

country’s U.S. embassy for final approval.

I would like to now discuss the key practices we have identified that can 

aid DOD in more effectively managing its building partner capacity 

activities.

Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders 

understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and 

how they fit in with broad national security interests. In our reviews, we 

found that DOD’s efforts to align goals with broader strategies and clarify 

terminology have varied. More specifically, in some reviews, we found 

that programs have aligned with broader strategies but DOD officials 

have experienced challenges in agreeing upon key terms.

A positive example of strategic alignment involves our work on the 

Section 1206 program.6 In 2010, we reported that the Section 1206 

activities have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism 

priorities while also addressing the partner countries’ security interests.7

 

6

The Section 1206 program authorizes DOD to build the capacity of a foreign country’s 

military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or to 

support or participate in military and stability operations in which the United States Armed 

Forces are participating. The section also authorizes DOD to build the capacity of a 

foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

For example, in 2010, we found that DOD and the State Department 

(State) have used Section 1206 funds in Kazakhstan to address its 

priority of enhancing the country’s counterterrorism capacity in the 

Caspian Sea, according to a U.S. embassy official. Additionally, in 

Pakistan, U.S. officials used Section 1206 funds to increase special 

operations capacity to support counterterrorism operations on its western 

border. Overall, from fiscal year 2006 to 2009, DOD and State allotted 

$932 million, or 95 percent, of all Section 1206 funding for 

counterterrorism-related equipment and training for partner countries and 

7

GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and 

Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010). 

Setting Clear Goals 

and Defining 

Terminology
 

Page 6 GAO-13-335T 

the remaining $47 million, or 5 percent, to build the capacity of five 

partner nations to participate in stability operations with the United States, 

such as providing spare parts for a country’s ground vehicles. We also 

found that most Section 1206 counterterrorism resources had been 

directed to countries that the U.S. intelligence community has identified 

as priority countries for the counterterrorism effort.8

In another case we found that DOD is taking steps to address challenges 

faced by department officials in identifying and defining partner country 

assistance requirements. In a November 2012 report on the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency’s oversight of security cooperation and

assistance programs, we found that since 2009, DOD has initiated 

reforms to improve the process of developing assistance requests that 

are intended to reduce implementation delays and improve the 

effectiveness of assistance to partner countries.9

In contrast, we recommended in 2010 that DOD re-evaluate the 

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa located in Djibouti to ensure it 

is appropriately aligned to support U.S. Africa Command’s mission of 

sustained security engagement.

First, DOD developed 

new training courses and provided in-country advisors to help country 

officials identify short- and long-term requirements and strategies to meet 

those requirements. Second, DOD is reforming its own processes for 

defining requirements to improve long-term effectiveness of security 

cooperation programs and provide short-term solutions for meeting 

requirements using assistance requests. Third, DOD created a strategic 

planning support group to assist combatant commands with early 

identification and resolution of issues related to capability requirements 

and certain types of assistance requests. Fourth, the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency established expeditionary teams whose purpose is 

to help the combatant commands, partner countries, and security 

cooperation officers identify and refine a partner country’s requirements. 

10

 

8

The list of priority countries is classified, which limits the precision of the analytical 

information we can report. 

While U.S. Africa Command stated that 

9

GAO, Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but 

Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management, GAO-13-84 

(Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012).

10GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa 

Task Force, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010). 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-335T 

the Task Force’s original mission of countering violent extremism and its 

location at Camp Lemonnier remain important, particularly given terrorist 

threats in the region, we found some activities that may not be aligned 

with the command’s mission. For example, at a training exercise for 

incoming Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa officials, discussion 

was raised concerning Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s 

discovery of a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard stating “donated 

by Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa”; current staff had been 

unaware of the school’s existence. While the activity may have promoted 

temporary benefits for the participants at the time it was built, its 

dilapidated state could have potentially promoted unfavorable views of 

the U.S. military within the partner nation and heightened concerns about 

how such activities fit into a framework of sustained security engagement. 

In another example, other embassy officials stated that the experiences of 

African navy and coast guard participants of Task Force maritime training 

sessions were dampened because participants had anticipated a 

permanent training program; instead, they received sporadic and shortterm training, which may not promote U.S. Africa Command’s mission of 

sustained or long-term security engagement. As a result, we 

recommended that U.S. Africa Command complete its evaluation of 

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to determine whether the Task 

Force should be retained, and if so, whether changes are needed to its 

mission, structure, and resources to best support the command’s mission. 

In a 2012 follow up on our recommendation, U.S. Africa Command stated 

that it had issued a plan to alter the Task Force’s mission in accordance 

with the command’s assessment of the current security environment. 

However, DOD has not identified how the Task Force is changing its 

structure and resources to support the new mission.

Another review in 2012 found that DOD’s lack of clarity surrounding the 

term “security force assistance” has created challenges for the combatant 

commands and military services in their efforts to plan for security force 

assistance as a distinct activity and enhance force capabilities.11

 

11GAO, Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic 

Combatant Command and Service Efforts, 

DOD 

intends to focus more on security force assistance activities and has 

directed the combatant commands to incorporate them into their long 

range plans and forecast requirements. In its instruction, DOD defined 

security force assistance as “DOD activities that contribute to unified 

GAO-12-556 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 10, 2012). 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-335T 

action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity 

and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting 

institutions.”12 Seeking to clarify this definition, DOD has further stated 

that security force assistance encompasses all DOD activities conducted 

under various programs to “organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise 

foreign security forces and their supporting institutions from the tactical to 

ministerial levels.”13

 

12Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (Oct. 27, 2010).

Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to clarify its 

terminology, we found that the commands continue to lack a common 

understanding of the term and therefore some were unclear as to what 

additional actions were needed to meet DOD’s intent. Officials we 

interviewed generally viewed security force assistance as a 

recharacterization of some of their existing security cooperation activities 

but had different interpretations of what types of activities should be 

considered as security force assistance. For example, within one 

command, officials considered nearly every activity with partner nations to 

be security force assistance. Another command considered only 

individual efforts to train partner nations as security force assistance and 

excluded other activities. Also, some command officials were not clear as 

to the intent of DOD’s increased focus on security force assistance and 

whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope 

or level of activities. As a result, they do not currently distinguish security 

force assistance from other security cooperation activities in their plans. 

The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and 

train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force 

assistance based on current requirements. Without greater clarity in 

regard to future needs, the services are uncertain whether their current 

efforts are sufficient or whether additional capabilities will be required. 

Therefore, we recommended that DOD take steps to clarify its intent, 

including the level of effort that combatant commands should devote to 

security force assistance, and what additional actions are required by the 

commands to plan for and conduct security force assistance beyond their 

existing security cooperation efforts. These steps would also help inform 

the services’ efforts to ensure that the capabilities that they are 

developing and thus the resources that they are investing are appropriate 

and adequate to meet future requirements. DOD generally agreed with 

our recommendations.

13Department of Defense, Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework (Nov. 1, 2011). 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-335T 

In another instance, we found that DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development used different terminology to describe similar 

efforts during our review of DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts.14 For 

example, according to DOD officials, DOD uses the term “humanitarian 

assistance” to describe its strategically planned assistance. In contrast, 

the U.S. Agency for International Development and State refer to 

immediate, life-saving relief as “humanitarian assistance” but other 

capacity-building efforts as “development assistance.” DOD officials 

explained that the terminology they use is derived from their legislative 

authority to perform humanitarian assistance, and DOD and U.S. Agency 

for International Development officials said that DOD uses “humanitarian 

assistance” rather than “development assistance” to ensure that the 

department is not perceived as performing development efforts that are 

outside of its legislatively-prescribed areas of responsibility. Further, DOD 

officials who are engaged in implementing some of DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts told us that differences in terminology can create 

challenges among agencies in understanding the scope and nature of 

each others’ efforts. State officials said that differing terminology creates 

challenges to setting goals or objectives when planning with other 

agencies. As a result, we recommended and they agreed that DOD, 

State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development collaborate to 

develop guidance that provides a common understanding of the 

terminology used for their humanitarian and development assistance 

efforts. In a 2013 follow-up on our recommendation, DOD officials stated 

that they have continued to regularly engage officials at State and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development through working groups and 

briefings to minimize confusion over terminology, but did not identify any 

actions taken to develop guidance on the differences in the agencies’ 

terminology. 

National strategies have emphasized the importance of building partner 

capacity using an interagency and whole of government approach, but 

mechanisms for coordinating activities and sharing information within 

DOD and across agencies have not been consistently implemented. Our 

work shows that DOD has taken steps to work with other agencies on 

activities, such as embedding representatives from their agencies at its 

 

14GAO, Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better 

Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts, GAO-12-359 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012). 

Coordinating 

Activities and Sharing 

Information
 

Page 10 GAO-13-335T 

combatant commands, but challenges remain. Agencies have different 

organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources to 

plan for and conduct their building partner capacity efforts, which can 

hinder interagency collaboration. Given these organizational differences, 

coordination mechanisms that can facilitate interagency collaboration are 

needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity 

efforts.

Our work has found that DOD has led or participated in coordinating 

activities and taken steps to share and integrate information for building 

partner capacity activities through some of the programs at its geographic 

combatant commands. For instance, U.S. Southern Command is a 

geographic combatant command that operates in the Americas and the 

Caribbean, areas primarily affected by challenges such as corruption, 

crime, transnational terrorism, natural disasters, and poverty that impact 

the security and stability of the region. In recent years, in an effort to 

better support security and stability in the region, U.S. Southern 

Command has sought to become a more interagency-oriented command, 

recognizing that many of the challenges it faces cross role and mission 

lines of various U.S. government agencies. In 2010, our review of U.S. 

Southern Command found that the command coordinated with 

interagency partners to develop mutually reinforcing strategies, including 

its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and its 2020 Command Strategy.15

However, challenges with coordinating and information sharing with other 

agencies remain. In 2012, we reported that DOD, State, and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development recognize the need to improve 

information sharing for humanitarian assistance efforts and they have 

U.S. 

Southern Command coordinated the development of its 2009 Theater 

Campaign Plan, which lays out the command’s theater priorities and 

guides its resource allocations, with over 10 U.S. government 

departments, agencies, and offices. In addition, for U.S. Southern 

Command’s 2020 Command Strategy, which was in development in 

2010, the command conducted a 3-day conference to gather perspectives 

from interagency partners on the command’s assessment of challenges in 

the region and the command’s strategic objectives.

 

15GAO, Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency 

Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large 

Military Operation, GAO-10-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010).
 

Page 11 GAO-13-335T 

begun to take steps to address the challenge.16

We have found that when agencies share information, managing and 

integrating information from multiple sources present challenges 

regarding data comparability. For instance, we found that the multiple 

DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts include constructing schools, digging water wells, 

preparing communities for natural disasters, and helping local populations 

obtain medical care. Despite DOD’s various collaborative efforts, 

challenges remain, particularly in project coordination and data 

management for information sharing. For example, officials said that the 

frequent rotation of personnel can lead to continuity challenges. Many 

officials also stated that coordination tends to be personality driven; when 

staff is replaced, relationships have to be rebuilt and progress can be lost. 

Further, while officials from DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development said that interagency personnel at the 

commands have helped improve coordination with DOD, the roles of 

these personnel may be limited. Some State and U.S. Agency for 

International Development officials explained that the role of their 

advisors assigned to DOD’s combatant commands is limited. Specifically, 

they are able to report on what is happening in their respective areas of 

responsibility but cannot make decisions or speak on behalf of their home 

agencies. Moreover, DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International 

Development do not have full visibility over each others’ assistance 

efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to U.S. assistance. 

There are several initiatives under way to improve information sharing; 

however, no framework, such as a common database, currently exists for 

the agencies to readily access information on each others’ efforts. 

Therefore, we recommended that the State Department, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, and DOD develop a framework for sharing 

information to be used by all agencies in their assistance efforts, and

indicated that this framework could involve selecting an existing initiative, 

such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. They agreed with our 

recommendation, and in 2012 DOD officials stated they submitted foreign 

assistance data on their peacetime humanitarian assistance programs 

and 12 other security programs to State for inclusion into the Foreign 

Assistance Dashboard. Further, State officials said they expect to have 

DOD’s foreign assistance data available on the Dashboard by the end of 

fiscal year 2013.

 

16GAO-12-359. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-335T 

data systems used to track National Guard State Partnership Program 

activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying 

methods and definitions to guide data inputs.17 In 2012, we reported that 

we could not provide complete information on the types and frequency of 

State Partnership Program activities because activity data are incomplete 

as well as inconsistent. According to National Guard Bureau officials, 

DOD’s Guidance for Employment of the Force mandates that all security 

cooperation activities be tracked, including State Partnership Program 

activities, in management information system databases.18

 

17GAO, State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed 

for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners, 

However, the 

National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands maintain separate 

databases for tracking events and each entity independently tracks its 

activities in databases that are not interoperable. Further, the terminology 

used to identify activity types varied both across the combatant 

commands and between the combatant commands and the National 

Guard Bureau. As a result, we found it difficult to identify whether the data 

in different databases were describing the same activity or two separate 

activities. Therefore, we recommended and the department agreed that 

DOD, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the combatant 

commands, and the embassy country teams, develop guidance for all 

stakeholders that includes agreed-upon definitions for data fields and 

rules for maintaining data until the program’s global data system is fully 

implemented. In December 2012, DOD issued an instruction requiring 

combatant commanders to submit annual records of State Partnership 

Program activities and defining specific data that must be included in 

these reports. While this instruction does not directly identify data field 

definitions, it could provide a basis for improving the department’s efforts 

to track State Partnership Program activities and funding.

GAO-12-548 (Washington, D.C.: May 

15, 2012). 

18As stated in the note to Table 1, Section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2013 established certain requirements for DOD regarding the State 

Partnership Program, including the submission of regulations to Congress. As of February 

5, 2013, the department had not met these requirements. However, a DOD official told us 

the department expected to meet them by the statutory deadline of February 28, 2013. On 

December 14, 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued Department of 

Defense Instruction 5111.20, which stated that it, among other things, provides 

instructions for the use of funds appropriated to DOD to pay the costs of authorized State 

Partnership Program activities conducted in accordance with section 1210 of Public Law 

111-84. 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-335T 

In 2012, we found that DOD efforts to provide timely security assistance 

were affected by communication and coordination issues within DOD that 

in some cases delayed assistance and increased costs.19

• equipment was held by the partner country’s customs agency 

because the delivery lacked proper documentation or proper address 

labels, and additional customs fees were incurred while the security 

cooperation officers found the missing information;

DOD’s Security 

Cooperation Organizations in foreign countries reported persistent 

difficulties obtaining information from the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency and the implementing agencies of the military departments—the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of security assistance 

equipment acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are 

difficult for them to access and contain limited information. DOD’s existing 

delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the status of 

equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD agencies 

are not entering the needed data into the system. Without advance notice 

of deliveries, Security Cooperation Organization staff have been unable to 

ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready 

to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs. 

For example, security cooperation officers we met with reported instances 

where:

• shipments were warehoused in a customs office for 2 years because 

they had no addresses or were improperly addressed;

• the Security Cooperation Organization discovered equipment at ports 

and airports that had arrived without advance notice.

To improve the ability of combatant commands and Security Cooperation 

Organization officials to obtain information on the acquisition and delivery 

status of assistance agreements, we recommended that DOD establish 

procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies populate security 

assistance information systems with complete data. In response, the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated that it would work with the 

military departments to ensure that information systems are populated 

with acquisition and delivery status data. The Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency is also developing a new electronic system, the 

Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to improve visibility and 

aggregate data from the separate computer management systems used 

 

19GAO-13-84.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-335T 

by DOD’s implementing agencies, but it is not expected to be fully 

implemented until 2020.

Developing plans to sustain DOD’s building partner capacity activities and 

establishing mechanisms to monitor programs and evaluate results can 

help ensure that these programs have long-term impact. Our work has 

shown that some building partner capacity activities may not endure 

because planning for sustainment has been a systemic challenge. In a 

2009 memo to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 

the Secretary of Defense stated that sustaining the results of capacitybuilding has proven difficult because the lack of multi-year planning and 

funding authorities at the outset of security assistance efforts makes it 

difficult for the U.S. government and its partners to build or maintain 

effective collaborative relationships.20

One example of sustainment planning challenges came from our review 

of the Section 1206 program. In 2010, we reported that the long-term 

impact of some Section 1206 projects could be limited because U.S. 

agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects.

Further, our work has also shown 

that DOD had not consistently defined performance measures, and 

reporting on progress and effectiveness of some building partner capacity 

activities has been limited to anecdotal information.

21

 

20Secretary of Defense Memorandum, DOD Review of Building the Security Capacity of 

Partner Nations (June 18, 2009). 

For 

example, we found that most participating countries have relatively low 

incomes and may be unwilling or unable to provide the necessary 

resources to sustain projects. According to project proposal instructions 

applicable at the time of our report, proposals must explain how projects 

will be sustained in future years. However, we found that only 26 percent 

of the 135 proposals we reviewed for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects 

explicitly addressed the recipient country’s ability or willingness to bear 

sustainment costs. Moreover, only 1 of the 15 Security Assistance 

Officers we interviewed indicated that he believed his partner nation had 

the ability to sustain its Section 1206 projects independently. For 

example, the Security Assistance Officer in Mali noted that sustainment of 

the Section 1206 project to train and equip that country’s light infantry 

units would be problematic if the country had to find its own funding. Our 

21GAO-10-431. 

Sustaining Efforts and 

Evaluating Progress
 

Page 15 GAO-13-335T 

2010 report also showed that DOD and State had conducted little 

monitoring and evaluation of the Section 1206 security assistance 

program. Specifically, DOD and State’s reporting has generally consisted 

of anecdotal information and DOD officials told us that they had not

consistently monitored these security assistance projects. Our review of 

149 approved proposals for Section 1206 projects for fiscal years 2006 

through 2009 showed that only 32 percent (48 proposals) defined 

measures of effectiveness or anticipated outcomes. In addition, only 25 

percent (34) of 135 approved fiscal year 2007 through 2009 proposals we 

reviewed documented an intention to monitor results. We recommended 

that DOD and State develop and implement specific plans to monitor, 

evaluate, and report routinely on the results of such monitoring and 

evaluation for Section 1206 projects. DOD agreed with our 

recommendation and, in response, completed its first systematic 

assessments of Section 1206 projects implemented in 5 countries in 

2012.22

In a separate review of U.S. Africa Command in 2010, we found that it is 

unclear whether all of the activities that U.S. Africa Command inherited or 

is planning fully align with its mission of sustained security engagement in 

Africa because the command was generally not measuring the long-term 

effects of its activities.

As part of that effort, DOD also created the Section 1206 

Assessment Handbook to be used for the future, annual assessment 

efforts. Officials we spoke to stated that these pilot assessments validated 

the assessment methodology, which will be used to evaluate all future 

potential recipients’ capabilities prior to receipt of Section 1206 

equipment, as well as to conduct evaluations of selected Section 1206 

efforts following the implementation. 

23

 

22DOD considers information about the results of the assessments to be sensitive.

For example, U.S. Africa Command officials we 

met with while observing a command activity in Uganda told us that the 

command planned to produce an “after action” report after the activity, but 

they acknowledged that U.S. Africa Command needs to develop a

method to perform longer-term assessments of activities. Command 

officials also stated they did not know whether projects such as 

reconstructing a school would have a sustainable effect on the community 

and State officials added that the command’s efforts to support U.S. 

23GAO, Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 

Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 28, 2010). 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-335T 

embassies by augmenting or broadening existing public-diplomacy efforts 

were not being assessed. While long-term evaluation can be difficult to 

achieve, particularly the ability to link an action to a desired effect, we 

noted it nonetheless remains important for the command to have some 

performance measures. Therefore, we recommended that U.S. Africa 

Command conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities 

to determine whether the activities are having their intended effects and 

supporting the Command’s mission. In a 2012 follow up to our 

recommendation, the command stated that it has conducted nationwide 

polling and stakeholder interviews across several African countries to 

develop a baseline against which progress can be measured. For 

example, the command asked how participants viewed their nation’s 

military and how they felt toward international cooperation in military 

training and peacekeeping in Africa. However, U.S. Africa Command still 

needs to take steps to develop metrics and indicators in order to conduct 

more thorough assessments. Until the long-term assessments of its 

activities are completed, U.S. Africa Command may have difficulty making 

successful future planning decisions and allocating resources to 

maximize its effect in Africa.

More recently, in 2012, we found that because the National Guard’s State 

Partnership Program did not have agreed-upon goals or metrics, it could 

not assess progress.24

 

24

National Guard Bureau officials acknowledged that 

once they update program goals and objectives, they will need to develop 

metrics to measure results of the program. The officials are working with 

experts from other organizations and have begun to develop metrics for 

the program. However, they indicated that due to the relationship-building 

nature of the program, it is difficult to establish appropriate metrics that 

capture the effects of the program. We recommended that the department 

complete and implement the program’s comprehensive oversight 

framework by using the goals, objectives, and metrics currently being 

developed. In the December 2012 DOD instruction, the department

directed the alignment of State Partnership Program activities with 

combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation program objectives, 

as well as with the objectives of the U.S. embassies and national security 

objectives of the partner nations. This is a positive step; however, goals, 

objectives, or metrics specific to the State Partnership Program still need 

to be completed. Such goals, objectives, and metrics would form the 

GAO-12-548. 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-335T 

foundation for a comprehensive oversight framework and, until they are 

put into place, DOD cannot fully assess whether the program is an 

effective and efficient use of resources.

In addition, our work on counternarcotics efforts has found challenges 

with the reliability of performance data. For example, our 2012 review of 

the Andean countries25 found that although DOD is working to improve its 

counternarcotics performance measurement system, the department’s 

Inspector General has been unable to attest to the reliability of the 

performance data from 2007 through 2011, as required by the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy.26 We previously reported that DOD had 

established performance measures for its counternarcotics activities, 

such as percentage of tasked counternarcotics missions flown, the 

number of partner nation law enforcement agencies engaged, and the 

number of military working dog teams trained.27

 

25The Andean region consists of five countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 

Venezuela. 

However, during our 

2012 review, we found that the DOD Inspector General cited a number of 

reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD’s performance data. One 

example was that DOD’s 2008 performance report did not include 4 

consecutive years of data required for tracking improvements. Lacking 

these attestations from DOD, the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

has minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD’s reporting on its 

estimated $956 million in counternarcotics assistance for those years. 

Without reliable information, the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

may be limited in its ability to carry out its responsibility for coordinating 

and overseeing implementation of the policies, goals, objectives, and 

priorities established by the national drug control program and to report to 

Congress on counternarcotics assistance provided by agencies under its 

purview. As a result, we recommended that the department submit its 

performance summary report along with the Inspector General’s 

attestations of the reliability of the information reported to the National 

26GAO, Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean 

Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results, GAO-12-824 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 10, 2012). See also Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, Drug 

Control Accounting (May 1, 2007) for data reliability requirements.

27GAO, Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System to 

Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities, GAO-10-835 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 21, 2010). 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-335T 

Drug Control Policy office. DOD agreed with our recommendation but did 

not detail how it would address this recommendation. 

In conclusion, DOD’s building partner capacity efforts encompass a broad 

range of security cooperation activities that focus on emphasizing existing 

alliances and expanding cooperation with emerging partners to ensure 

collective capability and capacity for securing common interests, as well 

as sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.28 Given the 

recent emphasis on these efforts, it is vital to manage them effectively 

and efficiently. By setting clear goals and defining terminology, 

coordinating activities and sharing information, and sustaining efforts and 

evaluating progress, DOD can avoid confusion about the activities and 

help to assess their long-term impact. Effective management of current 

and future building partner capacity efforts will help DOD steward its 

resources to achieve its strategic priorities and provide Congress with the 

information it needs as it evaluates current programs and considers future 

funding levels. Moreover, effective management of these efforts will likely 

better position the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions 

and future uncertainties around the world.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, this concludes my prepared 

remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

For future information regarding this statement, please contact Janet A. 

St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on 

the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are 

listed in appendix II.

 

28Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 
Appendix I: Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-13-335T 

Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some 

Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance 

Program Management. GAO-13-84. Washington, D.C.:

November 16, 2012.

Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in 

Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results.

GAO-12-824. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012.

State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training 

Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide 

Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556. 

Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and 

Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts.

GAO-12-359. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2012.

Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates 

Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed 

Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801. 

Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 

Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794. 

Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement 

System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities.

GAO-10-835. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of 

Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment 

Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 

Assistance Programs. GAO-10-431. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of 

National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information 

Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.

Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact name above, Charles Michael Johnson Jr., 

Director; John Pendleton, Director; Sharon Pickup, Director; Marie Mak, 

Assistant Director; James Michels, Assistant Director; Jennifer Andreone, 

Kathryn Bolduc, Katherine Forsyth, Simon Hirschfeld, Meghan Perez, 

Erika Prochaska, Steven Putansu, Jodie Sandel, Michael Simon, John 

Van Schaik, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Nicole Willems made key 

contributions to this testimony.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351800)
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