MODERNIZING THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE

Observations on DOE’s and 

NNSA’s Efforts to Enhance 

Oversight of Security, 

Safety, and Project and 

Contract Management

Statement of David C. Trimble, Director

Natural Resources and Environment

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on 

Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

GAO-13-482T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

United States Government Accountability Office

 

Highlights of GAO-13-482T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, House of Representatives. 

March 2013 

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY

ENTERPRISE 

Observations on DOE’s and NNSA’s Efforts to 

Enhance Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project 

and Contract Management

Why GAO Did This Study

DOE and NNSA are responsible for 

managing nuclear weapon- and 

nonproliferation-related national 

security activities in national 

laboratories and other sites and 

facilities, collectively known as the 

nuclear security enterprise. Major 

portions of NNSA’s mission are largely 

carried out by contractors at each site. 

GAO has designated contract 

management of major projects (i.e., 

those $750 million or more) at DOE 

and NNSA as a high risk area. 

Progress has been made, but GAO 

continues to identify security and 

safety problems at DOE and NNSA 

sites as well as project and contract 

management problems related to cost 

and schedule overruns on major 

projects. 

This testimony addresses DOE’s and 

NNSA’s oversight of (1) security 

performance, (2) safety performance, 

and (3) project and contract 

management in the nuclear security 

enterprise. It is based on prior GAO 

reports issued from August 2000 to 

December 2012.

DOE and NNSA continue to act on the 

numerous recommendations GAO has 

made to improve management of the 

nuclear security enterprise. GAO will 

continue to monitor DOE’s and NNSA’s 

implementation of these 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, continue to 

face challenges in ensuring that oversight of security activities is effective. For 

example, in July 2012, after three trespassers gained access to the protected 

security area directly adjacent to one of the nation’s most critically important 

nuclear weapon-related facilities, the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE and 

NNSA took a number of immediate actions. These actions included repairing 

security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 

protective force contractor. As GAO and others have reported, DOE has a long 

history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting remedies 

to fix these problems. For example, 10 years ago, GAO reported on 

inconsistencies among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors’ security 

activities and, since that time, DOE has undertaken security initiatives to address 

these issues. GAO is currently evaluating these security reform initiatives. 

DOE and NNSA continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of safety 

performance activities is effective. DOE and NNSA have experienced significant 

safety problems at their sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and 

processes have not demonstrated sustained improvements. Long-standing DOE 

and NNSA management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety 

problems at NNSA’s national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, GAO

reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at NNSA’s 

national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to 

address persistent safety concerns. For example, in March 2010, the Deputy 

Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE’s safety and 

security directives. However, GAO reported in September 2012 that DOE’s 

safety reforms did not fully address continuing safety concerns that GAO and 

others identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal 

oversight and, in fact, may have actually weakened independent oversight.

DOE and NNSA have made progress but need to make further improvements to

their contract and project management efforts. DOE has made progress in 

managing nonmajor projects—those costing less than $750 million—and in 

recognition of this progress, GAO narrowed the focus of its high-risk designation 

of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and NNSA to major 

contracts and projects. Specifically, as GAO noted in its December 2012 report 

on 71 DOE EM and NNSA nonmajor projects, GAO found the use of some sound 

management practices that were helping ensure successful project completion. 

However, major projects continue to pose a challenge for DOE and NNSA. For 

example, in December 2012, GAO reported that the estimated cost to construct 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State had tripled to 

$12.3 billion since its inception in 2000, and the scheduled completion date had 

slipped by nearly a decade to 2019. Also, in March 2012, GAO reported that a 

now-deferred NNSA project to construct a new plutonium facility in Los Alamos, 

New Mexico, could cost as much as $5.8 billion, a nearly six-fold cost increase. 

View GAO-13-482T. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov
Page 1 GAO-13-482T 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the security, safety, 

and project management issues related to the nation’s nuclear security 

enterprise. As you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy 

(DOE), is responsible for managing nuclear weapon- and 

nonproliferation-related missions in research and development 

laboratories, production plants, and other facilities—known collectively as 

the nuclear security enterprise.1 NNSA directs these national security 

missions, but work activities are largely carried out by management and 

operating (M&O) contractors at each site within the nuclear security 

enterprise. Working under M&O contracts, NNSA contractors apply their 

scientific, technical, and management expertise at NNSA’s governmentowned, contractor-operated sites.2

As we testified before this Subcommittee in September 2012,3

 

1

Specifically, NNSA manages three national nuclear weapon design laboratories—

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los Alamos National Laboratory in 

New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. It also 

manages four nuclear weapon production plants—the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Y-12 

National Security Complex in Tennessee, the Kansas City Plant in Missouri, and the 

Tritium Extraction Facility at DOE’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina. NNSA also 

manages the Nevada National Security Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site.

questions 

have been raised about DOE’s and NNSA’s oversight of security, safety, 

and project and contract management for the nuclear security enterprise. 

For example, we first designated DOE’s management of its contracts as 

an area at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in 1990 

because of the department’s record of inadequate management and 

oversight of its contractors. During the late 1990s, DOE experienced 

security problems at the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories and 

2

M&O contracts are agreements under which the federal government contracts for the 

operation, maintenance, or support, on its behalf, of a government-owned or -controlled 

research, development, special production, or testing establishment wholly or principally 

devoted to one or more of the major programs of the contracting federal agency. Federal 

Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 17.601 (2012).

3

GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear 

Security Administration’s Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management, 

GAO-12-912T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-482T 

significant cost overruns on major projects (i.e., $750 million or more). 

According to a June 1999 report by the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board, DOE’s management of the nuclear weapons 

laboratories, while representing “science at its best,” also embodied 

“security at its worst” because of “organizational disarray, managerial 

neglect, and a culture of arrogance.” The advisory board urged Congress 

to create a new organization that, whether established as an independent 

agency or a semiautonomous agency within DOE, would have a clear 

mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of 

authority and accountability. Responding to the advisory board’s 

recommendations, Congress created NNSA under Title 32 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000—the NNSA Act.4 The 

NNSA Act established NNSA as a “separately organized agency” within 

DOE. The act established the position of DOE Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the Administrator of NNSA. 

The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy were 

allowed to establish policy for NNSA and to give direction to NNSA 

through the Administrator; however, other DOE employees were 

prohibited from directing the activities of individual NNSA employees. 

DOE directives remain the primary means to establish, communicate, and 

institutionalize policies, requirements, responsibilities, and procedures for 

multiple departmental elements, including NNSA, but the act gives the 

NNSA Administrator the authority to establish NNSA-specific policies, 

unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy. NNSA does this through

the issuance of Policy Letters.5

NNSA’s creation, however, has not yet had the desired effect of fully 

resolving long-standing management problems. For example, NNSA and 

DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) remain on our high-risk 

list.6

 

4

Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999).

Furthermore, we have frequently reported on security incidents and 

safety issues that have contributed to the temporary shutdown of 

facilities, such as at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National 

5

NNSA, Policy Letters: NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business Operating 

Procedures, NA SD 251.1 (Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2011).

6

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013). We 

have shifted our focus concerning the high-risk area to major DOE-EM and NNSA major 

projects (i.e., those $750 million or more). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-482T 

Laboratories in 2004 and 2005,7 as well as the safety and security

initiatives that contractors at these laboratories put in place to help ensure 

improvement. More recently, at the Y-12 National Security Complex, in 

July 2012, three trespassers gained access to the protected security area 

directly adjacent to one of the nation’s most critically important nuclear 

weapon-related facilities without being interrupted by the security 

measures in place. According to DOE’s Inspector General, this security 

incident was unprecedented and represented multiple system failures 

including failures to maintain critical security equipment, respond properly 

to alarms, and understand security protocols.8

DOE’s management approach to security over the years has shifted in 

part due to concerns raised by some national laboratory, DOE, and NNSA 

officials. These officials believed that DOE’s and NNSA’s oversight of the 

laboratories’ activities had become excessive and that the safety and 

security requirements for the laboratories are overly prescriptive and 

burdensome, which had resulted in a negative effect on the quality of 

science performed at these laboratories. Partly in response to these 

concerns, DOE and NNSA embarked on reforms in 2010 and 2011 that 

sought to streamline requirements and institute what has been called by 

the National Research Council, the DOE Inspector General, the DOE 

Office of Health and Safety Performance, and the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board) a “hands-off, eyes-on” role for 

federal oversight. This approach placed more reliance on contractors’ 

self-oversight through its contractor assurance systems to ensure such 

things as effective safety and security performance.

Furthermore, the Inspector 

General found that contractor governance and federal oversight did not 

identify and correct early indications of these multiple system 

breakdowns.

9

 

7

For additional information on the 2004 temporary shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos, 

see GAO, Stand-Down of Los Alamos National Laboratory: Total Costs Uncertain; Almost 

All Mission-Critical Programs Were Affected but Have Recovered, 

Building on this 

theme, in February 2012, the National Research Council found that 

GAO-06-83 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2005). 

8

DOE Office of Inspector General, Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear 

Security Administration’s Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE/IG-0868 (August 2012).

9

These systems include management controls that help ensure the department’s program 

missions and activities are executed in an effective, efficient, and safe manner. We are 

currently evaluating the implementation of contractor assurance systems at NNSA sites 

and NNSA’s oversight of these systems.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-482T 

“safety and security systems at the [NNSA] Laboratories have been 

strengthened to the point where they no longer need special attention.”10

In this context, there have been calls to enhance NNSA’s ability to 

operate independently of DOE. For example, the Defense Science Board 

proposed in 2006 that a completely independent nuclear weapons agency 

be created.11 In January 2007, we reported that former senior DOE and 

NNSA officials with whom we spoke generally did not favor removing 

NNSA from DOE.12 Furthermore, in a June 2012 report, we concluded 

that such a drastic change was unnecessary to produce an effective 

organization,13

My testimony today discusses DOE’s and NNSA’s management of the 

nuclear security enterprise. It focuses on our reports issued from August 

2000 to December 2012 on oversight of (1) security performance, (2) 

safety performance, and (3) project and contract management in the 

nuclear security enterprise. Detailed information about the scope and 

methodology can be found in our previously issued reports. We 

conducted the performance audit work that supports this statement in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

and we generally hold this view today. However, in the 

wake of the Y-12 security incident and persistent problems with major 

projects, there have been renewed calls to reexamine NNSA’s 

organization. Most recently, the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act created the Congressional Advisory Panel on the 

Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to examine options and 

make recommendations for revising the governance structure, mission, 

and management of the nuclear security enterprise.

 

10National Research Council, Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the 

NNSA National Security Laboratories, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2012).

11The Defense Science Board provides the Department of Defense with independent 

advice and recommendations on matters relating to the department’s scientific and 

technical enterprise. See Defense Science Board Task Force, Nuclear Capabilities 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2006).

12GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.19, 

2007).

13GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the Organization 

and Management of the National Nuclear Security Administration, GAO-12-867T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-482T 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOE is responsible for a diverse set of missions, including nuclear 

security, energy research, and environmental cleanup. These missions 

are managed by organizations within DOE and largely carried out by 

M&O contractors at various DOE sites. According to federal budget data, 

NNSA is one of the largest organizations in DOE, overseeing nuclear 

weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactors missions at its 

sites. With an $11 billion budget in fiscal year 2012—nearly 40 percent of 

DOE’s total budget—NNSA is responsible for providing the United States 

with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons in the absence of 

underground nuclear testing and maintaining core competencies in 

nuclear weapons science, technology, and engineering. Ensuring a safe 

and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is an extraordinarily complicated 

task and requires state-of-the-art experimental and computing facilities, 

as well as the skills of top scientists in the field. To its credit, NNSA 

consistently accomplishes this task, as evidenced by the successful 

assessment of the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon 

type in the nuclear stockpile since its creation. To support these 

capabilities into the future, in 2011, the administration announced plans to 

request $88 billion from Congress over the next decade to operate and 

modernize the nuclear security enterprise.

As discussed earlier, work activities to support NNSA’s national security 

missions are largely carried out by M&O contractors. This arrangement 

has historical roots. Since the Manhattan Project produced the first atomic 

bomb during World War II, NNSA, DOE, and predecessor agencies have 

depended on the expertise of private firms, universities, and others to 

carry out research and development work and efficiently operate the 

facilities necessary for the nation’s nuclear defense. Currently, DOE 

spends 90 percent of its annual budget on M&O contracts, making it the 

largest non-Department of Defense contracting agency in the 

government.

DOE generally regulates the safety of its own nuclear facilities and 

operations at its sites. In contrast, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-13-482T 

(NRC) generally regulates commercial nuclear facilities, and the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) generally 

regulates worker safety at commercial industrial facilities.14 However, 

because of the dangerous nature of work conducted at many sites within 

the nuclear security enterprise—handling nuclear material such as 

plutonium, manufacturing high explosives, and various industrial 

operations that use hazardous chemicals—oversight of the nuclear 

security enterprise is multifaceted. First, DOE policy states that its M&O 

contractors are expected to develop and implement an assurance 

system, or system of management controls, that helps ensure the 

department’s program missions and activities are executed in an 

effective, efficient, and safe manner.15 Through these assurance systems, 

contractors are required to perform self-assessments as well as identify 

and correct negative performance trends. Second, NNSA site offices, 

which are collocated with NNSA sites, oversee the performance of M&O 

contractors. Site office oversight includes communicating performance 

expectations to the contractor, reviewing the contractor’s assurance 

system, and conducting contractor performance evaluations. Third, 

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security—especially its Office of 

Independent Oversight—conducts periodic appraisals to determine if 

NNSA officials and contractors are complying with safety and security 

requirements.16 Fourth, NNSA receives safety assessments and 

recommendations from other organizations, most prominently the Safety 

Board—an independent executive branch agency created by Congress to 

assess safety conditions and operations at DOE’s defense nuclear 

facilities.17

 

14DOE regulates the safety of most of its own sites with nuclear operations; NRC 

regulates several DOE nuclear facilities, and OSHA regulates occupational safety at DOE 

sites that have no nuclear function.

To address public health and safety issues, the Safety Board 

is authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, who 

15DOE, Department of Energy Oversight Policy, DOE P 226.1B (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

25, 2011). Contractor assurance systems are to cover the following operational aspects: 

(1) environment, safety, and health; (2) safeguards and security; (3) emergency 

management; and (4) cyber security.

16DOE reorganized offices within its Office of Health, Safety, and Security. The Office of 

Independent Oversight merged with the Office of Enforcement and was renamed the 

Office of Enforcement and Oversight. For the purposes of this report, we refer to it as the 

Office of Independent Oversight.

17The Safety Board provides oversight for all NNSA sites except the Kansas City Plant, 

which manufactures non-nuclear components. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-482T 

may then accept or reject, in whole or in part, the recommendations. If the 

Secretary of Energy accepts the recommendations, the Secretary must 

prepare an implementation plan.

DOE and some of its contractors have viewed this multifaceted oversight 

to be overly burdensome. To address this issue, in March 2010 the 

Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE’s 

safety and security directives and modify the department’s oversight 

approach to “provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement 

safety and security programs without excessive federal oversight or 

overly prescriptive departmental requirements.” In the memorandum 

announcing this effort, the Deputy Secretary noted that burdensome 

safety requirements were affecting the productivity of work at DOE’s sites 

and that reducing this burden on contractors would lead to measurable 

productivity improvement. The Deputy Secretary noted that DOE’s Office 

of Health, Safety and Security in 2009 had begun reforming its approach 

to enforcement and oversight. Similar to, but independent of DOE’s safety 

and security reform effort, in February 2011, NNSA initiated its 

“governance transformation” project, which involved revising the agency’s 

business model to, among other things, place more reliance on 

contractors’ self-oversight through its contractor assurance system to 

ensure such things as effective safety and security performance. NNSA’s 

non-nuclear Kansas City Plant completed implementation of this new 

business model, and other NNSA sites—such as the Nevada National 

Security Site and the Y-12 National Security Complex—were in the 

process of implementing it, too, when the Y-12 security incident occurred.

In response to the Y-12 security breach, multiple investigations and 

reviews of the incident were performed by NNSA, the DOE Office of 

Inspector General, and the DOE Office of Independent Oversight. These 

reviews identified numerous problems with NNSA’s and its contractors’ 

performance, including: physical security systems, such as alarms; 

protective force (i.e., NNSA’s heavily armed, contractor guard forces) 

training and response; failures to correct numerous known problems; and 

weaknesses in contract and resource management. In addition, at the 

request of the Secretary of Energy, an independent panel, composed of 

three former executives from Federal agencies and the private sector, 

and a NNSA Security Task Force found broader and systemic security 

issues across the nuclear security enterprise. The Secretary’s panel in 

December 2012 analyzed various models for providing security at DOE 

and NNSA sites but generally found that improvements to the security 

culture, management, and oversight were necessary, in addition to having 

DOE’s and NNSA’s 

Oversight of Security 

Performance 

Continues to Face 

Challenges
 

Page 8 GAO-13-482T 

an effective organizational structure. In addition, the leader of the NNSA 

Security Task Force testified before the House Armed Services 

Committee in February 2013 about significant deficiencies in NNSA’s 

entire security organization, oversight, and culture.

In response to the Y-12 security incident and these findings, DOE and 

NNSA took a number of immediate actions, including repairing security 

equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 

protective force contractor. In February 2013, the Acting NNSA 

Administrator committed to implementing a three-tiered oversight process 

involving contractor self-assessment, NNSA evaluation of site 

performance, and independent oversight by DOE’s Office of Independent 

Oversight. The Acting Administrator testified before the House Armed 

Services Committee that she believed that such actions will help instill a 

culture that embraces security as an essential element of NNSA’s 

missions.

In assessing DOE’s actions to address the security breakdowns at Y-12, 

a central question will be whether these latest actions taken will produce 

sustained improvements in security at Y-12 and across the nuclear 

security enterprise. As we and others have reported, DOE has a long 

history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting 

responses and remedies to “fix” these problems. For example, in 

examining the Y-12 security incident, NNSA’s former Acting Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security and the leader of the NNSA’s Security Task 

Force testified in February 2013 about problems with NNSA’s federal 

security organization including poorly defined roles and responsibilities for 

its headquarters and field security organizations, inadequate oversight 

and assessments of site security activities, and issues with overseeing 

contractor actions and implementing improvements. As noted in table 1, 

10 years ago we reported on very similar problems, and since that time 

DOE has undertaken numerous security initiatives to address them. We 

have not evaluated these recent initiatives but we have ongoing work to 

evaluate them as part of our review on security reform for the 

Subcommittee, which we will complete later this year.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-482T 

Table 1: Comparison of GAO 2003 Findings Regarding NNSA’s Federal Security Organization with NNSA Security Task 

Force’s February 2013 Findings

GAO May 2003 Findings 

NNSA Security Task Force February 2013 

Findings 

Defining clear roles and 

responsibilities

NNSA has not fully defined clear roles and 

responsibilities for its headquarters and site 

operations.

NNSA security line management authority is illdefined. There are overlapping lines of authority 

and a mixing of staff and line functions. 

Assessing sites’ security 

activities

There are inconsistencies among NNSA sites on 

how they assess contractors’ security activities. 

Consequently, NNSA cannot be assured that all 

facilities are subject to comprehensive annual 

assessments as required by DOE policy.

NNSA does not have an adequate security 

performance assessment process or capability.

NNSA has come to rely overwhelmingly on federal 

staff reviewing contractor-provided data, rather 

than effectively assessing performance itself.

Overseeing contractors’ 

actions and implementing 

long-term improvements

NNSA contractors do not consistently conduct 

required analyses in preparing security corrective 

program action plans. Security performance at 

sites may not be maximized because corrective 

security program actions are developed without 

fully considering root causes, risks posed, or costs 

and benefits of taking corrective action.

NNSA has attempted to correct some identified 

issues over the years, but it has not adequately 

emphasized security mission performance. Recent 

DOE and NNSA reforms have deemphasized 

performance verification by federal staff, resulting 

in a weakened federal security assessment 

program. 

Allocating staff NNSA has shortfalls at its site offices in number 

and expertise of staff, which could make it more 

difficult for site offices to effectively oversee 

security activities.

The NNSA federal security function is not properly 

organized or staffed. 

Sources: GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 30, 2003); and Hearing on Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability, and Reform, Before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong. (Feb. 28, 2013) (Statement of Brigadier General Sandra E. Finan, 

Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. Testimony based on Previous Position as Acting Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, 

NNSA).

It is also important to note that NNSA’s long-standing security problems 

are not limited to Y-12. DOE’s and NNSA’s work with nuclear materials 

such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, nuclear weapons and 

their components, and large amounts of classified data require extremely 

high security, however, as we and DOE have reported, NNSA and DOE 

have a long history of poor security performance across the nuclear 

security enterprise, most notably at Los Alamos and Livermore national 

laboratories, as well as ongoing struggles to sustain security 

improvements, including information security.18

 

18 We note that over the past decade, the DOE Inspector General and Office of 

Independent Oversight periodically identified serious security issues at almost all of 

NNSA’s sites, including Sandia National Laboratories; the Nevada National Security Site,

Pantex, and prior to the July 2012 security incident, the Y-12 National Security Complex. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-482T 

As we noted in our September 2012 testimony,19 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (Los Alamos) experienced a number of high-profile security 

incidents in the previous decade that were subject to congressional 

hearings, including some held by this Subcommittee. Many of these 

incidents focused on Los Alamos’s inability to account for and control its 

classified resources. These incidents include the transfer or removal of 

classified information from authorized work areas or the laboratory itself, 

the temporary loss of two hard drives containing nuclear weapon design 

information, and difficulties in accounting for classified removable 

electronic media. In addition to these well-publicized incidents, security 

evaluations through 2007 identified other persistent, systemic security 

problems at Los Alamos. These problems included weaknesses in 

controlling and protecting classified resources, inadequate controls over 

special nuclear material, inadequate self-assessment activities, and 

weaknesses in the process that Los Alamos uses to ensure it corrects 

identified security deficiencies. Partly as a result of these findings, as we 

reported in 2008,20 Los Alamos underwent a 10 month shut-down of 

operations in 2004 and experienced a change in contractors in 2005. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Energy issued a compliance order in 2007 

requiring Los Alamos to implement specific corrective actions to, among 

other things, address long-standing deficiencies in its classified 

information programs. We reported in January 2008 and testified before 

this Subcommittee in September 2008 that Los Alamos had experienced 

a period of improved security performance but that it was too early to 

determine whether NNSA and Los Alamos could sustain this level of 

improvement.21

In March 2009, we reported on numerous and wide-ranging security 

deficiencies at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore), 

particularly in the ability of Livermore’s protective forces to ensure the 

 

19GAO-12-912T. 

20GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve 

Security and Management Oversight, GAO-08-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 

21 GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of Classified Data, 

Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management 

Weaknesses, GAO-08-173R (Washington D.C.: Jan. 10, 2008), and GAO, Nuclear

Security: Los Alamos National Laboratory Faces Challenges in Sustaining Physical and 

Cyber Security Improvements, GAO-08-1180T (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 25, 2008). 

Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory
 

Page 11 GAO-13-482T 

protection of special nuclear material and the laboratory’s protection and 

control of classified matter.22 We also identified Livermore’s physical 

security systems, such as alarms and sensors, and its security program 

planning and assurance activities, as areas needing improvement.

Weaknesses in Livermore’s contractor self-assessment program and the 

Livermore Site Office’s oversight of the contractor contributed to these 

security deficiencies at the laboratory. According to one DOE Office of 

Independent Oversight official, both programs were “broken” and missed 

even the “low-hanging fruit.” The laboratory took corrective action to 

address these deficiencies, but we noted that better oversight was 

needed to ensure that security improvements were fully implemented and 

sustained. In September 2012, NNSA and Livermore completed efforts to 

move the site’s most sensitive nuclear material to other sites, thereby 

easing the site’s security requirements.

We also have reported extensively on NNSA’s challenges in maintaining 

effective and secure information security systems, particularly at Los 

Alamos. For example, in June 2008, we reported that significant 

information security problems at Los Alamos had received insufficient 

attention.23 The laboratory had over two dozen initiatives under way that 

were principally aimed at reducing, consolidating, and better protecting 

classified resources. However, the laboratory had not implemented 

complete security solutions to address either the problems of classified 

parts storage in unapproved storage containers or weaknesses in its 

process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies 

were completed. In addition, in October 2009 we reported that Los 

Alamos needed to better protect its classified network.24

 

22GAO, Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements 

at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained, 

Specifically, we 

found significant weaknesses remained in protecting the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of information stored on and transmitted over its 

classified computer network. Moreover, we found the laboratory’s 

GAO-09-321 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2009).

23GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve 

Security and Management Oversight, GAO-08-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 

24GAO, Information Security: Actions Needed to Better Manage, Protect, and Sustain 

Improvements to Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Classified Computer Network, 

GAO-10-28 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2009).

Information Security
 

Page 12 GAO-13-482T 

decentralized approach to information security program management has 

led to inconsistent implementation of policy.

DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their 

sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have 

not demonstrated sustained improvements. As we testified in September 

2012 before this Subcommittee,25 long-standing DOE and NNSA 

management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems 

at NNSA’s national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, we 

reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at 

NNSA’s national laboratories since 2000.26 These accidents included 

worker exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical 

shocks. Although no one was killed, many of these accidents caused 

serious harm to workers or damage to facilities. As we also reported, at 

Los Alamos in July 2004, an undergraduate student who was not wearing 

required eye protection was partially blinded in a laser accident. Our 

review of nearly 100 safety studies—including accident investigations and 

independent assessments by the Safety Board and others issued since 

2000—found that the contributing factors to these safety problems 

generally fell into three key categories: (1) relatively lax laboratory 

attitudes toward safety procedures, (2) laboratory inadequacies in 

identifying and addressing safety problems with appropriate corrective 

actions, and (3) inadequate oversight by NNSA site offices.

27 DOE’s 

Office of Inspector General has also raised concerns about safety 

oversight by NNSA’s site offices. Specifically, the Inspector General 

reported in June 2011 that NNSA’s Livermore Site Office was not 

sufficiently overseeing its contractor to ensure that corrective actions 

were fully and effectively implemented for a program designed to limit 

worker exposure to beryllium, a hazardous metal essential for nuclear 

operations.28

 

25GAO-12-912T. 

26GAO, Nuclear and Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of 

Safety Improvement Efforts at NNSA’s Weapons Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).

27GAO-08-73. 

28DOE Office of Inspector General, Implementation of Beryllium Controls at Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0851 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2011).

DOE and NNSA’s 

Oversight of Safety 

Performance 

Continues to Face 

Challenges
 

Page 13 GAO-13-482T 

DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety 

concerns. In March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a 

reform effort to revise DOE’s safety and security directives. The reform 

effort was aimed at modifying the department’s oversight approach to 

“provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and 

security programs without excessive federal oversight or overly 

prescriptive departmental requirements.” As we reported to this 

Subcommittee in April 2012,29

However, since our September 2012 testimony,

this reform effort reduced the number of 

safety related directives from 80 to 42 by eliminating or combining 

requirements the department determined were unclear, duplicative, or too 

prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards. However, 

as we noted in September 2012 before this Subcommittee, DOE’s safety 

reforms did not fully address safety concerns that we, as well as others, 

have identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and 

federal oversight and, in fact, these reforms may have actually weakened 

independent oversight. We stated, for example, that while DOE policy 

notes that independent oversight is integral to help ensure the 

effectiveness of safety performance, DOE’s Office of Independent 

Oversight staff must now coordinate their assessment activities with 

NNSA site office management to maximize the use of resources. This 

arrangement raised our concern about whether Office of Independent 

Oversight staff would be sufficiently independent from site office 

management. In our April 2012 report, we recommended, among other 

things, that DOE develop a detailed reform plan and clearly define the 

oversight roles and responsibilities of DOE’s Office of Independent 

Oversight staff to ensure that their work is sufficiently independent from 

the activities of DOE site office and contractor staff. DOE has taken steps 

to respond to these recommendations, including developing a plan aimed 

at improving safety management and drafting a memo from the Secretary 

of Energy reconfirming the department’s commitment to independent 

oversight of safety and security.

30

 

29GAO, Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Safety 

Reform Effort, 

concerns continue to be 

raised about safety performance and oversight at several NNSA sites, 

which indicate DOE’s safety reforms have not brought about a sustained 

change in safety practices. The following are examples:

GAO-12-347 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).

30GAO-12-912T. 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-482T 

• A November 2012 report by DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight 

raised concerns about safety culture issues at NNSA’s Pantex Plant.

Among the concerns were reluctance by workers to raise safety 

problems for fear of retaliation and a perception that cost took priority 

over safety.

• At an October 2012 public hearing in Knoxville, Tennessee, the Safety 

Board noted that safety controls to prevent or mitigate consequences 

from accidents had not been fully incorporated into the design of a 

new uranium processing facility at Y-12. The Safety Board noted the 

facility’s safety basis—a technical analysis that identifies potential 

accidents and hazards associated with a facility’s operations and 

outlines controls to mitigate or prevent their impact on workers and

the public—did not adequately address controls to protect workers or 

the public in the case of an earthquake or small fires, and did not 

adequately calculate reasonably conservative radiation exposure 

consequences that could lead to putting greater safety into the 

facility’s design. The Safety Board further noted that these 

deficiencies raise the potential for significant impacts on public and 

worker safety.

• A January 2013 Office of Independent Oversight report reviewing the 

Los Alamos Site Office assessment of the contractor corrective action 

system found that the contractor had not implemented effective 

corrective actions for identified safety system problems. This report 

noted that the site office concluded that more than half of the 62 

safety system items needing corrective action had been closed 

without adequate action or sufficient documentation. Moreover, in 

October 2012, NNSA issued a Preliminary Notice of Violation to a Los 

Alamos contractor for repeated electrical safety problems. NNSA’s 

notice stated that insufficient oversight of subcontractor work by the 

contractor safety staff was among the contributing factors. NNSA 

fined the contractor $262,500.

A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects 

on time and within budget. DOE has taken a number of actions to 

improve management of projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For 

example, DOE has updated project and contract management policies 

and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost 

estimates, better assess project risks, and better ensure project reviews 

that are timely and useful and identify problems early. In addition, in 

December 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy convened a DOE 

Contract and Project Management Summit to discuss strategies for 

additional improvement in contract and project management. The 

participants identified barriers to improved performance and reported in 

DOE and NNSA Have 

Made Progress but 

Further 

Improvements 

Needed on Project 

and Contract 

Management 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-482T 

April 2012 on the status of initiatives to address these barriers. DOE has 

continued to release guides for implementing its revised order for 

Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets 

(DOE O 413.3B), such as for cost estimating, using earned value 

management, and forming project teams. Further, DOE has taken steps 

to enhance project management and oversight by requiring peer reviews 

and independent cost estimates for projects with values of more than 

$100 million and by improving the accuracy and consistency of data in its 

central repository for project data.

DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects—those costing 

less than $750—million and in recognition of this progress, we narrowed 

the focus of our high-risk designation to major contracts and projects.

Specifically, as we noted in our October 2012 report on DOE’s EM 

cleanup projects funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act, at the time of our analysis, 78 of 112 projects had been completed.31

Of those completed projects, 92 percent met the performance standard of 

completing project work scope without exceeding the cost target by more 

than 10 percent, according to EM data. However, we made four 

recommendations to DOE in this report aimed at improving how EM 

manages and documents projects, particularly with respect to establishing 

key performance parameters such as project scope targets and baselines 

for cost and schedule. DOE concurred with all of our recommendations, 

recognizing that improvements could be made and that lessons learned 

from these projects can be applied to EM’s broader portfolio of projects 

and activities. In addition, in December 2012, we reported that EM and 

NNSA were making some progress in managing the 71 nonmajor 

construction and cleanup projects that we reviewed and are expected to 

cost an estimated $10.1 billion in total.32

 

31GAO, Recovery Act: Most DOE Projects Are Complete, but Project Management 

Guidance Could Be Strengthened, 

For example, we identified some 

NNSA and EM nonmajor projects that used sound project management 

practices, such as the application of effective acquisition strategies, to 

help ensure the successful completion of these projects. We also 

recommended that NNSA and EM clearly define, document, and track the 

scope, cost, and completion date targets for each of their nonmajor 

GAO-13-23 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 15, 2012).

32GAO, Department of Energy: Better Information Needed to Determine If Nonmajor 

Projects Meet Performance Targets, GAO-13-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2012).
 

Page 16 GAO-13-482T 

projects and that EM clearly identify critical occupations and skills in its 

workforce plans. NNSA and EM agreed with these recommendations.

Notwithstanding these positive developments for nonmajor projects, 

major projects (i.e., those $750 million or more) continue to pose a 

challenge for DOE and NNSA. Since 1990 when we placed contract and 

project management on the high-risk list, we have reported on problems 

that principally involve ineffective oversight and poor management of 

contractors. Our recent work, as well as reporting by DOE, indicates that 

these problems continue. Examples are as follows:

• In December 2012, we reported that the estimated cost to construct 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State 

had almost tripled to $12.3 billion since the project’s inception in 2000, 

and the scheduled completion date had slipped by nearly a decade to 

2019.33

• In March 2012, we reported that NNSA’s project to construct a new 

plutonium facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement Nuclear Facility, at Los Alamos could cost as much as 

$5.8 billion, a nearly six-fold increase from its original estimate.

Moreover, we found that DOE’s incentives and management 

controls were inadequate for ensuring effective project management 

and we also found instances where DOE prematurely rewarded the 

contractor for resolving technical issues and completing work.

34

• In November 2010, we reported that NNSA’s plans to construct a 

modern Uranium Processing Facility at its Y-12 National Security 

Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had experienced significant cost 

While the facility may be large enough to support nuclear weapon 

stockpile requirements, our March 2012 report found that it is unclear 

if the facility will be large enough to accommodate DOE’s non-weapon 

activities that involve plutonium—such as nonproliferation, nuclear 

forensics, and nuclear counterterrorism programs—because the 

department has not comprehensively studied its long-term research 

and storage needs.

 

33GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: DOE Needs to Take Action to Resolve Technical 

and Management Challenges, GAO-13-38 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2012). 

34GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at 

Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, GAO-12-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 

2012).
 

Page 17 GAO-13-482T 

increases.35

• In April 2010, we reported that weak management by DOE and NNSA 

had allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities 

at the National Ignition Facility to increase substantially.

More recently, in September 2011, NNSA estimated that 

the facility would cost from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion to construct—a 

nearly seven-fold cost increase from the original estimate.

36 We 

reported that, since 2005, ignition-related costs have increased by 

around 25 percent—from $1.6 billion in 2005 to over $2 billion in 

2010—and that the planned completion date for these activities had 

slipped from the end of fiscal year 2011 to the end of fiscal year 2012 

or beyond. Ten years earlier, in August 2000, we had reported that 

poor management and oversight of the National Ignition Facility 

construction project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had 

increased the facility’s cost by $1 billion and delayed its scheduled 

completion date by 6 years.37

• In March 2010, we reported that NNSA’s Mixed-Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility currently being constructed at DOE’s Savannah 

River Site in South Carolina had experienced delays, but project 

officials said that they expected to recover from these delays by the 

end of 2010 and planned for the start of operations on schedule in 

2016. In addition, after spending about $730 million on design, NNSA 

has cancelled the pit disassembly and conversion facility and is now 

planning to use existing facilities at DOE’s Savannah River and Los 

Alamos sites and will add equipment to the mixed oxide facility. 

NNSA is working on a cost and schedule estimate for the use of these 

existing facilities and for adding the additional equipment.

We have also issued several reports on the technical issues, cost 

increases, and schedule delays associated with NNSA’s efforts to extend, 

through refurbishment, the operational lives of nuclear weapons in the 

 

35GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its 

Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology 

Readiness, GAO-11-103 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010).

36Ignition-related activities consist of the efforts separate from the facility’s construction 

that have been undertaken to prepare for the first attempt at ignition—the extremely 

intense pressures and temperatures that simulate on a small scale the thermonuclear 

conditions created in nuclear explosions. See GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to 

Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the 

National Ignition Facility, GAO-10-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2010).

37GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost 

Overruns and Schedule Delays, GAO/RCED-00-271 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).
 

Page 18 GAO-13-482T 

stockpile. For example, in March 2009, we reported that NNSA and the 

Department of Defense had not effectively managed cost, schedule, and 

technical risks for the B61 nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead 

refurbishments.38 For the B61 life extension program, NNSA was only 

able to stay on schedule by significantly reducing the number of weapons 

undergoing refurbishment and abandoning some refurbishment 

objectives. Earlier, in December 2000, we similarly had reported that 

refurbishment of the W87 strategic warhead had experienced significant 

design and production problems that increased its refurbishment costs by 

over $300 million and caused schedule delays of about 2 years.39

In conclusion, the actions that DOE and NNSA have taken to address 

weaknesses in oversight of security, safety, and contract and project 

management are very important, but problems persist. While we have 

noted progress in the area of project management, we also observe that 

NNSA and DOE EM have not begun a new major project since taking 

these actions. The Y-12 security incident was an unprecedented event for 

the nuclear security enterprise and perhaps indicates that NNSA’s 

organizational culture, over a decade after the agency was created to 

address security issues, still has not embraced security as an essential 

element of its missions. In terms of safety, DOE has recently taken the 

initiative to examine the safety culture at its sites. We believe, as do other 

organizations, including the DOE Inspector General and Safety Board, 

that a “hands off, eyes on” oversight approach for security, safety and 

contract and project management is insufficient and unwarranted until the 

department can demonstrate sustained improvement in all three areas.

We will continue to monitor DOE’s and NNSA’s implementation of actions 

to resolve its safety, security, and contract and project management 

difficulties and to assess the impact of these actions.

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

 

38GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the 

Stockpile Life Extension Program, GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

39GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement Stockpile 

Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-01-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2000).
 

Page 19 GAO-13-482T 

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions 

to this testimony are Allison Bawden, Jonathan Gill, and Kiki 

Theodoropoulos, Assistant Directors; and Nancy Kintner-Meyer, Michelle 

Munn, and Jeff Rueckhaus, Senior Analysts.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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