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******************************************************FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OFFICER,

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES, ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL. (SC 19371)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued January 14—officially released September 22, 2015Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was ColleenM. Murphy, executive director and general counsel, forthe appellant-appellee (named defendant). Jacqueline Hoell, assistant attorney general, with whomwereHenryA. Salton, assistantattorneygeneral, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).Opinion EVELEIGH, J. Thepresentcase arisesfromthe ruling of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), that the defendant Ron Robillard was entitled to the disclosure of documents in the possession of the plaintiffs, the Department of MentalHealthandAddiction Services (department) and its Freedom of Information Officer (information officer), under the Freedom ofInformation Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The commission appeals fromthejudgment ofthe trial court, claiming, interalia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission’s decision. The plaintiffs

cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the documents were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment ofapatient and were, thus, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuantto General Statutes § 52-146e. We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision ofthe commission, and further agree with the plaintiffs that the documents at issue are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs’ appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. The plaintiffs received a request under the act from Robillard for any records concerning a person named Amy Archer Gilligan for the period oftime from 1924 through 1962. Gilliganwas
apatient at a facility now known as Connecticut Valley Hospital (hospital) following her conviction for second degree murder for the arsenic poisoning of a resident ofhernursing home. Gilligan’s life is widely considered to be the basis for the play and movie entitled ‘‘Arsenic and Old Lace.’’ The plaintiffs provided Robillard with copies of those records pertaining to Gilligan that it deemed were disclosable under the act. Robillard was notified by the plaintiffs that other records, deemed exempt from disclosure under the act, were withheld.
Robillardthen filed acomplaintwiththe commission alleging that the plaintiffs violated the act by failing to provide these records concerning the confinement of Gilligan. Afterafullhearingandanincamerainspection of the records before a hearing officer of the commission, the commission adopted the proposed findings and decision ofthe hearing officer. In its memorandum of decision, the hearing commission found that some of the records submitted for in camera review were exempt from disclosure as psychiatric records under § 52-146e. The commission found that two documents submitted for in camera inspection were exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (10) as ‘‘communications privileged bythe attorney-client rela-tionship

. . . .’’ The commission found that the rest of the records submitted for in camera review did not qualifyaspsychiatricrecords orattorneyclientcommunications, but were ‘‘on their face medical records

. . . .’’ The commission found that the medical records

were not exempt from disclosure under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. The commission furtherfoundthatthe medicalrecordswerenotexempt from disclosure under the act because Gilligan is deceased and, therefore, there can be no invasion of privacy under § 1-210 (b) (2).
The plaintiffs thenfiled an administrative appealpursuantto General Statutes § 4-183 oftheUniformAdministrative Procedure Act (UAPA). On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiffs made the following claims: ‘‘(1) The [commission] erroneously applied Connecticut’s psychiatric-patient privilege by allowing disclosure of certain of the documents requested by Robillard, (2) the [commission] erroneously applied the § 1-210 (b) (2) exemption from disclosure under the [act], and (3) the [commission] erroneously interpreted the department’s claimed exemption under HIPAA.’’ The trial court found that the commission properly applied § 52- 146e, with the exception of two documents that the court ordered partially redacted as to diagnosis. The trial court further found that the commission properly applied § 1-210 (b) (2), but found that the plaintiffs had mettheirburdenunder § 1-210 (b) (2) asto thephysical and dental examination records contained in the documents, finding that they were not a legitimate matter ofpublic concern and would be highly offensive if disclosed. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ appealastothosephysicalanddentalexamination records. The commission appealed and the plaintiffs

cross appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred those appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
On appeal to this court, the commission claims that the plaintiffs lacked standingto appealto thetrial court from the commission’s decision that Gilligan’s medical records were not exempt from disclosure. In the cross appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that all ofthe records at issue were not exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.1 We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission’s decision and that the trial court improperly concluded that all of the records at issue werenot exemptfrom disclosureunder § 52-146e.
I
The commission asserts that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission’s decision that Gilligan’s medical records were not exempt from disclosure.2 Specifically, the commissionasserts that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved because their personal privacy interest was not affected by its decision. Further, the commission claimsthattheplaintiffs lack standing because they cannot assert the privacy interests oftheir deceased client. In response, the plaintiffs assert that they had standing to appeal from the commission’s decision that Gilligan’s medical records were not exempt from disclosure under § 1- 210 (b) (2) because theywere aggrievedbythe decision of the commission. We agree with the plaintiffs. ‘‘As apreliminarymatter, we address the appropriate standard of review. If a party is found to lack [aggrievement], the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.

. . . A determination regarding atrial court’s subject matterjurisdiction is a question of law. When

. . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.

. . . ‘‘Subjectmatterjurisdiction [implicates] theauthority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.

. . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is withoutjurisdiction

. . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time

. . . [a]nd the court ortribunalmayact onits ownmotion, and should do so when the lack ofjurisdiction is called to its attention.

. . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d 292 (2007). ‘‘Only parties aggrieved by the decision ofthe [commission] have standing to take appeals to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 1-21i (d). Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.

. . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy

. . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. ‘‘As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great

. . . [and] need not be primarily economic.

. . .‘‘Inappealspursuantto § 1-21i (d), wehavetranslated these general principles into a twofold test for aggrievement that requires a showing of: (1) a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [commission] decision; and (2) a special and injurious effectonthisspecificinterest.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Board ofPardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 648–49, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989). Althoughthe commission does not expresslyaddress why the plaintiffs are not aggrieved, it seems to assert that because they are merely the holder of the public records at issue here, they are not affected by any disclosure and are not the appropriate parties to provide evidence astowhydisclosure would constitute aninvasion of privacy. In response, the plaintiffs assert that they are aggrieved by the commission’s decision because they have a legally protected interest that has been, and will in the future be, adversely affected by the commission’s decision. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the department is statutorily charged with providing comprehensive, client based services in the

areas of mental health and substance abuse treatment to people in the state, including manypeople who have been found not guilty of crimes but are in need of psychiatric care and others who may be characterized

as notorious. The plaintiffs further assert that the department’s interest in providing such care is adversely affected by the commission’s determination that medical records of patients in their facilities can be subject to disclosure under the act because it might adversely affect patients’ willingness to provide information regarding their medical history and status if such information is subject to disclosure.
In support of their position, the plaintiffs rely on Board ofPardons v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, supra, 210 Conn. 646. In Board ofPardons, the commissionhadissuedadecisionfindingthattheBoard ofPardons (board) had improperly gone into executive session to discuss records of prisoners. The board appealed the decision to the trial court and then to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded that the board did not have standing to appeal from the decision of the commission because it was not aggrieved. Seeid., 648. Thiscourtreversedthejudgment ofthe Appellate Court, concluding that ‘‘the board has

a legitimate institutional interest in the integrity of its decision-making process. The board has advanced a colorable claim of injury to its own deliberative functions that transcends the interests ofindividual prisoners in the disclosure of their records. In deciding whether to grant a pardon or to commute a prison sentence, the board depends not simply on objective [fact-finding], but also on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior

. . . . In orderto carry out this sensitive mission, the board claims that it needs the opportunity for confidential dialogue about every aspect of a prisoner’s record. The board alleges that, as a practical matter, there is a great deal of overlap between the discussion of the records of individual prisoners, which the [commission] has orderedto be held inpublic, andthe discussion ofthird party information, which even the [commission] has permitted to be conducted in executive session. The bifurcatedprocedure thatthe [commission] ordermandates therefore gave rise to a colorable claim of injury to a central aspect of the board’s functions.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 650–51. This court further concluded that the commission’s decision ‘‘would undoubtedly have

. . . a chilling effect on the [board] the next time it contemplated

. . . an executive session in order to decide whether to grantapetitionforapardon.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 651. Similarly, we conclude thatthe plaintiffs have made a colorable claimthatthe commission’s decisioninthepresent case wouldhave achilling effect

on its statutorily mandated role of providing mental health and addiction services to patients in the state of Connecticut.
In Board ofPardons, this court also relied on the factthatthepotentialforcriminalliabilityorcivilincarceration was sufficient to confer standing. ‘‘Because the [act] makes noncompliance with [a commission] order a class B misdemeanor; General Statutes § 1-21k (b); theindividualmembersoftheboardhavea‘specific and personal’ interest in the validity of such an order. In the future, board members face the risk ofinjury, in the form of criminal prosecution and sanctions, ifthey fail to comply with the present [commission] order. Suchariskofprosecutionestablishesthe requisite ‘specific andpersonal interest’ ofthe members ofthe board and of the board itself as their representative.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Board ofPardons v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, supra, 210 Conn. 650.3 In the presentcase, basedonthecommission’sruling, employees of the department may face criminal liability or civil incarceration in the future if they do not disclose records. Such potential is sufficient to present a colorable claim of direct injury. Moreover, the plaintiffs are subject to General Statutes § 52-146j,4 which provides a cause of action for improper disclosure ofpsychiatric records. The potential for a civil action and penalties for improper disclosure of such actions is further evidence that the plaintiffs have a colorable claim ofdirect injury related to the commission’s decision.5 Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs had standingto appealfromthe decisionofthe commission.
IIIn their cross appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly affirmedthe decision ofthe commission finding that some of the records at issue were not exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.6 Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the commission and the trial court improperly divided the records at issue between documents that were related to psychiatric

care andthosethatwere medicalrecords. Theplaintiffs assert that such a division was improper because all of the documents at issue were created during care for a patient at an inpatient mental health facility, and that medical diagnosis and treatment are part ofpsychiatric treatment and diagnosis at an inpatient mental health facility. In response, the commission asserts that the commission and the trial court properly determined that the medical and dental records are not exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e because they are not privileged communications and records as defined by General Statutes § 52-146d (2).7We agreewiththeplaintiffs and, accordingly, reverse thejudgment ofthe trial court to the extent that it determined that the medical records were not exempt from disclosure under § 52- 146e.
‘‘This court reviews the trial court’sjudgment pursuant to the

. . . UAPA

. . . . Under the UAPA, it is [not] the function

. . . ofthis court to retry the case or to substitute itsjudgment for that ofthe administrative agency.

. . . Even for conclusions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse ifits discretion.

. . . [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.

. . . [Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes.

. . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is

. . . involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.

. . . Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination ofa question oflaw has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny

. . . the agency is not entitled to special deference.

. . . We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation ofa statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute

. . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to]

. . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board

v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276, 281–82, 77 A.3d 121 (2013). Even iftime-tested, wewill deferto an agency’s interpretation ofa statute only ifit is ‘‘reasonable’’; that reasonableness is determined by ‘‘[application of] our established rules of statutory construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of PublicSafetyv.StateBoardof LaborRelations, 296 Conn. 594, 599, 996 A.2d 729 (2010).
‘‘When construing astatute, [o]urfundamental objective is to ascertain and give effecttothe apparentintent of the legislature.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence ofthe meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.

. . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also lookforinterpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding itsenactment, tothelegislativepolicyitwasdesignedto implement, andto its relationship to existinglegislation and commonlawprinciples governingthe same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, supra, 310 Conn. 283. The issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case is a question of law subject to plenary review. See id., 282–83.
We begin with the text of the statute. Section 52- 146e (a) provides as follows: ‘‘All communications and records as defined in section 52-146d shall be confidential and shall be subject to the provisions of sections 52-146dto 52-146j, inclusive. Except as provided in sections 52-146f to 52-146i, inclusive, no person may disclose or transmit any communications and records or the substance or any part or any resume thereofwhich identify apatient to any person, corporation or governmental agency withoutthe consent ofthe patient orhis authorized representative.’’ The plain language of § 52- 146e exempts all such ‘‘communications and records’’ from disclosure. Therefore, we must consider whether medical and dental records are ‘‘communications and records’’ for the purposes of § 52-146e. Section 52-146d (2) defines

‘‘ ‘[c]ommunications andrecords’ ’’ as ‘‘all oral andwritten communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient’s mental condition between the patient and a psychiatrist, or between a member of the patient’s family and a psychiatrist, or between anyofsuchpersons andapersonparticipating under the supervision of a psychiatrist in the accomplishment ofthe objectives ofdiagnosis and treatment, wherevermade, including communicationsandrecordswhich occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility

. . . .’’
In the present case, the crux of the disagreement between the commission and the plaintiffs is whether medical and dental records contained within Gilligan’s file are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. The commission asserts, and the trial court agreed, that these documents were not exempt from disclosure because they were not ‘‘oral and written communications and records thereofrelating to diagnosis or treatmentofapatient’smentalconditionbetweenthepatient andapsychiatrist, orbetweenamemberofthepatient’s family and a psychiatrist

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52- 146d (2). We agree that the medical and dental records

are not communications directly between Gilligan and

apsychiatrist orbetween amember ofGilligan’s family and a psychiatrist. Nevertheless, the definition of ‘‘ ‘[c]ommunications and records’ ’’ in § 52-146d (2) does not stop there. Section 52-146d (2) further defines ‘‘ ‘[c]ommunications andrecords’ ’’ to include ‘‘all oral andwritten communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment ofapatient’s mental condition

. . . between any of such persons and a person participating under the supervision ofapsychiatrist in the accomplishment ofthe objectives of diagnosis and treatment, wherever made, including communications and records which

occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility

. . . .’’
Ininterpretingthis statute, we do notwrite on aclean slate. ‘‘As we have previously observed, [t]he people of this state enjoy a broad privilege in the confidentiality of their psychiatric communications and records

. . . and the principal purpose of that privilege is to give the patient an incentive to make full disclosure to a physician in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion ofprivacywhich could result from a doctor’s testimony.

. . . Accordingly, the exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure of communications between psychiatrist and patient were drafted narrowly to ensure that the confidentiality of such communications would be protected unless important countervailing considerations required their disclosure.

. . . ‘‘Although we are cognizant that [c]ommunications that bear no relationship to the purpose for which the privilege was enacted do not obtain shelter under the statute and are admissible subject to the normal rules ofevidence

. . . we are equally convinced that the protection of communications that identify a patient are central to the purpose of the statute. The language of the statute supports this conclusion. Section 52-146e (a) specificallyprohibits the disclosure ortransmission of any communications or records that would identify

a patient

. . . . Section 52-146d provides that thephrase identify a patient refer[s] to communications and records which contain (A) names or other descriptive data from which a person acquainted with the patient might reasonably recognize the patient as the person referred to, or (B) codes or numbers which are ingeneraluseoutsideofthementalhealthfacilitywhich prepared the communications and records

. . . . Further, the fact that an explicit exception contained in subdivision (3) of [General Statutes] § 52-146f permits the disclosure of a patient’s name, address and

. . . [t]hat the person was in fact a patient for purposes of collection disputes between the hospital and the patient, lends weight to our conclusion that the general rule against disclosure applies with equal force to identityastootherinformation.’’ (Citationsomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Falco v. Institute ofLiving, 254 Conn. 321, 328–29, 757 A.2d 571 (2000).
In State v. Jenkins, 73 Conn. App. 150, 162, 807 A.2d 485 (2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 271 Conn. 165, 856A.2d383 (2004), theAppellateCourtconsidered whetheranursing assessment is amental healthrecord

as definedin § 52-146d. TheAppellate Courtrecognized that ‘‘[t]hepurpose oftheprivilege is ‘toprotectatherapeutic relationship. The statute provides aprivilege for confidential communications so that a patient may safely disclose to his therapist personal information that is necessary for effective treatment or diagnosis.’ Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819, 462 A.2d 1060 (1983)

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 162.
The Appellate Court concluded that the nursing assessment is amental health record as defined in § 52- 146d, relying on the document itselfthat indicated that the defendant authorized diagnosis and treatment of a mental condition and testimony from the director of the facility that the nursing assessment was conducted under the supervision of a psychiatrist, and that all the information, even the biographical data, is used to ‘‘gather information about mental health issues

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Similar to the evidence in Jenkins, at the hearing before the commission, Thomas Pisano, a psychiatrist, testified that the medical and dental records at issue

were created at the hospital during Gilligan’s inpatient treatment. Pisanofurthertestifiedthattherecordswere created under the direction of a psychiatrist. Pisano also testified that the superintendent of the facility at the time Gilligan was a patient was a psychiatrist. The foregoing examination of the plain language of §§ 52- 146d and 52-146e and prior interpretations support the conclusion that the medical and dental records ofGilligan are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.8
The plaintiffs assert that related statutory provisions also support the conclusion that Gilligan’s medical and dental records are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. Specifically, theplaintiffs assertthatGeneral Statutes § 17a-5459 supports its position. Section 17a-545 requires inpatient mental health facilities to conduct a physicalexaminationofeverypatientandtomakethose reports part of the patient’s clinical record. We agree with the plaintiffs that the legislature’s decision to requirephysicalexaminationsofallpatientsatinpatient mental health facilities supports our conclusion that such physical examinations and the resulting medical recordarepartofthepatient’smentalhealthrecordand notsubjectto disclosure. Furthermore, the legislature’s decision to require physical examinations of patients at inpatient mental health facilities also indicates that thelegislatureunderstoodthatmentalhealthconditions

are often related to physical disorders and that the proper treatment of mental health involves the treatment of physical issues, as well.
Our construction of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is also consistent with the broad language ofthe psychiatristpatient privilege. As ‘‘[t]his court previously has explained

. . . § 52-146e spreads aveil ofsecrecy over communications and records relating to the diagnosis

or treatment of a patient’s mental condition. With certain exceptions not pertinentto the present discussion, the statute provides that no person may disclose or transmit any communications and records

. . . to any person, corporation or governmental agency without the consent ofthe patient or his authorized representative. [General Statutes § 52-146e (a)]. The broad sweep ofthe statute covers not only disclosure to a defendant

orhiscounsel, butalso disclosuretoacourtevenforthe limitedpurpose ofanin cameraexamination.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 424, 957 A.2d 852 (2008). Accordingly, our understanding of the broad veil of secrecy created by the psychiatrist-patient privilege also supports our conclusion that medical and dental records that are created by an inpatient mental health facility during the treatment of a patient are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.
On the basis of the relevant statutory language, related statutory provisions and prior interpretations of the act, we conclude that the trial court improperly affirmedthe commission’s determinationthat Gilligan’s medical and dental records were not exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs’ appeal.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and ZARELLA, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js., concurred.

1 In its appeal, the commission also asserts that the trial court improperly: (1) substituted its ownjudgment for that of the commission when it determinedthat disclosure ofthe records relatedto Gilligan’s physical and dental examinations would constitute an invasion ofprivacy under § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) foundthat records relatedto Gilligan’s physical and dental examinationswere exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (2) when Gilligan was an infamous arsenic murderess; (3) found that under § 1-210 (b) (2) disclosure ofthe records related to Gilligan’s physical and dental examinations would be highly offensive to areasonable person when Gilligan has been deceased since 1962 and is not survived by any relative; (4) found that records related to Gilligan’s physical and dental examinations were exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (2) when Gilligan’s privacy rights terminated upon her death; (5) foundthat records relatedto Gilligan’s physical and dental examinations were exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (2) as protecting the privacy rights of Gilligan’s living relatives when Connecticut has yet to recognize survivor privacy right and, alternatively, even if such rights were recognized, they would not be applicable here because there is no evidence that Gilligan is survived by a relative and the records at issue do not involve gruesome images ofher death. Theplaintiffs also assertintheircross appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that some of Gilligan’s medical records were not exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (2). Because

weconcludethatallofGilligan’smedicalrecordsareexemptfromdisclosure under § 52-146e, we need not reach these other claims.

2 It is not entirely clear from the commission’s briefwhether it challenges the plaintiffs’ standing to appeal under both §§ 1-210 (b) (2) and 52-146e. To the extent that the commission challenges the plaintiffs’ standing under both statutes and because standing is ajurisdictional question, we address the commission’s claim as a threshold issue. The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that ‘‘I do not understand why the majority has analyzed the department’s standing in its opinion.

. . . Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the department has standing to raise this exemption.’’ See footnote 2 of the concurring and dissenting opinion. The concurring and dissenting opinion further asserts that ‘‘the commission concedes that the department has standing to raise’’ the psychiatric records privilege. Id. We disagree. From our review ofthe parties’ briefs, we do not conclude that the commission concedes that the department has standing in this appeal. Accordingly, out ofan abundance ofcaution, we address the standing issue.

3 In the present case, it is unclear whether the commission asserts that the information officer ofthe department also lacks standing to appeal from the decision of the commission. As the individual tasked with making sure that the department complies with the act, the information officerfaces risk ofprosecutionforfailureto followan orderofthe commission. Therefore, to the extent that the commission asserts that the information officer does not have standing to appeal from its decision, we conclude that ‘‘[s]uch a risk of prosecution establishes the requisite specific and personal interest

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board ofPardons v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, supra, 210 Conn. 650.

4 General Statutes § 52-146j provides: ‘‘(a) Any person aggrieved by a violation ofsections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, may petition the superior court for the judicial district in which he resides, or, in the case of a nonresident of the state, the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford, for appropriate relief, including temporary andpermanent injunctions, and the petition shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial. ‘‘(b) Any person aggrieved by a violation of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, may prove a cause of action for civil damages.’’

5 In support of its claim, the commission cites to Chairman, Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 60 Conn. App. 584, 760 A.2d 354 (2000) (disclosure of employee’s personnel or medical files), Superintendentof

Policev.FreedomofInformationCommission, 222 Conn. 621, 629–30, 609 A.2d 998 (1992) (disclosure of pistol permits), and West Hartford v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, 218 Conn. 256, 264–65, 588 A.2d 1368 (1991) (disclosure of addresses of retired employees). We find these cases to be inapposite to the present case. 6 General Statutes § 52-146e provides: ‘‘(a) All communications and records as defined in section 52-146d shall be confidential and shall be subject to the provisions of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive. Except

as provided in sections 52-146fto 52-146i, inclusive, no person may disclose

or transmit any communications and records or the substance or any part

or any resume thereof which identify a patient to any person, corporation

or governmental agency without the consent of the patient or his authorized representative. ‘‘(b) Any consent given to waive the confidentiality shall specify to what person or agency the information is to be disclosed and to what use it will be put. Each patient shall be informed that his refusal to grant consent will notjeopardize his right to obtain present or future treatment except where disclosureofthecommunicationsandrecordsisnecessaryforthetreatment.‘‘(c) The patient or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the person or office in which the original consent was filed. Withdrawal ofconsent shallnot affect communications orrecords disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.’’

7 General Statutes § 52-146d provides in relevant part: ‘‘(2) ‘Communications and records’ means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient’s mental condition betweenthepatient and apsychiatrist, orbetween amember ofthepatient’s family and a psychiatrist, or between any of such persons and a person participating under the supervision of a psychiatrist in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis and treatment, wherever made, including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility

. . . .’’ 8 The interpretation of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e proffered in the concurring and dissenting opinion is contraryto this court’s well established interpretation ofthis statute. The interpretationunnecessarilyrestrictstheprotections afforded to psychiatric records ofindividuals who seek mental health treatment in this state in favor of ‘‘this state’s abiding commitment to ‘the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.’ Wilson v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980)

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) The concurring and dissenting opinion fails to acknowledge, however, that its very strict interpretation of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e, which is completely unsupported by any case law,
servestothreatenthe ‘‘broadprivilegeinthe confidentialityoftheirpsychiatric communications and records’’ that the citizens of this state have long enjoyed in all circumstances, not just those involving requests under the act. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Falco v. Institute ofLiving, supra, 254 Conn. 328. Indeed, the interpretation posed in the concurring and dissenting opinion in the present case would serve to discourage individuals from seeking mental health treatment for fear that information contained in records prepared by mental health and other medical providers would notremainconfidential, butcouldbedisclosedwithoutthepatient’sconsent. We refuse to interpret the psychiatrist-patient privilege in such a manner so as to thwart mental health treatment in this state at a time when society is seeing the ever increasing need for individuals to seek out and receive mental health treatment. This court has repeatedly recognized that ‘‘[t]he privilege covers not only communicationsbetweenthepatient andpsychiatrist, but also all communicationsrelatingtothepatient’smentalconditionbetweenthepatient’sfamily and the psychiatrist and his staff and employees, as well as records and communications prepared at mental health facilities.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 379, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988). ‘‘Our statutory scheme prohibits the disclosure of any covered records or communicationswithoutthewritten consent ofthepatientorhis authorized representative.’’Statev. Jenkins, 271 Conn. 165, 180–81, 856A.2d383 (2004). Contrary to this well established interpretation, and without any citation to authority, the concurring and dissenting opinion would have us remand the case for further findings as to whether the medical and dental records
were prepared as part of Gilligan’s mental health treatment. A remand in this matter is unnecessary. The plaintiffs have already presented testimony that the records at issue are ‘‘the psychiatric and medical records of [the hospital] of

. . . Gilligan.’’ The plaintiffs’ witness further testified that the records were created under the direction of a psychiatrist, were prepared at the hospital and that the hospital was considered a mental health facility forthe treatment and diagnosis ofmental illness at the time the communications occurred. Furthermore, as the concurring and dissenting opinion acknowledges, ‘‘[i]fthedocumentsthemselvesdemonstratethattheprivilege applies, aproponent can meetthis burden simplyby offering the documents for in camera inspection by the commission’s hearing officer

. . . .’’ Not only is such a task nearly impossible for records that were created at a mental health facility approximately fifty to ninety years ago, but such distinctions are inconsistent with the purpose of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e and our interpretation of those statutes. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, supra, 271 Conn. 176 (nursing assessment prepared at mental health facility where patientwas beingtreated coveredunder § 52-146d). Moreover, the approach adopted in the concurring and dissenting opinion is inconsistent with other courts that have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Ex parte Western Mental Health Center, 884 So. 2d 835, 840 (Ala. 2003) (‘‘[i]t is not disputed that

. . . medical records, created during the psychiatrist-patient relationship,
areincludedinthe confidentialrelationship andare alsoprivileged’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, ‘‘[r]ecognizing the rule that hospital and medical records are generally within the physician-patient privilege, [courts in many jurisdictions have] allowed hospitals to assert the privilege on behalf oftheir patients.’’ Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 552, § 4 (1981). In the present case, the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden, through testimony and by virtue ofthe records themselves, that the documents fall within the protections of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e. The disclosure at issue is not covered by any of the exceptions in § 52- 146f. ‘‘Itisjust as clearthatno exceptionis availablebeyondthose contained in § 52-146f.

. . . With respect to § 52-146e, we have noted that the legislature has narrowly drafted the exceptions to the general rule against disclosure after carefully balancing the important countervailing considerations.’’ (Citation omitted.) Falco v. Institute ofLiving, supra, 254 Conn. 330. Moreover, the concurring and dissenting opinion completely ignores thefact that many ofthe records that it finds to be subject to disclosure identify the patient and include the patient’s diagnosis. As stated previously in this opinion, in discussing the disclosure of identifying information contained within records ofamental healthfacility, this courthas reasoned as follows: ‘‘Althoughwe are cognizantthat [c]ommunications thatbearno relationship to the purpose for which the privilege was enacted do not obtain shelter underthe statute and are admissible subject to the normal rules ofevidence

. . . we are equally convinced that the protection of communications that identify a patient are central to the purpose ofthe statute. The language of the statute supports this conclusion. Section 52-146e (a) specificallyprohibits the disclosure or transmission of any communications or records that would identify a patient

. . . . Section 52-146d provides that the phrase identify a patient refer[s] to communications and records which contain (A) names or other descriptive data from which a person acquainted with the patient might reasonably recognize the patient as the person referred to, or (B) codes or numbers which are in general use outside ofthe mental health facility which prepared the communications and records

. . . . Further, the fact that an explicit exception contained in subdivision (3) of § 52- 146fpermits the disclosure of a patient’s name, address and

. . . [t]hat the person was in fact a patient for purposes of collection disputes between the hospital and the patient, lends weight to our conclusion that the general rule against disclosure applies with equal force to identity as to other information.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 328–29. ‘‘We also disagree

. . . that identifying information is of lesser importance within the statutory scheme than other communications and records. The confidentiality of a patient’s identity is as essential to the statutory purpose ofpreserving the therapeutic relationship as the confidentiality of anyotherinformationinapatient’scommunicationsandrecords. Thestatute recognizes the unfortunate reality that a stigma may attach to one who seeks psychiatric care, and that revealing a patient’s identity may subject him or her to embarrassment, harassment or discrimination.’’ Id., 329. We are bound to apply this court’s interpretation of §§ 52-146d and 52- 146e in Falco v. Institute ofLiving, supra, 254 Conn. 329, which prohibits the disclosure of any documents from which a patient can be identified. None of the parties have asked us to overrule or modify our decision in that case. Furthermore, in the fifteen years since Falco, the legislature has not acted to amend §§ 52-146d and 52-146e in response to this court’s interpretation. ‘‘Although we are aware that legislative inaction is notnecessarily legislative affirmation

. . . we also presume that the legislature is
aware of [this court’s] interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonactionmaybeunderstoodasavalidationofthatinterpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 309 Conn. 62, 78, 68 A.3d 1150 (2013). By choosing not to legislatively overrule Falco, the legislature has acquiesced to this court’s interpretation of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e. Indeed, one oftheindicators oflegislative acquiescenceto ourinterpretation of a statute is the passage of ‘‘an appropriate interval [of time] to permit legislative reconsideration

. . . without corrective legislative action

. . . .’’ Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 494–95, 923 A.2d 657 (2007). The concurring and dissenting opinion relies on State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 759 A.2d 995 (2000). In Montgomery, Elaine Janas, a mental health assistant at Cedarcrest Hospital, testified at a criminal trial regarding
a telephone conversation she overheard between the defendant and a third party unconnected to the facility, while the defendant was a patient at the mental health facility in which she worked. Id., 722–23. The defendant appealed claiming that ‘‘because Janas was assigned by a psychiatrist to observe him and to record his behavior, anything that the defendant said within her earshot necessarily related to his diagnosis and treatment.’’ Id., 723. This court rejected the defendant’s claim and concluded that the trial courtproperlyallowedJanas to testify ‘‘inthe presence ofthejuryregarding the defendant’s statement.’’ Id. This court reasoned as follows: ‘‘As the trial courtconcluded, the communicationatissuewasnotbetweenthe defendant and a psychiatrist or Janas, but, rather, between the defendant and an unknown third party located outside of the hospital. Moreover, the defendant’s instruction to that third party not to ‘forget [he] was with [the third party] last night’ bore no relation to the defendant’s diagnosis or treatment. The mere fact thatJanas was assigned to observe the defendant forhis own protection does not transform the defendant’s statement into a protected communication underthe psychiatrist-patientprivilege. A contrary determination would extend that privilege well beyond the plain statutory language that defines it. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperlypermitted the state to elicitJanas’ testimony regarding the defendant’s statement.’’ Id., 725. A review ofthe opinion and the briefs in Montgomery demonstrates that the defendant never claimed that Janas’ testimony violated §§ 52-146d and 52-146e because it revealed the defendant’s identity as an individual who received treatment at the mental health facility. Indeed, althoughMontgomery was decided approximately two months after Falco, the court did not address Falco in Montgomery

. The absence of such a reference indicates that this court did not consider Montgomery to raise an issue regarding disclosure ofidentifyinginformation. We conclude thatMontgomeryis inapposite to the present case because it involved a communication by the patient to a third party, which is not an issue in the present case. Moreover, the concurring and dissenting opinion misstates the factual and procedural background of Montgomery

. Specifically, the concurring and dissenting opinion explains as follows: ‘‘[Janas] was permitted to testify about patient conversations that she overheard even though her testimony identified the defendant as apsychiatric inpatient.

. . . [Janas] was allowedto testify before the court, initially outside the presence of thejury, that the defendant was treated at the psychiatric hospital where she worked; that a psychiatrist had instructed her to monitor the defendant on a ‘ ‘‘oneto-one’ ’’ basis and take notes of his activities every fifteen minutes; and that such protocol was typical for suicidal patients.

. . . The trial court allowed her testimony and she repeated much of this same information to the jury.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) This is inaccurate. In Montgomery, this court explained as follows: ‘‘The defendant filed amotion in limine to preclude [Janas’] testimony

. . . . The trial court conducted
a hearing on the defendant’s motion outside the presence of the jury

. At the hearing, Janas testified that, pursuant to a psychiatrist’s instructions, she was assigned to monitor the defendant on a ‘one-to-one’ basis on

. . . the day after the homicide. Pursuant to those instructions, Janas was to remain within ‘arm’s length’ of the defendant at all times and to take notes regarding the defendant’s activities every fifteen minutes. Janas further testified that ‘one-to-one’ supervision is ordered for a patient’s protection, usually when that patient is suicidal.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Montgomery, surpa, 254 Conn. 722–23. In contrast, when describing Janas’ trial testimony, this court only stated: ‘‘Janas

. . . testified in thepresence ofthejury regardingthe defendant’s statement.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 723. Therefore, unlike the representation in the concurring and dissenting opinion, nothing in this court’s opinion inMontgomery explains to what extent, ifany, Janas’ testimony revealedthe identity ofthe defendant inthat case as apsychiatric inpatient. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Montgomery is relevant to our analysis in the present case. The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that certain administrative documents should not be exempt from disclosure. We disagree. There are approximatelyfourlettersfromthesuperintendentofthefacilityto Gilligan’s daughter, which contain identifying information and responses to questions abouthertreatment. Thereisoneletterfromthe superintendenttoMetropolitan Life Insurance that details Gilligan’s diagnosis, psychiatric treatment andmentalstate. We conclude thatthese correspondence are coveredunder §§ 52-146d and 52-146e because they contain identifying information and information related to Gilligan’s diagnosis. See Falco v. Institute ofLiving, supra, 254 Conn. 322–23 (concludingthatfacilitywas notrequiredto release ‘‘name, last known address and social security number’’ offormer patient). The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that the fact that Gilligan’s commitment to the hospital is a matter ofpublic record and that the department has already released numerous records indicating her commitment to the hospital are reason to disclose additional documents that identify her. We disagree. The issue before usis onlywhethertheseparticulardocuments shouldbe disclosed. We have notbeen askedto indicate whetherthe department’s prior disclosures were proper and those disclosures are not, therefore, part of the present appeal. Consequently, we do not address those priordisclosures. We also conclude thatinterpretingthepsychiatrist-patient privilege in light ofwhat the public may or may not know about the person or his or her medical history is a dangerous proposition not authorized by statute. As this court stated in Falco, ‘‘it is contrary to the language of the statute and the intent of the legislature for courts to make discretionary case-by-case determinations of when the privilege may be overridden.’’ Id., 331. This is precisely what the concurring and dissenting opinion is suggesting we should do in the present case. Thus, while the concurring and dissenting opinion may choose to criticize our approach as ‘‘heavy-handed’’ and ‘‘yield[ing] the detritus of a needless collision between two competing statutory mandates,’’ which is ‘‘at odds with § 52-146e’’ and an ‘‘overbroad interpretation of the privilege,’’ we are merely applying our established
case law. The concurringand dissenting opinionfurtherassertsthatPisanotestified that ‘‘certain documents were not psychiatric records, including the correspondence with Gilligan’s daughter.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree with this representation ofthe testimony. Pisano cataloged the documents in the file, but never offered an opinion as to whether all of the documents were or were not psychiatric records. The testimony was as follows: ‘‘[Assistant Attorney General]:

. . . [W]hen you reviewed the records, did you find any records that were not specifically psychiatric in nature? ‘‘[Pisano]: Well, as stated, there was the newspaper clippings. There was the correspondence between the warden at the Connecticut State Prison in Wethersfield and the superintendent at [the hospital]. There was— * * * ‘‘The Hearing Officer: The

. . . original question was, as I heard it, were there records that were not psychiatric records?
* * * ‘‘[Pisano]: Okay. And there was

. . . the correspondence by the state’s attorney. There was the news clippings, the Metropolitan Life Insurance. There was correspondence between the superintendent and

. . . the patient’s daughter.’’ We disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion’s assertion that theplaintiffs’ witnesstestifiedthatthe correspondencebetweenthe superintendent and the patient’s daughter was not apsychiatric record. Even ifthe witness had offeredhis opinion as to whethertheywerepsychiatric records,
a determination of whether the records at issue fall within the protection of §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is a legal determination, not a factual one. Moreover, the plaintiffs disclosed many of the documents listed by the witness, including many communications from Metropolitan Life Insurance to the hospital, the correspondence from the state’s attorney, the correspondence between the warden and the superintendent, and the newspaper clippings. 9 General Statutes § 17a-545 provides: ‘‘Every patient hospitalized under anyofsections 17a-540to 17a-550, inclusive, shallreceiveaphysicalexamina-tion within five days of his hospitalization, and at least once each year thereafter. Every patient shall be examined by a psychiatrist within fortyeight hours of his hospitalization, and at least once each six months thereafter. Reportsofallphysicalandpsychiatricexaminationsshallbecompleted and signed by the examining physicians and made a part of the patient’s permanent clinical record.’’